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Bearing the stamp of History: the Elitist Route to Democracy in the Netherlands

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Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
<i>Notes on the Contributors</i>	ix
1 Introduction <i>John Garrard, Vera Tolz and Ralph White</i>	1
2 Liberal Democratic Theory: Some Reflections on Its History and Its Present <i>Adrian Oldfield</i>	6
Part 1 The Nineteenth Century	
3 Democratization in Britain <i>John Garrard</i>	27
4 Bearing the Stamp of History: The Elitist Route to Democracy in the Netherlands <i>Robert van der Laarse</i>	50
Part 2 Between the World Wars	
5 Democracy and War <i>Ralph White</i>	77
6 The Attempt at Democratization under Weimar <i>Stefan Berger</i>	96
7 The Corporatist Threat and the Overthrow of the Spanish Second Republic <i>Angel Smith</i>	116
Part 3 Post-1945	
8 Restoration and Stability: The Creation of a Stable Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany <i>Mark Roseman</i>	141

4

Bearing the Stamp of History: the Elitist Route to Democracy in the Netherlands

Robert van der Laarse

This chapter sees the Netherlands as a unique case of democratization. In countries such as France, democracy developed after some sort of revolutionary break from the *ancien régime*; in others, such as Britain, the transition from absolutism to democracy occurred more gradually. Dutch history, however, shows that the Netherlands' route to democracy was a combination of both and, as I shall suggest at the end, its success requires a particular sort of explanation.

The national state itself dates only from the Batavian Revolution of 1795, pre-dated by the Patriot Revolt of the 1780s and completed by the Orangist Restoration of 1813. But there is no vestige in the nation's memory of this revolutionary episode, since nineteenth-century civic ritual and national iconography sanctified the 'heroic age' of the Eighty Years' War against Habsburg Spain (1566–1648) and the liberation from French occupation in 1813; in the same way, the German occupation of 1940–5 enjoyed such a high public profile that most people divide modern history simply in terms of before or after 'the war'.

Among scholars, too, there is a strong tendency to present Dutch history from the perspective of continuity and conciliation, instead of breaks and conflicts. Even the introduction of mass politics at the end of the nineteenth century has been interpreted from a Whig perspective as a rather peaceful process of segmented emancipation, known as 'pillarization'.¹ It has become a stereotyped idea that the liberal elites agreed to accommodate the Calvinists, Catholics and socialists by accepting at the local level an almost complete sub-cultural segmentation, while maintaining narrow political relations between the elites of the 'pillars' at the top. According to political scientists, the Netherlands has experienced a unique political

system of 'consociational democracy' ever since the so-called 'Pacification' of 1917. This settled the religious conflict over education, and the social struggle for universal suffrage, by accepting certain political 'rules of the game', transforming politics into a proportional distribution of public influence and spending. Hence the paradox of subcultural pluralism and political stability is ascribed to the 'conflict management' of 'prudent elites', who took responsibility when faced with the danger of national disintegration in a traditionally segmented society undergoing modernization.² From this conciliatory perspective, the emergence of the new pillarized mass parties appears as a one-way integration of the political periphery into an age-old 'accommodationist elite culture', reaching back to the urban elite of the old Republic.³

Strangely, considering the assumption of historical continuity, political developments before the emergence of pillarized mass politics have not attracted much scholarly attention from the perspective of democratization. Yet by exploring the features of Dutch political culture from the end of the Republic until the Pacification, I will show that parliamentary democracy in the Netherlands had initially proceeded from a mixture of aristocratic and populist strategies, initiated by competing local elites, long before pillarized democracy took definite shape. For that reason the process of democratization will not be approached from the perspective of social emancipation, but be viewed in the light of liberal dissension. I shall draw attention to the way Dutch liberalism had to cope with an internal contradiction between the old-republican language of 'particularism' and a new-republican language of national unity, born during the revolution of 1795 but appropriated by the 'enlightened' monarchy of 1813. This conceptual flexibility could explain both the liberals' accommodation to revolutionary situations, and their close affiliation with the language of political conservatism. Viewed from this angle, it was the relationship between religion and politics, linked to the liberals' failure to win the popular vote, that produced the decline of the nineteenth-century ruling class and subsequently favoured the rise of a new arrangement of pillarized politics.

Invented restoration

The United Kingdom of William I was essentially a product of European diplomacy. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the introduction of the monarchic principle was regarded as a restorative

guarantee of internal stability, while the containment of imperialist France required a political union between the former Dutch Republic and the Austrian Netherlands. But apart from the temporary link-up of the Low Countries, which in its anachronistic throwback to the old Burgundian heritage lasted only until the Belgian Revolt of 1830, the new Dutch state completely broke with the past. For William's kingdom, as far as it was not created at the Viennese negotiating table, was strongly influenced by the spirit of the Enlightenment, and greatly indebted to the project of Bonapartist unification.

Though originally formulated by radical printers, journalists and Freemasons during the Patriot Revolt of 1785–7, the demand for political centralization was only realized with French political aid after the Batavian Revolution of 1795. Patriotism then was a highly confusing political label for a temporary coalition of at least two sorts of 'patriots': a militant underworld of clubs and societies, in favour of social equality and national unity, and a second, aristocratic group who adhered as 'good regents' to the old federalist or particularist principle of 'true freedom'. Their protest, drawn up carefully in the anonymously published *Grondwettige Herstelling van Nederlands Staatswezen* (1785–6), was directed against the old corruption of the Orangist system of patronage.⁴ What these aristocrats in revolt demanded was a restoration of the privileges of the provincial estates, embedded in the Union of Utrecht of 1579, regarded as the Dutch Republic's constitution. In contrast, the radicals found final expression in the Batavian Revolution of 1795, when the Batavian National Assembly demanded the dismantling of the old regime, and proclaimed the national sovereignty of the people, legitimized by natural law instead of historical arguments. This unitary idea of the nation was embodied in the radical (or Jacobin) constitution of 1798, which determined the framework of the modern Dutch state.⁵

Recent research into the character of Dutch elites has revealed a remarkable change in personnel during the first phase of the Revolution, when the estates were broken up, the Church and nobility lost their privileges, and new revolutionary administrations were purged of Orangists and federalists. Except for a minority of former patriot noblemen and aristocratic regents, most Batavian representatives and administrators were *homines novi*, recruited from the landed gentry and commercial classes.⁶ But the Revolution could also be mapped by religion. The language of patriotism found its main support among the 'enlightened' latitudinarians within the Dutch Reformed Church, as well as Catholics and Protestant dissenters; the non-Calvinist part of the

population that had formerly been excluded from government.⁷ Otherwise, the Calvinist orthodoxy in the old centre of the Republic (that is, Holland, Utrecht and Zeeland) edged away from radicalism. Here, as local research suggests, the Revolution lost support among the Protestant majority, who feared the dismantling of the Reformed Church and the nationalization of its funds and buildings on behalf of the Catholic minority.⁸ In fact this geographical and religious imbalance was already reflected in the radical referendum of 1798, when in Holland the unitarian constitution was rejected by three-quarters of the voters, whereas in the Catholic province of Brabant it was accepted by two-thirds.⁹

