The modular security toolbox
Assembling state and citizenship in Jerusalem
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4 CRAFTING AND REINFORCING THE STATE THROUGH SECURITY PRIVATIZATION
In the Palestinian neighborhoods around the Old City of Jerusalem, a few houses stand out from the rest. These are Jewish-Israeli settlement compounds, small clusters of houses from which Palestinian families have been evicted and replaced by Jewish-Israeli settlers. Large Israeli flags hang from the windows, security cameras have been placed on each wall and a guardhouse has been built on the roof, where armed private security guards are stationed at all times. Paid for by the Israeli government, these private guards conduct patrols around the neighbourhood, provide vehicular and pedestrian escort services to the settlers, and operate a network of hundreds of CCTV cameras. Their deployment in the heart of East Jerusalem’s Palestinian neighbourhoods, in an area occupied and annexed by Israel in 1967, is ostensibly intended to protect the lives and property of the settlers. However, their presence also marks a departure from the state’s claim to providing universal protection to all its residents, evidencing instead the state’s increased capacities to territorialize East Jerusalem through the introduction of state-sponsored private security actors.

With the emergence of modular security as a mode of governance in East Jerusalem, Israeli state security actors seek to ’plug in’ additional modules – public and private – to overcome the operational and legal constraints they face in pursuing controversial security policies. Some of these modules, as I explored in Chapter 3, involve various regulatory, environmental and administrative state agencies and their practices, materialities and logics. In this chapter I explore a different dimension of the assembling of a modular security toolbox, by observing the enlistment of private security actors. I continue my inquiry of the transformed security landscape in East Jerusalem by asking how, and to what end, state security actors pursue security privatization. I seek to extend our understanding of the state’s changing role in policing, and its associated enmeshing of state and non-state security actors, through an exploration of a very localized public-private security assemblage around East Jerusalem’s settlement compounds.
As I explained in Chapter 1, I argue against a perception of outsourced security provision as eroding and diminishing state’s sovereignty and authority. Rather, I propose that the privatization of security can reinforce the state’s capacity to pursue territorialization – defined, following an adaptation of Vandergeest and Peluso’s (1995) work, as a process in which the state claims authority over people and resources in a delineated area through cohesive enforcement of state policies and the mobilization of policies, capital and discourse. I suggest that the state’s capacity to pursue territorialization is strengthened by a form of security provision that represents and performs the state in a delineated area, while simultaneously enabling a decrease in state actors’ responsibility and accountability towards (selected groups of) residents. In attending to the relations between different security actors – police, government ministries and private security companies – I explore how this project of state territorialization is pursued through an emerging public-private security assemblage, that ‘plugs’ private security companies into a controversial state-led security project.

In this chapter I suggest three modes through which the outsourcing of security provision to private actors can enhance the capacities of state security actors’ (and particularly those of the police): this enlisting of private actors allows security agents to evade personal and collective accountability for wrongdoings; it enables the differential redistribution of (in)security as a matter of policy while deflecting legal scrutiny; and it avoids domestic and international pressure by distancing the state from a politically controversial project. I elaborate these modes here to analyze how and why private security companies are enlisted within an extended security toolbox, ‘plugged in’ along with other security actors with the aim of reinforcing state actors’ capacities.

In the next section I engage in more detail with the literature on security privatization, elaborating my position, stated more briefly above and in
Chapter 1, on the relation between state projects and the outsourcing of security roles to private actors. This is followed by a section that provides a brief historical overview of the inception and growth of Jewish-Israeli settlement compounds in East Jerusalem, situating the phenomenon within the larger history of East Jerusalem’s transformation under the Israeli occupation. Next, I explore the public-private security provision at the settlement compounds, attending to the roles of each actor while critically assessing the mesh of relations formed between public and private security actors. I ask both how and why this form of modular security provision has emerged at these sites in this particular form. I suggest that the Israeli authorities have pursued a policy of encompassing East Jerusalem into the fold of the nation-state through a private market solution, as a way of negotiating legal, diplomatic and public opinion limitations. In other words, by ‘plugging in’ private security companies, state actors have authored a public-private policing mechanism that enables the state to maintain its ‘democratic’ image while facilitating a strategically unequal protection of residents and evading legal and public accountability regarding state policies of displacement.

