Polysemy or monosemy: Interpretation of the imperative and the dative-infinitive construction in Russian
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CHAPTER IV

Meaning and interpretation of the dative-infinitive construction

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will present an analysis of the Russian construction with an infinitival predicate, a so-called ‘dative subject’, and in some specific cases impersonal use of the verb byt’ (‘be’). Note that in Russian the verb byt’ is usually not expressed in the present. In cases where there is an opposition with the past tense or the future tense of byt’, some scholars therefore speak of a zero form of byt’. In the construction under discussion the past or future tense of byt’ is expressed under specific circumstances.

The construction expresses that the participant in the dative is the recipient of the situation expressed by the infinitive, or put differently, the participant expressed in the dative is the potential agent of the situation expressed by the infinitive, which is assigned to him by a force. The verb byt’ (‘be’) can, under particular conditions, be used to relate this scene to a time before, or after the moment of speaking. Some examples of this construction are given below:

(1)  
Mne eshche reshat' zadachu. (Maurice, 1995: 115)  
I-DAT still solve-INF-IMPERF problem  
'I still have to solve the problem.'

(2)  
Tebe zavtra ne vstavat' rano. (Maurice, 1995: 152)  
you-DAT tomorrow not get.up-INF-IMPERF early  
'You don't have to get up early tomorrow.'
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(3) Byt' grozel' (Bricyn, 1990: 219/A. Vetrov)
be-INF-IMPERF thunder-DAT
'There will be thunder.'

(4) Ne byt' miru i porjadku, pokaz Imperija ne raskinetsja, kak ran'she (...).1 (A. Koul, 
Vozvrashhenie imperatora)
not be-INF peace-DAT and order-DAT, as long as the empire spreads out, as before
'There won't be peace and order, as long as the empire doesn't extend, as before.'

(5) Emu ne razobrat'sja samomu. (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II: 373)
he-DAT not understand-INF-PERF self-DAT
'He can't understand it by himself.'

(6) Pete zalezt' na derevo, a Mishe net. (Mets, 1985: 205)
Petja-DAT climb-INF-PERF on tree, but Misha-DAT not
Petja can climb the tree, but Misha can't.'

(7) Polez Zhilin v dyru, chtob i Kostylinu prolez't. (Garde, 1963: 291/L. Tolstoj)
climb Zhilin in hole, in order and Kostylin-DAT get through-INF-PERF
'Zhilin climbed into the hole, so that Kostylin could also get through.'

In the literature this construction is treated as part of the class of so-called ‘infinitive sentences’, that is, the class of constructions where the infinitive can be seen as the predicate of the sentence (e.g. Russkaja Grammatika, 1980). Since the dative-infinitive construction is the main construction in Russian that constitutes the class of infinitive sentences, some authors use this term to refer specifically to the construction under discussion (e.g. Bricyn, 1990). Another name that occurs in the literature is ‘modal infinitive’ (Maurice, 1996). This term is used because the dative-infinitive construction has a modal character, and expresses notions such as (absence of) necessity, (im)possibility, directivity, and wish. In my analysis I will use the term dative-infinitive construction, or DI-construction, for this construction. The choice of this term is motivated by the formal structure of the sentences given above, namely the occurrence of the dative and the infinitive. It must be remarked, however, that some constructions with an infinitive predicate where no dative is expressed, share important semantic and syntactic features with the DI-construction. The absence of a dative in such sentences can in some cases be motivated by the generic status of the agent of the infinitive situation. In such cases

it is possible to insert the sentence into the paradigm of the DI-construction. In other sentences the dative is not expressed because the nature of the potential agent is given contextually, and therefore not formally expressed; in such sentences a dative noun may be inserted in the sentence. Although these constructions cannot strictly be seen as instances of the DI-construction, I will discuss them as well, since they share important semantic-syntactic features with the DI-construction.

Several scholars have given overviews of the different uses of the DI-construction (e.g. Timofeev, 1950; Veyrenc, 1979; Bricyn 1990, and Maurice, 1996). Besides these overviews, the DI-construction has also received attention from scholars addressing more theoretical issues. The main discussion about the DI-construction centers on the question how the different uses or interpretations of the construction can be accounted for (e.g. Maurice, 1995, 1996), and what the semantic-syntactic status is of the different constituents in the construction. More specific questions that have been addressed concern which constituent the modal nature of the construction can be attributed to (e.g. Wierzbicka, 1966; Veyrenc, 1979; Zolotova, 1982; Ebeling, 1984; Bricyn, 1990; Schoorlemmer, 1995), and whether all instances of the construction have a modal meaning (e.g. Schoorlemmer, 1995; Rubinstein, 1986). Before going into the research question of this chapter, I will briefly discuss the different uses of the DI-construction.

The DI-construction is used, in both interrogative and assertive sentences, to express different shades of necessity, or in the case of negation, absence of necessity; examples of such uses are given in (1)–(4). In such sentences the infinitive prototypically has the imperfective aspect. As I will argue below, the necessity of the DI-construction has a typical 'ontic' character, expressing the 'way things are/go', and differs as such from other forms that express necessity. In the context of negation, and prototypically the perfective aspect, the DI-construction is used to express different shades of impossibility, an example of such use is given in (5). The possibility interpretation, and notions close to possibility, occurs in specific contexts only. These are interrogative contexts, and non-interrogative contexts with the operators tol'ko ('only'), edva ('hardly') and vjrad li ('it is doubtful whether'), sentences with the subordinators chtoby ('in order') as in (7) above, sentences with the particle xot' ('even'), and contrastive sentences, as in (6) above. The contexts for the possibility interpretation can partly be identified with contexts that can be reduced in some way or another to negation, and that are contexts for so-called negative polarity items. This the case for example with the operators tol'ko ('only'), edva ('hardly'), vjrad li ('it is doubtful whether'), which are all contexts for negative polarity items across languages, and can be reduced to negation in a
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straightforward way (see Van der Wouden, 1994; Giannakidou, 1997). A reduction to negation is, however, more problematic in other contexts, for example in the case of the subordinator \textit{chtoby} ('in order') as in (7) above. Operators like \textit{chtoby} ('in order') are not listed in the literature as constituting negative contexts.

The DI-construction also occurs with the particle \textit{by}; the function of this particle is to indicate that the realization of the infinitive action takes place in a hypothetical world or mental space only. Uses of the DI-construction with \textit{by} can express different modal notions, such as wish or direction, e.g.:

(8) \textit{Otdoxnut' by mne.} (Mets, 1985: 358)
Rest-INF-PERF IRR I-DAT
‘If only I could rest.’

Most uses of the DI-construction have a clear modal character, hence the name ‘modal infinitive’ for this construction (Maurice, 1995, 1996). Uses that do not have a clear modal interpretation, and which are sometimes erroneously treated as altogether non-modal (e.g. Schoorlemmer, 1995: 64), occur in specific contexts only, namely with the subordinators \textit{esli} (‘if’), \textit{pered tem kak} (‘before’), and \textit{chtoby} (‘in order to’):

(9) Gruzovik i kombajn tozhe bezvredny, esli im ne perebegat' dorogu. (Bricyn, 1990: 285/V. Panova)
truck and harvester also harmless, if they-DAT not cross-INF-PERF road
‘The truck and the combine-harvester are also harmless, if they do not cross the road.’

(10) A nedavno, pered tem kak vzoi ti lune, po nebu letala bol'shushchaja ptica. (Comrie, 1974: 133/Gor'kij)
but recently before rise-INF-PERF moon-DAT, about sky flew huge bird
‘Recently, before the moon rose, a huge bird was flying about the sky.’

(11) Oni zhdut poezda, kotoryj ix povezet, chtoby im ne opozdat' kuda-to. (Rubinstein, 1986: 367/Okudzhava)
they wait for train, that them takes, in order they-DAT not be late-INF-PERF somewhere
‘They wait for the train which will take them, so that they won’t be late.’

As I will argue below, sentences like these are also modal in nature, but the modal character has a more abstract nature.

The DI-construction can be paraphrased with different Russian forms, depending on the context in which it occurs. Among the oppositional forms are modal predicates of
necessity (nado, nezhdno, sledovat' etc.), possibility (moch', mozhno, nel'zja, udat'sia), and the future tense (the perfect present, the future tense of but'). The different oppositional forms of the DI-construction indicate that different uses can be distinguished for the DI-construction. Nevertheless, the different uses of the DI-construction share features that are absent in the case of oppositional forms. I will go into these features below.

Having briefly discussed the different uses of the DI-construction, I will now discuss the relation of the DI-construction to other constructions in the linguistic system. More specifically, I will discuss the 'subject' function of the dative in the DI-construction in relation to similar functions of the dative in other constructions, and I will discuss the 'predicate' function of the infinitive in the DI-construction in relation to similar functions of the infinitive in other constructions.

The DI-construction is part of a family of constructions where no nominative subject is expressed or expressible, and where the dative is associated with the highest-ranking semantic role on the scale of agentivity (see Fillmore, 1968). In the DI-construction, the dative expresses the recipient of the situation expressed by the infinitive, and the past or future tense of the verb but' in the neuter declension situates this scene to a time before or after the speech moment; in the present tense no form is expressed. The DI-construction is related to constructions where the dative participant can be seen as the recipient of an adverbial state, and where the infinitive, under particular circumstances, may be expressed to specify the adverbial state:

(12) Mne nado bylo rabotat'.
    I-DAT necessary-ADV was-NEUT work-INF-IMPERF
    'I had to work.'

In this sentence the dative can be seen as the recipient of the state expressed by the adverbial predicate; the infinitive has the function of a subject-complement or specification (see 4.4.4 for an analysis). The DI-construction differs from the construction with an adverbial predicate because in the DI-construction the dative subject is the recipient of the situation expressed by the infinitival predicate; this means that the participant expressed in the dative can be seen as the potential agent of the situation expressed by the infinitive (see 4.6).

Besides the DI-construction, an interpretation of the dative as the potential agent also occurs in the case of the so-called existential construction, e.g.:

(13) Est mne kuda idti. (Veyrenc, 1979:72)
    is I-DAT where go-INF-IMPERF

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'There is somewhere for me to go.'

In this sentence the participant expressed by the dative is the recipient of the existence of a place, which is characterized by the infinitive situation. This means that, in contrast to the DI-construction, the dative participant is only indirectly the potential agent of the infinitive situation. The existential construction is related to the DI-construction, but differs both syntactically and semantically. I will discuss the existential construction in 4.16.2.

In the literature the term 'dative subject' is used by some authors for the use of the dative as it occurs in the DI-construction and constructions with an adverbial predicate. (e.g. Zaichkova, 1972; Schoorlemmer, 1995). The term subject is used to indicate that this particular use of the dative shares semantic-syntactic features with the nominative subject. Nominative subjects in Russian have certain syntactic properties that set them apart from other parts of the sentence. These are predicate agreement, so-called anaphoric binding, and gerund binding (see Neidle, 1982: 422; Schoorlemmer, 1995: 59–60). Dative subjects do not induce verbal agreement, but they do bind anaphors and gerunds. As such they fall, at least partly, within the set criteria formulated by Keenan (1976) for subjecthood. I will discuss the term 'dative subject' in more detail in 4.3.2, but it should be kept in mind that I use the term 'dative subject' for sentences or clauses where the participant expressed in the dative is associated with the highest-ranking semantic role on the scale of agentivity, and where there is no nominative subject available for the finite verb.

In the Russian linguistic literature (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980; Zolotova, 1982; Bricyn, 1990) the DI-construction is treated as part of a family of constructions where the infinitive is analyzed as the predicate of the sentence or clause, the so-called 'infinitive sentences'. In most instances of the DI-construction, the infinitive forms a sentence or a subordinate clause (for example in sentences where the DI-construction is introduced by chto). In some cases, however, the infinitive and the dative can best be analyzed as the specification to a noun. An example of such a construction is given below:

(14) Seliov segodnja s utra dal komandu vsem otdyhat', kupatsja. (Bricyn, 1990: 155/A. Salynskij)
Seliov today from morning gave order everyone-DAT rest-INF-IMPERF, swim-INF
'This morning Seliov gave an order that everyone should rest and swim.'

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2 Such cases are sometimes considered ungrammatical.
In this sentence the noun *komandu* (‘order’) is specified by the infinitive, and, as I will argue below, the dative is interpreted both as the dative subject of the infinitive and as the indirect object of the noun. Constructions like these will be discussed separately in 4.16.3, since they differ from the DI-construction in important respects.

In the DI-construction, the infinitival predicate occurs with a dative subject; in other constructions where the infinitive can be seen as the predicate, the infinitive can also occur with a nominative subject, as in (15), or without expressed or expressible subject at all, as in (16):

    you-NOM – laugh-INF-IMPERF at me? Oh you, baby
    ‘You, laugh at me? What do you know?’

(16)  Mnogo znat' – malo spat'. (Veyrenc, 1979: 46)
    much know-INF-IMPERF – little sleep-INF-IMPERF
    ‘To know a lot, means to sleep little.’

As I will argue below, the dative occurs with an infinitive predicate to express the specific modal semantics of this combination. This specific modal character is absent in infinitive sentences with a nominative, or in constructions where no subject is expressible.

Besides the occurrence of the DI-construction with dative (pro)nouns, I will also analyze the occurrence of *odin* (‘alone’) and *sam* (‘self’) in the dative case when they occur as adjuncts to an infinitive (cf. Neidle, 1982, 1988). An example of such a so-called ‘second dative’ is given below:

(17)  Xotel ot nas otdelat'sja, da? Chtoby samomu uliznut', kak pytalsja vchera?3 (R.
    Zheljazny, *Dolina Proklijat*)
    wanted from us escape, yes? In.order self-DAT slip.away-INF-PERF, how tried
    yesterday
    ‘You wanted to escape us, didn’t you? So that you could slip away by yourselves, like
    you tried yesterday.’

In my analysis I will argue that the construction with the second dative must be seen as a special instance of the DI-construction. The second dative will be discussed in 4.17.

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Now that the DI-construction has been introduced in a general way, the research question can be presented:

What is the meaning of the combination of the dative as 'subject' (= the dative is not part of the valency structure of the main verb, and no nominative subject is expressed or expressible) and the infinitive as predicate?

More specifically, I will address the following issues in this analysis:

(i) Can one meaning be attributed to the DI-construction or is the construction polysemous?
(ii) Can the abstract meaning of the DI-construction be seen as compositional, i.e. can it be derived from its component parts?
(iii) What is the semantic-syntactic status of the different constituents in the construction?
(iv) How can the different interpretations of the construction, both modal and so-called 'non-modal', be accounted for?
(v) How can the restriction of particular interpretations to particular context types be explained?
(vi) In what contexts is a dative assigned to the infinitive?

I will argue that an abstract meaning can be attributed to the DI-construction. This meaning can be defined both as an abstraction from the total of occurrences of the DI-construction, and as the result of the composition of the different component parts of the construction. A compositional analysis can account for the range of uses of the construction and for the restriction of the construction to specific contexts. Moreover, the idea that one can give semantic maps or paths showing that occurrence of some uses can only be explained as later developments (e.g. Van der Auwera & Plungian, 1998, for some uses of the DI-construction; Sweetser, 1990, for modality in general) cannot be sustained for this construction; the different uses of the construction must be seen as interpretations of a more abstract general meaning.

The semantic-syntactic status of the DI-construction has received considerable attention from many scholars. The DI-construction is interesting in a theoretical respect because the construction has so-called modal interpretations, while no modal element is expressed in the construction. This has led some scholars, mainly those working from a generative framework, to posit a non-expressed underlying modal
element in the DI-construction similar to modal adverbs (e.g. Schoorlemmer, 1994, 1995). In this analysis I will show that the modal interpretation of the construction can be derived from the meanings of the constituents, without it being necessary to posit such an underlying modal element.

Another semantic-syntactic issue raised in the literature is the question of which constituent must be seen as the predicative or ‘verbal’ element of the construction. In the literature the predicative element of the construction is taken to be either the infinitive (e.g. Timofeev, 1950; Russkaja Grammatika, 1980; Bricyn, 1990), or the verb *byt* (‘be’) (e.g. Veyrenc, 1979). In my analysis I will argue that no main predicative element is expressed in this construction, but that the predicativeness is an interpretative phenomenon that arises from the interaction of the meaning between the dative and the meaning of the infinitive, more specifically the unification of the non-expressed infinitive subject and the participant expressed by the dative noun.

Another reason why the DI-construction is interesting is that it has such different interpretations, ranging from clearly modal uses to uses that do not have a clear modal interpretation, and that, as I will argue, are often mistakenly called ‘non-modal’. To my knowledge, no adequate answer has been given in the literature to the question how the modal interpretations are related to the so-called ‘non-modal’ ones. Related to this issue is the question of how the different modal interpretations are related to one another. Maurice (1995, 1996) has addressed this question, and has pointed out that the difference between a necessitative interpretation and one of impossibility is connected with the question of whether an intention can be ascribed to the dative participant to realize the action expressed by the infinitive. Maurice did not, however, analyze the relation between the different interpretations of the construction and the meanings of the different constituents in the construction. She did not, for example, address the question of why the construction expresses possibility only in very specific contexts, taking into account the meaning of the construction. In this analysis I will argue that the occurrence of specific interpretations of the construction in specific contexts can be accounted for if we take the meaning of the construction and the ‘meaning’ of modality into consideration. I will argue that a model of modality such as that presented in Talmy (1985) can motivate the occurrence of the use of possibility to a restricted set of contexts. As such, the analysis of the DI-construction may give further insight into the phenomenon of interpretation in general and that of modality, especially

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4 None of these authors, however, explicitly discuss the difference between the predicate and the predicative or verbal element.
5 However, the importance of context is also mentioned by other authors, e.g. Bricyn, 1990.
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the interconnection between such notions as '(im)possibility' and '(un)necessity', in particular.

In my analysis I will show that the assignment of the dative to the infinitive is semantically motivated. This means that all the instances of the DI-construction share semantic features. Taking the semantics of the different forms in the construction into consideration makes it possible to relate the different uses — both modal and so-called 'non modal'— of the construction to one another, to explain the systematic occurrence of the dative in the construction, and to account for the different interpretations. Furthermore, this approach makes it possible to relate the contexts where the infinitive predicate is combined with a dative (pro-)noun to the contexts where *odin* ('alone') and *sam* ('self') occur as adjuncts of the infinitive in the dative. As such, the approach advocated here provides a 'deeper' explanation for the phenomena under discussion than analyses proceeding from a generative framework (e.g. Franks, 1990; Kondrashova, 1994; Junghanns, 1994; Schoorlemmer, 1995), or analyses operating within the framework of Lexical Functional Grammar, more specifically that of Neidle (1982, 1988). In these analyses meaning is not systematically taken into account in the syntactic analysis. Such an approach fails to draw parallels between different interrelated phenomena, and to motivate them.

In the following sections I will look at the questions raised above. In 4.2 I will briefly discuss the method that I will use to analyze the DI-construction, and touch on the topic of compositionality. In the next sections, 4.3—4.5, I will discuss the meaning and use of the different constituents of the construction: the dative, the infinitive and the verb *by* ('be') respectively. In 4.6 I will consider the abstract meaning and the semantic-syntactic structure of the construction. In 4.7—4.8 I will discuss the usage types and classification of the construction. The last part (4.9—4.17) consists of an analysis of the different uses of the construction, and of other related constructions. This part should be seen as an overview of the different uses and the contexts in which they occur, and the rules of interpretation. Finally, in 4.18, I will present my conclusion.

4.2 Method

In this section I will set out the way in which I will analyze the construction, and address the question of whether the construction is compositional.

Before addressing the general issue of method and compositionality, I will first briefly present the different constituents in the construction. The DI-construction is constituted
by a dative noun or pronoun, an infinitive, and in some cases the verb *byt* (‘be’) in the past or future tense (*bylo/budet*) in the neuter declensions.\(^6\) I will propose that the following meanings are relevant for the meaning of the construction:

(i) infinitive: situation type
(ii) *bylo/budet* (past/future tense of *byt*): auxiliary of time
(iii) dative: the participant is a recipient/experiencer

The infinitive expresses aspect (perfective or imperfective), and can be negated; the negation is placed before the infinitive. There are no lexical restrictions on the lexical items that can occur as infinitives in the construction, although some interpretations are restricted to lexical items of specific classes. This is the case for example with the so-called ‘epistemic-ontic’ uses of the construction, where the knowledge of the way things go can be seen as evidence that lead the speaker to conclude that the infinitive situation will necessarily be the case, these uses only occur with lexical items that can be interpreted as ‘states’ (see Bricyn, 1990: 214–215). In some cases the DI-construction occurs with sentences where no infinitive is expressed, but where the identity of the infinitive can be inferred from the context, e.g.:

(…) I-DAT IRR on her there
‘The journey will go to the very edge of the north. If only I could go there.’

(19) A mne chto? (Zoshchenko, 1935)
but I-DAT what?
‘But what must I do?/But how does that concern me?’

In the first sentence, the combination of the infinitive with *by*, the dative, and the time indication (*tuda*), together with the pragmatic context in which the sentence is uttered, implies that the situation referred to must be identified with an act of movement, comparable to ‘going’. In the second sentence the situation could be identified with something like *delat’* (‘do’). Such sentences are special instances of the DI-construction.

The verb *byt* occurs with an inflection for tense (past/future/‘zero’ for present), and person (neuter), and cannot be negated. The occurrence of this verb is subject to

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\(^6\) I will also discuss cases where the dative is an adjunct.
particular restrictions, viz. to particular lexical items and contexts; I will consider these restrictions below in more detail. It must be remarked here that in Russian the verb *byt'* is usually not expressed in the present tense; in such cases there is normally an opposition with the past tense and the future tense. In the case of the DI-construction, however, there are additional restrictions on the expression of the past tense and the future tense, which can be attributed to the meaning of the construction.\(^7\)

The neutral word order for the DI-construction is dative-infinitive, but this word order can be changed. A restriction on the word order of the DI-construction is that the infinitive and *bylo/budet* always seem to occur as a single constituent (see Veyrenc, 1979; *Akademicheskaja Grammatika*, 1980, II: 378). This means that *bylo/budet* can occur before the infinitive, or as a clitic after the infinitive.

The (pro)noun in the dative can occur with both animate and inanimate participants. There are restrictions on the class of verbs that can occur in the DI-construction: impersonal verbs that indicate meteorological phenomena or psychological states cannot form infinitive sentences (Bricyn, 1990: 25). The impossibility of forming infinitive sentences with these lexical items can be motivated by the absence of the idea of an agent in these cases.

In some cases no dative is expressed, especially in directives (where the addressee is the potential agent), interrogatives or sentences with *by* where the speaker can be identified with the potential agent (PA), and in the case of a generic agent:

**Directive (PA= addressee)**

(20)  *Molchat’!*
    be.silent-INF-IMPERF!
    ‘Be silent!’

**Question (PA= speaker)**

(21)  *Kak poexat’ v centr?*
    how go-INF-PERF in center
    ‘How can I get into the center?’

\(^7\) Whether one wishes to speak of a zero form of the verb *byt'* in this case is, in my opinion, foremost a matter of taste.
Chapter IV

Wish (PA=speaker)

(22) Vot by uznat', chto tvorilos' u starogo skazochnika v golove, kogda on sochinja etu istoriju? PRT IRR know-INF-PERF what was.created at old fairy.tale.writer in head, when he created that history 'If only I knew what was going on in the head of the old fairy-tale writer when he created this history.'

Generic reading of impossibility (PA=generic agent)

(23) Vam ponachalu pridetsja prignut'sja, inache zdes' ne projti, no eto nichego? (R. Fejst, Vrata vojny) you first.of.all must bend, otherwise here not pass-INF-PERF, but that nothing 'First of all you must bend, otherwise it's impossible to pass here, but that's no problem.'

In the case of directives (20) and sentences where the speaker must be identified with the non-expressed infinitive subject (21), (22), a dative (tebe or mne respectively) can be used, although this leads to a subtle change in meaning of the expression. In the case of the generic interpretation, as in (23), the expression of a dative changes the specific generic interpretation of the sentence. Nevertheless, such cases fall within the paradigm of the DI-construction (mne/tebe/emu/nam/vam/im ne prijti). Although the constructions discussed here are not strictly speaking instances of the DI-construction, I will discuss such sentences as well because they share important semantic and syntactic properties with sentences with a dative.

Having now discussed the constituents of the DI-construction in a general way, I will address the question of how the DI-construction can best be analyzed. The syntax can be modeled as the combining of the components to form a new component. The syntax of some construction follows the following general rules:

1. Constructions have a hierarchical structure, i.e. a constituency structure. This means that constructions can be divided into components that may also consist of components.

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8 http://www.russ.ru:8085/krug/razbor/19991210.htm l
9 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/FEIST/appret.txt
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2. Meanings can be modeled as information frames with slots. Such slots can be seen as information variables. The syntax can be modeled as the filling of these slots. The identity of the slots is sought in the context. This process cannot be identified with some psychological process of sentence parsing, but is rather a reconstruction of the conventional sentence structure.

3. Constituents form conceptual entities. Because of this, the filling in of slots happens in chunks (constituents). This means that information may be stored, or held, such that the filling in of slots may be delayed. (see Keijzer, 1985).

4. The hierarchical structure of constituents may be described in terms of relational hierarchies, that are connected with the information structure of the clause, i.e. linking (see Keijzer, 1985).

5. In order for a word or string of words to be a construction, some component, or the total of components must be associated with a predicate (predicative minimum), or to put it differently, in order for an expression to be informative, something has to be said about something (From the tradition of Aristotle).

The general rules given here must be reflected in the representation of constructions. In this book, I will use a representation with a tree structure, and a non-formal way of representing information frames. I will present my representation by taking an instance of the DI-construction (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 is a representation of the process of relating information frames to one another such that their slots are filled in. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the relating of frames occurs in chunks; in the representation above the dative frame is only filled in when the infinitive frame and the 'by' frame are already related to each other. This does not mean that the information expressed by the dative is not considered when these two frames are related to each other: information that is expressed remains active but can be put 'on hold'. Furthermore, note that the question of which constituent can be seen as the predicate of the sentence, or the predicative element/idea of the sentence, can only be decided when the whole sentence is uttered. It may be for example that the infinitive is first interpreted as the predicate, but later reinterpreted because some other predicate is uttered. The predicate structure of the sentence is therefore given at the top. In my analysis of constructions, I will start with the constituents that make up the

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10 In the case of expressions such as *spasibo* ("thank you") the whole expression must be seen as a predicate. Such expressions do not have a subject-predicate structure. In fact, I do not think that the idea of predicativity necessarily means that constructions have a subject-predicate structure in the sense that particular constituents must be identified with either subject or predicate.
construction and work bottom-up, instead of top-down. The strategies that are used to 
semantically combine components are the result of the information contained in the 
individual components and general rules of interpretation. Such interpretational rules 
may be inferred from other constructions where they also apply, but are basically 
general in nature.

Figure 4.1

\[ V^+ = \text{non-expressed (IS THE CASE, APPLIES, MUST, CAN, etc., depending on the context)} \]

\[ \text{'Predicate' = INF} \]

\[ R \text{ is recipient of situation type T in past/future} \]

\[ \text{situation type T by a is the case in past/future} \]

\[ \text{[recipient R of situation s], [situation type T by agent a], [situation s is the case in past/future],} \]

\[ \text{dativive, infinitive, bylo/budet, } \varnothing \]

where:

\[ y \]

\[ x \]

\[ =_{\text{def}} \text{ form x is associated with information y} \]
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

\[ x = \text{def } x \text{ is decomposed into } y \text{ and } z, \text{ where } z \text{ is linked to } y \]

\[ y z \]

\[ = \text{def } x \text{ is decomposed into } y \text{ and } z, \text{ where } y \text{ is linked to } z \]

Letters in inverted commas refer to identified concepts (‘x’...n; ‘X’.....n)
Letters refer to non-identified concepts; e.g. a = agent, s = situation
[...] refers to information frames
[...](a...z), refers to the conceptual status (a...z) of information frames ([...])
The large arrow on top of the tree refers to the predicate structure of the sentence

The concept of general rules of interpretation may be rather vague, so I will illustrate it with an example. Consider the sentence John ate. In this sentence John and ate, are related to each other such that John is the agent of ate. This can be modeled as the filling in of slots in the different information frames (ate has an action frame and can contain an agent and a goal). In the information frame of ate there is a slot for the object of the action. In this sentence no object is given. Because of this the object of the action is interpreted either as referring to a contextually given object, or to a non-specified object (John ate something). In the latter case the identity of the object is ‘pushed to the background’, for example because it is not relevant for the communication. The interpreting of some non-expressed argument as referring to some non-specified entity must be seen as a general rule of interpretation. This rule can be semantically or pragmatically motivated: if some information is not relevant, it is not expressed. This is a general pragmatic principle basic to communication. Note, however, that the grammar must state the cases in which such rules may be applied by the speaker; languages may differ in the extent to which slots may remain unspecified. In the case of the DI-construction the reference to interpretational rules is relevant for cases like (20)–(23), where the identity of the participant associated with the potential agent of the infinitive is not formally expressed, but is implied by the context.
I will proceed from the point of view that the meaning of the DI-construct can be reconstructed from the composition of the meanings of its component parts or from other constructions already established in the grammar. This is not to say that the construction can be said to be compositional in the sense that the meaning of the construction can be strictly predicted in some way or another from its component parts or from other constructions already established in the grammar. Because of the flexibility and multi-interpretablility of meanings, and the prototype effects that are associated with meanings, constructions are never compositional in the sense that the result of the composition of meanings can be predicted in some strict sense. It is difficult to define when one can actually speak of prediction because the notion of prediction in language is a highly subjective and theory-dependent notion. Whether something is predictable or reconstructable in language is a matter of degree, and something for which no strict logical or deductive basis can be given. It therefore makes more sense in the case of language to speak of ‘motivation’ rather than about prediction. The importance of motivation in the field of language is further evidenced by some motivation-based reasoning strategies used in Artificial Intelligence, e.g. the strategy of abduction, where after-the-fact inferencing is used to determine why a given sequence of event should have occurred as it did. (Goldberg, 1995: 71). In contrast to the notion of deduction, the notion of motivation is inherently a matter of degree, and probability. This character is also evident in the description of ‘motivation’ given by Lakoff (1990: 537–540), where a given construction is motivated to the degree that its structure is based on other constructions in the language.

The idea that the notion of strict predictability does not make sense in language, and that it is better to speak of motivation, implies that constructions, as linguistic phenomena, are never purely compositional. As such, constructions may very well be conceptualized as ‘wholes’ or ‘entire Gestalts’ (Lakoff, 1990: 539). This is not to say, however, that the composition of the different components in the construction does not play an important part in the construction of this ‘whole’. This point is also made by Goldberg (1995: 24), who works within the framework of Construction Grammar. She remarks that the analysis of constructions must be both top-down (from the construction to the components) and bottom-up (from the components to the construction). She argues, however, that constructions must be seen as the basic units in language, because they contribute meaning to the components of the construction (Goldberg, 1995: 4, 10, 16). In my opinion, such a modeling of constructions is indeed ‘elegant’ for the analysis of many constructions, especially for the constructions analyzed by Goldberg herself. I do not think, however, that such an analysis necessarily contradicts analyses of constructions that...
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

focus on the composition of those constructions. For my analysis I think that the focus on the individual components in the construction is necessary to motivate the specific distribution of the construction, more specifically the peripheral status of cases that express possibility. Analyses that start out from abstract meanings of the construction (e.g. Bricyn, 1990; Maurice, 1996) fail to provide motivation for such facts. This is not to say that different usage types cannot be distinguished on different levels of abstraction (cf. Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2

<table>
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<th>DI-construction</th>
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where x, y, etc. refer to different lexical items

In many cases these different usage types correspond to more or less clear-cut constructions that may well have an 'independent' status in the process of language parsing and production. In my analysis, however, I will focus mainly on the systematization of and behind these conventional uses. This means that I will try to motivate the interpretation of particular instances of the construction.

In the analysis of the DI-construction I will use the following procedure:

11 Although I agree with the analyses given by Goldberg, I think that she partly bases her evidence for the basic status of constructions on an incomplete analysis (Goldberg, 1995: 15–16). In her example of the use of the Dutch impersonal passive, she does not prove that the restriction to non-telic use of verbs in the construction cannot be based on the meanings of the constituents in the construction (er, worden). I would prefer an analysis that focuses more on the meanings of constituents in the analysis of constructions.
(i) Definition of the meanings of the forms in the construction by abstraction from the total of occurrences of the forms in the considered set of data.

(ii) Definition of the abstract meaning of the construction by composition.

(iii) Definition of the abstract meaning of the construction by abstraction from the total of occurrences of the construction in the considered set of data.

(iv) Description and motivation for the rules of interpretation of the construction.

Firstly, the meaning of the different components of the DI-construction must be defined. This can be done by abstraction from the total of occurrences of these forms in the language structure in the considered set of data.\(^{12}\) In some cases, uses can be grouped together, such that prototypical and peripheral uses can be established. Peripheral uses are understood in terms of the more prototypical uses, such that eventually an abstract meaning for all the uses of a particular form can be given, or in other cases, polysemous complexes can be established.

Secondly, the meaning of the construction can be defined by means of the composition of the different components in the construction and the way in which they occur in the construction (word order and accentuation). This abstract meaning can be seen as a theoretical construct that defines the borders of use of the DI-construction. This meaning is inherently fuzzy and general because it does not take account of the influence of other forms or constructions in the language structure. It does, therefore, not contain all the information on the particular distribution of the construction. This means that while it may contain enough information to interpret an instance of the construction, it does not contain enough information to correctly predict which uses are possible and which not. Because important information may be lost in the process of defining the meaning of forms by means of abstraction, it may be necessary to go back to the initial data, viz. the occurrences of constructions themselves, and abstract from them.

The third theoretical step is therefore the abstraction from the total of occurrences of the construction, taking into account the already established meanings of the individual constituents in the construction. This can be represented in a simplified way as in Figure 4.3, where arrows stand for cognitive operations, i.e. manipulation of information.

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\(^{12}\) Of course, the bigger the set of data, the bigger the prediction value of the abstraction. The notion of the total of occurrences of a form remains principally an idealization.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

Figure 4.3

Meaning of form(x, y) → composition → Meaning of construction X=x+y

abstraction from x, y

construction (X .............n) with component forms(x, y, x+y)

abstraction from X

The final step is the description and motivation of the rules of interpretation of the construction. This means that a description must be given of the interaction of the established meaning and the context that leads to the different uses of the construction.

In this section I have argued that the DI-construction can best be analyzed in a compositional way. This means that in order to analyze the DI-construction it is necessary to define the meanings of the different constituents in the construction: dative, infinitive, *bylo* and *budet*. In the following sections I will discuss the meanings of these constituents. In 4.3 I will discuss the dative, in 4.4 I the infinitive, and in 4.5 the meaning of *byt*. In 4.6 I will discuss the composition of these constituents, the abstract meaning of the construction and the semantic-syntactic structure of the construction.

4.3 The dative

In this section I will give a short description of the meaning of the dative in constructions without preposition (*datel'nyj bezpredlozhennyj*). I will first give some examples of the use of the dative in Russian, and then say something about the abstract meaning of the dative. Finally I will make a few comments on the status of the dative in constructions where it can be analyzed as a so-called ‘dative subject’.

4.3.1 Functions and meaning of the dative

In Russian, the dative without preposition can have different functions in the sentence. Zaichkova (1972) distinguishes six semantic-syntactic functions, viz. (i) the dative
occurring with a verb in the function of ‘subject’ or ‘object’, (ii) the dative occurring in different constructions with the impersonal verb byt’ in the function of ‘object’ or ‘subject’, (iii) the dative occurring with nouns, (iv) the dative occurring in elliptical constructions, (v) ethical datives, (vi) the dative occurring with particles. Some examples of these functions are given below (the examples are taken from Zaichkova (1972), unless otherwise indicated):

**Dative ‘object’ of finite verb (indirect object, benefactive object)**

(24) **On mne dal knigu**
    he I-DAT gave book
    ‘He gave me the book’.

(25) **On sh’et ej kostjum.**
    he sews she-DAT costume
    ‘He is sewing a costume for her.’

(26) **Il’ja Ivanych rasplatilja za pivo i grustno pozhal mne ruku.** (Zoshchenko, 1935)
    Il’ja Ivanych paid for beer and sadly shook I-DAT hand
    ‘Ilja Ivanych paid for his beer, and sadly shook my hand.’

**Dative ‘subject’ of finite verb**

(27) **Mne ne spitsja.**
    I-DAT not sleep-3SG-REFL
    ‘I can’t sleep.’

**Dative in impersonal constructions with byt’ in the function of ‘subject’**

(28) **Mne xolodno.\(^{13}\)**
    I-DAT cold-ADV
    ‘I feel cold.’

**Dative in construction with noun (expressing the ‘indirect object’ of the noun)**

(29) **prikaz komu**

\(^{13}\) In this case the verb byt’ is not expressed, but it can be expressed in the past or future tense.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

order who-DAT
‘order to someone’

(30) oskorblenie komu
insult someone-DAT
‘insult to someone’

Ethical dative

(31) No on zhe mne ne chuzhoj chelovek! — skazala Alisa.14 (K. Bulychev, Izluchatel’dobroty)
but he PRT 1-DAT not strange man! (…) 
‘But he isn’t a stranger to me!’, said Alisa.’

(32) Prishel on tebe domoj, vse dveri nastezh’. (Jakobson, 1995: 359)
came he you-DAT home, all doors wide.open
‘He came home on you, all the doors wide open.’

Dative in ‘elliptical’ construction

(33) Vse bogatstva — mne!15 (N. Alenev, Lesnaja skazka)
all richness — I-DAT
‘All richness — for me!’

(34) Mir xizhinam, vojna dvorcami! (Paustovskij, Nachalo nevedomogo veika)
peace-NOM huts-DAT, war-NOM palaces-DAT
‘Peace to the huts, war to the palaces!’

Dative occurring with ‘particle’

(35) Vot tebe den’gi.
PRT you-DAT money
‘Here is the money.’

(36) Byli u professora den’gi? — Zachem emu den’gi? poslyshalsja golos Ichun’. — Esli emu
chto-nibud’ bylo nuzhno, vse srazu prisylali iz goroda.16 (K. Bulychev, Izluchatel’dobroty)

15 http://inache.karelia.ru:8084/skazka.html

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"Did the professor have money? What would he need that for?" said the voice of Ichun. "If he needed something, they immediately sent it to him from town."

As I will argue below, all these cases of the dative share features, viz. the participant expressed in the dative is an experiencer or recipient. This abstract meaning is interpreted differently, depending on the semantic-syntactic context in which the dative form occurs. In many cases it is not possible to draw strict boundaries for different usage types of the dative, which points at the fact that all dative uses share basic features. I will not go into the specific function of the dative in the sentences given above, but will first discuss the meaning of the dative in general. Finally I will say something about the function of the dative as a subject.

In the literature there has been much debate concerning the question of whether case must be analyzed as a semantic category, or as a purely syntactic category without semantic basis. One of the earliest semantic theories about the Russian case system is given by Jakobson [1936], while 'syntactically' based theories of case proceed from the work of Chomsky. Analyses based on Chomsky start out from the following two principles, viz. (i) case is determined by syntactic structure, that is, particular verbs or prepositions assign a particular case to a form, and (ii) case has no influence on the semantic interpretation of sentences. In my analysis I will focus on the semantic basis of case, but I would like to stress that convention plays an important part in case assignment. This means that a semantic analysis of case must be seen as a motivation and systematization of and behind linguistic norms, rather than as a rule-based explanation.

Jakobson assumes three important principles in his study of the Russian case system, viz. (i) cases have meaning, (ii) every case has exactly one (general) meaning and different context-dependent uses or interpretations, and (iii) the meaning of the different cases (nominative, genitive, dative, accusative, instrumental, locative) must be described in opposition to the other cases in the system. More specifically, cases are described in terms of the markedness principle, that is, in terms of the obligatory signalling of the presence of a feature x (marked for x), or the absence of such an obligatory signalling (unmarked for x). The features employed by Jakobson in his work on case [1936], are 'directedness', 'scope', 'status' and 'shaping'.

Jakobson analyzes the meaning of the dative as follows: "[I]t signifies peripheral status, like the I [instrumental], and involvement in an action, like the A [accusative]. Thus the D [dative] has been defined as the case of the indirect object or the auxiliary object" (1995: 357). Jakobson further argues that the dative participant must be seen as
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a recipient (Jakobson: 1995 [1936]: 359). According to him, one can speak of a recipient if “an action, or more exactly a state of affairs, is experienced as independent of the activity of the experiencer”. The idea of a recipient is also clear in Jakobson’s description of the dative as denoting the existence of its referent as independent of the action (1995: 358).

The meaning of the dative given by Jakobson must be seen as a general meaning or invariant; hence the description of the dative is said to apply in all the different dative uses. To give an example, in the case of the ethical dative, verbs that are not normally associated with indirect objects are assigned an extra role because of the meaning of the dative. Jakobson (1990: 359) argues that the function of the dative in such cases is to indicate that the participant expressed by the pronoun is a recipient, because the participant expressed in the dative is perceived “as if he were affected by the action, as if it had even taken place with reference to him”. Although Jakobson (1990) illustrates the meaning that he gives with many examples, the way in which the general meaning must be interpreted, and the exact status of the different features used in the description, remains in some cases unexplained.

An up-to-date approach to case meaning is given by Wierzbicka (1986), who discusses the dative in Polish. She proposes that the dative case be described in terms of a core meaning. She further argues that the dative core meaning is similar across languages, but the extensions from this basic meaning differ from language to language. She argues (1986: 387) that the core meaning of the dative can be identified with its use as it occurs with verbs like give; she offers the following description for this core meaning: “X did something with thing Y; wanting person Z to come to have it; something happened to Y because of that; one could assume that Z would come to have Y because of that”. After careful investigation of different uses of the dative in Polish, Wierzbicka (1986: 419) further concludes that all the dative cases in Polish have something in common, viz. the idea that the dative implies a situation which is not controlled by a person Z but which is likely (though not certain) to have an effect on him.

In my description of the dative I wish to focus on the idea of ‘being affected’. The idea of ‘being affected’ is also part of other descriptions of the dative meaning in different languages, for example in the notion of ‘active experiencer’ used by Langacker (1991b: 236–254). The notion of ‘affectedness’ or ‘active experiencer’ can be illustrated with the sentence (24) above. In this sentence the dative participant can be seen as a recipient because he is actively involved in the act of giving, he is ‘affected’ by this act, without initiating this act, that is, being the agent of the action. This differs from the
role of the participant in the case of the accusative, where no active involvement is required and where the participant is not necessarily affected, e.g.:

(37) Ja videl ego.

I-NOM saw him-ACC

'I saw him.'

In this case the patient of the action does not have to be aware that he is the object of some action; put differently, he is not actively involved or affected. The idea of active experiencer, or being affected is not clearly present in all instances of the dative, especially in cases where the dative participant is a non-animate entity. In such cases, the idea of 'effect' is connected with the idea of coming into effect. This can be illustrated with the word *konec* ('end') that can occur with a dative if it is used in an abstract sense, and has the function of subject or object of the sentence (Zaichkova, 1972: 55); compare:

(38) I nastupil vse-taki konec ego muchen'jam.

and came in.the.end end his sufferings-DAT

'And finally in the end there came an end to his suffering.'

(39) Chasy pokazyvali konec rabocheho dnja.

clocks showed end work-GEN day-GEN

'The clocks showed the end of the working day.'

With *konec* ('end') the dative is used in those cases where the coming into being of the final phase of some temporal phenomenon is concerned, possibly as the result of an external force, whereas the genitive is used in those cases where the final phase is portrayed as an (inherent) feature of the phenomenon in question. In the sentence with the dative, the phenomenon in question is conceptualized as a dynamic phenomenon, that is, we conceptualize the transition from the moment where there is no end to the suffering to the moment where such an end exists. This dynamic character is absent in the case of the genitive.

In the definitions of the dative given by Jakobson and Wierzbicka the emphasis lies on the affected nature of the dative participant. The affected nature presupposes that there is some force or agent that can be seen as the affecting force. This presupposition is more clearly expressed in the definition of the dative given in Zaichkova (1972: 82); she defines the meaning of the dative in Russian as goal-oriented
directedness (*celevaja napravlennost*). The idea of 'goal-directedness' is clear in sentences such as *On mne dal knigu* ('he gave me the book'). In this sentence the subject (*on*) can be seen as a participant that performs an action directed at the dative participant. This means that the goal of the action is that the dative participant will receive the object of the action. In some constructions the idea of 'goal-directedness' has a more abstract character because there is no identifiable participant that can be seen as the goal-directed force. This is the case for example in constructions with a dative subject and an adverbial predicate, as in (28). In this sentence the dative participant can be seen as the experiencer of the state expressed by the predicate that is induced by an abstract force such as circumstances, the weather, etc.

Considering the different uses of the dative in Russian, I think it can best be described in terms of a basic meaning and extensions of this basic meaning. As cases occur in a relatively clear-cut system of cases, it can be expected that the choice of case and the conventionalization of use of case must be described in terms of choosing the optimal case from the case system, since optimization in terms of basic uses accounts for the relative stability of the case system (see Chapter II for a more general discussion of stability and polysemy). I would like to propose that the following three interrelated features constitute the basic meaning of the dative in Russian:

(i) There is some force directed at Y.
(ii) Y is potentially affected by this force.
(iii) The potential effect (potentially) results in a dynamic scene ('receiving', 'coming into effect').

Besides basic uses there are peripheral uses. This notion is a theoretical notion, in the sense that the peripheral status is not based on psychological evidence or evidence from judgments of language users, but on theoretical criteria. Peripheral uses can be described and analyzed as uses where some features present in the basic dative meaning are weakened or changed because of the context in which the dative occurs. Peripheral uses are exemplified by cases where the force that is directed as the dative participant is not expressed, and where the dative is an inanimate entity. An example is given below:

(40) Vsem cvetam cvety. (A. Velichko, 1996: 15)
all-DAT flowers-DAT flowers
'The best flowers of all.'
Here we find an instance of the construction \([\text{sem} + \text{noun\_plural} + \text{noun\_nominative}]\) which expresses that the noun in the nominative \((x)\) is considered by the speaker to be the best example of the universal set of \(x\); in this sentence there is no identifiable or expressed force directed at the phenomenon expressed in the dative, and the dative noun is an inanimate entity. I will not go into this construction here but will offer a suggestion as to how this use of the dative might be motivated. In this sentence the speaker expresses that for all flowers the following statement applies: the contextually given flowers are the flowers, that is, the best flowers. The speaker can be seen as a force directed at all flowers since he makes a statement concerning all flowers; this presupposes an information state where it is not known that the statement in question applies to all flowers. Similar ‘abstract’ instances of ‘affectedness’ can be found with some uses of the DI-construction that occur with overt subordinators like chtoby, pered tem kpek and esli, as in \((9)-(11)\) given above. In my analysis I will argue that the occurrence of the dative in these cases is facilitated by the context in which it occurs, more specifically the meaning of the subordinators, and that the idea of ‘recipient’ occurs in these cases in a weakened form. If we take this point of view, we can motivate the specific distribution of the dative, and point at semantic and syntactic similarities between the DI-construction and constructions with the second dative. Such a motivation is not provided in the generative literature. The occurrence of the datives in sentences like these is normally treated in the generative literature as a ‘syntactic phenomenon’ where the experiencer semantics of the dative is presumed not to play a part in the occurrence. Schoorlemmer (1995: 64), for example, distinguishes sentences with a so-called structural dative from sentences with an experiencer semantics dative and claims that they are not connected to each other. As I will discuss later, this is an unsatisfactory conclusion, which leads to inaccurate syntactic analyses and the failure of unifying phenomena that are formally unified.

I do not think it is possible to predict the range of uses of the dative on the basis of the three features I gave above. It is possible, however, to understand the dative on the basis of these features and the context in which the dative occurs. Furthermore, it may be that particular regularities in the use of the dative can be observed.17 A complete

17 It would be interesting to study the change in the use of the dative in Russian, to see whether it must be attributed to a change in basic meaning of the dative or not. In older stages of Russian, up to the nineteenth century, the dative stood in opposition to the genitive case in contexts where in modern Russian a genitive is required. (see Vinogradov & Shvedova, 1964: 157–172). Consider the following sentence: Loo ej [rybe] ne nachinalja esbe (Vinogradov & Shvedova, 1964: 163/Golovn.), (catch they-DAT not started yet, ‘The catching of the fish has not started yet’). The occurrence of the dative in this sentence can be motivated as follows: the fisher can be seen as a force that is directed at the catching of the fish, which means that the fish is affected by the catcher (resulting in the ‘fished’ state of the fish). In modern Russian
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

description of the dative in Russian must list all the different usage types for the dative and point out regularities, while at the same time defining the basic use of the dative; it must also state how the dative differs from other cases. Finally, whether some participant of an action expressed by a verb is expressed in the dative is, at least partly, a matter of convention, and must therefore be listed in the valency structure of the verb. A complete analysis of all the different uses of the dative case is beyond the scope of this research. I have confined myself to formulating the meaning of the dative insofar it is relevant for my study. In the next section I will make a few remarks on the use of the dative as a so-called ‘subject’.

4.3.2 The dative as a so-called ‘subject’

In the DI-construction the dative is interpreted as the potential agent of the infinitive situation. Some scholars (e.g. Zaichkova, 1972; Schoorlemmer, 1995; Komar, 1999) call the dative in the DI-construction a subject. The interpretation of the dative as a subject may be based on different theoretical principles, which I will not go into here. In my opinion the syntactic classification of the dative as a ‘subject’ can be based on two different criteria: (i) the same construction can be interpreted differently depending on the syntactic function assigned to the dative; this accounts for a syntactic classification as such, and (ii), the function of the dative in the DI-construction, and other similar constructions, shares particular features with nominative subjects, which accounts for the use of the term subject for some uses of the dative. I will briefly discuss these criteria below.