The radicalization of the Revolution produced a wave of anti-Catholicism, pointing to a future in which all Dutch reform movements in the nineteenth century would be defeated by Protestant intransigence. From 1800, most Catholic representatives in the revolutionary municipalities in Holland and the northern provinces were replaced by former Orangist regents.¹⁰ This process of consolidation by the Protestant elites signalled the decay of ecumenical egalitarianism. The revolution from below, which started as a dynamic complex of municipal and regional revolts, became a revolution from above. In 1806 this hierarchical process of statebuilding resulted in Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's Kingdom of Holland, which was annexed in 1810 by Napoleon's French Empire. Thus the radical demand for national unification found final expression in a long-term bureaucratic centralization, pushed forward by Bonapartism, and completed after the Restoration of 1813 by King William I's programme of reconciliation.

After 1800 the Protestant amalgamation of former regents and patriot newcomers produced a new ruling class of 'notables', who dominated social life and politics until the end of the nineteenth century. Crucial to William's state-building was a policy of ennoblement.¹¹ During the Republic the nobility had been restricted to the old noble families, raised to the peerage before the Dutch revolt and recognized in their titles by the regional estates on the principle of ancestry and seigniorial status. This was even though most of the regents had changed from merchants into landlords, and at least a tenth had succeeded in buying titles and seigniories. From 1815, however, the Dutch nobility became a national elite taking its official recognition from the Crown. Following Napoleon's example, hereditary titles in the Netherlands were not bestowed on the principle of birth, but conferred as a reward for merit, defined in bourgeois terms of wealth and money. As a result, the old nobility had to accept in the

restored *Ridderschappen* (the provincial noble estates) the presence of a new nobility, composed of descendants of the former regent aristocracy, and a remarkable number of *nouveaux riches*. The invented character of the 'restored' nobility was, however, accentuated even more by the corresponding invention of a new patrician estate. This non-titled part of the political class of notables incorporated not only the rising class of manufacturers and administrators, but also some prominent members of the landed gentry and some of the richest Amsterdam merchant bankers, who refused to buy their dignity from the king.¹²

Although the constitutional commission of 1815 had adopted the English model of a Lower and Upper House, it feared a concentration of land and power among the hereditary peerage. For that reason it accepted the French law of partial succession (favouring a division of the legacy among the relatives) instead of the British principle of primogeniture. Hence the Dutch Senate became a royal instrument composed of notables appointed by the king. Only the Lower House or Second Chamber of the States General functioned as a kind of assembly, although representatives were chosen by a very complicated electoral system in which town councils, regional estates and provincial councillors all functioned as electoral bodies, but at two (or more) removes from the voters. Moreover, the franchise restrictions strongly favoured the highest and most prominent taxpayers, notably noblemen and patricians.¹³

Power, then, was concentrated at the national level, and delegated by the government in The Hague to provincial governors (Lord Lieutenants), burgomasters and court presidents, all of whom were appointed by the king. An immense amount of correspondence between these various authorities bears testimony to their function as royal eyes and ears, although this material also demonstrates that the early-nineteenth-century government was far from monolithic.¹⁴ The electoral complexity helped to produce a great deal of corruption and government control, in particular within the provincial administrations, where the old nobility and regent aristocracy still played a prominent role. Yet the king's most powerful administrators were recruited from the patrician bourgeoisie, such as the Lord Chancellor, C. F. van Maanen, who started his career as a radical unitarian (Jacobin) under Louis Napoleon and stayed in office until 1842.¹⁵ Together, the centralized administration, the royal policy of patronage and the local elite's tendency to particularism produced a kind of a political hybrid.

Considering the above, it is not surprising that William I has been considered the first and only Dutch 'enlightened despot', marked by a Bonapartist presidential style of government as well as a patriarchal self-image, adopted from his relative, Frederick the Great, and his brother-in-law, the Prussian king, Frederick William III.¹⁶ For that reason a Belgian historian recently spoke rather polemically of a Dutch 'Germanic *Sonderweg*'.¹⁷ According to the German historian Horst Lademacher, however, William's kingdom possessed Europe's most 'liberal' constitution before the Belgian revolution of 1830, one rooted in a long tradition of freedom and tolerance.¹⁸ Yet, in my opinion, these contradictory characteristics only confirm the essentially dualist nature of the nation. Because, if the king followed the example of the great European monarchs and governed increasingly by royal decree, beneath the surface of bureaucratic order many local and regional authorities still clung to the federalist tradition.

So, paradoxically, the restorative element in the new monarchy was responsible for its 'early liberal' appearance. Instead of the privileges favoured by the king, liberties were regarded as established rights – rights defended by the urban regents and regional estates against, consecutively, the King of Spain, the stadholders, the French emperor and finally the king of the Netherlands. This federalist reflex was even expressed symbolically in the legitimization of royal sovereignty. In 1813 the Prince of Orange had been proclaimed 'sovereign' by some prominent lords, acting as representatives of the Dutch notables, on the condition that he reigned under a 'wise constitution'.¹⁹ Though William would soon regard the constitution as *his* gift to the people, the ruling elite never accepted the monarchic principle. In fact, the question of the legitimization of power was central to political opposition until the end of the nineteenth century. But the defence of liberty would also present itself in a religious form. Together this contributed to the specific outcome of the Dutch process of democratization.

The rise and fall of an opposition

How could one guarantee the stability of a nation that by tradition was infected with the virus of particularism, without catching the 'French disease' of bureaucracy? This question of the balance between federalism and national unity had been crucial to the founding fathers of the Dutch constitution. Yet by the 1820s its main architect, Count G. K. van Hogendorp, concluded in his 'letters to the nation' that the social contract had been violated by royal despotism. To fight the corruption of

autocracy, *grand seigneurs* such as Hogendorp, and many aristocratic governors and burgomasters, proposed reforms that surpassed even their 'own' constitution. As the embodiment of the old regency and court nobility, these moderates were now prepared to join hands with bourgeois radicals. Confronted by censure and repression, they closed ranks around what was known as the British model of parliamentary monism and the French doctrine of the separation of Church and state.²⁰ In reaction to these liberal demands, however, the monarchy affirmed its desire for centralization and unity. Thus, in 1829, William's son, Prince Frederick, was appointed head of a 'royal government', while the state's officials were forced by royal proclamation to promote the unity of language, education and religion as being crucial to the survival of the nation.²¹ It is these politics of Enlightenment that would soon become the main source of ideological segmentation.