SECURITY PRIVATIZATION AND STATE-LED PROJECTS

The privatization of security provision is often analyzed in relation to broader transformations of the state in an era of structural adjustment and neoliberalization. The neoliberal state is often understood as eroded into incapacitation (Jessop 2002), as transformed into a part of the market (Hendrikse and Sidaway 2010) or as beholden to the prosperity of the financial market, at whose demands state actors initiate deregulation,
property enclosure and at times use of force, at the expense of democratic majority rule (Harvey 2005). The privatization of security provision is especially contentious, given the implications for the state’s claim to a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. As noted in Chapter 1, in contexts across the world, private security companies increasingly replace and complement the state, conducting security operations that were previously within the exclusive domain of the police and the military. Security privatization generally refers to a wide spectrum of policies and practices, ranging from the selling off of state agencies, and the growth of private companies competing with state security actors, through the regulatory mandated hiring of private companies, to the outsourcing of security operations, in which state security actors enlist private security companies for administrative, operational and logistical support. These different forms of privatization have different implications for state actors’ roles and relevancy.

In attending to security outsourcing, and analyzing this as a localized example of territorialization, this chapter suggests that in some cases the market-based form of the relations between public and private security actors can obfuscate the pursuit of a controversial state-led project of territorialization, allowing state actors to evade legal and public accountability. The state’s role following security privatization can thus engender the unequal protection of citizens, their dispossession and a denial of political participation. Security outsourcing introduces new security actors, materialities, technologies and practices into a reconfigured security provision; in other words, it contributes to the emergence of a public-private security assemblage, characterized by a heterogeneity and multifacetedness that can (re)produce a partial, biased, partisan form of security provision.

As other scholars have noted, the growth of private security does not denote the disappearance of public security actors. Neoliberalization can be read as involving the disassembling and reassembling of state bodies, resulting
in an intertwined array of public and private actors (Sassen 2006). This is certainly the case with security provision. This entanglement with private actors does not necessarily lead to the diminished capacities and authority of state security actors. Rather, as my analysis of the Israeli case shows, with their roles re-defined and their toolbox re-equipped, state actors are able to use private security to commit to projects they would otherwise be unable or unwilling to pursue. Following Ong’s (2006) contention that the state’s adoption of and integration within the global neoliberal market contributes to both the weakening and the strengthening of different activities of the state, this chapter explores the case of privatized security provision in settlement compounds in East Jerusalem. Focusing on these locales under Israeli occupation, this chapter analyzes the emerging configurations of a public-private security assemblage as inextricably tied to the strengthening of a colonial and exceptional (Shlomo 2016) state-led project, which involves asserting territorial claims through the Judaization of large parts of occupied East Jerusalem.

As I have set out in previous chapters, I use the term assemblage here not to denote an ontological shift towards a ‘flat’ topography of social interactions, but rather as a means to reflect on the rhizomatic relations formed between and through diverse human, material and technological elements. Recognizing that assemblages are often understood as ad-hoc groupings that are ‘never structured around centripetal forces, organizing fields and boundaries’ (Bigo 2014: 211), I specify my approach to assemblage theory with the concept of modularity. In so doing, I emphasize state actors’ largely intentional assembling of pluralized and privatized security modules. This chapter highlights how and why state actors seek to enlist private security companies, and associated technologies and materialities, to pursue controversial state-led security policies.

In addition to focusing on private actors, this chapter, even more than other sections of this dissertation, also zooms in on a more localized scale
than is generally the case in discussions of security assemblages. Abraham-
sen and Williams (2009: 90) propose that the privatization of security is ‘part of a wider process of state disassembling and the emergence of global assemblages, [involving the formation of] transnational structures and networks, in which a range of different actors and normativities interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices, and forms of deterritorialized security governance’. While such authors (Abraham-
sen and Williams 2011, Loader and Walker 2007, Gould 2015) have con-
centrated on transnational forms of security assemblages as a global, large-
scale phenomenon in which transnational capital plays a pivotal role, this chapter seeks to draw attention to security assemblages’ materialization at a local, often national, scale. I draw attention to a more place-based form security assemblages, emphasizing that the plugging in of different public and private modules can contribute to an effort to territorialize space, particularly in claiming authority over restive spaces and populations.

Rather than focusing on the transnational scale of security governance and its embedding within neoliberal market logics, in this chapter I attend to the political territorialization of a city through privatization, a case that reflects a localized state-led project of performing sovereignty through the enmeshment of public and private security actors. The case of Jerusalem, while characterized by a distinct political history, is not unique in this re-
gard. Working in Cape Town, for instance, Samara (2011) explores how state bodies cooperate with private security companies and business elites to ‘reclaim’ or ‘revitalize’ urban spaces, contributing to the perpetuation of the divided, Apartheid city. His account emphasizes the distinctions and relations between Cape Town’s affluent central city and the disempowered

11 Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) use deterritorialization to refer to the diffusion of actors, actants, and their agency away from geographically delimited boundaries following globalization. It should be noted that my usage of (de)territorialization is different, and refers to the deliberate attempts by state actors to assert claims on specific territories, following Vangengeest and Peluso’s (1995) approach.
townships. In East Jerusalem, unlike in the townships, public-private efforts to territorialize urban space are not pursued in direct relation to an ‘other’ metropolitan center. Rather, as set out in my discussion in Chapter 2 on the Israeli policies in East Jerusalem, these efforts are directed primarily at extending the grip of the state in and of itself.

