The modular security toolbox
Assembling state and citizenship in Jerusalem
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GOVERNANCE THROUGH PLURALIZATION
Silwan, a sloped urban cluster of over 50,000 residents (Shipler 2015) overlooking Jerusalem's Old City, is a microcosm of East Jerusalem, a place where all of the city’s beauty, and all of its woes, converge. This is a Palestinian neighborhood, with attractive houses with small vine-covered patios on one corner, and demolished homes on the next. Here, children fear Israeli violence as they travel from their homes to their dilapidated schools, but this is also a place where residents are immensely proud of their historical location bordering both the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Mount of Olives. Over the last few years, increasing numbers of Jewish-Israeli settlers have moved into Silwan, evicting Palestinian residents from their houses and creating small, but expandable segregated Jewish-only compounds within the neighborhood’s dense and dilapidated urban space. Confrontations on the streets between Israeli security personnel and Palestinian residents are commonplace. During the Israeli attack on Gaza in the summer of 2014, and during the outburst of protests and violence in the fall of 2015, the neighborhood became a battleground. With a growing threat of violence towards Jewish-Israeli settlers and visitors to the nearby Israeli holy and archaeological sites, the Israeli authorities were confronted by their limited capacity to contain, suppress or prevent Palestinian protests using the existing legal, financial and operational resources of Israeli state security actors.

In this chapter I suggest that the Israeli authorities sought to address this limited capacity and to augment their security interventions by drawing together – or assembling – a plurality of state and non-state civil actors, which could be entwined, detached and withdrawn within a modular form of security provision. Meir Eliahu, Silwan’s border police commander, aptly illustrated this modularity and its employment by security agencies in an interview with a popular television channel (Musako 2014, emphasis added):
What we have here is a widespread joint policing activity of all different authorities, including enforcement agencies that are totally unrelated to the police: the Tax Authority, the Municipal Water Authority, all those things. We want to create leverage that would ultimately make things quiet. We will enter from this alley, we will enter from that alley, climb from above, descend from below, we will come through several dimensions and deal as much as possible with these outlaws. Full stop, that’s the message.

Israeli security provision is increasingly pursued outside the institutions of the police, military and criminal justice system, by and through new security modules in a pluralized and privatized security landscape. In this chapter, I elaborate the concept of modular security, focusing on security pluralization in East Jerusalem. I define modular security as the diffusion of security provision into different modules – actors, performances, technologies and materialities - which can be enrolled, deployed, entwined, detached and withdrawn at will. Traditional state security actors, such as the police, military and gendarmerie are (re)configuring their mode of security governance, in a manner that may reinforce their capacities and authority by enrolling additional modules. This process involves both security pluralization - tasking a broad range of administrative, social, educational and public utility bodies with security roles, but also security privatization, in which state actors enroll commercial security actors. In this chapter I focus on the former, while the next chapter addresses the latter process.

In the contemporary security landscape, security authorities increasingly employ additional public and private actors, technologies and materialities when pursuing (controversial) security objectives. The pluralized security landscape lends itself to theoretical exploration, in which scholars approach security through different methodological and epistemological lenses. Many of these approaches demonstrate the degree to which the
scholarly focus has pivoted away from state-centric approaches (see also Diphoorn 2015). This chapter continues my theoretical intervention from Chapter 1, by advancing a conceptualization of modular security, which adjoins the security assemblage approach in its focus on the relations formed between a plurality of state and non-state security actors, technologies, and materialities. My approach bring back the question of agency to the discussion on security assemblages, by highlighting the actively-crafted design of modular security, in which different modules are plugged in and out from a state-led security assemblage if and when the need arises.

These modular relations in a pluralized security landscape are not a new phenomenon – as Neocleous (2006) notes, policing has been understood as a wider effort of myriad actors to order people and capital far before the establishment of modern police departments. My development of the concept of modularity seeks to conceptualize these relations in the context of (perceived) growing security threats; in so doing I aim to shed light on the governance logic, administrative mechanisms and security practices that these plural entanglements entail. As an illustrative case study, an analysis of East Jerusalem demonstrates how previously undefined and ad-hoc security arrangements become cohesive, normalized and codified to produce a modular form of security provision, as part of a strategy to overcome security challenges in the context of limited political, legal and operational capacity and maneuverability.

Foucault’s approach to governmentality is of particular relevance in exploring how modular security is pursued as a mode of governance. Foucault addresses governmentality as ‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security’ (Foucault
The plurality of the ‘ensemble’, applied to the governance of security, refers to the multitude of actors, technologies and practices that shape the field of security provision, setting the boundaries of possibility, legality and legitimacy in their interaction with the population(s). Security pluralization and privatization, viewed through the lens of governmentality, open up new modes of governance that were formerly deemed impossible or unacceptable, ‘plugging in’ new modules in the service of security governance.

Drawing on my research in East Jerusalem, I identify four features of urban modular security provision. The first is the heterogeneity of its public and private components, which include diverse actors, technologies, and materialities. The second feature is the development of reserved security capacities, in which state security actors underwrite the operational, legal and financial capacities of other actors, reasserting their centrality should the need arise. The third feature is the differential multifacetedness of modular security actors’ performances and practices, while the fourth is the ubiquity of informal knowledge and information transfer between different actors.