The Belgian Revolution of 1830 was the first and most fundamental reaction to this kind of official nationalism. In the north, however, the attack on the honour of the House of Orange weakened the call for reform, and united (at least temporarily) the 'Protestant nation' behind the king. The atmosphere of romantic, popular nationalism in both parts of the Low Countries came to a head a year later, when, under the command of the Princes William and Frederick, the 'mutinous' Belgians were defeated in a military campaign, supported by civic guards and student militias. The European powers, however, would not intervene, and within ten years the financial costs of William's 'policy of perseverance' bankrupted the state. Coupled with the economic crisis in the Netherlands' East Indies – brought about by the government misusing the profits of the Dutch Trading Company and the so-called *Cultuurstelsel* (the state's exploitative cultivation system in Java) – this completely isolated the monarchy from the world of finance. Ironically, however, William had to abdicate in 1840 because he wanted to marry a half-Belgian Catholic countess. Worried about the state's repayment of government bonds, the Amsterdam merchant bankers then called for financial reforms. Appointed prime minister by King William II under a new constitution that at least officially recognized the principle of ministerial responsibility, their political spokesman, F. A. van Hall, was able to restore confidence in the money market.²² Strengthening its support among the moneyed aristocracy, however, the government's main concern soon became the ideological legitimization of its policy in the nation at large.

Calvinism had been the Republic's official religion until 1795, and even the patriots were initially inspired by the seventeenth-century

'Batavian myth' of the Republic as a New Israel. Yet, from the late eighteenth century, religion was changed in form and meaning. As in politics, the Restoration of 1813 only continued this Enlightenment project. By tradition, the Calvinists were staunch adherents to the House of Orange, but the orthodox creed was incompatible with the king's policy of religious unification. From both his Batavian predecessors and his own experience with Prussian *Staatskirchentum*, William had inherited a strong belief in Christian unity as being crucial to the policy of state-building. Therefore, the Dutch Reformed Church was reorganized in 1816 under state supervision, as a hierarchic ecclesiastical association headed by the king, while the doctrines of Calvinism were sacrificed for a more intimate, humanist religion of reason, under the latitudinarian device of 'belief, hope, and peace'.²³ As such, this new set-up of religion and politics contributed to new forms of dissent. The ardent critics of this religion of Enlightenment were to be found in the so-called *Reveil*, composed of groups of high-bred romantics, accompanied by a 'grass-roots' pietist movement. In contrast to aristocratic revivalism, this was expelled systematically from the Dutch Reformed Church, providing a Presbyterian alternative to the 'hierarchical' order of 1816 after the Secession of 1834.²⁴

Thus we can observe around 1830 a defence of liberty in religion as well as politics against 'enlightened despotism', legitimized by revivalist doctrines and inspired by romantic imagination. It can be argued that this interesting interweaving of political radicalism and religious opposition was itself a product of a political climate that neglected every form of organized dissent, and even made the word 'party' taboo. In fact, the government itself raised the spectre of factionism by creating a register of potential 'separatists' involved in the Church and politics: liberal aristocrats, radical democrats, Catholic ultramontanists and orthodox Calvinists. The paradox of this self-fulfilling fear of segmentation was made clear by the Amsterdam editor of the moderate newspaper *Algemeen Handelsblad* in a confidential recommendation made to King William II in 1840.²⁵ According to this political insider, it was William's policy of repression that was responsible for the regime's loss of confidence. Government intervention against the Belgians, the religious 'fanatics' and the radical press allied moderates and even former 'king's men' with the liberal opposition. Taken all together, it shows us the making of an opposition.²⁶

Without going into further detail, it is clear that the crisis of 1830 only ended with the liberal changeover in March 1848. Perhaps this explains the 'velvet' character of the whole event, which happened

peacefully, not least because some radical 'gentlemen leaders' gained the new king's confidence as spokesmen of the people. While most of these romantic aristocrats – such as the impoverished nobleman-journalist Adriaan van Bevervoorde, who took part in the formation in Brussels of Karl Marx' *Association Démocratique* (1847) – had only their personal antipathy against Van Hall in common, they gathered strength from the local tax riots of 1844 (against Van Hall's financial reforms), and the food riots of 1845–7 (as a result of the potato blight).²⁷ Impressed by the March revolts in Paris, Vienna and Berlin and popular demonstrations in The Hague and Amsterdam, William II changed overnight from being conservative to liberal, as he himself admitted. In fact, even this can be seen as a dialectic proof of kingcraft. After Van Hall's resignation some months earlier, the king was able to split the liberal opposition by permitting the Leiden jurist J. R. Thorbecke to create a liberal constitution that in its scope went much further than the 'early liberal' proposals. Though considered 'un-Dutch' for its German 'organic' orientation and French doctrinaire argumentation, this constitution has survived all political changes up to the time of writing.²⁸

It seems to me that the significance of the 'Thorbeckian momentum' of 1848 emerged from a kind of epistemological jump from the discourse of Restoration to the discourse of Revolution, marked by Thorbecke's own conversion from legalistic monarchism to a doctrinaire liberalism. Passing over the old republican and Anglophile orientation of early aristocratic liberalism, this established an imaginary link with democratic patriotism. As head of government from 1849, he completely changed the franchise, and introduced periodic elections by direct vote. Yet, if this electoral reform weakened the king's power, Thorbecke's constitutional system was generally weighted more towards centralism than federalism, preferring strong government to parliamentary monism, a Bonapartist nationalization of the taxation system, and strengthening state control over education and poor-relief. Precisely because of this break with particularism, however, the Thorbeckian revolution from above lacked the necessary support from below.

