The modular security toolbox
Assembling state and citizenship in Jerusalem
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PERFORMING THE HOME
AND NEGOTIATING
CITIZENSHIP IN
JERUSALEM
Nasser took a drag on his cigarette and sighed heavily. Sitting on a sunny balcony on the top floor of a small residential building, he pointed inside towards a studio apartment, telling me how he and his family had ‘really dressed up the place nicely’. Inside, they had placed a large bed as the main feature of the small dark room. A small armoire stood near a tiny kitchenette, while two single mattresses were stacked against the far wall. Nasser, a stocky man in his mid-forties, continued his description of the apartment: ‘We’ve got here two set of clothes for each one of us, some toys for the boys, on the shelf some pictures from our wedding day … we wanted to make it look like we really live here’. Except that he and his family did not live there. They used the spare room on his brother’s rooftop as a showcase home, an address to register at the Israeli Ministry of the Interior. The apartment was a performance of a home, aimed at maintaining Nasser’s family’s Israeli residency, a permit afforded only to Palestinian permanent residents of Jerusalem.

Born and raised in Wadi-al-Joz, a short walking distance from Herod’s Gate in Jerusalem’s Old City, Nasser had married early and built his home in Abu Dis, a Palestinian suburb on the eastern outskirts of the city, only three kilometers as the crow flies from his birthplace. This seemed like a good idea at the time, he explained: ‘A big house with a nice garden, only a ten minutes’ drive away from Jerusalem’s Old City … better schools and better neighbours … it’s all we wanted’. Little did he know that within a few years an 8-meter-high cement wall would separate his new home from his native neighbourhood and his workplace, while new Israeli security regulations and practices would make his family’s legal status precarious, almost untenable.

Nasser works as a construction general contractor, spending his days coordinating the multitude of suppliers, workers, agents and professionals required in construction worksites, mostly in West Jerusalem. He is not
the kind of person who would shy away from an argument; he became irritated easily. He spoke at length to me about his legal quarrels and physical altercations with sub-contractors, customers, even municipal officials. Yet when I asked him about his family’s ordeal with their residency permit, he turned quiet, giving brief answers, treading on eggshells.

Since the mid-1990s, the Israeli authorities in East Jerusalem have vigorously enforced a policy of revoking the residency permits of Palestinian Jerusalemites who relocate outside Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries, particularly those who move to the nearby West Bank suburbs, such as Abu Dis. If a Palestinian Jerusalemite loses his residency, this means he will be stripped of his rights to legally enter or work in Jerusalem (and the rest of Israel), to access social benefits including unemployment and health insurance, and to request a travel document to go abroad.

When Nasser’s son turned 16 and requested his first Israeli ID card, the Israeli authorities started asking questions: where do you live? How long have you lived there? Can you provide evidence, such as utility bills? Nasser knew that the next step could be a home visit by Israeli investigators, aimed at ascertaining his actual address and setting the ground for an eventual revocation of his family’s Israeli residency. He changed his address to the small housing unit on top of his brother’s place in Wadi-al-Joz. Hence the ‘dressed up’ apartment: a home performed through socio-material practices, social entanglements and bureaucratic paperwork, crafted to simulate ‘normality’ to the prying eyes of the Israeli authorities.

In this chapter I explore the Israeli practices of residency revocation in Jerusalem and how the city’s Palestinian residents encounter and negotiate this policy. I understand the Israeli policy and practices of residency revocation, aimed at reducing the demographic and spatial presence
of Palestinians in Jerusalem, as part of the Israeli security toolbox. The making of the Israeli security toolbox, as discussed in previous chapters, requires the continuous assembling of multiple legal, administrative and regulatory modules, involving different actors, practices materialities and technologies. This dynamic toolbox allows Israeli security actors to open new ‘fronts’ to address the securitized (Goldstein 2010) threat posed by Palestinians’ presence in Jerusalem, while simultaneously endeavouring to preserve a façade of a united Jerusalem under Israeli democratic rule, where all residents are afforded equal legal protections. This toolbox is multi-scalar. Israeli state actors at the national level envision security policies in order to demographically engineer (Tzfadia and Yacobi 2011) the city, while municipal and other local actors then translate them into specific urban interventions. Security measures in Jerusalem trickle down from the national, to the urban, to the domestic space of everyday life – where one's house, and one's practices of habitation, play a crucial role.

In this chapter, I highlight the crucial, but often overlooked, political character of domestic space, which can play a central role in state-citizen encounters. I complement my understanding of modularity as a mode of state governance, by concentrating here on how Palestinian Jerusalemites negotiate the residency revocation policy by assembling their own modular toolbox of material, legal and social responses. I suggest that their performance of the home, which I explore through three distinct dimensions of socio-material practices, the mobilization of social relations and the procurement of bureaucratic documentation, is a citizenship performance aimed at maintaining limited rights, resources and mobility in the face of urban exclusion and demographic engineering.

In the next section I discuss theoretical discussions of citizenship performances and claims in which I situate my discussion of Palestinian Jerusalemites’ practices around the home. I go on to outline the origins and
legal framework of the residency revocation policy in Jerusalem, before attending to the security practices employed by Israeli public and private agents as part of that same policy. Next, I analyze different types of citizenship performances employed by Palestinian Jerusalemites negotiating the Israeli residency revocation policy: how they use social-material practices to perform their showcase homes, mobilize their social network to their aid, and how they manage to meet excessive bureaucratic demands to document their lives through paperwork. I then conclude by bringing to the fore the significance of the home as a site of citizenship performance, indicating other cases where the performance of the home is used to make citizenship claims towards state authorities in different contexts.