In Jerusalem, the outsourced security provision replaces a nominally universal protection logic committed to the protection of all citizens, with an explicitly partisan protection logic aimed at performing Jewish-Israeli sovereignty in East Jerusalem. As noted previously, various other examples come to mind outside Israel/Palestine. From the mutual dependency of state power and PSCs as part of the prison-industrial complex in the United States (Doty and Wheatly 2013), to the partial outsourcing of the UK’s controversial and violent deportation regime (Athwal 2015) or the privately-run detention centers operated on behalf of the Australian government in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, an ever-increasing number of ‘Western democracies’ employ private security contractors to carry out punitive actions against marginalized, unwanted populations in the name of the state, both at home and abroad. In attending to the case of the settlement compounds in East Jerusalem, I explore the multiple facets of the public-private security assemblage, which enable and promote the collusion of different security actors in pursuing a state-led project.

In Israel/Palestine, as elsewhere, the state’s involvement in security provision is reconfigured through its diffusion into a multitude of ‘nodes of power, authority, and agency’ (Berndtsson and Stern 2011: 411), or modules, with the state providing the framework for a liberalized market increasingly populated by private actors with a global reach. Security policy is enacted, performed and constructed in and across such modules and their diffuse relations, within an assemblage that transcends vertical perception of governance and policy-making. Such policing configurations
often have no tangible state/non-state divide; security actors are situated on a continuum between the public and the private, (re)positioning themselves in a manner that blurs the lines between public and private actors (see Diphoorn 2015).

In Jerusalem, the security provision at the settlement compounds evidences this broad public-private spectrum, with the promotion of private companies to represent state actors, but also a strong public involvement in the deployment, regulation and instruction of private security provision. As Braithwaite (2008: 26-28) notes, blurred lines between the public and the private leads to the interdependency of public and private actors: the police is increasingly dependent on private actors for their operations and projects, while private companies require the regulatory framework and financing of the state to continue and prosper. The embedded proposition within this argument is that state actors are increasingly attuned to the needs of private, often for-profit actors rather than to those of their citizens, leading to the (re)allocation of security and resources on an unequal basis.

The enmeshing of public and private security actors in providing citizens with day-to-day security ‘has made the public private and the private public’ (Leander 2008: 160). Leander suggests that in obscuring the outsourcing of sovereign rule into private hands, the enmeshment of public and private security contributes to a diminishing of the state’s obligation to provide security equally. The nominal assertion of equality is replaced by an open arena of conflicting claims of protection, in which the state’s ‘logic of protection’ (Huysmans 2006) is articulated. Huysmans is asking who can make a legitimate claim on the state for protection, from which dangers, and who is ultimately responsibilized to provide said security. These questions are political, and Huysmans argues that we should address them by an agency-focused analysis, which accounts for the transformative
capacity of security agencies (and individual agents) to shift the balance ‘between emancipatory and conservative visions of protection’ (Huysmans 2006: 6).

RECONFIGURING SECURITY AT EAST JERUSALEM’S SETTLEMENT COMPOUNDS

The early 1990s marked a turning point in Israeli intervention in the Palestinian urban fabric of East Jerusalem, with a substantial growth in the number of Jewish-Israeli settlers moving into Palestinian neighborhoods, evicting Palestinian residents from their houses and creating small but expandable segregated, Jewish-only settlement compounds within residential East Jerusalem. These compounds are explicitly intended to strengthen Israel’s hold on Jerusalem and its environs. Over 2000 settlers now reside in evicted Palestinian houses in East Jerusalem (Peace Now 2014), causing a ‘mixture of exclusion, neighborhood abandonment and warehousing of Palestinian residents’ (Dumper and Pullan 2010: 14). These settlements are nominally established by private religious-nationalist NGOs, who locate the properties and recruit suitable settlers to populate the evicted houses. Yet these organizations could not operate without the strong support of Israeli state actors. Palestinians are usually evicted following court proceedings, in which the settlers’ organizations demand expropriation and/or eviction based on claims that may include the establishment of an archaeological site, the relocation of previous Palestinian owners outside the borders of Israel, a claim of prior ownership by Jewish residents, or the contested and secret purchase of the property by a shady corporation reg-
istered offshore (ACRI 2010). Such claims often rely on the cooperation of Israeli state agencies, including those detailed in Chapter 3.