The liberal abolition of the estates, seigniorial rights and urban excise duties was particularly favourable to the rising commercial bourgeoisie and industrial manufacturers in the Outer Provinces, but not to the Amsterdam merchant-aristocracy and the landed interest, who endorsed Van Hall's 'conservative liberal' policy of moderate reform. Moreover, the Thorbeckian separation of Church from state alienated the Protestant majority from the government, because they

feared increased influence by Catholic elites on local schools and charity institutions. Finally, Thorbecke's *laissez-faire* policy was opposed to the social demands of the 'people's leaders', who still hoped for an intervention from the king and opted for a sort of radical royalism.²⁹ What these three groups had in common was not a longing for the old regime, but rather an aversion to doctrinaire liberalism, personified by Thorbecke's intellectual hauteur and legalism. So it was religious and class identities as well as political style that explained the estrangement of the 'new liberals' from the mood of the nation.³⁰ While Dutch liberal culture bore for years the legalistic stamp of Thorbecke's personality, 'old liberal' conservatism longed for the Burckian virtues of tradition, prudence and 'Protestant tolerance'. Incapable of philosophical systematizing, its moral language was utterly remote from the scientific attitude and stiff sense of duty of Thorbeckian liberalism and was probably more akin to the evangelical spirit of English Gladstonian liberalism (although lacking the latter's immense popular appeal).

The complexity of this new differentiation of liberalism and conservatism may explain the anti-Catholic anger of the Protestant nation during the so-called April Movement of 1853. Rallying against Thorbecke's consent to a restoration of Catholic ecclesiastical organization, sanctioned by the constitutional separation of Church and state, the Protestants lost confidence in reform from the moment the Catholics began to profit from it – just as the radicals and Catholic patriots had been expelled from office half a century earlier. Though the national organization of this 'no-Popery' movement is still shrouded in mist, local research suggests that it was the combined attack of Thorbecke's government on the vested interests of economy, state and Church that created a 'big Protestant' *rapprochement* of nonconformist radicals, 'early liberal' conservatives, and Calvinist 'Anti-Revolutionaries'.³¹ Most important from the perspective of democratization, however, was its combination of populist strategy and royalist political orientation. Using the instrument of a nationwide people's petition, framed by the Dutch Reformed Church and presented to the king, the April Movement was able to mobilize 'the people behind the electorate' against the liberal government. The petitions – signed by the vast majority of the Protestant adult male population (roughly 200 000 signatures) – were ritually handed over to the king in two ceremonies in the old centre of the Reformation, Utrecht, and the new capital, Amsterdam.

This confrontation between two models of democracy (populist and representational) resulted in a conservative victory, after which Van

Hall took over. Yet, it was not the strength of this anti-parliamentary opposition but rather the king's unconstitutional behaviour that had forced Thorbecke to resign.³² King William III, who had come to the throne in 1849, passionately denounced his father's consent to the idea of constitutional government. Opposed to the former king's liberal revolution, his royalist coup symbolically confirmed the mythical alliance between the House of Orange and the 'Protestant nation', as well as the 'social contract' of 1813 between sovereign and notables. Yet, it was only a brief moment of hope and glory for the last nineteenth-century king of Orange, who, after his finest hour, soon found history passing him by.

The geography of politics

After Thorbecke stepped down in 1853, the old regime seemed to be restored in practice. Indeed, William I's class of notables would govern the nation for at least another thirty years. Although the franchise of 1848 was no longer composed of voters and electives, suffrage still depended on income, while a new differentiation between local and national voters restricted politics, as before, to the upper classes, at least when national issues were at stake. Before 1848 a relatively large group (roughly 90 000) of urban voters could only elect members from a select category of people in the highest tax bracket, restricted to roughly 1 per cent of adult males. From 1848, the franchise was extended to 18–19 per cent for municipal elections, but restricted to 10–11 per cent of adult males for parliamentary and provincial elections (roughly 75 000 voters, or 6–7 per cent of heads of households).³³ Moreover, chosen by indirect vote by the provincial councillors, the Upper House continued to be almost exclusively noble and patrician, while in the Lower House (now chosen by direct vote) at least two-thirds of the seats were taken by noblemen and their untitled relatives, most of whom were burgomasters, court presidents or provincial governors. Before the 1880s only a few members of parliament belonged to the industrial bourgeoisie, and the middle and lower classes were not represented at all.³⁴

To explain this aristocratic continuity after the 'bourgeois revolution' of 1848, Dutch historians have generally assumed that Thorbecke's reforms came too early. It has even been argued, though without much evidence, that the franchise of 1848 was of ample dimensions, since elections had a poor turnout, at least until the denominational politicization of the middle classes from the 1870s.³⁵ Indeed, politics

were characterized during this transition period from enlightened royalism to pillarized mass politics by an almost complete lack of formal party organization, and, accordingly, an individualist voting behaviour in parliament that puzzled even well-informed contemporaries, such as the English ambassador, Lord Napier. In fact, even the ideological colour of the cabinets is hard to classify, as their creation and reshuffling was completely independent of parliamentary influence.³⁶ But does this really mean that the nation adapted itself to the prudent leadership of its moderate elites?

An examination of local elections polls reveals an interesting pattern, which makes it possible to understand the political indifference from a more rational perspective. Both the constituency voting system and the formal rules of the election system of 1848 favoured the majority party through the principle of 'winner takes all'.³⁷ To have a chance of representation, political minorities had either to co-operate or take electoral meetings by surprise. As long as the political factions in the constituencies balanced each other, the polls were generally high. But the turnout lowered as soon as a majority party became firmly entrenched, as voting could hardly be interesting when nothing was at stake. Therefore, the electorate was highly politicized during the political crisis of 1848–53, when in many boroughs old and new liberals were fighting for votes and power. Things changed, however, after the 'April Storm' of 1853, when the 'Thorbeckians' and their Catholic allies were thrown out by majority vote. For at least a decade, elections became ritual confirmations of the conservative hegemony of the Protestant elites. Of course, the office-holders still had to offer themselves as politicians for election by direct vote, and in the aftermath of 1853 some Protestant newcomers from the upper middle class were admitted to office. But the system's complexity promoted the periodic re-election of sitting administrators over new candidates, which means that, for practical purposes, they were chosen for life.

These general observations of the electoral mechanism help us to understand why radical changes in many constituencies often got bogged down in religious strife, which favoured political stability in the end. Yet, they do not explain the significant geographical differentiation in Dutch political culture. The social historian Th. Van Tijn has argued that political opposition in the Netherlands, from the Patriot Revolt of the 1780s to the rise of pillarization in the 1870s, must be interpreted in terms of provincial movements for emancipation, opposed to the economic and political dominance of 'the Amsterdam – The Hague axis'.³⁸ Although there is little empirical proof

for such a long-term geographic continuity of patriotism and liberalism, the election results from 1848 support the idea of an ideological contradiction between Holland and the Outer Provinces. Up to 1870 the central *Randstad*-area between Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam and The Hague was a bulwark of conservatism, whereas the liberals were mainly returned to Parliament by votes from the provincial periphery. This is an interesting contrast to the current cliché of the backward Province as compared to the progressive *Randstad*. The evidence suggests, however, that here religion rather than regionalism was at stake. The electoral basis of conservatism was primarily situated in the Protestant strongholds of the public Church, while the liberals won the polls in some latitudinarian areas in the northern provinces and in the Catholic provinces of Brabant and Limburg.³⁹ Of course, this does not mean that liberalism was weak in Holland; early liberalism, as we saw, had firm roots, especially in Amsterdam, while many Protestant conservatives or 'conservative liberals' were of liberal or even radical descent. For years after the April Movement, though, liberalism in this western part of the country was mainly restricted to the Catholic minority, which comprised 30–40 per cent of urban voters. Thus it seems that 'religiography' explains the fundamental weakness of the liberals in the aftermath of 'their' revolution of 1848, as the patriot dependence on the Catholic periphery could have caused the defeat of radicalism in around 1800.