The difference between the ‘subject’ function of the dative and the ‘indirect object’ function can be elucidated with the following instance of the DI-construction:

a genitive is required here (Vinogradov & Shvedova, 1964: 163); this means that the catching is portrayed as a property of the fish. This diachronic change can possibly be seen as part of a larger group of similar phenomena. During the course of the nineteenth century the use of the dative with nouns was confined to specific syntactic contexts, viz. (a) as the specification of the predicate with nouns like drug (‘friend’), e.g. on drug bratu (‘he a friend of my brother’), (b) in constructions like dat’ nachalo del’ (‘to start something’), and (c) with nouns that express direction, appeal, etc., e.g. xvala goerjam (‘praise of the heroes’), pozor ubije (‘shame on the murderer’). There seems to be a diachronic tendency in Russian to use the dative in those cases where it is part of the predicate of the sentence (see Vinogradov & Shvedova, 1964: 14.) At the beginning of the nineteenth century it was still possible to use words like drug (‘friend’) in the dative as a specification of a noun in non-predicative contexts (Vinogradov & Shvedova, 1964: 171), whereas by the end of the nineteenth century this use had become obsolete. It may be that the dative became reserved for predicative contexts because in such sentences the idea of recipienthood was more strongly felt.
In this construction the dative could – hypothetically speaking – be interpreted in two ways, viz. (i) as the indirect object of the verb (‘Shall I pour you?’), (ii) as the potential agent of the infinitive situation (‘Will you pour?’); the first interpretation is pragmatically the more likely and is chosen by the language user.

In the case of the ‘indirect object’ interpretation the participant expressed by the dative is portrayed as a participant to which an action with an identifiable subject (in this case the speaker) is directed. For this interpretation the following informal analysis can be given:

nalit': ‘to pour’; valency structure: subject (who poured?), object (what is poured?), indirect object (for whom is poured?)
- indirect object: dative
- object: non-specified
- subject: because of the infinitive mood non-specified, but associated with the speaker

In the case of the so-called ‘subject’ interpretation the participant expressed by the dative is portrayed as a participant that is the recipient of the situation expressed by the infinitive. In this case the force that assigns this situation to the dative participant has no clearly identifiable character. The following informal analysis can be given for this interpretation:

nalit': ‘to pour’; valency structure: subject (who poured?), object (what is poured?), indirect object (for whom is poured?)
- indirect object: non-specified
- object: non-specified
- subject: because of the infinitive mood non-specified, but associated with the dative

Since the dative participant can be seen as the potential agent of the infinitive situation, and no other entity with agentive properties is expressed or implied in the construction, the dative is sometimes called the dative subject.

The interpretation of the dative as a ‘subject’ also occurs in other constructions where no nominative subject of the finite verb is expressed, and where the dative participant
is the recipient of some state that has no subject, or at least no identifiable subject. The relation between the DI-construction and other constructions with a dative ‘subject’ is shown in the tree in Figure 4.4.

As is shown in Figure 4.4, a main division can be made between those sentences where there is a finite verb and the reflexive suffix -\textit{sja}, and those cases where the finite element is expressed by the neuter form of \textit{byt’} (‘be’). Sentences where the finite verb can be identified with \textit{byt’} (‘be’) can be subdivided into cases with an adverbial predicate on -\textit{o}, and cases without adverbial predicate on -\textit{o}.$^{18}$ Cases without adverbial predicate are exemplified by the DI-construction. Cases without adverbial predicate on -\textit{o} are exemplified by the existential construction (e.g. (13)); in this construction the interrogative can be seen as the predicate of the sentence.

What these cases have in common is that the dative participant is the experiencer of a situation that has no nominative subject, or agent with a clearly identifiable character. The non-identifiable character of the subject of the situation means that the dative participant

$^{18}$ Cases with an adverbial predicate can be further subdivided into particular cases with modal predicates (\textit{możno, nado, nieżno}) and other predicates. As I will argue in 4.5, this difference is connected with the semantic-syntactic status of the predicate and the verb \textit{byt’} (‘be’).
is more highlighted, or put differently, more 'profiled' (Langacker, 1991), than in sentences where it functions as a so-called indirect object. In the case of the dative use under discussion, the prominent status of the dative participant is further underlined by the association of the dative participant with an agentive role.

In the DI-constructon (1)–(7), and in the so-called existential construction (13), the dative has an agentive role because he can be seen as the potential agent of some situation. This means that these constructions imply (the absence of) a scene where the dative participant realizes the infinitive situation.

In constructions with a reflexive finite verb (27) the participant is associated with an agentive role because he intends to realize a situation, in which he does not succeed; instead another action is induced by the circumstances.

In other constructions the association of the dative subject with an agentive role may be more abstract. This is the case for example in sentences with an adverbal predicate on -o, such as in (28) above, where the dative participant experiences some feeling induced by the cold temperature. In this sentence the 'agentive' role is connected with the fact that the dative participant is actively involved in the situation, the cold temperature may for example give rise to a bodily sensation, without being an actual agent; the bodily sensation is the result of an external force. Note that not all adverbs can occur as predicates with a dative subject (Schoorlemmer, 1994:140), e.g.:

(42) *Nam bylo krasivo.
we-DAT was-IMPER S beautiful-ADV

The property 'krasivyy' is conceptualized as an inherent property of some thing, and cannot be conceptualized as having an effect on some participant ('we found it beautiful'). This phenomenon is part of a larger group of similar phenomena; that is, there are similar adverbs that cannot be used as predicates, or particular modifications are necessary in order to use such an adverb as a predicate. For a further discussion, I refer to Zaitseva (1990: 215–229), who describes the conditions for the dative NP in impersonal constructions in Russian.

Whether the prominent status of the dative participant in the cases discussed above is enough to classify it as a subject, is, in some way, a senseless question, because it depends on the particular definition of subject. A possible reason to speak of a dative subject is to do credit to the fact that that nominative subjects and so-called dative subjects share semantic features, which can account for some observed phenomena I mentioned earlier such as gerund binding and anaphoric binding. Other features that point to similarities with nominative subjects are the tendency of the dative to occupy the first position in the
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clause, and probably other features that are related to the topical status of the dative. Nevertheless, I would like to stress that dividing the use of the dative into different semantic-syntactic functions is to some extent only a theoretical issue, which, in my opinion, cannot be adequately defined. This can be illustrated with the following construction without verb, where the event suggested by the combination of the dative and the noun has already taken place:

\[(43)\quad \text{Emu smeex – a mne chut’ ne infarkt.}^{19}\]

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{he-DAT} & \text{laughter-NOM} \quad \text{but I-DAT little not stroke-NOM} \\
\text{‘It made him laugh, but I almost had a stroke.’}
\end{array}
\]

I think this construction can best be analyzed as follows. The dative occurs, facilitated by the contrastive nature of the construction, to indicate that the participant expressed in the dative was the recipient of the referent expressed by the noun. The combination of the dative and the noun creates a predicative relationship, that is, the construction expresses that the participant received the thing, or realized the action suggested by the noun. Should the dative in this construction be seen as a subject or not? If the subject is defined as the participant with the highest ranking semantic role, the dative could indeed be seen as a subject, but if the subject is defined as the participant expressed in the nominative, the dative *cannot* be seen as a subject in this case because of the presence of a nominative subject. Cases like these show that the issue of subjecthood is very much a theoretical issue, which cannot be adequately solved. I will, however, use the term dative subject in my analysis, to refer to the use of the dative in the DI-construction, where the potential agent is expressed. The term ‘subject’ in my analysis can thus not be seen as having any kind of theoretical implications in the sense of Generative Grammar (cf. Komar, 1999, on the status of subjecthood in formal frameworks).

**4.4 The infinitive**

In this section I will discuss the meaning and function of the infinitive. I will start with a general discussion of the meaning of the infinitive. I will argue that the infinitive must be seen as a verb denoting a situation type. I will further propose that some specific ‘modal’ uses of the infinitive result from the interaction between this abstract meaning and the

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context in which it occurs, and that the differences between infinitives and oppositional forms such as nouns must also be accounted for in terms of the difference in meaning between these parts of speech. Finally, I will give an overview of different uses of the infinitive in the different semantic-syntactic contexts.

4.4.1 Situation type

I agree with Ebeling (1984) that the infinitive denotes in all its different uses a situation type. I use the term ‘situation’ to refer to all the phenomena that are expressed by verbs, such as events, states, etc.; this means that my term ‘situation’ is identical to the term ‘process’ used by Langacker (1991), and the term ‘fact’ used by Ebeling (1984). Because the infinitive denotes a situation, it can evoke the thought of an agent or subject of the situation and the idea of the realization of a situation, unless the lexical meaning of the verb blocks the idea of a subject (in the case of impersonal verbs). In contrast to situations expressed by finite verbs, the infinitive does not refer to an individual instantiation of a situation but rather to a situation type. Situation types can be seen as abstractions from individual occurrences of situations that are grouped together on the basis of similarity. In contrast to individual situations, which are expressed by finite verbs, the infinitive does not express person, number, or tense. The only grammatical information expressed by the infinitive is aspect, which is connected with the internal structure of the situation; some authors also treat the reflexive suffix -sja as grammatical information (voice). Apart from the absence of a grammatical subject, the Russian infinitive has the normal valence of finite verbs.

The absence of inflection for person, tense, and gender is connected with the type character of the infinitive. In the case of the infinitive, features that are associated with the realization of the situation by a specific person, at a particular moment in time are abstracted, resulting in those features that the individual situation shares with other similar individual situations. Because of the type character of the infinitive, the infinitive shares features with parts of speech that denote referents or things, such as nouns. It is typical of situations that they occupy a unique position in time and space, whereas things can occupy different positions in time and space. Infinitives, however, differ from nouns because they are associated with an agentive role if the verb is personal; as such they can function both as predicate and complement (see 4.4.3).

The description of infinitives as a situation type, resulting from the cognitive manipulation of abstracting from the individual properties of the situation such that types can be constructed, is in accordance with the description given by Langacker (1991b: 82)
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for the English infinitive. According to Langacker, in the case of the infinitive the sequential scanning of the verb stem is suspended, which means that the processual predication of the stem is converted into an atemporal relation. It is not clear to me, however, whether the cognitive strategy to construct situation types must be seen as based on some visual capacity. It could for example also be argued that the suspension of the sequential scanning is the result of viewing the situation as a type. Furthermore, I do not think that the verbal character of parts of speech such as infinitives is solely constituted by the cognitive manipulation of ‘sequential scanning’ (Langacker, 1991b). In my opinion the main reason that infinitives are verbal in nature, and can as such be seen as verbs, is that they are always associated with the idea of the realization of the situation and hence with an agent or subject of this realization if the verb is personal (see 3.1, for the discussion of the status of verbs). In the case of situations such as actions we focus on the relation in time between the agent of the action and the action itself. We perceive a scene as an action because we conceptualize the entity as expending energy over time such that an event takes place in time. This means that it is not only the sequential scanning which is relevant, but the whole of agenthood, realization, and time.

The conceptualization of the infinitive event as having an agent means that the subject of the action must be identified with some agent present in the context (cf. Zolotova, 1982: 254–255). If no specific agent is available in the context, the nature of the agent will be non-specific. This non-specific nature of the infinitive agent in such contexts is the result of the type character of the infinitive. An example of this can be found in sentences such as Katat’ja veselo (skate-INF fun-ADV; ‘It’s fun to skate’), where the infinitive applies to unspecified agents (‘Generally, it’s fun to perform the action of skating’). In some contexts, however, the agent of the action may be associated with a specific agent. This is the case for example in sentences like On nachal uchit’ja (‘He started to study’). As a result of the relation that is made between the infinitive and a specific agent, the infinitive refers in this sentence to a situation that is definite. The individualized character of the infinitive in its context must be seen as an interpretation and not as part of the meaning of the infinitive.

The process of unification of the infinitive agent with a specific agent in the context may very well be partly conventional; that is, it has to be learned by the language user, and does not follow from our cognitive make-up. This is not to say that these conventions cannot be reconstructed as primarily ‘pragmatic’ in nature, that is, based on common sense. In the case of the sentences On nachal chitat’ (‘He began to read.’); On ljubit chitat’ (‘He likes to read.’) the agent present in the context is the agent
of the finite verb. The presence of this agent in the syntactic context may be the sole reason that we interpret the agent of the infinitive as identical to the agent of the finite verb. In other contexts, other agents may be more plausible candidates. This is the case for example in sentences where the finite verb occurs with an indirect object, as in On velel emu priexat ("He ordered him to come"). In this case the only plausible candidate for the agent of the infinitive is the same referent as the indirect object. If the subject of the finite verb was interpreted to be the agent, this should lead to the pragmatically odd interpretation where someone orders someone else that he himself would do something.

Of course, this is by no means a complete analysis, but it does suggest that syntactic conventions may very well have a semantic-pragmatic ground. In generative analyses the association of the infinitive agent with a specific agent is described in terms of positing an underlying element in the sentence, called PRO, that can have case (e.g. Comrie, 1974) or be assigned case (e.g. Franks, 1990). In my opinion, the non-expressed subject of the infinitive cannot be seen as an individual subject that can have case, since it must be seen as an abstraction over individual subjects, which means that we cannot conceptualize PRO as a specific entity. In some cases, however, the non-expressed infinitive subject may be associated with an expressed participant. For the unification of the non-specified infinitive agent with some participant, I think an analysis in a model such as Optimality Theory would be suitable (for references I refer the reader to Archangeli & Langendoen, 1997).

In the literature it is often remarked that the infinitive expresses so-called ‘subjective modal’ nuances such as unexpectedness, wish, desire, etc. or objective modal nuances such as necessity or possibility. Some scholars (e.g. Růžichka, 1994) try to attribute a modal meaning to the infinitive, but the status and interpretation of this modal ‘meaning’ remains unclear. Ebeling (1984: 128) proposes to account for such uses in his definition of the meaning of the infinitive, viz. “the Russian infinitive presents a fact as a member of a pair of facts [situations], the relation between the two being ‘accompanying’”. In my opinion Ebeling’s description cannot be seen as the meaning of the infinitive, but must be seen as a description that defines the range of possible interpretations of the abstract meaning ‘situation type’. I think it is best to see the specific ‘modal’ use of the infinitive as an interpretation of the more abstract meaning ‘situation type’. This means that the infinitive itself has no modal meaning, but can be used to express modal notions, and other related notions, in a specific context.

In some contexts, for example, the infinitive is interpreted as expressing unexpectedness. This interpretation can indeed be described in terms of ‘two situations’:
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the conceptualization of a situation as a type may point to the need to contrast the situation with some other situation. An example of an interpretation where a part is played by the notion of 'contrast' or 'unexpectedness' occurs in the nominative-infinitive construction, exemplified by the following sentence:

(44) Ja pod zemlej byl, kak raz u sabja v inzhenernyx sooruzheniux, vdrug — bums — zemlia drognula. U menja v odnom meste v tonnle s potolka pesok stal sypats'ja. Ja — bezhat' iz-pod zemli.20 (Veles i Kompanija, Nevoennaja xronika soldatskoj sluzhby)

(45) I — run-INF from under the ground

'I was under the ground, when in the engineers building suddenly — boom! — the ground was shaking. In one of the parts of the tunnel sand started falling from the ceiling. I started to run from under the ground.'

This sentence has a so-called ingressive interpretation, indicating the beginning of an unexpected action. I think Ebeling (1984: 119–120) gives an appropriate analysis for such cases. He argues that in such sentences the infinitive presupposes the idea of a contrast with an expected action in the narration. A similar interpretation can be found in the following sentence:

(45) Kak priedet — spat'.21 (L. Leonov, Barsuki)

'When he comes home — goes to sleep.'

In this sentence the infinitive indicates the action that the subject will engage in as soon as some other action is completed. The preceding context (kak priedet) already presupposes the question ‘what type of action will the subject do?’; the infinitive fills in the identity of the action, and does not convey what was already presupposed, viz. the idea that the subject will engage in some action.

A different interpretation can be found in cases that express notions such as direction or permission. Consider the following sentence:

(46) Molchat'!

'Be silent.'

21 http://moshkow.orsk.ru/Library/lat/LEONOWL/barsuki.txt
The modal nature of this sentence must not be sought in some modal feature that is part of the infinitive form. Instead, it is preferable to account for such cases by looking at the interaction between the meaning ‘situation type’ and the context in which the infinitive occurs. In this sentence the infinitive is used as a directive, an interpretation that can be motivated as follows: if the speaker expresses the idea of a particular situation type in the context where there is some addressee who does not perform the infinitive action, a possible interpretation is that the speaker expresses that in the given circumstances the infinitive action (and as such no other situation type) applies or is the case. Because the agent given in the context is the addressee, the non-specified infinitive agent is unified with the addressee, and because the agent is not performing the infinitive action, the infinitive is interpreted as a directive. Note that this explanation presupposes that the idea of ‘is the case’, or ‘applies’, is naturally inferred if the infinitive is used in a context where it is not embedded in a syntactic context with a finite verb. In my opinion, this is the most neutral predicative meaning of any form that can enter into a predicative relationship. An example from English would be an utterance like ‘beautiful weather’, which is interpreted as ‘It is beautiful weather’, and not, for example, ‘I hope that in two days it will be beautiful weather’.

There are further regularities in the use of the dative in Russian, which cannot be attributed to the meaning of ‘situation type.’ Ebeling (1984: 102) remarks that in the case of predicates indicating modal attitudes (e.g. xotet (‘to want’), ljubit (‘to love’), dal'ben (‘must’), sobirat'sja (‘to be going to’) the infinitive situation is necessarily ‘indefinite’, that is, the infinitive cannot refer to a situation that takes place at the same time as the situation expressed by the finite verb.\textsuperscript{22} Compare the following sentences from Russian and Dutch respectively:

(47) Roland dumał uvidet' v aptekë sovsemen to, chto uvidel.
Roland thought see-INF-PERF in chemist's shop at all not that, what saw
‘Roland didn't expect to see at all in the chemist's shop what he saw.’

(48) Roland dacht iets ongewoons in de apotheek te zien.
Roland thought something unusual in the chemist's shop to see-INF
‘Roland thought he saw something unusual in the chemist's shop.’

\textsuperscript{22} An exception to this rule is the construction by' + rad (‘happy’) + infinitive, where the infinitive refers to an action that takes place at the same time as the state expressed by the predicate and the verb by'. I do not think it is correct to account for the impossibility of sentences like (48) in Russian in terms of the infinitive meaning (cf. Ebeling, 1984, for such an approach).
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In Russian the infinitive in the construction with dumat' ('think') expresses an action that the subject expects to do in the future, whereas in Dutch the infinitive is interpreted as an action that takes place at the same time as the action expressed by the finite verb. To obtain a similar interpretation in Russian, one has to use a subordinate clause introduced with chto ('that'): on dumal chto. In my opinion, regularities like these do not imply that the meaning of the infinitive has to be changed such that the definition can predict them. I think it is best to say that the infinitive means 'situation type', but that the actual way in which this meaning can be used is conventional, and must therefore be described in the semantic description. This points to the relevance of taking the meaning of constructions into account in the linguistic description.

4.4.2 Infinitives versus nominalizations

As I have argued, the infinitive is a verb with a type character. The verbal nature of the infinitive accounts for its specific use and the differences in use between the infinitive and non-verbal parts of speech, such as nouns that denote 'things' or 'referents'. The definition of the term 'thing' is an intricate problem, because it is not clear to what extent this notion must be seen as a language specific or language dependent notion, or whether a language independent definition can be given that is based on general cognitive capacities of humans, such as the capacity to construe Gestalts. Langacker (1991b: 20) defines the term 'thing' quite broadly to refer to a “region in some domain”. To obtain a better insight into the difference between verbs and nouns it is useful to look at the difference in meaning between infinitives and their closest oppositional forms from the domain of nouns, the nominalizations. Langacker (1991b: 98–99) argues that the difference in meaning between nominalizations and verbs in English (for example explode versus explosion) can be attributed to the fact that they employ different images to structure the same conceptual event: explode imposes a processual construal on the profiled event, while explosion portrays it as an abstract region. Following Langacker's line of thought, the infinitive of explode imposes a processual construal where the sequential scanning is suspended, whereas the nominalization explosion portrays the event as an abstract region.

23 Problematic in this definition is that ontological and epistemic categories are confused in the linguistic terminology. Although things always take up some region, they are not regions; at different times things can be at quite different regions. But this is only a matter of terminology; I agree with Langacker that the difference between noun and verbs is connected with a difference in conceptualization or 'construal'.
In my opinion, an important difference between nouns and verbs is the question of whether the particular conceptualization abstracts from the idea of agenthood and realization.

finite verb abstraction from idea of realization, and agenthood
infinitive realization
nominalization agenthood

Although I think that an analysis of the difference between verbs and nouns in terms of strategies of abstraction from the notion of realization and agenthood is correct, it does not fully explain the specific differences in use and meaning of the different parts of speech. In order to account for these differences it is best to look at the specific contexts where they can be seen as oppositional forms. Consider the following sentences:

(49) On ljubit chitat'.
    he likes read-INF-IMPERF
    ‘He likes to read.’

(50) On ljubit chtenie.
    he likes read-NOUN
    ‘He likes reading/people reading.’

(51) Ja nachala chitat' s zhadnost'ju, i skoro chtenie uvleklo menja sovershenno. (Slovar' Russkogo Jazyka, 1984, IV/Dostoevskij)
    I began read-INF-IMPERF with craving, and soon reading-NOUN carried away me totally
    ‘Eagerly, I began to read, and soon the reading carried me totally away.’

In the case of the infinitive (49) the agent of the situation must be identified with the nominative subject of the finite verb, whereas the nominalization (50) does not express the idea of an identifiable agent. The first sentence therefore only expresses that the subject strives to read himself, whereas the second sentence can also mean that the subject likes to listen to other people read. Note furthermore that the nominalization chtenie can be used to refer both to a specific instance of a reading event (‘the reading’) and in the plural to an institutionalized event where someone is reading (‘lecture’). This latter interpretation shows more clearly the ‘thing’ character of the noun, that is, the
abstraction from the idea of a subject, and the conceptualization of the phenomenon in question that can occupy different places in time and space.

The specific difference in meaning between the infinitive and the nominalization can further be illustrated with sentence (51). In this sentence both an infinitive and a noun occur. In the case of the infinitive the focus is on the realization of the action type ‘read’ by the subject of the finite verb. The subject performs an action that can be seen as the start of the action of reading. Put differently, the action of the subject is directed at, or is part of, the realization of the action expressed by the infinitive. In the case of the nominalization, an instantiation of the action type ‘read’ is already taking place and is as such established. It can therefore be perceived as a thing, and can function as the subject of a predication. Although the noun (chtenie) can be associated with a logical subject (the subject of the corresponding clause), it does not express the idea of realization of the action. The logical subject of nouns can therefore only be expressed as an attribute to the thing denoted by the noun (e.g. chtenija Petra; lit. the reading of Peter).

In my opinion the difference between the interpretation of the agent in these cases is connected with the fact that the nominalization, in contrast to the infinitive, does not express the idea of realization. The infinitive can be used in the context of actions or phenomena that are directed at, or related to, the realization or coming into being of the situation expressed by the infinitive. Such a conceptualization is absent in the case of the nominalization. In the case of the nominalization the focus is not on the idea of realization, or agenthood, but on the phenomenon as such. This means that the nominalization has a more general character than the infinitive, and is not intimately related to an agent, even if it is given in the context.

The difference between nominalizations and infinitives can further be illustrated with another context where the infinitive and the nominalization stand in opposition, viz. cases where a noun is specified either by an infinitive (a) or by a nominalization in the genitive case (b):

a. Noun + infinitive
b. Noun + nominalization-genitive

In the construction [noun + infinitive] the infinitive specifies the noun type in terms of a situation type. The phenomenon expressed by the noun is often interpreted as directed at/facilitates the realization or coming into being of the situation expressed by the infinitive. The features of ‘directedness’ and ‘coming into being/realization’ can be seen
as two sides of the same coin: because we conceptualize the ‘coming into being/realization’ of a situation we may infer that the referent of the noun before the infinitive is directed at/facilitates/leads to this realization (see also 4.4.4.4). In the construction with the nominalization the phenomenon expressed by the noun is conceptualized as a property of the phenomenon expressed by the nominalization.

If one takes the specific meaning of nouns and infinitives into account, particular regularities observed in the literature can be motivated. Such a regularity is remarked by Bricyn (1990: 143), who says it is surprising that the infinitive can be used as a complement of finite verbs that indicate phasal actions such as nachat’ (‘begin’), but that it cannot be used as the specification of nouns like nachalo (‘beginning’):

(52) a. Ja zhelal rabotat’ → zhelanie rabotat’
   I wished work-INF → wish-NOUN work-INF
   ‘I wished to work’ → ‘the wish to work’

b. Ja mog rabotat’ → vozmozhnost’ rabotat’
   I could work-INF → possibility-NOUN work-INF
   ‘I could work’ → ‘the possibility of working’

c. Ja nachinal rabotat’ → *nachalo rabotat’
   I started work-INF → beginning-NOUN work-INF
   ‘I started to work’ → not interpretable

The noun nachalo, can, however, be combined with a nominalization in the genitive:

(52) d. nachalo rabotat’
   beginning work-NOUN-GEN
   ‘The beginning of the working.’

I would suggest motivating the regularities mentioned here as follows. One can say nachalo rabotat’ (‘beginning of the working’) because the event of working can be conceptualized as a thing with particular characteristics, such as having a beginning and an end. In this case one cannot use the infinitive (*nachalo rabotat’) because the infinitive can only be used if the phenomenon expressed by the noun is directed at the realization of the infinitive, such that we conceptualize the coming into being of the infinitive situation. This reading is not possible with phasal verbs, because the scene of ‘beginning of the working’
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presupposes that the working is already taking place. The infinitive can, however, be used with nouns like **возможность**, as in (52b), because the possibility can be seen as a phenomenon that enables the carrier of this phenomenon to realize the infinitive action; put differently, the possibility is directed at or facilitates the coming into being of the situation type expressed by the infinitive.

The exact rules of use of infinitives or nominalizations with nouns are quite subtle, and difficult to define. An example of the subtle difference in meaning between the two constructions is exemplified by the following extract where the noun ** риск** ('risk') occurs first with an infinitive and then with a nominalization:

(53) Pivo vyvodi iz organizma kancerogennye veshestva i snizhaet risk zabolet' rakom. Issledovaniya japonskix uchenyx pokazali, chto reguljarnoe upotreblenie piva sposobno snizit' risk zabolevaniya v 2–3 raza.

beer removes from organism cancer substance and decreases risk get.ill-INF by. cancer. research by. Japanese scientists showed that regular use of beer able-ADV decrease-INF risk get.ill-NOUN-GEN in 2–3 time s

'Beer removes the cancer substance from the organism and decreases the risk of getting cancer. Research conducted by Japanese scientists has shown that regular use of beer can lead to a decrease in the risk of getting ill by 2 or 3 times.'

The noun **заболевание** can be used to refer both to an illness, and to the process of getting ill, whereas the infinitive **заболеть** refers to the situation of falling ill. I suspect that in the case of the infinitive the focus is more on the idea of realization of the process of getting ill by a non-specified agent, whereas the noun is used to focus on the phenomenon,

24 Note that in Dutch the infinitive can be ‘individualized’ by placing the determiner **het** before the infinitive (begin van het lezen, beginning of the read-INF, ‘beginning of the reading’). In this construction the infinitive can occur both with an adjective (with flection) and with an adverb (without flection), probably with a difference in meaning (e.g. het snelle/snel lezen, the fast-ADJ read-INF/fast-ADV read-INF, ‘the fast reading’). The comparison between Dutch and Russian shows that languages may differ as to whether the referent of the infinitive may be individualized; this is possibly due to the different oppositional classes of the language, and the different morphological structure of the language.

25 Bricyn (1990: 144) notes that the infinitive cannot be used to indicate the situation in which some phenomenon is directed with nouns that indicate physical actions (e.g. *нагибание поднять*, bending take.up-INF versus *нагнуться поднять* ‘bend to take up’). I suspect that this is connected with the fact that the nominalization refers to the situation in abstraction from the idea of an agent, and has as such a more general character. This general character is not in accordance with the specific character of the scene to which one here intends to refer.

26 http://beer.artcon.ru:8105/texts/medecine.html
including the result (having the illness), in abstraction form the idea of an agent. The infinitive therefore has a predicative character, it expresses something like ‘the risk that one gets ill’; this predicative character is absent in the case of the nominalization. The conceptualization of the scene with either an infinitive or a noun is possibly connected with the ‘information structure’ of the text. There may be a tendency to use the nominalization in those cases where the topic of getting ill has already been introduced and established. The exact difference between infinitives and the corresponding nominalizations merits further investigation, but lies beyond the scope of this book.

4.4.3 Complement-specification or predicate

In the sections above I have described the infinitive as a situation type. I think this specific meaning accounts for the difference in meaning and distribution from oppositional forms such as nouns. I have argued that the infinitive expresses the idea of the realization or bringing into being of a situation by a non-specified subject (if the verb is personal). In this section I will argue that this specific meaning accounts for the syntactic functions of the infinitive; I will argue that due to the meaning ‘situation type’, infinitives always occupy a position in-between predicates and complements or specifications.

In the Russian linguistic literature different classifications are given of the use of the infinitive, although usually a main division is made between infinitives that are dependent upon some other constituent, and infinitives that function as the predicate of the sentence. Zolotova (1982: 252–253), for example, makes a three-way division, namely a into (i) dependent infinitives, that is infinitives as complements of finite verbs, (ii) independent infinitives, that is infinitives as complements of adjectival or adverbal predicates, and (iii) infinitive sentences, that is infinitives as predicates. A somewhat different classification is given by Bricyn (1990), who offers a main classification into (i) infinitives occurring with finite verbs, (ii) infinitives occurring with

27 It can be expected that also in this construction there will be a difference between the infinitive and the nominalization, due to the fact that infinitives, unlike nouns, are always associated with a non-expressed agent. In Dutch the difference between nouns and infinitives can be clarified with a similar construction, viz. the difference between *het risico van besmetting* (‘the risk of contamination’), with a noun, and *het risico te besmetten* (‘the risk to contaminate’) with an infinitive. The construction with the infinitive is interpreted as a scene where some unspecified agent realizes the action of ‘contamination’, whereas the construction with the noun can be interpreted as a scene where some other participant contaminates the subject. This underlines the importance of the idea of realization and agenthood in the case of the infinitive, which is absent in the case of the nominalization.
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adjectival and adverbial predicates, (iii) infinitives occurring with nouns and infinitives, and (iv) infinitive sentences, that is, cases where the infinitive is the predicate of the sentence.

Although both authors use similar parameters for the classification of the infinitive, they classify different constructions differently. This is the case for example with the existential construction (e.g. (13)), which Zolotova (1982: 253) classifies as an infinitive sentence, whereas Bricyn (1990: 182-193) argues that one cannot speak of an infinitive predicate in the case of this construction. Another example is the construction with an infinitive and no finite verb, given below:

(54) Stranny ljudi, eti Kresse! Skazat' pri mal'chishke takuju veshch'! (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980 II: 376/Bulgakov)

strange people, those Cretians! say-INF-PERF at boy such thing!

‘Strange people those Cretians! To say something like that in front of a boy.’

The Russkaja Grammatika (1980) treats this construction as an infinitive sentence, but Bricyn (1990) does not discuss such sentences in his section on infinitive sentences. Such differences point at the problematic status of syntactic criteria in the classification of the infinitive.

In my opinion, a classification of the use of the infinitive remains principally an idealization, but nevertheless it is possible to make a main division into cases where the infinitive must be seen as a complement/specification of a predicate, and cases where the infinitive must be seen as the predicate of the sentence. The division into these main types mirrors the observation that in some cases the infinitive is the subject of some predication, the object of some action or attitude, or the specification of some thing, action or state, whereas in other cases the infinitive is not dependent upon some other constituent, and functions as the predicate of the sentence. In these latter cases the main information that is expressed in the sentence is that the situation type expressed by the infinitive ‘is the case’, or ‘applies to some agent’, and the infinitive is ‘predicative’. According to the traditional Russkaja Grammatika, every utterance must express in some way the category of predicativity in order to constitute a sentence. The term ‘predicativity’ is defined by the Academic Grammar (1980, I: 86) as “the category that relates the utterance to some temporal plan of reality by the whole complex of syntactic and formal means”. The term ‘predicativity’ derives from the word ‘predicate’, which comes from the Greek logico-philosophical tradition where the predicate is defined as the basic part of a judgment, that which says something about the subject. The
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notion of predicate and predicativity can be illustrated with the example given by Ebeling (1978: 231):

a. The high trees
b. The trees are high

Ebeling argues that both require the existence of high trees in the appropriate referents, which implies the presence of a situation of which these trees are a part. This situation is characterized by a feature that consists of the fact that the referent of trees is identical with the referent of high. According to Ebeling the difference between (a) and (b) is that this feature of the situation is explicitly transmitted by (b) but not by (a). This explicitness is typical of the character of a judgment expressed by the predicate.28 The difference between (a) and (b) can be seen as a difference between a concept and a constellation of concepts that forms a judgment; whereas in (a) the identified referent is 'high trees', in (b) the identified referent is 'tree' about which something is said.29

The difference between the function of the infinitive as a specification-complement, and the function of the infinitive as a predicate can be illustrated with the following two sentences:

(55)  Xochu rabotat'.
      want-1SG work-INF-IMPERF
     'I want to work.'

(56)  Rabotat'!
      work-INF
     'Work!'

In (55) the infinitive can be seen as the object of some attitude, viz. the attitude of wishing. In this case the infinitive can be seen as a complement to a predicate. Such cases express what Ebeling (1984: 101–102) calls 'implicative fact type', that is, the

28 In poetic speech, the mere projection of the referent may constitute the goal of an expression; in such cases the poet invites the reader to imagine particular phenomena, for example to illustrate the setting of an event.

29 As discussed by Langacker (1991: 174–175), both the predicate-subject relation and the modifier-head relation can be seen as a dependency relation; the predicate/modifier is always conceptually dependent on the subject/head, which is conceptually autonomous. The information structure of the sentence reflects the different dependency character of these conceptualizations (see Keijsper, 1985).
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working of the subject is not a definite action, but only something that is conditioned or implied by the attitude expressed by the finite verb.

In (56) the infinitive occurs without other constituents, and constitutes a sentence on its own. In this sentence the infinitive expresses that the action type ‘work’ applies in the context. This context is constituted by a directive context, such that the addressee is interpreted as the subject to whom this action type applies. This leads to the interpretation that the addressee is directed to realize the infinitive action. In this case the infinitive cannot be seen as a complement, but rather it functions as a predicate.

It must be stressed that the distinction between these different main types is largely theoretical. In many cases no clear boundaries can be drawn between sentences where the infinitive functions as a complement and sentences where the infinitive functions as a predicate. This can be illustrated with (54), which is classified as an infinitive sentence by the *Russkaja Grammatika* (1980, II: 376); this means that the infinitive can be seen as the predicate of the sentence.

The *Russkaja Grammatika* (1980, II: 375) remarks about such sentences that “in the co-text the infinitive sentence can at the same time express an action or state, and contain an element of judgement, a subjective relation to the action or state. Such sentences, that express a state or action from the perspective of the person who judges, are always a component of a whole text”. The observation made by the *Russkaja Grammatika* stresses that the status of predicate depends heavily on the co-text in which the sentence occurs. As such, this sentence can be compared to a sentence where the infinitive phrase occurs embedded in a syntactic context, e.g.

(57)  

*Govorit’ pri mal’chishke takuju veshch’ — ochen’ stranno!*  
say-INF at boy such a thing — very strange  
‘It is very strange to say such a thing in front of a boy.’

In this sentence the infinitive phrase occurs as a component of the sentence, viz. as a subject complement to the predicate *stranno*. The infinitive can therefore be seen both as a complement, and at the same time as a predicate of some contextually given or generally assumed subject. This example illustrates that the difference between the component status and the predicate status is in many cases not clear. The ‘fusion’ between these functions is the result of the fact that the infinitive can be seen both as a verb, and as a type. The verb character implies that the infinitive is always associated with an agent, this means that the infinitive always has a predicative character, even in those cases where it does not function as the predicative element. The type character implies that the verb is
not individualized, but generalized. As such, it can function as a subject, an object, or a specification.

The fusion between the complement role of the infinitive and the predicate role of the infinitive resulting from its action type character has further consequences. One of these is that it is unclear whether an infinitive component constitutes a clause or not. In the literature infinitive complements are sometimes treated as subordinate clauses, even if they do not occur with subordinators. The reason that infinitives are treated as clauses is that they contain an agent/actor term or a participant term. In the generative literature, this means that an infinitive contains PRO (Model, 1991: 192–193). Here, I will not go into the question of whether and when infinitives can be seen as subordinate clauses. In my opinion, this is a theoretical question that depends on the definition of subordinate clause. In 4.16 I will further consider the question of sentencehood of the infinitive.

Although infinitives do not automatically separate into either complement-specifications or predicates, I will maintain this classification here. It must, however, be remarked that this distinction is a classification into proto-types, and that due to the meaning of the infinitive, borderline cases exist. It must further be remarked that the context in which the infinitive occurs, are important factors in the particular syntactic interpretation of the infinitive. In some cases the infinitive can be seen as the predicate of the sentence, because of the construction in which it occurs (as in the case of the DI-construction): in other cases the interpretation of the infinitive as a predicate is facilitated by the pragmatic context in which the infinitive sentence occurs (as in the case of directive infinitives), and yet in other cases the linguistic context plays an important part (as in (54) above).

4.4.4 Overview and classification of the infinitive

Below I will briefly give some examples of different uses of the infinitive. The following uses can be distinguished, although a different classification remains possible:

Complement or specification

(i) Complement of finite predicate
(ii) (Goal) specification of finite predicate
(iii) Complement of adverbial predicate/specification of adjectival predicate
(iv) (Goal) specification of noun, gerund
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Infinitive predicate

(i) DI-construction and related constructions
(ii) Nominative-infinitive construction
(iii) Other infinitive constructions

I will briefly discuss these constructions below.

4.4.4.1 The infinitive as a complement of a finite predicate

The infinitive can be a complement of a finite verb. In such cases the infinitive may be the object of the action denoted by the predicate. Such uses can be further subcategorized into objective and subjective infinitives. If the subject of the infinitive is identical to the subject of the finite verb one speaks of subjective use:

(58) Xochu rabotat'.
want-1SG work-INF-IMPERF
'I want to work.'

(59) On nachal uchit'sja.
he started study-INF-IMPERF
'He started to study.'

In such sentences the finite verb can be 'subjective modal' in nature, indicating the attitude of the subject to the potential action expressed by the infinitive (e.g. xolet' ('want'), ljubit' ('love'), poprobovat' ('try'), reshat' ('decide')), or phasal in nature, indicating some phase of the action (e.g. nachat' ('begin'), prodolzhat' ('continue')); I refer the reader to Bricyn (1990), for an overview of different lexical items that can form subjective infinitives.

If the agent of the infinitive is identical to the indirect object of the finite verb, one speaks of objective use. The finite verb in the case of the objective infinitive indicates an action of the subject that aims at the realization of the infinitive action by some other agent:

(60) Ja velel emu priexat'.
I ordered him come-INF-PERF
'I ordered him to come.'
4.4.4.2 The infinitive as goal specification of a finite predicate

In some cases the infinitive is interpreted as a specification to a finite verb with the function of expressing the purpose or goal of the action expressed by the finite verb, e.g.:

(61) On poshel otdyxat'.
he went rest-INF-IMPERF
‘He went to rest.’

(62) Prishla s raboty, postavila varit’ mjaso i prilegla.30
came from work, put cook-INF-IMPERF meat and lay.down
‘She came back from work, put the meat on to cook, and lay down.’

In the first example the non-specified agent of the infinitive is associated with the subject of the finite verb, whereas in the second sentence the infinitive subject is associated with the object of the finite verb (mjaso).

4.4.4.3 The infinitive occurring with adverbial or adjectival predicates

Infinitives can also occur as complement-specifications of adverbial predicates or specifications of adjectival predicates:

**Adverbial predicate**

(63) Stydno obmanyvat’. (Zolotova, 1982: 252)
ashaming-ADV deceive-INF-IMPERF
‘It is a shame to deceive.’

(64) Katat’sja veselo. (Zolotova, 1982: 252)
skate-INF fun-ADV
‘It’s fun to skate.’

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Adjectival predicate

(65) Ja rad tebja videt.
    I-NOM happy you see-INF-PERF
    'I am happy to see you.'

The exact function of the infinitive in these sentences depends on the predicate with which it occurs: whether it is adverbial or adjectival, or whether it is modal or non-modal. Wierzbicka (1966: 94) argues that in a sentence with an adverbial predicate, as in (63), the infinitive can be seen as the object of the state expressed by the adverb. Zolotova (1982: 268) gives a different description, and contends that one cannot speak of an object of some state, but that the infinitive expresses an action which causes the state that the subject is in. I think that the analysis given by Zolotova is more accurate. In my opinion sentences with an adverbial predicate express that if the subject realizes the infinitive action, he will experience the state expressed by the adverb. Therefore, sentences with an adverbial predicate, a dative and a past tense of byt' (e.g. Mne bylo stydno obmanyvat', 'I found it a shame to deceive him') do not necessarily express that the subject actually realized the action, although in a certain context such a reading is possible.31 This contrasts with the construction in (65). In this sentence the infinitive can be seen as the object of the predicate, that is, it expresses the content of the state of being happy. This sentence does not have the conditional character typical of the adverbial construction, but rather can always be paraphrased with a that-clause (Ja chto ja vizhu tebja, 'I am glad that I see you').

A few words should be added here about the status of so-called 'independent' infinitives. These are infinitives that occupy the first position in the clause and, as such, function as the topic of the clause. Such sentences occur with adverbial predicates as in (64). This use of the infinitive is sometimes called 'independent nominal use of the infinitive' (Timofeev, 1950: 261). Traditionally, the infinitive is said to function like a subject ('podlezhashchee') in these sentences and it has a function similar to that of a noun. The analysis under discussion is not unproblematic, as Timofeev points out himself (1950: 262), remarking that the information structure of the clause may sometimes be the only factor that distinguishes an independent nominal infinitive from a dependent infinitive. This can be illustrated by means of the following two sentences,

31 In (63) without dative such a reading is less clear; this sentence means that people who realize the infinitive situation should be ashamed.
which differ only in information structure, but have a different syntactic structure according to this view:

**Dative subject-Infinitive specification**

(66)  
Emu bylo stydno ubit' cheloveka bezoruzhnogo.(Timofeev, 1950: 262/Lermontov)  
he-DAT was-IMPERSON ashamed-ADV kill-INF-PERF man unarmed  
'He was ashamed to kill an unarmed man.'

**Infinitive topic**

(67)  
Ubit' cheloveka bezoruzhnogo emu bylo stydno. (ibid.)  
kill-INF-PERF man unarmed he-DAT was-IMPERSON ashamed-ADV  
'To kill an unarmed man was a shame for him.'

On the basis of such evidence, both Wierzbicka (1966: 90) and Bricyn (1990: 104) reject the idea that the infinitive can be seen as a subject in the sentences above. The difficulty in this case is connected with the fact that the status of subjecthood (grammatical, logical, and psychological) is not clear. Although the different types of subject can be distinguished, they are also similar in important respects.

In my opinion it is best to distinguish the information structure from the semantic-syntactic structure in the case of sentences like these. This means that in both sentences the infinitive has the same syntactic and semantic function. In both cases the infinitive expresses the situation that induces the state expressed by the adverbial predicate of which the participant expressed in the dative is the recipient. In both cases the situation expressed by the infinitive can be identified with the situation expressed by the adverbial predicate. As such, the infinitive can be seen as identical to the non-identifiable subject of the verb *byt’*.

Can such a subject be compared to a nominative subject? It seems to me that there are differences and similarities. The infinitive topic is not identical to a nominal referent that is predicated by a finite predicate. In the case of a referent-predicate relation the predicate specifies some property of the thing. The inherent relation between the property and the thing is expressed in the case of finite verbs by means of agreement. In the case of adverbs as in (67), a predication is made about some non-specified situation, the identity of which is expressed by the infinitive. This means that the predicate indirectly predicates over the referent of the infinitive phrase. As the infinitive is a verb, the predication is made about a different kind of referent than in
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the case of a nominative subject. The property of an action may be for example the influence that the situation has on the agent (xo\odno (‘cold’), veselo (‘fun’), trudno (‘difficult’)). In the case of the construction under discussion, these properties are therefore associated with the dative participant, which has agent-like properties. Finally, whether one still wishes to speak of a subject or not, is ultimately a matter of choice. In my analysis, however, I will treat the infinitive as the subject in this construction.

4.4.4.4 The infinitive occurring with nouns

As I mentioned above, the infinitive also occurs as a specification to nouns or participles, as in the following examples:

(68)  Zhelajushchie poexat’ na ekskursiju, dolzhny sobrat’ rovno v devyat’ casov.
 wish-PART go-INF to excursion, must gather precisely in nine hours
 ‘Those who wish to go on the excursion, must gather at nine sharp.’

(69)  Ja ne byl v sostojanii rabotat’.
 I not was in position work-INF
 ‘I wasn’t in the position to work.’

(70)  Esli est’ chto dobavit’ – pishite.
 if is what add-INF -- write
 ‘If you have something to add, write.’

In these sentences the infinitive specifies the referent of the noun by a restriction in terms of the situation type expressed by the infinitive. To give an example, the noun sostojanie refers to ‘position’ in general, but by placing the infinitive after it – sostojanii rabotat’ – the speaker refers to a position as far as the realization of the situation type ‘working’ is concerned. The specificational function of the infinitive is connected with the referent of the noun being directed at the realization of the situation expressed by the infinitive, that is, the noun expresses a phenomenon that has particular characteristics that give rise to the realization of the infinitive situation. The specific nature of the relation between the referent of the noun and the infinitive situation differs from case to case.

In (68) the participle suggests a situation (‘wishing’) that is directed at the realization of the infinitive situation. In this case the infinitive expresses the content of the

32 Not all adverbial predicates occur with infinitives, e.g. mne teplo (‘I feel hot.’). A discussion of such cases fall beyond the scope of this analysis.
phenomenon expressed by the noun. In (69) the physical-psychological phenomenon expressed by the noun (‘position’) can be seen as something that enables the carrier of this phenomenon to realize the infinitive situation. In (70) the pronoun expresses a phenomenon (‘something’), which is specified by the infinitive. This specification can be seen as the ‘purpose’ of the phenomenon, that is, the referent has particular characteristics such that one can realize the infinitive situation (‘a piece of text that is suitable for adding to existing text’).

4.4.4.5 Infinitives as predicats

I will now briefly discuss constructions where the infinitive can be seen as the predicate of the sentence, the so-called ‘infinitive sentences’. I will give three types of such constructions, viz. (i) the DI-construction or similar constructions, (ii) the nominative-infinitive construction, and (iii) constructions without subject in the dative or nominative. Furthermore, I would like to argue that in constructions with the subordinators chtoby (‘in order’), esli (‘if’) and prezhdde chem/pered tem kak/do togo kak (‘before’), the infinitive can also be seen as the predicate of a clause with a subordinate character; such cases can therefore be seen as special instances of the class of infinitive sentences. Examples are given below of the constructions under discussion:

Sentences with subordinators (related to the DI-construction)

(71) Pered tem, kak nagnut’sja, ona posmotrela v nebo. (Aksenov, Ozhag)
before it how bend.down-INF, she looked at sky
‘Before she bent down, she looked at the sky.’

(72) Ja edu k morju, chtoby otdoxnut’. (Bricyn, 1990: 289)
I go to sea, in.order.to rest-INF
‘I go to the sea to rest.’

(73) Esli tronut’ strasti v cheloveke, to, konechno, pravdy ne najdesh’. (Bricyn, 1990: 287/Esenin)
if touch passion in man, then, of course, truth not you.will find.
‘If you touch the passion in a man, then, of course, you won’t find the truth.’
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Nominative-Infinitive construction

(74) A oni – xixikat’. (V. Erofeev, 1993)
but they – laugh-INF
‘But they started to laugh.’

(75) Chut’ svet, a ty uzh poxmeljat’sja. (L. Leonov, Barsuki)\(^{33}\)
hardly light, and you already take.a.hair.of.the.dog.that.bit.you
‘It’s hardly light, and you already take a hair of the dog that bit you.’

(76) Ja revnovat’? Vot ideja! (Ebeling, 1984: 120/Gogol)\(^{34}\)
I-NOM be.jealous-INF? what idea!
‘Me be jealous? What an idea!’

Constructions without subject

(77) Sejchas v vannuju, bystro est’ i spat’.\(^{34}\) (From a list of things to do in a diary, Internet)
now in bathroom, quickly eat-INF-IMPERF and sleep-INF-IMPERF
‘Now go into the bathroom, eat something quickly, and go to bed.’

(78) Strannyе ljudi, eti Kressel Skazat’ pri mal’chishke takuju veshch’! (Russkaja Grammatika,
1980, II: 376/Bulgakov)
strange people, those Cretians! Say-INF-PERF at boy such a thing
‘Strange people those Cretians! To say something like that in front of a boy.’

(79) Mнogo znat’ – malо spat’. (Veyrenc, 1979: 46)
many know-INF-IMPERF – few sleep-INF-IMPERF
‘To know a lot, means to sleep little.’

(80) Exat’ tak exat’. (A. Velichko, 1996)
go-INF then go-INF
‘If we have to go, then let’s go.’

The interpretation of the infinitive as a predicate occurs in constructions where there is
no agreement between an expressed or contextually given nominative and a finite verb, or

\(^{33}\) http://moshcow.orsk.ru/Library/lat/LEONOWL/barsuki.txt
\(^{34}\) http://www.zhurnal.ru:8085/zavist/cinema/i_knew.htm
in constructions where the finite verb is the impersonal use of the verb *byt* ('be'). As I argued above, the interpretation of the infinitive as a predicate may be the result of the meaning of the construction itself, or of the linguistic/pragmatic context in which the construction occurs. As such, the 'independent' semantic and syntactic status of the construction differs from one construction to another.