PERFORMING CITIZENSHIP

Performances can never be studied in isolation; there is a need to acknowledge the specific social and political context where performative practices, materialities and visualities emerge. Following Woolford and Nelund’s (2013: 296) proposition, I seek to ‘examine the broader constraints that structure these performances, which give them their shape and purpose and which are, in turn, shaped and reshaped by these very performances’. In this chapter I seek to situate the discussion on political performances in the domestic sphere, illustrated through the practices and materialities of everyday life. These performances, I argue, can shed light on how rights, resources and privileges are claimed and (re)distributed. Various scholars have focused on with other dimensions of the performative politics of citizenship. Mahtani (2002), for instance, explores the multiplicity and ambiguity of performances of everyday life enacted by Canadian women of mixed descent, arguing that the complexity of their belonging allows
them to reconstitute both national and ethnic boundaries through their performances. In East Jerusalem, Palestinian residents are placed in an ambiguous position: they are Palestinians under occupation, yet they are afforded limited rights as Israeli residents, distinguishing them from their West Bank compatriots (Dumper 2014). Could Palestinian Jerusalemites, like women of mixed descent, reconstitute their relations vis-à-vis the state by performing a qualifying version of themselves? Can they craft a citizenship performance aimed at the Israeli authorities, while maintaining their belonging to and identification with the Palestinian political community?

State citizenship regimes both shape, and are shaped by, performances: even in the most brutal and unequal states, citizenship is constitutively produced through a process where differing claims and performances interact. Isin and Nielsen (2013) highlight how the claiming and negotiating of citizenship entails an active role for citizens, in performing both the present and a potentiality of a future. In other words, a citizenship performed is a citizenship imagined; it charts both a personal and a collective course that transcends the current situation and shapes a political imaginary of the future. While state actors seek to make the population within their territory legible, often superficially and schematically (Scott 1998), citizens can attune their citizenship performance to highlight specific dimensions of their lives while concealing others. In this chapter I explore how Palestinian Jerusalemites perform a showcase home to state actors, following a script designed to imitate a qualifying dwelling within predefined geographical boundaries in order to maintain their limited rights and access to resources.

The performance of citizenship vis-à-vis the state involves a number of claim-making practices. As Woolford and Nelund (2013), for example, show in their analysis of the performance of neoliberal citizenship in Winnipeg, Canada, that citizenship performances aimed at seeking state assis-
tance may involve the need to perform a qualifying version of the self – to make a positive narration of one’s life. These claim-making practices often involve the materiality, economy and social significance of the home. Pido (2012) illustrates through the case study of a Filipino community in California how citizenship is claimed through a performance of property and home ownership, arguing that the ownership of a house can be leveraged to navigate exclusion and discrimination while signaling national belonging. Focusing on Belfast, Coyles (2017) explores how the confluence of housing with security threats is translated from the national arena to local politics, where urban residents are mobilized or addressed as insurgents through their habitation of a house. Similarly, many Palestinian Jerusalemites perform their citizenship through the criteria preset by the Israeli authorities: they are required to prove their actual and lawful residency in Jerusalem (within the Israeli-recognized boundaries), by showcasing a normative affinity to the city through their home. In this chapter I illustrate how they do so through socio-material practices, social relations and bureaucratic performances.

In Jerusalem, houses became an arena of contestation between Israeli authorities and Palestinian residents, as illustrated by the efforts of Jewish-Israeli settler organizations in taking over Palestinian homes (discussed in Chapter 4), or in the Israeli policy of house demolitions (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015: 87-102). In this chapter I observe how a Jerusalem-address home (whether owned, shared or rented) is central to the claims Palestinians make vis-à-vis the Israeli authorities. Through their citizenship performance of the home, Palestinian Jerusalemites seek to qualify themselves as eligible residents, ‘jumping through the hoops’ of the Israeli bureaucracy, averting and subverting Israeli security policies through a performance curated for agents of the state. As Isin (2002) emphasizes, a citizenship claim is a political act. The myriad ways in which Palestinian encounter and negotiate with Israeli actors, as mundane as these acts may seem, are part and parcel of the larger Palestinian political struggle.
In this chapter I draw primarily on interviews that I conducted with twelve Palestinian residents and community activists who faced the threat of Israeli residency revocation, discussing negotiation strategies for avoiding loss of residency. Some of the interviewees faced the prospect of residency revocation themselves, while others shared the experiences of family, neighbours or colleagues. Additionally, I gained valuable information from interviews with five Israeli policymakers and Palestinian lawyers who were involved in the legal deliberation over the residency revocation policy, including in the seminal Israeli Supreme Court case of Mubarak ‘Awad (1988), in which the court defined the parameters for residency revocation. The chapter is also informed by a secondary data analysis of public documents that detail the process of residency investigations and revocation in East Jerusalem; these documents include court proceedings, parliamentary protocols, policy research reports, and media articles. Writing this chapter posed specific ethical dilemmas, requiring a nuanced approach towards maintaining the safety of both my interlocutors, and their wider community, as detailed in Chapter 2.

