Concession. A typological study

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3 Semantic properties

In this chapter, which consists of five parts, I will define and delimit the semantic domain of concession, describing at the same time various types of concessive constructions and the manner in which these constructions fit into the layered discourse structure of the FG framework. In Section 3.1 I define the concept of concessivity in general. In Section 3.2 I give an overview of the different levels of linking which apply to concessives, proposing in Section 3.3 a possible way of representing concessives within the hierarchical structure of discourse in FG. In Section 3.4 examples will be given of the various subtypes which correspond with the different semantic levels. In Section 3.5, finally, I will discuss the semantico-syntactic behaviour of these concessive subtypes.

3.1. Delimiting the semantic domain of concession

3.1.1. Concessivity versus adversativity

Traditional grammar usually gives the following type of definition of concessive constructions: 'Concessive clauses indicate that the situation in the matrix clause is contrary to expectation in the light of what is said in the concessive clause' (Quirk et al. 1985: 1098).

Often concessive and adversative constructions are being reduced to the same denominator: 'There is good evidence for the assumption that concessive or adversative relations can be expressed in all languages' (König 1988: 146), or 'The basic meaning of the adversative relation is contrary to expectation' (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 250). In the following I will try to demonstrate that most of the times there is a semantic distinction to be made between adversative and concessive relationships.

1 The Real Academia Española (1985: 557) has the following entry concerning the relation between adversativity and concessivity: '... Lo que se expresa mediante coordinación adversativa: *Me ha ofendido profundamente, pero sabré perdonarle*, puede formularse también por medio de subordinación concessiva: *Aunque me ha ofendido profundamente, sabré perdonarle*. Este parentesco lógico explica el parentesco histórico entre la coordinación adversativa y la subordinación concessiva; varias conjunciones (*aunque, aun*) y giros conjuntos se han usado y se usan indistintamente en ambos tipos oracionales. [What is expressed by adversative coordination: He has offended me deeply, but I will be able to pardon him, may also be formulated through concessive subordination: Although he has offended me deeply, I will be able to pardon him. This logic relationship explains the historical relationship between adversative coordination and concessive subordination; several conjunctions (*aunque, aun*) and conjunctional phrases have been and are being used indistinctly in both sentence types].
3.1.1.1. Concessive relations

The two clauses that form part of a concessive construction have a factual character and someone who utters a construction of the general format (1), is committed to the truth of both propositions (cf. König 1988: 146).

\[(1) \quad \text{Although } p, q\]

An example is given in (2):

\[(2) \quad \text{Although it is raining, I am going out for a walk.}\]

Moreover a connection is implied between the propositions of the two related clauses in question: the speaker asserts these two propositions against the background assumption that the two types of situations \(p\) and \(q\) describe are generally incompatible. This implication has the status of a presupposition rather than that of an entailment (cf. König 1986: 233). For an example such as (3a) the concessive presupposition may be expressed as in (3b):

\[(3) \quad (a) \quad \text{Although John did not have any money, he went into that posh restaurant.}\\
(b) \quad \text{If one does not have any money, one usually does not go into a posh restaurant.}\]

Abstracting from the content of the two clauses or, in other words, considering concessive sentences of the format (1), the relevant presupposition may therefore be formulated as follows:

\[(4) \quad \text{If } p', \text{ then normally } \neg q'\]

Expressing a concessive sentence of the format (1) amounts to expressing two propositions \(p\) and \(q\) against the background assumption that the eventualities \(p'\) and \(q'\), of which \(p\) and \(q\) describe an instance, normally do not go together.

3.1.1.2. Adversative relations

Sentences that are conjointly by an adversative conjunction must, in some way, be semantically related to one another, but at the same time they must differ in such a way that there is a denial of a certain pattern of expectation.

\[(5) \quad \text{John is tall but Bill is short.}\]
\[(6) \quad \text{John hates ice cream but I like it.}\]
\[(7) \quad \text{John is tall but he's no good at basketball.}\]
\[(8) \quad \text{John hates ice cream, but so do I.}\]

In examples (5) through (8) we can start by asking exactly where the difference lies

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\(^3\) In discussing the major properties of concessive constructions, I will draw heavily on König (1986, 1988, 1994).
that allows the use of *but*. In both (5) and (6) we see that two of the lexical items in each sentence (*tall/short, hate/like*) form a pair of antonyms in each case. As Lakoff (1971: 133) points out, there is no relationship, implicit or otherwise, between the two parts of the sentence except that the subjects of the two sentences are directly opposed to one another in a particular property: there is no reason to assume that, since the first part of the sentence is true, the second part should be false; no conclusion about the second member of the conjunct is derivable from the first. Lakoff (1971: 133) has labelled this use of *but* as the *semantic-opposition-but*.

In the examples (7) and (8) there are no pairs of words that are opposed; in fact, in (8) the same lexical item *hates* is apparently contrasted with itself. Although in this case *but* is used without any notion of semantic opposition, there is obviously a difference implied between the two members of the conjunct.

In a sentence like (7) the use of *but* is conditioned by the combination of an assertion plus a presupposition. The assertion of the whole construction goes as follows: John is tall and he is no good at basketball. In this case the presupposition concerns the connection that the speaker makes between being tall and being good at basketball: if someone is tall, then normally one would expect him/her to be good at basketball. Since the presupposition in (7) involves a general tendency or expectation, Lakoff (1971: 133) calls this the *denial-of-expectation but*. Example (8) is similar; while the assertion is: John hates ice cream, and so do I, the presupposition is: One would expect that anything John hated, I would like. Contrary to a sentence like (7), in (8) the speaker and hearer obviously must know something special about John's relationship to the speaker in order for such a sentence to be meaningful.

3.1.1.3. Concessives versus adversatives

As suggested by the definitions given above, the adversative conjunction *but* may be replaced by the concessive conjunction *although* in those cases in which a denial of a certain pattern of expectation takes place. In the case of semantic opposition, the replacing of *but* by *although* will present interpretation problems.

(9) Although John is tall, he's no good at basketball.
(10) Although John is tall, Bill is short.

In (9) the concessive subordinate clause is a potential obstacle for the validity of the main clause; in the case of a sentence like (10) one can ask oneself to which extent John's length would lead to a certain expectation concerning Bill's length.

Of course there always exists a chiastic symmetry between an adversative and a concessive clause. An adversative conjunction marks a main clause, while a concessive conjunction will necessarily mark a subordinate clause within a construction. If they marked the same clause the opposition main-subordinate clause would be lost, since the concessive conjunction would acquire an adversative status.