In constructions where the infinitive can be seen as the predicate of the sentence, the so-called predicative meaning of the infinitive can be paraphrased with 'is the case', or 'applies to some agent'. This semantic overlay can be seen as the expression of predicativeness in its most basic form, and presupposes that there exists some referent about which the situation is predicated. Note that in my analysis I make a distinction between the constituent of the sentence that can be analyzed as the *predicate* of the construction, and the *predicative center* of the construction, that is, the head constituent that expresses the 'verbal' properties of the construction. In my analysis I will argue that it is incorrect to assign the category of predicativity to non-finite verbs. As I will argue below in 4.5 and 4.6, the predicative center of the DI-construction and the nominative-infinitive construction is an *interpretative* phenomenon that is not formally expressed, but is rather implied by the combination of the infinitive and some expressed or implied agent that is associated with the infinitive (dative, nominative). The specific way of associating the infinitive with an agent differs from one construction to another, and is connected with the meaning of the different constituents in the construction.

Below I will briefly discuss these different constructions, and say why I think the infinitive can be seen as the predicate of the construction.

In the case of the DI-construction, the non-expressed infinitive agent is associated with the dative participant. The association of the non-expressed infinitive agent with the dative subject leads to a modal interpretation (necessity, wish, possibility, direction, etc.). As I will argue below, this modal nature of the DI-construction results from the fact that the speaker states that a situation will be the case regardless of the question of whether the potential agent initiates the situation; this means that the infinitive situation is assigned to the dative participant. In the DI-construction the predicative center is implied by the association of the infinitive with a dative participant; the infinitive can be seen as the predicate of the sentence in the sense that it expresses the situation type that is assigned to the dative participant. The DI-construction will be discussed extensively below.

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35 As I will discuss below, in some constructions the third person use of the verb *znachit* ('mean') can be expressed.
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In the case of sentences with the subordinators chtoby ('in order'), esli ('if') and prezhdite chem, or pered tem, kak and do togo kak ('before') no dative subject occurs, although, as I will discuss below in 4.11, the dative may be expressed under particular circumstances; such cases can be seen as instances of the DI-construction. In the literature the construction under discussion (with or without dative) is usually not treated as an instance of the class of infinitive sentences (see Bricyn (1990: 282-304) for a discussion). Bricyn (1990: 285) argues that the construction under discussion often shows formal correspondences with infinitive sentences, but differs from the infinitive sentences because they lack the specific modal meaning typical of infinitive sentences. In my opinion, this statement is not entirely correct for two reasons, namely (i) sentences with subordinators and a dative do have a modal character, and (ii) the predicate status of the infinitive is not constituted by the 'modal' meaning of the construction.

The question of whether the construction without a dative can be seen as an infinitive sentence or not is, in my opinion, a question that cannot be answered with a simple yes or no because the so-called 'category' of predicativity is not a clear-cut semantic phenomenon, but an interpretational phenomenon. Consider the following sentence, where the goal of the action is not introduced by chtoby:

(81) Podumala poexat' v meriju, tam najti pravdu, a mne posovetovali ne trepat' sebe nervy. (Internet, Newspaper).

's I thought go-INF-PERF in city hall, there find-INF-PERF truth (...) 'I thought about going to the city hall, to find the truth there, but they advised me not to go into all that trouble.'

Must the infinitive be seen as a predicate or not? Both syntactically and semantically, the infinitive constituent has, at least to some extent, an independent status. The syntactically independent status is underlined by the intonation break, indicated by the commas. It can be argued that the infinitive forms a semantically independent unit because it is not a necessary complement to podumala poexat' v meriju, but gives additional information about the goal of the action; since the infinitive is always associated with an agent, the infinitive constituent can be seen as a clause with a subordinate character. Nevertheless, the infinitive constituent also has a dependent status, since it semantically depends on the information expressed in the first clause; the infinitive is only possible when it indicates a programed, consciously chosen situation (see Murav'eva, 1984, for a discussion). The syntactic dependence of the infinitive is underlined by the fact that the infinitive

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Note that one could insert i ('and') here, which points at the co-ordinate character of the construction.
constituent necessarily occurs in a second position (*Tam najti pravdu, podumala poexat' v meriju*). In the case of sentences with *chtoby* the independent character is even stronger. I agree with Ebeling (1984: 105), who remarks that *chtoby* connects two separate situations, whereas sentences without *chtoby* present one complex identity, consisting of two parts. Semantically, this is underlined by the fact that the infinitive need not refer to a consciously chosen situation, and syntactically, because such infinitive clauses can also occur as the first clause in the sentence; this is made possible by the fact that the indication of goal is expressed by a form, and not inferred from the context.

A different construction is exemplified by the nominative-infinitive construction in (74)–(76). In the nominative construction a participant is identified by the nominative pronoun, and the situation of this subject is expressed by the infinitive. Such sentences always have SV order, occur only as main-clauses, and often have an intonational pause between the subject and the infinitive (indicated in written language with ‘—’). In some cases (those that have an ingressive interpretation) the particle *mu* can be placed before the infinitive. Depending on the context, these infinitives receive a so-called ingressive interpretation (indicating the beginning of an action) or an intensive interpretation (indicating that the infinitive action contrasts with another expected action). I think these specific interpretations are the result of the interaction between the general infinitive meaning of situation type, as discussed earlier, and the context in which the infinitive occurs. The subject in the nominative combined with a situation type presupposes a contrast with another, expected action. In all cases it is expressed that the infinitive situation applies to the agent, and not a situation of another type. Bulygina & Shmelev (1997: 105) argue that this construction only occurs with controlled situations, which they underline by the impossibility of using lexemes like *xudet’* (*become slim*) or non-animate subjects in the construction.37 The construction can only be used in the case of identifiable subjects, in cases where the realization of the situation can be perceived at the moment of speaking. Note that the occurrence of the nominative in this construction, instead of the dative, means that the realization of the infinitive situation is not conceptualized as the result of a force; this construction therefore differs semantically from the DI-construction.

In many constructions where the infinitive can be seen as the predicate of the sentence it is not possible to express a subject (nominative, dative) at all, or the expression of a dative subject would alter the meaning of the construction. This is the case for example in (80). The construction [infinitive + infinitive] can be used to express

37 This restriction only accounts for the ingressive interpretation; in the case of the intensive interpretation the situation may be uncontrolled (*ja – renovat’? Vot idejal;* Ebeling (1984))
consent with the realization of the infinitive situation. This construction could be paraphrased in English with 'if it is the case that the infinitive situation is appropriate, then the infinitive situation is appropriate'; this reading suggests that the speaker agrees with the realization of the infinitive. In this construction the dative may be inserted, e.g.:

(82)  A mne uzh exat' tak exat', (A. Velichko, 1996: 20)
but -DAT PRT go-INF-IMPERF then go-INF-IMPERF
'Well if I have to go, I'll go'/I have to go, so I'll go.'

Cases with a dative express the idea of necessity more clearly than cases without a dative; by expressing the dative, this construction can be seen as an instance of the DI-construction.

In other cases it is not possible to insert a dative. This is the case for example in (77), where the infinitive is used in a list of actions that are going to be performed; in (78), where the speaker expresses his negative attitude to the past realization of the situation type by the contextually given agents, and in (79), where two infinitive clauses are conjoined to form a complex sentence with a conditional interpretation.

The impossibility of expressing a dative in these cases must be motivated by the absence of the idea of a force that is directed at the realization of the infinitive situation. In the case of a list of actions, the speaker merely focuses on the identity of the things that he is going to do. In the case of (78) the infinitive situation is not conceptualized as the result of a force, but rather the speaker focuses on the type of situation, as such abstracting from the individual occurrence of the situation. As I mentioned before, this use of the infinitive is typical of contexts where a judgement is uttered about the type of action (cf. Ebeling, 1984). Note that in contrast to the DI-construction, in both constructions the predicativity of the infinitive is dependent on the linguistic or pragmatic context in which the construction occurs.

For the impossibility of expressing a dative in conditional constructions like (79), the motivation must be sought in the 'general character' of the construction. This construction expresses that there is a relation of coherence between the realizations of the two situation types. This identity may be interpreted differently, depending on the context in which the construction occurs. The Russkaja Grammatika (1980, II: 312–314) distinguishes five main types, viz. (a) identity, (b) equivalence, (c) existence, (d) implication and (e) comparison. In most cases it is not possible to change the order of the constituents, because this would lead to a change in meaning, more specifically the relation of implication would be reversed. I think that the absence of the dative in this construction must be motivated by the semantics of the construction and the
incompatibility of the meaning of the construction with the meaning of the dative noun. In my opinion, the fact that no dative noun can be expressed in this construction is connected with the general, law-like character of such expressions. This general character presupposes the idea of a non-specific agent, which means that the infinitive subject must remain unspecified.  

The impersonal conditional infinitive construction as in (79) has given rise to much discussion in the literature, especially because it is not clear whether the infinitives in these sentences are predicates, nor whether such sentences have a subject-predicate structure. To give more insight into the status of predicative infinitives, I will briefly discuss them here.

In the Russkaja Grammatika (1980, II: 312) sentences like these are treated as sentences with a subject-copula-predicate structure. In my terminology this means that the status of predicative center is assigned to the non-expressed or expressed finite verb, and the status of predicate is assigned to the second infinitive. Peshkovskij (1956: 279) gives a different analysis, and speaks about a complex of two infinitive sentences. This means that a predicative status is assigned to each of the infinitives. He does, however, make an exception for cases where a copula or a finite verb like 

\[ \text{znachit} \] (‘means’) is expressed:

(83)  \begin{align*}
\text{Nazvat’ ego v glaza obmannikom – bylo podvergnut’ sebja pogibeli.} \\
\text{(Pushkin/Peshkovskij, 1956: 279)} \\
\text{call-INF him in eyes deceiver, – was-NEUT expose-INF self to death} \\
\text{‘To call him a deceiver in his presence, was like exposing yourself to death.’}
\end{align*}

(84)  \begin{align*}
\ldots \text{ Revnovat’ znachit unizhat’ i sebja i ee …. (L. Tolstoj/Peshkovskij, 1956: 279)} \\
\text{be.jealous-INF means humble-INF and self and her} \\
\text{‘To be jealous means to humiliate both yourself and her.’}
\end{align*}

Peshkovskij (1956: 279) contends that in these sentences one can speak of subject, copula, and predicate, although he claims that the question of which infinitive must be seen as subject or predicate cannot be answered. An altogether different opinion is expressed by Bricyn (1990: 177), who thinks that in this construction the infinitives have a purely nominal function, and cannot be seen as either subject or predicate. Bricyn (1990: 177) says:

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{Ebeling (1984: 117) argues that the absence of a subject must be interpreted in the same way as the absence of the infinitive subject in subjective infinitives, but I am not sure how this remark should be interpreted. I would like to point out that in the case of the conditional construction and in the case of the construction where the infinitive has the character of a complement, the forms \textit{odin} and \textit{sam} occur in the dative case. For a further discussion, see 4.17}
\end{align*} \]
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-Construction

178) therefore speaks about a ‘three componental subjectless predicateness schema (Inf-Inf-Vfnt)’.

The differences in opinion presented here not only indicate the difficulty of this linguistic phenomenon, but also point to the problematic status of terms like ‘subject’, predicate, and ‘predicative’. The subject-predicate structure of language must principally be seen as a logico-pragmatic feature, rather than as a structural feature. In order for a linguistic expression to be informative, something must be said about something. In language this logical-pragmatic subject-predicate structure can be called ‘predicativity’. Predicativity is the feature of linguistic forms in their context such that they can be interpreted as predicates. Finite verbs are inherently predicative because they always evoke the idea of an agent.\(^{39}\) In such cases what is expressed is that some entity was the agent of some action. Other parts of speech may need more contextual information to be predicative. Consider for example the following sentences where an adjective and a noun are predicative:

a. Tasty!
   = That is tasty.

b. Tea?
   = Do you want tea?

Infinitives are always associated with agents (if the verb is personal); this means that infinitives are potentially predicative. In relation to finite verbs, however, the level of predicativity is ‘lowered’ because the relation between a specific subject and an action is abstracted. In its context, however, the infinitive may be related to a specific agent, which may induce a predicative interpretation if no other predicate is available. In the construction under discussion the infinitives have a predicative interpretation, but this interpretation only occurs when the clauses are related to each other, to form a compound predicate. In terms of lambda abstraction: \(\lambda x P(x) = \lambda Q(x)\) is interpreted as \(\lambda x (P(x) = Q(x))\). In this analysis the predicative interpretation of both of the infinitives is the result of the context, which is partly constituted by the infinitives themselves.

A problematic aspect of this analysis is that the predicative nature of the infinitives is not very clear in most cases, especially in those cases where the agent of the infinitive cannot be identified with some specific agent given in the context. In the conditional construction under discussion the predicative character of the infinitives can only be

\(^{39}\) In the case of impersonal verbs, the ‘agent’ has a more abstract nature.
made clear with a paraphrase such as 'If you do X, you will also do Y'.40 A further problematic aspect of the treating of the infinitives as predicative is that they do not essentially differ in function from infinitives that occur as a complement to an adverbal predicate, e.g.: Nazvat' ego v glaza obmannikom — bylo opasno ('Calling him a deceiver in front of his eyes was dangerous').

Because of the problematic status of predicativity of infinitives in the conditional construction under discussion it might be better to follow Bricyn (1990: 177), who treats the infinitives in this construction as pure nominals. I do not think, however, that this is entirely right. Infinitives cannot be seen as purely nominal, because they are always associated with some agent, either generic or given in the context. As such, they differ from nominals expressed by nouns. It is precisely the borderline status of infinitives that gives rise to the problems in the classification of such sentences. In my opinion, the occurrence of sentences like these shows that the division of infinitives into complements and predicates is not absolute, and is to some extent artificial. As such, infinitives are never real complements, nor real predicates.

In this section I have discussed the meaning of the infinitive, and the different syntactic functions of the infinitive. In the following section I will discuss the meaning and function of the verb byt'.

4.5 The verb byt'('be')

In this section I will give a description of the verb byt' ('be') as it occurs in the DI-construction, and as it occurs in other constructions. The verb byt' in the DI-construction shows clitic-like behavior. As such, it can be compared to the use of byt' as it occurs with some modal adverbial predicates (možno, nado) and modal adjectival predicates (dolžen). I will argue that the clitic-like status of byt' in the DI-construction is connected with the modal nature of the construction. I will propose that the function of byt' ('be') in the DI-construction is that of an auxiliary of time. This means that byt' cannot be seen as the predicative center of the DI-construction, i.e. it does not express the main verbal properties of the sentence. The predicative center of the construction is not formally expressed, but results from the unification of the non-expressed infinitive agent with the agent in the dative or some non-expressed agent, leading to the modal nature of the construction.

40 Note that in some cases nouns can be used in the same context, e.g. in the Dutch sentence Macht is kracht ('Power is strength'). Such sentences share properties with the infinitive sentences under discussion.
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I will first briefly look at the way in which this word functions in the DI-construction. I will start by touching on the impersonal character of the verb *byt*, and then consider the auxiliary status of *byt*.

### 4.5.1 Impersonal use

In the DI-construction the verb *byt* occurs in the neuter declension. This specific use can be seen as so-called ‘impersonal’ use. One can speak of *personal* use of *byt* if there is grammatical agreement between a nominative subject and *byt*, for example in the expression *ja byla/uy byli* (I-NOM was-AGR/you-NOM were-AGR). One speaks of *impersonal* use if there is no nominative subject available, and the verb *byt* occurs in the neuter declension. The impersonal use of *byt* occurs in constructions where there is no finite verb other than *byt*, and where the subject, if expressed or expressible, is a dative subject. These are constructions with an adverbial predicate, constructions where the infinitive is the predicate, or the existential construction, where the adverb/pronoun + infinitive is the predicate.

It may be argued that the neuter declension of *byt* in the case of the impersonal use points to the fact that one has to speak of a non-expressed subject comparable to the English ‘it’ in this construction. This opinion is discussed by Birjulin (1993), and more explicitly put forward by Smith (1994), who defines the non-expressed subject of impersonal use of verbs as ‘the setting’. In my opinion one should be careful ascribing meaning to a constituent which is not formally expressed and expressible. I therefore prefer to speak of a non-specified subject in these cases, rather than of a non-expressed specific subject. To give some insight into the semantic-syntactic function of *bylo*, I will give a simplified syntactic representation of an instance of an adverbial construction with impersonal use of *byt* in Figure 4.5.

In the sentence in Figure 4.5 the impersonal verb *bylo* expresses that some unspecified situation was the case; this unspecified situation is then further associated with the situation expressed by the infinitive. As such, the subject of *bylo* can be indirectly identified with the infinitive. The identification of the non-expressed situation with a specific expressed situation occur in all cases. Take for example the following sentence: *Bylo zharko* (was-IMPERSON hot-ADV; ‘It was hot’). In this sentence the verb
bylo expresses that there was a situation where non-specified people experienced hotness.\footnote{Of course one can say that in this case the subject of the sentence is ‘the setting’, but I am not sure whether such an analysis attributes much to the understanding of the construction. Furthermore, the gender of the verb \textit{bylo} can also be motivated in terms of the most \textit{optimal} choice from the gender system.}

**Figure 4.5**

1sg experienced past situation ‘action type R by 1sg’ as having property ‘P’\footnote{A more adequate way of saying could be ‘there was a situation in the past where I experienced the difficulty of my working’.
}

\begin{itemize}
    \item Past situation ‘action type ‘R’ by agent a has property ‘P’
    \item Past situation s has property ‘P’
    \item [Rec. R sit. s] [prop. P sit. s] [sit. s the case in past], [action type ‘R’ by agent a],
    \item Mne
    \item trůdno
difficult-ADV
    \item bylo
was-IMPERSON
    \item Ø
    \item rabotat’
work-INF-IMPERF
\end{itemize}

4.5.2 The auxiliary status of \textit{byt’}

In the DI-construction, \textit{byt’} can occur in the past and future tense; the absence of the verb \textit{byt’} in the present tense can in principle be seen as a zero form of \textit{byt’}, since the
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absence of byt' stands in opposition to presence of byt' in the future and past tense.\footnote{Another way of analyzing the absence of byt' in the present tense is to say that the predicative idea of 'something being the case' is an interpretative phenomenon that is induced by relating the constituents in the construction to each other. This means that the idea of byt' is implied by the context, rather than expressed by a zero form in the construction.} Another way of analyzing the absence of byt' in the present tense is to say that the predicative idea of 'something being the case' is an interpretative phenomenon that is induced by relating the constituents in the construction to each other. This means that the idea of byt' is implied by the context, rather than expressed by a zero form in the construction. It must be remarked here that byt' occurs more frequently in the past tense than in the future tense (see Maurice, 1996), and that there is a tendency for byt' to occur with specific verbs only (see the analysis of the different uses below). As such, the absence of byt' in the present tense of the DI-construction does not always imply an opposition with a past or future tense. This means that the status of byt' in the case of the DI-construction differs from the status of byt' in other constructions with a 'zero form' of byt' (cf. the nominative-copula-noun construction in (91) below, where there is no restriction on expressing byt' in the past of future tense).

There are further restrictions on the verb byt' in the DI-construction. The verb byt' cannot be accented, and cannot be negated; the negative particle ne has to be placed before the infinitive; a sentence like the following is ungrammatical:

(85)  *Emu ne bylo ponjat'.
He-DAT not was-IMPERS understand-INF

Byt' can occur as a clitic to the infinitive (bylo INF) or as a non-clitic (INF bylo); the infinitive and byt' always seem to form a constituent (Veyrenc, 1979). The dative can occur before the infinitive-byt' constituent or after it:

(86)  ?Bylo emu ne ponjat'. (byt' and the infinitive do not form a constituent)
was-IMPERS he-DAT not understand-INF

(87)  ?Rabotat' vchera mne bylo. (ibid.)
work-INF yesterday I-DAT was-IMPERS

(88)  Emu bylo ne ponjat'.
he-DAT was-IMPERS not understand-INF
'He couldn't understand'

---

\footnote{Another way of analyzing the absence of byt' in the present tense is to say that the predicative idea of 'something being the case' is an interpretative phenomenon that is induced by relating the constituents in the construction to each other. This means that the idea of byt' is implied by the context, rather than expressed by a zero form in the construction.}
The syntactic behavior of *byt'* (no accent, impossibility of negation) shows clitic-like properties. As I will argue below, the clitic-like status of *byt'* is connected with the modal nature of the construction. To gain insight into the meaning and use of *byt'* in the DI-Construction we have to look at the function and use of *byt'* in other constructions as well.

The semantic-syntactic function and use of the verb *byt'* differs from one construction to another. Veyrenc (1983: 212) gives an overview of the different uses of *byt'*. He speaks about a 'scale of *byt'* where seven types can be distinguished. Below in Table 4.1, I give an overview of the different functions distinguished by Veyrenc:

Table 4.1. The seven degrees of *byt'*(be') (Veyrenc, 1983: 212)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of past <em>byl</em>-</th>
<th>Forms of present and negation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Hyperemphatic)</td>
<td><em>est'~sut'</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Emphatic with support</td>
<td><em>ne est'~ne sut'</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Absolute-existential construction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Emphatic</td>
<td><em>est'</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Locative construction)</td>
<td><em>(???)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Emphatic ~ accented</td>
<td><em>est'~Ø</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Possessive construction)</td>
<td><em>(net)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Accented</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Copular use)</td>
<td><em>ne</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Accented ~ clitic</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Non-modal adverbs)</td>
<td><em>ne~...</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Clitic</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Modal adverbs)</td>
<td><em>ne...</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Suppresible clitic</td>
<td><em>(Ø)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DI-construction)</td>
<td><em>(ne...)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 'ne...' means that the negation cannot be followed immediately by *bylo*; 'x~y' means that both x and y occur.

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44 Vinogradov & Shvedova (1964: 341) note on the use of the infinitive sentence in the nineteenth century that in the spoken language the accent may be on the copula in the case of the particle *by*: *bylo by* + INF.
Veyrenc bases his classification on (i) the acceptability or emphazizability of byt', (ii) the possibility or necessity of expression in the present tense, (iii) the negatability, and (iv) the type of negation (ne or net). This syntactic classification, based on parameters of information structure, mirrors semantic differences between the different functions of the verb byt'. Roughly speaking, three uses can be distinguished, viz. (i) uses that express existence (types 5-7), (ii) so-called copular use (type 4), and (iii) uses that must be seen as auxiliaries (types 1-3). Veyrenc classifies the DI-construction as a case of type 1, which means that the verb byt' in the DI-construction must be seen as a suppressible clitic with the status of an auxiliary. Below I will briefly discuss the different functions of byt' mentioned here.

In the case of the so-called existential use of byt', the form byt' expresses the existence or presence of an entity. This is the case for example in the locative construction given below:

(89)  V etoj biblioteke est' interesnye knigi.
in this library is interesting books
'There are interesting books in this library.'

A formal difference between existential use and non-existentia l use is that in the case of existential use byt' can be expressed in the present tense; note that there is only a third person singular form of byt' in the present, viz. est'. As I will argue below, in such sentences byt' is both the predicative center (main verbal element) and the predicate of the sentence.

In the case of so-called copular use the verb byt' (expressed in the past or future tense, and 'implied' in the present tense) can be seen as the predicative center, expressing the verbal properties of the sentence, but not as the predicate of the sentence. A copula is used to point at the relation of some property, expressed by the predicate, and an entity, which is interpreted as the carrier of the property expressed by the predicate (cf. Ebeling, 1978: 231). For the copular meaning of Russian byt' one can offer the description given by Langacker (1991a: 65) for English be, viz. "be profiles a continuation through time of a stable situation characterized only as a stative relation". In Russian, copular use occurs with adjectives or nouns:

(90)  On byl molodoj.
he-NOM was-SG-M young-SG-M

45 The classification given by Veyrenc does not account for the existential construction.
Chapter IV

‘He was young.’

(91)  On uchitel’.
he teacher
‘He is a teacher.’

In such sentences a predications is made about the subject of the sentence; the subject is said to have the property expressed by the predicate (in the case of adjectives), or the subject is said to have the identity expressed by the noun. In the present tense the verb byt’ is not expressed in the case of copular use. In such cases the predicativity is inferred from the combination of the adjective or noun, and the subject (or expressed by a zero form), or put differently, expressed by a zero form. The verb byt’ is only expressed in the past tense or the future tense; in such cases the expression of the copula is necessary to express tense. In constrast to the clitic-like use of the verb byt’ in the DI-construction and in the case of modal adverbs, the copula can be negated. In the case of negation it is expressed that the subject does not have the property expressed by the predicate.

The verb byt’ also occurs with adverbial predicates, as in (28) above. In the case of predicates, as in (28), one cannot speak of copular use in the strict sense because there is no relation between the nominative subject and a finite verb. Veyrenc (1983: 212) therefore uses the term ‘auxiliary’ for such cases. Note that the status of bylo/budet/Ø (auxiliary/copula) also depends on the information structure of the clause. In constructions with non-modal adverbs byt’ can occur in a pre-adverbial position, or as a clitic of the adverb:

ey they went on the street. was-NEUT hot
‘They went out on the street. It was hot outside.’

(93)  Oni vyshli na ulicu. Zhárko bylo. (ibid.)
they went on the street. hot was-NEUT
‘They went out on the street: it was hot outside.’

The difference in position and intonation is related to a difference in meaning (cf. Veyrenc, 1983: 213). As I will argue below, this difference in meaning can be related to the difference in information structure.
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The term 'auxiliary' is used quite broadly by Veyrenc to refer to those cases that he classifies as non-existential and non-copular (types 1–3). Besides the use with an adverbial predicate, which I discussed under copular use, he classifies as auxiliary use cases with the modal predicates dolžen, nado, mozžno and nel'žja (type 2) and the modal infinitive construction (type 1). What these cases have in common is that the verb byt’ occurs as a clitic and cannot be negated. The clitic-like status of the verb byt’ in the case of modal predicates occurs both with nominative subjects, where there is agreement between the subject and byt’, and with dative subjects, where we find the neuter form:

Agreeing modals

(94) On ne dolžhen byl ostavat’sja.
    he-NOM not must-AGR be-PAST-AGR stay-INF-IMPERF
    ‘He didn’t have to stay.’

(95) On dolžen byl ne ostavat’sja.
    he-NOM must-AGR be-PAST-AGR NEG stay-INF-IMPERF
    ‘He had to not stay.’

(96) *On dolžen ne byl ostavat’sja.
    he-NOM must-AGR NEG be-PAST-AGR stay-INF-IMPERF

Non-agreeing modals

(97) Emu ne nádo bylo ostavat’sja.
    he-DAT NEG need be-PAST-NEUT stay-INF-IMPERF
    ‘He shouldn’t have stayed.’

(98) Emu nado bylo ne ostavat’sja.
    he-DAT need be-PAST-NEUT NEG stay-INF-IMPERF
    ‘He should have not stayed.’

(99) *Emu nado ne bylo ostavat’sja
    he-DAT need NEG be-PAST-NEUT stay-INF-IMPERF

This use of the verb byt’ can be contrasted with the use of the verb byt’ with normal adverbial predicates, where byt’ occurs before the adverb, and where byt’ or the adverb can be negated:
In these sentences the adverb can be seen as a modifier of the state expressed by *byt*'. As such, negating the adverb and negating the copula amount to negating the same state of affairs. This is not possible in the case of modal adverbs; the use of *byt*’ with modal adverbs/adjectives can be compared to the use of *byt*’ in the DI-construction, where the verb *byt*’ cannot be accented or negated.

The relevant information I have presented so far can be summarized as follows. The verb *byt*’ in the DI-construction shows clitic-like behaviour. In this respect it differs from the use of *byt*’ in the case of the existential constructions, and in the case of normal adverbial predicates. It does share, however, this property with some modal predicates. Considering this, it may be that the clitic-like status of *byt*’ is related in some way to the modal meaning of both constructions.

Before going into the relation between modality and the auxiliary status of *byt*’, I want to argue that there exists the following general relation between the degree of *byt*’ and its predicativity:

The higher the degree of *byt*’ as defined by Veyrenc (i.e. the lower its clitic-like status), the higher its predicativity; the lower the degree of *byt*’ (i.e. the higher its clitic-like status), the lower its predicativity.

This is a very general statement, as both the phenomenon of ‘clitic-like behavior’ and the phenomenon of ‘predicativity’ are very fuzzy; and difficult to define and measure. Nevertheless, the statement conveys the observation that in those cases where *byt*’ shows clitic-like behavior, it cannot be seen as the predicative center. This phenomenon can be pragmatically motivated by the following rule:

If some information ‘x’ is expressed by form x, then the same information will not be expressed by form y in the same sentence.
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This means that in those cases where byt' occurs as a clitic, it is not the predicative center, because the predicativity is expressed by some other form, or combination of forms, and in those cases where it occurs as a non-clitic, the predicativity is expressed by byt' itself.

I would like to suggest that the fact that byt' can only occur after the predicate in the case of the modal predicates is connected with the predicative status of these modal forms. My assertion is that modal s that necessarily occur before impersonal byt' function as predicative elements, viz. the elements expressing the verbal properties of the sentence. In such sentences the modal forms can be seen as the predicative center of the sentence, and the verb byt' as an auxiliary of time. The auxiliary only expresses the time of the situation expressed by the predicate. It cannot be negated because that would 'clash' with the meaning already expressed by the modal form. The modal form expresses that some situation is the case in reality, while byt' expresses that the action that is the case is related to a particular time. Negating byt' would amount to saying that 'something which is the case is not the case'.

In the case of adverbs that can occur after the copula as in (100)–(101), the predicate is the adverb, but the predicative center (the form expressing the verbal properties) is the copula: it expresses that there is a stable relation between the subject and the property expressed by the adverb. It is possible to negate the copula, because this amounts to saying that there is no such relation.

It has to be explained (a) why the modals mozhno, nada, dolzhen can function as 'verbal' predicates, and (b) how the information structure of the sentence is related to the predicative status of these modals. To start with the first question: why can modal adverbs/adjuncts function as predicative elements? In order to answer this, it must be shown that the modal meaning of these predicates is compatible with the idea of agenthood, realization, and embedding in time. I think this is indeed the case. I wish to argue that the idea of being compelled to do an action can be conceived as a situation in which there is a moment where the subject is not compelled, and a moment where the subject is compelled by a particular force to do an action. The same, I think, accounts for cases of possibility; here there is no compelling force, but rather an enabling 'force' that enables the subject to do an action. In both cases, we perceive an entity as expending energy to do an action such that a state of affairs can be perceived through

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46 Cf. Schoorlemmer (1994), who argues that modal adverbs must be seen as verbs. In her analysis, however, the verbal status of the modals is only analyzed in terms of syntactic properties, and is not semantically motivated.
time. Note that an expression of modality does not imply per se that we perceive the action in time, only that it is compatible with the idea of embedding in time.

The predicative nature of the modal can be illustrated with an example. In the following sentences the short adjective dolzhen occurs, in (a) as an adjective proper and in (b) as a modal form:

(102) On byl dolzhen mne dva dolara.
    he-NOM was-AGR obliged-ADJ I-DAT two dollar
    ‘He owed me two dollars.’ (lit. He was under obligation me two dollars)

(103) On dolzhen byl ostavat’sja.
    he-NOM obliged-ADJ was-AGR stay-INF
    ‘He had to stay.’

In (102) dolzhen expresses a property of the subject. The expression of the property (dolzhen) is not related to time; the predicative center of the sentence is the copula. Here we can negate byt’ because this amounts to saying that the property expressed by the adjective is not part of the subject. In (103) it is expressed that the subject is under the influence of a particular force that compels him to do something. Here byt’ cannot be negated because the verbal use of the adjective, which expresses the idea of ‘something being the case in reality’, is not in accordance with the negation of byt’. The function of byt’ in this sentence is to express that the situation that is the case, is related to the past.

It must be remarked that the proposed predicative status of the modal adverbs/adjectives under discussion only occurs in cases where (i) the subject of the predicate is expressed in the dative or nominative case or (ii) the subject of the adverb is not expressed but is interpreted as a non-specified subject. An example of a non-specified subject can be found in the case of the modal adverb mozno; mozno cannot be combined with a dative in most contexts, but still shows Adverb byt’ order. In the case of impersonal sentences, however, the verb byt’ can be negated, if it occurs before the adverb:

(104) a. ne bylo nado.
    not was must-ADV

b. ne nado bylo.
    not must-ADV was

c. *nado ne bylo.
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must-ADV not was

d. bylo ne nádo.
   was not must-ADV
   'It wasn't necessary.'

The same accounts for sentences with universal negation in the dative and negative concord, where the dative does not refer to a specific person, but to the universal negative quantifier:

(105)  a. Nikomu ne bylo nádo.
       nobody-DAT not was-IMPERS necessary-ADV

b. Nikomu ne nádo bylo.
   nobody-DAT not necessary-ADV was

c. ?Nikomu nádo né bylo.\(^{47}\)
   Nobody-DAT (that) necessary-ADV not was

d. Nikomu bylo ne nádo.
   Nobody-DAT was not necessary-DAT
   'Nobody had to/It wasn't necessary for anyone.'

The relation between impersonal sentences and sentences with a universal negative quantifier can be motivated as follows. The negative universal quantifier does not refer to an entity, viz. a person or thing with the name 'nobody'. Because of this, no properties can be attributed to it. The non-entity status of the universal quantifier accounts for some of the observed semantic behavior of this form, e.g. for its so-called anti-additive behavior. The property of additivity can be defined as follows (cf. Van der Wouden, 1994: 30):

Definition Let \( B \) and \( B^* \) be two Boolean algebras.
A function \( f \) from \( B \) to \( B^* \) is additive iff for arbitrary arguments \( X, Y, \in B \):
\[
f(X \cup Y) = f(X) \cup f(Y)
\]

\(^{47}\) Insertion of \( íto \) ('it') makes the sentence grammatical: Nikomu nádo íto né bylo (lit. 'For nobody necessary it was not'). The prosodic structure of the sentence plays an important part in phenomena like these.
Because the negative universal quantifier is anti-additive, the following sentences cannot be seen as identical:

Nobody drinks or smokes $\neq$ Nobody drinks or nobody smokes

In the case of nobody it is not expressed that there is some subject of some action, but rather that for some action there is no subject. As such, the syntactic behaviour of nobody is not that of a subject. The difference between normal subjects and nobody has a semantic origin, and leads to the syntactic processing of drinks or smokes as one unit to which no subject is assigned. As such, sentences with a negative universal quantifier can also be compared to impersonal sentences as well.

Now we can go back to our initial problem, viz. why is it that in impersonal sentences the status of nado is not that of the predicative center, but must be compared that of adverbs like grustno in (101). To motivate this, then, it is necessary to explain why we cannot embed the situation in time, as in the case of personal sentences (mne nado bylo). The reason for this, I think, can be found in the fact that we do not have the idea of a situation in which there is a moment where a specific subject is not compelled, and a moment where the subject is the recipient of some state of being compelled, assigned by a particular force. In the case of impersonal sentences we perceive the necessity as a stative state of affairs, rather than as a repetitive event where a force compels the subject to do an action. As such impersonal cases where byt' occurs before the predicate, and cases where it can be negated may be compared to adverbs in sentences like:

(104) Bylo zhárko
     was-IMPERS warm-ADV
     'It was warm.'

These impersonal sentences with an adverb indicate a state and do not point at the relation between a participant and the way in which the participant is affected.

The exact relationship between the syntactic status of the constituents and the information structure merits further investigation. In this respect, some interesting statistical data are provided by Sirotinina (1965: 118), who gives a list of the relations between the order of the predicate and the copulative element in the case of different predicates. The above-mentioned modal predicates (dolžhen, možhno, nado, nuzhno) occur in 99.8% of the investigated cases with post position of the copulative element. On the other side of the scale we find predicates like ubezhden ('convinced') and suveren ('sure'), which in her collection of data only occur with the copulative element before the
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predicate. Most predicates, however, occur with both configurations. I think it would be interesting to look at whether the predicate can occur with other constituents that may be focused, whether a nominative subject or a dative subject can be expressed, and whether and where negation occurs in the sentence.

I argued above that the special behavior of the verb byt' in the case of some modal forms is connected with its auxiliary status. This auxiliary status is the result of the predicative status of the modal form. As I explained, modal forms have some particular semantic features that enable them to be perceived in time. However, this does not explain the relation between the predicative interpretation and the information structure of the sentence. In the following I will try to give an answer to the question of how the information structure adverb/adjective verb is related to the idea of embedding in time of the first constituent.

The explanation of the information structure and the predicative status of the adverb is not an easy task, because it is not clear on what deeper level of abstraction a possible explanation should be based, and how/whether such an explanation could possibly be falsified. The first thing to do, then, is to see whether in other domains of the language there is a correspondence between the information structure in question, and the status of predicativity of one of the elements in the structure. A second step would be to try to find a deeper level to explain the phenomena in question. The direction in which these steps should be taken is suggested by Keijsper (1985, 1994). Keijsper (1985: 333) suggests that one might explain the difference between the placement of the copula in the case of modal adverbs in the same way as one explains the difference between the word order in the case of sentences like On gotóv byt (he ready was), with a so-called ‘backward link’ and On byl gotóv (he was ready), with a so-called ‘forward link’. For a further analysis of the theory of linking, sentence accent, and word order I refer the reader to Keijsper (1985, 1994). Here, I will only make a few suggestions.

Both in the case ofmodal adverbs, and in the case of On gotóv byl, the predicate is expressed before the verb byt'. In these cases the verb byt' can be seen as an auxiliary of tense, because it only repeats that some action is the case. In the sentence On gotóv, however, it is first expressed that some situation is the case, and then the identity of this

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situation is filled in. As such, the verb byt' does not function as an auxiliary of tense, but rather as a pure copula. In many cases a different order has a different 'semantics'. An example of this is given in (92) and (93).

In (92), two independent events are presented, whereas in (93) the second event is presented as the cause of the first event. It seems to me that the explanation for this semantic difference is the same as in the case of the modal adverbs. In both of these the element that is already established as being the case occurs first, giving rise to the auxiliary status of the verb byt'. A final question that remains to be answered is why the specific order is related to the predicative interpretation. In my opinion the answer to this question must be stated in terms of our cognition, and the way we process information. It may be connected to do with our tendency to present information about events in temporal order, and the tendency to present given information first. Note that this corresponds with the fact that in (92) the identity of the slot could in principle by filled in differently; it could for example also have been the case that it was cold, whereas in (93) the speaker has already taken the temperature into consideration. The word order mirrors the temporal order of the events as experienced by the speaker. I suspect that a similar analysis must be given for the order of the modal predicates.

I have discussed the status of byt' in modal forms in some detail. How can we apply the findings here to the status of byt' in the DI-construction? The syntactic similarities between the modal forms and the DI-construction are listed below:

**Modal adverb**

- Byt' clitics to modal adverb/adjective
- Byt' cannot be accented
- Byt' cannot be negated
- The negation is placed before the modal adverb/adjective

**DI-construction**

- Byt' can occur as a clitic to the infinitive or as a non-clitic (before the infinitive)
- Byt' cannot be accented
- Byt' cannot be negated
- The negation is placed before the infinitive
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As we can see from the above information, an important similarity between the DI-construction and the modals is that the negation cannot occur before byt'. An important difference is that the negation is placed before the modal element in the case of the modal predicate, whereas in the case of the DI-construction, the negation occurs before the infinitive.

I would like to suggest that byt' in the DI-construction can be seen as an auxiliary of time. In the case of sentences like Nam bylo ne ustavat' ranon ("We didn't have to get up early"), the form of byt' expresses the time to which the situation of "the subject being under the influence of a force compelling it to the infinitive action" is related. The auxiliary cannot be negated because this would yield a reading where it is stated that the dative participant is the experiencer of some action, and at the same time it is stated that this is not the case. The impossibility of negating byt' occurs in the modal cases where there is always an association between the infinitive and some agent.

The analysis given here motivates the position of the negation in a straightforward way, taking the semantics of the construction into account. It shows that in order to account for the presence of negation no appeal has to be made to phenomena such as 'negation transportation'. Such an analysis is given by Rappaport (1985: 211), who claims that the negation is moved from the verb byt' to the infinitive. This analysis is probably based on the assumption that the modal meaning of the construction can be ascribed to one constituent, namely the verb byt'. It may be clear that in my opinion this is not correct: the modality of the construction is an interpretative phenomenon that cannot be ascribed to one constituent. The same confusion between meaning and interpretation can be found in Schoorlemmer (1995: 66), who posits a null modal element in the construction. In her analysis, she is not able to account for the position of negation.

As I have explained, the impossibility of negating bylo/budet in the DI-construction may be motivated by the modal nature of the combination of pronoun and infinitive. There are, however, some possible historical data that point to a different situation. According to Veyrenc (1979: 42), in Old Russian and even until the seventeenth century the copula could be negated, while the construction also had a modal meaning (see Nikiforov, 1952: 191–223). In my opinion, however, this is not sufficient evidence for the status of the construction in modern Russian. It seems to me that the different syntactic behavior of the construction in Old Russian must first of all be attributed to a different meaning and use of byt' in Old Russian.49

49 Nikiforov (1952: 191–223), in his discussion of the DI-construction in sixteenth-century Russian, only gives examples of the DI-construction where the negation occurs before the infinitive, and examples of the
If there has been a historical change, it may be that there has been a development from бýt' as the predicative center of the DI-construction to a situation where the predicative center is implied by the combination of dative and infinitive, and where бýt' has become an auxiliary. Perhaps, this development was made possible by the modal meaning of the construction, as I explained earlier. It could be that when the function of бýt' developed from a predicative verb to a verb with the status of an auxiliary, its status became marginal.50

As Maurice (1996: 85) remarks, the status of the auxiliary in the DI-construction is marginal because it is not possible to make a complete tense paradigm with every infinitive sentence. In many cases it is theoretically possible to fit in бýlo, in other cases it is doubtful, and sometimes it is not possible at all. The expression of бýdet is even more restricted than that of бýlo. In my opinion, the present marginal status of бýt' must be explained in terms of the interference between tense and modality. A problem with this analysis is that in the case of lexical modal items like надо, we find the whole tense paradigm (Maurice, 1996: 85):

(105) Emu nádo (Ø/býdet/býlo) uexat'.
    he-DAT necessary-ADV be-PRES/FUT/PAST go
    'He has to/will have to/had to go'

It seems to me, however, that if one wishes to explain the occurrence of бýt' in terms of interference between tense and modality, the infinitive construction and modal lexical items cannot be treated in the same way. In the case of the infinitive construction the modality is syntactically derived, and not lexically expressed, which has important consequences for the semantic and syntactic properties of the construction. I will discuss this later in more detail.

Having now discussed the meanings of the constituents in the DI-construction (dative, infinitive, auxiliary), I will discuss what the abstract meaning of the construction is.

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50 It must be remarked that this is a very general and incomplete sketch of the status of бýt'. Important questions that have to be answered are (a) what was the exact meaning of the DI-construction in Old Russian?, (b) how can this specific meaning be linked to the status of the constituents?, (c) has there been a development in the structure of the DI-construction?, and (d) if so, why?
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4.6 Meaning and syntactic structure of the DI-construction

In the preceding sections, I have discussed the meaning and use of the various constituents in the DI-construction. In this section I will show how we can derive an abstract meaning of the DI-construction by composition of the various meanings in that construction. I will argue that the predicative element of the construction cannot be identified with a specific form, but arises because the non-specified infinitive agent is unified/asociated with the participant expressed in the dative. This means that the verbal head of the DI-construction, the modal element, is syntactically derived. I will first discuss the abstract meaning of the DI-construction, and then discuss the question of to which constituent the modal meaning of the construction must be attributed.

4.6.1 The abstract meaning

In the DI-construction we find the following constituents with their meanings:

- dative noun: active experiencer, recipient of situation s
- infinitive: situation type with associated agent a
- bylo/budet (in some cases): auxiliary of tense of situation s

How do these constituents combine? The semantic structure of an instance of the DI-construction can informally be represented in a tree (Figure 4.6).

The infinitive can be seen as the predicate of the sentence in the sense that it expresses the situation that is associated with the dative participant. Note, however, that the head or verbal element of the sentence can be identified with the idea that is the result of the application of the dative to the infinitive, and is as such an interpretative phenomenon. The verb byt' can be identified with an auxiliary of tense.\(^{51}\) In some cases no dative participant is expressed. In such cases the agent of the infinitive must be identified with a potential agent given in the context (for example the speaker), or with a generic agent. The information structure of the DI-construction may differ from instance to instance. In some cases the infinitive can be identified with the focus (theme) of the sentence, while in other cases the dative must be identified with the focus (theme) of the sentence.

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\(^{51}\) In many cases bylo occurs before the infinitive. In such cases the verb byt' must still be seen as an auxiliary.
V = non-expressed (IS THE CASE, APPLIES, MUST, CAN, etc., depending on the context)
'Predicate' = INF (the infinitive expresses the situation that is associated with the dative participant)

R is recipient of sit. type T by R in past/future

Sit. type T by a is the case in past/future

[Recipient R of sit. s], [Sit. type T by agent a], [Situation s is the case in past/future],

Dative Infinitive (+accent) bylo/budet Ø

On the basis of the meanings and the syntactic process given above the abstract meaning of the infinitive construction can informally be described as in Figure 4.7.

It should be noted that the description given here does not apply to the existential construction, or to constructions with an adverbial predicate. In the case of the existential construction the infinitive must be seen as a specification of the pronoun/adverb. In this construction the dative participant is therefore only indirectly the recipient of the situation expressed by the infinitive. In the case of constructions with an adverbial predicate and an infinitive, the infinitive must be seen as a specification-complement of the adverbial predicate (see 4.4.4.3). Note, however, that sentences with an adverbial predicate and infinitive sentences share important properties, which is underlined by the occurrence of sentences that share properties with both the DI-construction, and constructions with an adverbial predicate (see 4.16.1).

Above I have given the abstract meaning of the DI-construction. Four important remarks have to be made about this meaning:
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(i) The meaning given here describes the basic uses of the DI-construction; peripheral uses must be analyzed in terms of selection and backgrounding of features.

(ii) The meaning given here does not predict the entire possible range of the DI-construction, but gives enough information to understand the different uses of the construction.

(iii) The subject status of the dative differs from the subject status of the nominative.

(iv) The expression of the dative is semantically motivated.

I will briefly discuss these below.

Figure 4.7

- The dative expresses the idea of a recipient rec: [rec = recipient of situation s]_{potential agent}
- [recipient of situation s]_{potential agent} presupposes force F that brings about [realization of situation s by agent a]
- The infinitive expresses the idea of a situation type INF: [situation type INF by non-specified agent a]_{situation}
- [dative rec] + [infinitive INF]: rec is the potential agent of INF because of the existence of F

Interpretation:

Some force is directed at the realization of the situation expressed by the infinitive of which the dative participant is the potential agent

As I will show in my analysis of the different uses of the construction, the idea of recipiency of a situation presupposes an initial information state where the dative participant is not associated with the realization of the infinitive situation (or in the case of negation, where the dative participant is associated with the infinitive situation), which is contradicted.

Firstly, the description of the DI-construction given above must be seen as an 'idealized' interpretation, that is, it must be seen as an abstraction from different instances of the construction, where information about the lexical meaning of the
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infinitive, nature of the dative participant, etc. is abstracted. The meaning must account for a whole range of different uses, ranging from the more prototypical cases of the DI-construction, to the more peripheral ones. The occurrence of prototype effects can be motivated by the fact that case meaning occurs in a clearly delineated system of oppositions. The choice of case can therefore best be explained in terms of choosing the optimal case from the case system.

As I will argue below, the idea of being the recipient of a situation type can be interpreted differently, depending on the context in which it occurs. In some cases the idea of recipiendhood is connected with the presence of an identifiable force, such as a norm, script, or observable pattern in nature or ‘fate’ that brings the situation about. This is the case for example in sentences that can be classified as cases of so-called (de)ontic necessity (if the force is a norm or script) or epistemic-ontic necessity (if the force is ‘fate’, or ‘the way things go’). The idea of recipiendhood is, however, less clear in some other contexts, for example in cases with the conjunctions esli (if), pered tem kak (‘before’), and in some cases that express possibility, for example contrastive contexts such as (6). As I mentioned above, an important feature of the DI-construction is that the initial information state that the dative participant is not associated with the realization of the infinitive situation, is contradicted. In my analysis I will show that the dative noun is triggered in these contexts because of this particular feature, and that these cases can be analyzed as cases of so-called ‘epistemic deblocking’.

Secondly, the meaning given above, derived by composition of the components of the construction, must be sustained by a description based on abstraction over the different uses of the construction. The compositional analysis cannot predict which uses of the DI-construction are possible, and which uses are not. This can be underlined if we look at the use of the DI-construction in older stages of Russian. The uses of the DI-construction in the sixteenth century discussed by Nikiforov (1952: 196–203) cannot all be paraphrased with a DI-construction in modern Russian, although they can all be understood by a speaker of present day Russian. More specifically, the use of the DI-construction to express necessity was less confined than it is now (Maurice, 1996). The change in use of the DI-construction may possibly be attributed to a change in the system of oppositional forms.

Thirdly, the subject status of the dative differs from the status of the nominative subject. In 3.1 I illustrated the conceptualization expressed by a nominative subject with an example of a prototypical scene for the nominative, viz. the movement of a ball flying through the air. In this case we see the movement as a property of the ball, that is,
although the ball and its movement may be conceptualized separately, they are not conceptualized independently of each other. This can be expressed in language as ‘The ball is flying’. The inflection on the verb indicates that the action is related to person, and to time; this means that the subject and the verb are interdependent (finite verb presupposes subject, subject presupposes finite verb). This conceptualization differs from the dative in combination with the infinitive. In the case of the dative subject and the infinitive predicate, the realization of the action and the subject of the action are independently conceptualized. Since the situation is assigned to the dative participant by some force, and the dative participant is not the initiator of the situation, the situational scene is conceptualized as the coming into being of something that may lead to the situation expressed by the infinitive. This means that the scene is conceptualized in two moments, viz. a moment where the situation does not take place, and a moment where the situation takes place, namely the moment where the dative participant is the subject of the situation. In contrast to the nominative-finite verb construction, the dative subject is only a potential subject, because the conceptualization does not convey whether the subject will actually give in to the force and realize the infinitive action.