In the following section I sketch the emergence of modular security provision in Jerusalem through pluralization, situating this within the local context of colonial rule limited by the pledged incorporation of Jerusalem into Israel. The next section explores the security challenges that modular security provision addresses, followed by an analysis of its four features based on examples from East Jerusalem. After addressing each of these features in turn, I conclude this chapter with an examination of the potential benefits and pitfalls to policymakers of introducing modular security provision.
The Israeli authorities face tremendous difficulties in the governance of occupied East Jerusalem. As discussed in the previous chapter, despite the official Israeli rhetoric of a ‘united’ Jerusalem, the city continues to be divided between Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian spaces, with a string of visible and invisible boundaries bisecting the city (Pullan et al. 2007, Dumper 2014). While Israel annexed East Jerusalem, it did not annex its Palestinian residents, who are considered in legal terms to be a stateless foreign populace, afforded only a revocable residency permit to inhabit their own city. Israeli security policies in the city reflect the half-in-half-out approach adopted by Israeli policymakers towards East Jerusalem, in which the city’s formal annexation was followed by a simultaneous mix of exclusionary and inclusionary practices, an approach that can be conceptualized as an exceptional – or aberrant – governmentality (Shlomo 2016).

The Israeli authorities security challenges reflect not only Palestinians’ resistance to Israeli rule, but also the growing phenomenon of securitization, understood here as a move towards defining a multitude of issues as security threats that require ‘a legitimate need to go beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations’ (Taureck 2006: 55). Increasingly, political, societal and economic issues are defined as security threats (Goldstein 2010) - and since these could never be ‘solved’, security interventions are destined to become a permanent feature of contemporary life, permeating all areas of governance on a scale ranging from the local to the global. In the case of East Jerusalem, I suggest that the Israeli state response to ever-growing threats, in the context of the inherent conflict between Jerusalem’s colonial administration and the political assertion of a fully incorporated Jerusalem under democratic rule, was partially found in the formulation and adoption of a modular form of security provision that involves the pluralization
and privatization of security actors. Walking the tightrope between the wish to forcefully pacify dissent, and the desire to maintain a façade of democratic normalcy, Israeli state security actors have pursued modularization as a creative balancing act to address security threats within the predefined existing legal and operational parameters.

Modularity, while often used to describe complex technological or biological structures, is used here as a descriptive composite formation, wherein distinct yet independently functional units can be separated and re-combined by design. Modularity further implies standardization – divergent units are enrolled and categorized, with a focus on their usability and a lesser regard to their internal structure. A modular formation is thus an assemblage encapsulating different independent units, that jointly compose a coherent, distinct body. It is important to stress that modularity does not emerge by coincidence: this is a deliberate, authored assembling of different elements. In the realm of security provision, security responses can be authored to enroll additional private and public actors as separate yet temporarily coalescing modules whose capacities and authority are harnessed while their own functions continue independently.

In the case of Jerusalem’s security provision, such modularity can be observed with the plurality of enrolled actors contributing, whether temporarily or permanently, their own authority and capacities as securitized module, or facilitating the enrollment of their technologies and materialities towards a state-led security provision. How are these modules assembled into a pluralized form of security? Who plugs these modules and their varied capacities in and out of East Jerusalem’s security assemblage, and how?

In Jerusalem, this process can be identified clearly in the practice of punitive blacklisting. In a 2015 exposé (Hasson 2015a), the Israeli newspaper Haaretz revealed that the Jerusalem District Police had been compiling
blacklists of Palestinians suspected of partaking in riots, many of whom were minors below the age of criminal liability, and disseminating these lists to other public authorities. The article specifies that ‘the file has their name, ID number, ID number of their father, mother and partner, and even the house [location] coordinate numbers. In addition there are columns […] reporting on the progression of enforcement against those on the list’ (Hasson 2015a).

This model was explained in closed quarters by Jerusalem’s mayor, Nir Barkat, in the following terms (Hasson 2016a):

We developed a few very interesting models [...] Cooperation between the General Intelligence Agency, the Police and the Municipality’s enforcement agencies. We sat down together and developed these models, which exist nowhere else, and I need say no more. [...] Suddenly the bad residents understand that the public system can work together, and suddenly it’s not so cosy being a villain, it’s not so nice being on the other side.

Barkat explained how the Israeli District Police and General Intelligence Service [Shin Bet] compile lists of troublemakers, often youths (under 12, the age of criminal liability) who were involved in opposition to the Israeli policies in East Jerusalem. These blacklists are subsequently used by a myriad of state actors to punish and deter Palestinian Jerusalemites and their families from resisting Israeli rule. In lieu of pursuing convictions through the criminal justice system, the Israeli security authorities assemble heterogeneous public bodies – such as the municipality, the National Parks Authority or the Tax Authority – to make use of their capacities in order to discipline those residents who challenge the Israeli administration of the city. Such modular security is developed through an intentional, albeit fuzzily effectuated process: some securitized actors are officially tasked with security roles, while other public actors offer, or are expected to offer, their capacities or know-how spontaneously. Despite the opacity of such in-
teractions, Jerusalem’s modular security provision is both understood and acknowledged as a deliberate, punitive and large-scale security intervention by many Palestinian residents, the target audience. In the following pages, through ethnographic data gathered in Silwan and other Palestinian locales in Jerusalem, I identify and detail four features of modular security provision: heterogeneity, the development of reserved capacities, multifacetedness, and informal knowledge and information transfer, followed by a discussion on the merits and limitations of adopting modular security provision.