(i) Although it's raining I'm going for a walk.
(ii) It's raining *but* I'm going for a walk.
When the *semantic-opposition-but* is replaced by *although*, one finds that, if the sentence is still meaningful, one has inadvertently assumed a denial-of-expectation interpretation.

(11) John is poor but Bill is rich.
(12) ?Although John is poor, Bill is rich.
(13) John has black hair but his parents both have blond hair.
(14) ?Although John has black hair, his parents both have blond hair.

As I have already mentioned, a connection is presupposed between both conjuncts of concessive constructions as well as between both conjuncts of adversative constructions in the case of a denial-of-expectation reading. We have seen above that this connection is obviously not the case with adversative constructions with a semantic-opposition reading. Therefore we may claim that the subordinating concessive conjunction *although* is coupled with the coordinating adversative conjunction *but* in the case of a denial-of-expectation reading of the latter. However, as we will see in the following, there remains a conceptual difference between the two types of construction.

(15) (a) It is very late, but I’m not tired.
   \[ p, \text{but} q \]
   (b) Although it is very late, I’m not tired.
   \[ \text{although} \, p, \, q \]

The proposition \(p\) in (15a) and (15b) has the underlying presupposition \(r^*: \text{if it is very late, one should be tired.}\) However, \(q\) expresses exactly the opposite: *I am not tired* \((\neg r)^*\). The force of \(q\) contra \(r\) is bigger than \(p\)’s force pro \(r\). Thus, we may state that the propositional content of \(q\) expresses a primary concept within both constructions \((p, \text{but} \, q \text{ and} \text{although} \, p, \, q)\), while the propositional content of \(p\) expresses a secondary concept in both constructions. In other words, the adversative conjunction *but* introduces the primary concept, while the concessive conjunction *although* introduces the secondary concept. As we will see below there are also instances of a completely matching use of *but* and *although* where the so-called *adversative although* introduces the primary concept as well.

Ducrot (1980) mentions an adversative use of concessive conjunctions and more or less corroborates the position that *but* and the adversative *although* express the primary concept, while the concessive *although* expresses a secondary concept. When somebody who is asked the way answers with *C’est loin* \((p)\), *mais il y a un bus* \((q)\) (It is far, but there is a bus), the proposition \(p\) suggests *it is hard to get there* \((r)\), while \(q\) suggests precisely the opposite: *it is not hard to get there* \((\neg r)\). The force of \(q\) contra \(r\) is bigger than \(p\)’s force pro \(r\), so that \(p\) *mais* \(q\) has to be interpreted as \(\neg r\). Thus *It’s far, but there is a bus* may be interpreted as *it is not hard to get there*.

In the light of Ducrot's analysis of adversatives I would like to claim that concessives always introduce the secondary concept, even in those cases in which a denial of a certain pattern of expectation takes place and they actually replace adversatives.

(7) John is tall but he's no good at basketball.
(9) Although John is tall, he's no good at basketball.

Taking another look at examples (7) and (9), we may conclude that the but-clause in (7) expresses the primary concept, while the although-clause in (9) expresses the secondary concept. In (7) the force of the but-clause \( q \) contra \( r \) (if someone is tall, then one would expect him to be good at basketball) is bigger than the force of \( p \) (John is tall) pro \( r \). In (9) the force of the main clause \( q \) contra \( r \) is also bigger than the force of the although-clause pro \( r \).

As mentioned above, there are languages in which the concessive conjunction may get an adversative status. Consider the following Spanish examples:

(16) Spanish (Indo-European)
   (a) *Aunque me duelen los pies, puedo andar.*
       although to:me hurt:3PL the feet can:1SG walk:INF
       'Although my feet hurt, I can walk.'
   (b) *Me duelen los pies, pero puedo andar.*
       to:me hurt:3PL the feet, but can:1SG walk:INF
       'My feet hurt, but I can walk.'
   (c) *Me duelen los pies, aunque puedo andar.*
       to:me hurt:3PL the feet, although can:1SG walk:INF
       'My feet hurt, but I can walk.'

In (16a) the force of the main clause \( q \) contra \( r \) (I cannot walk) is bigger than the force of the aunque-clause pro \( r \). In (16b) and (16c), however, the force of the pero-and the aunque-clause \( q \) contra \( r \) (I cannot walk) is bigger than the force of \( p \) pro \( r \). It is obvious that in these last cases the aunque-clause can never be in initial position, since it immediately loses its adversative status once it is preposed and automatically acquires concessive status as in (16a).

3.1.1.4. Conclusion

The adversative conjunction *but* cannot be replaced off-hand by the concessive conjunction *although*. This is only possible in those cases which have a denial-of-expectation reading. However, the although-clause maintains its concessive status in these cases and expresses the secondary concept of the complete construction. In those cases in which *but* can be replaced by adversative *although*, although expresses the primary concept.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Note that in these cases there is no question of chiastic symmetry, since the although-clause necessarily takes the same sentence final position as the but-clause.
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In the case of semantic opposition the replacement of *but* by *although* only seems possible when the speaker has inadvertently assumed a denial-of-expectation interpretation.

3.1.2. Concessives versus concessive conditionals

Concessives are closely related to a certain type of conditionals and often derive from such conditionals. In a wide variety of grammars and specific analyses of the relevant area, among others Haiman (1974), the following sentence types, each of which identifies one specific subtype of *concessive conditionals*, are usually not grouped together as varieties of one and the same construction type:

(16) (a) Even if he does not find a job, John will marry Susan next month.
(b) Whether or not he finds a job, John is going to marry Susan next month.
(c) Whatever his prospects of finding a job are, John is going to marry Susan next month.

If these three constructions are brought together at all, it is only in connection with the pragmatic category of 'conceding' or 'concession' (Hausplmath and König 1998: 564).