The assignment of a situation type to some participant in the dative creates a predicative relationship: the situation is related to the participant, which is to realize the infinitive situation. Because of the predicative nature of the unification of the non-expressed infinitive agent (PRO) with the dative participant the status of cases in which the dative is assigned to second predicates (odin (‘alone’), sam (‘self’)) can be compared to sentences (S) or subordinate sentences (S’). The predicative moment that is constituted by the relating of the infinitive predicate to the dative subject creates the idea of a phenomenon perceived in time; this phenomenon can be seen as the ‘verbal’ element of the construction. I suspect that the verbal element of the construction with a dative subject and the infinitive predicate is expressed by the combination of the dative and the infinitive. This means that it is not expressed by one form, and must be seen as an epiphenomenon of the construction. The subject dative in combination with the infinitive predicate is capable of conveying verbalness (the conceptualization of some scene in time) because the idea of recipienthood always presupposes change in time, viz. a change from the scene where the subject is not receiving the action, to a scene where the subject is the receiver of some action.52

Fourthly, the expression of the dative is semantically motivated. In the generative literature the occurrence of the dative in the case of the DI-construction is ‘explained’

52 In the case of expressions such as mne xolodno (I-DAT cold-ADV) the change in time has a very abstract character.
by stating a rather mechanical rule, viz. a rule that assigns the dative case to PRO (e.g. Franks, 1990; Komar, 1999), or a rule that states that PRO is dative (e.g. Comrie, 1974; Neidle, 1988). Although such rule may partly capture particular regularities in the linguistic data, no explanation for the rule itself is given. In my opinion, a semantically-conceptually based analysis can provide a deeper level of explanation, because it can motivate why the case of PRO may be dative. A further shortcoming of the postulation of such a non-motivated rule is that in some cases it fails to make correct observations. It does not account for the nominative-infinitive construction, where the infinitive occurs with a nominative subject (e.g. (74)-(76)), or cases where the infinitive construction cannot occur with a subject at all (e.g. (77)-(80)):

(106) Tebe* mnogo znat’ – tebe* malo spat’. (Compare (79))
they-DAT many know-INF – they-DAT few sleep-INF

(107) Strannye ljudi, eti Kressel Im* skazat’ pri mal’chiku takuju veshch’! (Compare (78))
strange people, those Cretians! They-DAT say-INF at boy such a thing

Neidle (1988: 152) tries to account for cases with a nominative subject such as (74) by saying that this construction contains a null verb with the meaning ‘starting’. This analysis, however, does not explain how this meaning comes about, and why in some cases, for example Ja revnoval’? (I be.jealous-INF, ‘Me-be jealous?’), the meaning of the proposed null verb is different. Franks (1990: 237) tries to account for the absence of a subject in cases like (78) by claiming that dative subjects are licensed only when in the scope of a tense operator in C, or to put it differently, dative subjects only occur in clauses with tense. In my opinion tense is not a necessary part of the construction with a dative subject (see for example (9)-(11) above). Note furthermore that in most cases no tense is expressed for the DI-construction; as I will argue below the absence of tense has a semantic-pragmatic nature.

The impossibility of expressing a dative has a semantic reason. Above I have argued that the impossibility of inserting a dative in (79) is connected with the obligatory generic status of the infinitive subject in this construction. The absence of tense in most cases is connected with the fact that such sentences do not refer to a specific scene in time, but have a more general character; in some cases, however, a

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55 For the exact interpretation of these rules I refer the reader to these analyses.
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tense operator may be expressed. In the case of (78) the absence of the (subject) dative is connected with the absence of the idea of a force.

In my opinion, it makes no sense to assign case to the non-expressed subject of the infinitive (PRO) or to posit an underlying element PRO that already has case. The non-expressed subject of the infinitive, PRO, cannot be seen as an individual subject, since it must be seen as an abstraction from individual subjects, which means that we cannot conceptualize PRO as a specific entity. However, if the infinitive predicate occurs with a dative subject, PRO is unified or associated with the dative subject.

4.6.2 The modal nature of the DI-construction

In the preceding section I discussed the abstract meaning of the DI-construction; in this section I wish to argue against the idea expressed in the literature on the DI-construction that the so-called 'modal' meaning of the construction must be attributed to one of the constituents in the construction.

I have argued that we can account for the modal character of the DI-construction if we look at the meanings of the constituents in the construction and the way in which they are combined. In the literature on the DI-construction, opinions differ about how the different meanings contribute to the meaning of the DI-construction, and how the DI-construction should be analyzed both semantically and syntactically. Three main opinions exist about why the DI-construction is modal in nature:

(i) Because of the presence of a non-expressed modal element (Wierzbicka, 1966; Kondrashova, 1994; Junghanns, 1994; Schoorlemmer, 1995)
(ii) Because of the presence of the infinitive (Ebeling, 1984; Růžichka, 1994)
(iii) Because of the presence of byt' (Veyrenc, 1979)

I wish to argue that the modal meaning of the DI-construction is an interpretation of the combination of the dative with the infinitive in a particular context, viz. in a context where the non-specified infinitive agent is associated with a particular agent expressed by the dative. This means that I reject the idea that the modality can be attributed solely to one of the expressed or non-expressed constituents in the sentence. I will now briefly discuss the analyses mentioned above.

Note that in these cases no dative noun can be expressed, but the case of the adjuncts odin and sam is dative (see 4.17).
The first possibility is advocated in an early work of Wierzbicka (1966) and by scholars working in a generative framework (Schoorlemmer, 1995; Kondrashova, 1994; and Junghanns, 1994). Wierzbicka claims that the DI-construction has essentially the same structure as sentences with a dative subject and an adverbial predicate like:

(108) Mne legko bylo rabotat'.
    I-DAT easy-ADV it.was work-INF
    'I found it easy to work.'

Wierzbicka claims that in such sentences we find the following semantic information:
(a) subject of the state (*mne*),
(b) process (*bylo*),
(c) property (*legko*),
(d) object of the state (*rabotat*). In the case of the DI-construction we find exactly the same structure, a null predicate (and often a null copula).

Generative treatments of the modal infinitive construction (Schoorlemmer, 1995; Junghanns, 1994) assume a non-overt modal predicate comparable to modal predicates like *nado* ('must', 'have to'). According to these studies, the positing of a null predicate explains some syntactic features of the modal infinitive construction, especially the occurrence of the structural dative (Schoorlemmer, 1995: 66), although it does not account for the position of the negation in such sentences (Schoorlemmer, 1995: 66).

In my opinion, it is not correct to speak of a null predicate in the case of the infinitive construction because the status of such a null predicate remains unclear. It is not clear (a) why a null predicate occurs in the case of the infinitive construction, (b) what the meaning is of this predicate, (c) why the null predicate is sometimes interpreted as a case of necessity and sometimes as a case of (im)possibility and (d) what the relation is between the so-called modal uses and the non-modal uses of the DI-construction. Further evidence that one cannot speak of a null predicate in the case of the DI-construction is that the syntactic possibilities of the DI-construction and sentences with modal adverbs are different. As I will discuss below, the semantic-syntactic behaviour of sentences with modal adverbs such as *nado* and *mozhno* is different from the semantic-syntactic behavior of the DI-construction. If we claim, that in the case of the DI there is a null adverb that behaves in the same way as an overt adverb, we cannot adequately explain the differences in combinatory possibilities between the DI and the overt adverb.55

55 In some specific cases, however, the combination of a dative and an infinitive is better analyzed in terms of ellipsis. This is the case for example in the following sentence *A mne, a mne pozmoctrel', – sheptala neterpelovaja moja ljubov* (...). (M. Kononenko, Tango; http://www.litera.ru:8085/slova/tango.htm; but I-
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I have claimed that it is incorrect to posit a null predicate in the case of the DI-construction. However, I do not think that the idea of a null predicate is entirely erroneous. In the case of the DI-construction, the predicative idea of the sentence (is the case, applies, must, can, etc.) is not formally expressed, because it is induced by the combination of the dative and the infinitive. If some agent is the recipient of a situation type, this implies the idea of a predicative scene, viz. the situation that there is some external force that compels the agent to do the action. This means that in the case of the DI-construction, the predicative center is not formally expressed, but only implied. As such, the predicate cannot be seen as a null form that functions independently of the other constituents in the sentence. The relation between the DI-construction and sentences with an adverbial predicate can be made clear with the interpretation of *mne stat' chlenom ètogo sojuža* in the following two sentences:

(109) Legche verbludu projtì skvoz' igol’noe uško, chem *mne stat' chlenom ètogo sojuža.*\(^5\) easier camel-DAT pass through needle eye, than I-DAT become-INF-PERF member of.that union

‘It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for me to become a member of that union.’

(110) *Mne stat' chlenom ètogo sojuža.*

I-DAT become-INF-PERF member of.that union

‘I will become a member of that union.’

In the first sentence *mne stat' chlenom ètogo sojuža* is interpreted in the domain of the predicative adverb *legche* (it is easier). This means that the dative expresses the recipient of a state, whose the identity is filled in by the infinitive. In the second sentence no predicative adverb is expressed. In this sentence the predicate is expressed by the infinitive. The verbal element of the sentence is an interpretative phenomenon that expresses the idea of predicativity in its most basic form, viz. ‘is the case’, or ‘applies to an agent’. Because of the specific context (dative, aspect, etc.) this meaning is interpreted as a case of epistemic-ontic necessity, expressing the infinitive situation will necessarily be the case.

The second possibility, viz. that the modal meaning of the DI-construction is due to the meaning of the infinitive is advocated by both Rúzhichka (1994) and Ebeling

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\(^5\) http://tm.jazz.ru/books/markin/50.htm
(1984); Růžichka (1994) does not motivate the modal meaning of the infinitive, so I will not go into his analysis here. Ebeling (1984) points out that some infinitive sentences occur without a dative and copula but still have a modal character. These are sentences with a non-expressed and generically understood subject like the following:

(111) Zdes' ne projti.
Here not go through-INF-PERF
One can't trespass here.'

This could be seen as an argument in favor of the idea that the modal character of the infinitive construction must be sought in the meaning of the infinitive itself. According to Ebeling, the infinitive "presents a fact as a member of a pair of facts, the relation between the two being 'accompanying'" (1984: 128). Ebeling's description applies to all infinitive cases and is the basis of the modal meaning of the infinitive. The meaning is interpreted differently depending on the context in which the infinitive occurs. In the case of the modal infinitive construction 'accompanying' takes the shape of 'giving rise to'. This means that there is some situation that 'furthers' the coming into existence of another fact.

As I already argued in 4.4.1, I do not think it would be right to attribute the modal character of the construction to the meaning of the infinitive, as Ebeling does. In my opinion, it is the specific use of the infinitive that creates a modal interpretation in cases like (111); infinitives are capable of being interpreted as such because of their specific meaning of situation type. A sentence like (111) expresses that the not reaching of the terminus of the situation expressed by the infinitive is applied to an unspecified agent. If a situation has a general application, it can be interpreted such that there must be some force that is compelling any agent (or put differently, the unspecified agent) toward this action, hence the modal interpretation. As in this case the infinitive action is not initiated by the agent himself, the agent can be seen as an entity with a status that is close to that of a recipient.57 In sentences like (111) it is possible not to express the agent-subject because in Russian a zero subject form is (under specific circumstances) to be interpreted as a generic subject.

In my opinion, the occurrence of sentences like (111) does not imply that in sentences where a dative is expressed, it does not contribute to the modal nature of the construction. Furthermore, I do not think that something like a modal meaning should

57 I do not wish to claim that one should speak of a zero recipient in such cases. The term recipient must be reserved for linguistic expressions.
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be attributed to the infinitive form. However, the combination of the meaning of the
infinitive and a specific context may yield a modal interpretation.

The third possibility, viz. that the modal interpretation of the DI-construction can
be ascribed to the impersonal use of byt', is advocated by Veyrenc (1979: 37–39).
According to him, across languages we find that verbs which indicate possession or
existence can also indicate necessity (or impossibility). Languages usually fall in one of
the two groups. In languages like English the verb ‘to have’ is used to indicate necessity
(he has to go), whereas in languages like Finnish and Hungarian, the verb ‘to be’ is used
to express necessity.

Of course, I cannot deny the facts presented by Veyrenc, but I do not think that
this typological evidence can be seen as evidence that in the Russian construction the
modality must be described solely to the verb byt'. To motivate this, an analysis must be
given of how byt' accounts for the modal interpretation of the construction. Unfortunately,
Veyrenc does not give such an analysis. Ebeling (1984: 107) rejects the
analysis given by Veyrenc because in many cases the verb byt' does not occur (more
specifically in the case of the present tense); in my opinion, this is not a very strong
argument against Veyrenc, since byt' can, under specific circumstances, be expressed in
the past and the future tense. A better argument against Veyrenc’s position is the
marginal position of byt' in the DI-construction, and the impossibility of expressing byt'
at all in some cases (for example sentences with subordinators) that nevertheless have a
modal character. As such, the modality cannot be ascribed to the verb byt'.

I have argued that I do not think the verb ‘be’ on its own contributes to the modal
meaning of the DI-construction. I have in fact argued that the modal character of the
construction is the result of the interaction of all the components, and cannot be seen
as a meaning but rather as an interpretation. In the following section, I will discuss how
the construction is interpreted in the different contexts.

4.7 On the interpretation of the DI-construction

In the sections above I have discussed the meanings of the different constituents in the
DI-construction, and the meaning of the construction as a whole. I have argued that
the meaning of the construction must be defined both as a composition of the
meanings of its constituent parts, and as an abstraction from the total of occurrences
of the construction. In this section I will go into the question of how the DI-
construction can be interpreted, and what the relation is between particular interpretations and particular context types.

In the literature it is generally accepted (e.g. Timofeev, 1950; Bricyn, 1990; Maurice, 1996) that the DI-construction has different uses.\(^{58}\) Bricyn (1990), for example, gives a main classification into the following types: (a) necessity (dolžhenstvovanie) or absence of necessity, (b) predestination (predopredelenost) or negation of predestination, (c) impossibility (nevoznõzhnost) and in some special cases possibility, (d) purpose-wish (celesoobraznost'–xelatel'nost'), (e) directive sentences (pobuditel'nye predloženija), and (f) interrogative sentences (voprositel'nye predloženija). This classification is based on the semantic differences between the different uses, which are made visible by the different ways in which they can be paraphrased with other forms in Russian. The classification further treats declarative, directive and interrogative sentences separately, notwithstanding the fact that interrogative sentences can also be classified as cases of (negation of) necessity or (im)possibility.

Maurice (1996) gives a similar classification based on semantic criteria, but places more emphasis on the existence of context types. In her study of the modal infinitive construction, she makes a main division between non-interrogative sentences and interrogative sentences. Non-interrogative sentences are classified into declarative sentences, sentences with by, and directive sentences. The declarative sentences are further classified according to aspect, presence or absence of negation, and other formal features such as the presence of particles (če) and the Aktionsart of the verb. The interrogative sentences are further classified according to the type of interrogative adverb or pronoun, and of the presence of other forms (such as li, mozhet). The different context types constituted by these different forms (negation, particles, etc.), and meanings (aspect, lexical classes) roughly correspond to the semantic types given by Bricyn (1990).

Classifications of the DI-construction in the literature such as the ones discussed here show that (i) the DI-construction has different uses, (ii) the different instances of the construction all have a so-called ‘modal’ meaning, (iii) particular uses are confined to specific contexts, and (iv) in some cases no clear boundaries can be drawn between different uses. These observed phenomena point to the interpretative status of the different uses. The different uses cannot be seen as meanings, but are all interpretations

\(^{58}\) Note that different authors use different terms for the construction that I call the DI-construction. Bricyn (1990) calls instances of this construction ‘infinitive sentences’, according to the classification of the infinitive as a predicate. Maurice (1996) speaks about ‘modal infinitive sentences’, according to the modal nature of the construction. I will maintain the term DI-construction.
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of the same abstract meaning, or put differently, are all interpretations of the interaction of the same meanings, viz. infinitive and dative.

In the literature, the question of why these different interpretations occur, and how these interpretations can be motivated by the meaning of the construction and the context in which it occurs has not been systematically addressed by most authors. An exception is Maurice (1995, 1996), who points to the fact that the two main interpretations of the DI-construction without by, viz. necessity and impossibility, can be motivated by the intention that may be ascribed to the dative participant. In the case of the necessitative interpretation, no intention is ascribed to the dative subject, whereas in the case of the impossibility interpretation, an intention to realize the action can be ascribed to the dative subject. The question of whether an intention can be ascribed or not in most cases corresponds with the aspect of the infinitive. In the case of the impossibility interpretation the perfective aspect prototypically occurs, whereas in the case of the necessitative interpretation the imperfective aspect prototypically occurs.

Maurice (1995, 1996) does not systematically go into the question of how the different interpretations of the DI-construction are related to the meaning of the construction, or the meaning of its component parts. Furthermore, she does not systematically address the question of why in declarative sentences the possibility interpretation occurs in very specific contexts only, and why in interrogative sentences it occurs without restriction. In my opinion, this is connected with the fact that she tries to analyze the modal meaning of the construction in terms of modal logic operators. She (1995: 151–152) asserts that the basic modality of the DI-construction is necessity; she motivates this with the modal logic equation: Necessary (not X) = not possible (X). According to this equation, the uses that express impossibility can be analyzed as necessitative uses and uses that express possibility must be reduced to negation as well.

Maurice (1995, 1996) discusses two uses that express possibility, viz. uses with edva ('hardly') and tol'ko ('only'): 59

        streets so small, that hardly overtake-INF-PERF two-DAT cars-DAT
        'The streets are so narrow that two cars can hardly overtake each other.'

(113)    A i tol'ko v vyrezy murashu projti. (Maurice, 1995: 151/Byliny)

59 Maurice (1996: 152) explicitly states that she will not discuss sentences with chtoby.
but and only in hole ant-DAT go-through-INF-PERF
‘But only an ant can go through those holes.’

She claims about such uses that they can be seen as cases of restricted possibility, and that restricted possibility can be seen as impossibility in a broader sense. She motivates the reason why the DI-construction expresses only necessity or impossibility, by pointing at the fact that necessity is more informative than possibility: “How can one explain that impossibility is more central than possibility? Possibly because it is more informative. When I know that someone can do something, then I don’t know whether he will do it or not. When I know, however, that someone can’t do something, I can suppose that he won’t do it.” (my translation; Maurice, 1996: 282). She (1995, 1996) concludes that the DI-construction only expresses the more informative modalities.

The analysis given by Maurice (1995, 1996) has a number of weak points. Firstly, if all uses express necessity, and impossibility can be reduced to necessity by means of a logical operation, we need additional logical rules in order to apply the operation in the case of restricted possibility: only possible $X \neq$ necessary only $X$; the right side of the equation is stronger.

Secondly, if all uses must be reduced to necessity, it is not clear how we should deal with cases where the possibility interpretation cannot be reduced to negation at all, e.g. sentences with chtoby:

(114) Polez zhilin v dyru, chtob i Kostylinu prolez. (Garde, 1963: 291/Tolstoj)
climbed Zhilin in hole, in order that Kostylin-DAT pass-through-INF-PERF
‘Zhlin climbed into the hole, so that Kostylin could pass through as well.’

It is unclear how the equation given above can be applied in this case.

Thirdly, Maurice analyzes all cases of the DI-construction as uses that express notions such as ‘necessity’ or ‘possibility’. In some cases, however, it is questionable whether an analysis in terms of either necessity or possibility does justice to specific use of the construction. This is the case for example with uses with the particle by. One can of course try to classify such uses as cases of necessity or possibility, but these are only theoretical notions, and not concepts expressed by the construction itself.

Fourthly, the motivation for the basic meaning of necessity of the DI-construction is rather implausible. No motivation is given for why in the case of the DI-construction the ‘weak’ modality of possibility cannot be expressed, whereas it can be expressed with other forms or other constructions in the linguistic system (e.g. mozhno).
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Furthermore, it remains unclear why in some cases, for example sentences with by, the construction is not interpreted as a case of necessity or impossibility.

The problematic nature of Maurice's analysis is connected with the logical model she uses for modality. In my opinion, the way she uses modal logic operators has two weaknesses: (i) The model defines modality extensionally, and not intensionally, and (ii) the model ascribes meaning to a form, whereas in the case of the DI-construction the modality is an interpretative phenomenon.

Firstly, the model that she uses defines modality extensionally; that is, it defines what the result is of some ‘must’ or ‘can’ situation, rather than how this situation comes about. In such models, ‘necessary x’ is defined as a situation where in all possible worlds x is the case, whereas ‘possible X’ is defined as a situation where in some worlds X is the case. This description of modality lacks important information in the description of modality for the DI-construction; viz. it lacks the information of how the described situation comes about.

Secondly, the model used in Maurice (1995, 1996) analyzes the modal feature of the construction as a definable operator. Such an analysis does not explain how this operator comes about in the construction, and why it does not occur in all instances of the construction. More particularly, it does not take account of the inherent fuzzy nature of the modality in the case of the DI-construction. As I will argue, the meaning of ‘recipient of a situation type’ cannot be equated with ‘necessity’, but can be interpreted as such in some contexts. The notion of ‘necessity’ as defined in the model used by Maurice has no conceptual status, but is rather a mathematical idealization of conceptualization.

The problematic aspects connected to the analysis given by Maurice (1995, 1996) can be solved if we look at the meaning of the construction. If we do this, we can motivate why the construction can express both necessity and impossibility, and why the possibility interpretation is restricted to specific contexts. If we try to account for the use of the construction in this way it becomes unnecessary to posit modal logic operators as defined in logical models.

The shortcomings of the modal logic model in the analysis of modal predicates in natural language are absent in more cognitively oriented models of modality, such as that of Talmy (1985). In this model English modal verbs are described in terms of Force Dynamics. Talmy (1985) describes the meaning of modal predicates such as can and must in terms of the dynamics of different opposing forces. The following conceptual primitives play a part in the theory of force dynamics. There are two entities, that each exert a force on the other. One is foregrounded or singled out for focal attention (the
‘agonist’), the other is considered for the effect it has on the agonist (the ‘antagonist’). Entities are taken to exert a force by virtue of an intrinsic tendency toward either motion (action) or toward rest (inaction). Opposed forces have different relative strengths, and the entity that is able to manifest its tendency at the expense of its opponent is the stronger. According to their relative strengths, the opposing forces yield a resultant. This means that the agonist will either act or not act.

In Talmy (1985) modality is described in terms of two opposing forces in the following way:

\[
\text{Necessary } x = \text{def}
\]

\[
\text{Subject } x = \text{Agonist}
\]

\[
\text{Subject } x \text{ has tendency to inaction (not } X) \rightarrow \text{Antagonist opposes this tendency)
\]

\[
\text{Antagonist is stronger than subject}
\]

\[
\text{Possible } x = \text{def}
\]

\[
\text{Subject } x = \text{Agonist}
\]

\[
\text{Subject has tendency to action (} X) \rightarrow \text{Antagonist opposes this tendency)
\]

\[
\text{Subject is stronger than Antagonist}
\]

In this model ‘necessity’ is described in terms of an imposing force, whereas ‘possibility’ is described in terms of an absent potential barrier. This can be illustrated with the following sentences:

a. I have to go to school; my mother wants me to.
b. I can sing very well; I take lessons.

In (a) the subject is presented as having no choice but to do the action; the Antagonist in this case can be identified with a specific person, namely his mother. In (b) it is expressed that if the subject wants to sing, he will do it, because he has particular properties that enable him to do so. The notion of ‘enabling’ presupposes that some force is needed to overcome the situation where one cannot sing (the situation where one takes no lessons).

I think that the model under discussion can be used for the description of modality in the case of the DI-construction, with the following reservations. Firstly, whether the subject will act or not act is not an extensional issue. In the case of necessity the action only takes place in an ideal world; in the actual world the subject may not give in to the imposing force (e.g. \textit{I have to go to school, but I won’t do it}). In the case of possibility it can
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only be expected that the subject will act; in the actual world the subject may not follow the initial intention to act. Secondly, in the case of the necessitive interpretation, one can speak of a tendency to inaction of the subject only in the sense that the action is presented as the result of some other force. The subject may agree with the intended action of the other force; as such there does not have to be a situation of opposing forces. This is the case for example with so-called utilitarian modality (see Shatunovskij, 1996 for a discussion of this type of modality), e.g.: I really have to go now (in order to catch the tram, and I want to catch the tram), or in the case of accepted norms, where one agrees with the norms or expectations that one has to follow.

With the additions to the model of modality, the two main modal possibilities of the infinitive construction, 'necessity' and '(im)possibility' can be modeled. Proceeding from the meaning of the DI-construction given above, two main interpretations of the DI-construction are represented schematically in Figure 4.8.

Figure 4.8*

(Negation of) necessity:

\[
\text{situation (not) INF} \quad \text{EF} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{DAT}
\]

(Negation of) possibility:

\[
\text{DAT+} \quad \text{situation (not) INF} \quad \leftarrow \quad \text{EF}
\]

* DAT = dative-participant ('+' points at the intention of the potential agent to fulfill the situation), EF = contextually given external force, INF = infinitive situation, arrow represents that there is a force directed at the dative participant.

The difference between the necessitive interpretation and the possibility interpretation relates to the question of whether the intention of the agent to do the situation is taken into consideration. The specific interpretation is influenced by the aspect of the infinitive verb, the presence or absence of negation in the sentence, and presuppositions of the interpreter.

In the case of necessity, the interpreter focuses on the fact that, no matter whether the potential agent wants to realize the situation or not, he will (not) be the potential agent of the infinitive situation. This means that in the case of the necessitive
interpretation, the intention of the potential agent to fulfill the situation or not is considered to be irrelevant, and the focus is on the force leading to the realization of the infinitive situation. Necessitve cases prototypically occur in the imperfective aspect.

In the case of the (im)possibility interpretation, the situation is ‘viewed’ from the point of view of the potential agent that intends to fulfill a particular situation (DAT+) but is initially not in the position to realize the situation, and the focus is on the question of whether the dative participant is in the position to realize the intended situation. Cases that express possibility prototypically occur in the perfective aspect. Note that the term ‘intention’ does not necessarily mean that the dative participant deliberately and consciously strives to realize the infinitive situation; in some cases the term ‘intention’ must be understood in a more abstract way, namely as referring to the positive attitude of the agent toward the realization of the infinitive situation.

I would like to stress that the dative participant is the recipient of a situation. As I mentioned above, the idea of recipiency is connected to the contrast between the initial information state pertaining to the realization of the infinitive situation by the dative participant, and the scene expressed by the construction. In affirmative sentences the initial information state is a scene where the dative participant is not the potential agent of the infinitive situation; in negative sentences the initial information state is a scene where the dative participant is the potential agent of the infinitive situation.

In my opinion, the recipiency of the agent can motivate the different uses of the DI-construction, especially the ontic character of the different uses, stressing that the realization of the infinitive situation is in full accordance with the way things are or go. The ontic character of the DI-construction is underlined by the fact that the so-called deontic use only occurs in specific contexts, and is favored by particular formal features (eshche, ved; zhe, contrast). The recipiency of the agent can also motivate why the DI-construction is only interpreted as a case of possibility in very few contexts. About the restriction on the use of possibility, I will make a few comments.

If the agent of a situation is a recipient, this means that he does not initiate the action himself. In the case of the impossibility interpretation one can speak of recipiency because the agent is the recipient of the situation ‘not X’, whereas he has an intention to realize situation ‘X’. In the case of the possibility interpretation one can speak of recipiency because the blocked intended situation of the dative participant is unblocked, which makes him the recipient of the situation ‘X’. As such, the possibility interpretation only occurs in very specific contexts, viz. those where the agent can be seen as a recipient, which occurs in contexts where the action is
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unblocked. These contexts are provided by interrogatives, negation, contrastive sentences, *toł'ko* ('only'), *xot* ('even'), *cloby* ('in order'). In sum: the DI-construction can only express possibility in those contexts where there is some kind of blocking (associated with negation), or in those cases where there is some kind of unblocking (associated with the undoing of negation). Furthermore, the possibility interpretation only occurs in those contexts where an intention can be ascribed to the dative subject, whereas a necessitive interpretation only occurs in those cases where the intention of the dative subject is not taken into account.

As I mentioned, the DI-construction can also occur with the particle *by*, which expresses irreality or a 'negative epistemic stance' (for this term, see Sweetser, 1996). Such cases can have the character of advice or wish, e.g.:

(115)  *Otdoxnut' by bratu.* (Mets, 1985: 358)
rest-INF IRR brother-DAT
‘Our brother should rest.’

(116)  *Otdoxnut' by tebel* (ibid.)
rest-INF IRR you-DAT
‘You should rest.’

Prototypically, in such sentences the speaker (Sp) can be seen as the external force. For cases like these a representation as in Figure 4.9 can be given.

Figure 4.9

```
  action (not) X
Sp   ----> DAT
```

IRREALITY SITUATION

The situation described here has the following logic. If some agent is the recipient of an action in a irreality situation, this implies that the agent is not performing the action in the present situation, and that the speaker takes into consideration that the hypothetical situation will not happen anyhow in the future. Sentences with *by* like these are closely related to cases that express necessity because in these sentences the speaker can be seen as an external force. Since the speaker is the source of information and perspective, the situation is presented from the point of view of the external force.
In some sentences, however, the speaker may identify with the dative subject and ascribe an intention to realize the action to the subject. Sentences like these share properties with sentences that express possibility, because in these sentences it is expressed that an agent wishes to fulfill an action, but the realization of this action is blocked, e.g.:

(117)  Otdoxnut' by mne (ibid.)
rest-INF IRR I-DAT
‘If only I could rest.’

Such cases could be represented as in Figure 4.10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>action (not)</th>
<th>INF</th>
<th>IRREALITY SITUATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAT+ = Sp</td>
<td></td>
<td>EF =Sp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It must be stressed, however, that in most cases both interpretations are possible, and that no discrete borders can be drawn between the different interpretations.

In the following section, where I will discuss my classification of the DI-construction, I will say more about the way in which the construction can be interpreted and whether different uses can be distinguished.

4.8 Usage types and classification of the DI-constuction

In the preceding section I discussed how the different modal interpretations of the construction can come about. In this section I will discuss how these uses can be classified. I will briefly discuss the different criteria of classification, and finally present the classification that I will use.

The classification of the DI-construction into usage types can be based on the following three interrelated criteria:

(i) Semantic-functional criteria
(ii) Formal-contextual criteria
(iii) Criteria based on some system of interpretation of the meaning frame
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

Most classifications of the DI-construction (e.g. Timofeev, 1950; Bricyn, 1990; Maurice, 1996) are primarily based on the different functions or semantics that can be ascribed to the different uses. These are different so-called modal functions like ‘necessity’, ‘predetermination’, ‘impossibility’, ‘wish’, etc. Although a classification of the construction into such semantic types mirrors observed semantics, there are a number of problems connected with such a classification of the DI-construction:

(i) The status of the semantic criteria is not always clear.
(ii) Many instances of the construction do not fall under the proposed semantic descriptions.

Semantic criteria can be based on either language-independent definitions of modal notions, or language-dependent strategies, viz. classifications according to oppositional forms. An example of the use of language-independent definitions is given by Maurice (1995, 1996), who uses definitions from the logical tradition in her analysis of the DI-construction. Semantic criteria can also be based on the possibility of paraphrase, either with other forms from Russian, or from other languages. Both Bricyn (1990) and Maurice (1996) mention the possibility of paraphrase with other forms in Russian, such as the modal forms nel'zja, mozhno, (ne) moch', ne udatl'zja, (ne) nado, nuzhno, predstoi, and future tense forms (perfective present, future tense with byt'). Maurice (1995) further refers to the possibility of paraphrasing the DI-construction in other languages (German and English).

Although a classification based on semantic criteria as discussed above may give insight into perceived semantic-functional differences, it must be stressed that it is not always clear what the status of such differences is. A classification based on oppositional forms may impose the parameters of the oppositional forms on the construction, whereas for the meaning structure of the construction itself these parameters may be irrelevant. To give an example, in Russian there are different forms that express necessity, for example nado, nuzhno, dolzhen, prizaditsja etc. The differences between these forms are connected with, among others things, the type of obligation (cf. Shatunovskij, 1996). For the language user these differences in the type of necessity are important, because they correspond to different forms. However, the fact that the DI-construction can be paraphrased with these different forms does not imply that the parameters that define the differences between the modal forms are also relevant for the DI-construction; in this case the different ‘semantic’ features are not connected to different forms.

A second problem with a classification based on semantic criteria is that many instances of the DI-construction cannot be classified as clear examples of either
(im)possibility or (un)necessity, and it is often difficult to tell whether a particular case must be seen as a case of (un)necessity or (im)possibility. Consider the following sentence:

(118) Xotel by ja d golymi rukami/Okno d tjuremnnoe vzlamat'/Da zhal' bratishechki ja skovan kandalami/Mne vse ravno ne ubezhat'.

(Song text)

(I-DAT anyway not escape-INF-PERF)

'I would like to break the prison windows with my bare hands, but alas, my brothers, I am chained. I can\'t escape anyway.'

'I would like to break the prison windows with my bare hands, but alas, my brothers, I am chained. I won\'t escape anyway.'

This sentence could in principle be classified both as case of epistemic necessity and as a case of impossibility. The fusion between sentences that express impossibility and sentences that express negative epistemic necessity can be explained with the models of modality discussed above and the meaning of the DI-construction.

Extensionally speaking, the situation where an action will necessarily not occur can be identified with a situation where it is impossible that an action will occur. Intensionally speaking, however, these situations differ. In the case of possibility an intention can be ascribed to the subject to realize the infinitive action, whereas in the case of necessity, the intention of the subject is not considered. In most cases the aspect of the infinitive in the construction directs the specific interpretation. In the case of the perfective aspect, we can ascribe an intention to the dative subject to realize the action. In the case of the imperfective aspect, we do not focus on the possible completion of the action, and do not ascribe an intention to the dative subject to realize the action. In all cases, however, the dative subject can be seen as a recipient of some action. This means that in all cases some situation is imposed on the dative subject. This idea of imposing is closely related to the necessitive situation, but cannot be identified with it. It explains, however, why all sentences that express impossibility have an ontic flavor. As I will discuss below, this ontic flavor is especially strong in those cases where forms like vse ravno ne, or nikogda ne occur.

The same 'fusion' between modal types also occurs in some sentences without negation:

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(119) Ėtim rebjatem ezdit'/Oni po prirode ezdovye//A ej/ona nikogda ne smozhet sama sest' za rul'. (Bricyn, 1990: 225)
these-DAT boys-DAT drive-INF-IMPERF/they by nature fit.to.drive//but she-DAT/she never not will.can herself sit-INF-IMPERF behind wheel.
'These boys will drive/They are drivers by nature//But she/she will never be able to sit behind the wheel.'
'These boys can drive/They are drivers by nature//But she/she will never be able to sit behind the wheel.'

This sentence is classified by Bricyn (1990: 225) as a case of ‘predestination’, in my terms ‘epistemic-ontic necessity’, whereas Mets (1985: 205) classifies such sentences as cases of possibility. The question as to which classification applies is connected with the question of whether one considers this to be a case of imposing, or a case of deblocking. As I will argue in 4.10.2, such sentences can be seen as cases of deblocking. This deblocking, however, is always connected to the idea of recipiency, and as such to the idea of ‘imposing’.

The discussion of the phenomena here suggests that a division into notions such as ‘necessity’, ‘possibility’, ‘deontic necessity’, ‘epistemic necessity’, etc. must be seen as model theoretic idealizations of the semantics of the construction. As such, a classification according to these parameters does not adequately capture the meaning of the construction.

Because of the problems discussed above, classifications based on semantic criteria can be backed up with classifications that are based on context types. Context types are constituted by collections of formal features that correspond to clear examples of different semantic types. Context types can be seen as idealized models. This means that instances of the DI-construction can share more or fewer features with context types.

Because particular semantic types such as ‘necessity’ or ‘impossibility’ prototypically occur with particular formal features, context types for such semantic types can be given. Features that constitute such context types may be the aspect of the verb, the presence or absence of negation, the presence or absence of conjunctions, adverbs and particles, the word order and information structure of the sentence, the presence or absence of question markers, the presence or absence of a dative, etc. In some cases non-formal features constitute context types, for example the Aktionsart of the verb.

There are two main types of non-interrogative DI-constructions without by, viz., (i) sentences with an imperfective infinitive, with or without negation, expressing different

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61 Note that in the last sentence of the extract an explicit modal verb is chosen, viz. smoch ('can').
Chapter IV

shades of necessity, and (ii) sentences with negation and a perfective infinitive expressing different shades of impossibility. Sentences without negation and a perfective infinitive occur in special contexts only, and can be interpreted as special cases of necessity, possibility, or similar notions. Because of the perceived relation between types based on semantic criteria, and specific formal features, these (collections of) formal features can be said to constitute context types. This does not mean, however, that a classification based solely on formal features mirrors classifications based solely on semantic features. Because of the multi-interpretability of phenomena such as imperfective and perfective aspect, this is not the case. As such, a classification based solely on aspect will not adequately capture some perceived semantic similarities and differences. Classifications of the DI-construct have to therefore take both semantic and formal criteria into account.

A possible third way to classify and categorize the different uses of the DI-construct would be to point at some system or structure behind the different interpretations. Such a system could be based on the systematic possibilities of the interpretation of some abstract meaning, corresponding to different semantic and contextual types. In the case of the DI-construct a system of interpretations could for example be based on the following parameters:

(i) The question of whether the dative subject is the recipient of the action in this world, in a hypothetical world (in the case of esli, chtoby, and pered tem), or in an irreality world (cases with by).

(ii) The question of whether the dative subject is the recipient of negated or non-negated action.

(iii) The question of whether an intention can be ascribed to the dative participant to realize the infinitive action (roughly corresponding to aspectual choice).

(iv) The question of whether the DI-construct functions as a question or not.

(v) The nature of the external force or the dative participant (for example, is the external force the speaker or some other entity? can the external force be identified with fate, or with some script, norm, or contextually given force?).

Needless to say, classifications of the DI-construct must be seen as idealizations of the linguist, because the DI-construct cannot be seen as neatly falling into different usage types. Usage types can, however, be seen as systematizations of and behind the linguistic system, and, as such, give insight into the different ways in which the construction may be used. In some cases usage types may perhaps also constitute
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relevant types for the processing and parsing of language. I think that in order for an instance of the abstract DI-construction to be an instance of such a 'subconstruction' of the DI-construction, it must satisfy two conditions, viz. (i) it must have a well-defined formal structure that is distinguishable from other instances of the DI-construction, and (ii) this structure must correspond to a well-defined and distinguishable linguistic function. A well-defined and distinguishable function presupposes that the function of the construction is not too abstract, and not too specified. Since psycholinguistic research would be needed to answer such questions adequately, I will not go into this theme here.

In my discussion of the DI-construction, I will mainly follow the classifications that are proposed in the literature mentioned above (cf. Bricyn, 1990; Maurice, 1996). I think these classifications can be justified because of the perceived differences in use of the construction, which can be sustained by different oppositional forms, the existence of context types, and the system behind these cases. The following types can be distinguished:

Uses of the DI-construction

- Uses with prototypically the imperfective aspect that express notions like deontic-ontic necessity
- Uses with prototypically the imperfective aspect that express notions like epistemic-ontic necessity
- Uses with the imperfective aspect and the particle ḥe that express notions in-between necessity and impossibility
- Uses with the imperfective aspect that express the idea of ‘being capable of’
- Uses with prototypically the perfective aspect and negation that express notions like impossibility
- Uses with prototypically the perfective aspect and special context of deblocking that express notions like possibility
- Uses that occur with subordinators esli, pered tem kak, and chtoby
- Optative use without by (with VS order)
- Uses with by
- Directive use
- Interrogatives without interrogative pronoun/adverb

62 In fact, I do not think that it makes sense to speak of ‘functions’ in the case of highly abstract or specified notions. Functions are by definition not too abstract or too specified.
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Related constructions

- Uses with verbs of motions and quantificational modifier
- Existential construction
- DI-construction as specifications of nouns
- Instances of the second dative

There are three important things that have to be mentioned about this classification, viz. (i) the classification is a cross-classification, because some uses are classified twice (e.g. uses with *chtoby* are classified as cases that express possibility, and are discussed separately), (ii) the classification is an idealization, because all uses share the same semantics, and in many cases no strict borders can be drawn between different uses, and (iii) the classification of the DI-construction into ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ etc. is only an idealization, because these terms do not convey the actual meaning of the construction. Nevertheless, the classification partly conveys perceived differences between different uses, and partly aims to give an insightful overview and explanation of the different uses.

My main aim in the linguistic analysis of the DI-construction is to show how the language user interprets a particular use of the construction. This means that the linguistic analysis must reconstruct how the language user employs the semantic information from the construction to arrive at his interpretation. In the following sections I will give a reconstruction of the interpretations of the construction.

4.9 Necessity and absence of necessity: Cases of imposing

In this section I will discuss uses of the DI-construction that can be seen as cases of necessity. Uses that express necessity can be visually represented as in Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11*

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{EF} \\
\text{(not) INF} \\
\rightarrow \\
\text{DAT}
\end{array}
\]

* INF = situation expressed by the infinitive; DAT = the participant expressed by the dative noun, EF = external force
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

In the case of the necessitve interpretation of the DI-construction, the dative participant is not the initiator of the situation but only a potential agent because there is some external force that compels the participant expressed in the dative to realize the infinitive situation. Such an interpretation occurs if no intention is, or can be ascribed to the dative subject to realize the infinitive situation, and the infinitive situation can be interpreted as the result of a force. The following prototypical context can be given for such cases:

\[
\text{DAT (+byt*neuter) + (ne) + INF imperf + [presupposition: initiation of the (non)realization of the infinitive situation can be ascribed to another force than the dative participant] } \rightarrow \text{ The dative participant has a necessity to do the infinitive situation, or in the case of negation, no necessity to do the infinitive situation.}
\]

This must be seen as a prototypical context because in some cases one can speak of an necessitive interpretation of the DI-construction, while the infinitive verb is perfective.

Two main necessitive uses of the DI-construction can be distinguished: (i) uses that have a deontic-ontic character, and (ii) uses that have an epistemik-ontic character. I will speak of ‘deontic-ontic necessity’ if the external force can be identified with a force like a person, institution, norm, or script that compels the agent to do the action. In this term, deontic refers to the force (person, norm, or script), whereas the term ontic refers to the idea of ‘the way things are or go’. I will speak of ‘epistemic-ontic’ necessity if the force can be identified with something like ‘fate’, ‘the inevitable way things go’; or ‘some observable pattern in reality’; in these sentences it is expressed that the situation will necessarily be the case because of fate or the way things go. In this term, ontic refers to the idea of ‘the way things are’, whereas the term epistemic refers to the idea that knowledge of the way things are can be seen as evidence leading to the conclusion that the situation will necessarily be the case. Below examples of both types of necessity are given:

**Deontic-ontic**

(120) Mne zhe vecherom vse ravno idu v biblioteku; kakaja tut rabota! (Brcyn, 1990: 208)
1-DAT PRT evening anyway go-INF-IMPERF to library; what here work! 
'I have to go to the library this evening anyway; how could one work here!'

**Epistemic-ontic**

(121) Byt* sil'nomu dozhduj.
be-INF strong-DAT rain-DAT
There will be heavy rain.

(De)ontic infinitive sentences can be paraphrased in Russian with modal predicates of necessity, *nado, dolžhen* ('must') and in some contexts with *nuzhno* ('need') or the future tense. Epistemic-ontic infinitive sentences can be paraphrased with future tense (*budet*) and in some contexts with *dolžhen byt* ('must be') and *predstojat* ('be due for', 'await').

It must be noted that in many cases it is not possible to make a distinction between (de)ontic cases and ontic cases with an epistemic character. This underlines that the classification into such types must to some extent be seen as an overspecification by the linguist.

As discussed, there are two different interpretations of necessity of the DI-construction. How do we account for them? In other words, how can the DI-construction be interpreted such that it expresses (de)ontic necessity and epistemic-ontic necessity? In the theoretical linguistic literature, it is often assumed that epistemic modality must be seen as an extension or later historical and psychological development of deontic necessity (e.g. Sweetser, 1990). In such analyses, deontic necessity is seen as more 'basic' than epistemic necessity. The hypothesis that deontic necessity is more basic than epistemic necessity seems to imply that an epistemic interpretation of the DI-construction can only be motivated by means of the deontic interpretation of the construction, and not the other way around. Such a hypothesis cannot be sustained for the DI-construction. It is therefore more appropriate to say that the meaning of the construction can be interpreted either as a case of deontic-ontic necessity or as a case of epistemic-ontic necessity, depending on the context in which it occurs. The interpretative status of these uses is underlined by the occurrence of borderline cases.63

Some remarks have to be made about the status of the DI-construction as a means to express necessity. Maurice (1996: 306–308) remarks that the use of the DI-construction to express necessity is more marginal now than it was in the past; she suggests that the decline of this use is connected with the preference of language users for a more explicit way to express necessity, like such as modal forms like *nado, nuzhno,* and *dolžhen.* I think that Maurice's observation is correct, but it must be added that the DI-construction may still be preferred in particular contexts, and with particular verbs. I suspect that the DI-construction is still a neutral way to express necessity in the case of so-called 'script-

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63 Note furthermore that in older stages of Russian the DI-construction could be used in some contexts where in modern Russian a modal predicate expression of deontic necessity is preferred. (See Nikiforov, 1952). It may be that there is a diachronic tendency to use the DI-construction for epistemic-ontic cases, and not for deontic-ontic cases.
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necessity; in the case of sentences where the subject is emphasized, and generally in sentences where the speaker emphasizes that the necessity is the result of the appropriate way things go and are; typical of such contexts is the use of particles such as ved’ and zhe. Furthermore, the DI-construction is an implicit way to express modality; in some cases such an implicit way may be preferred, especially in interrogative sentences, where paraphrase with a modal form is sometimes unacceptable (see Maurice, 1995: 190), or where the DI-construction can be chosen to keep the modality in question underspecified. In the following sections I will discuss the (de)ontic necessitive use of the infinitive construction in affirmative and negative sentences, and then discuss the epistemic-ontic necessitive use of the DI-construction.

4.9.1 Deontic-ontic necessity

The following sentences are examples of what I call ‘(de)ontic’ necessitive uses of the DI-construction:

(122) Poedem? Èvka budet rada. – Mne zavtra v Ameriku letet’, – govorju. – Ne vyspljus’. (V. Erofeev, Gomoroska)
shall we go? Èvka will be happy. – I-DAT tomorrow to America fly-INF-IMPERF, I say – not I.sleep ‘Shall we go? Èvka will be happy to see you. “I have to fly to America tomorrow”, I said. “I will have to get up early.”’

(123) Pojde m bystree, mne cherez pjt’ minut vyezzhat’. (V. Pelevin, Princ Gospknd)
let’s go faster, I-DAT in five minutes go.away-INF-IMPERF ‘Let’s go faster, I have to go in five minutes.’

(124) A ved’ zavtra mne vstavat’ rano/Potomu chto mne k tomu pamnju/Na zache t idti opjat’, mama. (A. Babij, Untitled poem)
but PRT tomorrow I-DAT get.up-INF-IMPERF early/because I-DAT to that guy/on test go-INF-IMPERF again, mama ‘But tomorrow I have to get up early/Since with that guy/ I have to do a test again, mama.’

64 http://moshkow.donetsk.ua/lat/PELEWIN/prince.txt
65 http://www-tm.alex.krskru/197_7l972/1972_08.htm

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(125) A nam eshche merit’ versty, I zhi’ nam, i veselo pet’ ... . 66 (Songtext, L.Sergeev, Tolstý)
but we-DAT still measure-INF-IMPERF versts, and live-INF-IMPERF we-DAT, and
happy sing ...
‘But we still have to measure the miles, and live, and sing happily.’

(126) Mne exat’, a tebe ostavat’sja. (Mets, 1985: 206)
I-DAT go-INF-IMPERF, but you-DAT stay-INF-IMPERF
‘I have to go, but you have to stay.’

(127) A ty, ty chto sdelal? Vot otskrebут sechjas sanitary kishki tvoi ot asfal’ta – vot i vse tvoi
dela. A nam rabotat’ i rabotat’, celuju maxinu vorochat’, potomu chto vse, chego my
poka dobilis’, èto tol’ko nachalo, èto vse eshche nuzhno soxranit’, milyj moj, a soxranivshi
– priumnozhit’ ... 67 (A. & B. Strugackie, Grad Obrëchennyj)
(...). but we-DAT work-INF-IMPERF and work-INF-IMPERF, (...)
‘But you, what have you done? Well the hospital attendants will have to scrape you off
the asphalt, that’s what will happen to you. But we have to work and work, deal with a large
number of things, because everything that we have achieved until now, that is just the
beginning, and we have to keep all that, my dear, and what we keep we have to increase.’

(128) Tol’ko i guljat’ segodnja, a tebe sidet’ tut do temnoty. 68 (R. Gusejnov, Ibo prezhnee prishlo)
only and walk-ESFF-IMPERF today, but you-DAT sit-INF-IMPERF here till darkness
‘It would be nice to go out for a walk today, but of course that’s not possible, one has to
stay here till it gets dark.’

(129) Ne tebe sudit!’69 (E. Shvarc, Obyknovennoe chudo)
not you-DAT judge-INF-IMPERF!
‘It is not up to you to judge!’

(130) Ty, Sultan Abramych, krugom neprav. Potomu chto ne tebe govorit’ o giderejugende,
fashizme-nacizme, Gitrele. 70
you, Sultan Abramych, all.over wrong. because not you-DAT speak-INF-IMPERF about
Hitlerjugend, fascism-nazism, Hitler

66 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/KSP/sergeew.txt
68 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/ZHURNAL/rustam.txt

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“You, Sultan Abramych, are totally wrong. Because you have no right to talk about the Hitler youth, fascism-nazism and Hitler.”

(131) Sud'ja dejstvitel'no zdes', i ètot sud'ja – ty. Tebe sudit', xorosh o li vyshlo. (Maurice, 1996:122)

judge really here, and that judge – you. You-DAT judge-INF-IMPERF, good part went ‘The judge is really here, and that judge is you. It is up to you to decide whether it went well or not.’