The modular form of Israeli security provision in East Jerusalem reflects a two-faced administration, whose practices are firmly embedded in the (settler) colonial governance of the city (Zureik 2011), while its legal and regulatory framework nominally establishes a ‘Western’ form of democratic rule. As I argue through this dissertation, Israeli security actors have been seeking ways to balance these contradictions. On the one hand, police forces have been further militarized; heavily armed border police units, delegated with the role of maintaining security within the Palestinian neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem (Dumper 2013), have been provided with additional (lethal and ‘non-lethal’) weapons and equipment. At the same time, security provision has been increasingly privatized, with private actors taking on security roles previously within the domain of the police and the armed forces. Their deployment reflects public security actors’ inability and unwillingness to devote extensive resources to the maintenance of public security in an area deemed a high risk to the lives, morale and public legitimacy of state security agents. Aharon Franko, the former head of the Jerusalem district police, explained that ‘The Israeli Police is not a security company. If you demand the Israeli Police to safeguard [individual] houses, to safeguard persons, it would mean to become a security company, which we are not’ (Knesset Internal Affairs committee 2010). As in the rest of Israel, in Jerusalem both public and private organizations employ security guards, who are stationed at the entry of every Israeli institution, school, ministry, shopping mall or museum, as part of an ever-encompassing ‘culture of security’ (Ochs 2011). Armed with automatic weapons, they guard the tram stops and patrol the tram tracks. The Old City, particularly, is the site of a sophisticated operation of both public and private security actors, aimed at intimidating some residents while reassuring others (Grassiani and Volinz 2016).
These public-private security interventions are particularly visible in the dense urban space of Jerusalem. Weizman (2007) explores how different forms of Israeli rule inscribe themselves in space, positing that the Israeli architecture in Jerusalem has simultaneously embodied and rejected the old Palestinian cityscape (2007: 43-44). Likewise, the sight of Jewish-Israeli settlement compounds – Palestinian houses transformed into urban fortresses, topped with towering flags, marking them with signs of modernity and ethnoreligious distinction – reflects an ambivalence towards, and competition with, the indigenous Palestinian design. All Jewish-only settlement compounds in East Jerusalem’s Palestinian neighborhoods are protected by PSCs, which are hired and paid for by the Israeli Ministry of Housing. In total there are over 350 full-time security guards (one for every five settlers), who provide a range of security services (Peace Now 2014). In 1987, during the initial stages of the First Intifada, former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon rented an apartment in the Wittenberg settlement compound in the Muslim quarter of the Old City. When he was appointed Minister of Housing and Construction in 1990, a security detail from the Ministry was assigned to protect his residency. Following demands from other settlers, the Ministry began providing security to other settlement compounds as well (Or et al. 2006). Soon thereafter, a public tender was published, awarding the contract to Modi’in Ezrachi, a well-established PSC, which up to this date provides security to most settlement compounds, as well as to other sensitive locations in East Jerusalem.

In the following pages I unpack the relations and tensions between the different public and private actors involved in modular security provision around the settlement compounds, focusing on the policymaking, funding flows, management, supervision, and daily practices of security at the sites in question. As Loader and Walker (2007) argue, state security actors remain relevant even after privatization, not only when private security fills a void left by public police forces in the protection of lives and prop-
erty, but also in situations where state actors remain actively involved in the operation, regulation, and provision of private security. Jewish-Israeli settlement compounds in East Jerusalem provide an example for these interactivities. The government foots the bill for private security guards at these sites, rather than deploying regular police forces. A government ministry maintains overall authority over the private contractors, while simultaneously distancing itself from responsibility for their actions. State authority and responsibility are diffused into multiple ‘private’ modules in the operation, performance, and supervision of security and violence, while leaving the state claim’s to monopoly over legitimate violence intact.

While security privatization and outsourcing denotes the distancing of state actors from security provision, it does not necessarily mark the state’s abandoning of its core function of protecting its citizens. Instead, state security actors can outsource parts of their work to private actors while maintaining a backstage position from which to direct the use of permissible violence. This outsourcing is not merely a neoliberal attuning of the state to the global demands and norms of the market, but is instead a political shift towards the territorialization of urban space through the performance of state sovereignty by contracted private security companies.

NEW PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE NODES OF AUTHORITY IN JERUSALEM

Aharon Franko, a former head of the Jerusalem district police, argued in a parliamentary session that the police had a very different, political neutral approach to protection than PSCs (Knesset Internal Affairs committee 2010):
I treat all residents equally. This is the difference between us and you [the PSCs]. You are political and I am not. I should provide equal protection for a Jew who resides in Sheikh Jarrah or a Palestinian in East Jerusalem. That’s the job we were tasked with.