3.1.2.1. Conditionality and concessive conditionals

A more thorough look at sentences (*17a–c*) shows us that they are basically conditionals. All three sentence types express a conditional relationship between an antecedent and a consequent. What differentiates them from standard conditionals (if *p*, then *q*) is the nature of the antecedent. Instead of relating a single antecedent to a consequent, as in the case of standard conditionals, the concessive conditionals relate a series of antecedent conditions to a consequent, as illustrated in (18):

(18) If *{a or b or c or d . . .}* then *q*

This set can be specified by characterizing the antecedent as an extreme value for the relevant conditional sentence form (*scalar concessive conditionals* as in (*17a*)), by a disjunction between antecedent *p* and its negation (*alternative concessive conditionals* as in (*17b*)) or by some quantification over a variable in the antecedent (*universal concessive conditionals* as in (*17c*)). As Hausplmath and König (1998: 566) point out, in the case of scalar concessive conditionals, the fact that the conditional is asserted for the extreme case implies that it also holds for the less extreme cases; hence the quantificational effect of *even*. The basic conditional

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*This section is based on Hausplmath and König (1998). For a more detailed discussion of concessive conditionals the reader is referred to this article.*
meaning of sentences like (17a–c) is reflected more clearly by Haspelmath and König (1998: 566) through the following semantic representations:

(19)  
(a) Even \( (\lambda x \left[ \text{if } x \text{ then } q \right]) \),\ not-p 
(b) If \( (p \text{ or not}-p) \) then \( q \) 
(c) \( (\forall x) \ (\text{if } p \text{, then } q) \) 

Representation (19a) is the result of extracting the focused part of a sentence as ‘even if not-p, q’, of replacing it by a variable and of binding the variable by a lambda operator. In (19b) the conditional connective relates a disjunction of an antecedent and its negation to a consequent. Representation (19c), finally, is meant to capture the intuition that universal concessive conditionals involve some kind of universal quantification over a variable in the antecedent, which is restricted by an expression that in many languages is also used as an interrogative or relative pronoun (who-ever, what-ever, when-ever, where-ever, etc.).

3.1.2.2. Concessivity and concessive conditionals

Concessive conditionals share with genuine concessives the inclusion of an unfavourable circumstance in the set of antecedents related to the consequent. In the examples under (17) this unfavourable circumstance is ‘John’s not finding a job’. A second property shared by concessive conditionals and concessives is the factuality of the main clause. Constructions with concessive clauses, however, entail both their main clause and their subordinate clause. Thus, anyone who utters the concessive sentence exemplified in (20a) is committed to the truth of both (20b) and (20c):

(20)  
(a) Even though he sprained his ankle on Monday, John ran the Marathon on Tuesday.
(b) John sprained his ankle on Monday.
(c) John ran the Marathon on Tuesday.

Whereas sentences with concessive clauses entail both their main clause and their subordinate clause, concessive conditionals are semifactual in the standard cases, and therefore typically entail their main clause (König 1986, Barker 1991).

As Haspelmath and König (1998: 567) clearly show, the semifactuality of concessive conditionals is expressed most explicitly in alternative concessive conditionals. In these cases the consequent is invariable true, because one of the two possibilities given in the antecedent (i.e. \( p \) and not-\( p \)) is necessarily true or bound to materialize.

(21) Whether or not you dislike ancient monuments, Warwick Castle is worth a visit.
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Since the antecedents of universal concessive conditionals exhaust a set of possibilities along some parameter, this type of conditionals entails its main clause as well. Consider (22):

(22) Whatever your feelings are about ancient monuments, Warwick Castle is worth a visit.

Haspelmath and König (1998: 572) point out that the conditions that allow a semifactual interpretation of scalar concessive conditionals are rather complex: all concessive conditionals at the epistemic or speech-act level entail their consequent and are therefore semifactual. In uttering a concessive conditional at the epistemic level, a speaker discusses and rejects the relevance of certain premises for the assertion of a conclusion. These premises do not have any bearing on the conclusion, which is independently assertible. Consider the epistemic scalar concessive conditional and the speech-act alternative concessive conditional in (23) and (24), respectively:

(23) Even if this had not been his intention, he certainly managed to alienate most of his colleagues.

(24) Whether you feel like it or not, you are coming with me tomorrow.

As for scalar concessive conditionals at the content level, the identity of the focus chosen for *even* is clearly relevant in these cases. If the focus is on the polarity of the antecedent, scalar concessive conditionals can more or less be interpreted as alternative concessive conditionals and therefore do entail their consequent (Haspelmath and König 1998: 572).  

(25) Even if you dislike ancient monuments, Warwick Castle is worth a visit.

(26) You will get a scholarship, even if you don’t get an A.

(27) Even if your mother-in-law does turn up, we will have a good time.

Furthermore, Haspelmath and König (1998: 573) state that in those cases where the focus of *even* forms some constituent of the antecedent or is the antecedent itself, the relevant factor seems to be whether the scale induced by *even* includes the real world, or, more specifically, the case of inertia, the case where nothing happens. Example (28a) obviously does not entail its consequent: somebody who does not

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7 In an epistemic concessive conditional construction, the conditional linker combines two items of knowledge, a premise and a conclusion. In a speech-act concessive conditional construction, however, the subordinate clause raises a question which is assumed to be relevant for the speech act uttered in the main clause (Haspelmath König 1998: 569). A detailed description of (concessive) linking at these levels follows in Section 3.2.

8 In a content concessive conditional construction two situations are linked in such a way that the second follows the first and is probably caused by it (Haspelmath and König 1998: 569).

9 Cf. also Barker (1994).
drink normally will not be fired. In (28b), on the other hand, 'nothing at all' seems to be included in the scale induced by even: if somebody refuses to do a repulsive act for a lot of money, he/she will also refuse to do it for nothing.

(28) (a) Even if you drink just a little, your boss will fire you.

(b) Even if he gives me a million dollars, I won't do it.

The conditions that allow a semifactual interpretation of scalar concessive conditionals do not constitute the only problem concerning these conditionals, since this type of concessive conditionals (even if p, q) is difficult to distinguish from factual concessive clauses. König (1994: 680) points out that in the core cases the distinction seems to be clear enough, since it is either expressed by the connective (e.g. English even if vs. even though), by the mood (subjunctive vs. indicative) of the adverbial clause (e.g. Spanish aunque llueva 'even if it is raining' vs. aunque llueve 'even though it is raining') or by some other inflectional contrast marked on the verb (Dargi -adra vs. -Gira). However, in a lot of languages there does not seem to be a clear boundary between scalar concessive conditionals and concessives. As König (1994: 680) states, in many, and perhaps all languages, concessive conditionals with focus particles can be used in a factual sense, i.e. in exactly the same way as genuine concessive clauses (e.g. English Even if he IS my brother, I am not going to give him any more money). In addition, concessive conditionals with focus particles frequently develop into genuine concessive constructions.

3.1.2.3. Concessives versus causals

Concessive clauses have always seemed to be related to, and even in some way opposed to, clauses of cause and reason. König (1994: 680) points out that there is quite some evidence that this opposition is best analyzed as a specific manifestation of duality, i.e. as a semantic relation that structures important parts of the lexicon in natural languages. Such a semantic relation of duality is to be found whenever a sentence can be negated in two ways: by external negation which relates to the complete sentence or by internal negation which affects only a clause that is part of the sentence. As underlined by König, two expressions a and b stand in this relation of duality if the external negation of a sentence with a is equivalent to the internal negation of a sentence with b, and vice versa. The following examples show us that the external negation of a causal construction may actually be equivalent to a concessive construction with a negated main clause:

(29) (a) Jim Thompson's house is no less comfortable because it dispenses with air-conditioning.