Different types of deont-ontic use can be distinguished, although one should bear in mind that in many cases no strict borders can be drawn between different types; the different types are given below:

- Necessity based on personal plans with an ontic character (often ved', çhe, eshche)
- Contrastive sentences
- Necessity based on generally accepted norms (often with contrastive accent) expressing ‘the appropriate way things go or are’

In some sentences the necessity is linked to a personal plan (e.g. (122)–(125)). Relative to some individual plan, the infinitive action is conceived as necessitive; such cases prototypically occur with a first person. Because the infinitive action is linked to an individual plan, the infinitive action does not necessarily have to occur, as it does in the case of epistemic-ontic necessity; in the following sentence the infinitive action occurs on an ‘ideal’ level only:

(132) Mne eshche konja poit', no ja, pozhaluj, ètogo ne budu delat'. (Bricyn, 1990: 210)

I-DAT still horse water-INF-IMPERF, but I probably that not will do
‘I still have to give water to the horse, but I probably won’t do it.’

In many cases the necessity based on the individual plan is presented as the motivation for another situation; typical of such cases (e.g. (124)) is the expression of the particles ved’ (‘you know’, ‘after all’) and çhe (‘you see’). The particle ved’ emphasizes the obviousness of a fact or truth contained in an utterance, whereas the particle çhe places categorical and insistent emphasis on the indisputability of a fact (Vasilyeva, 1972: 46–71). Another typical element is the particle eshche (‘still’) as in (125) and (132). This particle emphasizes that at the present time the infinitive situation has not yet been realized, but that according to some plan, the infinitive situation will still have to be realized. In all cases,
the ontic character of the deontic necessity is underlined, because the speaker expresses that according to the planned way things are the infinitive situation will be the case.

In other cases the deontic-ontic use of the DI-construct occurs in sentences where the necessity to do the action is contrasted with another situation, as in (126)–(128). In such sentences the speaker may express his discontent with the necessity to realize the infinitive situation.

The deontic-ontic interpretation furthermore occurs in sentences where the realization of the infinitive situation is presented as an appropriate action, based on some generally accepted norm or script (cf. Maurice, 1995, 1996; for the term 'script'). This reading is typical of sentences with partial negation, as in (129)–(130). Sentences like these can often be paraphrased in English with 'it's up to x to do Y'.

What the contexts given above have in common is that the idea that the participant expressed in the dative is the recipient of the infinitive situation is emphasized, either by implicitly negating the opposite situation (by partial negation), by emphasizing the obviousness of the recipienthood of the dative participant (expressed by ved' or zhe), by focusing on the fact that the situation is still to happen (expressed by estche), or by constrasting the recipienthood of the participant of the infinitive situation with some other situation. In all cases one can speak of what I will call 'epistemic imposing'. In my opinion these contexts show that the deontic-ontic interpretation has a basic ontic nature, expressing 'the way things are and go'. This specific ontic character is absent in the case of oppositional forms such as nado, nuzhno, dolzhen, sledovat', and prixodit'ja. A further difference between the use of the DI-construct under discussion and the oppositional forms nado and nuzhno, and sledovat' is that in the case of the predicative adverbs, and the verb sledovat', the dative subject may remain unspecified, and can be interpreted as a generic agent:

(133) Est' tverdo prinjatyj teatrovedcheskij postulat – chto proizvedenie sleduet sudit' ne po namerenijam avtora, a po rezul'tatu.71 (Theatre journal)

exists strong accepted theatrologic postulate — that work must judge not according intention of author, but according result

'There is a well accepted theatrologic postulate — that one has to judge a literary work on the basis of the way it is played, and not on the basis of the way the author intended it to be.'

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Such an interpretation is not possible for the use of the DI-construction under discussion; in this case there is always some emphasis on the recipienthood of the dative participant.

Below, I will give a further description of the meaning of the DI-construction in the case of the deontic-ontic use. First, the abstract meaning is given, followed by the relevant semantic-syntactic features for the deontic interpretation, and finally I described how these features interact with the abstract meaning. Note that, in contrast to the description of the Russian imperative in Chapter III, I do not present the different uses of the construction in terms of semantic extensions or transfers, but as interpretations of the different constituents making up the construction, or as different interpretations of the abstract meaning of the construction (cf. Figure 4.12).

Figure 4.12

The dative participant x is the recipient of a situation type Y, i.e. x does not initiate Y himself

Semantic-syntactic features

(i) Y is prototypically imperfective.
(ii) Participant x is animate.
(iii) If x is not expressed it must be interpretable as the speaker or addressee
(iv) Y can be interpreted as a (controllable) situation.
(v) In the case of a personal plan reading, the action is placed in the context of a place/time specification (zavtra, esbche, sejchas, etc.); in general the initial information state that the infinitive situation is not already the case must be emphasized (favored by ved', zhe, esbche, contrastive context, contrast accent, etc.).
(vi) The auxiliary bylo can be expressed, but is restricted to specific contexts; the expression of budet is unacceptable.
(vii) Prototypically [dative infinitive] order.
(viii) The infinitive can be negated.
(ix) The infinitive can occur in interrogative sentences.

Interpretation

Because no intention is ascribed to x to realize situation Y, and the situation can be controlled by the animate subject x, the reason that the action Y is not initiated by x is that there is some other force that compels x to do Y:
The participant (expressed in the dative form) is the recipient of an action type assigned to him by some force, i.e. according to some ‘script’, or ‘plan’ the agent has no choice but to do the infinitive action; or in the case of negation, the agent does not have to do the infinitive action.

It is typical of the deontic-ontic use of the DI-construction, that the recipiendhood of the dative participant is stressed; this means that there is always an implicit negation of an alternative situation (typically expressed by ved’, zhe, or contrastive accent).

Below I will discuss in more detail the semantic-syntactic features as they are given in Figure 4.12.

(i) Aspect

Ontic-deontic necessitive infinitives mostly have the imperfective aspect. The explanation for the imperfective aspect is that the first thing that comes to mind if an action is imposed on an agent, is the occurrence of the action as such, and not the possible completion of the action. By using the imperfective aspect, the focus is not on the possible intention of the dative subject to complete the action, but on the fact that some action is imposed, and that the force compels the subject to engage in the action.

In some specific usage types the (de)ontic necessitive interpretation also occurs with perfective verbs. The following usage types with a (de)ontic necessitive interpretation and a perfective infinitive can be distinguished:

(a) Possibly in sentences with the particle eshche (‘still’), or sentences without eshche, that can be interpreted as cases with eshche (see Maurice, 1996: 119, 120, 142)
(b) Sentences with a restrictive necessitive character
(c) Sentences where the necessity has the character of a ‘need’ (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II)
(d) Sentences where the necessity has the character of ‘a wish directed at the speaker’

I will briefly discuss these cases below.

Maurice (1996: 119) claims that the perfective aspect can be used in sentences with the particle eshche (‘still’) in order to emphasize that the result of the action is wished, e.g.:

(134)  **Mne eshche reshit’ zadachu.** (Maurice, 1996: 119)
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

I-DAT still solve-INF-PERF problem
'I still have to solve one problem.'

Maurice (1996: 120, 142) further argues that most speakers of Russian do not accept sentences with a perfective aspect and *eshche*. Since I have not seen actually attested cases of such expressions, and the possibility of these cases is rather hypothetical, I will not analyze them further.72

A perfective aspect occurs in the following sentences with the restrictive particle *tol'ko*:

(135) Da ved' emu tol'ko glazom mignut', on takim by psom obzavelsja, chto axnut'. (M. Bulgakov, *Sobach's serda*).
PRT after.all he-DAT only with. eye wink-INF-PERF, he such IRR dog acquire, that 
gasp-INF-PERF
'He only has to wink, and he would have a dog that makes you gasp.'

(136) Mne tol'ko na minutku zabezhat' v kontoru. (Maurice, 1990: 120/L.Tolstoj)
I-DAT just for a minute run-INF-PERF in office
'I just have to go into the office for a second.'

The first sentence has a conditional character. It expresses that for situation Y to occur, it is only necessary to realize the situation expressed by the infinitive. The restrictive character is connected with the semelfactive character of the verb in combination with the meaning of *tol'ko* ('just') + *glazom*. In this case, using the imperfective aspect (*migat*) would not convey that the dative subject has to do only a very small action for another situation to occur. The conditional character is absent in (136). In this sentence the occurrence of the perfective can be motivated in the same way. It is expressed that the dative participant just has to realize a small thing, with the suggestion that after this he can do another action.

Another sentence type where the perfective aspect occurs is constituted by sentences that express some need to do the action expressed by the infinitive. The *Russkaja Grammatika* (1980, II: 374) gives the following two examples:

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72 I find it difficult to analyze the expressions under discussion, since I have not seen attested cases. The only attested case given by Maurice (1996: 120) is (136), where *eshche* does not occur. I will, however, analyze this sentence differently, viz. as a case of restricted necessity.
Sentences like these can be paraphrased with *nuzhno* ('need') or *xotet* ('want'). The perfective aspect indicates the relevance of reaching the telos of the action from the perspective of the dative participant. The occurrence of the dative shows that the action is not conceptualized as the result of the will of the agent, but that an internal disposition or urge compels the subject to do the action. It must be remarked that such cases only seem to occur in very specific contexts, namely where the presence of the dative participant is directed at the realization of the infinitive action, and is *motivated* by the need to realize the infinitive action. I suspect that the perfective aspect is sustained by this particular context of motivation. In those cases where a motivation has to be given for the presence of the subject in terms of ‘goal specification’ the emphasis on the need to realize the action leads to a better motivation. Note that the interpretation of the infinitive as ‘goal specification’ also occurs in cases without dative subject, such as in the following sentence:

(139) I zachel' vy to'l'ko prishli brat'ec? (...) – Posmotret' na vidy kontrrevoljucii, brat'ec, – otrvet' Ozhogov. (B. Pil'njak, *Volga spadet' v Kaspijskoе more*)

And why you just came brother? (...) – see-INF-PERF on sight of.counter-revolution, brother, – answered Ozhogov.

And why did you come, brother? (...) “To look what is going on with the counter-revolution”, answered Ozhogov.’

In this sentence the idea of goal specification is expressed without the idea of need.

The perfective aspect also occurs in the case of sentences where the speaker ‘directs’ himself to do an action (and where the dative is emphasized):
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(140) Poexat' i mne, uznat', chto tam takoe, – skazal Dubov.73 (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II: 374/A. Fadeev)
go-INF-PERF and I-DAT get.to.know-INF-PERF, what there such, – said Dubov
'Td better go myself too, to find out what is going on there, said Dubov.'

The occurrence of the perfective aspect can be motivated by the fact that the speaker wishes the realization of the infinitive situation in the immediate speech context.

(ii-iv) Nature of the dative participant and the infinitive action

In order to interpret the DI-construction as referring to a scene where a force compels the agent to do something, it is necessary that there is an agent expressed by the dative subject, which is conceptualized as an entity that could, under the influence of a force, do the infinitive action. This means that the infinitive subject must be associated with the dative participant, that the agent must be animate, and that the action expressed by the verb must be understood as controllable by the agent. As I will explain below, the epistemic-ontic interpretation occurs if these conditions are not met, especially when the agent is non-animate and when the infinitive situation can be interpreted as a state, instead of an action.

In some cases no dative subject is expressed; in such sentences the agent may be interpreted as the speaker ('I'), or the addressee present in the speech situation ('you'):

(141) Nu/govoril s nim//I chto//V subbotu snova dezhurit'. (Bricyn, 1990: 209)
well/spoke to him//and what//on saturdays again be.on.duty-INF-IMPERF
'Well, I spoke to him, and do you know what, I have to be on duty Saturday again.'

(142) Da uljazhesh'sja ty nakonec!/Rano zhe vstavat'. (Bricyn, 1990: 209)
PRT will.lay down you at.last/early PRT get.up-INF-IMPERF
'Are you lying down at last!/You should get up early.'

In these sentences the subject can be inferred from the context, and in principle inserted.74 Cases without dative participant can also be interpreted as directive cases, expressing that the speaker wants the addressee to realize the infinitive action, e.g.:
Such sentences can also occur with the perfective aspect, stressing the wish of the speaker to realize the action; in such sentences the second person addressee may be formally expressed, but in most cases it is inferred from the context. I will discuss directive sentences in 4.14.

If the infinitive is perfective, impersonal sentences (that is sentences without a dative participant) can also be interpreted as expressing direction to non-specified people (‘people’, ‘they’):

(144)  
Zarezat takogo starika ko vsem svin'jam! (I. Babel': 231)  
kill-INF-PERF such a old man to all pigs  
‘They should kill the old man like a pig/Let them kill the old man like a pig.’

Such sentences cannot strictly be seen as cases of the DI-construction, since the dative participant cannot be expressed ((im*) zarezat takogo starika ko vsem svin'jam). A similar case is the following sentence, where the identity of the infinitive subject may also be associated with the speaker himself:

(145)  
Nichego v nix osobennogo, pusten'kie devicy. Zabyt' pro nix. (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II: 372/Trif)  
nothing in them special, empty girls. forget-INF-PERF about them  
‘There is nothing special about them, they are superficial girls. One should forget about them/ Let me forget about them.’

This sentence shows similarities to the construction with luchshe (‘better’), where the speaker states that it is better to do the infinitive action (Mne luchshe zabyt’ pro nix). Both (144) and (145) can be seen as infinitive sentences that share features with sentences where the infinitive clause is a complement; such cases lean heavily on the context in

nedolgo so mnoju muchit'sja, moi kaprizy snosit'. (V. Erofeev, Russkaja Krasavica); (they already from road main left, on map look, go not.long, soon that same Tartar field appears, not.long with me suffer-INF-IMPERF, my whim bear-INF-IMPERF; ‘They already left the main road, and look at the map, it won’t be long before the Mongol-field will appear, they won’t have to suffer from me anymore, and bear my whims’). Sentences with dolgo have a different structure than regular cases and are discussed in 4.16.1.
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which they occur (see 4.4.3). A non-directive reading of impersonal sentences occurs in
the case of sentences with *tol'ko* ('only') that express reduced negation:

(146)  Gosudar', ponimaesh', manifest podpisal, chtoby vse perevernut' po-novomu, nikomu
ne obizhat', muzhikam zemlju i vsex sravnjat' s dvorjanami. Podpisannyj ukaz, ty chto
dumaesh', tol'ko obnarodovat'. (B. Pasternak, Doktor Zhivago)
(...). signed decree, what you think, only proclaim-INF-(IM)PERF
'The ruler, you know, signed a decree, to change everything completely, to insult no-
one, to give the farmers land so that they have as much as the noblemen. The signed
decree, just imagine, only has to be proclaimed.'

This sentence has a deontic character, expressing that the only action that is to be
realized is the infinitive action; the infinitive subject is associated with a non-identified
group of people ('they').

In all these sentences the necessity has a general character, since the non-expressed
infinitive agent is not linked to a specific agent. These cases therefore lack the typical
ontic character that can be ascribed to the combination of the dative and the infinitive.
The non-generic status of the agent in the DI-construction also differs from the status
of the agent in the case of the adverbial predicate of necessity *nado*. This adverb often
occurs without a dative subject; in such cases the subject is interpreted as a generic
subject (Shatunovskij, 1996: 241). In the case of *nado*, the generic interpretation is made
possible by the fact that the modality is expressed by a form, whereas in the case of the
DI-construction the necessitive interpretation occurs because the non-specified agent
of an action type is unified with some agent expressed in the dative; the omitting of
the dative leads to a different interpretation, viz. a directive interpretation, or, with *tol'ko*, to
a deontic interpretation without the ontic nuance.

(v) Additional specifications

Bricyn (1990: 209, 215) remarks that most deontic necessitive interpretations of the
DI-construction occur with a specification of space and time such as *tut* or *totchas*. The
expression of a time specification is also noted by Mets (1985: 206), who claims that a
DI-construction like the following is not interpretable without context:

(147)  ?Mne rabotat'.
I-DAT work-INF-IMPERF

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This is in contrast to sentences with a form expressing necessity, like the modal adverb nuzhno (‘need’):

(148) Mne nuzhno rabotat’.
1-DAT necessary work-INF-IMPERF
‘I have to work.’

According to Mets, adding a form like zaatra (‘tomorrow’) makes sentence (147) interpretable (Mne rabotat’ zaatra). Note that the time-space specification is not a necessary trait of the (de)ontic necessity interpretation of the DI-construction, but only occurs in the case of a personal plan reading. Note furthermore that the specification of time is often absent in the case of the epistemic-ontic interpretation of the DI-construction; the epistemic-ontic interpretation typically occurs with states that cannot be linked to a particular moment in time (Bricyn, 1990: 227).

I think that the difference between the syntactic behavior of the DI-construction and modal predicates must be sought in the different syntactic-semantic status of these two expressions of modality. In the case of the DI-construction, the modality is indirectly expressed, that is, derived by composition, whereas in the case of forms like nuzhno or nado, the modal meaning is associated directly with the form. In the case of the deontic interpretation of the DI-construction, it is expressed that the dative participant is the recipient of some situation. This differs from the construction with nado or nuzhno, where the dative participant is the recipient of a state, viz. a state where some abstract agent is compelled to do something by some force; in those cases where a dative is expressed this abstract agent is associated with the dative participant.

In contrast to modal predicates like nado and nuzhno, the deontic use of the DI-construction has a typical ‘ontic’ character, that is, the construction expresses that according to some force (plan, script, norm) something is bound to happen, or due to happen. In many cases the ontic character of the deontic interpretation of the DI-construction is underlined by the use of particles like ved’ (‘after all’), which stress that the way things are supposed to be is such that the infinitive situation will be realized. In order to interpret this meaning as referring to a case where the speaker expresses that some deontic force compels the speaker to realize the action, it is necessary to place the action in time, prototypically by expressing a future-oriented time specification (zaatra, esbche, totchas, tut, etc.). Such a specification is absent in those cases where the emphasis is not on the fact that the action is due to happen, but is on the agent of the action, the action type, or other circumstances of the action.
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(vi) Expression of bylo/budet

Necessitive infinitives occur with the impersonally used copula bylo to locate the scene expressed by the infinitive predicate in a moment before the moment of speaking. In most cases bylo occurs before the infinitive, but bylo can also occur as a clitic to the infinitive (e.g. (152)). Insertion of bylo is acceptable in the case of partial negation, interrogatives, and with the verb privykat' (Maurice, 1996: 138, 225, 238):

(149) On zhil po-svoemu, ne mne bylo sudit' ego; on shel svoej dorogoj.75 (A. Nikitin, Noch' beynulebevgo psa)
he lived in his own way, not I-DAT was-NEUT judge-INF-IMPERF him; he went his way
'He lived in his own way, it wasn't up to me to judge him; he went his own way.'

(150) V karmane ostalis' tol'ko prava i kljuchi ot mashiny. Chto mne bylo delat'? Prishlos' volej-nevolej pustit'sja v stranstvie za prezrennym metalлом (...).76 (M. Isaev, Ozhivenie) (...)
what I-DAT was-NEUT do-INF-IMPERF?
'In my pocket only the driving license and the car keys were left. What should I do? Whether I liked it or not, I had to start my journey for that filthy lucre.'

(151) Zadacha okazalas' ne iz lekgix, no k podvigam geroju bylo ne privykat'.77 (A. Smirnov, Zerkal'nyj shit)
task turned out to be not from easiest, but to heroic deeds hero-DAT was-NEUT not get.used-INF-IMPERF
'The task was not one of the easiest ones, but our hero was accustomed to heroic deeds.' (lit. 'he didn't have to get used...')

(152) Artemu, nemalo pobrodivshemu po raznym miram, ne privykat' bylo ko vsjakim chudesam, no zdes' on stolknulas' s sovershенно neob'jasnim javleniem.78 (Ju. Brajder & N. Chadovich, Kliniki Maksarov)
Artyom-DAT (...), not get.used-INF-IMPERF was-NEUT (...)
'Artyom, who had been travelling a lot through different worlds, was accustomed to all of these miracles, but in this case he was confronted with an unexplicable phenomenon.' (lit. 'he didn't have to get used...')

75 http://www.litera.ru:8085/slova/nikitin/noch.html
76 http://www.litera.ru:8085/slova/isaev/max1.htm
77 http://www.litera.ru:8085/slova/ak_smirnov/2s.htm
Maurice (1996: 138–140) states that in other contexts the expression of *bylo* is unacceptable.\textsuperscript{79}

The restriction on the expression of *budet*, the future tense of *byt’*, is even stronger. I have attested no sentences with *budet* and a deontic-ontic interpretation. I suspect that the expression of *budet* in the DI-construction emphasizes the ontic nature of the construction, implying an epistemic-ontic interpretation.

It must be remarked that the acceptability of *budet* in the DI-construction is subject of disagreement amongst different scholars. Vinogradov & Shvedova (1964: 343), for example, claim that it is too categorical to state that *mne exat’* (I-DAT go-INF-IMPERF) in modern Russian (nineteenth century) does not have a corresponding past or future tense construction with *bylo* or *budet*. The occurrence of past tense or future tense forms may also be related to particular styles, viz. colloquial speech and 'skaz'-style language (cf. Maurice 1996: 288; who claims that the function of *byt’* in ‘byliny’ (folklore stories) cannot be seen as purely temporal). It is also important to keep in mind that the marginal status of *byt’* in the case of the deontic-ontic use of the DI-construction differs from the status of *byt’* in constructions with modal adverbs, where there are no restrictions on the use of *byt’*.

In my opinion it is best to motivate the restrictions of *byt’* in the DI-construction by the specific ontic character of the construction. I would like to suggest that the difference between the function of *bylo/budet* in the DI-construction and the function of the construction with *nado* must be sought in the different syntactic and semantic properties of these expressions, and the resulting difference in conceptualization. As I argued above, in the case of *nado*, the dative participant is an experiencer of a particular state, viz. the state of being obliged. In the case of the infinitive construction, the idea of obligation occurs as the result of the interaction between the meaning of the dative and the meaning of the infinitive. The dative participant is under the influence of some force that assigns the infinitive action, thus creating the necessity to realize the action. The idea of a recipient of an action type is a constellation that is embedded in time; we can picture a moment where the subject is not under the influence of a force, and the moment where the subject is forced to do the action. I think that because of this

\textsuperscript{79} Vinogradov & Shvedova (1964: 340, 342) note that until the beginning of the nineteenth century *bylo* could also be used to locate the situation in a desirable counterfactual world (*bylo* in the function of *by*): *Mne pet’ bylo o Troe* (Lomonosov), (*If only I could sing about Troy*), and to indicate actions that the participant should have done in the past, or to indicate an uncertain decision (e.g. *Popylat’ja bylo sprosit’ u nego*; “Should I try to ask him?”). In modern standard Russian, such use is highly infrequent.
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inherent dynamic character, we often tend to interpret the action of the infinitive as a future action. I want to argue that because of the interference between modality and tense, budet is normally not expressed in the DI-construction; the construction itself expresses the idea of a future action, which makes insertion of budet superfluous. The form budet may only be expressed in those cases where the speaker wishes to emphasize that the infinitive situation is due to be realized. Such an interpretation occurs mainly in the case of the epistemic-ontic interpretation of the DI-construction (see 4.9.2). In the case of the deontic-ontic use of the construction, the emphasis on the feature of ‘inevitability’ is not possible, since this use expresses necessity based on generally accepted norms that are not linked to a specific moment in time, or the necessity to realize an action based on an individual script, where the future orientation is already expressed by other modifications such as zavtra and where the script as such already exists in the present.

For the restriction on the use of bylo a similar motivation may be given. Insertion of bylo in the construction leads to an additional mental step, viz. the creation of a vantage-point at a moment before the moment of speaking, from which a ‘future’ action is conceived. In many cases such an additional mental step is not in accordance with the character of the construction, especially in the case of sentences that express personal plans. The insertion of bylo is less restricted in the case of sentences such as (149)–(152) above, where the ‘personal plan’ character is absent, and where the narrator expresses the presence of (the absence of) necessity pertaining to the past.

(vi) Word order

The word order for the deontic-ontic use of the DI-construction is [dative infinitive]; the last accent (indicating focus) may be on the infinitive or another constituent. The Russkaja Grammatika (1980, II: 378) states that there is a possibility of changing this order, but the examples that are given are all cases that express impossibility. The clause initial position of the dative in the case of neutral word order is typical of constructions where the dative can be seen as the highest participant (dative subject). Since I have not attested deontic-ontic necessitive cases with a VS order, I will not analyze this order here. For the analysis of VS word order, see 4.10.1.
(vii) Expression of negation

The DI-construct can be interpreted as a case of (de)ontic necessity in sentences with negation; in such sentences, the DI-construct expresses the absence of some necessity to do an action (e.g. (151)–(152). I have already discussed the position of the negation in the case of the DI-construct in 4.5.2, but I will briefly analyze such sentences here as well.

As Maurice (1995: 152) remarks, the interpretation of absence of necessity occurs in those cases where the realization of the infinitive action can be evaluated negatively. Consider the following sentence:

(153)  Tebe zavtra ne vstavat’ rano. (Maurice, 1995: 152)
You-DAT tomorrow not get-up-INF-IMPERF early
‘You don’t have to get up early tomorrow.’

The reason why such sentences are interpreted as cases of absence of necessity can be explained as follows. It is only informative to speak of ‘not necessary X’ if ‘necessary X’ is the case or is to be expected. This situation applies if an action that is expected to be necessary is presented as not necessary, or if the necessity that is the result of an action that is imposed on the potential agent is taken away. This description applies to (153), where the action of ‘getting up early’, which is not evaluated positively by the dative participant, so that the intention to do the action does not come from the dative participant, is expected to be the case.

The following context can be given for sentences like these:

\[ \text{DAT (+byt'neuter) + negation + INF_{imperf} + [presupposition: no intention of the dative participant to do Inf]} \rightarrow \text{Agent has no necessity to do Inf} \]

Cases like these have an imperfective aspect. The imperfective aspect occurs here because the emphasis is placed on the (non-)occurrence of the action as such, and not on the (non-)reaching of the terminus of the action.

It should be noted that sentences like these are interpreted as cases of negation of necessity, although compositionally they express that some external force gives an impulse to a negative action. This explains why in past tense the negation cannot be placed before the copula, sentences but must be placed before the infinitive:

(154)  ?Naš ne bylo vstavat’ rano.'
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**(155)** Nam bylo ne vstavat' ran.
we-DAT be-PAST not getup-INF-IMPERF early
‘We didn’t have to get up early.’

Placing the negation before the copula would yield a reading where the relation between the subject and the infinitive predicate is negated. Modal infinitive constructions, however, always express a relation between an action and a subject that is the result of an external force, hence the ungrammaticality of (154).

Note that in terms of modal logic, sentences like (153) share properties with cases where there is a possibility of a negated action; in logical terms: \( \neg \Box x = \Diamond \neg x \). In the latter case the external force provides the possibility of realizing the negation of the action; compare:

**(156)** Vy mozhete ne otvechat' mne.
you can not answer-INF-IMPERF me
‘You can not answer me.’

The difference between such sentences and the DI-construction is that in the case of the DI-construction the agent has no choice about doing the action or not: some external force initiates the action not X, where not X is wanted by the agent. In the case of the DI-construction there is always some force that gives rise to some action. In the case of affirmative sentences this force is interpreted as indicating necessity, in the case of negative sentences this force must not be interpreted as indicating the absence of necessity, but rather as the presence of a force – call it necessity – that leads to the absence of some presupposed necessity. The confusion between the notion of a force leading to some action and the idea of necessity is clearly underlined by those analyses that use underlying modal operators in the analysis of the DI-construction.

The nature of the negative DI-construction also motivates why negative deontic cases of the DI-construction are interpreted as cases of ‘not necessary X’, instead of ‘necessary not X’. In the case of ‘not necessary X’ there is always the implication of a choice between doing X and doing not X. In the case of the DI-construction, however, this choice is absent because of the presupposition that the agent does not want to perform the infinitive action. Sentences that are interpreted as cases of necessity to not do a situation only occur with directive sentences with a second person agent, such as (157):

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(157) Ne otkryvat’ dver’ na xodu poezda. (Rappaport, 1985: 108)
not open-INF-IMPERF door on motion of train
‘Don’t open the door while the train is in motion.’

In such contexts an intention can be ascribed to non-expressed infinitive agent to do the action; the speaker can be seen as the external force that initiates the action ‘not Y’.

(viii) Interrogative sentences

The DI-construction expressing necessity also occurs in interrogative sentences with interrogatives like kak, chto, kogda, gde, začem, pochemu, etc. The interrogative may be part of the valency structure of the infinitive, or may function as a specification of place, time, manner, etc. of the infinitive situation. Below some examples are given:

but who you? – at me many names. – and how I-DAT call-INF-IMPERF you? – call me just A
“’But who are you?” “I have many names.” “And what should I call you?” “Just call me A.””

(159) – No chego nam bojat’sja? – Nikto ne znaet, chego imennno nuzhno bojat’sja. (A. Amal’rik; 1970)
but what-GEN we-DAT be.afraid-INF-IMPERF? – no.one not knows, what just need-ADV be.afraid-INF-IMPERF
‘But what should we be afraid of? No-one knows, what we should be afraid of.’

In the following extract the infinitive and dative (mne exat’) do not occur with an interrogative, but with a specification of direction (K uchitelju):

80 Rappaport (1984), gives an example with a third person: Kurgan, tak kurgan! Kazach’sj slav ne propadat’.
(Rappaport, 1984: 212/Pavlenko) (Burial ground, so burial ground! Cossacks-DAT glory-DAT not die-INF-IMPERF; ‘Burial ground or no burial ground, the glory of the Cossacks must not die!’). I think this sentence must be seen as a case of epistemic-ontic necessity (‘will not die’).
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(160) A ne nado, – skazala Pelegeja. – Spasibo tebe, Ivan Kuz'mych, za sovety. Mne exat' nado. I Pelegeja, ostaviv na stole kulek s zemom, poshla k dveri. Potom vernulas'. – Drob'-to mne, Ivan Kuz'mych ... Gde mne pro ètu samuju drob'-to teper' uznat'? K uchitelju, chto li, mne exat'? (Zoshchenko, 1935)

(...) where I-DAT about that same fraction PRT now know-INF-PERF? to teacher, or something, I-DAT go-INF-IMPERF?

"Oh, that's not necessary", said Pelegeja. "But thank you for your advice, Ivan Kuz'mych. I have to go now." And Pelegeja, leaving the paper bag with the grain on the table, walked to the door. Then she returned. – "Where can I find out more about that fraction? Must I go to the teacher, or something?"

In the construction, the dative may be expressed in all persons; in sentences where the dative is not expressed the speaker or the generic agent can be seen as the potential agent. In cases where the interrogative clause is a subordinate clause, the potential agent may also be associated with a contextually given participant:

(161) Judzhin Danbi ne znal, chto delat'. (D. Chekalov, Pust' èto vas ne bespokoit)

Judzhin Danbi not knew, what do-INF-IMPERF

'Eugene Dunbee didn't know what to do.'

Interrogative instances of the DI-construction differ from assertive instances in particular respects. These difference are given in Table 4.2.

I think that the features mentioned here can be motivated by the specific nature of questions and the specific semantics of the DI-construction. For the analysis of the possibility interpretation in interrogatives, see 4.10.2; I will now briefly discuss the other features.

An important factor in the interpretation of interrogative instances of the DI-construction is aspect. As Rassudova (cited by Maurice, 1995: 155) remarks, with infinitive-interrogatives a necessitive interpretation occurs normally in the case of the imperfective aspect, whereas a possibility interpretation normally occurs in the case of the perfective aspect.

82 Note that the first construction (Gde mne pro ètu samuju drob'-to teper' uznat?) must be seen as a case of possibility.

### Table 4.2. Differences between affirmative instances and interrogative instances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affirmative</th>
<th>Interrogative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The possibility interpretation occurs in special contexts only.</td>
<td>No restrictions on the possibility interpretation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The perfective aspect (in non-directive sentences) points at an interpretation of (im)possibility.</td>
<td>Perfective cases may have a necessitive interpretation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a relatively clear-cut opposition between necessity and (im)possibility.</td>
<td>Neutralization of the opposition between necessity and possibility in many cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The interpretation of (de)ontic necessity is confined to specific contexts only (see 4.9.1.)</td>
<td>There are no special restrictions on the use of necessity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of <em>bylo</em> is highly restricted.</td>
<td>Less restriction on the use of <em>bylo</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The dative is an integral part of the construction.</td>
<td>The potential agent may remain unspecified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The construction occupies a peripheral position in the system of modal expressions.</td>
<td>The construction occupies a central position in the system of modal expressions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maurice (1995: 155) cites the following examples from Rassudova, both without expressed dative:

(162) *Kak posylat* vashe pis'no: avia ili prostym?  
How send-INF-IMPERF your letter: air or normal?  
‘How should I send your letter: air or normal?’

(163) *Vy ne znaete, kak poslat* otsuda zakaznoe pis'no?  
You not know, how send-INF-PERF from here registered letter?  
‘Could you tell me how to send from here a registered letter?’

In (162) the speaker asks the hearer what act he is supposed to do, i.e. the speaker has no particular intention to fulfill the situation, and the hearer can be seen as the initiating force; the active role is indicated by the pronoun *vashe* (‘your’). This sentence can be paraphrased with modal predicates that express necessity such as *dalzhen*. In  

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84 Exceptions are discussed above.
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(163) the speaker intends to realize the infinitive situation himself, and asks the addressee how he can contribute to this realization; this case has the character of possibility, which is underlined by the possibility of paraphrasing with mozhno or moch' ('may').

Maurice (1995: 156) remarks that the aspect is not the only factor that determines the interpretation, because sentences with the perfective aspect can also express necessity; she gives the following example with the lexeme ponjat' ('understand'):

(164) Kak ponjat' vashe vyrazhenie?
    how understand-INF-PERF your remark?
    ‘How should I understand your remark?’

Maurice analyses this sentence as a case where the deontic force ('modal subject*) is the addressee, and where the speaker does not desire the infinitive situation. In this sentence there might be different possibilities from which to choose, and the speaker asks the addressee which is the appropriate one. The necessitive interpretation is underlined by the possibility of paraphrasing this sentence with dolzhen ('must').

Maurice further argues that in other cases the opposition between possibility and necessity can be absent altogether. She illustrates this with the following example, where the infinitive occurs in a subordinate clause.85

(165) Ne znaju, kak postupat'/postupit' (Maurice, 1995: 156)
    not I know, how act-INF-IMPERF/act-INF-PERF
    ‘I don’t know how I should/could act.’

This sentence can be paraphrased with both nuzhno ('need') and mozhno ('can'), but the difference between these paraphrases is minimal.

I do not wish to dwell on interrogatives here, but I would like to make a few suggestions for the study of these cases. It must be kept in mind that the notions of necessity and possibility are not part of the meaning of the construction, but are general terms to classify different interpretations of the construction. It is preferable to account for the choice of aspect and the occurrence or non-occurrence of the dative in isolation from the question what modality is at stake. The interpretational status of the modality of the DI-construction is underlined by the fact that in many cases the opposition between necessity and possibility is neutralized. In such cases one cannot decide on the parameters

85 Maurice (1996: 229) gives the same example without this subordinate context.
relevant for the modal status of the construction (does the potential agent intend to realize the infinitive, or can the addressee be seen as the modal force?). To analyze this ‘neutralization’ or the modal character of these questions in general it is relevant to look at the following factors: (i) the pragmatics of questions, (ii) the presence or absence of a dative noun, (iii) the meaning of the lexical item, and (iv) the meaning or function of the interrogative in the construction.

In the case of the questions under discussion, the speaker asks the addressee for information pertaining to the realization of the infinitive situation. This context presupposes that the speaker wants the realization of the infinitive situation, or at least accepts the realization of the infinitive situation as a given fact. Furthermore, this context presupposes that the addressee always plays a more or less active part in the communicative context. Since the parameters for the type of modality are the intention or non-intention of the speaker to do the infinitive, and related to that the question of whether the dative participant can be seen as the modal force or not, it can be expected that in the case of questions these parameters do not have a + or − status.86

The specific pragmatics of questions also accounts for the occurrence of the necessitive interpretation without the restrictions that occur in the case of assertive sentences, where the deontic interpretation only occurs if there is some initial information state that is contradicted (see 4.9.1). In my opinion, this can be motivated as follows. In the case of questions with interrogatives, the speaker assumes that the situation will take place, but asks for information pertaining to the place, time, person, manner, etc. of the realization of this specific situation. Since the realization of the situation has already been taken into account by the speaker, the logical subject of the infinitive situation (dative participant) can be presented as being affected by the infinitive situation. Interrogatives therefore do not need an additional context of imposing (ved’, zhe, contrast, etc.) but can have a (de)ontic reading without such a context, albeit a stronger ontic character.

The difference in nature between modal predicates and the DI-construction in interrogatives is evidenced by the fact that in some cases, the DI-construction cannot be paraphrased with modal forms. Maurice (1996: 190, 239–240), remarks that in the following sentence with the interrogative zache (‘why’) a paraphrase with a modal adverb is unacceptable:

(166) Zache mne vrat?
why I-DAT lie-INF-IMPERF

86 A similar motivation can be given for cases with third person datives. In such cases one can speak of free indirect speech.
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'Why would/should I lie?'

(167) Zachem mne nuzhno vrat'.
why I-DAT need-ADV lie-INF

The reason that (167) is unacceptable as a paraphrase of (166) can probably be motivated as follows: in (166) the speaker asks the addressee rhetorically what reasons exist that can be seen as a force which will make him realize the infinitive situation in the future, whereas in (167) the speaker asks the addressee what the reason is that makes him obligated to perform the infinitive situation. This presupposes that the speaker accepts that he must perform the action, but does not know the exact reason for this necessity (cf. Maurice, 1995: 239). The reason for these different interpretations can be attributed to the ontic character of the DI-construction, which is absent in the case of nuzhno. The DI-construction focusses on possible reasons that will convince the speaker to realize the infinitive action in the future, whereas nuzhno focuses on the presently experienced need of the infinitive action.

Whether an intention to realize the situation can be ascribed to the dative participant, further hinges on the question of whether a dative is expressed, and on the specific lexical item in question. Maurice (1995) analyzes sentences where the dative is not expressed, without pointing at the different conceptualization resulting from the absence of a dative. The absence of the dative is connected to the generic status of the non-expressed infinitive subject. Although the speaker may be associated with the potential agent, the sentences given above can all be translated with ‘one’, which means that the nature of the non-expressed infinitive subject may remain unspecified. The absence of the idea of a specific agent to which the infinitive situation pertains, leads to a ‘neutralization’ of the idea of necessity and possibility, since the idea of a generic agent means that the intention to realize the infinitive situation cannot be attributed to a specific agent.

In sentences with a dative, the perfective infinitive does not necessarily mean that the sentence can be seen as a case of possibility. A paraphrase with a modal form expressing possibility is appropriate in cases where the speaker intends to realize the infinitive situation, is blocked in this realization, and asks the addressee, to give information such that the blockage is removed (see 4.10.2); such a reading is not possible with all lexical items in particular contexts. In the case with some lexical items, such as the infinitive ponjat'/ponimat' (‘understand’), the choice of aspect is related to other parameters than the question of whether the dative participant wants the realization of the situation or not. Consider the following sentences:
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(168) On ne ponimait. Da i kak emu ponjat? (A. & B. Strugackie, Trudno byt' bogom)
he not understand. yes and how he-DAT understand-INF-PERF?
‘He doesn't understand. And how would/could he understand?'

(169) Kogda ty voshla v otverstie, mozhet sluchit'sja vse chto ugodno. Pomni, chto nuzhno byt'
ostorozhnogo i v to zhe vremja smeloj. – No kak mne ponjat', chto tam est' chto? –
sprosila ja. (T. Abeljar, Magichestkij perexod)
(....) – but how I-DAT understand-INF-PERF, what there is what? – asked I
‘When you have gone into the hole, anything may happen. Remember, that you have to
be careful and at the same time courageous. "But how do I know what is what there?", I
asked.'

(170) No uchtiite – ja krut! – predupredil on (....). – Kak mne ponimat' vas. (V. Pikul',
Bogatstvo)
(....) how I-DAT understand-INF-IMPERF you? (....)
‘But don't forget that I have a stern temper”, he warned me (....). “How should I
understand your remark”'

In the case of the perfective aspect the dative participant wishes to realize the infinitive
situation, but the speaker thinks that it is not possible to realize this situation. By using
the perfective aspect he stresses that in his opinion the reaching of the end point of the
situation ('come to understanding') is not likely. In (170), which has an imperfective, the
speaker asks the addressee to provide him with the information about the right
interpretation of this words. In this case the imperfective aspect is chosen because the
focus is on the question of how he should perform the action; the fact that he will realize
the action as such is already given. A similar function of aspect can be found in the
sentences given below:

(171) Ja ne znaju kak mne postupit', ja vynuzhdena na eto [abortion] pojti, mne tak bol'no i
strashno.
I not know how I-DAT act-INF-PERF, I need on that go, I-DAT so painful-ADV and
terrible-ADV

87 http://www.moshkow.pp.ru:5000/lat/STRUGACKIE/be_god.txt
89 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/PIKULX/bogatstvo.txt
90 http://www.herpes.ru:8105/abort/mnenia1.htm
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

'I don’t know what I must do, I have to go to have an abortion, I am so hurt and terrified.'

(172) No, po krajnej mere, ja znal, kak mne postupat' dal'she.91 (S. Luk'janenko, Nochnoy dozor)
but, in any case, I know, how I-DAT act-INF-IMPERF further
‘At least I know what I should do further.’

In (171) the speaker expresses that she does not know what to do, in a situation where it is clear that something should be done; in (172) the speaker has already taken the decision to engage in the infinitive situation, and focuses on how in particular he will engage in it. Note that dal'she expresses the idea of continuation, which triggers the imperfective aspect.

4.9.2 Epistemic-ontic necessity

The following sentences are examples of what I call epistemic-ontic interpretations of the DI-construction:

(173) Ne rasti trave/Posle oseni;/Ne cvesti cvetam/Zimoj po snegul (A. Kol’tsov, Pesnya)
not grow-INF-IMPERF grass-DAT;/after autumn;/not flower-INF-IMPERF flowers-DAT/in.winter on snow
‘Grass will not grow after the autumn, flowers will not bloom in the winter on the snow’

(174) [Ja] znamu — sadu cvest’ (...). (Brizyn, 1990: 219/Majakovskij)
I know, garden-DAT blossom-INF-IMPERF
‘I know that the garden will blossom.’

(175) — Byl ja segodnja v bol'nice u Danila Aleksandrycha. I skazal on mne, chto u menja neizlechimaja bolezn’, rak zheludka, cherez dva mesjaca mne umirat’, a eto vremja stradat’ i muchit’sja strashnymi mukami. (B. Pil’njak, Goby god)
— was I today in hospital at Daniil Aleksandrycha. and told he me, that at me untreatable illness, cancer of.stomach, over two months I-DAT die-INF-IMPERF, and that time suffer-INF-IMPERF and be.tortured-INF-IMPERF by.terrible pains

91 http://sf.glasnet.ru:8105/lukian/books/nochnoy_dozor/nochnoy_dozor_1_07.htm

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‘Today, I visited Danil Aleksandrych at the hospital. And he told me, that I have a terminal illness, cancer of the stomach, in two months I will die, and before that time I will suffer, and be tormented by terrible pains.’

(176) Nam kazalos’ — mashina ne xochet/I ne mozhet rabotat’ na nas./Zavtra mne i mashine v odnu dut’ dudu/V avarijnom rezhime u vsex na vidu, – /Ty mne nozh naposledok ne vsazhivaj v sheju92 (V. Vysockij, My vzletali kak utki ...) 

(...) tomorrow I-DAT and car-DAT in one blow whistle-INF-IMPERF

‘It seemed to us that the car didn’t want to/And wasn’t able to work for us./Tomorrow me and my car will sing the same tune/In the safety procedures, in front of everyone/At last, don’t put your knife on my throat.’


‘Yet it will age swiftly.’

(178) Ne byť miru i porjadku, poka Imperiia ne raskinetsja, kak ran’she (...).93 (A. Koul, Vozvrashchenie imperatora) not be-INF peace-DAT and order-DAT, as.long.as empire not will.spread.out, as before

‘There won’t be peace and order, as long as the empire doesn’t extend, as before.’

In the case of the epistemic-ontic interpretation of the DI-construction, the DI-construction expresses that the infinitive situation will necessarily occur because of the way things go. This particular interpretation can best be explained if we compare this use of the DI-construction with its oppositional form, viz. the future tense budet. A sentence with a future tense like budet dozhdi (‘there will be rain’) expresses that the situation ‘raining’ will occur in the future, whereas a sentence with an infinitive like byt’ dozhdju (‘there will be rain’) expresses that the situation will inevitably or necessarily occur because of the way things go or are (‘fate’). By using the DI-construction in such cases the speaker implicitly contradicts the idea that the dative participant would not be the subject of the infinitive situation; instead the speaker expresses that the dative participant is necessarily ‘affected’. Because of its specific epistemic-ontic meaning, this use of the DI-construction has a rather pathetic character, and primarily occurs in poetic speech.

92 http://kulichki-lat.rambler.ru/vv/pesni/my-valetali-kak-utki.html
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Apresjan (1992) claims that the construction with *byt'* dative must be seen as an independent construction, i.e. the meaning of the construction cannot be motivated from the meaning of its parts or from other constructions, and is therefore not a instance of the class of modal infinitive sentences. I agree with Maurice (1996: 136), who argues that this statement is too strong. Nevertheless, I think that the epistemic-ontic use of the DI-construction shows strong idiomatic features. Expressions such as *byt' groze* ('there will be thunder'), *byt' bede* ('there will be misfortune') can be seen as more or less fixed expressions. Furthermore, the construction very frequently occurs with verbs like *byt*' ('be'), *rasti* ('grow'), *cresti* ('flower'), *zhit'* ('live'), and *umirat'* ('die'). The frequent occurrence of these verbs may possibly be motivated by the meaning of the construction, as I will explain below, but I am not sure whether this motivates the entire distribution of this use.

How can we arrive at the epistemic-ontic interpretation if we start out from the abstract meaning of the DI-construction? We start out from the abstract meaning given earlier, and specify it with a context (see Figure 4.13).

**Figure 4.13**

The agent (expressed in the dative form) is the recipient of a situation Y, i.e. x does not initiate Y himself

+ Semantic-syntactic features:

(i) Y is prototypically imperfective.
(ii) x is always expressed.
(iii) x is animate or inanimate.
(iv) If x is animate, then Y is not controllable or indicates a state, unless it occurs with specific formal features like accentuation of Y or modifications like *bol'she ne, uzhe ne, vse ravno, nikogda, ni v chem, ne vse* etc., whose function is to assert the (non-)existence of Y (and which overrules the prototypical Aktionsart of the verb).
(v) The infinitive can be negated.
(vi) prototypical [dative infinitive] order; in the case of the verb *byt'* [infinitive dative order].
(vii) The future tense indication *budet* occurs in some cases.
Interpretation:

Because the agent is inanimate, or animate but the potential subject of an uncontrollable action, there can be no 'real world force' that compels the agent to do the action. However, we can still speak of the agent as the recipient of the action because the action will *inevitably* occur, that is, the speaker presents the occurrence of the action not as the result of the initiation of the participant, but as something that will *necessarily be the case, because of the way things go*:

The agent (expressed in the dative form) is the recipient of a situation type assigned to him by some force like destiny or fate, i.e. the agent is 'compelled' to do the infinitive situation in the sense that *the way things go* leads inevitably to the situation being the case.

By using the DI-construction the speaker makes explicit that no alternative situation is possible, and that the dative participant is necessarily affected by the infinitive situation.

The description given above needs further explanation. For this it may be useful to contrast my analysis with that of Sweetser (1990: 58–65), who discusses the occurrence of epistemic necessity in English. She claims that epistemic necessity is the epistemic counterpart of the root-modal (in my terms 'deontic modal') *must*, and proposes that root-modal meanings, like the English *must* or *may*, can be extended metaphorically from the 'real' (socio-physical) world to the epistemic world, since in the case of epistemic necessity, evidence can be seen as a force that compels the speaker to draw a particular conclusion. Her analysis differs from traditional treatments of epistemic modality in that she claims that the epistemic interpretation must be seen as a metaphoric extension of the deontic interpretation, and that the mapping from the domain of root-modality to the epistemic domain is a *basic* mapping in language, in other words, it occurs in many different domains of the language system.

Although Sweetser's analysis is successful for the English modals, it is not clear whether it can also be applied to the DI-construction. The occurrence of the dative suggests that it is not the speaker who is conceptualized as 'forced' ('I am forced to draw the conclusion etc.'), but rather the dative participant itself. If we follow Sweetser's line of thought for the Russian infinitive, it is not clear how we can map the idea of a participant being forced to the idea of the speaker being forced, without an intermediate step where both the participant itself and the speaker are in some way forced. It therefore seems better to follow the line of thought proposed by Jakobson...
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

(1990 [1936]: 359), who speaks about a fated necessity ('destiny') in the case of sentences like byt' dozhd'ju. The same idea is expressed by Maurice (1996: 132–134), who refers to 'the events as they are predicated from above, and the way things go'. I wish to argue, therefore, that in the case of the DI-construction the epistemic interpretation always has an ontic flavor. This means that the external force leading to the occurrence of the event must be identified as something like a regular pattern in reality, in other words, 'the way things go'. This pattern 'compels' the agent to do the infinitive action, and as such leads the speaker to the conclusion that the event will occur:

(179) Vse nebo zakryto tuchami. Byt' si'nomu dozhd'ju.
all sky covered with.clouds. Be-INF strong-DAT rain-DAT
'The sky is all covered with clouds. There will be heavy rain.'

Because the initiator is not a particular entity, but a regularity in the world, the occurrence of the action is not linked to an ideal level, but to an absolute level: the action will necessarily occur.

Note that the idea of necessity as the result of the speaker being forced to draw a particular conclusion is weakened or even absent in particular contexts, which can be seen as further evidence for the 'fated' analysis. This is the case for example in the following sentence:

(180) Kak verevochke ni vit'sja, konec vse ravno budet. (Osipova, 1992: 25/Proverb)
how string-DAT not unwind-INF-IMPERF, end all.the.same will.be
'No matter how you wrap people around your finger, there will come an end to it anyway.'

In this case the speaker is not forced to draw the conclusion that a particular action will be the case, but it is expressed that no matter what destiny will be, no matter how things will go, the occurrence of the infinitive action will not lead to the action mentioned in the second clause. As such, the idea of necessity is absent in this sentence, although we can still speak of a fated interpretation.