HETEROGENEITY: ‘THEY COME TOGETHER’

With East Jerusalem’s annexation to Israel, security and law enforcement became the duties of the civil authorities rather than the military. The Israeli military is officially prohibited, with a very few exceptions, from operating in the city. The largest Israeli security actor in East Jerusalem is the Israeli police, which maintains both a visible and an undercover presence throughout the city. Few of the policemen are Palestinian Jerusalemites, and those few are often in junior positions; the top brass is composed entirely of Jewish-Israeli station commanders. The border police, a gendarmerie corps of military recruits within the police structure, plays a particularly visible role in East Jerusalem (Dumper 2013). The district police regularly demands, and receives, additional budget for the recruitment of extra personnel and the deployment of new technologies, yet they

8 Jerusalem’s police district provides a valuable example of the militarization of the Israeli police (Volinz 2017), more so even than the ‘Judea and Samaria’ (West Bank) police district. Specific combat gear (such as sponge-tipped bullets and ceramic full body shields) have been first introduced in East Jerusalem, where there is a perceived need for ‘non-lethal’ and close-proximity battle equipment, as well as the potential for a productive testing ground (ACRI 2015).
face a perennial difficulty in finding new police recruits for East Jerusalem (Kubovitz et al. 2015). Despite a growing budget, the Israeli police complains of legal and political constraints in dealing with Palestinian resistance in East Jerusalem. One attempt to overcome these hurdles has been to seek amendments to Israeli law to further deter Palestinian protestors, for example by demanding harsher prison sentences, of up to 20 years, for cases of stone throwing (Shuttleworth 2014). Another strategy has been to hasten and extend the diffusion of security roles towards a heterogeneous plurality of security modules – actors, technologies, and materialities - some of which were found in the private market, while others were found among the different institutions of the state.

The Israeli police sought out commercial security providers for specific, sensitive tasks. In and around Jerusalem, private security companies (PSCs) have been awarded several state contracts, as part of what Seidman (2014) calls the ‘managerial’ logic of the partial privatization of Israeli military and public security functions. Private security guards are now stationed at the checkpoints between East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank (as I discuss in Chapter 5; see also Havkin 2014), at Jewish-Israeli settlement compounds throughout Palestinian East Jerusalem (see Chapter 4), and at government agencies, transport hubs and commercial enterprises.

While Israeli security privatization has begun to come under some academic scrutiny, security pluralization, also a growing phenomenon in East Jerusalem, remains largely unexplored. Instead of governing (in)security through the traditional institutions of police and the criminal justice system, Israeli state security actors pursue security objectives through the distribution of security roles and responsibilities to other administrative, environmental, educational or regulatory state bodies. This process included enlisting prominent actors such as the Jerusalem municipality, the Nature and Parks authority, the National Insurance Institute and the municipal water and sewage corporation (see the next section for further explanation on their security roles).
To illustrate the impact of pluralized security on the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, and their perspective on this shift, I turn again to Silwan. Hussam, a Palestinian man in his fifties and one of my main interlocutors in the neighborhood, was working part-time at his cousin’s grocery shop along one of Silwan’s sloped and congested roads. Sitting at the shop entrance, or at home looking out his house’s wide windows, Hussam was well-placed to observe the local goings-on, particularly around the Jewish-Israeli settlement compound established near his home. Sitting on a shaky small wooden stool on the narrow pavement, he succinctly described to me the near-cohesion with which state and non-state actors partook in a (partisan) security provision aimed at safeguarding Israeli interests against Palestinian challengers:

With the settlers and their private security guards around, there is no way you can complain or argue with them. If you do, the security guards would come to take photos of you. The next day the municipal inspectors would come to give you a fine or a demolition order – and the day after the National Parks Authority will send their inspectors to find a way to punish you a bit more. They’re all one team, working together, conspiring together… When one hand doesn’t do the trick, they use the other one. One time it’s the municipality, the other time it’s Magav [Israeli Border Police], then it’s the police and then it’s the National Parks Authority.. […]], the Antiquities Authority, undercover informants, the National Insurance Institute, they all come together.

While Hussam’s comments reflect a monolithic perception of the Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem – like many Palestinian Jerusalemites who perceive nearly all Israeli institutions as part of a single, antagonistic machinery against them – they also aptly portray the extent to which security interventions are pluralized and privatized. Whether they operate in
the same physical operations, or assume roles and responsibilities within a shared security policy developed in police and security intelligence headquarters, Hussam’s insistence that ‘they all come together’ suggests the transformation of security provision. The line between civil agencies and security authorities, and between public and private actors, has become blurred in the alleys of Silwan. Hussam also spoke to me about the impact the visible joint operations between the police and other public authorities were having on his children:

Magav and the police are terrorizing the neighborhood during the day and at night. Not only when they come to arrest someone, or search some house, but every time they go into the neighborhood with some inspectors from the Municipality or the National Parks Authority [...] the children hear the walkie-talkies, beep beep and the sound of Hebrew in their backyards and they start crying.

Since 2016, the Israeli police conducted several joint operations under the headline ‘Operation 700’. These operations include (border) policemen, Shabak (General Intelligence Services) agents, municipal workers and National Insurance Institute investigators operating jointly in Palestinian neighborhoods throughout East Jerusalem. These massive incursions of hundreds of Israeli security agents are both planned and marketed as occasions during which the presence of police personnel enables the ‘provision of community services’ – including house demolitions, issuing of fines, property foreclosures and business license inspections – by municipal workers and other agencies.

In a promotional video, the local police commander briefed his police officers (Mynet 2017):
Operation 700 is intended to enhance our enforcement. First, on the operational level, [police] forces are entering [the neighborhoods], conducting arrests. The operation’s second axis is the community axis, in which we also enter to provide a more intensive service to the community, alongside municipal enforcement in these East Jerusalem villages.