(b) Jim Thompson's house is no less comfortable, although it dispenses with air-conditioning.

In (29a), which is to be read as a single prosodic group, the whole sentence falls within the scope of the negation. In (29b) only the main clause falls within the
scope of the negation and it is precisely in such cases that a causal construction may be paraphrased by a suitably negated concessive one.\(^a\)

3.2. Semantic types of concessive clauses

Concessive clauses occur in all positions where adverbal clauses are permitted in a language. In many languages they may either precede or follow the main clause. However, as König (1994: 679) has pointed out, concessive clauses differ from other types of adverbal clauses in a number of ways: (i) in contrast to most other types of adverbal clauses, there does not seem to be a concessive interrogative pronoun in any language, analogous to English *when* (Time), *why* (Reason), *how* (Manner), etc.; (ii) concessives cannot be the focus of a focusing adjunct (focus particle) like *only, even, just, especially* as contrasted in (30a) with a causal construction; and (iii) concessives cannot occur as focus in a cleft sentence (30b) and, finally, concessives cannot be the focus of a negation or a polar interrogative (30c).

\[
\begin{align*}
(30) \quad & (a) \\
& (i) \text{ Only because it was raining . . .} \\
& (ii) \text{* Only although it was raining . . .} \\
& (b) \\
& (i) \text{ It was because it was raining that . . .} \\
& (ii) \text{* It was although it was raining that . . .} \\
& (c) \\
& (i) \text{ Was he harassed because he was a boxer?} \\
& (ii) \text{* Was he harassed although he was a boxer?}
\end{align*}
\]

As König claims, all of these divergent properties seem to be manifestations of a single syntactic\(^a\) constraint on the use of concessive clauses: they cannot be focused. This constraint with regard to focusability is generally considered to indicate that the relevant clauses are less tightly integrated into a main clause than other types of adverbal clauses.

As we have seen in Section 2.3.1, in FG six layers are claimed to be relevant for the analysis of clause structure in natural languages. Hengeveld (1996: 119) points out that a serious problem lies in providing evidence for the validity of each of these layers in main clauses. An important way to solve this problem is to study the properties of subordinate constructions. Since subordinate constructions may be classified according to the highest layer they contain, and since each of the layers present in the hierarchical clause model may be turned into a subordinate construction, the study of different types of subordinate constructions will lead to a better understanding of the differences between the layers.

\(^a\) The dual relation between concessives and causals became quite clear to me during the fieldwork sessions I held in order to collect the data for this work. More than once, especially when there was no 'strong' meta-language in which I could communicate with my consultants, causal instead of concessive constructions would pop up. See Section 5.2 for an overview of the methodology used to collect the data.

\(^b\) The restriction on focusability as such may not be the manifestation of a syntactic, but rather of a pragmatic constraint.
A strong argument in favour of the existence of the different semantic layers is the fact that languages may use different conjunctions to express all sorts of adverbiai relations. French *parce que* 'because' is used specifically for predicational conjunction, while *puisqu* e is the correct causal conjunction at the propositional or utterance layer (cf. Sweetser 1990: 82).

\[(31) \quad (a) \quad \text{Il va l'epouser parce qu'il l'adoire.} \\
\text{He's going to marry her because he adores her.} \]

\[(b) \quad (\text{Mais si,}) \quad \text{il va l'epouser, puisqu'il l'adoire.} \\
\text{(But of course,) he's going to marry her, since he adores her.} \]

Likewise, Latin *quoniam*, English *since*, and Spanish *ya que* show a strong tendency towards a propositional or utterance reading, rather than towards a predicational reading (Quirk *et al.* 1985, Bolkestein 1991, Crevels 1994, 1998).

Sweetser (1990) clearly demonstrates the contrast between root, propositional, and 'speech-act' uses of modal verbs, multiple uses of conjunctions and conditionals. Linking between three different types of entities, i.e. (i) real or hypothetical situations, (ii) aspects of knowledge or (iii) speech acts, takes place at, respectively, the content, the epistemic and the speech-act level. These distinctions may also be made for concessive constructions, and Sweetser's multiple semantic domains correspond in turn with the predicational, the propositional, and the utterance layers within the layered structure of discourse in Functional Grammar (Dik *et al.* 1990). In addition, however, we should add a fourth level, the so-called text level, to Sweetser's classification of semantic levels. This level corresponds with the paragraph layer in FG (Crevels 1994, 1998; Hengeveld 1997a). Concessive clauses pertaining to this level have to do with the organization of the discourse and apply therefore to text units which may contain more than one sentence, as will be exemplified in the following section.

### 3.2.1. Entity types

As discussed in Section 2.3.2, Hengeveld (1989, 1992, 1997a) classifies the semantic types of adverbial clauses on the basis of the entity types they designate. Taking into consideration the two highest layers, which apply to the underlying units of
the paragraph and the discourse as a whole, linguistic units may therefore refer to entities of six different types (cf. Table 2).

3.2.2. **Integration**

First order entities cannot be realized by concessive adverbial clauses, since they can only be expressed by means of noun phrases and not by means of clauses, which implies that concessive clauses necessarily refer to entities of a higher order. Apparent counter-examples such as (32) show a first order noun which actually has a second order interpretation:

(32) He went to the opera in spite of his broken leg.

Concessive clauses realized as sixth order entities are hard to conceive of, but the other four types are indeed relevant. The different subtypes of concessives represented in (33) can be explained in terms of the various types of entity designated by them or, in other words, in terms of the layered structure of discourse.

(33) (a) We're going for a walk although it's raining.

(b) John is not at home, although his car is parked in front of the house.

(c) Even though I am calling you a bit late, what are your plans for this evening?

(d) I speak and write Serbian, Albanian, Turkish and Dutch, but I cannot express my true feelings in any other language than Romani. Although, now that I come to think of it, I have done it many times . . .

The difference between (33a) and (33b) corresponds with the distinction made by Lyons (1977) between second and third order entities, i.e. between states of affairs and propositional contents. The relation expressed in the concessive construction in (33a) is an example of what Sweetser calls a *real world or content* relationship, expressed in FG by (e,): although in the real world the rain forms an obstacle indeed, it nevertheless cannot prevent our going out, or, in other words: the rain is the *real-world obstacle* for our walk. Applying the formula in (4) (if $p'$, then normally $\neg q'$), we reach the following paraphrase: 'If it rains, then one normally does not go out for a walk'.