I have claimed that in the case of the epistemic-ontic interpretation of the DI-construction, we can still speak of a recipient, because the action is not the result of the intention of the subject, but is initiated by something like fate or the way things go. In order to interpret the DI-construction as such, we need a specific context. Below I will discuss the contexts as they are given above in more detail.

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Chapter IV

(i) Aspect

The aspect of the epistemic-ontic DI-construction is normally imperfective. For this the same explanation can be given as for the imperfective aspect in the case of the deontic interpretation. In the case of epistemic-ontic necessity the speaker focuses on the fact that some action is imposed on the dative participant and that he will engage in the action; in such sentences the fact that the action will necessarily be realized is not is not highlighted. In some cases, however, one finds the perfective aspect, e.g.: 


they-DAT soon become-INF-PERF soldiers

'They are about to become soldiers.'

(182) Tak chto, — zagovoril on toroplivo, — front, bozhe soxranii, prodvigaetsja ... Ili nam

*podatsja* v glub' strany ... Ili, mozhet byt', *ostatsja* .... (A. Zoshchenko, 1935)

(...) or we-DAT draw.forward in depth of.land ... or, maybe, stay-INF-PERF

"'So", he said in a hurry, — "the front, may God protect us, is moving forward ... Either

either we will have to draw forward into the heart of the country ... Or, maybe, we will stay.'"

In the first case the perfective aspect focuses on the end point of the process of becoming a soldier, as such pointing to the situation where they are soldiers. The second sentence can be seen as an intermediate case between deontic-ontic necessity and ontic necessity with an epistemic nuance. This sentence can be paraphrased with constructions/forms like *stoi* ('have to'), *luchshe* (by) ('it's better'), *nado* ('must'), *dolzhny* ('must'), and also with the verb *moch* ('can'). The perfective aspect focuses on the desirable result of the situation ('we will be in the heart of the country' / 'we will still be in the same place'), and not on the fact that the subject will engage in the situation.

(ii-v) The nature of the dative participant and the infinitive situation

The dative participant may be an inanimate agent or an animate agent. Sentences with inanimate agents are often sentences that express the necessary occurrence of natural phenomena, like *vesti sadu* ('The garden will blossom.') or *byt' gruz* ('There will be thunder:'). In cases like these it is clear that we cannot interpret the DI-construction in a deontic way: there is no force that compels the agent to do the action, because the agent is inanimate and the action consequently uncontrollable. In these sentences it is some pattern in nature that is observed by the speaker as evidence, that will lead inevitably
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

to the occurrence or existence of the action. If the dative participant is an animate agent, it needs a particular context in order to be interpreted as a case of epistemic-ontic necessity, rather than a case of deontic necessity. If the agent is animate and the agent cannot control the action, the DI-construction is interpreted as a case of epistemic necessity. These are often sentences with the ‘existential’ verbs *byt* (‘be’), *ne byvat*, *zhit* (‘live’), *umirat* (‘die’); below some examples are given with the verb *byt*, *byvat*:

(183)  Ox, neraschetlivyj ty tip, Sapargalievl – vzdoxnil Edik. – *Ne byt* tebe bogatym i zazhitochnym. (V. Kunin, Russkie na Marienplatz)
(…) not be-INF you-DAT rich and well-to-do
“‘Oh, what a wasteful type you are, Sapargliev!’”, said Edik. “You won’t be rich or well-to-do.”

(184)  Kogda slushal tolki, chto *byt* skoro Mit’ke glavnym inzhenerom kolchoza, nichego ne govori l (Brjcin, 1990: 224/Ivanov)
when heard rumours, that be-INF soon Mit’ka-DAT head engineer of.kolkhoz, nothing not said
‘When he/I heard the rumours that Mit’ka would soon be the head engineer, he/I said nothing.’

(185)  *Ne byvat* Sadku so sinja morja! (The Penguin book of Russian verse, 1962/Bylisy)
not be-INF Sadko-DAT from blue sea!
‘Sadko will not be returning from the blue sea.’

Maurice (1996: 130) argues that the absence of controllability is present in all the cases of the ontic interpretation of the DI-construction. Put differently, if we encounter an instance of the DI-construction and we have to interpret it, the controllability of the verb determines whether it should be interpreted as a case of (de)ontic necessity, or as a case of epistemic-ontic necessity. The problem is, however, that it is not clear which verbs can be seen as controllable, and which not. Maurice argues that the controllability of a verb can be tested by inserting the verb in a *chtoby* (‘in order to’) clause. If the verb can be inserted in a *chtoby* clause without losing its purposive meaning, it can be said to have the feature [+control]:

+ control

(186)  My zashli k sosedke, chtoby ona ne obidelas’.
we went to neighbor, in.order she not be.insulted
'We went to the neighbor, so that she wouldn’t be insulted.'

- control

(187) *Solnce zashlo, chtoby bylo temno.
sun set, in.order was dark.

(188) Ego dolgo nosilo po svetu, i nakonec on priexal sjuda, chtoby cherez polgoda umeret' zdes' ot maljarii. (Bulygina, 1982: 69)
him long it.carried over world, and at.last he came here, in.order over half.a.year die here of malaria
‘He wandered all over the world, and at last he came here, to die of malaria in half a year.’

Although it may be the case that the specific epistemic interpretation of the DI-construction implies that the action is perceived as not controlled by the agent, we cannot judge from the verb alone whether it will be interpreted as a case of (de)ontic necessity or epistemic-ontic necessity. Some verbs that are controllable according to the test given above can, without special context, be interpreted as cases of epistemic-ontic necessity (such as lelet’ (‘fly’)), while other verbs that are controllable need a specific context to be interpreted as such. The claim that controllability is the distinguishing factor in whether the DI-construction is interpreted as a case of (de)ontic necessity or epistemic-ontic necessity can therefore not be maintained.

It seems that an important factor in the interpretation of the DI-construction is the Aktionsart of the verb. An analysis based on this idea can be found in Steedman (1977) for the English modals must, will, may. Steedman claims that the difference between the epistemic interpretation and the deontic interpretation of the English modals is connected with the Aktionsart of the verb with which it is combined. He claims that verbs naturally fall into two groups. The first group – of events – includes activities, accomplishments, and achievements. They all describe what happened or what someone did. The second group – of states – describe something being the case. Steedman claims that if the verb with which the modal form is combined is interpreted as a state, it is interpreted as a case of epistemic modality, and if it is interpreted as an event, it is interpreted as a case of (de)ontic necessity.

Steedman’s analysis can be used for the DI-construction in the following way: in order to interpret the DI-construction as a case of epistemic necessity we necessarily have to interpret the infinitive-situation as a state: the epistemic DI-construction
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expresses that a particular action will necessarily be the case. Some verbs have a meaning that make them interpretable as such. Bricyn remarks (1990: 226–227) that among the typical verbs that occur in the DI-construction in an epistemic interpretation we find verbs that indicate ongoing processes or states, rather than events that are linked to a specific moment in time. These include verbs that indicate position, like *stoja‘* (‘stand’), *sitra‘* (‘sit’). Other verbs that are normally interpreted as cases of epistemic necessity are those that indicate physical or psychological influence on a person, like *strudit‘* (‘suffer’) and *muchit’ja* (‘be tormented’) in (175). As Bricyn (1990: 227) mentions, such actions cannot easily be planned, which makes it difficult to associate them with a specific moment in time:

(189)  
?Mne v 5 chasov nad nim nasmexat’ja. (Bricyn, 1990: 227)  
I-DAT at 5 o’clock at him make.fun-INF-IMPERF  
‘I have to make fun of him at 5 o’clock.’

Other verbs are normally interpreted as events, but can indicate a state if they occur in the right context. Such a context can be provided by (a) a particular accentuation or (b) occurrence of particular modifications such as negation. An example of the influence of accentuation is given below:

*Deontic use*

(190)  
Emu chitat’ knigu.  
he-DAT read-INF-IMPERF book  
‘He has to read the book.’

*Epistemic use*

(191)  
Emu chitát’ knigu.  
he-DAT read-INF-IMPERF book.  
‘He will read the book.’

In (190) it is expressed that the agent must do a particular action, whereas in (191), with the accent on the infinitive, it is expressed that a particular action will be the case. An accented infinitive negates the presupposition that the infinitive action is not the case.
Other features that influence the interpretation of the DI-construction are particular forms like *uzhe ne, bol'she ne* ('not anymore'), *vse ravno ne* ('not anyway'):

(192) **Mne volos tvoix/ne trogat' bol'she/Gub tvoix, Alena/Mne ne celovat**[^94] (Song text)

I-DAT hair your/not touch-INF-IMPERF anymore/Lips your, Alena/I-DAT not kiss-INF-IMPERF

'I won't touch your hair anymore, and your lips, Alena, I won't kiss.'

(193) **Emu uzhe ne chitat' knig**. (Bricyn, 1990: 226)

he-DAT already not read-INF-IMPERF books.

'He won't read books anymore.'

These forms emphasize the fact that the infinitive situation will not occur in the future, by contrasting it with the occurrence of the action in the present (*bol'she ne, uzhe ne*), or by expressing that no matter how things go the action will not take place (*vse ravno ne*). It seems that if these modifications occur, the DI-construction is always interpreted as a case of epistemic-ontic necessity. This means that sentences like (192)–(193) cannot be interpreted as expressing absence of necessity, even if the infinitive situation is interpreted as a negative state. The motivation for this may be that in the case of negation, the realization of the infinitive situation is not related to a specific moment in time. Note furthermore that such sentences can in principle be interpreted as cases of impossibility if an intention to realize the situation is ascribed to the dative subject. This underlines the close relation between these various interpretations and the interpretative status of the different uses.

(vi) Word order

The word order is mostly [Dative infinitive], as in the case of deontic-ontic use. In the case of the construction with *byt*, however, the order is [*byt* 'dative'].[^95] Timofeev (1950: 279) argues that this order gives the construction a nuance of inevitability, and therefore a greater expressiveness. This specific order here must be motivated by the meaning of *byt*. I will give the following tentative motivation. The verb *byt* cannot be in a focus position in this construction (it cannot have the last accent) because that

[^94]: http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyr/K08/K08.05.lat.html

[^95]: An exception must be made for the saying *Chemu byt*, togo [tomu] ne minovat*'. (What must happen, you cannot avoid'), but this construction has a different semantic structure.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

arrangement would presuppose a contrast with another situation relevant for the dative subject, or would presuppose that the dative subject does not exist:

(194)  ?Bede být'.
misfortune-DAT be-INF

(i) Contradiction of a ‘relevant alternative’ situation. (cf. Verhagen, 1986; for this term)
(ii) Contradiction of the presupposition that beda does not exist.

Both interpretations are pragmatically odd. The first because no such alternative situation can be given, the second because it presupposes the idea of a world where misfortune does not exist at all.

(vii) Occurrence of budet

In some cases budet, the future tense of byt’, is used to stress that the scene expressed by the DI-construction is related to a time after the moment of speaking:

(195)  A o chem ja dumaju? Vot o chem: chem nam zhit' budet?* (letter from Pushkin)
but about what I think? here about what: through.what we-DAT live-INF-IMPERF
will.be
‘About what I think? Here is what I think: on what will we live?’

(196)  Frolu nesdobrovat' budet. (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II: 376/Shukshin)
Frol-DAT turn.out.badly-INF-IMPERF will.be
‘It will turn out badly for Frol.’

Such uses are infrequent (Maurice, 1996). I think the restrictions can be explained in terms of the interference of the future tense with modality. The auxiliary bylo is not expressed in the construction, which can be motivated by the ontic nature of this use.97

97 The Russkaja Grammatika (1980, II: 376) notes that bylo occurs in an old saying; this use is not productive in modern Russian.
4.9.3 The construction with *zhe*, negation and imperfective infinitives: In-between imposing and blocking

The imperfective infinitive occurs in sentences with the particle *zhe* ('after all') and negation:

(197)  
Muzhchina dostig svoej celi — on isportil-taki ej nastroenie. V konce koncov, ne emu zhe odnomu razdrazhatsja\(^98\) (O. Malakov & A. Vasilenko, Okean Protivopolozhnosti)  
(...) after all, not he-DAT PRT alone-DAT be.annoyed-INF-IMPERF  
'The man achieved his goal, he also spoiled her mood. After all, he couldn't possibly be irritated alone.'

(198)  
Ne vsem zhe v stolica x zhit*! (A. Zoshchenko, 1935)  
not all-DAT PRT in capitals live-INF-IMPERF  
'After all, we cannot all live in the capital!'

(199)  
A chto ja mog sdelat* e shche? Ne ustupat* zhe bylo emu svoju dolzhnost'. (S. Dovlatov, Kompromis)  
but what I could do still? not let.have-INF-IMPERF PRT was-NEUT him own duty  
'But what more could I do? After all, I couldn’t possibly hand over his duty to him.'

(200)  
Kak zhe byt*? Ne dozhidatsja zhe mne vashego muzha! (A. Chexov, Rasskazy)  
how PRT be? not wait-INF-IMPERF PRT I-DAT your husband  
'But what should I do? I can’t possibly wait here for your husband.'

(201)  
Ne mne zhe odnomu obo vsem etom dumat*\(^99\).  
not I-DAT PRT alone-DAT about everything think-INF-IMPERF  
'I can’t possibly think about everything myself.'

(202)  
I kak xorosho, chto ja vchera gostincev kupil, — ne exat* zhe v Petushki bez gostincev.\(^100\) (V. Erofeev, Moskva — Petushki)  
and how good, that I yesterday gift bought, — not go-INF-IMPERF PRT in Petushki without gifts  
'And how good that I bought some presents yesterday, after all one can’t go to Petushka without gifts.'

\(^98\) http://www.litera.ru:8085/slova/malahov_vasilenko/ocean.htm  
\(^99\) http://www.moshkow.pp.ru:5000/lat/ZHURNAL/savelichev.txt  
\(^100\) http://lib.ru/lat/EROFEEW/petushki.txt
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The following semantic-syntactic information is relevant for this construction:

- Ne and zbe (and sometimes vei') are obligatory elements of the construction.
- Ne and zbe are placed respectively before and after the constituent with the
  sentence accent, or in the case of second datives, as in (201) above, around the first
  dative
- The infinitive is imperfective.
- The construction occurs with first, second and third person datives.
- Cases with a third person always occur in free indirect speech (Maurice, 1996: 108).
- In many cases the dative participant is not expressed; such cases have a generic
  character (202), although the speaker may be associated with the potential agent.
- The verb bylo occurs in the construction; no attestation of budet.
- Both VS and SV order occur.

This construction can be seen as an intermediate case between possibility and necessity
(cf. Maurice, 1996: 112). The fact that the construction can be analyzed both as a case
of necessity and as a case of possibility can be motivated as follows.

The construction is uttered in a context where the speaker proposes that it might
be argued that the realization of the infinitive situation by the potential agent is the
case, or is appropriate. By using the construction under discussion the speaker appeals
to a generally accepted fact (implicitly referred to by zbe) that can be seen as a norm
that assigns the non-realization of the infinitive situation to the potential agent. This
means that according to this norm, the realization of the infinitive situation is
inappropriate, not possible, or not permitted. In contrast to actual cases of
impossibility, with the perfective aspect, no actual intention is ascribed to the potential
agent to realize the infinitive situation. The ascription of an intention to the potential
agent in the case of this construction has only a rhetorical value ("the hypothetical
statement that X would be appropriate is not correct, since according to some generally
accepted norm the realization of X is inappropriate"). As such, cases like these are close
to necessitivc cases.

The construction under discussion expresses very clearly the 'contrastive' nature of
the DI-construction: the initial information state that the dative participant could be
the performer of the infinitive situation is contradicted with reference to an
indisputable fact, sustained by the particle zhe, this means that the dative participant is
necessarily affected by the (non-occurrence of) infinitive situation. For the expression of *bylo*, see 4.9.1. For the word order, see 4.10.1.

4.9.4 Sentences with imperfective infinitives that express the idea of ‘being capable of’

In some cases the DI- construction occurs with an imperfective infinitive in sentences where the idea of being the recipient of the infinitive situation is connected to the idea of ‘being able to’ or ‘being capable of’; such sentences can be paraphrased with modal predicates of possibility, such as *można* and *sposoben*. Two examples are given below:

(203)  
Ty ne romantik! – busheval Pashka.– Tebe sidet' doma i razvodi* kvadratnye
arbuzy!101 (K. Bulychev, *Ga’do i ego gostpozhda*)
you are not a romantic! – said Pashka in a rage – you-DAT sit-INF-IMPERF at home
and grow-INF-IMPERF square melons

‘You are not a romantic!’, Pashka said in a rage. ‘You will wind up staying home and
growing square melons/you are capable of staying home and growing square melons.’
(that is, do something dull or boring).

(204)  
Otr’elsja ty, komandir. V shtabe tebe sidet', a ne voevat'. (S. Luk'janenko, *Osennie viзity*)
overate you, commander. in headquarters you-DAT sit-INF-IMPERF, and not fight-INF-IMPERF

‘You have become fat, commander. Your place is to sit in the headquarters, and not to
fight.’

In both sentences the occurrence of the dative is facilitated by the constrastive reading of
the sentence, which is implied in (203) and explicit in (204). In contrast to the sentences
that express impossibility and possibility with a perfective aspect, in these sentences no
actual intention is ascribed to the dative participant to realize the infinitive situation, but it
is expressed that ‘the dative participant has such properties that the only thing for him to
do is the infinitive situation’. Sentences like these show that in some cases it is difficult to
make a distinction between cases that express necessity and cases that express possibility,
since these terms do not adequately describe the actual meaning and interpretation of the
construction.

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4.10 ‘Impossibility’ and ‘possibility’: Cases of blocking and deblocking

In this section I will discuss uses that express impossibility or possibility. Such uses can be visually represented as shown in Figure 4.14.

Figure 4.14*

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DAT}^+ \quad \text{EF} \\
(\text{not}) \text{INF}
\end{array}
\]

* INF = the action expressed by the infinitive; DAT = the participant expressed by the dative; EF = external force

In the case of the (im)possibility interpretation of the DI-construction, the dative participant is not the initiator of the action because (a) he intends to realize the action but the realization of the action is blocked by an external force (which makes the dative participant the recipient of action not INF), or (b) the dative participant intends to realize the action, but he is blocked, and this blockage is removed (which makes the dative participant the recipient of INF). The following general context can be given for such cases:

\[\text{DAT} + (\text{negation/deblocking}) + (\text{bylo/budet}) + \text{INF}_{\text{perf}} + [\text{presupposition: intention x to realize Inf}] \rightarrow \text{There is some (im)possibility for the agent to do Inf}\]

Cases of (im)possibility can be paraphrased in Russian with modal forms, e.g. (не) moch’, (не) udat’sja and with the perfective present. In the next two sections I will discuss how the DI-construction can be interpreted as a case of impossibility or possibility. I will discuss sentences without negation separately because of the special position that they occupy in the use of the DI-construction.

4.10.1 ‘Impossibility’ and related cases

The following sentences are examples of impossibility interpretations of the DI-construction:

‘There is not place where you can hide to escape death. You won’t succeed escaping the enemy.’

(206) **Emu ved’ ne uji iz goroda.**102 (N. Shitova, *Derzhaba*)
he-DAT PRT not go.from-INF-PERF from city
‘After all, he can’t leave town.’

(207) Svoboda, Paul’; – funkcija organizma! Tebe ètogo ne ponjat‘! Ved’ ty rodilsja svobodnym, kak ptica!103 (S. Dovlatov, *Kompromiss*)
(...) you-DAT that not understand-INF-PERF!
‘Freedom, Paul, is a function of the organism. You can’t understand that! After all, you were born free like a bird.’

(208) No, ponimaja, chto bez pomoshchi mne uzhe ne obojitis’, ja vse zhe opravilsja na ispoved’ v xram pri Staroj Shkole.104 (U. LeGuin, *Eshche odna istorija, ili rybak iz vnutrimor‘ja*)
but, understanding that without help I-DAT already not go.around-INF-PERF, I all PRT went on confession in church near old school
‘But, since I understood that I wouldn’t be able to cope without help, I went to confession in the church near the Old School.’

(209) Odin gospodin iz Berdicheva/sel na sled isprazhnenij a ptich’ego./Ogljadevshi svoj frak,/on skazal – èto znak,/to’lk o smys l mn e ne postich’ ego.105
(...)/ just meaning I-DAT not reach-INF-PERF him.
‘A man from Berdichevo/sat down on some birds droppings/After looking at his suit,/he said: “It’s a sign,/I just won’t be able to find the meaning of it.”’

These sentences express that the agent of the infinitive situation intends to realize the infinitive situation, but is blocked in this attempt. Note that the term intention does not necessarily mean that the agent consciously plans to realize a situation; in some cases the imagination of the realization of the infinitive situation is just seen as something positive. In all cases the speaker contradicts the initial information state that the infinitive situation is the case/realizable by expressing that the dative subject fails in

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103 [http://lib-r.isp.net/lat/DOWLATOW/kompromiss.txt](http://lib-r.isp.net/lat/DOWLATOW/kompromiss.txt)

104 [http://mirror.primorye.ru/moshkow/lat/LEGUIN/rybakizwnutrimoriya.txt](http://mirror.primorye.ru/moshkow/lat/LEGUIN/rybakizwnutrimoriya.txt)

realizing the intended situation. As in the case of the necessitive use of the DI-construction, the typical ontic nature may be underlined by particles like uzhe ne, and ved’.

Note that the verbs with which the impossibility interpretation of the DI-construction occurs, often indicate situations where the subject deliberately strives to reach the natural end point of the situation (Bricyn, 1990: 235). In such cases the negation of the infinitive in combination with the meaning of the dative emphasizes the fact that the speaker is not in the position to realize the action. Sentences like these can be paraphrased with a dative subject and the form udat’ja (‘succeed’). This form, combined with negation, expresses the failing of the subject in realizing the intended action. The idea of succeeding is less clearly present in the case of modal forms with a nominative subject like smoč’ (‘can’). This form indicates an inherent property of the subject, and, unlike the DI-construction, has a future oriented meaning. Because of the different semantics of smoč’ and the DI-construction, the DI-construction can not be paraphrased with smoč’ in all contexts:

(210) Tebe ne zapugat’ menja (…). (Maurice, 1996: 104/MM)
    you-DAT not frighten-INF-PERF me
    ‘You won’t frighten me.’

(211) Ty ne smožesh’ zapugat’ menja. (incorrect as a paraphrase of (210))
    you-NOM not can-1sg-PERF frighten-INF-PERF me

Sentence (210) expresses the general statement that the dative participant has such properties that he is not in the position to frighten the speaker, whereas the statement in (211) has a clear future oriented character, and therefore a less general and more specific meaning. The general character of (210) is the result of the ontic character of the construction. Note that in the case of verbs that do not indicate goal-oriented actions, the impossibility interpretation takes on an even clear epistemic-ontic character, e.g. (208). This character can be traced back to the meaning of the DI-construction: the DI-construction expresses that agent x is the recipient of state type not Y. A sentence like mne ne projti (lit. ‘to me not go through’) expresses that the agent will not be the recipient of the action of projti, because of particular circumstances or because of the way things are.

In many contexts the DI-construction can be paraphrased with the perfective present, for example in (210): Ty menja ne zapugaš’. This form, however, lacks the
aspect of the specific antic nature of the DI-construction. Consider the following sentences:

(212) Nikogda **mne** etogo ne **zabyt**\
\(106\) (U. LeGuin, *Eshche odna istorija, ili rybak iz vnutrimorya*)
never I-DAT that not forget-INF-PERF
‘I will never forget that.’

(213) My v teatre vstretilis’, a ne v posteli, Olimpiada Nikolaevna! I vot etogo ja ne zabudu nikogda!\(107\) (N. Ptushkina, *Plachu vpered*)
(...) and PRT that I not forget-PRS-PERF never! (...
‘We met in the theatre, and not in the bed, Olimpiada Nikolaevna! And I will never forget that!’

In the first sentence, with the DI-construction, the speaker expresses that no matter what she tries, the way things are is such that she will not forget. In (213), with the perfective present, the speaker asserts that he will never forget, without stressing that the non-occurrence of the situation is due to factors outside of his will. The construction with the perfective present and the verb *zabyt* has a future oriented meaning, whereas the DI-construction has a more general character.

In 4.9.1 I already pointed out that the position of the negation is in full accordance with the meaning of the construction. As such, strategies like ‘negative transportation’ are not needed to motivate the negation in such sentences. Furthermore, I argued that that the impossibility interpretation cannot be reduced to a necessitive interpretation (necessary not X \(\neq\) not possible X). In the case of the DI-construction, the meaning of necessity expressed by the construction cannot be defined as a logical operator of necessity ‘\(\triangleright\)’, because the necessity is the result of the idea of being a recipient of an action type, and is not the result of some presupposed operation of necessity. Both in the case of the necessitive interpretation, and in the case of the impossibility interpretation, the meaning of recipient plays a part. This idea of being a recipient of an action type X cannot be equated with ‘\(\triangleright y \triangleright X\)’, where y is the subject of X. The idea of the agent as a recipient of an action type can be interpreted as a case of negation of necessity (\(\neg \triangleright X\)), or as a case of impossibility (\(\neg \triangleright X\)), depending on the context in which it occurs. In the case of impossibility we start out from the perspective of the

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\(106\) http://mirror.primorye.ru/moshkow/lat/LEGUIN/rybakizvnutrimoriya.txt
\(107\) http://www.theatre.ru:8084/drama/ptushkina/plachu1.html
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subject of the situation that has an intention to fulfill the action, whereas in the case of the necessitive interpretation, we do not take the perspective of the agent into account.

How can we derive the impossibility interpretation from the meaning of the construction? We start out from the meaning given earlier, and specify it with a context (Figure 4.15).

Figure 4.15

x is the recipient of a situation type Y, i.e. Y is not initiated by x

+ semantic-syntactic features:

(i) Y is negated.
(ii) Y is prototypically perfective.
(iii) x is animate or inanimate; if x is inanimate an intention to reach the resultative situation of Y can be ascribed to people associated with x.
(iv) x is expressed in the dative, or if not expressed interpretable as a generic agent
(v) The auxiliary is mostly not expressed.
(vi) The word order is prototypically [dative infinitive], but a reverse order occurs as well.

Interpretation:

The subject can be interpreted as a recipient because he intends to realize the action (which is underlined by the perfective aspect), but is blocked in his intention, i.e. he is the recipient of state not Y:

The agent (expressed in the dative form) has the intention to realize the infinitive action Y, but is blocked by particular circumstances, which means that the dative participant is the recipient of the state ‘not Y’, i.e. the agent cannot do/will not/does not succeed in doing action Y.

Below I will discuss the contexts as in Figure 4.15 in more detail:
(i) The negation in the case of impossibility

The impossibility interpretation occurs in so-called negative contexts.\textsuperscript{108} In the case of the infinitive two main types of negation can be distinguished:

- Cases where an action (expressed by the infinitive) is fully negated.
- Cases where an action is partly negated; these cases amount to possibility with a clear reference to a possible failure.

Under full negation we can classify cases with \emph{ne} ('not'), negative concord forms like \textit{nikogda} ('never'), \textit{nichego} ('nothing'), and the negative construction \textit{[ni ... ni]} ('neither ... nor'). Under partial negation we can classify sentences with \textit{edva} (\textit{li}) ('hardly'/ 'almost not')\textsuperscript{109} and \textit{vrjad} (\textit{li}) ('probably not'); such sentences express that there is a situation close to the non-occurrence of the situation:

(214) Ulicy takie uzbekh chto edva razminut'sja dvum mashinam. (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II: 374)
street so small, that hardly overtake-INF-PERF two-DAT cars-DAT
'The streets are so narrow that two cars can hardly overtake.'

(215) Mne zabyt' tvoi glaza edva edva li.\textsuperscript{110} (Song text, twentieth century)
I-DAT forget-INF-PERF your eyes hardly
'I can hardly forget your eyes.'

(216) Izvinite mne moj voprosy, ska<zal> Isp<anec>, – no vrjad li mne najti v drugoj raz udovletvoritel'nyx otvetov. (Vinogradov & Shvedova, 1964: 347/Pushkin)
forgive me my questions, said spaniard, – but probably not I-DAT find-INF-PERF in another time satisfactory answers

\textsuperscript{108} In logically oriented literature, negative contexts are sometimes described in terms of particular logical properties that they share, e.g. in terms of monotonity (see Van der Wouden, 1994). The term 'monotonity' concerns patterns of inference; in the case of monotonity one can speak of stability of semantic information or truth-value under change of context. Van der Wouden (1994) argues that operators such as 'hardly' can be seen as a monotone-decreasing operators. This means that this operator allows reasoning from sets to subsets. Negation is a typical monotone-decreasing operator. As such, 'hardly' shares features with negation.

\textsuperscript{109} Note that a similar interpretation can occur with \textit{edva} and the past tense: Bednjaj mat' edva otrudila menja ot pomeshavshegoja tega cheloveka ('My poor mother could hardly free me from the embrace of that man').

\textsuperscript{110} http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyr/T9/T9.32.lat.html
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"Forgive me my questions", said the Spaniard, "but another time I will probably not be able to find satisfactory answers."

(217) My daleko zashli i vyyod vriad li nam najti.\textsuperscript{111} (Kuz'min)
we far came and exit probably.not we-DAT find-INF-PERF
'We have come a long way, and will probably not find the exit/succeed in finding the exit.'

Negative contexts constituted by edva and vriad li differ from contexts such as tol'ko (‘only’) because in the case of tol'ko the negation is applied to a presupposition or implication (only x can do Y, presupposes or implies that others cannot do Y). In the case of these operators, the negation is not presupposed or implied, but rather contained in the expression (almost/probably (Y)). Because of this, I will discuss sentences with tol'ko under cases of possibility. Sentences with edva and vriad li are rather infrequent in modern standard Russian; in most cases a construction with a modal form (udat'sja, uspet', smoch', mozhno, sumet') is preferred.

(ii) The aspect of the infinitive

In the case of the impossibility interpretation of the DI-construction, the infinitive normally has the perfective aspect, which expresses the intention of the agent to realize the infinitive situation, that is, reach the natural or imposed end point (te/os) of the situation. In the case of the construction under discussion we start out from the contradicting initial information state where the dative participant realizes the infinitive situation, and express that this scene will not occur. By initiating the situation ‘not Y’ the external force blocks the result of the situation intended by the potential agent.

The perfective aspect, it should be noted, is not a necessary feature of the impossibility interpretation. In the case of verbs that indicating actions that have no natural end point we find the imperfective aspect:

(218) Tam tebe ne guljat': wysokij sneg. (Maurice, 1995: 152)
there you-DAT not walk-INF-IMPERF: high snow
‘You can’t walk there: the snow is too high.’

(219) Konechno, Smirnovu kak kamen'schhiku s Pashej ne tjagat'sja. (Proeme, forthcoming, V. Belov, Vospitanie po doktoru Spoku)

\textsuperscript{111} http://www.relex.ru:8040/~kuzmin/songs/din82/beda.txt
of course, Smirnov-DAT as mason with Pasha not compete-INF-IMPERF
‘Of course, as a mason, Smirnov can’t compete with Pasha.’

In these sentences the idea of not succeeding is less strongly expressed, but it is expressed that the dative participant is not in the position to realize the infinitive situation.

(iii-iv) The nature of the dative participant

The dative subject can refer to an animate entity, or an inanimate entity, e.g.:

(220) Boloto? — sprosi l Morgan. — A obojti ego mozhno? — Mozhno, no togda vy ne popadete v Dzhassu. Po etomu puti nikto ne xodit, tak kak karavanam s gruzom zdes’ ne projti.112 (K. Kurtc, Vlastitel’ dentil) marshland? — asked Morgan. — but go.around him may? — may, but then you not end.up in Dzhassa. by.this road no-one not goes, because caravans-DAT with.goods here not pass-INF-PERF ‘Marshland? — asked Morgan. — But can you go around it? — You can, but then you don’t end up in Dzhassa. No-one takes that road, because caravans with goods can’t pass here.’

In such sentences one can speak of personification because the people leading the caravans are identified with the caravan.

In some cases one finds a negated perfective infinitive in sentences without a dative subject. Such sentences express that there is no agent that can reach the telos of the infinitive situation, or put differently, no agent can realize the infinitive situation, e.g.:

(221) To, chto menja vyvelo iz ravnovesija, naxodilos’ v odnoj komnate so mnoj — eto vygljadelo … nu dazhe ne opisat’ (…).113 that, what me brought.out of balance, was.present in one room with me — that looked. like … well even not describe-INF-PERF ‘The thing that brought me out of balance was in the same room with me, it looked like, well, you can’t even describe it.’

(222) Vam ponachalu pridetsja prignut’sja, inache zdes’ ne projti, no eto nichego!114 (R. Fejst, Vrata vojn)
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you first.of.all will.have.to jump, otherwise here not pass-INF-PERF, but that nothing 'First of all you will have to jump, otherwise it's impossible to pass here, but it is very easy.'

(v) Auxiliary

The auxiliary bylo is expressed in some instances of the construction under discussion:

(223) Zaplatkina bylo uzhe ne vernut'. (Uppsala corpus)
Zaplatkin-ACC was-NEUT already not get.back-INF-PERF
'One couldn't bring Zaplatkin back any more [he was dead].'

(224) Skol'ko my ni vgladyvalis' v binokli, nikak ne ugadat' bylo, chto zhe èto takoe. (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II: 376/Ju. Kazakov)
how.much we not looked through binoculars, never not guess-INF-PERF, what PRT that such
'No matter how much we looked through the binoculars, we couldn't find out what was going on there.'

In these sentences no dative is expressed; a dative is also absent in the examples given by the Russkaja Grammatika (1980, II: 376). I suspect that the expression of bylo is less restricted with sentences without dative (cf. 4.5.2 for the relation between verbalness and the expression of the dative with modal adverbs).

In some cases the auxiliary budet is expressed, e.g.:

(225) On na sebja do smerti slavushku nadel, emu ne otmyt' ee budet. (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II: 376/Rasp.)
he on him till death ill.fame put.on, he-DAT not wash.off-INF-PERF her will.be
'He will have ill fame until his death, he won't be able to wash it away.'

(226) A esli ty bespokoish's'ja, chto Maku odnomu vsex nas budet ne vytašchit', – po-
prezhnemu lenivo progovorila Ordi, gljadja na boloto, – tak ty ne zabyvaj, chto tashchit'
emu pridetsja odnogo, ot sily dvux, a on mal'chik sil'nyj. (B. & A. Stmgackie, Ostrv) (..), that Mak-DAT alone-DAT all of.us will not pull.out-INF-PERF (..)
'If you're worried whether Mak will be able to drag us all out by himself, said Ordi lazily, looking at the swamp, then keep in mind that he has to drag out alone only me, with at most two persons, and he is a strong boy.'
In these sentences the function of budet is to stress the future character (the action will take place in the future) of the scene. For a further discussion of the expression of the auxiliary, see 4.9.

(vi) Word order

The word order of most uses is [dative infinitive]. The Russkaja Grammatika (1980, II: 378) notes that it is possible to place the infinitive at the first position in the clause in a rheme position, e.g. (with my accentuation):

(227) Kakaja ni est' – ne zabyt' mne ee. (J. Mamleev, Son v lesu)
which not is – not forget-INF-PERF I-DAT her
'No matter who she is, I won't forget her.'

(228) Ne projí mal'chiku po ètoj dorogel (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II: 378)
not pass-INF-PERF boy-DAT by that road
'The boy can't pass by that road.'

(229) Tol'ko vidit Volod'ka – ne razobrat' emu, gde ego molodaja zhená.
just sees Volod'ka – not find.out-INF-PERF he-DAT, where his young wife
'Volod'ka just sees that – he can't find out where his young wife is.'

According to the Russkaja Grammatika, such sentences have an 'expressive' character. In my opinion, this expressive character must be related to the specific information structure of the sentence and the argumentative function of the infinitive sentence in the discourse where it occurs.

In all three of these sentences the information expressed by the infinitive sentence is closely connected to the information expressed in the previous discourse.115 The function of the word order in this case is reminiscent of the function of ŠV order remarked by Bonnot & Fougeron (1982: 313, 320) for nominative subjects. They argue that ŠV order serves as an explicit mark of the dependence on the preceding context; in the case of SV order this specific marking is absent. Kompeer (1992: 218, 219) reformulates this description by stating that SV order tends to refer to an event or situation as a fact present at a given moment. For the VS order here a similar analysis can possibly be given.

115 In Dutch this can be made visible by the use of particles such as toch.
I suspect that in these expressions the identity of the subject is already given in the discourse, and functions as an addition to the information expressed by the accented infinitive. The accent on the infinitive expresses that the presupposition that the infinitive might not be the case is contradicted. The emphasis on the existence of the situation expressed by the infinitive would not occur in the case of VS order, since this is the neutral arrangement for the expression of a scene where the dative subject is the recipient of a situation. In the case of VS order the identity of S is not relevant because it is already given; this presupposes a strong informational tie with the preceding discourse. The accent on the infinitive serves as a marker that the infinitive situation does exist (or not exist in the case of negation).

4.10.2 ‘Possibility’ and related cases

The dative-infinitive construction with a possibility interpretation occurs without restriction in the case of interrogative sentences, and in the case of non-interrogative sentences only in special contexts, viz. contexts that provide ‘deblocking’: contrastive sentences, sentences with *tal'ko*, sentences with *chtoby*, and sentences with *xot* in (6) above, an example of a contrastive context was given.

The interpretation of the DI-construction as a case of possibility is peripheral not only in the sense that it occurs in special contexts only, but also in the sense that such uses with special contexts do not occur frequently in modern standard Russian (Timofeev, 1950: 281; Bricyn, 1990: 230). Furthermore, in many cases neutralization can be perceived between cases that express possibility and cases that have a necessitive ontic nature. Before giving my analysis of the possibility interpretation of the dative-infinitive construction, then, I should make a few remarks about the status of the data on which my analysis is based.

There are two problematic aspects connected with my analysis of the possibility interpretation of the DI-construction. The first problem concerns the set of data on which my analysis is based. These data are mostly examples taken from the linguistic literature on infinitive sentences, with some data collected from corpora, or from the Internet. Because the amount of data I have at my disposal is relatively small, it is difficult to make and test hypotheses about them. The second problem is that the data I have collected are often examples from the nineteenth century, or twentieth-century phrases from poetic texts or fragments with a colloquial or *skaz* character. It could be said that these sentences are typical of nineteenth century Russian, or modern Russian with archaic features (poetry, *skaz*), and cannot be analyzed as part of the twentieth-century Russian
language system. If this is the case, an explanation must be given as to (i) why and how the system has changed and (ii) why the sentences given in the literature all occur in specific contexts only.

Data from historical grammars (Vinogradov & Shvedova, 1964: 336; Borkovskij, 1978: 278–282; Nikiforov, 1952) show that the specific use of the dative-infinitive construction has changed in some respects, perhaps partly due to change of oppositional forms and due to change of the meaning of the constituents (for example the function of бывать). Vaulina (1988: 135), however, concludes in her study of the evolution of modal expressions in Russian from the eleventh to the seventeenth century, that infinitive sentences preserve a relative stability in the course of the studied period, and occupy a rather peripheral position in the system of modal expressions. From her discussion of the use of the DI-construction as a way to express (im)possibility, we can conclude that there are no major differences from the current contexts for possibility. Like in modern Russian the DI-construction expresses impossibility rather than possibility (see Vaulina, 1988: 53). A difference from modern Russian is that in older stages of Russian the DI-construction was freely used to express possibility with verbs that express ‘to see’ such as видеть, зреть (see Borkovskij, 1978: 280). In modern Russian, such constructions with a dative are archaic; a modern way to express similar notions is a construction with an adverbial predicate (e.g. видно). Borkovskij (1978: 280) writes that the same modal meaning was sometimes also expressed with other verbs; the examples he gives, however, all have an ontic character, and might be seen as examples of ‘necessity’. Another difference from modern Russian is that in older stages of Russian, the infinitive was used in sentences without a dative to express so-called ‘permanent possibility’ (Vinogradov & Shvedova, 1964: 337; e.g. да в нём зме купити людин чорни; ‘there one can buy black people.’). In modern Russian such cases must be paraphrased with the adverbial predicate можна. Because of the absence of a dative, these cases cannot be seen as instances of the DI-construction. I will discuss such cases in 4.11.3.

Since I have seen no good indication that one can only account for the occurrence of the possibility interpretation of the DI-construction by looking at a diachronic change, I will assume that the sentences under discussion are all interpretable by modern Russians and can be seen as part of the modern Russian language system.116

How can we derive the possibility interpretation from the meaning of the construction? We start out from the meaning given earlier, and specify it with a context (Figure 4.16).

116 Whether the interpretations of possibility are part of modern Russian or not, an explanation must still be given as to why they occur in specific contexts only.
**Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction**

**Figure 4.16**

*x is the recipient of a situation type Y; i.e. Y is not initiated by x*

+ context:

(i) Y can be interpreted as being 'deblocked'.
(ii) Y is prototypically perfective.
(iii) x is animate or inanimate; if x is inanimate an intention to perform Y can be ascribed to x.
(iv) x is expressed in the dative, or if not expressed interpretable as a generic agent.
(v) The auxiliary is mostly not expressed.

**Interpretation:**

The agent x (expressed in the dative form) who was initially blocked in the realization of the intended action Y, can realize the action Y because the blockage is removed, or because the potential blocking is absent.

The possibility interpretation is represented in Figure 4.17.

**Figure 4.17**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DAT+</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force = property DAT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the agent is a recipient of a situation type Y, one can only speak of 'possible Y' if an intention to do a situation is ascribed to the agent, but 'not possible Y' is initially the case or to be expected, and the external force can be seen as an 'enabling' force that initiates the intended situation. About such cases two important points have to be noted.

Firstly, it must be remarked that the notion of deblocking of the intended situation differs from the possibility of *can*, since the notion of deblocking in the case of the DI-construction must be in accordance with the idea of recipiency. A sentence like the following is not possible:

(230) *Ivanu reshit' etu zadachu.*

Ivan-DAT solve-INF-PERF that problem.

meaning: 'Ivan can solve that problem.'
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The marginal status of the possibility interpretation of the DI-construct is connected with the specific meaning of the construction. The meaning of 'recipient of a situation type' is not easily combined with the idea of possibility. To be interpreted as such, it needs a specific context. The contexts in which the possibility interpretation occur are partly contexts that are typical of negative polarity items (тоже) and partly not (e.g. чтобы).

Secondly, the notion of deblocking must in all non-interrogative cases, except sentences with чтобы, be identified with what I call 'epistemic' deblocking. In the case of epistemic deblocking, the unblocking has nothing to do with the initial presence of a physical barrier blocking the intended action of the participant, and the removal of this barrier, but must be identified with blocking in the domain of presupposition. This means that there is some presupposition that the dative subject is not the recipient of the infinitive action, but this presupposition is contradicted. The exact nature of this blocking will be discussed below, when I will analyze the different contexts for possibility in more detail.

4.10.2.1 Perfective infinitives in a contrastive context

Mets (1985: 205) claims that a possibility interpretation can occur in contrastive sentences which express that agent x is the recipient of a situation Y, and agent x' is not. An example of such a case was given in (6), and another example is given below:

(231) Вам, сынам Земли, когданибудь разгадат загадку. Но не нам. (Метс, 1985: 387/А.Толстой)

you-DAT, sons-DAT of.Earth, one.day solve-INF-PERF mystery. But not we-DAT
‘You, sons of the Earth, will one day solve/be able to solve the mystery. But we will not.’

Note that sentences like these have an ontic character; this is especially clear in sentence (231); this sentence can be interpreted both to indicate that the infinitive situation will occur in the future, and to indicate that the agent will have the ability to realize the situation.117

117 Note that Bricyn (1990: 225) classifies the following sentence (119) with a verb of motion as a case of what I call epistemic-ontic necessity: Ей им ребятам есть/ Одни по природе ездёнь/ А ей она никогда не смогет съесть всё са/ре/т. (Bricyn, 1990: 225). The differences in classification point at the fact that all uses have the same meaning and that the different uses must be seen as interpretations. These different interpretations cannot be classified as clear cases of either necessity or possibility.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

How can we explain why the DI-construction can be used to express possibility in contexts like these? It may be argued that contrastive contexts allow for the possibility reading because they trigger an ‘epistemic deblocking’; contradiction/negating of a presupposition can be seen as a weak form of deblocking.

In the case of these sentences there is a presupposition, based on the contrasted situation, that the situation will not occur. The occurrence of the dative subject can thus be explained because we focus on the fact that the subject is the recipient of a situation, by placing it under the presupposition that the subject has an intention to initiate the action, *but is blocked from doing so*. This ontic deblocking can be compared to cases that express ontic necessity, like *Emu chitât’ knigu* (‘he will read the book.’). In these sentences the speaker negates the presupposition that the agent will not read the book, and expresses that the infinitive action will necessarily be the case. The sentences under discussion here differ from these sentences in that an *intention* is ascribed to the subject to initiate the situation, which leads to the interpretation of ‘possibility’; in these sentences the external force can be identified with something like the capacities of the dative subject. Note that this does not mean that the dative participant actually wants to realize the action; in (6) it is only expressed that *if* the dative participant wants to realize the action, he can do it.

4.10.2.2. Sentences with *tol’ko*

A possibility interpretation can occur in the case of sentences with *tol’ko* (‘only’). In these two sentences *tol’ko* modifies the dative:

(232) A i tol’ko v vyrezy murashu projti (Maurice, 1995: 151/Bylny)
but and only in hole ant-DAT go.through-INF-PERF
‘But only an ant can go through such holes.’

countless world minces in mesmerism, and only wind-DAT tie-INF-PERF
‘The uncountable world minces in the mesmerism, and only the wind can tie it up.’

Sentences with *tol’ko* and a possibility interpretation can be analyzed as follows. In (232) it is expressed that because of its particular qualities (for example its small size), it is possible only for an ant to realize the infinitive situation. In (233) a similar interpretation occurs. Note that we find the perfective aspect, which is typical of the
possibility interpretation. The perfective aspect emphasizes the success in reaching the telos of the infinitive situation. In this case the dative participant is an inanimate entity; this means that we ascribe a tendency to the wind to realize the infinitive situation (that is, the wind is seen as being directed at the realization of the infinitive situation).

In the sentences under discussion one can speak of deblocking because the possibility of realization of the situation by the dative subject is contrasted with the impossibility of the same situation in a presuppositional world. The contrast with those cases where the agent cannot be seen as the recipient of the situation triggers the ‘possibility’ interpretation; in these sentences the contrast with the non-recipienthood of the other agents triggers the expression of the dative. As such, this case can be compared to a case of epistemic deblocking as discussed above.¹¹⁸

It must be noted that sentences with a possibility interpretation and tol’ko are infrequent in modern standard Russian, and occur in language with archaic features such as skaz or poetry. In modern standard Russian modal infinitive sentences with tol’ko with a possibility reading occur mostly in sentences without dative where the agent of the infinitive is understood as a generic subject (‘one’), and where, consequently, tol’ko does not modify the dative. I will discuss these sentences below in 4.10.2.6.

The DI-construct with tol’ko also occurs with imperfective verbs:

tol’ko modifies the place specification of the infinitive:

(234) I ty nazyvaesh’ eto – Muzykoj?, neozhidanno zlo zasmejalas’ Feja. Nechego skazat’, Tvorec! Da tebe tol’ko na bazare igrat’! (T. Konstantinov; Grushtye skazi o ljubvi) and you call that – music?, unexpectedly mean laughed Feya. nothing say creator. PRT you-DAT only on market play-INF-IMPERF "And you call that music?", laughed Feya unexpectedly mean. "And that calls itself a creator! The only place where you can /will play is the market!!!"

tol’ko modifies the time specification of the infinitive:

(235) Za dver’ju strogij nadziratel’/Prisonivshis’ u tochka stoit/On odin, odin lish’ tol’ko znaet/Parnju do rassveta tol’ko zhit¹¹⁹ (Songtext)

¹¹⁸ Note that the operator tol’ko can also trigger a possibility reading in the case of the perfective present, e.g. Tol’ko russkij nationalism spaset Russiju, a vlast’ segodnya ne u pravitel’sva. (lit. ‘only the Russian nationalism will save Russia and the government doesn’t have the power.’)
¹¹⁹ http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyr/15/15.02lat.html

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**Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction**

behind door severe supervisor/leaning.against at loo/he alone, alone just only
knows/man-DAT till dawn only live-INF-IMPERF
'Behind the door the severe supervisor/Leaning at the door of the loo/He alone
knows/That the boy will only live till dawn.'

tol'ko modifies the dative:

(236) Ivan-carevich perelez v krepot', tam vse storozha spali, zashel na konjushnju, pojmal
konja zlatogrivogo, da pozariilsja na uzdechu — ona zolotom, dorogimi kammami ubrana;
v nej zlatogrivomu konju tol'ko guljat'. (Bj/dyn)
Ivan-prince climbed in castle, there all guards slept, went to eauarry, took horse
with.golden.manes, and set.his.eyes.on bridle — she with.gold, with.valuable stones
decorated, in her with.the.golden.manes-DAT horse-DAT only go-INF
'Prince Ivan climbed into the castle, there all the guards were sleeping, he went to the
eauarry, took the horse with the golden mane, and looked at the bridle, it was gold and
decorated with precious stones, only the horse with the golden mane could go in it [was
good enough to go in it].'

In (234) it is expressed that because of his bad musical abilities, the only place for the
agent to play his music is the market. In this sentence we find an epistemic-ontic
nuance; this character is connected to the conditioned character of the occurrence of
the action in this sentence, viz. if people play that bad, the only place for them to play
is the market. In this sentence the external force can be identified both with the
internal abilities of the dative subject and with a general law or script. In (235) the ontic
character is even stronger. This sentence conveys that the way things go is such that
the dative participant will only live till dawn. Sentence (236) conveys that it is
appropriate only for the dative participant, and not for anyone else, to realize the
infinitive situation.

For sentences like these, the occurrence of the dative can be explained by pointing
at their epistemic-ontic character: they express that because of the abilities of the dative
subject, or the situation in which the dative subject is, the realization of the infinitive
action is necessarily the case.