One of the strategies used by those controlling government after 1848 was gerrymandering: that is, moving constituency boundaries to include desired religious groups. The crucial variable, however, was the balance of power within the centre. Things would only change if some of the Protestant majority were to link up with the Catholic periphery. Such a reshaping of political loyalties took place in the 1860s, the decade that has been called the pivot on which the whole period of 1850–90 hinged.⁴⁰ Repeating the pattern of the 1840s, different religious and social minorities then closed ranks against the established elites by supporting each other's candidates.

In fact, all parties from 1848 onwards had been *ad hoc* coalitions. So too was the 'Big Protestant Party' of 1853, which split up around 1860, when a group of enlightened Protestants tried to win the votes of the Protestant orthodoxy by outbidding the liberals with a mixture of royalism and educational reform. This would possibly have resulted in a Dutch variant of Disraeli's Tory Party, had not another group of Calvinist anti-revolutionaries exchanged the old-Protestant idea of one Church and one nation for a new concept of a free church and a free school, both liberated from government control. This opened up a new

field of coalitions, and the immediate outcome was a liberal victory at the polls. In 1862, Thorbecke formed a second government, which was able to complete the law-making programme of his first administration. And when, in 1866, the conservatives returned to power, the king had to appeal to the country for support for 'his' cabinet against the liberal majority in Parliament. At first this constitutional crisis strengthened the conservative party, as it had in 1853. Yet, eventually, party politics eroded the royalists' right to power.⁴¹ The conservatives suffered an electoral defeat after a second dissolution of Parliament in 1868, when public opinion learned of secret deals between the government and the 'ultramontanists' to join forces against the liberals. At that crucial moment, the heirs of the April Movement of 1853 lost not only the battle but also the Protestant nation.

This remarkable ideological volte-face resulted from the separation of Church and state. This undermined the influence of the notability in Church affairs. In the Dutch Reformed Church, the 'liberal' patricians (both old and new liberals) lost their ecclesiastical hegemony after the introduction of an electoral system for Church offices in 1869, enabling the *reveil* aristocrats to mobilize the orthodox parishioners against the exponents of the 'theology of Enlightenment'.⁴² Equally, after the Episcopal restoration of the Roman Catholic Church in 1853, the notable liberal laity lost influence to a new elite of ultramontanists, who – solidly backed by the clergy – exchanged their allegiance to the democratic parties of 1795 and 1848 for an anti-modernist policy, inspired by the encyclical *Quanta Cura* (1864).⁴³

Around 1870, these ecclesiastical changes produced political change. The 'big Protestant' coalition of conservatives and anti-revolutionaries and the 'Papo-Thorbeckian' alliance of liberals and Catholics both disintegrated. In 1860, liberals and conservatives each had 34 out of 72 seats in Parliament. In 1877 the liberals occupied 45 seats, while the conservatives dropped to 7 seats (out of 80); the rest was divided among the new clerical parties: Catholic ultramontanists and Calvinist anti-revolutionaries.⁴⁴ Within a few years this reversal of alliances was responsible for the complete transformation of the geography of politics. Liberalism after 1870 lost its hold on the Catholic south and took its main strength from the latitudinarian north and the old stronghold of conservatism: the cities of Holland. The anti-revolutionaries conquered the orthodox 'Bible Belt' in the middle of the country, and the Catholics were politically organized on ultramontanist foundations from the southern province of Brabant.⁴⁵ In mixed areas of Protestants and Catholics, the meeting of forces took the form of anti-Papist charivaris,

just as it had during the earlier breaks in political culture around 1800, 1830 and 1850.⁴⁶ But, again, these rituals of identity only accentuated the essentially pluralist character of the nation, which since 1795 had never seriously been questioned.

Politics in a new key

In the 1870s, the separation of religion and politics, generated by the 1848 disestablishment, culminated in a *Kulturkampf*. On the one hand, a new generation of 'young liberals' tried to cleanse politics of religion; and on the other, a new generation of clerical politicians transferred religious revivalism to politics. Thus, in 1878, the liberal prime minister, J. Kappeyne van de Coppello, initiated a civilizing offensive to 'enlighten' the nation through the state's primary-school system, while both the ultramontanists and anti-revolutionaries petitioned the king for state aid for denominational education.⁴⁷ Significantly, though, the 'School Act agitation', aimed at the withdrawal of the liberal Education Bill, mobilized an even larger part of the nation against the government than the no-Popery agitation of 1853. Yet, the instrument of a people's petition proved to be outdated, since the monarchy had lost its political power as a result of the constitutional crisis of 1866-8.

Although clerical constituency associations dated from the 1860s, the 'school struggle' stimulated their national integration along party lines. In 1879, the Calvinist preacher-politician, Abraham Kuyper, founded the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), held to be the first modern political party in the Netherlands; and in 1883 the priest-politician, H. J. A. M. Schaepman, published his ultramontanist 'Manifesto for a Roman Catholic Party'. Interestingly, their new strategy of political centralization and ideological isolation was accompanied by a more 'politicised' theological orientation. Kuyper distanced himself from the ethical-pietism of the conservative *reveil* aristocracy, while Schaepman, though distrusted by the episcopate for his 'open' Catholicism, initiated an ideological break with the 'Papo Thorbeckian' elites. Together, this opened up the prospect of a 'monstrous coalition' of the adherents of Rome and Calvin. This ideological bridging of the cleavage of the Reformation, which until then had prevented the conservatives from winning the Catholic vote, goes by the name of 'the Antithesis': the dichotomy of Christianity and 'Paganism', or, in Dutch terms, the dichotomy of right and left.