In (33b) the concessive construction concerns an *epistemic* relationship ($X_e$): the concessive connective combines two items of knowledge, a premise and a conflicting conclusion. Thus, in this particular example the speaker, even though he/she knows that the car of the person in question is parked in front of his/her house, reaches the conflicting conclusion that this person is not at home. Example (33b) is normally interpreted as meaning that the speaker's *knowledge* of John's car being parked in front of the house (as a premise) does not impede him/her to reach
the conclusion that John is not at home. The possible paraphrase goes as follows: 'If someone's car is parked in front of his/her house, then he/she normally is at home.'

In (33c) we find an example of an illocutionary relationship (E_1): in this case the protasis forms an obstacle for the speech act expressed in the main clause, a possible paraphrase being 'If I know that I should not phone you at this hour, then normally I would not phone you at this hour to ask what you are doing this evening'. Concessives at the speech-act level are often closely related to the conversational maxims of Grice (1975); thus, the concessive clause in (33c) appeals to Grice's condition of informativeness. Consider another example of an illocutionary relationship:

(34) Maria, the letter is in the drawer—although I'm sure you already know that.

Example (34) would be practically incomprehensible if the conjunction were interpreted at the content level—the concessive clause cannot be understood as stating the real-world obstacle to the event or situation described in the main clause. Rather, the concessive clause describes an obstacle to the speech act embodied by the main clause. The speaker's certainty about the fact that Maria already knows where to find the letter is in no way incompatible with the letter actually being in the drawer, and the speaker's belief that it is in the drawer. Despite its lack of Gricean informativeness the assertion is still made, and the speaker feels bound to comment on this violation. A possible paraphrase of (34) might be 'If I know that you know that the letter is in the drawer, then normally I wouldn't tell you so', or 'If I know that you know that the letter is in the drawer, then normally I wouldn't perform the speech act of asserting this to you'.

Example (33d), finally, is an instance of a textual relationship (M_1). In this case the concessive clause stretches across a whole series of preceding utterances, signalling an unexpected turn in the discourse context, a possible paraphrase being 'If I conclude all of a sudden that I have expressed my true feelings many times in another language then Romani, then normally I would not have said previously that I speak Serbian, Albanian, Turkish and Dutch, and write it, but that I cannot express my true feelings in any other language than Romani'. Consider (35):

(35) A: Do you prefer a slim and bony woman or a woman with curves and roundings?

B: I stick with Modigliani. I'm the old-fashioned type. Although I like the Venus of Milo as well.

In (35) another example is given of a textual relationship. In this case there is no question of a subordinated concessive clause forming an obstacle for the realization of a situation described in the corresponding main clause, but of an independent
concessive sentence which concerns the organization of the text. Through an
unforeseen turn in the discourse context the textual concessive modifies a whole
preceding text unit which may be composed of various sentences.

There are examples in which only the context can disambiguate the domain of
conjunction:

(36)  John has porridge for breakfast every morning, even though he doesn’t like
it.

It would be possible to interpret (36) either as an assertion of a person’s breakfast
habits, followed by a real-world obstacle for this particular taste, or as a logical
conclusion: in spite of the fact that the speaker knows that John does not like por-
ridge, he/she reaches the conclusion that John does eat it every single morning. As
I will show in Section 3.4.1., a commaless reading of (36) would force a content-
conjunction rather than an epistemic-conjunction interpretation.

3.3. Concessives in FG

At this point I would like to return to the hierarchical structure of discourse in FG
and propose a possible way of representing concessives within this structure.

As I have mentioned before, the frames within the hierarchical structure of dis-
course play no role in my research on concessives. Of the six layers which have
been distinguished in Chapter 2, four have proved to be relevant for the descrip-
tion of my data. As we have seen in Section 3.2.2, first order entities do not play a
role in the context of adverbial subordination, since they can only be expressed by
NP’s and not by clauses, and sixth order entities would be difficult to conceive of
in this context.

Applying the typology of satellites to the domain of concessive connection, four
satellite types manifest themselves as Concession satellites as shown in (37):

(37)  (a)  Predication satellites (σ₁)
      John left his wife although he loved her

      (b)  Proposition satellites (σ₂)
      John loved his wife, although he left her.

      (c)  Utterance satellites (σ₃)
      Although it’s none of my business, your behaviour is a disgrace.

      (d)  Paragraph satellites (σ₄)
      Drugs? I would never touch them. Although, I’ve had one or two
      joints in the good old days.

The various concessive constructions may be represented as follows in (38):
In conformity with this representation and with what I have stated in Section 2.4 about the external connection and the internal structure of satellites, I arrive at the following representations of the underlying structures of concessives.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Paragraph concessives} & \quad (M_i), (M_j)_{\text{Concession}} \\
\text{Utterance concessives} & \quad (M_i; [(E_i), (E_j)_{\text{Concession}}] (M_j)) \\
\text{Propositional concessives} & \quad (M_i; [E_i; \text{DECL} (S) (A) [(X_i), (X_j)_{\text{Concession}}] (E_j)] (M_j)) \\
\text{Predicational concessives} & \quad (M_i; [E_i; \text{DECL} (S) (A) (X_i); [(e_i), (e_j)_{\text{Concession}}] (X_j)] (E_j)] (M_j))
\end{align*}
\]

**Figure 4.** The underlying structure of concessives

From this point on I will adhere to Sweetser’s extended terminology of semantic levels (see Table 3). This implies that I will be referring to content, epistemic, speech-act and textual concessives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity type (order)</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>FG</th>
<th>Sweetser (1991) extended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>State of affairs</td>
<td>Reality</td>
<td>Predicational</td>
<td>Content level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>Propositional content</td>
<td>Truth</td>
<td>Propositional</td>
<td>Epistemic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>Speech act</td>
<td>Felicity</td>
<td>Utterance</td>
<td>Speech-act level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>Move</td>
<td>Thematic continuity</td>
<td>Paragraph</td>
<td>Text level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note once again that the FG labels for predicational, propositional, utterance, and paragraph concessives correspond with the content, epistemic, speech-act and textual concessives discussed in Section 3.2.2.
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3.4. Four levels of concessive connection

In the following I will discuss concessive constructions that correspond with second, third, fourth, and fifth order entities, or, in other words, concessive constructions at the content, epistemic, speech-act, and text level.

3.4.1. Content concessives

In the content domain a concessive connection indicates that the event or the state of affairs described in the concessive clause forms an obstacle for but does not impede the realization of the event or the state of affairs described in the main clause.

(39) She's just had a baby although she's forty-eight.

(40) He came and saved my life although he could hardly walk.

(41) He can walk faster than I can though he's well over eighty.