Besides the occurrence of tol'ko in sentences that express 'possibility' or ontic
necessity, sentences with tol'ko and an infinitive can also be interpreted as cases of wish.
In this construction tol'ko modifies the infinitive situation. Consider the following
sentences, given by Veyrenc (1979: 54), where the speaker can be identified with the
potential agent of the infinitive:
Veyrenc (1979: 54) claims that these sentences express possibility; however, this claim is based solely on the possibility of translating these sentences in French with the form pouvoir ('can'). I do not think one can say that the construction expresses possibility, but rather that the relation of the sentences (237)—(238) and sentences that express possibility can be motivated as follows. In the case of (237)—(238) the speaker intends to realize the infinitive situation, but in the real world this situation does not take place. By using the DI-construction with tol'ko, the speaker expresses that he is focused on just one thing, and that is the future realization of the infinitive situation. As such, the speaker is focused on the deblocking of the realization of the infinitive situation in some hypothetical world. This construction can also occur without expressed potential agent, e.g. tol'ko eshche raz uvidet' ee; in such sentences the speaker is identified with the potential agent.120

If the dative subject cannot be identified with the speaker, a paraphrase with a form expressing possibility is not possible, e.g:

(239) Vam tol'ko vljubljať'sja, da kak by zamuzh vyjti za blagorodnogo, chtob barynej byt'!
(Bricyn, 1990: 241/A. Ostrovskij)
you-DAT only fall.in.love-INF-IMPERF, and how IRR marry to nobleman, in.order. lady be-INF
'The only thing you want is to fall in love, marry a nobleman and become a lady.'

Sentences with tol'ko and an imperfective or perfective infinitive are interpreted as cases of wish, where an intention can be ascribed to the dative subject to realize the infinitive action, and the dative participant can be identified with the force.

In sum: the DI-construction with tol'ko can be interpreted differently, depending on the context in which it occurs. The three basic uses of tol'ko can be schematized as in Table 4.3:

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120 According to informants expression of the particle by in (237–238) would make this sentence more acceptable. Furthermore, they remarked that this sentence could, with the right intonation and context, also be interpreted as a case of restricted possibility.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Necessity</th>
<th>Possibility</th>
<th>Wish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>to’ko</em> modifies</td>
<td>no restriction</td>
<td>dative(^{121})</td>
<td>infinitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention DAT to realize INF</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>law, script (external)</td>
<td>ability DAT (internal)</td>
<td>DAT (internal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that some sentences can be classified both as cases of ontic necessity, and as cases of possibility; in such cases the parameters of both necessity and possibility can be applied to the sentence in question. The occurrence of the possibility interpretation can be explained by the fact that the recipiency of the infinitive agent is emphasized by constrasting it with other agents that cannot be seen as recipiency. This constrasting can be seen as deblocking, and triggers the possibility interpretation in those cases where an intention can be ascribed to the dative subject to realize the infinitive situation.

4.10.2.3 Sentences with *xot’*

Veyrenc (1979: 54) argues that the following use of the DI-construction, where the particle *xot’* ('even', 'almost') modifies the infinitive VP, can be seen as a case of possibility:

\[(240) \quad \text{Mavra bylo vse ravno. Ej xot’ sejcha s tatarinom li, s zhidom li povenchar’sja, ...} \]
\[(\text{Mel’nikov}) \]

\[\quad \text{Mavra was all the same. she-DAT even now with Tartar PRT, with Jew PRT marry-INF-PERF} \]
\[\quad \text{‘Mavra didn’t care anymore. Now she could/would even marry a Tartar or a Jew.’} \]

Similar sentences cannot always be translated with modal predicates that express possibility, compare:

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\(^{121}\) I suspect that *to’ko* may also modify other constituents, but I have not attested examples of such cases.
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(241) **Aleksandr** xot’ skvoz’ zemlju provalit’sja. (Vinogradov & Shvedova, 1964: 347/Goncharov)

Alexandr-DAT even through ground disappear-INF-PERF

‘Alexander almost felt like vanishing from the face of the earth.’

In this sentence the DI-construction can be paraphrased with *gotov byl* (‘was ready’), *v poru* (‘time to’).

The claim that (240) must be seen as a case of possibility is based solely on the possibility of translating this sentence in French with *pouvoir* (‘can’). In my opinion, it is incorrect to speak of possibility, but rather the relation between this sentence and sentences that express possibility can be elucidated as follows. Sentence (240) expresses that because of some particular emotional state (*ese rannu*), the participant expressed in the dative is in the position to realize a situation that would, under normal circumstances, be the least expected situation to be realized. As such, the emotional state can be seen as the external force that creates the possibility for the least expected situation to occur. Note that in this case we find the perfective aspect, which is typical of those cases where an intention is ascribed to the dative subject to realize the infinitive situation.

It seems that the particle *xot’* (‘even’), or similar particles, are necessary components of sentences like these. A similar context is given below, where we find the form *i* (‘and’/’even’), which modifies the object of the infinitive:


you-DAT forget-INF-PERF and border of Versailles on board of the flying carpet

‘You [=youth] can/will even forget the border of Versailles, on board the flying carpet.’

It seems that the occurrence of the possibility interpretation in this sentence can be related to the occurrence of *i* (‘even’). The forms *i* and *xot’* both express in the DI-construction that of all the actions that are to be expected, the infinitive action (‘forget the border of Versailles’, ‘marry a Jew or a Tartar’) is the least expected. In other words: there is an expectation that something is not the case but this presupposition is negated and it is stated that because of the particular circumstances the least expected is the case. For the occurrence of the dative one can perhaps give a similar explanation to that for the contexts discussed above. The negation of the presupposition that something will not be the case emphasizes the recipienthood of the subject. Hence the occurrence of the dative in sentences with a perfective infinitive.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

The infinitive with the particle xot' also occurs in sentences without dative, such as in the sentences below, which have a directive or permissive character:

(243) I èxø vsled kukuët tozhe. Nakukovali nam toskul Xot' ubezhat'. Izbav' nas, bozhe, / Ot èlegicheskix ku-ku. (Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II: 373/Pushkin)
and echo after cuckoos also they. cuckooed we-DAT melancholy-ACC. even run-INF-PERF deliver us, god/from elegiac cuckoo
'And the echo cuckoos after us. The cuckooing made us melancholic. It would be better to/one should/one would almost run away. Deliver us O God, from the elegiac cuckooing.'

(244) Odezh u samuju luchshuju dam: cherkesku, i sapogi, xot' zhenit'sja. (Timofeev, 1950: 281/L. Tolstoi)
(…), almost marry-INF-IMPERF
'I give you the best clothing: a Circassian coat, boots, you could almost marry.'

In the first sentence no intention to realize the infinitive action is ascribed to the non-specified agent, hence the necessitivé interpretation. In the second sentence an intention can be ascribed to the contextually given infinitive agent (the addressee) to realize the infinitive action, hence the possibility interpretation. In both cases the modal interpretation is closely related to the directive meaning of this construction, which is underlined by the possibility of paraphrasing these sentences with an imperative (xot' ubegi, xot' zhenis'). In modern Russian, the construction with the infinitive + xot' expressing permission is not frequently used; instead the construction with the imperative is used (see 3.2).

The particle xot' also occurs in sentences that express a wish or desire, such as in the following sentence, where xot' modifies the specification of time of the infinitive:

(245) A mne xot' raz v godu vzgljanut'; / A mne xot' raz v godu shagnut'/Na ètu tesnuju, drozhashchiju ploshchadku (...).122 (Song text, V. Luferov)
but I-DAT even once in year look-INF-PERF; but I-DAT even once in year walk-INF-PERF/on that narrow, shivering ground
'I would like to look just once a year; I would like to step just once a year/On that narrow shivering ground.'

122 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/KSP/luferow.txt
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In this sentence the speaker expresses his desire to realize the infinitive situation, even if he could do it just once a year. I have only seen examples of such sentences with a first person singular. For such sentences two analyses could apply: (a) the external force can be identified with the dative subject, and an intention to realize the infinitive action can be ascribed to the dative subject; (b) the blocking force is counterfactually overcome (debloked) by the dative subject. Which interpretation is at stake here? In my opinion, this question cannot be answered. Such sentences can be seen as borderline cases between blocking and deblocking.

To recapitulate my main point: the DI-construction with xat' can be interpreted differently, depending on the context in which it occurs. The occurrence of the dative in the case of the 'possibility' interpretation can be motivated by the epistemic deblocking that is facilitated by the meaning of xat'. The basic interpretational possibilities of sentences with xat' can be represented for sentences with and without dative respectively as in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5.

Table 4.4. The DI-construction with xat'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibility</th>
<th>Wish of deblocking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intention DAT to realize INF</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>property DAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity DAT</td>
<td>1/2/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5 Infinitive sentences without dative with xat'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibility</th>
<th>Necessity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intention infinitive agent to realize Inf</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infinitive agent</td>
<td>Generic agent; Addressee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>Contextually given; Speaker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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The occurrence of the possibility interpretation can be motivated by the fact that the recipienthood of the infinitive agent is emphasized by contrasting it with the expected situation; in the case of xor' it is expressed that the dative subject is the recipient of the least expected situation. This contrasting can be seen as epistemic deblocking, and triggers the possibility interpretation in those cases where an intention can be ascribed to the dative subject to realize the infinitive situation.

4.10.2.4 Sentences with a possibility interpretation in interrogatives

As I discussed above in 4.9.1, the DI-construction also occurs in interrogative sentences with interrogative adverbs. A possibility interpretation occurs in the case of the perfective aspect, such as the following:

(246) Kak mne uexat's det'mi v Shtaty?\(^{123}\)
    how I-DAT leave.for-INF-PERF with children in USA
    'How can I travel to the USA with children?'

In my opinion one can speak of deblocking in such cases as well. In the case of questions like in (246), the speaker has an intention to perform the infinitive action but cannot realize the action, in other words, he is blocked from realizing the intended action. By asking the question the speaker asks the hearer how the blocking can be unblocked, or put differently, how he can realize the action. As such, questions like these can be seen as cases of deboxing.\(^{124}\)

4.10.2.5 Sentences with a 'possibility' interpretation and chtoby

The DI-construction can be interpreted as a case of 'possibility' in some contexts with chtoby ('in order'). I will discuss the different uses of the DI-construction with subordinators separately below in 4.11. Here, I will confine myself to briefly discussing the uses of this construction that might be classified as cases of possibility.


\(^{124}\) Besides regular questions, the infinitive also occurs in rhetorical questions. In the case of the infinitive construction these are questions where there is an anticipated answer, which is negative. Veyrenc (1979: 57) claims that in the case of rhetorical questions one has to speak of impossibility. His argumentation is based on the translation of infinitive rhetorical questions in French with pouvoir, in contrast to regular questions that are translated with devoir. It can be argued that one has to speak of impossibility in the case of such sentences because the anticipated answer to rhetorical questions like these is negative.
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Garde (1963: 291) notes that the DI-construction can be used to express possibility in sentences with the conjunction of purpose *chtoby* ('in order to'). He gives the following example of such a sentence:

(247) Polez zhilin v dyru, chtoby Kostylinu prolezt'. (Garde, 1963/Tolstoj)

climbed Zhilin in hole, so that and Kostylin-DAT pass.trough-INF-PERF

'Zhilin climbed into the hole, so that Kostylin could pass through as well.'

In the sentence given above, the subject of the matrix sentence is not co-referential with the subject of the complement sentence. In the following example, which has a clearer ontic character, the subjects of the two sentences are co-referential:

(248) A chtob nam poprilingualj odet’sja,/My po novoj pojdem vorovat'.125 (Song text from the film Respublika Shkid, 1966)

and in order to we-DAT better dress-INF-PERF,/we again go steal-INF-IMPERF

'In order to dress ourselves better,/We go out stealing again.'

In both these sentences one can actually speak of the *deblocking* of an action: an action is performed in order to facilitate the occurrence of another action. In other words: there is a situation where the agent wants to realize the action, but is not in the position to do so, and a situation where the blockage is taken away, and the obstacles to realizing the action are overcome. Note that all cases with *chtoby* and a dative have a clear ontic nature; a paraphrase with modal predicates of possibility *(udast’sja, smoch’t;* etc.) does not convey the actual meaning of the construction.

4.10.2.6 Sentences without a dative subject that express possibility

The possibility interpretation occurs in some cases with infinitive sentences where no dative is expressed. Because of the absence of the dative subject, and the impossibility of inserting a dative subject in such sentences, these cases cannot be seen as uses of the DI-construction. I will, however, briefly discuss such sentences as well, since they are semantically related to the DI-construction.

Three groups of infinitive sentences without dative that express possibility can be distinguished: (i) sentences with *vidat’* (*styxat’*), which have a strong phraseological

125 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyt/11/11p.lat.html

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certainty, (ii) sentences with *tol'ko*, and (iii) sentences without restrictive context. I will briefly discuss them below.

An example of a sentence with *vidat* is given below:

(249)    Srazu *vidat*, chto principal'nyj. (K. Paustovskij, Nachalo nevedomogo veka)  
    immediate see-INF-IMPERF, that man.of.principle  
    'You can see immediately that he is a man of principle.'

The construction with *vidat* also occurs with negation:

(250)    Celi bylo ne *vidat*.126 (V. Pikul', Rekviem karavanu PQ-17)  
    target-GEN was-NEUT not see-INF  
    'The target wasn’t visible.'

In older stages of Russian, sentences with *vidat* (and *s/yxat*) also occurred with a dative, but in modern Russian this use has become obsolete. In modern Russian, *vidat* can also function as a parenthetic word, expressing something like ‘clearly’:

(251)    Pomer, *vidat*, ot natugi.127 (J. Burkin & S. Luk'janenko, Ostrov Rus')  
    died, see-INF, from tension  
    'He died, clearly, from tension/effort/.'

Because of the phraseological character of sentences with *vidat*, I will not discuss them here, but confine myself to the non-phraseological cases.

The infinitive predicate can occur with the form *tol'ko*, as in the following sentences, where *tol'ko* modifies a specification or argument of the infinitive:

(252)    Tol'ko s ptich'im shepetom i *s/ravnit* bylo zvonkij Polin golosok. (Russkaja Grammatika,  
    1980, II: 376/Leon.)  
    only with birds sound and compare-INF-PERF was-NEUTER clear of.Polin voice  
    'You could only compare the clear voice of Polja with the singing of a bird.

(253)    Vnov' vernutsja zhuravli. Tol'ko ix *vstrechat* vesnoju.128  
    again will.return cranes, just them meet-INF-IMPERF in.spring

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126 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/PIKULX/req_pq17.txt  
127 http://moshkow.relline.ru:5000/lat/LUKXQN/russ.txt  
128 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyt/L1/L1.40.lat.html
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‘Again the cranes will return. You can only meet them in spring.’

The expression of the restrictive form *tol’ko* may trigger a possibility interpretation because these can be seen as cases of partial negation (cf. the analysis of cases with a dative). Since no intention to realize the infinitive can be ascribed to a specific agent, but rather to a generic agent, sentences like these, in contrast to cases with a dative, do not express the idea of ‘succeeding’. As I mentioned above, cases without dative are less restricted than cases with a dative. This may be connected with the fact that in personal sentences, by using a form expressing possibility (*udat’ija, (j)moch*), one can place more emphasis on the possibility. In the case of subjectless sentences, it may be that the ‘generic’ nature of the subject, and hence the general character of the proposition, are expressed by the infinitive construction, than by oppositional forms or constructions. It is possible that the occurrence of the imperfective aspect in (253) is also connected with the more general character, and the fact that no intention to realize the infinitive situation is ascribed to a specific agent.

Besides sentences with *tol’ko* sentences with a possibility reading without *tol’ko* occur:

(254)  
Takix ljudej po pal’cam *pereschitat*'. *(Russkaja Grammatika, 1980, II: 377)*  
such people-ACC on fingers count-INF-PERF  
‘You can count such people on your fingers.’

(255)  
Posredi lesnoj tishi, gde rukoj *dostat* do neba, – ja stoju v sugrobax snega (...). *(Brizin, 1990: 230/Cybin)*  
amongst wood silence, where with hand touch-INF-PERF to sky, I stand in piles of snow (...)  
‘Amongst the silence of the wood, where one can reach the sky with one’s hand, I was standing in piles of snow.’

(256)  
Tak u nej bylo umno izdelano: takaja ljul’ka bol’shaja, vrode dvuspal’naja, i tuda i sjuda *klast*’. *(Timofeev, 1950: 281/L. Tolstoj)*  
so with her was smart done: such cradle big, type double.bed, and there and here put-INF-IMPERF  
‘So it was very well done: a big cradle, like a double bed, and you could put it everywhere.’

In contrast to the sentences with a dative that express possibility, we do not find the context of deblocking in the case of the impersonal sentences under discussion (*constast, Tol’ko, interrogative sentence, *xat*, *chtoby*). An exception can possibly be made for (254) with the modification *po pal’am* (‘on your fingers’); this modification can
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possibly be seen as a negative context, comparable to *tol’ko*. A similar analysis cannot, however, be given for the other examples.\textsuperscript{129}

As I remarked above, in older stages of Russian, this specific use of the infinitive was possibly less restricted than it is now. In modern Russian such cases are normally expressed with the adverbal predicate *mozhno* (‘may’). Since I have not attested many examples of sentences like these it is difficult to analyze them thoroughly, so I will confine myself to a few observations.

Firstly, they do not clearly express the idea of *succeeding* in doing an action. This can be motivated by the absence of the dative participant. If no agent is expressed, we do not attribute an intention to a specific agent to realize the action, but only to a generic agent. Secondly, in these sentences, the possibility is not a property of the non-specified agent, like in the case of sentences with a dative. Sentences without dative subject have the following structure: an object, referent (which may be a situation or a place) is such (has such properties), that it makes the realization of the infinitive action by some contextually given agent (or generic agent if no agent is given in the context) possible. In other words, the deblocking is provided by the particular properties of the referent. As such, the deblocking is less strong than in the case of sentences with a dative subject. A sentence like the following is not possible:

\[(257) \quad \text{?Posredi lesnoj tishi mne rukoj dostat' do neba.} \]
\[\text{amongst wood silence I-DAT with.hand reach sky} \]

The specific contexts that trigger a possibility interpretation in the case of subject-datives are listed above.

In all sentences given here the predicative adverb *mozhno* can be inserted. Sentences with *mozhno* essentially have the same structure as the infinitive sentences under discussion. The modal adverb of (im)possibility *nel'zja / mozhno* can be used to express (im)possibility only in the case of a generic subject, i.e. if it is not combined with a dative subject:

\[(258) \quad \text{Na ètom avtobuse mozhno/nel'zja doexat' do centra.} \]
\[\text{in that bus can-ADV/cannot-ADV reach-INF-PERF to center} \]
\[\text{‘One can(not) reach the center with that bus.’} \]

\[(259) \quad \text{Ètu zadachu mozhno reshit' ochen' bystro.} \]

\textsuperscript{129} It may be that the context of deblocking in (255) is connected with the interrogative form *gде*. 

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that problem can-ADV solve-INF-PERF very quickly
‘One can solve that problem very quick.’

In combination with a dative subject it expresses deontic (im)possibility, i.e.
prohibition/permission:

(260)    Ej nel’zja est’ sladkoe.
she-DAT cannot-ADV eat-INF-IMPERF sweet
‘She may not eat sweet things.’

(261)   Tebe mozhno vojti.
you-DAT may-IMP go-in-INF-PERF
‘You may enter.’

Sentences with mozhno and dative with a non-permissive possibility interpretation occur
only if the possibility can be seen as induced by some external force, that is, if
circumstances, and not an inherent property of the agent, give you the possibility of
realizing Y:

(262)    …, i serdce nachalo tak sil’no bit’sja, chto drugomu mozhno bylo slyshat’ ego. (Scholz,
1973: 151/Gogol’).
…, and heart started so forceful beat, that other-DAT can-ADV was-NEUT hear-
INF-IMPERF him
‘And the heart started to beat so hard, that someone else could hear it.’

(263)   A mozhno mne teper’ dogadat’sja, chto proizoshlo v tex parax, gde partnery soxranili
podstrojku?2130 (Text on hypnosis)
and can-ADV I-DAT now guess, what went.on in those couples, where partners kept
arrangement
‘And is it now possible for me to guess what happened with those couples that kept the
arrangement?(...)’

(264)    Vojna byla konchena. Nakonec mne mozhno bylo exat’ k moim roditeljam. (A.
Pushkin, Arab Petra velikogo)
war was ended. allast I-DAT may-ADV was go-INF-IMPERF to my parents
‘The war had ended. At last I could go to my parents.’


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(265) Prochitav neskol'ko stranic, on axnul, reshiv, chto u nego belaja gorjachka. Ego napugalo bol'she vsego to, chto emu — znachit — nel'zja dal'she pit', a do litra vodki on ne dobral eshche 200 gramm.\(^{131}\) (J. Mamleev, Tetrad' individukst) after reading some pages, he sighed, deciding, that at him white fever, him frightened most of all that, that he-DAT — means — may.not-ADV further drink, but till liter of vodka he not took still 200 gramm

'After reading some pages, he sighed, and decided that he had delirium tremens. The main reason to be frightened of this was because he couldn’t drink anymore, and there were still only 200 grams left from the liter of vodka.'

In the case of both the sentences given earlier and the sentences with možhno, the possibility to do the infinitive situation is not so much a property of the agent of the infinitive; cases of possibility where the possibility is the result of an internal property are expressed with the verb možh'. Two questions have to be asked here: (a) What is the difference between cases with and without možhno?, and (b) Why is the context of deblocking less strong than in the case of sentences with a dative?

The answer for (b) is probably connected with the absence of the dative, and the difference between this type of possibility and the possibility of cases with a dative. In the case of the sentences with a dative subject, the subject must be seen as a recipient. A possibility interpretation occurs only in those cases where the idea of deblocking is in accordance with the idea of recipienthood. These cases are restricted to contexts where there is some kind of ontic deblocking, or physical deblocking. In sentences without dative subject, no such restriction occurs. In these sentences the possibility interpretation is connected with the association of the infinitive agent with a generic agent. This act of relating can be compared to ‘it is the case that’. In many sentences this ‘it is the case that’ character has no clear modal nature. Consider the following sentences where we find no modal interpretation:

(266) [Ogneva] … Vechero m — v poezd, i — zabyt' i spat' … Prosnut'sja daleko, daleko, — v okne mel'kaju telegrafnye stolby. (Bondarko & Bulanin, 1967/A. Tolstoj)

[Ogneva] … at night — in train, and — forget-INF-PERF and sleep-INF-IMPERF… dream-INF-PERF far, far, — in window flash telegraph poles

'At night — in the train, forget and sleep … To wake up, far far away, in the window the flash of telegraph poles.'

(267) Kak prioted — spat'. \(^{132}\) (L. Leonov, Barsuki)

\(^{131}\) http://www.rvb.ru:8090/mamleev/01prose/2stories/2centre/01-2-2-24.htm
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how comes home – sleep-INF-IMPERF
‘As soon as he comes home – he goes to sleep.’

(268) Da ved’ emu tol’ko glazom mignut’, on takim by psom obzavelsja, chto axnut’.
(Bulgakov, Sobach’e serdie)
yes PRT he-DAT only with.eye blink-INF-PERF, he such dog IRR obtained, that
gasp-INF-PERF
‘Well, he only had to blink, and he would have gotten a dog that makes you gasp.’

In the first sentence a scene is introduced (Vechero m – v poezd) and it is stated that in this situation the infinitive action applies (people do this action in this situation).133 In the second sentence it is expressed that as soon as the subject comes home, the infinitive action is the case. In this sentence the infinitive is interpreted as ‘the action will take place’. In (268) it is expressed that if a particular situation is the case (he has the dog), the infinitive action will also be the case; in this sentence the infinitive is interpreted as ‘will take place because of the influence of the given situation’. In all these sentences the use of the infinitive stresses the type character of the action; (What does the agent do in the given situation? It is the infinitive action that applies/is the case).

Why do we not find a possibility interpretation in these sentences? A possibility interpretation occurs in those cases where we can ascribe an intention to the generic agent to realize the action (favored by the perfective aspect), and where circumstances make the realization of the action possible. Note that in many cases it is not clear whether one should speak of a possibility interpretation, necessity interpretation, or an ‘applies’ situation; this is the case for example in (266) above. The ‘hybrid’ nature of the interpretation of the sentences under discussion may be the answer for (b). Sentences with the predicative adverb moshtno express possibility; sentences without adverb have a less specific modal meaning. In some contexts, it may be, that such an underspecified modality is more appropriate.134

132 http://moshkow.otsk.ru/Library/lat/LEONOWL/barsuki.txt
133 Compare Dutch: Bij ons is het liegen, bedriegen en geroddel. (Daklozenkrant); (at us is lie-INF, cheat-INF and gossip-INF). Sentences like these can in principle be interpreted differently, depending on the context, as cases of necessity, possibility or ‘is the case’.
134 In older stages of Russian the situation was different because of the different linguistic system, more specifically because of the absence, or different use of moshtno. It may be that the meaning of permanent possibility, remarked by Vinogradov & Shvedova (1964: 337), was therefore more freely expressed by infinitive sentences than it is now.
4.11 The DI-construction with the subordinators *pered tem, kak, chtoby, and esli*

The DI-construction can occur as a subordinate clause introduced by the subordinator of anteriority *pered tem, kak* ("before"), with the subordinator of purpose *chtoby* ("in order"), and with the conditional subordinator *esli* ("if"). Because of the subordinate context, the occurrence of the dative subject in these cases depends on the semantics of the subordinator. As I have mentioned before, I will analyze such sentences as subordinate clauses with infinitival predicates.

Sentences with the subordinators under discussion and a dative are rather infrequent in modern Russian. The standard rule for *pered tem, kak* and *chtoby* and an infinitive (e.g. (71)–(72)) is that the agent of the situation mentioned in the principal clause is co-referential with the non-expressed infinitive agent; in such cases the agent of the infinitive action is not expressed, but can be inferred from the context. In the case of *esli* (e.g. (73)) the infinitive agent remains unspecified, and is interpreted as the generic agent.

What these constructions have in common is that, relative to the moment expressed by the subordinator, the infinitive situation is projected in a hypothetical world or space. A construction with another conjunction such as the conjunction of posteriority and the infinitive is therefore not possible:

(269)  *A posle togo, kak zabolet*, ochen’ skoro umer.
      but after that how become.ill-INF, very soon died

Bricyn (1990: 284) notes that constructions with *esli* are never oriented on the past

(270)  *Esli vstavat* rano, uvidel rassvet.
      if get up-INF early, saw.3sg dawn

The occurrence of the dative subject in sentences with the above-mentioned subordinators is often treated as a purely syntactic phenomenon, especially in the generative literature (e.g. Schoorlemmer, 1995; for cases with *pered tem, kak*), or as a means to avoid co-reference disturbance (Rubinstein, 1986, for cases with *chtoby*). Below I will argue that the claim that the dative subject does not have experiencer semantics in the case of the subordinators under discussion cannot be maintained. As I will argue, all cases with a dative have experiencer semantics, and can, as such, be seen as instances of the DI-construction.
4.11.1 The DI-construction with *pered tem, kak* ('before')

Below we find examples of the DI-construction with the conjunction of anteriority *pered tem, kak* ('before'):

(271)  *Pered tem, kak nam pojavitsja v Leninoj kvartire, dushevnij papa pobytal na obed i predusmotritel'no zagotovil sebe na vecher 10 litrovui kanistru piva (...)*.135

*Before we-DAT appear-INF-PERF in of.Lena house, understanding father stayed on dinner and foresightfully prepared for.self on evening 10 jerry.can of.beer (...)*

‘Before we were to appear in Lena’s house, her understanding father had dinner, and foresightfully prepared himself a jerry can with 10 litres of beer for the evening.’

(272)  *Za den’ pered tem, kak im pribyt’ v Sautgempton, mama sprosilat, xochetsja li ej snova uvidet’ Ajju.*136 (R. Kipling, *Dejat’ ibornikov rasskazov*)

till day before they-DAT arrive-INF-PERF in Southampton, mama asked, want PR T she again see Ajju

‘A day before they were to arrive in Southampton, mama asked whether she would like to see Ajju again.’

(273)  *Pered tem kak nam uzhe uxoedit’ na pristan’, podoshel staruxin syn.* (Proeme, forthcoming/A. Gajdar, *Sud’ba barabamshchika*)

*Before we-DAT already go.out-INF-IMPERF to pier, came of.old.woman son*

‘Before we went to the pier, the son of the old woman came up to us.’

(274)  *Pered tem, kak sluchit’ja vsej etoj istorii, ja spokojno pisala svoego Chonkina (...).* (I. Vojnovich, *Ian’kiada ili Rasskazy a veslennii pisatel’ia Vojnovicha v novuyu kvartiru*)

*Before happen-INF-PERF this history, I quietly wrote my Chonkin*

‘Before this history was going to happen, I was quietly writing my Chonkin.’

(275)  *[N]ochi za dve pered tem, kak baryshne umeret’, gljanula na tualet, a v zerkale stoi kto-to belyj-belyj, kak mel, da dlinnyj-predlynnyj!* (I. Bunin, *Rasskazy*)

*nights over two before lady die-INF-PERF, looked at toilette, but in mirror stands someone white white, like chalk, but long-very.long!*

‘Two nights before the lady was to die, I looked at my appearance, but in the mirror I saw someone very white, like chalk, and very tall.’


136 http://kulichki-lat.rambler.ru/moshkow/KIPLING/rasskazy.txt
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(276) [Pushkin] zanimałsja swoim ‘Sovremennikom’ i za chas pered tem, kak emu exat’ streljat’šja, napisal pis’mo k Ishimovoj (...) (Proeme, forthcoming)

Pushkin was working on his ‘Sovremennik’ and over hour before, he-DAT go-INF shoot-INF-IMPERF, wrote letter to Ishimova.

‘Pushkin was working on his ‘Sovremennik’ and an hour before he went to duel, he wrote a letter to Ishimova.’

(277) Ja vynuzhdën byl unosit’ s soboj iz stolovoj v spal’nju tot dragocennyj, xrupkij poceluj, kotoryj mama imela obyknovenie darit’ mne, kogda ja lezhal v posteli, pered tem kak mne zasnut’ (...).

I accustomed was take with me from dining-room to sleeping.room that dear, fragile kiss, that mama habit give me, when I laid in bed, before I-DAT fall.asleep-INF-PERF

(...) ‘I was accustomed to taking the kiss with me from the dining room to the sleeping room, that dear, fragile kiss, that my mama always gave me, when I laid in bed, before falling asleep.’

Note that in most sentences the agent of the infinitive is not co-referential with the agent of the situation in the main clause; exceptions are sentence (276) and (277). Furthermore, all sentences have an ‘ontic’ character, which is underlined in some cases by the English translation with the construction [be + to INF].

Schoorlemmer (1995: 64) argues that the dative in the case of infinitival complements of anteriority (pered tem kak) must be seen as a so-called structural dative. She claims about infinitive complements with conjunctions of anteriority that the “[s]tructural dative case is not connected to experiencer semantics”. An analysis such as the one given by Schoorlemmer leaves many questions unanswered. It does not motivate (a) why the infinitive is assigned a dative subject, (b) why in some instances of the DI-construction we find modal interpretations, whereas in others no clear modality is expressed, and (c) what the difference in meaning is between cases with and without a dative.

I wish to argue that the specific features of the DI-construction mentioned above can be motivated by the meaning of the DI-construction given earlier, viz. the participant expressed in the dative is the recipient of a situation type, and the meaning of pered tem, kak. In the construction under discussion, the conjunction pered tem, kak indicates a situation just before the intended or expected realization of another situation. The idea of expected course of events is realized differently. In some cases the external force

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137 http://moshkow.orsk.ru/Library/lat/INPROZ/PRUST/swan.txt
can be identified with a plan or script (as in before we were to appear), or something like ‘the way things go’ (as in before she was to die). Such cases share properties with ontic necessitive cases. The construction under discussion can be represented in a simplified way as shown in Figure 4.18.

Figure 4.18

\[
\text{HYPOTHETICAL WORLD} \\
\begin{array}{c}
\text{EF} = \text{fate, script, plan} \\
\text{INF} \rightarrow \text{DAT}
\end{array}
\]

In this construction the dative participant is the recipient of an action assigned to him by a force, which may be identified with a script/plan or ontic force (‘the way things go’).

In some sentences, the external force can be identified with some planned or intended action that the subject is just about to realize. This is the case for example in (273); in this sentence it is expressed that the subject of the sentence wanted to realize a particular action, but was stopped in the realization of this action due to the circumstances expressed in the main clause. Note that the occurrence of the modal particle уже (‘already’) in (273) is connected with the specific meaning of the construction: it expresses that according to some plan or script the time had come to realize the infinitive action. The use of this particle stresses that according to plan, the infinitive situation was just about to be realized.

The analysis given here motivates why the dative is not expressed in the case of президир chem. In the case of the conjunction of anteriority президир chem, the anteriority is not specified with respect to closeness. This complementizer indicates that there is a temporal order of anteriority between events X and Y, and focuses on the realization of the situation expressed in the main-clause. In the case of the sentences with перед тем, как the contribution of the conjunction is not only to express that there exists a temporal order between two events, but also to stress that the action of the subject in the main clause occurs just before the moment that is ‘predestined’ to be the moment on which the action of the infinitive will occur. As such, the meaning of this conjunction is in accordance with the ontic character of the DI-construction.

\[138\] Schoorlemmer (1994: 63) does not observe this and treats them equally, even changing the conjunction in (10) to президир chem.
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The ontic character that we find in the DI-construction is absent in sentences without a dative and in sentences with a finite verb; compare:

(278) Pered tem, kak nagnut'sja, ona posmotrela v nebo. (V. Aksenov, Ozhyg)
between bend.down-INF, she looked at sky
'Just before she bent down, she looked at the sky.'

(279) A moj kollega po koktejlju, kak mne potom rasskazali, ushel kak raz pered tem, kak ja poshel v tualet.139
but my colleague by cocktail, as me afterwards they.told, went.away immediately
before I went to toilet
'But my cocktail companion went away, as they told me afterwards, just before I went to the toilet.'

In (278) no reference is made to the ontic nature of the events; the conjunction + infinitive points to the moment just before the realization of the infinitive situation. The ontic nature is also not expressed in (279); note that in this sentence the infinitive cannot be used because this would lead to co-reference disturbance.

4.11.2 The DI-construction with chtoby ('(in order) to')

Below we find examples of the DI-construction with the conjunction of anteriority chtoby ('in order'):

(280) Kstati, ja koe-chto zaberu, chtoby tebe zavtra ne tashchit' mnogo. (Proeme, forthcoming)
by.the.way, I something take, in.order you-DAT tomorrow not carry-INF-IMPERF much
'By the way, I will take something, so that you won't have to carry much tomorrow.'

(281) Na to ved' i moe prizvan'c, Chtob ne skuchali rasstojan'ja, Chtoby za gorodskoju gran'ju/Zemle ne toskovat' odnoj. (The Penguin book of Russian verse, 1962/B. Pasternak)
(...) So.that beyond town boundary/earth-DAT not pine-INF-IMPERF alone-DAT
'It is my calling, after all, to see that distances do not feel lonely and that beyond the town boundary the earth does not pine in solitude.'

(282) Nashe schast'e v otkrytom puti / V tom chtob rodine jarche cvesti / Chtob v prostorax skvoz' versty / Serdce druga najti. 140 (Songtext, 1960)

our happiness in open road/in that in-order homeland-DAT clearer shine-INF-IMPERF/in-order in spaces though wersst/heart-ACC friend find-INF-PERF

‘Our happiness lies in the open road/In that the homeland will shine brighter/To find the heart of a friend miles away in the spacious fields.’

(283) Oni zhdut poezda, kotoryj ix povezet, chtoby im ne opozdat' kuda-to. (Rubinstein, 1986: 367/Okudzhava)

they waited for-INF train, that them will.take, in order they-DAT not be.late-INF-PERF somewhere

‘They wait for the train which will take them, so that they won’t be late.’

As I remarked above, in most sentences with chtoby and an infinitival predicate, the identity of the non-expressed infinitive agent is non-specified, and contextually given. In the sentences above, however, the dative is expressed to identify the potential subject of the infinitive. Note that in the case of infinitives with indirect objects in their valence, this interpretation is not possible; in these cases the dative is interpreted as the indirect object of the infinitive verb, e.g.:141

(284) Emu i tak bylo nelovko, da eshche eto “tpru-u”! Chto on, loshad' chto li, chtoby emu govori' “tpru-u”?142 (V. Krukovskij, Mys Traxtankut)

(...) what he, horse, or something, in.order he-DAT speak-INF-IMPERF “tpru-u”?! ‘He felt already so uncomfortable, and then also that “giddy-up”’! As if he was some kind of horse, to say “giddy-up” to him?!

The use of infinitival clauses with chtoby and a dative subject is analyzed by Rubinstein (1986). Rubinstein states that the occurrence of the dative subject in infinitive clauses of purpose (ICPs) in Russian is much more restricted now than it was in the past, but still occurs in colloquial and popular speech.143 Rubinstein shows in his article that when stylistic conditions are satisfied, certain structural factors come into play. The use of the dative subject in ICPs is favored by co-reference disturbance (complete co-reference, partial or obscured co-reference with the matrix subject, contrastive emphasis, lack of

140 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyr/L2/L2.39.lat.html
141 At least, in all the examples that I have attested this was the interpretation at stake.
142 http://www.litera.ru:8085/slova/krukovsky/traxtk.html
143 Nikiforov (1952: 207) discusses infinitive sentences with chtoby and a dative from the second half of the sixteenth century; the sentences he discusses are classified as cases of necessity (‘dolzhenvovanie’).
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

expressed matrix subject); in the case of co-reference disturbance, the use of the subject-dative is usually obligatory in ICPs, since it is the only means of avoiding ambiguity. Rubinstein also observes that the use of the subject-dative in the ICP is favored by negation. As Rubinstein (1986: 373) remarks, some instances of the construction are not possible without negation:

(285)  Ja prines dokumenty, chtoby mne ne byt' na sude goloslovnym.
       I brought documents, in order I-DAT not be-INF in court without.motivation
       'I brought the documents, so that I wouldn't be in court without motive.'

(286)  Ja prines dokumenty, chtoby (*mne) pokazat' ix na sude.
       I brought documents, in order (I-DAT) show-INF-PERF them in court

(287)  Ja luchshe pojdu tuda sam, chtoby mne ne prosit' ego lishnj raz.
       I better go there myself, in order I-DAT not ask-INF-PERF him another time
       'I'd better go there myself, so that I don't have to ask him another time.'

(288)  Ja luchshe pojdu tuda sam, chtoby (*mne) prosit' ego lishnj raz.
       I better go there myself, in order (I-DAT) ask-INF-PERF him another time

Rubinstein notes about this phenomenon that "[t]he action of negation can probably be accounted for by the semantics of negative ICPs similar to that of certain modal structures in which the DAT [subject-dative] is often expressed" (1986: 376-7). He also remarks about his study: "Nor does it treat such important problems as the relation of ICPs to infinitival sentences and the grammatical status of the DAT [subject-dative]" (1986: 377).

In my opinion, the intuition expressed by Rubinstein that there is a relation between modal infinitives and ICPs with a dative subject is essentially correct but should be put more strongly: ICPs with a dative subject are instances of the modal infinitive construction. If we recognize this we can motivate the distribution of the ICPs with a dative subject by means of the meaning of the construction and the meaning of chtoby. The modal nature of the construction can have the character of future-oriented possibility, (negation of) epistemic necessity, and negation of deontic necessity.

The particular use of the construction must be motivated by the meaning of chtoby and the meaning of the DI-construction. The subordinator chtoby expresses the goal of an action, and as such situates the intended goal in a hypothetical world; in combination with the DI-construction, this goal is the situation that some participant is the recipient of an
action type. The goal character accounts for the future oriented nature of the construction that we find in all cases, and motivates why the ICP with a dative subject rejects past or future tense of *byt’* (Rubinstein, 1986: 377). The meaning of the construction can further motivate the specific distribution, and why the action of a negation favors the subject-dative. The specific contexts of use can be explained pragmatically.

One can do an action to facilitate the occurrence of another action intended by some agent; this is only possible in cases of deblocking. One can do an action to facilitate the non-occurrence of a non-intended action by some agent; in that case the sentence can be paraphrased with *ne nuzhno*. One can do an action in order to facilitate the occurrence or non-occurrence of some action because one wants the occurrence or non-occurrence of the situation oneself. In that case the intention to do the action of the infinitive agent is not considered; case one can speak of (absence of) epistemic-ontic necessity. The pragmatic possibilities of the construction can be schematized as shown in Table 4.6.

### Table 4.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>‘will’</th>
<th>‘can’</th>
<th>‘does not have to’</th>
<th>‘won’t’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Onitic necessity</td>
<td>Onitic possibility</td>
<td>Absence (de)ontic necessity</td>
<td>Absence ontic necessity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention Inf</td>
<td>not considered</td>
<td>+ (perfective)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>not considered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negation</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deblocking</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have not seen examples of deontic necessity and impossibility in affirmative sentences, although I think that it should in principle be possible in those cases where you do an action to make the action necessary for someone else (I do X such that Y has to do Z), or to take away the impossibility of some action.

I suspect that (286) is unacceptable because of the valency of *pokazat’* (+3) and because the DI-construction with a perfective infinitive only occurs without negation if some kind of deblocking is involved; such cases have a so-called ‘possibility’ interpretation. It may be that in (286) the idea of deblocking is not sufficiently sustained by the context.

---

144 In one of his own examples *bylo* is expressed: *Ja dlia sebja ce [mukuj], che li, prijatelja, dlia sebja beregli? Dlia vas zhe, parazyty vy nenaednye, chtab vam zastra bylo ch zhevav’? Chtab vam zhe s golodu ne podoxxnut’* (Rubinstein, 1986: 372/Rasputin). In this sentence, however, *bylo* does not refer to a past event.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

of the sentence: we do not first have a situation where the subject is blocked (first I was not in the position to show the documents in court) and then a situation where this blockage is taken away. The precise nature of deblocking in sentences like these needs further analysis.

Finally, an answer must be given to the question of how sentences with a dative differ from ICPs without a dative. A reason to express the dative may be that the expression of the dative leads to a stronger modal character than in those sentences where no dative is expressed. I suspect that the expression of a dative in ICPs may stress the modal nature of the scene; the unification of the non-specified infinitive agent with a specific agent focuses on the imposing or deblocking of an action. Take the following ICP without a dative subject:

(289) Bez ljubovnoj uslady/Ne xo Chu bol'she zhit'/Est' eshche v skljanke jadu/Chtoby zhizn' prekratit'.
without love delight/not want further live/is still in phial poison/In.order life end-INF
‘Without the delight of love/I do not want to live any further/There is still poison in
the phial/To end my life.’

In this sentence the phrase Chtoby zhizn' prekratit' (‘to end my life’) can be seen as a complement to jadu. Here it is not possible to express the dative (mne) because this would imply that the poison exists to facilitate the realization of the infinitive action.

4.11.3 The DI-construction with esli (‘if’)

Below some find examples are given of the DI-construction with the subordinator of condition esli. Such sentences can be called ‘infinitive complements of condition (ICC):

Affirmative sentences with negation

(290) Esli zakljuchen no m u ne perestukivat'sja, tak chto emu i delat'? (Proeme,
forthcoming/A. Solzhenicyn, Arxipelag Gulag)
if prisoner-DAT not communicate.by.tapping-INF-IMPERF, then, what he-DAT and
do-INF?
‘If a prisoner may not communicate by tapping, what else should/could he do?’

145 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyr/D5/D5.11.lat.html
Chapter IV

(291) [M]ozhet delo dojti do ubijstva, esli emu ne zhit' oddeľ'no za stenoj (...) (Proeme forthcoming/L. Petrushevskaja, P'zy)
can case go till murder, if he-DAT not live-INF-IMPERF separate behind wall
'People may get killed, if he will not/may not live behind a separate wall.'

(292) [E]sli on umret prezhdе, chem budet postavleno "Kol'co", on zaveshchaet partituru
Listu s tem, chtoby poslednij szeg ee, esli emu uzhe ne dostich' ispolnenija ee v
zhelaemom duxe 146 (Text on Wagner)
if he dies before, then will be performed 'The Ring', he dedicates score to.List with
that, in order last burned it, if he-DAT already not achieve-INF-PERF performance
of it in wished spirit
'In case he dies before the 'Ring' is performed, he dedicates the score to List with the
task to burn it, if he does not achieve the performance of the piece in the way he
wants.'

Affirmative sentences without negation

(293) Esli delu tomu sdelat'sja, tak razve na tu zimu (Ebeling, 1984: 116/Mel'nikov).
if case-DAT that-DAT do-INF-PERF, then PRT in that winter
'If we have to do it anyway, then it's better to do it next winter.'

(294) Net, brat, izvini, uzh koli chemu na vystavku itti, tak razve etoj gruppe. (ibid.)
no, brother, sorry, PRT if that-DAT to exhibition go-INF, then PRT that-DAT group-DAT
'No brother, sorry, if anyone goes to the exhibition, then it will be that group.'

Interrogatives

(295) Ja podumal, chto esli mne ne shevelit'sja, zameret', oni zabudut o moem prisustvii.
147(K. Lomer, Planeta katastrof)
I thought, that if I-DAT not move-INF-IMPERF, freeze-INF-PERF, they will forget
about my presence
'I thought that if I didn't move, and if I froze, they would forget about my presence.'

(296) Chto esli mne samoj odnazhdы k vam pod vecher zajti? (...) Chto esli mne igrushku
synu vtoeru podarit'218

147 http://icc.migsv.ru/library/lat/LJVUMER/plcatast.txt
148
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

what if I-DAT self-DAT once to you near evening go-INF-PERF? (...) what if I-DAT
toy to:son your give-INF-PERF
‘What if I came to you in the evening sometime. What if I gave your son some presents?’

A chto vy skazhete, esli nam sejchas kupit' vodka i pojit' ko mne. (D. Xarms, 1991: 410)
and what you say, if we-DAT now buy-INF-PERF vodka and go-INF-PERF to me.
‘What do you think, how about if we bought some vodka and went to my place.’

As I remarked above, hypothetical sentences with esli and an infinitive usually occur
without dative; in those cases the non-specified infinitive agent is unified with the
generic subject. Sentences with esli + infinitive express a hypothetical scene (expressed
by esli) where the infinitive situation is the case; such sentences can be paraphrased
with ‘if generic agent x (‘one’) does Y’. In such cases the modal character of the
sentence is less clear than in cases where the ICC occurs with a dative. In sentences
with a dative, the scene expressed by the infinitive clause is not just interpreted as
‘being the case’, but rather as something that is assigned to the dative participant by
some force. I would like to assert that the occurrence of the dative is triggered by a
specific context, viz. a context where the initial information state is that the dative
participant will not do the infinitive situation, and where this information state is
contradicted in the hypothetical world opened up by esli. I will briefly discuss these
contexts below.

In sentence (290) the dative can be motivated because the speaker holds that the
realization of the infinitive situation should be the case, and gives an invitation to
imagine the undesirable situation where a force interdicts the proposed realization. In
this sentence the dative can be motivated because there is an emphasis on the fact that
the subject will not even do the infinitive situation. Put differently, the speaker proposes
that one assume something to be the case that one would normally not assume to be
the case because it is highly inappropriate. Note that in contrast to the regular
impossibility interpretation of the DI-construction this force may also be a deontic
force, such that the construction is interpreted as ‘x may not do Y’.149

Sentence (291) is similar to (290); here the speaker also holds that the realization of
the infinitive situation should be the case, and claims that if the way things go is such

148 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyr/L2/L2.44.lat.html
149 The DI-construction never expresses deontic impossibility. The interpretation of the force as a deontic
interdicting force in the construction with esli is not clear to me.
that this realization is blocked, bad things will happen. In this case the occurrence of the dative can be motivated by the *ontic* character of the sentence.

In (292) the occurrence of the dative is facilitated by the particle *uzbe*. This particle stresses that there is no way in which the infinitive situation can still be realized. This case is close to regular uses of the DI-construction that express impossibility (not succeeding).

In non-interrogative affirmative sentences like (293) and (294) the force that assigns the infinitive situation to the dative participant can be identified with ‘the way things go’. In these sentences the occurrence of the dative is not only triggered by the idea of an ontic force that assigns a situation, under the presupposition that the occurrence of the infinitive action may very well not occur in the actual world; in such sentences one can speak of epistemic deblocking. Sentences like these can be paraphrased as: ‘I don’t think that X will be the case, but let’s suppose for argument’s sake that x is the case.’ I think that such an analysis must also be given for sentence (9) above with negation; in this sentence the speaker asserts that in principle the truck and the combine-harvester are harmless, *provided that* they don’t cross the road. This means that in reality, they may be dangerous.

A similar analysis can be given for interrogative sentences (295)–(297) that all have the character of a suggestion. In (295) and (296) the speaker suggests realizing the infinitive action, while taking into account that the addressee does not agree with the realization of the infinitive situation. In (297) a similar reading occurs; such sentences differ from cases without dative in that the realization of the infinitive action is presented as only a possible situation, that in reality might very well not occur.

### 4.12 Optative sentences without *by* or *tol’ko*

The infinitive can be used with a dative subject to express the wish or desire of the speaker that the infinitive situation will be realized:

(298)    | *Zhit’ vam do sta let!* (Van der Auwer & Plungian, 1998) |
         | live-INF-IMPERF you-DAT till hundred years |
         | ‘May you live a hundred years.’ |

A similar case can be found below, although in this sentence the ontic character of the construction is more straightforward:
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

(299) **Provalit'sja mne na ètom meste!**

disappear-INF-PERF I-DAT on this place
'I will disappear from this place [if I lie]!'

These sentences have an SV order, which is the typical order for optative sentences without optative conjunction (see 3.6.3 for a discussion of the meaning of word order). Van der Auwer a & Plungian (1998) suggest that this use of the infinitive must be seen as a later development of the infinitive, more specifically as a diachronical extension of the meaning of necessity. I do not see this as a necessary conclusion. In my opinion both uses — necessity and wish — can be seen as uses or interpretations of the abstract meaning of the construction. The optative use of the DI-construction can be compared to sentences where the force directed at the realization of the infinitive action can be identified with the stroke of fate, or the way things go. The idea of wish, or desire is attributed by the word order of the sentence and the particular meanings of the forms in the sentence. Compare:

**SV order**

(300) **Vam zhit' do sta let.**

you-DAT live-INF-IMPERF till hundred years
'You will live a hundred years.'