CITIZENSHIP UNDER OCCUPATION

When Israel occupied and subsequently annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, the Israeli authorities debated the legal status of Palestinian Jerusalemites; their choice, born out of concern both for Israel’s Jewish majority and international relations, was to consider Palestinian Jerusalemites as Israeli residents, not citizens (Ramon 2017). This has been reinforced in subsequent laws, regulations and court rulings. Yet, as I outlined in Chapter 1, I approach Palestinian Jerusalemites analytically as citizens embedded in the folds of the Israeli state, continuously involved in claims-making and ne-
negotiating with Israeli state actors regarding their collective and individual rights, resources and privileges. These negotiations takes place both within the formal spectrum of citizens/residents/‘deportable others’, as the performances highlighted here illustrate; and outside of the spectrum, with a plurality of daily national, communal and individual claims made on the occupying state. Together, the ensemble of different negotiations, claims and performances can shed a light on how citizenship is constituted by Palestinian Jerusalemites vis-à-vis Israeli authorities.

As early as the first months of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Palestinian residents had to contest the Israeli authorities’ decision to exclude them from the city by appealing against the results of the Israeli census (which omitted many Palestinian Jerusalemites from the population registry), by providing proof of their residency in Jerusalem (Ramon 2017: 75). Designating Palestinian Jerusalemites as residents rather than citizens has rendered these residents officially stateless, as they are granted only limited rights in the Jewish state. Some Palestinian Jerusalemites have retained limited affinity to the Kingdom of Jordan, from which they can request travel documents. Palestinian Jerusalemites can also apply for Israeli citizenship through a naturalization procedure, yet relatively few do so, because of both the political unwillingness to swear allegiance to ‘Israel as a Jewish State’ (Jefferis 2012), but also due to what some of my interlocutors described as ‘foot-dragging’ by the Israeli Ministry of the Interior, which leads to low success rates.

Palestinian Jerusalemites’ ‘permanent’ residency status allows them to live and work in Israel, and to access Israeli healthcare and social welfare,

17 Palestinian West Bank and Gaza residents, unlike their Jerusalemite counterparts, are not provided with an Israeli residency permit. Instead, they are registered in a Palestinian Authority registry, which is supervised by and synchronized with the Israeli military COGAT (Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories) unit. Thus the Israeli government controls the registration of all newborns and migrants in Israel/Palestine.
yet it is also a precarious legal status that is subject to revocation. For decades, the conditions of issuing or revoking Palestinian Jerusalemites’ residency status remained a legal and bureaucratic gray zone, until the Israeli Supreme Court enshrined these conditions in statute in 1988 (Ramon 2017). From then on, Palestinian Jerusalemites’ permanent residency could legally be revoked on the basis of prolonged absence from Jerusalem, when residents relocate ‘out of Israel’, including to nearby Israeli-occupied Palestinian suburbs, for a period of seven years or more. This is known as the ‘Center of Life’ policy. Furthermore, Palestinian Jerusalemites who receive citizenship or permanent residency status abroad may also lose their Israeli residency permit. Since 1967, over 14,595 Palestinian Jerusalemites have been stripped of their permanent residency; the majority of those lost their residency after 1995, when the Israeli authorities began enforcing the ‘Center of Life’ policy in earnest (Human Rights Watch 2017). In addition, a small but growing number of Palestinian Jerusalemites lose their residency following Israeli claims of their lack of allegiance to the State of Israel, a practice that Human Rights Watch has denounced as politically-motivated ‘punitive revocations’ (Human Rights Watch 2017).

The residency revocation policy is not merely a procedural matter – it is first and foremost a security practice, one that the Israeli authorities see as critical to improving national security. Goldstein (2010), following an understanding of security as a range of practices, suggests that when measuring real threats becomes difficult, state actors and policymakers focus instead on perceived threats to an ill-defined ‘way of life’; these threats can go through a process of securitization, in which they are constructed as a danger or an existential threat (Goldstein 2010: 492). Israeli authorities commonly frame all state policies towards Palestinians, both within and outside of Israel, as security issues (Yiftachel 2006). In Jerusalem, it is the Palestinian presence in the city that undergoes securitization and is constructed as a demographic threat to the prevailing ethnicized order. The
continuous municipal and governmental efforts to limit the demographic presence of Palestinians in Israel’s self-declared capital can be understood as a long-term project of demographic engineering (Tzfadia and Yacobi 2011: 37-38), in which state actors seek to alter the urban demographic balance through the settling of certain populations, and the exclusion of others.

Jabareen (2010) analyzes the controversial Israeli master plans for Jerusalem, which specify a desired, limited Palestinian demographical presence in Jerusalem as part of an attempt to counter the Palestinian ‘demographic threat’. Jabareen posits that it is primarily through urban planning regulations that the Jewish-Israeli presence is reinforced, while Palestinian population growth is obstructed, leading Palestinian Jerusalemite towards informal, or illegal, housing solutions. This chapter suggests that the residency revocation policy is part and parcel of such Israeli efforts to counter a securitized Palestinian ‘demographic threat’. Residency revocation complements other security responses in a larger Israeli toolbox used to limit the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, designating Palestinians as a threat to the Jewish-Israeli majority and thus as deportable ‘others’. The silent deportation of Palestinian Jerusalemites allows Israeli authorities to extend Jewish-Israeli urban space through settlement activities, while reducing the budgetary costs of Palestinian residents’ social, health and administrative expenses.