Sweetser (1990:82) claims that for those causal and adversative conjunctions which do not require a comma separating the clauses, the comma-less conjunction cases are obligatorily interpreted as cases of content conjunction.13 It seems that concessive constructions which form a single prosodic contour, such as (39)–(41), are obligatorily interpreted as cases of content conjunction. These restrictive concessives limit the situation in the main clause to the circumstances described by the subordinate clause. From a pragmatic point of view, restrictive concessives are necessary for the representation of the main state of affairs. Let us now consider the next two examples:

(42) (a) John has left his wife even though he loves her very much.

(b) John has left his wife, even though he loves her very much.

In (42a) the restrictive concessive clause presupposes that John has left his wife, and simply asserts that he did so in spite of the fact that he loves her very much. Thus, the concessive clause is indispensable for a correct interpretation of the main clause. In (42b), on the other hand, the intonation break at the end of the main clause forces an alternative, epistemic reading, in which both the speaker's conclud--

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13 Chafe (1984) notes that 'bound' (commaless) because clauses have a readily accessible reading which presupposes the truth of the main clause, and asserts only the causal relationship between the clauses (cf. Sweetser 1990: 83–6).

14 The distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive sentences can be exemplified quite clearly through relative clauses. In My sister who lives in Berlin is coming tomorrow the information contained by the relative clause is necessary to identify the intended referent. In this case the relative clause is restrictive. In My sister, who lives in Berlin, is coming tomorrow, on the other hand, the information contained in the relative clause is not necessary to identify the referent of 'my sister', but only provides additional information about the sister. In this case the relative clause is non-restrictive.
sion that John has left his wife and the concessive relation between this conclusion and the relevant circumstances described by the adverbial clause are asserted. More than just a pause, the comma in (42b) seems to mark a phrase-final intonation drop at the end of the sentence-initial main clause. This marks the presentation of a clause as an independent assertion rather than as a presupposition. The distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive concessives may be tested through the insertion of modal adverbs. Thus, the restrictive concessive in (42a) does not allow the addition of a modal adverb as shown in (43):

(43) *John has left his wife even though he probably loves her very much.

The non-restrictive concessive in (42b), however, does allow for modal modification as shown in (44):

(44) John has left his wife, even though he probably loves her very much.

Dik et al. (1990: 63) claim that a distinction is to be made at the predicational layer between restrictive and non-restrictive predication satellites. As far as concessives are concerned, the dividing-line between restrictives and non-restrictives does not seem to manifest itself at the content level. On the basis of certain syntactic processes like, for instance, the conversion of restrictive and non-restrictive concessives into a yes/no question format, or the insertion of modal adverbs, I would like to claim that there is a clear-cut division to be made between these constructions according to the semantic domains to which they belong. Restrictive concessives are to be interpreted as cases of content conjunction, while non-restrictive concessives have an obligatory epistemic, speech-act or textual reading. This approach would imply that within FG restrictive concessives are limited to the predicational layer and are expressed as $\sigma$ satellites, while non-restrictive concessives belong to the propositional or any higher layer, manifesting themselves as $\sigma_o$ or higher-layer satellites. Quirk et al. (1985: 1076) signal that the restrictive/non-restrictive distinction overlaps with some of the distinctions they make between disjunct and adjunct clauses. All disjunct clauses are characterized as peripheral because they do not give circumstantial information about the situation in the main clause; therefore, they are necessarily non-restrictive. Adjunct clauses, on the other hand, must be restrictive, since they are required to complete the description of the situation in the matrix clause. The non-restrictive clause is marked by an intonation separation whether it follows or precedes its main clause.

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5 See Sweetser (1990: 83) for an elaborate discussion on this topic in relation to causal conjunction.

6 Quirk et al. (1985: 1070) state that adjuncts and disjuncts tend to differ semantically in that adjuncts denote circumstances of the situation in the main clause, whereas disjuncts comment on the style or the form of what is said in the main clause or on its content. The primary difference is that they differ syntactically in that disjuncts are peripheral to the clause to which they are attached. This peripheral status of disjuncts is demonstrated by the fact that they do not allow a number of syntactic processes to apply to them that are allowed by adjuncts, processes that reflect a measure of integration within the main clause.
Quirk et al. (1985: 1076) claim that punctuation is a redundant signal when the non-restrictive adverbial clause is preposed, since a preposed clause is inherently non-restrictive. Assuming that this holds for adverbial clauses as well, I, therefore, claim in Crevels (1998) that predicational concessives in Spanish will always occupy a sentence-final position.

3.4.2. Epistemic concessives

In the epistemic domain, concessive connection expresses the idea that the speaker, in spite of being convinced of the content of the concessive clause, reaches the opposite conclusion contained in the main clause. In other words, in the epistemic domain concessive conjunction will mark the impediment of a belief or a conclusion. Consider (45):

(45) Even though this solution would be harmful to our enemies, the damage done to us would be even greater.

Example (45) does not express any factual conflict, but a conflict between the conclusion and the potential counterargument expressed in the concessive clause. An example like (46), with explicit mention of the speaker’s knowledge state in the concessive clause, so to speak emphasizes an epistemic interpretation, as does example (47):

(46) Although I know that John really loves his mother, he ought to go and live somewhere else.

(47) Although I see that you are wearing your new tennis shorts, I suppose you aren’t going to the Sports Club?

3.4.3. Speech-act concessives

In the speech-act domain the content of the concessive clause does not form an obstacle for the realization of the event or the state of affairs described in the main clause, but raises obstacles for the realization of the speech act expressed by the speaker in the main clause.

As we have seen, the contents of some concessive clauses almost forces the choice of a certain semantic domain; thus, it is extremely difficult to understand (48) as anything else but an example of concessive conjunction at the speech-act level.

(48) The answer is on page 200, although I’m sure you already know that.

The speaker’s certainty about the fact that the interlocutor already knows where to find the answer is in no way incompatible with the answer actually being on page 200, and the speaker’s belief that it is on page 200. A possible paraphrase of (48) might be ‘if I know that you know that the answer is on page 200, then normally I wouldn’t tell you so’, or ‘if I know that you know that the answer is
on page 200, then normally I wouldn’t perform the speech act of asserting this to you.

At the speech-act level various subtypes of concessives can be distinguished. König (1994: 681) states that often the incompatibility does not lie in the factual content of the two clauses that together form a concessive construction, but in the conclusions or arguments which are based on these assertions. König calls such concessives rhetorical and notes that they are typically introduced by emphatic concessive connectives, such as English true, German zwar and/or the adversative conjunction but, and may therefore result in constructions which are indistinguishable from adversative constructions. In English the modal verb may is frequently used in this type of concessive, but though and although may also be used in this function. Consider (49)–(51):

(49) It may be self-satisfaction, but I am prepared to show whether I am a film director or not.