The video shows police officers conducting house searches and arrests, before accompanying street-cleaning personnel and municipal workers re-painting pedestrian crossings. The participation of public officials working on city beautification provides a justification for large scale, militarized incursions into Palestinian neighbourhoods. For many Palestinian residents like Hussam, their presence is seen as a collective punishment aimed at stifling Palestinian dissent. The plurality of Israeli agencies involved does little to mitigate the fear and anger that the Israeli incursions cause among the Palestinian population.

For the Israeli police, modular security holds significant promise. The heterogeneous but connected whole is of greater efficacy than the sum of their parts. By leveraging distinct forms of legal authority and extra-legal practices, the assembled modules enable state security actors to pursue security not only within but also beyond the confines of traditional policing, through informal disciplinary, punitive and dispossessing operations. In the next section I unpack the roles that different pluralized security actors assume in East Jerusalem, and the capacities, authorities, technologies and knowledge they offer within a modular security provision.
CALLING IN THE RESERVES

The Israeli (nominally civil) administration of occupied East Jerusalem requires an extension of security actors’ authority and capacity in order to quell dissent, increase the Jewish-Israeli presence and project an image of normalcy to domestic and international audiences. This extension has been obtained by enlisting other public and private actors to complement the policies and operations of traditional security actors. While the police and other security actors are granted some additional operational or legal capacities continuously – such as access to private information or the vetoing of employees – other capacities are only ‘plugged in’ if and when the need arises. On these occasions, state security actors can seek to make use of the capacities – such as legal authority, labour or technological resources - assured in advance by a pluralized security actors, complementing the traditional norms of policing and criminal justice with extra-legal measures. These reserved capacities, I argue, provide a significant contribution to the making of a modular security provision.

Following Crawford’s (2013) understanding of pluralized policing as producing an ‘extended policing family’, I seek to turn our gaze into the often overlooked members of this family – not the police or the private security companies, but rather the security roles undertaken by other social, regulatory and administrative public actors. In this section I analyze the capacities several of these newly securitized actors offer within a modular form of security provision in East Jerusalem.

Jerusalem Municipality, the largest Israeli municipal body, has had its share of difficulties in navigating the annexation of East Jerusalem, the consolidation and integration of municipal services and the local and international resistance to its interventions in Palestinian residents’ lives (Shlomo
2016). While Jerusalem’s municipality has always been involved in ‘national’ security projects, such as the construction of settlements and the development of the city’s differentiated mobility regime, over the last few years the municipality’s legal, bureaucratic and technological capacities have been further deployed in the service of the state security authorities. In an interview I conducted in late 2015, a former prominent municipal politician described the municipality’s integration into the modular security model:

With Mayor Barkat [Jerusalem’s right-wing mayor since 2008] you can really see how he got there; he began his first term with a sort of ‘businessman’ attitude to East Jerusalem, planning on buying favors with the residents with a few projects and some photo ops. The Jerusalem District police force were warning him for years, telling him that the police must act to restore deterrence among the Palestinian residents. In the summer of 2014 [during the Israeli attack on Gaza], when all hell broke loose, Barkat just gave up and agreed, in practice at least, to transfer East Jerusalem to the full command of the police. […] From then on, the municipality began to dance to the tune of the police and the General Intelligence Service [Shin Bet], and that goes down to the smallest practices of everyday lives: demolition orders, vetting school teachers, determining school hours, and especially the collective punishment in the form of handing out absurd fines.

Israeli municipalities possess formidable capacities when it comes to legal authority, personnel, technology and legitimacy. Municipalities are in charge of urban planning, construction permits and enforcement of building codes. In East Jerusalem, where many Palestinian homes are built illegally due to the near-impossibility of securing a building permit (Braverman 2007) and the indeterminacy of land ownership under the Israeli land
registry (Levine-Schnur 2011), the selective enforcement of construction laws provides the Jerusalem municipality with a wide leeway to deter and discipline Palestinian families and communities through house demolitions and the issuing of administrative fines. Similarly, the municipality of Jerusalem’s legal authority to assess and collect municipal taxes, and its authority to grant or revoke business licenses, threaten Palestinian Jerusalemites’ lives with the spectre of property repossession and the loss of livelihood by municipal order. Jerusalem’s municipality can deploy these capacities in service of the state security agencies, providing collective and individual leverage vis-à-vis Palestinian Jerusalemites in times of escalation and violence, and a deterrence to ‘toe the line’ at other times.

The Gihon company, Jerusalem’s wastewater and water corporation, is an independent public utility company, established by but separated from the Jerusalem municipality (Hagihon 2017). The company’s legal mandate guarantees the distribution of running water to all residents of the city, and allows the company to enforce payments and combat illegal connections. Security actors, such as the police and the Israeli military (in the case of Jerusalem’s periphery) may delegate security roles to the water company – either to administer punishment or to act as a cover for an armed incursion into Palestinian neighbourhoods. Measures may include issuing fines, repossessing property or lowering water pressure in informal Palestinian localities (Kushner 2016).

The Israeli National Parks Authority (NPA) is tasked with the administration and protection of Israel’s listed national parks. In East Jerusalem, national parks were declared in different parts of the city, particularly around

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9  Illicit water connections are often made out of necessity, but may also represent a claim-making – or a form of establishing a citizenship claim – by marginalized urban residents (see Anand 2011). Concurrently, water authorities’ attempts to discover, disconnect and punish unpermitted connections can be envisaged as countering those same claims.
the Old City, after 1967. Within these territorially delimited locales, the NPA possesses significant regulatory and administrative capacities. The preservation of national parks’ natural and cultural heritage entails strict limitations on construction, landscape design and services provision: the NPA can halt unauthorized construction, oppose or promote neighborhood master plans, issue fines following violations by residents or visitors, and limit the development of public services such as roads and water supply. In East Jerusalem, where national parks were declared by the Israeli government in dense Palestinian urbanities around Jerusalem’s Old City, the NPA’s programs have condemned several neighborhoods to mass-scale house demolitions (Emek Shaveh 2014) and others to stricter regulations. The NPA makes use of its enhanced legal capacities either through spatial interventions as part of the large-scale state-led project of Judaizing East Jerusalem,10 or as a punitive measure intended to pacify Palestinian individuals and communities. In the latter case, the NPA’s toolbox of administrative fines on construction, demolition of agricultural infrastructure or developments, and the de facto expropriation of land can be harnessed by state security providers as a securitized module of enforcement and pacification.