The Israeli authorities seek to implement the residency revocation policy either directly, through the Israeli Ministry of the Interior (usually for those Palestinian Jerusalemites who have relocated abroad), or following an investigation by the National Insurance Institute (NII), Israel’s social and health insurance state institution. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the NII has been enlisted by Israeli state security actors for its legal and operational capacities, which are used to enhance the reach and scope of the Israeli
security policies in East Jerusalem. The remaking of the NII as part of a modular security toolbox has prompted the NII to enlist additional actors of its own. Citing concerns regarding a ‘hostile’ local population, from 2003 the National Insurance Institute has begun outsourcing residency investigations in parts of East Jerusalem to private contractors, who also provide security escort services to the Institute’s own investigators (Knesset Labour, Welfare and Health Committee 2003). The outsourcing of investigations allows the NII both financial and regulatory flexibility, as private investigators are hired on temporary contracts with little supervision in place (similar to the relations, described in Chapter 4, between Israeli police and PSCs). The private NII contractors operate primarily in areas such as Kufr Aqab and Shuafat Refugee Camp, situated within Jerusalem’s municipal border but on the other side of Israel’s separation wall, areas where other state actors and municipal facilities are largely absent (Chiodelli 2013).

FRESH BANANAS AND A MOIST TOOTHBRUSH

Taher reclined in the swanky café chair, looking out at the Jerusalem skyline. Around us, the air buzzed with activity: diplomats running into meetings, journalists prepping in front of cameras and bureaucrats waiting impatiently at the buffet line. Like other Palestinian lawyers in Jerusalem, Taher inhabits the fine line between the Palestinian street, the Israeli legal world and the cosmopolitan sphere of NGOs and diplomatic circles. He speaks a fluent English dotted with the occasional perfectly-accented Hebrew legal jargon of the myriad cases he has brought to the Israeli courts on behalf of his Palestinian Jerusalemite clients, whether as a private law-
yer or as a legal advisor to NGOs. ‘I do everything’, he exclaimed: ‘legal correspondence with the Ministry, humanitarian committees, Bagatzim [Supreme Court appeals] – this story with the revocation never ends’.

Taher became well aware of the Israeli NII investigators’ practices after representing several dozens of cases for Palestinian Jerusalemites facing residency revocation. ‘Some investigators are worse than others’, he elaborated on his clients’ experiences with NII’s investigators. ‘While some of them try and work by the rules, others are aggressive, try and trick you, or are prone to taking bribes’. The investigators he spoke of, whether NII employees or private contractors, are expected to ascertain the location of Palestinian residents’ place of residence. Using undisclosed parameters to determine the ‘center of life’ of the family under investigation, they compile a file, which is later sent to the NII and the Israeli Ministry of the Interior. ‘They look at everything and talk to everyone’, Taher explained, suggesting that the investigation practices are focused on both domestic materiality (focusing on furnishings and other marks of use, either at the registered address or at the suspected actual address), and testimonies offered willingly or unwillingly to investigators by family members, neighbours or others.

‘They just show up unannounced’, Taher said of the investigators. ‘They demand to be let in the house, with no warrant or anything … Usually the families are afraid to resist’. The investigators turn the Palestinian residents’ home into an object of inquiry, using a variety of tactics to determine whether a certain address is used as a family’s residence. The Palestinian residents often do not distinguish between public and private investigators sent by the NII, and are almost uniformly not informed of their limited legal authority to inspect the property, conduct searches or question minors. The illegibility and opaqueness of what Israeli public and private agents can and cannot do is similar to the obfuscation of roles and legal authority
at Jerusalem’s checkpoints, discussed in Chapter 5 in the context of the deliberate production of uncertainty. This experience of being tricked was related to me by Nevin, a Palestinian pediatrician working in a public hospital, who had dealt with repeat visits by public NII investigators to her family home:

They pretend to be nice at first, saying they will help us sort it all out, that everything will be OK … it’s a way for them to make us speak frankly. … Only later, when they cancelled our health insurance and called us from the Israeli Ministry [of the Interior], we understood that they had fooled us.

Taher described what the investigators look for when visiting a Palestinian family home: ‘Once inside they start checking for clues – are there clothes in the closet? Food in the fridge? Are there children toys or school textbooks around the house?’ The normative expectations of what should be found in a family home can determine the results of an investigation; similarly, these same signs of regular habitation at Palestinian families’ secondary home can be used to prove relocation. These minute details can become crucial in an investigation, as many interviewees, court protocols and media reports can testify. In one case bordering on the absurd, an investigator presented the presence of a moist toothbrush and fresh bananas in a Palestinian family’s secondary home in the West Bank as the main proof that the family had left Jerusalem, and thus provided evidence towards the revocation of their residency permit (Jerusalem District Court 2014).

When a single visit does not suffice to establish the family’s ‘center of life’, investigators might augment their file through stake-outs, questioning neighbours or local shop-owners, and a repeat visit. ‘If the investigators
come again, they have all sort of tricks they can use’, Taher explained. ‘For example they would place an unused tissue under one of the pillows in their first visit […] when they return a few weeks later, they would check if the tissue is still untouched in the same spot, evidencing that the family does not live there’. Other intrusive practices include sifting through the trash at the families’ suspected residence, and conducting house searches in the early hours of the morning. While the Israeli authorities seldom question the information gathered by the investigators, and make use of their reports in residency revocation processes, several Israeli officials have voiced concern over bribes, the illegal questioning of unsupervised minors and threats towards residents by unruly investigators (Ganon and Peled 2016).