(50) I repeat that although Franco didn’t like the theatre, he did like the movies and, that, for sure, he was no illiterate.

(51) Although it isn’t very fashionable to say it nowadays, I am indeed a fan, a very big fan of Fidel.

These rhetorical concessive constructions are particularly used to concede the first assertion and to emphasize the second. Another subtype of concessive clauses in the speech-act domain is the one which I propose to call the evaluating concessive clause:

(52) Well, actually I force myself to read for a while every day before going to sleep. This has turned into a habit, although the truth is that nowadays I read very little time.

(53) A: Do you consider yourself the critical conscience of the public and political powers?

B: Sometimes I do, although the truth is that it isn’t exactly like that.

A possible paraphrase of (53) would be ‘if I know that my answer to your question isn’t exactly correct, then normally I wouldn’t answer your question in such a way’. Evaluating concessives occur quite often in combination with emphatic phrases and particles like, for instance, English actually, it’s obvious that, the verb do used emphatically, Spanish lo cierto es que, bien es cierto, la verdad es que, está claro que, claro, sí and sobre todo.

7 These connectives derive from expressions which were originally used for emphatic affirmation. Expressions with the original meaning true, indeed, fact or well are often grammaticalized as concessive connectives (cf. König 1994: 679). König (1994: 681) provides the following English examples of rhetorical concessives: (i) True he is still very young, but he has proved very reliable so far; (ii) He may be a professor, but he is an idiot.
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3.4.4. Textual concessives

Let us consider, finally, concessive conjunction at the text level where the modification is based on an unforeseen turn in the discourse context:

(54)  A: Yours is a very intense life and it is said that you are an incorrigible ladykiller . . .

        B: I have lived life fully, that is the way I like it. And as far as my being a ladykiller, I may have been one, but well . . . Even though it is a fact that men don’t do the conquering. And that is what happens to me, I’m not a conqueror, even though I let myself be conquered.

In contrast to speech-act concessives, textual concessives do not modify the main clause of a concessive construction, but generally a whole preceding text unit which may be composed of various sentences. Speech-act concessives are always part of a single construction, and, therefore, specify or modify a single preceding or following speech act; textual concessives, on the other hand, usually modify a whole series of preceding propositions, rather than just single utterances and often seem to be functioning as an afterthought. In (54) the concessive clause Even though it is a fact that men don’t do the conquering is linked to a whole series of preceding utterances, signalling an unexpected turn in the discourse context. Consider the next example:

(55)  A: From which point on did you have the feeling that you’d lost your privacy, your anonymity?

        B: I still don’t consider myself a popular figure, but I think that I have lost my privacy since the time I sometimes hear my name being called from behind me, or catch a look more intense than other looks . . . Even though one always gains other things . . .

At the text level a special subtype of concessives can be distinguished as well; whereas in the standard case the content of the preceding text is highlighted through the addition of the concessive clause, as in (56) and (57), the content of the preceding text is weakened whenever a rectifying clause (cf. König 1994: 681) follows as in (58) and (59):

(56)  I am a bundle of nerves; it seems as though I am continuously being pricked with a needle in my bum. Although I actually like tranquillity, and only now and again excitement.

(57)  (Greenbaum 1969: 68)

        My favourite poster is, I think, a French one for Nesquik, which shows a sophisticated-looking small boy leaning nonchalantly against something and saying that thanks to Nesquik he went back on to milk. He really looks a nice child. Though there are some Adchildren that one would feel quite ashamed to have around the house.
(58)  A: Getting back to the book, do you know whether Rainier of Monaco has read it?
B: Yes, yes he's read it. And he didn't like it. They preferred not to react.
A: And what happened to your friendship?
B: More than his I was his wife's, Grace's, friend. Although friend, friend, you can't ever say that with these people.

(59)  (König 1994:12)
Yes, it has come at last, the summons I know you have longed for. I, too, though it has come in a way I cannot welcome.

Although in written speech one is of course confronted with the bias of punctuation conventions, concessive clauses of this type do not always manifest themselves in the form of a simple sentence. If they do not, they are only loosely linked to the main clause of the concessive construction. Moreover, they typically exhibit main clause word order in those languages, like Dutch, Mestreechs and German, where main and subordinate clauses are distinguished on the basis of word order (cf. König and van der Auwer a 1988, Günthner 1993). In (60a) we have an example of a concessive with typical V2 main clause word order, whereas (60b) shows the V-final order for subordinated clauses:

Mestreechs (Indo-European; Ineke Jongen and Elisabeth Jongen-Köbben p.c.)

(60)  (a)  Ze kump vas en zeker;
she come:3SG for sure
allewel, bei häör wêts-te 't mer noets...
although with her know:2SG-2SG it MIT never
'She will come for sure; although, with her one never knows . . .' 

(b)  Ze kump vas en zeker,
she come:3SG for sure
allewel-ste 't bei häör mer noets wêts...
al though-2SG it with her PTCL never know:2SG
'She will certainly come, although one never knows with her . . .' 

In these cases the difference with speech-act concessives still lies in the unexpected turn in the discourse context; the concessive clause is not meant as a plain comment on the felicity of the preceding assertion, but rather modifies the preceding text unit by excluding certain interpretation options which have become available to the hearer in the course of it (cf. also Günthner fc.).

(61)  I speak Catalan, and I read and write it, but I wouldn't be able to write works of literary creation, although I have done it at times, in another language than Spanish.

Different subtypes of concessive clauses manifest different degrees of subordination to and integration into a main clause. I have already mentioned above that concessive clauses cannot be focused—even in their standard use—and tend to take wide
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scope over any operator in the main clause. Therefore, it is assumed that they are less tightly connected to a main clause than conditional, temporal or causal clauses. The higher the semantic level they pertain to, the looser they seem to be integrated into a main clause and the more paratactic-like the construction becomes. Rectifying concessive clauses are even more loosely linked to a main clause: they can only follow the main clause and typically exhibit main clause word order in languages like Dutch, Mestreechs and German. In conformity with these characteristics I have chosen to incorporate the rectifying concessives at the textual level instead of the speech-act level.

3.5. Semantico-syntactic behaviour of concessive subtypes

In order to exemplify the semantico-syntactic behaviour of the different concessive subtypes, I will consider in the following the constraints on their expression. I shall submit the subtypes to various tests, which are designed to determine the presence or absence of certain syntactic or semantic features of the concessives. In order to do this, I have tried to find clear examples of the concessive subtypes, avoiding, among other things, lexical meaning opposition between, for instance, predicates and modal adverbs. The following four examples will, therefore, serve as 'prototypical' expressions of concessives at the content (a), epistemic (b), speech-act (c), and text level (d):

(62)  (a) He doesn’t wear glasses although he’s in his eighties.