Unlike policemen, the PSCs at the settlement compounds are instructed to attend solely to the security of the Jewish-Israeli settlers. As one former security guard recalled in an interview: ‘our main concern is the safety of the Jewish residents. No matter what is told to the media, that we are here to keep the order […] It is always us against them [the Palestinians]’. While police forces are instructed, at least formally, to attend to the security concerns of all residents of Jerusalem, private security guards – paid for by the state – are concerned only with the safety of Jewish-Israeli settlers. Their deployment replaces a nominally universal protection towards all residents by public security agents with an outsourced provision of partisan security, entailing security for some and dispossession for others.

In attending to the relations between the Israeli Ministry of Housing, the police, and the PSCs in the following pages, I aim to show how a project of territorialization takes place in a contested area outside the full reach of the state, through the assembling of a modular public-private security toolbox, to which private security companies are enlisted. While a preliminary observation of the security provision at the Jewish-Israeli settlement compounds in East Jerusalem might seem straightforward, it ties to a broad range of other modules: state and non-state actors enlisted to effectuate, finance, support and supervise these operations. The Ministry of Housing publishes the public tenders, allocates the funds and chooses the private companies involved. One executive within the ministry is singlehandedly responsible for setting the terms of the public tenders, checking whether the companies fulfill their contractual obligations (and issuing fines in case of breaches), serving as an ‘ombudsman’ for employees’ labor rights, and
heading investigations into minor violent incidents (Ministry of Housing 2012).

In 2012 the Ministry came under court pressure to extend its supervisory role and has since enlisted an additional actor – an external PSC – for the daily administration, supervision, and training necessary for the outsourced security operations at the compounds (Ministry of Housing 2012). This was nominally done in order to end a conflict of interest, in which the PSC operating in the field was also in charge of supervising and reporting on their own staff (Ministry of Housing 2012). However, it also allows the Ministry to further distance itself from the controversial security provision by interposing an additional layer between the government body and the PSCs. The PSCs provide static (on-site), vehicular and pedestrian security escort services to the Jewish-Israeli settlers and their guests, safeguarding settlers’ houses and institutions, transporting settlers’ families around East Jerusalem with a security vehicle, or driving settlers’ children to school, to visit friends around the neighborhood or to the nearby Israeli transport terminal (see Figure 2).

*Figure 2: Private security guards providing transport services for Jewish-Israeli settlers, Silwan, Jerusalem, May 2015. Photo by: author.*
The relations between the PSCs and the Israeli police force (including border policemen) have developed over time. Daniel, a former security guard who worked at the settlement compounds for five years following his military service, recalled his experience:

In the early days, the relations we had with the police were very different. If we needed their help responding to an event, for example some Arab youth throwing rocks on a resident’s house, we had to call one-zero-zero [the regular police hotline] on our mobile phones and hope that they would take us seriously.

This, he recounted, began to change during the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2009.

During operation ‘Cast Lead’ we had balagan [mess, chaos] in the Silwan neighborhood every day, and we received a lot of support from the policemen and the border policemen. They would sit in our guardhouses and have a coffee, sometimes when the commander didn’t mind they would join us when we were patrolling the place […] it wasn’t official, there was no change of orders from the top, but they started taking our calls directly, coming over with the jeep whenever we asked them to.

Tal, a 32-year-old former security guard who had worked in the neighbourhood of Silwan had a similar perspective on the operational and ideological proximity that the police development with the PSCs:

At first, them [the police] didn’t care much unless something significant was happening, like if a new [Jewish] family moved in
or there was a war or something of that sort, [in which case] they were bringing in the big police commanders to review our mission files, to make sure everything is in order.

Yet these relations changed during the four years of Tal’s work:

They started feeling comfortable commanding us directly. When a border-police jeep would arrive to the street, we would become their subordinates, we would do whatever they say. […] Usually they told us to take a step back, and document events with our cameras while they handled things themselves.

As Daniel’s and Tal’s accounts suggest, the PSCs’ relations with the police took shape slowly, on the ground, in the streets and yards of East Jerusalem. These close hierarchical relations were not initially prescribed from above. Rather, they were the result of interpersonal encounters and camaraderie on-the-ground, coupled with the necessity of allocating labor, equipment and responsibility in ‘times of war’. Only at a later point in time, following political and legal pressure, were these relations formulated legally through ministerial guidelines and contractual obligations. Escalations in East Jerusalem during the period 2014-2017 each brought a temporary increase in police presence within Palestinian neighbourhoods, and closer operational ties with the PSCs. However, while Israeli (border) policemen are quick to come and go, Israeli private security guards remain, and become a permanent feature of Palestinian neighbourhoods, commonly described by Palestinian residents as a dangerous nuisance affecting their daily lives in countless ways.