If an NII investigation finds that an individual or a family has been residing for a lengthy time in the West Bank, including in some of Jerusalem’s Palestinian suburbs, their permanent residency status can be revoked. They would first be informed that they have lost their access to NII’s public healthcare and social welfare benefits; the NII would then send their case to the Israeli Ministry of the Interior, which can revoke their legal right to reside or work in Israel (including East Jerusalem). The residents affected would then no longer be able to renew their Israeli IDs, apply for a travel document (a *laissez-passer*, in lieu of a passport) or work legally in their home city. Stateless, without an Israeli ID or Palestinian authority citizenship, Jerusalemites who lose their residency status are placed in a very difficult predicament.

Sanaa, a Palestinian student whose family had their residency revoked five years ago, described the stark implications: ‘It’s terrible. The PA [Palestinian Authority] won’t give us other papers, they can’t. … We’re completely nothing, we can’t ask for anything or work legally or pass the checkpoints … we’re not even a number anymore’. Her account reflects how Jerusalemites who
lose their Israeli residency are stuck neither-here-nor-there, formally outside both the West-Bank and Jerusalemite Palestinian communities. Their predicament could also be described differently. Boano and Marten (2013) suggest that we should observe the Israeli governance of Jerusalem through its legal and territorial exceptionality. They propose that the revocation of residency policy is a part of the exceptional production of a disposable urban (non)resident in East Jerusalem, an urban version of Agamben’s (1998) *Homo Sacer*, living bare lives as ‘not even numbers’, devoid of rights and protection while unable to seek any form of redress. However, as Palestinian Jerusalemites’ sophisticated citizenship performances highlight, the scope of maneuverability afforded to Palestinian Jerusalemites can be wider than Boano and Marten (2013) assume; the Israeli attempts of marginalizing and displacing Palestinians can be resisted and negotiated in a plurality of different ways, as the following sections illustrate.

PERFORMING THE HOME THROUGH SOCIO-MATERIAL PRACTICES

I met Hadil at her workplace, a crowded office from which she coordinates educational church activities throughout Jerusalem and its surroundings. She’s a Palestinian in her late 40’s, married with three children; and while she exudes an air of a professional and personal success, she and her family have been forced into leading double lives for the past decade.

Born in 1970, she grew up in al-Bireh, a burgeoning suburb of Ramallah; it was her decision in 2003 to marry a Jerusalemite that changed her life forever:
‘He wanted us to move to Jerusalem immediately’, she recalled. ‘He already had an Israeli ID, but for me as a West-Bank Palestinian it wasn’t easy. At first the Israelis wouldn’t give me any permit, so I moved to our Jerusalem home clandestinely. Those days were tough – I was afraid of going outside, afraid of visiting my family despite them living so near’.

Hadil finally received her first Israeli permit in 2006, just before she gave birth to her first son. ‘But it was exactly then that my husband got a job in Ramallah, so we had to move’, she recalls; ‘It just wasn’t an option for him to commute daily, with the checkpoints and all’. If they had moved out of Jerusalem and changed their address officially, her husband and son could have lost their permanent residency permit, rendering them stateless, while she could have had her temporary permit revoked. Instead, they chose to maintain their address in Jerusalem. Hadil explained:

‘At first, we kept paying rent for the apartment in Beit Hanina [a Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem], but rarely used it. Two years later we registered at my husband’s family. They have a large house, and within it one apartment we can use. When we changed the address, we furnished the apartment, and since then we keep it as if we live there’.

To keep an apartment as if one ‘lives there’ requires a continuous effort to arrange a home to be ready for inspection on any given moment. Hadil described these efforts:

‘We set the beds to look like they were slept in. We put dirty clothes in the laundry basket, some food in the kitchen, we put toys in the house as if the kids play in the living room, everything to make it look like we regularly
use the place. His mom stocks up the fridge once in a while, she even used to wet the toothbrushes every morning, so if an investigator comes he'll think we all live there’.

Hadil and her family carefully crafted a showcase home, intended to convince Israeli investigators of their continuous residency in Jerusalem. The term, ‘a showcase home’, elicits the image of a model house displayed for sale, arranged in a neutral but convincing manner to appeal to potential buyers. I use this term here to refer to the houses performed by Palestinian Jerusalemites, who showcase their home within Jerusalem to Israeli security agents in charge of ascertaining their residency. Hadil and her family perform this home through the materialities of everyday life: a stocked pantry, children toys, laundry, and toiletries. They enlist both material and social practices in performing their showcase home, which is designed to conform to the normative expectations of an investigator – it should convincingly present a house that contains, nourishes and serves a family in every aspect of their lives.

Their performance of a showcased home is not a rare performance: tens of thousands of Palestinian Jerusalemites maintain a formal address in East Jerusalem, while they reside either outside the city (Ramon 2017: 326) or in the neighbourhoods beyond the separation wall (Ir Amim 2015). These homes can range from a stand-alone multi-story house to a single cramped room in their parents’ basement. Palestinian Jerusalemites’ performance of a home is aimed at the Israeli authorities, to whom they make a citizenship claim: against the background of military occupation, settlements construction and discriminatory practices, Palestinian Jerusalemites are forced to negotiate and claim their substantive citizenship rights, resources and privileges with the Israeli actors.
Hadil’s family choice to maintain a secondary home, in order to showcase their Jerusalem residency to the Israeli authorities, requires herculean efforts over a long period, and takes an economic and emotional toll. Real estate prices in East Jerusalem surged considerably following the construction of the Separation Wall, which induced a severe housing shortage (Amir 2011); to maintain an unused furnished apartment to showcase to the authorities is an expensive endeavor, which not all Palestinians can afford. Poor Palestinians can get only poorer as they seek to evade residency revocation, either by paying towards a showcase home or by being forced to relocate into more expensive Jerusalem neighborhoods within the Israeli defined boundaries. Often, poverty precipitates residency revocation, exacerbating existing inequalities among Palestinians and pushing poor Palestinian Jerusalemites out of their main source of income – the Israeli labour market. Hadil recalled the case of her aunt, who lost her Jerusalem residency because she did not have a heater when the investigators called in the midst of a chilly winter. ‘They told her: “no way you live here without a heater”’, and she was old so she didn’t really understand, she couldn’t argue, but she lost her benefits and residency just because she was poor’. With little access to legal aid or the support of employers, poorer Palestinian have fewer chances to successfully negotiate or confront the Israeli residency revocation policy – their possible scope of citizenship claims is narrowed.