The National Insurance Institution (NII) is the Israeli state authority charged with the mandatory social and health insurance of Israeli citizens and residents; insurance under the government scheme allows free access to the public healthcare system, as well as benefits for unemployment, disability and other social entitlements. Each of the NII’s regional offices contains an investigation unit, normally tasked with detecting cases of fraud or abuse of the public insurance system. In East Jerusalem, the NII uses this authority to investigate residents extensively, as the agency may

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10 To illustrate, several cemeteries lie within the Jerusalem Walls national park: the NPA strictly forbids burial within the Bab-al-Rahma Muslim cemetery (Mizrachi 2011), including by forcibly halting funerals, while at the same time continuously developing the nearby Jewish cemeteries under its authority.
revoke the entitlements of Palestinian Jerusalemites who reside outside of Israel (e.g. in the West Bank, often in Jerusalem’s periphery). The revocation of entitlements can lead to the revocation of residency by the Ministry of the Interior, and consequently to forceful deportation (see Chapter 6). The NII’s authority and capacity to conduct investigations, deny insurance claims and initiate the revocation of residency can be used as leverage vis-à-vis individual residents and communities; the fear of losing one’s health insurance, social benefits or ID card affords the NII an extensive reach into residents’ lives and the privacy of their homes, even more so than the police force. The NII’s investigators and policies in East Jerusalem constitute a valuable module through which security interventions can be pursued, either in times of escalation or in the daily administration of East Jerusalem.

The bodies listed above are the prominent pluralized security authorities involved in the modular security provision in East Jerusalem, yet the list is not exhaustive: other actors, such as the Israeli Tax Authority and the Antiquities Authority also offer securitized capacities to the Israeli security provision in East Jerusalem. The Palestinian neighborhood of Issawiya in East Jerusalem, built on the lower slopes of Mount Scopus and home to over 13,000 people, provides an example for the interactions between pluralized security actors and urban residents designated as a threat.

Strikingly near the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the neighborhood today is entirely surrounded by Israeli institutions: the university, a large hospital, a Jewish-Israeli settlement, the separation wall and a multi-lane highway facilitating access to the settlement bloc east of the city. ‘It wasn’t always this way’, I was told by Majed, a local community activist and a former political prisoner, as we drove around the sloped streets of the neighborhood. ‘Our village once had 12,500 dunams [1250 hectares] of land, before the Israelis took it. Now we just have this’ – he indicated the
landscape of dense cement alleys that dominate the neighborhood – ‘and even this they want to take away from us’. Today, the neighborhood covers a mere 80 hectares. The little remaining open land that has not been expropriated by the Israeli authorities since 1967, is in the process of being designated a national park by the Jerusalem municipality and the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, despite little to suggest any natural or cultural value in the largely barren land (B’tselem 2015).

The Israeli authorities consider Issawyia a ‘challenging’ neighborhood. Israeli security agents enter the neighborhood only as part of an armored incursion, led by the Israeli border guards’ corps, as they fear being attacked with stones, Molotov cocktails or fireworks by local youth. Police interventions in the neighborhood, including arrests and house demolitions, are often followed by weeks of violence and collective punishment by a plethora of Israeli actors. Majed described the former to me with a modicum of pride, and spoke with visible anger of the latter.

Issawyia’s main street is a winding road where cars compete for space on the narrow asphalt with rubbish piles, truant children and speeding buses. In early 2015 I conducted a participatory transect with Majed across the length of the street. Majed pointed at every business, recalling the October day when policemen and municipal inspectors jointly raided the neighborhood, in what was widely believed by the residents to be part of a collective punishment following a violent escalation the week before:

This grocery? They got a large fine for having a sign outside their window. This hardware store? It was fined for displaying pipes for sale outside. The greengrocer was arguing with the municipal workers, who then fined him for littering the street. Every car parked anywhere in the neighborhood received a parking ticket. I’m telling you, they invented names for the streets only so they could process our fines...
This collective punitive measure described by Majed, in which different public agencies descend upon an entire neighborhood in an enforcement campaign following occasions of violence, may shed light on how securitized modular capacities are sought, enrolled, entwined, detached and withdrawn. The near-cohesion with which public security actors, the police and the General Intelligence Service, and other municipal, administrative and regulatory state bodies pursue security objectives is best illustrated by the presence of militarized border policemen securing the way for municipal and other enforcement agencies to mete out indiscriminatory disciplinary measures.

Yet the Israeli security interventions in Issawyia, as in the rest of East Jerusalem, often take other, more subtle, forms, such as the practice of punitive blacklisting, described previously, which affected dozens of local youth and their families. Majed described the effects of blacklisting in Issawyia to me:

We’ve seen it again and again over the past year. They [the Israeli authorities] blame some children for causing trouble, and then they go after the extended family – parents, grandparents, brothers or sisters. […] They punish not with Magav [border police] but with going after them in other ways. The municipality issues a fine for construction or all different permits and licenses, the NII will cancel their allowances or summon them to special committees, the Gihon can disconnect their water and the Tax Authority can go after them, claiming they didn’t report their income. They want to pressure the family to force their kids to stop their involvement [in the uprising against the Israeli rule], and many times their way works.