Thus, just as the conservatives in the 1850s had initiated the electoral instrument of local constituency associations, so the clerics in the 1870s introduced modern party organization – featuring a party manifesto, voting discipline and a cult of leadership. This pattern was followed by the socialists in the 1880s, but never perfectly imitated by the liberals. Moulded by the agitation for *laissez faire* and public spirit in the 1840s and 1860s, liberal culture would adhere for more than a century to the respectable sociability of the Masonic club and the genteel style of the debating society.⁴⁸ Still, the education issue contributed not only to the strength of the clerical coalition but also to a 'Protestantization' of liberalism. The conservatives left the stage only because the clerics monopolized the interests of Church and religion, and the liberals took over carrying the torch of anti-clericalism, as defenders of the unitarian principles of 1795. As such, this ideological polarization marked a decisive division between the secular and the religious. The result was a new political arrangement, in which the secular 'left' (the socialists included) became identified with the autonomy of the state's public sphere as an endangered remnant of William I's enlightened nation, whereas the clerical 'right' demanded denominational 'particularism', as a corporatist translation of the old republican fear of centralism.

Thus, paradoxically, the nationalization of the masses took place in the Netherlands by way of pillarized segmentation. Yet this segmented integration should not blind us to the fact that, at least until the end of the century, at the local level the political machinery was still controlled by 'local bosses', functioning as power brokers between the state and their own communities. In most boroughs, a new generation of Catholic ultramontanists and anti-revolutionary officials simply continued the 'family government' of their conservative or liberal fathers and uncles.⁴⁹ The clerical 'emancipators' were drawn from the patrician class, not from 'the people', and often formed a paternalistic elite *par excellence*. Besides, even the liberal notables in Parliament could often survive for years by crossing the poles of the antithesis in their own constituencies, as active members of consistories and Christian school boards. Thus within the ARP, as within the Liberal Union (1885) and the Catholic party organizations, the regional notable elites played prominent roles until the 1890s.

This aristocratic continuity suggests that parliamentary democracy in the Netherlands did not imply a process of social democratization: it was the political dynamic itself that determined the rules of the game and the number of players. Thus, in 1887, the liberal majority party

initiated electoral reform, seeking new voters to outvote the more conservative clerical parties at the polls and win over the radical adherents of the 'League for Universal Suffrage' (1879). The discrimination between local and national voters disappeared, after which the electorate increased from 122 000 to 292 000 (25–26 per cent of the adult male population, 13 or 14 per cent of the adult population at that time). Yet these franchise extensions proved to be more favourable to the right than the left. The clerical minorities succeeded for the first time in mobilizing the popular vote 'against liberalism' by combining their lists of candidates. The liberals were not only defeated at the elections; they also had to face the holy music of a Christian cabinet (1888–92) being played within the old humanist nation of Erasmus and Spinoza. Yet the reforms of 1887 showed not only the fragility of the liberal order, they also pointed at the weak spot of 'the Coalition'. Only two of the eight ministers were Catholics: yet polling evidence suggests that Catholics cross-voted for anti-revolutionaries but Calvinists hardly cast a vote for ultramontanists. Thus after the Christian coalition (1888–1892) altered the liberal Education Act and reached consensus on the possibility of state-aided denominational education, it broke apart as an old-fashioned alliance of interest groups: there simply was no 'clerical policy' apart from the education issue.⁵⁰

Between 1891 and 1901 the liberals operated again (but for the last time) as a majority party. But behind the liberal-clerical scheme, a new segmentation was taking place. The 1890s were a decade of political radicalization, fostered by the agrarian depression as well as the take-off of modern industrialization and the consequential drift from the land to the cities. All parties were then confronted with their own democratic opposition, demanding an extension of the franchise and a change of personnel. For a while this seemed to result in a new, dualist party structure along the lines of class instead of religion. In opposition to the notable elites of their own clerical parties, Kuyper and Schaepman – the latter now backed by the social encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of 1891 – allied themselves with the young liberal prime minister, J.P.R. Tak van Poortvliet, in support of his radical bill to extend suffrage to the working classes. Though the liberals in 1894 occupied no fewer than 60 out of 100 seats, overall the 'Takkians' were defeated in the election. Yet, in the longer run, the democratic element in Parliament was strengthened by the moderate electoral law of 1896, which enfranchised tradesmen, shopkeepers and craftsman.

In all parties, this helped to produce a break with the notable elites. In 1896 the *reveil* aristocracy, opposed to electoral reform and Kuyper's

coalition with Rome, broke away from the ARP and virtually allied themselves with the 'national liberals'. This had seceded from the 'Takkian' Union, which also lost its left wing of social liberals in 1901. Only the Catholic Party did not split during the radical 1890s. It was reorganized by the clergy along corporatist lines as a league of upper, middle and lower class representatives, in response to popular demand for a progressive Christian Democratic Party.⁵¹

In 1896, the connection between suffrage and taxpaying was exchanged for a broader definition of electoral capability, which extended the franchise to some 50 per cent of the adult male population (581 000 voters in 1897). But again, as in 1887, electoral reform proved most favourable to the right. However, the second cabinet of the clerical coalition (1901–5) headed by Kuyper, contrasted strongly with the first coalition government, presided over by a moderate, Baron Aeneas Mackay, a descendant of Scottish nobility. Though royalist and nationalist at heart, Kuyper's populist appearance raised hopes for democratic reform. Yet, after the 'men with the double names' had lost their hold on politics, he exchanged his social policy for one of stabilization. On the threshold of the twentieth century, the antithesis was introduced once again, though it was no longer directed against liberalism, but this time against socialism. Kuyper lost his democratic reputation after the railway strike of 1903, when the government introduced its notorious anti-socialist 'strangle laws'. In fact, this new identification with law and order contributed to his overthrow in 1905. Yet the Social Democratic Labour Party (the SDAP, founded in 1894) played into the clerics' hands in 1913, by rejecting a liberal proposal for government participation. After the SDAP further isolated themselves by their so-called Operetta Revolution of 1918 – 'the revolution that did not come off', as the Marxists put it – the confessional parties were able to monopolize political power up to the Second World War.⁵²

After the Pacification of 1917, and the introduction of universal suffrage and proportional representation in subsequent years, the liberals changed from a majority party into one of the smallest political minorities. But the process of democratization was also at the expense of the socialists. Increased from two parliamentary seats in 1898 to twenty-two in 1918, the socialist vote stagnated until the 1960s at around 20–25 per cent. Again this was a case of 'religiography', since socialism (like social liberalism) was almost entirely a latitudinarian phenomenon, restricted to the radical sociability of nonconformists, freethinkers and Jews in the *Randstad* area, and the agrarian proletariat of the north-eastern Outer Provinces. In opposition to the old paternalism of the