SECRECY, SELF-CENSORSHIP, AND HOW TO MOBILIZE THE SOCIAL

Palestinian Jerusalemites’ performance of the home entails not only their own efforts, but also performances by and with their extended family, friends and neighbors. These others are enlisted both to corroborate a
qualifying script to Israeli investigators if and when they come snooping, and to maintain strict secrecy and self-censorship in their quotidian lives.

Gordon (2008) analyzes the transformation of the Israeli occupation from a disciplinary regime, which seeks to administer its colonial subjects, to a regime based on separation, renouncing its obligation towards the occupied population. While his assertion rings true for the Israeli governance of Palestinians in Gaza or the West Bank, living under siege or under the toothless state-building exercise of the Palestinian Authority, it does not fully reflect the administration of East Jerusalem, where Israeli authorities increasingly use a mix of disciplinary and punitive measures to subdue the Palestinian population, as I discuss in Chapter 3 and elsewhere throughout this dissertation.

Surveillance practices and technologies are a major part of these mixed measures. Zureik (2011) highlights how different practices and technologies of surveillance are central to the Israeli governance of Palestinian lives; the security practices employed by Israeli actors and explored in this chapter are an integral part of the ‘mundane’ and bureaucratic colonial surveillance (Zureik 2011: 8-9) of Palestinians’ lives. The performance of a showcased home requires Palestinian Jerusalemites’ to maintain secrecy in regard to their place of residence: to present to different surveillance actors and their information databases a single corroborated qualifying script.

This taxing performance takes an emotional toll. Hadil’s fear over losing her family’s residency card permeated every aspect of her personal and professional life. ‘Of course we’re afraid of the investigators’, she said. ‘It’s never easy always thinking what we would do if they ever catch us’. This fear leads to secrecy and self-censorship, aimed at limiting clues as to Hadil’s family life in Ramallah. ‘My husband keeps on telling me to be careful
with what I post on Facebook’, Hadil recounted. ‘He tells me not to “like”
too many pages of events or businesses in Ramallah, not to write all the
time about my experiences at the checkpoint, so no one would suspect we
don’t live in Jerusalem anymore. He’s afraid the Israelis will discover and
take away our IDs’. This fear extends to Hadil’s children, who study at a
private school in Ramallah. In a whispered voice, she explained that ‘we
taught our kids to lie … if anyone asks them where they live, we told them
to recite “we live at our grandparents’ house in Jerusalem”. Even to their
teachers they tell this. Maybe to their friends they tell the truth, that they
live in Ramallah’. Hadil’s fears over an investigation of her children is root-
ed in the experience of other Jerusalemites: NII’s and private investigators
are known to illegally interview, and record, children without the presence
of their parents (Ganon and Peled 2016).

Performing the home to the advanced array of Israeli surveillance technol-
ogies is particularly difficult. In recent years, Palestinian Jerusalemites have
become increasingly concerned about the development of the Israeli bio-
metric identification database and associated facilities, and the potential
of these to enhance Israeli surveillance of their movements in and out of
Jerusalem. The Israeli authorities adopted a mandatory biometric identifi-
cation system, in which all new ID cards, including those of Palestinian Je-
rusalemites or West-Bank permit holders, contain the holders’ fingerprints
and coded facial structure (Stevens 2011). With this system in place, Israeli
security actors can seek to record the entry of Palestinian passengers into
Jerusalem through the checkpoints between Jerusalem and the rest of the
West Bank. Hadil, for example, voiced concern over the prospect of the
 Israeli authorities discovering that she commutes daily from her Ramallah
home to her Jerusalem workplace. ‘I’m nervous about the checkpoint’, she
told me. ‘If I go through Qalandyia [a major checkpoint] they check my
ID and I have to stamp my fingerprint, they keep those records, and I’m
afraid they’ll find out we live in Ramallah’. To avoid the Israeli registration
of her movement, she prefers to travel with a colleague, travelling by car past a different checkpoint, where the control is less strict. If she cannot go by car, she follows her husband’s suggestion to keep her commuting to a minimum; this has forced her to skip work on occasion.

While Palestinian Jerusalemite families can strive to maintain an agreed script of their life in Jerusalem by mitigating the risk of a mobility paper trail, or by seeking the willing participation of their immediate family members, there is little they can do to limit the information their neighbours, relatives and employers share with the authorities. Hassan, a 40-year-old Palestinian Jerusalemite who relocated to the suburb of A-Ram, outside Jerusalem’s municipal border, can attest to these difficulties. He moved with his new wife to a spacious house in 1999; 15 years later, he, his wife and their four children lost their Israeli residency permit after NII’s investigators discovered that they lived outside of Jerusalem’s borders.