In examining the role of pluralized security actors in the case of Issawyia, I suggest that the development of reserved capacities is an essential part of
modular security provision. Security actors seek to mitigate risks by assembling various actors, each with their own capacities, to be called for service should the need arise. Reserved capacities extend the reach and efficacy of state security actors by providing them with additional legal authority, claims to public legitimacy, specific technologies, information and labor resources that can be ‘plugged in’ and deployed in times of escalation or increased risk. Such instruments – or modules – can be used to target either large (urban) communities or individuals through novel forms of punitive measures. As such, reserved capacities may constitute an important ‘boost’ to traditional forms of policing, simultaneously illustrating the weakness of state security actors in an expanding policing field (Loader 2000) and the novel ways through which they might pursue security despite their constrained authority and capacities.

THE MULTIFACETEDNESS OF (IN) SECURITY DISTRIBUTION

Security is always the aspired goal in the face of a looming threat, whether of (unsanctioned) violence, of crime, or of political or societal change. An inherent part of security providers’ work is to identify who needs to be protected from whom (or what). As such, security providers, whether public or private, differentiate between those who are seen as deserving security and those who constitute threats. Their policies, practices and structure reflect their multifacetedness, the capacity of enlisted modules to simultaneously present different elements of their work, and provide different interfaces, towards different population segments. This multifacetedness, a third core feature of modular security, characterizes not only the work of traditional security actors and private security companies, but also, and perhaps especially, that of the enlisted public actors described previously
in this chapter. In partaking in modular security provision, enlisted state agencies perform, offer and emphasize different elements of their work to different audiences. In other words, state agencies tasked with security roles undergo reconfiguration in order to adopt and embody the security norms of differentiation between those who need to be reassured and those designated as a (potential) threat.

One example can be found in the directives and practices of Jerusalem’s Combined Municipal Policing (CMP) units. The CMP programme was established in municipalities throughout Israel over the last two decades in an attempt to consolidate police and municipal authority (Shadmi 2012). Police officers appointed by the Israeli Ministry of Public Security conduct patrols jointly with municipality inspectors on the payroll of the city hall, with the official aim of tackling ‘quality of life’ issues (McGahern 2016). The CMP program was launched nationwide as part of ‘City Without Violence’, a state initiative that maps and combats petty urban crimes such as youth brawls, vandalism and noise pollution (CWV 2017). The Jerusalem municipality joined the program only after the violent escalations of late 2014, ordering 50 CMP patrol cars in order to ‘restore security to the residents […] and restore the city to its routine’ (Jerusalem Municipality 2014). In exploring the multifacetedness of the CMP operations in Jerusalem, I focus on their practices and interactions with two distinct groups of Jerusalemites: Jewish-Israeli citizens and Palestinian residents. I suggest that, from its initiation, the CMP programme in Jerusalem was established for two distinct audiences, with different directives, policies and practices, as an additional module within the modular security provision envisaged by state security actors.

CMP patrols are nominally primarily intended to combat localized problems such as under-age drinking in public spaces and other relatively minor nuisances. These are the kind of issues that are often reported both to
the police and to the municipal hotline; by joining forces (and resources), both actors are able to share the burden of providing the public with quality-of-life policing and enforcement. To the residents of the Jerusalem’s Jewish-Israeli neighborhoods, CMP is presented as an instrument to ‘increase the sense of security and the quality of life’ for residents (Israel Police 2015) – to reassure residents by deploying further security agents to the streets, while at the same time attending to citizens’ mundane complaints to their elected municipality. Israeli citizens most often encounter the CMP patrols as they cruise around Jerusalem’s outlying Jewish-Israeli neighborhoods, both during the day and at night. Their interaction with residents often follows either a complaint to the police or the municipal hotline, or consists of preventative interventions in public spaces against the unwanted presence of ‘unsocial’ elements. The ubiquitous presence of CMP units contributes to the (re)production of a certain social and political order: facilitating the mobility of some people and forms of capital while marginalizing others – homeless residents, migrant labourers or loitering youth (Shadmi 2012).

To the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, the CMP patrols present an entirely different logic. Palestinian East Jerusalemites suffer from an acute deficit, in stark contrast with their Jewish-Israeli neighbors, in terms of public service provision including roads, grid infrastructure, educational facilities and healthcare services (Nuseibeh 2015). Yet despite the lack of investment from national and municipal authorities, CMPs in East Jerusalem were introduced not as an answer to residents’ quality-of-life problems, but rather as a reply to the security challenges posed during the violent escalations in East Jerusalem in 2014 (Jerusalem Municipality 2014). The CMP was adopted as an alternative law-enforcement instrument to harness the authority and capacities of both the ‘regular’ police and the municipal inspectors to secure Israeli rule in East Jerusalem. After my arrival to Jerusalem in early 2015, I witnessed the growth of the CMP activ-
ities in East Jerusalem, from a few scattered units to a large-scale operation able to respond quickly in times of crisis. At a strategic location adjacent to the Old City’s Damascus Gate, East Jerusalem’s commercial, social and transport hub, a CMP station was established in a large mobile structure previously used by Jerusalem’s Municipality. In the early morning, municipal inspectors in workmen’s garb and policemen in blue uniform would sit together outside the station, drinking black coffee made over an improvised stove. Up to a dozen CMP patrol cars would converge at the station before heading further into East Jerusalem and embarking on pre-planned enforcement operations. During violent escalations, those missions would be multiplied and accompanied by heavily armed border policemen.