'liberal elites' as well as the growing influence of the orthodoxy in and outside the Dutch Reformed Church, both regions functioned from the late nineteenth century as the geographical nucleus of atheism in the Netherlands.⁵³ Therefore, rather than being a vehicle of democratization, socialism was one of de-Christianization. Thus it was hardly accidental that a former Lutheran clergyman, Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis, founder of the 'old socialist movement' in the 1880s, was hailed by his followers as 'Our Saviour' and titled his autobiography 'From Christian to Anarchist'.⁵⁴

In the Netherlands it was not the socialists but the ultramontanists who held the key to *social* democratization. Except for the hinterland of the great port towns of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, modern industrialization was concentrated in those areas where for centuries Catholics had been the majority among the working classes: from the mining industry in Limburg and the tanneries in Brabant, to the cotton belt of Twente and the breweries of Holland. Yet the political significance of the working classes also contributed to a remarkable volte-face in the clerical balance of power. The first Christian cabinets of Mackay and Kuyper had been no more than a try-out of the impending politics of pillarization, since they relied on the Catholic vote but reflected a Protestant hegemony. In fact, as we have seen, this had been a structural feature of Dutch politics ever since the Batavian Revolution. But this changed after the railway strike of 1903, when the episcopate started an anti-socialist offensive to organize the Catholic workers into corporatist 'estates'.⁵⁵ The strength of these pillarized, mass organizations contributed to the defeat of the Reds in 1918 (as later of the Fascist movement). After this the Roman Catholic State Party (RKSP) controlled the popular vote.

Yet, to underline the importance of class to Catholic policy, it was also at the insistence of the clergy that, on the eve of the Second World War (following the economic crisis of the 1930s), the social democrats were invited to join the government. Far from being a socialist victory, however, this so-called Second Pacification (in 1939) marked the Catholics' pivotal political role. Socialist participation in national politics was made possible only by its symbolic integration with the nation. In fact, the SDAP came to play a vanguard role in the European-wide 'bourgeoisification' of the socialists; but the price of its political success was the loss of its ideological soul: republicanism, Marxist ideology and trade unionism were replaced by a policy of appeasement towards 'Crown, Church and capital'.⁵⁶ Instead of a class ideology, socialism came to be seen as a moral stance against

materialism and individualism. This 'personalist' socialism – or 'ethical socialism' in British terms – was, in fact, so akin to Catholic corporatism that, in the aftermath of the Second World War, a political fusion of Catholics and socialists seemed to be likely. Yet, episcopal fear of de-Christianization frustrated this 'Breakthrough Movement', though for almost two decades the country was ruled by a 'Red Roman Coalition'.⁵⁷ The great transformation had to wait until the so-called depillarization of the 1960s and 1970s. Only then did the Roman Catholic Church experience a similar process of internal crisis, which the Dutch Reformed Church had experienced almost a century before.⁵⁸ And it was only after this that the liberal and socialist parties were able to penetrate the Catholic Outer Provinces, and govern without clerical consent; a political secularization that contributed strongly to a last swing of the political pendulum: the so-called purple coalition of liberals and socialists of the 1990s.

Conclusions

At the beginning of this chapter I questioned the idea of Dutch democratization as a gradual, straightforward evolution. In contrast to this conciliatory leitmotiv of both the political and scholarly community, I argued that political development experienced some fundamental discontinuities. But these breaks did not seriously endanger political stability. The argument we have developed suggests that political loyalties were moulded within an age-old culture of particularism, and were based primarily on kinship and 'religiography' rather than class and ideology. Moreover, the time-lag between the establishment of parliamentary democracy and the take-off of modern industrialization prevented a fundamental politicization of the lower classes.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, political culture was controlled by a relatively small class of notables, mainly landlords and merchant bankers, who gained power at the time of the Batavian Revolt of 1795 and the democratic reforms of the 1830s and 1840s. Political debate during this period centred on the constitutional legitimacy of kingship. After the constitution of 1848 and the constitutional crisis around 1870 had reshaped the political landscape, the new political parties would never again question the legitimacy of the system. What they asked for was access to the primary schools and the parliamentary system; in other words, admission to the nation. But even entry to public culture was controlled by the notable elites, whose politics of accommodation was based on the assumption that a gradual

incorporation of the lower classes would strengthen their position. If, in the end, this proved to be a miscalculation, it was not because the masses were putting through their own demands, but rather because new political elites, backed by the Churches, were seeking a confrontation with the old establishment by creating segmented routes to national integration.

This process of pillarized democratization reflected a fundamental economic transformation, that undermined the position of the old notability as a reasonably cohesive political, economic and cultural elite. Pillarization can therefore be seen as a new mechanism of social integration, balancing the interests of employers, tradesmen and workers; a vertical, religious integration that promoted social stability by cutting across the boundaries of class. Moreover, the national pillars also integrated regional interests after the old elites had disappeared. It was because of this that they led to the rise of new mediating elites, which, in spite of their ideologies of antithesis and class struggle, were ready to identify with the symbols and rituals of the nation as soon as they were allowed to participate in the political process.

It is here that we should look for the origin of the conciliatory myth of political development, because this late-nineteenth-century process of accommodation enabled the new elites to identify themselves with the legalist culture of liberal politics, combining a respect for judicial rules with an emphasis on moral integrity.⁵⁹ However, to understand the dynamic of this accommodationist elite culture, we cannot content ourselves with the historical myth of an age-old patrician culture of religious toleration. Faced with the politization of religious subcultures generated by the 1848 disestablishment, it was liberal dissension, and not the preference of the elites' for moderation and compromise, that produced this ruling behaviour. By accommodating potential opposition movements, or even initiating reforms themselves, the 'prudent leaders' succeeded in engaging the loyalty of their voters. This was a lasting strategy, that according to some, even survived the radical 1960s.⁶⁰

Yet, having demonstrated discontinuity in the process of democratization, what explains Dutch society's long-term stability? The answer, I would suggest, has much to do with the dualist origin of the political culture of the Netherlands' as traced above. If politicians, even today, successfully mask their recruitment from the upper classes by appealing to the common interest, they are merely heirs of the nineteenth-century notables. The political elite is considered to represent the moral authority of what is called the *overheid*: an idea of government

that – in contrast to the Prussian concept of *Obrigkeit* – is not associated with the state, but with the nation. Thus, democracy in the Netherlands is legitimated in terms of a defence of freedom. Rather than a game for popular influence, the crux of political power is a business-like play of negotiations on the distribution of means among the key groups of society, who are not expected to govern on their own. Bearing the stamp of history, this frozen system has never been seriously opposed from outside since it was democratized by the elites from above, and, is menaced only by the indifference of the masses below.