They kept their registered address at his parents’ house in the north Jerusalem neighbourhood of Dahyat-al-Barid for over ten years. Hassan’s parents’ house is only a few hundred meters from his own family home, yet on the other side of the separation wall. ‘We told their neighbours to lie and say we still live there’, he recalled. ‘If the investigators come, they know what to say. But that wasn’t enough – the children in the street, or the sellers in the shop, they told the investigators that we moved out’. One day a private investigator showed up on their doorstep in A-Ram; a few months later, they lost their residency permit, which they still hope to get back one day.

Palestinian Jerusalemites who have relocated outside the city may fear not only the Israeli authorities, but also the possibility that their neighbours or relatives might report them to the authorities. Hadil explained of several
cases she knew where ‘there were fights inside the family, big problems, so one relative can report on the other to the Israelis, tell them “he doesn’t live in Jerusalem anymore”, and so destroy his family’s future, work, everything. It’s crazy people can be like that’.

PERFORMING THE HOME THROUGH PAPERWORK

Palestinian Jerusalemites perform their home not only through socio-material practices around the home, or through the mobilization of their social relations, but also through another form of materiality: paperwork, the ultimate bureaucratic performance. Israeli authorities regularly request Palestinians to furnish evidence proving their residency in Jerusalem: title deeds and rental contracts, utility and tax bills, school registration certificates and payslips. Attaining these documents is not always a simple matter of procedure, but can often entail a complicated performance of eligibility through what Kim (2011) has dubbed a ‘papereality’. Failure to present a qualifying version of oneself ‘on paper’ can result in denial of services – or worse, in the loss of residency.

In a recent review, Hull (2012) notes an emerging scholarly discussion on documents, emphasizing how until recently documents remained a largely unexplored materiality, one that is constitutive of a plethora of bureaucratic ideologies and practices. This section seeks to extend this emergent literature by turning our scholarly attentions towards citizens’ (understood in the wider sense) performance of the home through documents and paperwork. I draw on the case of the residency revocation policy to demonstrate how citizens negotiate their relations with the state through the procure-
ment, collection and presentation of documents that testify to a qualifying script of their lives.

Formal documents are not always readily available in East Jerusalem: in some matters, such as land registry, Israeli authorities maintain deliberate ambiguity (Levine-Schnur 2011). In other cases, such as the recognition of Palestinian Islamic courts, there is a large grey area where state bureaucrats have the final say. This is not just a coincidence: the aberrant governmentality (Shlomo 2016) with which Israel governs East Jerusalem and its residents is aimed at allowing state actors a large degree of discretion or maneuverability, both within the Israeli legal and regulative framework and outside it. Deliberate ambiguity further provides opportunities to leverage ‘technical’ decisions in pacifying the Palestinian population, as I demonstrated in Chapter 3.

Palestinian Jerusalemites’ efforts to get the proper documents require strenuous efforts complemented by a healthy dosage of creativity – something not all Palestinian residents can muster. Mansour, a Palestinian legal advocacy worker, explained the difficulties Palestinian face in procuring the correct documents to prove their continuous residency in Jerusalem: ‘they ask for proofs, but it’s really difficult. In many cases bills and contracts are signed in another’s name – the neighbour’s name for electricity, the brother’s for Arnona [Municipal tax], the parents’ for the rental contract. We try to get neighbours to sign affidavits but it’s often not enough’.

Even those who haven’t relocated outside the city’s boundaries need to continuously reassure the Israeli authorities of their residency in Jerusalem: they are often requested to furnish documents and certificates proving their continuous residency in Jerusalem when they apply for a travel document or ID card, request social benefits or register their newborn children.
Mansour described the problems many of his clients face when applying for new Israeli IDs at the Israeli Ministry of the Interior in East Jerusalem:

At first, you file a request but they [the Ministry] pretend it was never sent. Then you come again, wait hours in line, and they ask you to send in papers proving your residency: bills, certificates of school attendance of the kids, Arnona [Municipal tax]… then you send it, but they pretend again they never got it. Then they send you a letter, which asks again for the documents, but perhaps you received it too late and you have to start the whole process again.

Taher’s clients faced a similar ordeal when applying for unemployment, disability or survivors’ benefits at Israeli National Insurance Institute:

They have a new approach of combining pending investigations with excessive demands for documents – asking residents to submit more and more documents detailing the specific request, and at the same time asking them to prove their Center-of-Life… What they do is often keep on asking again for documents, refusing to acknowledge that they received documents, sending requests by mail though they know many residents don’t have access to a regular mail service … they just postpone [a decision] until many residents give up on their money and rights.

These state responses are not only the result of mere incompetence or understaffing, but are instead indicators of what Lavie (2014) calls ‘bureaucratic torture’ – a mode of governance in which uncertainty and illegibility, features of the Israeli administration of Palestinian East Jerusalem I explored in Chapter 5, reign supreme. These state policies have conse-
quences. According to Taher, many Palestinian Jerusalemites have relinquished their rights to social support and state subsidies due to their fear of drawing the attention of state authorities. Others continue to struggle with the continuous need to provide ‘adequate’ documents to prove their residency in Jerusalem. This is particularly the case for those facing the prospect of residency revocation.