Palestinian Jerusalemites are most likely to encounter CMP units on one of their raids on East Jerusalem’s main commercial streets, where the patrolmen issue numerous fines to merchants and shoppers. Municipal inspectors cite violations of business, signposting or parking regulations, while the policemen stop and frisk passers-by and seek to identify deportable West Bank Palestinian residents. Such a degree of intervention in the daily affairs of Palestinian Jerusalemites by the municipal authorities is almost unprecedented. Considering that the Israeli authorities have turned a ‘blind eye’ to phenomena incompatible with Israeli administrative norms for the past decades (Shlomo 2016), the municipal fines are an exception, issued not out of a sudden interest in conforming East Jerusalem’s cityscape to Israeli administrative rule, but as a security deterrent. The larger CMP raids often follow violent incidents or protests; in one instance in September 2016, the entire commercial hub of Damascus Gate and its surroundings were shut down following an attack on policemen in the vicinity. CMP units enforced the closure, and fined businesses that defied the order by re-opening their stores (Hasson 2016b). In Palestinian East Jerusalem, the display of interchanging blue-and-orange flashing lights represents not the aspirations for better quality-of-life, nor the prospect of
a ‘City Without Violence’, but rather a punitive enforcement wing aimed at performing sovereignty and stifling dissent in contested areas.

The unequal distribution of (in)security by the CMP units, as a quality-of-life measure for Jewish-Israeli citizens and a module enabling the occupying security force for Palestinian residents, demonstrates the dimension of multifacetedness within a modular security provision. The public authorities and institutions tasked with such new, differentiating security roles are not left unchanged. Their differential conduct towards different citizens and residents disrupts and bisects their routine operations. On the one hand, their authority and capacities are mobilized as a module to a (violent) security intervention. On the other hand, these same authorities and institutions seek to maintain their public image and preserve their legitimacy as impartial civil agencies. The reconfiguration of public authorities into a modular form of security provision precipitates the development of different performances and practices towards different audiences.

INFORMAL KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION TRANSFER

The developing links between traditional security actors and privatized or pluralized security bodies rely on the formal and informal transfer of information and know-how between them. Different private or plural security actors can be tasked either with the collection and sharing of information, or supplied with intelligence in order to facilitate disciplinary and punitive actions, such as in the case of blacklisting. This is not a new phenomenon, nor one unique to the Israeli security provision. Lindekilde (2012) explores the Danish radicalization prevention programme, posit-
ing that the emerging form of disciplinary neoliberal governmentality is composed of sticks and carrots towards populations designated as a threat, including a variety of surveillance instruments employed either by police personnel or by additional enlisted actors, with facilitated information and knowledge exchange between them. These instruments are not only aimed at intelligence gathering, but are rather built on ‘the logic of internalization of surveillance, by making people aware that they are being watched’ (Lindekilde 2012: 116).

Balzacq (2008) posits that securitization should be studied through the instruments used and the policies developed, instead of a mere focus on impact and efficacy. Taking the case of EU counter-terrorism efforts, he suggests that information exchange is by itself a primary instrument employed following securitization. As mentioned above in the section on reserved capacities, information and knowledge sharing is an important security-related capacity in itself. Yet it is this capacity that precedes others – punitive, disciplinary and incentive security policies are often dependent on information sharing. In other words, the collection, dissemination and processing of data and knowledge both hinges upon, and enables, other elements of modularization, and in so doing plays an important role in assembling different actors and other modules together.

Some of these exchanges are formally defined, with a particular, limited scope and framed within specific legal or regulatory conditions. While one such example of formal information transfer – the development and exchange of ‘Western’ counter-terrorism databases – is accompanied by legal and political scrutiny (Hegemann and Kahl 2018), informal or semi-formal knowledge information transfers often remain opaque, outside the purview of the public at large and the communities affected in particular. Informal information exchanges can be sought by state security actors on temporary, ad-hoc basis – but these exchanges necessarily transform and
solidify over time, and are either formalized in law and practice (Balzacq 2008), or reach a limit of uncertainty and political contestation which may entail failed or hampered security responses (Hegemann and Kahl 2018).

The prevalent informality within Jerusalem’s security assemblage is illustrative in this regard. While social, regulatory and administrative bodies were actively involved in authoring security responses, these relations have not been formalized in a legal agreement or subject to judiciary purview. Instead, the transfer of information and knowledge has been of a voluntary nature: pluralized and privatized security actors not only consent to share information or take upon themselves security tasks, but sometimes actively seek it. This can be understood through the prism of Israel’s prominent and complex military-civil relations. Top military brass are often ‘parachuted’ from their military positions to senior civil jobs, particularly in the public sector; often, they then seek to employ other officers, their peers or subordinates, in their new place of work (Izraeli 2001). One such example, with significant consequences to the residents of Silwan, has been the appointment of Evyatar Cohen, a former Deputy Brigade Commander, as the Jerusalem district manager of the National Parks Authority. Under Cohen’s leadership, the NPA has devoted extensive efforts to the containment of Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, including through home demolitions and controversial declarations of ‘national parks’ where construction is prohibited (Rapoport 2006; Landau 2012).