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 33. Blok, *Stemmen en kiezen*.
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37. Robert van der Laarse and Jaap Talsma, *Accommodatiegedrag van lokale politieke elites bij gemeenteraadsverkiezingen in de tweede helft van de 19de eeuw* (Report of the 'Research group to local processes of pillarization, 1850–1920', University of Amsterdam, 1986, 40 pp.)
38. Th. van Tijn, 'The Party Structure of Holland and the Outer Provinces in the Nineteenth Century', in G. A. M. Beekelaar, J. J. Woltjer (eds) *Vaderlands Verleden in Veelvoud*, in particular pp. 564–7, 572.
39. Hans Knippenberg, *De religieuze kaart van Nederland. Omvang en geografische spreiding van de godsdienstige gezindten vanaf de Reformatie tot heden* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1992).
40. E. H. Kossmann, *De Lage Landen 1780–1940. Anderhalve eeuw Nederland en België* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1979) p. 145 (originally published as *The Low Countries, 1780–1940* (Oxford University Press, 1978); this notion is, however, restricted to political discourse, for the decline of political conservatism did not reflect a social transformation, as Kossmann suggests.
41. J. T. Minderaa, 'De macht des konings en de parlementaire democratie. De discussie van 1866', in E. Jonkers and M. van Rossem (eds), *Geschiedenis en Cultuur. Achttien opstellen. Festschrift voor Herman van der Dunk* (The Hague: SDU, 1990) pp. 97–106.
42. A detailed analysis of this process at the local level can be found in Van der Laarse, *Bevoogding en Bevinding*, pp. 140–62, 214–34.
43. J. P. de Valk, 'Meer Hollands dan Paaps? De Nederlandse kerkprovincie en Rome in de tweede helft van de negentiende eeuw', in *Archief voor de Geschiedenis van de Katholieke Kerk in Nederland* vol. 27 (1985) pp. 140–56; Robert van der Laarse, 'Verzwoegen door den ultramontaanschen vloed. Leken en clerus in katholiek Delft in de negentiende eeuw', in Blom and Misset, *Broeders sluit U aan*, pp. 68–109.
44. C. A. Tamse, 'De politieke ontwikkeling in Nederland, 1874–1887', in *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, vol. xiii (Haarlem/Bussum: Fibula-Van Dishoeck/Unieboek, 1978) p. 219.
45. Even as late as 1986 the polls for the elections of the Second Chamber reflect this pillarized political geography: Hans Knippenberg and Ben de Pater, *De eenwording van Nederland Schaalvergroting en integratie sinds 1800*. (Nijmegen: SUN, 1988) p. 193.
46. Frans Groot, 'Papists and Beggars. National Festivals and Nation Building in the Netherlands during the 19th Century', in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), *The Religious Morality of the Nation State* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
47. G. Taal, *Liberalen en radicalen in Nederland, 1872–1901* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980) pp. 43–81.
48. Remieg Aerts, *De letterheren. Liberale cultuur in de negentiende eeuw: het tijdschrift De Gids* (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1997); Ido de Haan and Henk te Velde, 'Vormen van politiek. Veranderingen van de openbaarheid in Nederland, 1850–1900', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, vol. 111 (1996) pp. 167–200.
49. The following is mainly based on the publications and reports of the 'Research group on local processes of pillarization, 1850–1920' at the Department of History of the University of Amsterdam. The results of the research will be published in 1999.
50. Paul Luyckx and Hans Righart (eds), *Van de pastorie naar het torentje; een eeuw confessionele politiek* (The Hague: SDU, 1991) pp. 176–9.
51. Taal, *Liberalen en Radicalen*, pp. 230–318; J. A. Bornewasser, 'De katholieke partijvorming tot de Eerste Wereldoorlog', in L. W. G. Scholten, J. A. Bornewasser, I. Schöffers *et al.*, *De confessionelen, ontstaan en ontwikkeling van de christelijke partijen* (Utrecht: Ambo, 1968) pp. 23–40; R. Kuiper, *Herenmuiterij. Vernieuwing en sociaal conflict in de antirevolutionaire partij 1871–1894* (Leiden: J. J. Groen, 1994).
52. A. J. C. Rüter, *De spoorwegstakingen van 1903. Een spiegel der arbeidersbeweging in Nederland* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1935); and H. J. Scheffer, *November 1918. Journaal van een revolutie die niet doorging* (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1971).
53. Knippenberg, *Religieuze kaart*, ch. 7, pp. 227–43.
54. Bert Altena (ed.), 'En al beschouwen alle broeders mij als den verloren broeder'. *De familiecorrespondentie van en over Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis, 1846–1932* (Amsterdam: IISG, 1997).
55. Siep Stuurman, *Verzuiling, kapitalisme en patriërchaat. Aspecten van de ontwikkeling van de moderne staat in Nederland* (Nijmegen: SUN, 1983) pp. 148 ff.
56. Dietrich Orlow, 'The Paradox of Success. Dutch Social Democracy and its Historiography', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* vol. 110, no. 1 (1995) pp. 40–51.
57. Jan Bank, *Opkomst en ondergang van de Nederlandse Volksbeweging* (Deventer: Kluwer, 1978); J. A. Bornewasser, *Katholieke Volkspartij 1945–1980, Vol. 1, Herkomst en groei (tot 1963)*, KDC Bronnen en Studies xxvi, (Nijmegen: Valkhof pers, 1995).
58. J. M. G. Thurlings, *De wankele zuil. Nederlands katholicisme tussen assimilatie en pluralisme* (Nijmegen/Amersfoort: Dekker & Van de Vegt/De Horstink, 1971); Jan Bank, "Verzuiling": A Confessional Road to Secularization. Emancipation and the Decline of Political Catholicism', in Duke and Tamse, *Church and State*, pp. 207–30.
59. Henk te Velde, *Gemeenschapszin en plichtsbefef. Liberalisme en nationalisme in Nederland 1870–1918* (The Hague: SDU, 1992); Stefan Dudink, *Deugdzaam liberalisme. Sociaal-liberalisme in Nederland 1870–1901* (Amsterdam: IISG, 1997); Robert van der Laarse, 'Een morele natie: religie en politieke cultuur', in H. Schmall Leo Lucassen, Jolanda E. Heemskerk *et al.* *Nederland in de twintigste eeuw* (Utrecht: Teleac, 1995) pp. 68–89.
60. James C. Kennedy, *Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw. Nederland in de jaren zestig* (Meppel: Boom, 1995).