The PSCs’ relations with the police today are stronger than ever. The PSCs are required to consult the police when equipping and arming their em-
ployees (security guards are provided with handguns, automatic rifles, pepper spray and shock grenades); they must also abide by police orders to extend the scope of their security provision, involving the redeployment or rescheduling of security guards around the settlement compounds (Ministry of Housing 2012). The security guards are provided with a police-frequency radio communication device; private security guards use the police frequency to contact the local police, either to call for back-up or for sharing intelligence. As the interviews with Daniel and Tal reveal, the close relations between the police and the PSCs allow the police to maintain a backstage position from which to remotely deploy and instruct additional private actors, in a bid to territorialize restive urban areas beyond the full grasp of the state.

CHALLENGES AND TENSIONS IN AN EMERGING SECURITY PROVISION

Why did the public-private security assemblage at the settlement compounds emerge in its particular form, in which public and private security actors are enmeshed in a state project aimed at territorializing East Jerusalem into the folds of the occupying state? The outsourcing of security provision can be a means to reinforce the state’s capacities to pursue a state-led project. State bodies, despite a nominal claim for a universal security provision, may continue to ‘author’ the urban security responses to a perceived threat in a manner which distinguishes between different residents of the city (Coaffee et al. 2009), while obfuscating the role of public security actors by positioning private actors at the forefront.

The outsourcing of security provision at the settlement compounds, with its political implications, has not gone unchallenged. It has drawn op-
position from different and often contradictory directions. Palestinian residents, in addition to their day-to-day opposition to the settlements’ presence, have filed a legal appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court demanding an end to the presence of private guards in their neighborhood (J. Siam and others vs. State of Israel 2011). The petition of the Palestinian residents, represented by an Israeli civil rights organization, argued that the outsourcing of security harms the constitutional rights of the Palestinian residents, including their rights to life, to equality before the law, and to privacy. During the court appeal, a settlers’ representative opposed the motion, arguing that ‘it’s not privatization, it’s a bad answer to the worse situation’ (J. Siam and others vs. State of Israel 2011). The court ultimately rejected the Palestinians’ petition without a full ruling.

In 2012, a recently founded labor union representing the private security guards themselves asked the Israeli regional labor court, as part of a labor dispute with the PSC and the state, to recognize the security provision at the settlement compounds as a ‘core function of the state […] which is impossible to privatize’. The union representatives further argued that the security guards should be recognized as full state employees, since the state contract with the PSC is a ‘fictitious registry […] aimed at allowing the state to evade its responsibility as an employer’ (National Workers Union vs. State of Israel 2012).

How can such a privatization process, a ‘bad answer’ or a ‘fictitious registry’, be understood? As noted above, the outsourcing of state functions is often explained within the context of neoliberal de-regulation, aimed at scaling down the scope of the state’s activities and allowing public service provision to become more cost-effective through free-market competition. Seidman (2014) explains the partial privatization of Israeli military and public security functions along these lines, understanding them primarily as managerial, cost-cutting decisions in line with the larger process of privatization in Israel. Yet the increasing governmental expenditure on private security provision at the settlement compounds in East Jerusalem, which peaked at over $21,700,000 per annum in 2014 and 2015 (Hasson
suggests that outsourcing cannot be explained solely in terms of economic efficiency. To reduce costs, the Israeli authorities could equally have deployed border policemen, the majority of whom are military recruits who receive no wage during their mandatory military service, to guard the compounds. Havkin (2014) suggests a different explanation. Focusing on the privatization of Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank, she shows how this process is ideologically motivated, dispelling misconceptions regarding its alleged profitability and efficiency. Privatization, she argues, was intended to 'professionalize' and 'depoliticize' the checkpoints, to contribute to the permeation of a violent status quo while obfuscating the state’s role within it.

I extend on Havkin’s (2014) analysis, and suggest that the process of security outsourcing is aimed at strengthening the state-led project in East Jerusalem by depoliticizing, normalizing and enabling the growth of Jewish-Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem. The Israeli government’s choice to employ non-state security actors at the settlement compounds can be understood as reinforcing, rather than diminishing, state actors’ capacities by enabling them to pursue a political project of territorializing Palestinian East Jerusalem through violent dispossession, which they would have been unable or unwilling to pursue otherwise. The outsourcing of security provision, and the interposition of mediating layers between state agencies and PSCs, functions as an attempt to distance state agencies from a security project they have initiated.
In the following section I present three modes through which state actors’ capacities to pursue territorialization are reinforced following security privatization. First, the security provision at the settlement compounds in East Jerusalem poses a risk to the Israeli authorities in terms of personal and collective accountability for damages and wrongdoings. Security personnel may be injured and sue the responsible ministry; Palestinian residents who have been maimed, or the relatives of those who have been killed by security agents may sue the state or bring about a criminal investigation against either the security guards or their government employers. Even the settlers may find a cause to seek compensation should their security providers not respond adequately to threats to their lives or property. However, by outsourcing the security provision at the settlement compounds and diffusing their responsibility to a plurality of private actors, the Israeli authorities are able to distance themselves legally and politically from any wrongdoings committed by the private actors employed. Instead of maintaining accountability to the public, as per their obligation by law, the public officials responsible utilize the outsourcing of security provision as a means of evading accountability and shifting their responsibility onto a long list of interdependent private security companies. A semi-retired municipal politician elaborated on this logic in an interview with me:

This option, to recruit private security companies instead of relying on the police force, can save us a lot of headache. It means that the authorities

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12 Israeli law defines state liability quite widely; public authorities, including the police, can be held accountable to civil damages in case of perceived wrongdoing. See also Torts Law (State Liability) 5712-1952.
don’t take full responsibility […] it means that accountability is scattered into so many different bodies so that in the end no one takes charge. […] it allows us to be bold in our projects, in our ambitions. I can see it growing.

His words are mirrored in the terms of the legal contract between the ministry and the PSCs operating at the settlement compounds. The contract stipulates that the private companies assume all responsibility for any damages resulting from their security operations. The PSCs are obliged to take an insurance policy that indemnifies the state from any claim or lawsuit brought forward as a result of actions by the PSCs and their employees (Ministry of Housing 2012). The PSCs are further obliged to pay for the legal costs of defending security guards in criminal trials arising from their conduct in the field, including cases of manslaughter. Such was the case in September 2010, when a security guard shot and killed Samar Sarhan, a resident of Silwan and a father of five, during confrontations in the neighbourhood. The ensuing investigation took place at the regular police regional unit, and not at the Police Internal Investigations Unit, since the security guard was not considered a public officer. While Samar Sarhan’s killer was not charged (after a mysterious loss of crucial evidence), Sarhan’s family could not hold the Ministry of Housing or the Police accountable for his death, not in terms of criminal charges nor in terms of compensation. This distancing – through privatization – of state actors from a controversial security provision allows the indemnification of state actors from possible wrongdoings. While coordinating, financing and directing the security provision at the settlement compounds, the state actors involved avoid being held accountable, or seek to be indemnified from, the violent and illegal actions committed on their behalf.

The second mode of reinforcement of state actors’ capacities is that of legally enabling state actors to pursue a policy that would have been unlawful, or subject to intense legal scrutiny, if carried out directly by public officials. As a result of the annexing of East Jerusalem into sovereign Israel,
‘regular’ Israeli law applies in all issues relating to policing, law enforcement and property rights. Unlike other parts of the Occupied Palestinian territories, where two different legal systems apply to Israeli settlers and Palestinian subjects, East Jerusalem should, by law, be ruled through a single legal system applicable to all its urban residents. Yet in practice, the modular form of security provision that has emerged at East Jerusalem’s settlement compounds marks the transposition of security and policing elements from the Occupied West Bank, administered by the Israeli military, into East Jerusalem. This form of mobility follows a well-established pattern of transplanting military strategies and technologies from the ‘periphery’ into militarized metropolitan areas (Coaffee 2003).

While Israeli law stipulates the obligation of the state to provide equal protection to all its residents, the outsourcing of security provision allows state security authorities to adopt a logic of protection that prescribes as legitimate only those claims for protection by some (Jewish-Israelis) residents from others (Palestinians). With public security bodies limited by their official designation as protecting all residents, the transformative capacity of the state’s protection logic (Huysmans 2006) is shifted from the public to the private, where private security companies can pursue a form of security provision that provides some residents with privileged protection services, while other residents face discrimination, intrusion and violence. While the police remains largely out of sight at the settlement compounds, their central role is continuously maintained. The Israeli police’s ‘hidden’ administration of the scope and type of security provision at these sites, coupled with the close daily cooperation between its administrative and operational units and the PSCs, exemplifies the multihued public-private spectrum upon which the state’s capacity to pursue controversial projects rests.

The outsourced security provision allows the Israeli authorities to deflect legal challenges to their partisan security provision by maintaining a façade
of equal security provision – in the form of a ‘neutral’ police force – while in practice employing non-state actors to do the ‘dirty work’ required to maintain the controversial settlement compounds in an occupied territory. The state has distanced itself sufficiently in legal terms, through the outsourcing of both the security provision and its management and supervision functions, from the controversial political project.