Informal relations, or often camaraderie, are prevalent among former military personnel employed by civil bodies. These relations are hardly surprising, but their implications in the field of security provision are often overlooked. Together with a strong ideological commitment to the Israeli security policy in East Jerusalem, different pluralized and privatized security actors partake willingly and (predominantly) informally in controversial reciprocal information and knowledge transfer.
Another such example is the informal exchange of information and security knowledge between the Israeli police and the private security company hired by the state to protect the lives and properties of Jewish-Israeli settlers living in Silwan (see Chapter 4). While the police (and in extension, the Israeli Security Agency, Shin Bet) formally share some of their local intelligence with the PSCs operating at the settlement compounds, the flow of information between these public and private actors is, in practice, bi-directional. The police rely on the footage recorded by the privately-operated CCTV cameras to arrest, indict and punish Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem who resist the expansion of the Jewish-Israeli settlement compounds. During potentially violent incidents, the private security guards, who remain at the guardhouse, are informally instructed to direct the CCTV cameras and their personal video cameras (ACRI 2010) to capture the unfolding events. The PSC staff may then edit the material they send to the police investigator. According to an interview with an Israeli lawyer working on policy advocacy in East Jerusalem, in the few cases when Palestinian residents filed complaints against the security guards or the police officers, the PSCs either refused to share their footage or reported that the cameras were not functioning at the time. The private operation of a large set of security cameras thus enables the PSCs to secure a near monopoly over the documentation of the settlement compounds and their vicinity. The PSCs can shield their own employees from facing criminal charges or public scrutiny by selectively releasing relevant footage, while deciding which Palestinians to target for harsh police treatment. While the police receive high-quality, court-ready footage that allows for quick and simple indictments, the Palestinian residents are further deterred by the PSCs’ surveillance from resisting the eviction and displacement of Palestinian families in their neighborhood.

Pluralized and privatized security actors are thus both sources and recipients of informal information on (perceived) security threats. As such, it is
hardly surprising that state security actors seek to connect to social, regulatory or administrative bodies to access the information they possess. Yet as these relations become formalized, pluralized security actors are tasked not only with identifying risk, but are also responsibilized with mitigating it. Traditional security actors seek to gather intelligence through other bodies – local governments, educational facilities, social welfare institutions or even (willing) private companies – while simultaneously requiring these same bodies to partake in disciplinary and punitive security policies.
CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have argued for a conceptualization of modular security provision as a configuration in which public security actors can enroll, deploy, entwine, detach and withdraw other modules – public and private actors, technologies and materialities - at will. While examining the contours of the relations formed in such a modular assemblage, I identified four features of urban modular security provision: heterogeneity, the development of reserved capacities, multifacetedness, and informal knowledge and information transfer. Drawing on different examples, I showed how the mobilization of additional public and private actors helped state security authorities negotiate various constraints they faced, allowing them to pursue security indirectly through the legal, administrative and labour capacities these additional actors offer.

I previously noted the security conundrum faced by Israeli policymakers, who seek to colonialize and incorporate East Jerusalem while maintaining a façade of democratic governance to domestic and international audiences. Have they indeed found their solution in the adoption of a modular security provision? Partially so. Israeli security authorities are able to pursue security through ‘neutral’ third parties, in a manner that obfuscates security policy and distances security authorities from their controversial instruments. In every assemblage there is an element of depoliticization, Li (2007), citing Ferguson (1990) refers to as ‘anti-politics’; political issues are rendered technical, considered a matter for professionals and outside the sphere of public discussion. Depoliticization can be an incredibly strong political measure. Williams (2003) attends to the anti-politics embedded in the process of securitization; when an agenda, or an issue, is presented and accepted as an existential security matter, it is placed ‘beyond normal politics’ - that is, ‘beyond public debate’ - and can be dealt with in extraordinary means.
Within modular security provision, the relations formed between security actors and other ‘modules’ are not acknowledged as a political issue, but are presented instead as technical expert decisions that does not require public scrutiny. Modularity thus enables the emergence of a depoliticized, yet highly political, form of security governance through which partisan security can be pursued with lessened political opposition. In East Jerusalem, Israeli state security actors, in developing a modular security provision, were largely able to evade both political and legal accountability for the punitive policies adopted during the violent escalations of 2014-2015. However, in adopting a modular security provision, several additional risks and pitfalls emerge. The delegation of security roles to social, administrative and regulatory state bodies not only (differentially) affects citizens and residents, but has also led to the transformation of these same securitized state bodies. The National Parks Authority has re-directed its enforcement efforts towards the policing of dense urban locales; the National Insurance Institute has reconfigured a major part of its investigations department unit to investigate residency permits instead of investigating cases of fraud; and the Jerusalem Municipality has redirected quality-of-life patrol units from preventing youth brawls to enforcing collective punitive measures.

Modular security can enhance state security actors’ authority, but it can also lead to the embedding a security logic of differentiation between citizens within ‘normal’ bureaucratic and public service work. In other words, when state bodies adapt to their new security roles, their structure and policies reflect this change. Having embodied the security logic of differentiation between those deserving of security and those deemed as threats, their performances and practices become multifaceted, presenting a different facet to different audiences. With time, these differentiating performances might prove unsustainable, as they may contribute to the erosion of civil state bodies’ legitimacy, or bring about legal and political challenges that were previously reserved to the state security authorities.
In this chapter I have attempted to map the relations formed between public security actors and other state and non-state actors within a modular form of security provision. I noted the modularity and near-cohesion with which they operate, and suggested that something new is unfolding – the emergence of a new mode of governance in which privatized and pluralized security actors are enlisted to overcome the constraints and challenges that state state security actors face. In observing how a modular security assemblage is crafted to engender its own security norms and practices of differentiation, I suggest that the shift towards a securitization of the entire state body adversely affects the relations between the state and its citizens, and increasingly replaces a nominal equality with an explicitly differentiated distribution of (in)security.