(b) He’s not at home, although his car is parked outside.

(c) Although I should be minding my own business, your behaviour is a disgrace.

(d) I speak L2, and I write it, but I cannot express my true feelings in any other language than Li. Although I have done it many times . . .

In Section 3.4.1 I have made the claim that there is a clear-cut division to be made between restrictive and non-restrictive concessives according to the semantic domains to which they belong: restrictive concessives are to be interpreted as cases of predicational conjunction, and take, moreover, a sentence-final position.

3.5.1. Content versus epistemic concessives

Often the distinction between concessives at the content and the epistemic level is not as clear as it appears to be at first sight. Nevertheless, there are a number of differences in the syntactic behaviour of these clauses which reflect the distinctions between the entity types that they designate.

3.5.1.1. Yes/no question

The conversion of a content concessive into the format of a yes/no question is a
syntactic device to distinguish content concessives from epistemic concessives:

(63)  
(a)  He doesn’t wear glasses although he’s in his eighties.  
(b)  Doesn’t he wear glasses although he’s in his eighties?

(64)  
(a)  He’s not at home, although his car is parked outside.  
(b)  ?Isn’t he at home, although his car is parked outside?

As we can see, the content concessive in (63a) fits smoothly into a question format in (63b), while the epistemic concessive in (64a) renders a more problematic reading in (64b). The only possible interpretation for (64b) would be that of an echo question.

3.5.1.2. Intonational gap

As I have argued in Section 3.4.1, epistemic concessives are inherently non-restrictive and, therefore, extra-sentential. This implies an intonational distinction between concessives at the content and at the epistemic level:

(65)  
He doesn’t wear glasses although he’s in his eighties.

(66)  
(a)  He’s not at home, although his car is parked outside.  
(b)  *He’s not at home although his car is parked outside.

3.5.1.3. Modal adverbs

Contrary to content concessives, some epistemic concessives may be accompanied by modal adverbs which modify the truth value or the speaker’s attitude towards the question.

(67)  
(a)  He doesn’t wear glasses although he’s in his eighties.  
(b)  *He doesn’t wear glasses although he’s probably in his eighties.

(68)  
(a)  He’s not at home, although his car is parked outside.  
(b)  ?He’s not at home, although his car is probably parked outside.  
(c)  He’s not at home, although that’s probably his car is parked outside.

(69)  
(a)  Even though this solution would be harmful to our enemies, the damage done to us would be even greater.  
(b)  Even though this solution would probably be harmful to our enemies, the damage done to us would be even greater.

3.5.2. Epistemic versus speech-act concessives

The difference between epistemic and speech-act concessives, and between epistemic and speech-act clauses in general, lies in the fact that where the first modify the propositional content of an expression (70), the last modify its illocutionary force (71).
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(70) He’s not at home, although his car is parked outside.

(71) Although I should be minding my own business, your behaviour is a disgrace.

3.5.2.1. Sentence types

Since epistemic concessives presuppose the positive commitment of the speaker towards the truth of the proposition that he/she presents, it comes as no surprise that these constructions are limited to declarative sentences. Speech-act concessives, however, may occur with all sorts of sentence types: declaratives (72), interrogatives (73), directives (74) and expressives (75).

(72) Although I should be minding my own business, your behaviour is a disgrace.

(73) Even though I’m calling a bit late, what are your plans for tonight?

(74) Although I understand your problems, get the work done tomorrow!

(75) Happy New Year!—even though I’m a bit late.

3.5.2.2. Modal adverbs

Contrary to epistemic concessives, all speech-act concessives may be accompanied by modal adverbs which modify the truth value or the force of the expression in question:

(76) (a) He’s not at home, although his car is parked outside.
     (b) He’s not at home, although his car is probably parked outside.

(77) (a) Although I should be minding my own business, your behaviour is a disgrace.
     (b) Although I probably should be minding my own business, your behaviour is a disgrace.

3.5.3. Speech-act versus textual concessives

Speech-act concessives are always part of a single construction, and, therefore, specify or modify a single preceding or following speech act; textual concessives, on the other hand, modify a series of preceding speech acts.

(78) Although I should be minding my own business, your behaviour is a disgrace.

(79) I speak L2, and I write it, but I cannot express my true feelings in any other language than L1. Although I have done it many times . . .

3.5.3.1. ‘Now that I come to think of it . . .’

Unlike speech-act concessives, textual concessives allow for addition of the phrase Now that I come to think of it:
3.5.3.2. Modal adverbs
Like speech-act concessives, textual concessives can be modified by modal adverbs:

(82) I speak L2, and I write it, but I cannot express my true feelings in any other language than L1. Although I have probably done it many times . . .

3.5.4. Conclusion
In the following table the semantico-syntactic criteria for the different subtypes of concessives which have been tested in the previous paragraphs are summarized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity type</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Epistemic</th>
<th>Speech-act</th>
<th>Textual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes/no questions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modalization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-/+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intonational gap</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentence type</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Now that I . . . ’</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the division between the content and the epistemic level may be made on the basis of a yes/no question format, the epistemic and the speech-act level may be distinguished partly by the addition of modal adverbs on the one hand, or, on the other hand, by the different sentence types which are impossible at the epistemic level but possible at the speech-act level. The dividing-line between the speech-act and the text level, finally, may be constituted by the addition of the phrase now that I come to think of it.

3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to delimit the semantic domain of concession by contrasting concessives with adversatives, concessive conditionals and causals, respectively. It was argued that the adversative conjunction but can only be replaced by the concessive conjunction although in those cases which have a denial-of-expectation reading. In such cases the although-clause still maintains its concessive status and expresses the secondary concept of the complete construction. In those cases in which but can be replaced by adversative although, although expresses the primary concept.
Furthermore I discussed the correspondences between FG’s layered structure of discourse and Sweetser’s (1990) semantic domains approach on the basis of the different semantic types of concessive clauses. I argued that linguistic units may refer to six different types of entity of which four have proved to be relevant for the description of concessive clauses, and I proposed a possible way of representing concessives within the hierarchical structure of discourse in FG.

A detailed account of concessive linking at the four relevant semantic levels has led to the formulation of a number of tests to determine the constraints on the semantico-syntactic behaviour of the four different semantic subtypes of concessives. Through these tests it has become clear that the various semantic subtypes indeed behave differently semantically and/or syntactically. In the next chapter I will discuss formal properties of concessive clauses.