The third mode is that of reinforcing the state’s capacities through depoliticization and normalization of controversial state-led projects, in a manner that curtails domestic and international public debate. Privatization and outsourcing mark a shift in the relations between capital and the state – and a consensus between political factions. The employment of private security companies contributes to the transformation of a public issue into a private one, in which the role of the state, committed to its contractual obligations, is maintained regardless of the political parties in power. Daniel, the former security guard, compared his labour as a soldier with his work as a security guard. Being a security guard, he told me, is a ‘boring, atrophying kind of job’. ‘In the army’, he recounted, ‘I had a ‘big mouth’, but here [working for a PSC]... here you get used to the high pay so you don’t complain, you don’t speak about it at home’. For the Israeli public, to be a security guard is often considered as just another student-job, with little of the prestige, appreciation and political role given to military or policing professionals. While the ‘dirty’ political work performed by soldiers and border guards may cause concern among soldiers’ relatives or friends, and thus sway public opinion, the employment of private actors reframes security provision not as a national duty but as professional and depoliticized labor.

The ties between state and non-state actors within the modular form of security provision at the settlement compounds can thus remain largely hidden from view for local and international audiences, many of whom subscribe to the Israeli framing of the settlement compounds as private ventures detached from governmental policymaking. Instead of applying
pressure on the Israeli authorities, concerned diplomats\textsuperscript{13} and activists may vent their anger towards the PSCs employed by the state (see e.g. the case of G4S contracts with the Israeli prison service; Diakonia 2013). In presenting the settlement compounds as a private initiative that should be viewed as separate from wider public scrutiny of Israeli policies, the Israeli authorities distance themselves from the PSCs’ activities in legal correspondence, media talking-points and diplomatic communications, attempting to obfuscate their financial, operational and administrative role in the partisan security provision which enables the presence and growth of the settlement compounds in East Jerusalem.

The introduction of PSCs to ‘maintain order’, and to safeguard the lives and properties of those whom the state deems worthy of additional protection, can be understood as the collapse – in practice but not in rhetoric – of the normative conceptualization of security as a public good. The multiple actors within East Jerusalem’s public-private security assemblage collude to implement and safeguard a state-led project of Jewish-Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, one that is dependent upon a partisan security provision. The outsourced urban security provision can be traced back to the state itself – to the variety of ways in which a state-led project of territorialization in a contested territory is implemented and legitimized through the enmeshing of state and non-state security modules.

\textsuperscript{13} The roles and opinions of foreign diplomats are of particular importance to the daily practices of resistance to Israeli rule in East Jerusalem; see Bicchi (2016).
CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have attended to the various ways in which state actors’ capacities may be reinforced following the privatization and outsourcing of security provision. In so doing I have sought to complicate analyses of this growing global phenomenon that read privatized security provision as diminishing or side-tracking public policing services. I have argued that the privatization of security can reinforce state actors’ capacities to pursue territorialization, by authoring, or assembling, a modular form of security provision that advances state policies while simultaneously reducing state actors’ responsibility and accountability towards their urban residents. I posited that the re-assembling of the state with private market modules should not be understood only in normative terms of strengthening/diminishing the state, but rather as a transformative re-arranging of public authority and power relations, often deliberately towards the accomplishment of certain, localized projects. The reinforcement of state actors’ capacities following privatization is inherently embedded in an unequal redistribution of rights, privileges, public goods and services, including prominently security provision.

The security provision at the settlement compounds in East Jerusalem provides a single, albeit highly significant, example, of how state actors may seek to depoliticize policies that are legally unsound and politically controversial by outsourcing security provision to private actors. From the Australian migrant detention facilities in the Pacific Ocean to the Blackwater contractors deployed in Iraq, from the UK deportation regime to private state prisons in the US, the privatization and outsourcing of security provision enables the implementation of controversial state-led projects in a manner that evades accountability and deflects local, international, and legal challenges, both ‘at home’ and abroad.
In East Jerusalem, the current public-private model of security provision, with its heterogeneous actors and lack of accountability, continues to serve the interests of the public funders, the commercial providers and the privileged addresses of security provision at Jewish-Israeli settlement compounds. Tracing the emergence of the security assemblage within this particular form sheds light on the collusion of private and public actors in territorializing East Jerusalem into the firm grip of the state. This emergence, as a key example of modular security provision in East Jerusalem, attests to both the reinforcement of the state’s capacity to pursue political projects through privatization, and to the demise of the liberal ‘universalist’ security provision that the Israeli authorities still claim to uphold.

The enmeshing of public and private security actors allows state authorities to place a private company at the front of a controversial project, while maintaining a backstage position from which to administer, guide and supervise its operations. In exchange for a wage, private agents take on the repercussions of a violent state project of territorialization and dispossession. They face the prospects of both violent resistance and legal challenges to their actions, and in so doing the deployment of private security guards allows state actors to outsource the burdens of an occupation. Within an assemblage undergoing continuous reconfiguration, through their formal and informal relations, in law and in practice, public and private security actors are re-defining the state’s territorial reach and its relations with different residents of the city.