Palestinian Jerusalemites negotiate or comply with the excessive demands for documentation in a variety of ways. Some have begun to selectively comply with Israeli demands, particularly through regular municipal tax payments (Barakat 2008), in order to prove their residency in Jerusalem. Others try and register the electrical or water meters of their Jerusalem-based relatives in their name; some subscribe to cable TV or Internet at their Jerusalem address. These efforts might not prove enough – some of Taher’s clients had their residency revoked after the Israeli authorities questioned their water and electricity usage patterns. ‘The NII asks people to submit their bills of electricity and water, both in their Jerusalem address and in their West Bank house, to trace and compare consumption’, Taher told me. If a family is using more utilities in their West Bank house than in their showcased Jerusalem home, the Israeli authorities might conclude that they no longer live in Jerusalem. Taher recounted how some Palestinian families, asked to provide utility bills, had to artificially increase consumption at their Jerusalem address prior to submitting their documents: ‘Some wasted water, or opened the oven for many hours to increase their electricity consumption. Some others were smarter … they connected a cable to their relatives who lived below or above’.

Hadil, who lives in Ramallah and whose family maintains a showcase home in Jerusalem, faced particular difficulties providing Israeli authorities with her children school enrollment certificates:
They wanted from us papers for the children’ school – that’s real difficult, since I was afraid they would revoke our residency of I gave their actual certificates from the school in Ramallah. I had to find a private school in Jerusalem where I can register them and that they will give me a certificate. So every year I pay 3000 Shekels to one school … just so I can show one paper to the Ministry. With two kids that’s now 6000 Shekels. And at the same time I still pay tuition for the private school in Ramallah…so double the money just because of this piece of paper.

As Hadil’s case demonstrates, the procurement of the necessary documentation to perform the home can be both a difficult and costly endeavor, which many Palestinians fail due to a lack of resources or an inability to find creative ‘work-arounds’ such as Hadil’s. Others encounter difficulties conforming their documents to the onerous requirements by the Israeli authorities, leading to a long process of repeated visits and applications to the NII or the Ministry of the Interior, and ultimately to a denial of rights and a revocation of their residency permit.

While Hull’s (2012) overview highlights how formal documents can take on ‘a life of their own’, the Palestinian responses to Israeli demands to provide excessive documentation illustrate the role of human agency, showing how a script of one’s life can be crafted through authenticable documents, producing a ‘papereality’ (Kim 2011) in which documents are plugged into a citizenship performance. Through a creative and costly endeavor, Palestinian Jerusalemites seek to procure qualifying documentation to maintain their limited rights and access to resources. They subscribe to unnecessary utility services, enroll their children in a showcase school, and maintain a strict collection of documentation to be submitted at the whim of the Israeli authorities. The materiality of excessive documentation, and the associated enactment of a papereality, become parts of a sophisticated citizenship performance through which Palestinian Jerusalemites lay claim rights in their city.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the assembling of an Israeli modular security toolbox aimed at addressing the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem through the residency revocation policy, and the Palestinian response of assembling their own negotiation toolbox. I found that Palestinian Jerusalemites make citizenship claims through their performance of the house, as they seek to claim rights, resources and unimpeded mobility in the face of exclusion and discrimination. I attended to the distinct dimensions of socio-material practices, the mobilization of social relations and the procurement of bureaucratic documentation, that are employed by Palestinian Jerusalemites in their performance of a qualifying home to Israeli state agents. Through this case, I highlighted the highly political nature of domestic space, and how residents’ practices and materialities of habitation are contested and negotiated, playing a crucial role in shaping the relations between citizens and the state.
The performance of the home is not unique to East Jerusalem, but is a global phenomenon with distinct local manifestations. From the case of migrants required to prove their integration into society, through welfare recipients who need to demonstrate a physical need for state assistance, to parents facing an inquiry by Child Protection Services, or ex-convicts attempting to prove their successful rehabilitation, the performance of an eligible home is central to how citizens claim rights, resources and privileges. In other words, it is central to how citizens become citizens.

In Jerusalem, Palestinian residents continue to negotiate their precarious legal status through the performance of the home. They set a stage, their home, which they perform through socio-material practices. They enlist additional actors, mostly family and friends, through their social networks. They produce and shape props, in the form of bureaucratic documentation. Together, they perform a script of a qualifying version of themselves to present to the Israeli authorities.

Their personal struggle is not detached from the political context it is situated in. In his poem *Passport*, the Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish (2015) writes:

Oh, gentlemen, Prophets / Don’t ask the trees for their names / Don’t ask the valleys who their mother is / [...] All the hearts of the people are my identity / So take away my passport!

Darwish describes his unwillingness to allow the Israeli authorities to decide whether or not he belongs in his homeland, placing the recognition of his fellow Palestinian countrymen before that of Israel. Not many Palestinian Jerusalemites can afford a similar stance: their Israeli-issued ID is a necessity of everyday life, allowing them to continue living in their city
– to study, to work, to have children, to fall ill, even to die and be buried within its confines (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015: 116-139). Yet their negotiation with the Israeli authorities does not negate their resistance to the Israeli occupation. Isin and Nielsen (2013) highlight how citizenship is enacted when subjects perform themselves as citizens, when people re-invent themselves as claimants through both visible and invisible political claims. Palestinian Jerusalemites assemble socio-material practices, social relations and bureaucratic materialities in a performance of a home, through which they not only make a claim vis-a-vis the Israeli authorities, from which they seek recognition and limited rights, but at the same time engage in a political enactment of Palestinian steadfastness (*Sumud*), in order to practice their right to live, build, and claim Jerusalem.