The dative participant is the recipient of the infinitive situation; this means that some force, fate, is directed at the realization of the infinitive situation. In the case of the VS order, the speaker wishes that the dative participant be the recipient of the infinitive action. This means that the speaker expresses his wish that some force, fate, the way things go, be such that the infinitive action is assigned to the dative participant, or that the speaker can be seen as the force that assigns the infinitive action to the dative participant.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ http://kulichki-lat.rambler.ru/moshkow/INPROZ/PAWICH/day.txt

¹⁵¹ The sentences given here are highly idiomatic; in the spoken language, however, this construction is used productively in modern Russian.

¹⁵² The same construction occurs with the particle by; in these sentences the direction or wish by the speaker is weaker because the non-occurrence of the situation is taken into account.
4.13 The DI-construction with *by*

The DI-construction can occur with the particle *by*. The particle *by* expresses that the situation to which it is semantically-syntactically applied, occurs in an 'irreality' world. For these cases the term 'negative epistemic stance' may be used (see Dancygier & Sweetser, 1996). Instances of the DI-construction with *by* can express different shades of necessity, direction, and wish. As I have argued before, the meaning of the construction with *by* can be accounted for by the composition of the meanings of the components in the construction. Such a compositional analysis does not have to posit basic modalities for the construction, such as 'possibility' or 'necessity', or to speak of 'neutralization of modality' (cf. Veyrenc 1979: 45 and Maurice, 1996: 152, who try to analyze instances of the DI-construction with *by* as cases of necessity or possibility). In this section I will briefly discuss the different uses of the DI-construction with *by*, and analyze the process of interpretation.

Uses of the DI-construction that occur with *by* can be schematically represented as in Figure 4.19:

**Figure 4.19**

![](IRREALITY_SCENE.png)

Different cases occur because of the different nature of the external force (speaker, non-speaker dative participant, non-speaker external force), the different nature of the dative subject (first, second, third, person), the presence or absence of negation, the aspect of the infinitive, and the presence of certain particles. The following three main types of the DI-construction with *by* can be distinguished:

(i) \( EF = \text{non-speaker external force (‘way things go’, ‘fate’, ‘norm’, ‘script’)} \)
(ii) \( EF = \text{speaker} \)
(iii) \( EF = \text{non-speaker dative subject} \)

I will briefly discuss these different types below.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

4.13.1 Type I: Sentences where the external force is 'the way things go'

The following sentences are examples of uses of the DI-construction with *by* with an ontic interpretation:

(301)  [V]stretila parnja i poljubila ego, i *byt’ by svad’be, no mat’ ee, Arina, vdrug zauprjamilas*. (…) (B. Pil’njak, *Smeriel’noe manit*)

met guy and fell-in-love with him, and *be-INF IRR wedding-DAT, but mother her, Arina, suddenly objected*

‘She met a guy and fell in love with him, and there would have been a wedding, if her mother, Arina, had not suddenly objected.’

(302)  *Nachinat’ by bylo mne srazu GULAG vmosto vojny, esli by ne shchastlivoe zastupnichestvo.* (A. Solzhenicyn, *Arxipelag Gulag*)

begin-INF IRR was-NEUT I-DAT immediately GULAG in stead of war, if IRR not happy intercession

‘I would have started to work in the GULAG instead of going to war, if it had not been for that fortunate protection.’

(303)  *[N]am zhit’ by, kazalos’, i knigam rasti,/no muzy bezrodnye nas dokonali,/i nyne pora nam iz mira ujti.153 (V. Nabokov, *Poety*)

we-DAT live-INF-IMPERF IRR, it seemed, and books-DAT grow-INF-IMPERF, / but muses homeless us destroyed,/and now time for us from world go. away

‘We would have to live, it seemed, and the books would have to grow, /but the homeless muses destroyed us, /and now it’s time for us to leave the world.’

(304)  *Tu t by emu i ponjat’ vse, no – net, ne soobrazil Voroncov, ne xvatio kriticheskoj massy informacii.*154 (V. Zvjagincev, *Odissej pokidaet Itaku*)

now IRR he-DAT and understand-INF-PERF all, (…) ‘Now he should understand everything, but no, Voroncov did not understand it, the critical mass of information was not sufficient.’

In sentences like these the infinitive situation is placed in a counterfactual world. This counterfactual world may be a world that could have been the case if circumstances had been different, as in (301) and (302). In such sentences the infinitive can be seen as the apodosis of a counterfactual conditional sentence. The conditional structure is

154 http://kulichki-lat.rambler.ru/moshkow/ZWQGINCEW/OdisseyPokidaetItaku2.txt
absent in (303) and (304); in these sentences the counterfactual situation is presented as something which should have been the case, but which in reality was not the case. In all cases the past character of the sentence is inferred from the context.

The sentences under discussion are visually represented in Figure 4.20.

**Figure 4.20**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAST RELATED IREALITY SCENE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>way things go/script</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How can we derive the interpretation of such sentences from the meaning of the construction? We start out from the meaning given earlier and specify it with a context (Figure 4.21).

**Figure 4.21**

x is the recipient of a situation type Y; i.e. Y is not initiated by x

+ context:

(i) The particle by occurs.
(ii) Y can be related to a contrasting past event (often the infinitive clause is part of a conditional sentence (apodosis) or can be interpreted as such).
(iii) The auxiliary by/o may be expressed (see (302)).
(iv) x is expressed in the dative, or if not expressed interpretable as a generic agent.
(v) Y is prototypically imperfective.

**Interpretation:**

The infinitive action is situated in a counterfactual world close to the actual past world, where the dative participant x would have been the recipient of the infinitive action Y:

In a counterfactual world, the dative participant x would have been the recipient of some action type Y; that is, the way things go would have been such that the participant expressed in the dative would have realized the infinitive action.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

In the sentences above the force that is directed at the occurrence of the infinitive situation can be identified with an ontic force.

4.13.2 Type II: Sentences where the external force is the speaker

The DI-construction with by occurs in sentences where the speaker identifies with the external force. The speaker expresses the existence of a counterfactual scene where the way things go is such that the dative participant is the recipient of the infinitive situation. Since the speaker wishes the realization of the infinitive situation, the speaker can be said to identify with the force that ‘assigns’ the infinitive situation to the dative participant.

By using this construction the speaker expresses that he wishes the realization of the infinitive situation, after the moment of speaking, or in a past situation. The following sentences are examples of uses of the DI-construction with by with an interpretation of wish:

**Wish-Necessity pertaining to the future**

(305) **Mne by v vodu vlezen’ sejchas.** 155
I-DAT IRR in water get into now
‘I would like to get into the water now.’

(306) **Otdoxnut’ by bratu.** (Mets, 1985: 385)
rest-INF-PERF IRR brother-DAT
‘The brother should rest/ ‘It would be good if the brother rested.’

(307) – Molokososyl’ – krichal on nam, molodym gazetchikam. (...) V gazete dolzhny byt’ takie rechi, chtoby u chitatelja spiralo dyxanie. A vy chto delaete? Mjamlite! Vam by pisat’ romany o malokrovnyx devicax. (Paustovskij, Nachalo nevdomogo veka)
(…) you-DAT IRR write-INF-IMPERF novels about anemic girls
“Greenhorns!”, he shouted at us, young journalists. (…) “In the newspaper stories should be such that readers have difficulty breathing. And what do you do? You just twaddle. You should write novels about anemic girls.”

155 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lr/M2/M2.04.lat.html

425
Wish-Necessity pertaining to the past

(308)  
Ja proxodil inogda cherez etot gorod/Mne by uvidet’, a ja ego ne zamechal.156 (Song text, 1930)  
I passed sometimes through this city/I-DAT IRR see-INF-PERF, but I him not noticed  
‘I sometimes passed that city. I should have seen him, but I never noticed him.’

(309)  
A mne by ne pet’, a ja vse pel./A mne by sgoret’, a ja ne sgorel (...).157(Song text, 1976)  
but I-DAT IRR not sing-INF-IMPERF, but I all sung, / but I-DAT IRR burn-INF-PERF, but I not burned  
‘I shouldn’t have sung, but I sang anyway, / I should have burned down, but it didn’t happen.’

(310)  
Volod’ke by, konechno, v shutku vse prevratit’. A on ochen’ obidelsja. (Zoshchenko, 1935)  
Little.volodja-DAT IRR, of.course, in joke all change-INF-PERF. but he very  
was.offended  
‘Volod’ka should, of course, have turned everything into a joke. But he was very  
offended.’

The meaning of the construction under discussion can be paraphrased with ‘for x it would be/would have been good to do Y’, as represented in Figure 4.22.

Figure 4.22

---

IF (not) INF  
speaker ———> DAT

---

If the agent in the dative can be seen as the addressee, and the situation can be interpreted as something to which the addressee can actively contribute, the construction can be seen as a directive with the character of advice:

(311)  
Otdoxnut’ by tebe! (Mets, 1985: 358)  
rest-INF-PERF IRR you-DAT

156 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyr/K11/K11.40.lat.html  
157 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyr/D2/D2.04p.lat.html

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‘You should rest’

(312)  Ot'dyxat' by tebe chashche! (Mets, 1985: 358)
rest-INF-IMPERF IRR you-DAT more often
‘You should rest more often.’

This use occurs in both aspects. Oppositional forms of this construction are the imperative and the subjunctive (Ot'doxnî; Ot'doxnîl by tyî).

In constrast to infinitive directives without by, this construction expresses that the realization of the infinitive action by the addressee takes place in an ideal world only; in reality the addressee can refuse to realize the action expressed by the infinitive. Brîcyn (1990: 245) observes that the DI-construction with by cannot be used in cases where it is clear that the infinitive action is positive only for the speaker, and not for the addressee:

(313)  ? Teb e by prinesti mne knigu.
you IRR bring-INF-PERF to.me book
‘You should bring the book.’

This is in accordance with the meaning of the construction I that gave above, viz. ‘for x it would be/would have been good to do Y’. In this case, however, it is possible to use the subjunctive:

(314)  Ty by prînestî ètu knigu.
you IRR brought that book
‘You should bring that book.’

The subjunctive may be used for cases where the realization of the action is positive only for the speaker and for cases where the results are positive for the addressee:

(315)  — Ty by sxodîl v ètot skit, posovetovala mne mama. (K. Paustovskij, Nachalo nevedomogo veka)
you IRR went-IMPERF in that monastery, advised me mama
‘‘You should visit to that monastery’, advised mama.’

158 Note that in the case of this use the dative participant is always expressed: the non-expression of the dative would lead to an interpretation where the speaker is associated with the potential agent. This differs from the directive use of the infinitive without by, where the addressee is usually not expressed.
The difference in use between the DI-construction and the subjunctive cannot be attributed to the meaning of *by*, since this particle occurs in both constructions. The difference in meaning must explained by taking into account the other constituents in the construction. I suspect that the idea of 'for *x* it is good' must be attributed to the presence of the dative in the construction in relation with the other constituents. The exact nature of the dative in this construction needs further explanation.

Note that the ideal world in which the infinitive situation takes place may be a future world or a past world. The difference between these interpretations is attributed by the context, the discourse in which the construction occurs, and in the case of negative sentences, the aspect of the infinitive. I will say more about negative sentences below.

I will now briefly discuss the process of interpretation of this construction. The process of interpretation can be analyzed as follows (in Figure 4.23).

**Figure 4.23**

**x is the recipient of a situation type Y; i.e. Y is not initiated by x**

*+ syntactic-semantic features:*

(i) The particle *by* occurs.

(ii) X occurs in all persons; if X is not expressed it is prototypically interpreted as referring to the speaker, and in some specific cases to a generic agent.

(iii) Y can be negated.

(iv) In the case of a first person *lo’ko* and *lish’* can be expressed.

(v) Y occurs in both aspects.

(vi) Both dative-infinitive, and infinitive-dative order occurs.

(vii) The infinitive can occur in a coordinate sentence.

**Interpretation:**

In these sentences it is expressed that ideally speaking the dative participant is the recipient of a situation type in an ideal world; this means that the speaker can be seen as the external force:

**The speaker expresses that ideally speaking x performs/performed Y (or not Y in the case of negation)**
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I will briefly discuss the context mentioned in Figure 4.23 below:

(i) The particle by

The reason for the addition of by, the particle indicating irrealis, to the combination of the dative and the infinitive is that the infinitive situation is portrayed as an ideal situation that does not necessarily occur, because (i) the subject may not give in to the force to realize the infinitive situation, or (ii) because in reality the dative subject performed a different situation in the past.

The expression of the particle by further accounts for the element of wish in the construction, but it is not expressed by it. The particle by does not express wish, which is underlined by the occurrence of by in cases where the element of wish is absent, for example in the case of sentences that express the way things go as described in the preceding section.

I think that the element of wish must be seen as an interpretative phenomenon, which is attributed by the context. Maurice (1995: 165) discusses the possibility of analyzing the infinitive sentences with by and a dative as elliptical conditional sentences, where the apodosis, stating the positive consequences of realization of the infinitive clauses, is left out. In my opinion, it is not necessary to treat this construction as an elliptical conditional sentence. Such an analysis is just a trick to make the attribution of the context to the construction visible. In the case of the DI-construction with by under discussion, the speaker identifies with the force that assigns the infinitive situation to the dative participant, in an ideal world; this implies that the speaker wants the realization of the infinitive situation. The possibility of identification of the speaker with the force also occurs in other uses of the DI-construction, as in cases with a VS order (see 4.12), for example, or in the case of directive sentences.

(ii) The dative

Cases of the DI-construction with by that expresses wish can occur with all persons (first, second, third). In many cases the potential agent is not formally expressed. In these cases prototypically a first person plural or singular is associated with the non-expressed agent of the infinitive situation:\footnote{The association of the non-expressed infinitive agent with the speaker may possibly be motivated pragmatically: if a wish is uttered that a situation will be realized, the speaker is the most likely candidate to be associated with the non-expressed infinitive agent, because (i) one usually wishes something for the}
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(316) Vot by uznat' chto tvorilos' u starogo skazochnika v golove, kogda on sochinja etu istoriju\(^{160}\)
PRT IRR get.to.know-INF-PERF what was.happened at old fairy.tale.writer in head,
when he created that story
'If only I knew what was going on in the head of the old fairy-tale writer when he created this story.'

(317) Trojk a by sejchas ... Uexat' by v snega, v step'. (V. Shukshin, Ljubaviny, Roman)
trojka IRR now ... go.away-INF-PERF IRR in snow, in steppe
'If only there would be a trojka now. We could go into the snow and the steppe.'

(318) On zakusil gubu. Zabyt' by.\(^{161}\)(A. Gromov, Tekodont)
he.bit.lip. forget-INF-PERF IRR
'He bit his lip. If only he could forget/He should forget.'

The first person may also be formally expressed as in (305) above, or as in the following sentence:

(319) Nam by tol'ko dvinut' etot jashchik. (Maurice, 1996: 155/Mickey Mouse)
we-DAT IRR only move-INF-PERF that box
'We only want to move that box.'

(320) Chto prikazhete? - suxo sprosil mertdotel'. - Mne by pozavtrakat'. - Prostite, zavtrakov net.\(^{162}\) (A. Averchenko, Byt)
what you.order? - drily asked maïtre d'hôtel. - I-DAT IRR have.breakfast-INF-PERF. - Excuse.me breakfast not
'Would you like to order?', asked the maïtre d'hôtel drily. "I would like to have breakfast." "I am sorry, but we don't have breakfast anymore."

I suspect that omitting the dative subject is not possible in all cases where the speaker is associated with the non-expressed infinitive agent. I have not seen examples of cases

\(^{160}\) http://www.russ.ru:8085/krug/razbor/19991210.html
\(^{161}\) http://kulichki-lat.rambler.ru/moshkow/RUFANT/GROMOV_A/tekodont.txt; this example can be seen as a case of free indirect speech.
\(^{162}\) http://dacota.rrai.org.ru:8005/Texts/Averchenko/byt.html
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without dative where the infinitive situation pertains to a past situation. Furthermore, I think that cases with a dative such as (319) or (320) have a slightly different character from cases without a dative. I think that cases without a dative have a stronger and more emotional character than sentences with a dative where the infinitive situation pertains to the future, like (305).

Garde (1963: 58) notes that in some cases without dative the non-expressed infinitive agent may be associated with a generic subject. According to Maurice (1996: 154) this interpretation occurs primarily in negative sentences. An example of such a reading is given below:

(321) Pochemu by ne pomeshat' religioznym kul'tam promyvat' mozgi nevinnym ljudjam? Pochemu by ne oktreyt' cerkovnye sudy dlja proverki mizskoj juridicheskoy sistemy?

why IRR not prevent-INF-IMPERF religious cults wash brains innocent people? why IRR not open-INF-PERF church courts for control by worldly juridical system?

'Why not prevent religious cults from brainwashing innocent people? Why not open church courts for the inspection by the worldly juridical system?'

In this interrogative sentence the speaker asks whether there are good reasons not to do the infinitive action in a counterfactual world. This sentence has a rhetorical character, that is, the speaker indirectly asserts that it would be good to realize the infinitive action. Note that in this sentence the speaker can, among other things, be associated with the infinitive agent ('why wouldn't we/one'). Maurice (1996: 154) argues that such a reading is not possible in the following sentence:

(322) Menja ne xudo by sprosit'. Ved' ja ej neskol'ko srodni (...). (Maurice, 1996: 154: Griboedov)
me not badly IRR ask-INF-PERF. since I for her some akin (...)

'It wouldn't be bad if they asked me, after all I am somehow related to her.'

In this sentence, however, the predicate of the sentence is not the infinitive but the adverb xudo; as such this sentence cannot be seen as an infinitive sentence. A generic reading is possible, however, in the following sentences with the restrictive particle lish' (‘just’) and tol'ko (‘only’):

(323) Ljudi pridumyvali sebe poroki i izvrashchenija, lish' by ne proslyt' presnymi. (Bricyn, 1990: 293/A. Tolstoj)

163 http://apolresearch.org/reed7_lat.html
people invented for self flaws and perversions, only IRR not be reputed for-INF-PERF
vapidity
'People invented flaws and perversions themselves, just not to be reputed for their
vapidity.'

(324)  
Ja s uvaženiem k nemu [= Javlinskij] otnosh's', no ja schitaju, chto vechnaja
opposicija, i vechnye 5 procentov - lish' by toł'ko ne brat' na sebjja otvetstvennost',
lish' by ne uchastovovat' vo vlasti - èto vazhno.\(^{164}\) 
(ено) PRT IRR only not take-INF-IMPERF on him responsibility, only IRR not participate
in power (ENO) 
'I have great respect for self, but in my opinion, the never-ending opposition, and the
everlasting 5 percent, just not to take responsibility, just not to participate in the power, is
important.'

(325)  
[D]a, esli net svezhej [somlevshaja vishnja], mozhno iz varen'ja pozaimstvovat' ili iz
kompota, toł'ko potom ne zabyt' by ee nazad vernet'.\(^{165}\) 
(ENO), only afterwards not forget-INF-PERF IRR her back bring
'Yes, if there are no fresh ones, you can take some from jam or compote, only don't
forget to put some back afterwards.'

Such sentences do not express wish or desire by the speaker, but the wish or desire of the
agents associated with the non-expressed infinitive agent. In the first two sentences these
agents are specifically given in the preceding context, whereas in (325) the non-expressed
infinitive agent can be associated with the addressee. Maurice (1996: 154) follows Bricyn
(1990, 293), who classifies such sentences as goal-oriented constructions, but in my
opinion such an analysis is not correct for all cases, e.g. not for (325).

(iii) Restrictive particles

Sentences with a first person, or without expressed agent, where the non-expressed
infinitive agent is associated with the speaker often occur with the restrictive particle toł'ko
('only') that modifies the infinitive:

(326)  
Toł'ko by uspeł! (Bricyn, 1990: 247/ G. Nikitina)
only IRR arrive.in.time-INF-PERF

\(^{164}\) http://www.kirienko.ru:8085/interview/kir3.html

\(^{165}\) http://www.anekdot.ru:8084/d85.html
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‘If only I would succeed!’

(327) No ja vse-taki nadejus’, chto v Rossii im [the west] ne oblomitsja. Nam by tol’ko za um vzjat’sja.166
(... we-DAT IRR only to senses take-INF-PERF
‘Yet I hope that Russia will not give it [resources] away to them. I wish we would come to our senses.’

(328) Nam by tol’ko dvinut’ ètot jashchik. (Maurice, 1996:155/Mickey Mouse)
we-DAT IRR only move-INF-PERF that box
‘We only want to move that box.’

In sentences without a dative such as (326) the particle tol’ko modifies the infinitive sentence. Since no agent is expressed, the infinitive agent is associated with the speaker. Without context such a phrase just expresses the ‘bare’ scene where only the infinitive situation is realized, but in its context the phrase is interpreted as that the speaker wishes the realization of this situation. This interpretation is highly conventionalized, such that it can be seen as part of the meaning of the construction. Note that this use of tol’ko is a general phenomenon in the Russian language (esli tol’ko, pust’ tol’ko), and also in other languages (e.g. if only ...).167

Besides with the particle tol’ko, the DI-construction with by also occurs with the restrictive particle lish’, as in the sentences below:

(329) I pust’ v rez’ult’ate obizhaetsja na menja Vasil’ev, mne lish’ by ne profanirovat’ sistemu.168
(...) I-DAT only IRR not profane-INF-IMPERF system
‘I don’t care if Vasil’ev is insulted as a result of this, I just don’t want to profane the system.’

(330) Vrjad li torgovcev dopuskajut pjanom v dom. – Nam lish’ by projti vorotal169 (J. Nikitin, Svijatoj Graal)
(...) we-DAT only IRR pass-INF-PERF gate

167 Similar particles that occur with this construction are xot’ and the adverb skone, which indicates an impatient wish (Bricyn, 1990: 247)
169 http://www.pool-7.ru/moshkow/lat/NIKITINYU/graal_1.txt

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"The merchants will probably not let us into the house directly." "But we just want to pass the gate!"

Sentences with the particle *lish' express a modest wish. The difference between this construction and constructions with *tol'ko must be attributed to a difference in meaning between these particles.

(iv) Negative sentences

The infinitive construction with *by also occurs with negation; in such cases the infinitive situation is negated. For the analysis of sentences with negation it is important to look at the aspect of the infinitive. In sentences with a perfective infinitive the speaker considers a hypothetical state of affairs that would be bad for him and expresses an apprehension that this bad thing might happen. Sentences like these express a desire to do something to prevent the undesirable state of affairs; below some examples are given, all without dative:

(331) Ne zabyt' by, kak nazyvaetsja dachnyj poselok na peschanoj kose, u kotorogo zakonchilas' vojna. (Uppsala corpus)
not forget-INF-PERF IRR, how call-REFL dacha settlement on sand spit, at which ended war
'We mustn't forget, what the dacha settlement on the sandy spit is called, where the war ended.'

(332) Ne popast' by, dumaju, pod motor. (Zoshchenko, 1935)
not end.up-INF-PERF IRR, I.think, under motor
'I hope I won't end up under the motor, I thought.'

(333) Ne otstavaj, ne opozdat' by k obedu. (B. Pasternak, Pastorunnij)
not stay.behind-IMP, not be.late-INF-PERF IRR to dinner
'Come on, move, we don't want to be late for dinner.'

In the above the speaker is associated with the potential agent of the infinitive; the following sentences have a more generic character:
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(334) I sootvetstvenno projavljaem solidarnost’ s “xoroshimi” i vojuem s temi, kto zashchishchaet “ploxxi”. Ne zabyt’ by poschitat’, s kakoj storony bol’she otrezannyx golov, chtoby znat’, kto xuzhe.¹⁷⁰
(... not forget-INF-PERF IRR count (...) ‘And in the same vain we proclaim solidarity with the “good” ones, and make war with those that protect the “bad”. Of course one shouldn’t forget to count the number of heads that are cut off in order to find out who is worse.”

(335) Analogichno stroim sobach’ju konuru na dache. Ne zabyt’ by tol’ko dyrku ostavit’ ne sverxu, a v stene. A to sobaka, pozhaluj, Vas ne pojmet.¹⁷¹
(... not forget-INF-PERF IRR just hole leave not on top, but in wall. (...) ‘In the same way we build a dog-kennel at the dacha. Just don’t forget to leave a hole in the wall, and not on top. Or else the dog will probably not understand you.’

Negative sentences can also occur with a dative, e.g.:

(336) “Nel’zja, chtoby v starosti chelovek ostavalsja odin, — dumlal on. — Odnako èto neizbezchno. Ne zabyt’ by mne s’est’ tunca, pokuda on ne protux, ved’ mne nel’zja terjat’ sily. Ne zabyt’ by mne s’est’ ego utrom, dazhe esli ja sovsem ne budu goloden. Tol’ko by ne zabyt’”’, — povtorjal on sebe.¹⁷² (È. Xeminguej, Starik i mor’)
(... not forget-INF-PERF IRR I-DAT eat-INF-PERF tuna (...). not forget-INF-PERF IRR I-DAT eat-INF-PERF him in morning, (...). just IRR not forget-INF-PERF (...). “One shouldn’t stay alone when one is old”, he thought. “But it is inevitable. I shouldn’t forget to eat tuna, as long as it has not gone off, since I may not loose strength. I shouldn’t forget to eat it in the morning, even when I am not hungry. I just don’t want to forget’, he repeated to himself.’

(337) Mne by tol’ko teper’ do konca ne raskryt’sja (...).¹⁷³ (A. Tarkovskij)
I-DAT IRR only now till end not open-INF-PERF ‘I just do not want to open myself up before the end.’

In my opinion, sentences without dative express the wish that a situation will (not) happen, with the proviso that in reality the situation might in fact very well happen. In sentences with a dative the apprehension that a bad thing might very well happen,

¹⁷³ http://www.ruthenia.ru:8085/60s/tarkovskij/mne_by.htm
and the idea that one should do something to prevent it, seems less strong. Sentences with dative, show more similarities to deontic-ontic cases of the DI-construction, where the speaker expresses the necessity to do a situation, whereas sentences without dative are infinitive sentences where the feature of wish is contributed by the context.

The aspect of the construction under discussion can be motivated as follows. The speaker focuses on the absence of completion of the situation, since this completion is associated with negative consequences. For such a reading the perfective aspect is typical.

In sentences with the imperfective aspect the speaker expresses (i) his wish that a necessity to do a situation in the future would be absent or (ii) the wish that a past undesirable situation would not have occurred, but that, instead, the infinitive situation would have occurred. The particle by expresses that the situation where there is an external force that directs the agent toward the situation is seen as counterfactual: on an ideal level the infinitive situation occurs/occurred, but in reality the action will not/did not occur:

(338) Ne vstatav’ by mne zavtra rano!
not.get.up-INF-IMPERF IRR I-DAT tomorrow early
‘I shouldn’t have to get up early to tomorrow.’

(339) Ne otkrvat’ by emu okno! (Mets, 1985)
not.open-INF-IMPERF IRR he-DAT door!
‘He shouldn’t have opened the window.’

The aspectual choice in this construction can be motivated as follows. In sentences where the infinitive situation is associated with a future event, the speaker focuses on the fact that the dative participant should not engage in the infinitive situation and uses the imperfective aspect; such sentences show close similarities to deontic-ontic necessitive cases without by. In the case of a situation that has already occurred, the completion of the situation is a given fact; in this case the speaker focuses on the occurrence of the situation qua situation, and uses the imperfective aspect.

(v) The aspect of the infinitive

In the construction under discussion the infinitive occurs in both the perfective and the imperfective. The difference in aspectual choice points at a difference in conceptualization and profiling. In the case of the perfective the emphasis is placed on the positive consequences of the realization of the infinitive situation, whereas in the
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case of the imperfective aspect the emphasis is placed on the occurrence of the situation qua situation, or the fact that the dative participant is to engage in the infinitive situation. A reason to choose the imperfective aspect may be to emphasize the duration of the situation:

(340) – Èx, slavnoe mestol – skazal filosof. – Vot tut by zhit', lovit' rybu v Dnepr i v prudax, oxotit'sja s tentami ili s ruzh'em za strepetami i krol'shnepami. (Garde, 1963: 58/Gogol')
O, heavenly place! – said philosopher – PRT here IRR live-INF-IMPERF, catch-INF-IMPERF fish in Dnepr and in ponds, hunt-INF-IMPERF with awnings or with arms after little bustards and curlews
‘O, what a heavenly place!’, said the philopsopher. “If only I could live here, catch fish in the Dnepr and in ponds, hunt with arms after little bustards and curlews.”

In the case of inherently perfective actions (e.g. semelfactives), or inherently imperfective actions (e.g. states) the difference in profiling is directed by the meaning of the lexical item itself. In some cases a difference in aspect strongly correlates with different usage types. This is the case for example with negative sentences as discussed above.

(vi) The word order

In the construction under discussion both the [infinitive dative] and [dative infinitive] order occur. I suspect that the [infinitive dative] order must be motivated in the same way as in the case of sentences without by. For an analysis see the preceding sections.

(vii) Conditional sentence structure

In some cases the infinitive occurs in a coordinate sentence with a conditional character:

(341) Ej by uchit'sja, ona by mnogo dostigla (Bricy, 1990: 242/A. Tvardovskij)
she-DAT IRR study-INF-IMPERF, she IRR much achieved
‘Had she studied, she would have achieved a lot.’

In such sentences it is expressed that the dative participant should have realized/should realize the infinitive action, because the infinitive action would have led/would lead to a desirable situation, which is expressed in a clause following the infinitive clause.
4.13.3 Type III: Sentences with *tol'ko* or *vse* where the external force is the dative participant

In the cases above the speaker wishes the realization of the action expressed by the infinitive. An exception to this rule occurs in some cases with *tol'ko* ('only'), *lish*, or *vse* ('all') In these cases the second or third person dative subject wishes to do just one thing (with an imperfective 'all the time'), namely to do the infinitive situation:

(342) **Tebe by vse pit' da zhrat'.** (Maurice, 1996: 162/Popov)
you-DAT irrealis all the time drink-INF-IMPERF and eat-INF-IMPERF

"If it were up to you, you would eat and drink all the time."

(343) Da ladno tebe, Vasja, — xlopnul ego po plechu vtoroj, s prokurennym golosom. — **Tebe by tol'ko zuby skaliat'**. Idem luchshe.\(^{174}\) (V. Maksimov, *Popolzovanie*)
PRT enough you, Vasja, — tapped him on shoulders second, with smoked voice. — you-DAT IRR only teeth show-INF-IMPERF we.go better

"Well, enough Vasja", said the second of the two men with a smoker's voice while tapping him on the shoulder. "You only want to have a good laugh. We 'd better go."

(344) **Kot Kornej uzhasnyj sonja. Spit celyi den'! Emu by tol'ko spat' i spat'!!\(^{175}\)**
cat Kornei terribly sleepy. sleeps all day! he-DAT IRR only sleep and sleep

"The cat Kornei is terribly sleepy. He sleeps all day! He just wants to sleep all the time."

(345) Nakinuv na golovu shlem, Aurel tronul motocikl s mesta i molniej vynessja so dvora. **Teper' emu by tol'ko vyvat'esa na trassu (...).\(^{176}\)** (V. Vasil'ev, *Serda i motory*).

put.on.GERUND on head helmet, Aurel touched motor from place and as.lightning take.out-GERUND from courtyard now he-DAT IRR only break.away-INF-PERF on route

"After putting on his helmet, Aurel moved his motor from its place and took off from the courtyard, as fast as lightning. Now he only wanted to break away and go on the route."

In these sentences it is expressed that the dative participant wants only one thing, viz. the realization of the infinitive action; see figure 4.24.

\(^{175}\) http://www.sm.ru:8085/detset/arseniy/cat/index.htm
\(^{176}\) http://www.r-isp.net/library/lat/WASILXEW/hear_eng.txt
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Figure 4.24

only/all the time INF    dative participant    →    DAT

In sentences with second persons the speaker often expresses his discontent with this wish of the dative participant. Such a reading is not typical of cases with a third person. In the case of third persons the speaker may identify with the dative participant and, from the perspective of this participant, express the wish to realize the infinitive situation. Such sentences can be paraphrased with modal predicates or constructions such as udast'sja (‘to succeed’), esli by on smog (‘If only he could’), or dovestis’ (‘to manage’). An example given below:

(346) Imej a v svoem rasporjazhenii polnuju moshchnost', on eshche mog by zatormozit i ujti v prostranstvo, tol'ko by emu nabrat' éti samye sto g. 177(S. Lem, Deznanié)

having in his order full power, he still could IRR brake and leave in space, just IRR he-DAT gather-INF-PERF that same hundred g.

'Since the order gave him full power, he could still put on the brakes and leave for space, if he would only succeed in gathering that same hundred g.'

In this sentences tol'ko modifies the proposition expressed by the combination of the infinitive and the dative: they have [tol'ko dative infinitive] order; this differs from the sentences given above, where we find a [dative tol'ko infinitive] order.

Below I will briefly discuss the interpretation of this construction. The interpretation of such sentences is accounted for in Figure 4.25.

Figure 4.25

x is the recipient of a situation type Y; i.e. Y is not initiated by x

+ syntactic-semantic features:

(i) The particle by occurs.
(ii) The infinitive may be imperfective or perfective.

177 http://moshkow.perm.ru/lat/LEM/inquest.txt
(iii) Occurrence of the forms toľ'ko, lish' or vse that modify the infinitive, or the combination of the dative and the infinitive.
(iv) Y can be negated.
(v) x occurs in the second or third person.
(vi) The dative occurs before the infinitive.

*Interpretation:*

In these sentences it is expressed that if it were up to the dative participant, the dative participant would be the recipient of just one action, viz. the infinitive action:

The dative participant would like to do/be completely satisfied with only the infinitive action Y

Below I will briefly discuss some of the contextual features given in Figure 4.25.

(i) The particle *by*

The particle *by* occurs because in such sentences the occurrence of the infinitive action does not take place in this world, but only in an ideal world. This ideal world is defined by the wish or urge of the dative participant.

(ii) Aspect

The infinitive may be imperfective or perfective. The imperfective aspect is typical of cases where the speaker disagrees with the kind of behavior, indicated by the infinitive, whereas the perfective aspect is typical of cases where the speaker identifies with the wish of the dative participant to realize a single event.

(iii) Restrictive forms

The interpretation where the dative participant can be seen as the external force only occurs with the forms toľ'ko (lish'), that indicate that the agent wants to do just this one action. Maurice gives an example with *vse*, in this sentence it is expressed that the agent wants to do one action all the time (and as such focuses on one action).
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

(vi) Word order

In the case of the interpretation under discussion we find the following arrangements (i) [dative [tol'ko infinitive]], and (ii) [tol'ko [dative infinitive]]. The first arrangement reflects the point of view of the dative participant. Note that the same order also occurs in sentences where the speaker can be seen as the force that assigns the infinitive situation:

(347) Nam by tol'ko dvinut' etot jashchik. (Maurice, 1996: 155/Mickey Mouse)
  we-DAT IRR only move-INF-PERF that box
  "We only want to move that box."

In cases where the narrator identifies with the third person dative participant, tol'ko modifies the combination of the dative and the infinitive. This use of tol'ko is similar to cases that express wish or desire in infinitive sentences without a dative, or in expressions with esli or post'.

4.14 Directive infinitive use

In this section I will briefly discuss the directive use of the infinitive. The infinitive can be used as a directive in sentences without dative where the non-expressed infinitive agent is unified with a contextually given second person addressee. In some cases the same construction occurs with a dative, usually with the forms vsem (all-DAT) and nikomu (no-one-DAT). Directive infinitives can be seen as special instances of the DI-construction. I will therefore briefly discuss them here.

In Russian the directive infinitive is prototypically used for two functions:

(i) As as an order or command, or strong urge.
(ii) In cases where the identity of the non-expressed infinitive agent remains unspecified ('one').

Examples of the first type can be found below:

(348) Molchat', idiotki - rjavknul Xvastishchev. (V. Aksenov, Ozhog)
  be.silent-INF-IMPERF, idiots - barked Xvastishchev
  "Quiet, you stupid girls", barked Xvastishchev."
Chapter IV

(349) Ne smet’! – javno bol’nym golosom voskliknul Filipp Filippovich.¹⁷⁸ (M. Bulgakov, Sobach’e serde)

not dare-INF-PERF – clearly with sick voice shouted Filip Filippovich
“Don’t you dare!”, shouted Filip Filippovich with a clearly sore voice.

(350) Ne strel’iat’! (K. Paustovskij, Nachalo nevedomogo veka)

not shoot-INF-IMPERF

‘Don’t shoot!’

(351) – Teper’ raketa gotova k poletu. Zavtra utrom vlkJuchim nevesomost’ i otbuksiruem kosmeticheskij korabl’ na startovuju plochshadku. A sejchas spat’. (N. Nosov, Neznanka na Lune)

(... but now sleep-INF-IMPERF

‘Now the rocket is ready to take off. Tomorrow morning we will switch on the zero gravity and tow off the space ship to the take-off place. But now – sleep.’

This use of the infinitive is typical of the order of an officer to a soldier, a human to his dog, or a parent to his child. The term ‘order’ does not apply equally well to all cases. It is typical of infinitive directives that the speaker does not take the possibility of the addressee refusing to perform the infinitive action into account. In some cases the directivity has the character of a binding statement, as in (352):

(352) – Ladno, – govori t Dimka, – bere m tebj a s toboj. Tol’ko ne xnykat’ potom. (Ch. Ajmatov, Posle skazki)

O.K, says Dimka, we take you with us. just not whine-INF-IMPERF afterwards

“O.K!”, said Dimka, “we will take you with us. But don’t start whining later on.”

If the infinitive is not uttered in the immediate speaker-addressee context, the non-expressed infinitive agent may remain unspecified, and be interpreted as the generic agent; in such cases the direction has the character of a general statement of how to behave in a certain situation. This use of the infinitive is found in the case of recipes or general instructions (Maurice, 1995: 167), e.g.:

(353) Prigotovit’ mjasnoj farsh s lukom, posolit’ , poperchit’, vzbit’ v nego 2 jajca, xorosh o peremeshat’. (Maurice, 1996: 168/Sizova)

prepare meat mince with onion, salt-INF-PERF, pepper-INF-PERF, break into-INF-PERF in him 2 eggs, good mix-INF-PERF

Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

‘Prepare the minced meat with onion, add salt, pepper, break two eggs into it, and mix it well.’

(354) Ne vysovyvat'sja. (Proeme, forthcoming/Notice in the train)
not lean.out-INF-IMPERF
‘Don’t lean out.

(355) To’lko predstavit’ chto kazhdyj iz nas – celyj mir, a obobshchat’ zhachit pomeshat’ sebja gde-to tam, nad mirami.179
only imagine-INF-PERF that each of us – whole world, and generalize means hinder self somewhere there, above worlds
‘Just imagine/one just has to imagine that each of us is a world on its own, and that generalizing means interfering with yourself, somewhere there in such a world.’

Cases where the non-expressed infinitive agent remains unspecified or generic cannot be seen as instances of the DI-construction proper.

Besides the cases where the direction is aimed at a second person addressee, the infinitive can also be used as a directive in the following contexts:

(i) directivity to the speaker (hortative)

(ii) directivity to a non-specified group of people

The following sentences are cases where the speaker directs himself to do an action:

train started stop – in.no.way station, – said he, – go-INF-PERF drink-INF-PERF
‘The train started to stop. “It seems to be a station”, he said, “let’s go and have a drink.”’

(357) Bol’she ne mogu, podumal Peskavin. Krivjas’ ot rezi v boku, on ostanovilsja i tzhelo sel na sneg. Vse. Pobegali – xvati t. Teper’ dumat’!180(A. Gromov, Tekodont)
(…) now think-INF-IMPERF
‘I can’t go any further’, thought Peskavin. He made a wry face because of the sharp pain, stopped, and sat down with difficulty in the snow. “Enough, we have to run. Now I must think.”’

179 http://kamburova.cdru.com:8082/sharm.htm
180 http://kulichki-lat.rambler.ru/moshkow/RUFANT/GROMOV_A/tekodont.txt
The *Russkaja Grammatika* (1980, II: 374) describes such sentences as expressing a desired, intended action, which the subject will immediately perform. In my opinion such sentences can best be seen as directives, where the speaker can be regarded both as the potential agent, and as the impulse giver. The sentences given above display some variation in character. In (356) the speaker expresses that it would be a good idea to realize the infinitive action. I suspect that the occurrence of the perfective aspect here is connected with the fact that the speaker expresses his *wish* to realize the infinitive situation action. This means that he does not focus on the fact that he will engage in the action, but rather on the fact that he wants to realize the action. The sentences (357) and (358) cannot be seen as cases of wish. In these sentences the speaker expresses the necessity to realize the infinitive situation in the given context. The sentences under discussion do not occur with datives, and can therefore not be seen as instances of the DI-construction.

A directive interpretation also occurs in the following sentences, where the non-expressed infinitive agent is associated with non-specified people (‘they’):

kill-INF-PERF such an old man to all pigs
‘They should kill the old man like a pig/Let them kill the old man like a pig.’

(360) *Razmenjat’ ego! — zakrichal veselym golosom paren’ s xmel’nymi glazami.* (K. Paustovskij, 1985: 27)
exchange-INF-PERF him! — shouted with happy voice man with drunken eyes cheerfully
‘They should exchange him!’, shouted the young man with the drunken eyes cheerfully.’

In such sentences no dative can be expressed; as such they cannot be seen as instances of the DI-construction. I will therefore not discuss them further here.

Bricyn (1990: 250–251) argues that the directive use of the infinitive can be analyzed as the complement of the finite verb *prikazyvat’* (‘order’). This means that a directive

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181 http://www.rvb.ru:8090/mamleev/01prose/2stories/4folk/01-2-4-04.htm
182 In most examples given by the *Russkaja Grammatika* (1980) no dative is expressed, with the exception of (140).
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

infinitive like *Molchat'* (be.silent-INF) must be analyzed as a sentence where the finite verb 'order' is left away (*Ia prikazyvaju molchat?', 'I order you to be silent'). According to him, this analysis motivates the categorical character of many directive infinitive sentences. A weak point of the analysis, is, however, that it does not motivate *why* it is the case that the directive infinitive often has the character of an order, and *why* in some cases the directive infinitive is *not* interpreted as an order, but as a general statement or as a direction to oneself or to a non-specified group of people. As such, the analysis given by Bracyn is insufficient. I think it is better to analyze the specific use of the infinitive from the point of view of the *meaning* of the infinitive, taking into account the influence of oppositional forms such as the imperative, and the context in which the infinitive occurs.

Directive infinitives can be analyzed as in Figure 4.26.

**Figure 4.26**

**Situation type Y by non-specified agent x**

+ *syntactic-semantic features:*

(i) Y, or not Y in the case of negation, does not occur at the moment of speaking.
(ii) Y is be interpreted as controllable.
(iii) Y occurs in both aspects.
(iv) The speaker can be seen as committing himself to the content of the utterance.
(v) x can be identified with some agent present in the directive situation; in some cases a dative occurs, especially in the case of *vse* ('all'), and *nikto* ('noone').
(vi) Y is prototypically not combined with modal particles.
(vii) Occurrence of embedded cases.

**Interpretation:**

For cases where a specific addressee is given, the interpretation can be analyzed as follows. The speaker states that in the given context action type Y is appropriate, and implicitly expresses that no other situation is the case. Since the utterance is made in the presence of an addressee, and the action type does not occur at the moment of speaking, or is thought of as not occurring at the moment of speaking, the speaker directs the addressee to realize the infinitive action, or in the case of negation, not to realize the infinitive situation:

The speaker directs the addressee x to realize the infinitive action Y, and no other given or implied situation.
For cases where no specific addressee is given the infinitive is used because (i) the focus is on the general validity of the situation in abstraction from a specific addressee, and/or (ii) the idea that the addressee should do the situation is already presupposed, and the infinitive occurs in a list of situations that the addressee is to perform. In both cases the speaker directs a potential agent to perform the infinitive situation:

**The speaker directs the addressee x to realize the infinitive action Y.**

Below I will discuss the context as given in Figure 4.26 in more detail.

(i) The situational context

It is typical of the directive context that the action expressed by the infinitive does not occur at the moment of speaking. In Russian the infinitive is not used in contexts where the speaker is already performing the action in question; in such cases the imperative is used.

(ii) Controllability

For a discussion of controllability I refer the reader to the 3.2.2.1 on the notion of controllability of the imperative use.

(iii) Aspect

The aspect of the directive infinitive is prototypically perfective; this is connected with the fact that the speaker wants the realization of the infinitive action. In the case of negation we find the imperfective aspect.

(iv) Speaker commitment

In the case of the directive interpretation of the infinitive the speaker commits himself to wanting the realization of the infinitive situation. By using the infinitive in a directive context the speaker expresses that the infinitive situation, and no other situation, applies in the given context. In my opinion, the type character of the infinitive accounts for the fact that the infinitive cannot be used to express permission, in contrast to the imperative.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

In the case of the imperative the speaker expresses that he wants the realization of the imperative action. In such cases, however, the initial intention to do the action may come from the addressee. In such sentences the speaker permits the addressee to do the infinitive action. A permissive interpretation is not possible in the case of the directive infinitive because by uttering the infinitive the speaker indicates which action type is appropriate in the given context. Because of this the infinitive is also appropriate to be used as an order or command. In a directive context, with a specific intonation, the speaker states that no other action than the infinitive action is appropriate.

(v) The unification of the infinitive agent with the contextually given agent

In most directive sentences there is no association of the non-expressed infinitive agent with an expressed agent. In such cases the non-expressed infinitive agent is associated with the addressee present in the speech context, the speaker, or a group of non-specified people. In some cases we find directive sentences with a dative subject. Typical of such cases is that the dative subject is a universal quantifier, viz. vsem (all-DAT), or nikomu (no-one-DAT):

(361)  Vsem sidet' na svoix mestax! prikazala uchitel'nica i sli va vmeste s direktorom. (Proeme, forthcoming/Below).
  all sit-INF-IMPERF at self places! ordered teacher and went together with director
  "Everyone stay on their places!", ordered the teacher and went out together with the director."

(362)  Kto bezhit? — Vasich trjaxnu l nad soboj avtomatom. (...) — Nikomu ne bezhat'! Von pushki! (ibid./Uppsala)
  who runs? — Vasich waved over his with.kalashnikov. no-one-DAT not run! there
  who is running away there?"Vasich waved with his kalashnikov above his head. "No-
  'No one runs away! There are the canons!"

(363)  Nikomu ne streljat!183 (A. Tjurin & A. Shchegolev, Indiana Dzhons protiv Tret'ego reixa)
  no-one-DAT not shoot-INF-PERF
  'No-one shoot!'
The information expressed by *vsem* and *nikomu*, unlike the identity of the addressee (*tebè*), cannot be inferred from the immediate speaker-addressee context, which explains why in some cases they are expressed. In some specific cases a second person in the dative is expressed:

(364) **Tebe — molchat'**. (…) — Ubiraj samovar.\(^{184}\) (M. Gor’kij, *Avtobiograficheskie Rasskazy, po zhurnal’noj publikacii*)

you-DAT — be.silent-INF-IMPERF. (…) — Take.away-IMP samovar

“You should keep your mouth shut.” (…) “Just take away that samovar.”

In this sentence the expression of the dative can be motivated by the contrastive context in which the infinitive occurs: the speaker expresses that the dative participant should keep silent, and not talk. This sentence is close to a necessitiv case; it is expressed that what the dative participant should do is the infinitive action. Maurice (1996: 168) gives the following example with a third person dative:

(365) **Jadovityj! Krolikam v pishchu ne upotrebljat’**. (Maurice, 1996: 168/Mickey Mouse)\(^{185}\)

poisened! rabbits-DAT for food not use-INF-IMPERF

‘It is poisoned! The rabbits shouldn’t use it as food.’

This sentence is not a typical directive case because the dative is a third person instead of a second person. The sentence cannot, however, be seen as a case of (de)ontic or ontic necessity (‘The rabbits don’t have to use it as food’). Sentences like these are exceptional.

Directive use of the infinitive further occurs with nominative subjects (with a pause between the subject and the infinitive):

(366) **Chto ja xochu, to i govorju, a ty — molchat’!** (Maurice, 1996: 169/Chexov)

what I want, that and say, but you — be.silent-INF-IMPERF

‘I’ll say what I want, and you — be quiet!’

This use can be seen as an instance of the nominative-infinitive construction (see 4.4.3).


\(^{185}\) Perhaps the dative in this case is not a dative subject but a benefactive subject (‘It is poisonous. One shouldn’t use it as food for the rabbits.’)
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

(vi) Particles

The infinitive is prototypically not used with particles such as -ка. The following sentence can be seen as an exception to that rule:

(367)  Или буквально несколько чеканных фраз на заседании правительства: а подать-ка судя Грузию да ввести с неё визовый режим! (Московские Новости, 9-15 ноября 1999)

and literally some precise phrases on meeting government: but give-INF-PERF PRT here Georgia and introduce-INF-PERF with her visa policy

‘And here are some literal phrases from the meeting of the government: well just bring Georgia here and introduce a visa policy there.’

(vii) Embedded infinitives

Infinitives with a directive interpretation also occur in embedded contexts:

(368)  Сказал, что время ему очень дорого, потому — не опаздывать.186
he.said ,, tha t tim e hi m  terrribl y  expensive ,  becaus e.of.that —  no t be .late-INF-IMPERF

‘He said that his time was terribly expensive, and therefore we should not be late.’

The occurrence of embedded infinitives with a directive interpretation shows that the directive feature is not part of the meaning of the infinitive, as in the case of the imperative, but is rather an interpretation.

4.15 Interrogatives without interrogative adverbs and pronouns

Besides the occurrence of the DI-construction in interrogative sentences with interrogative adverbs and pronouns, the infinitive predicate can occur in interrogatives without such interrogative forms where the speaker can be seen as the non-expressed infinitive agent, and where the speaker offers to realize the infinitive situation and asks whether the addressee is OK with this proposed realization, e.g.:

(369)  Налишь тебе еще? — Не доходить сон, он разливает бренди.187 (А. & Б. Стругацкие, Tuchо)

pour you-DAT still? – not waiting permission, he pours out brandy
"‘Shall I pour you some more?’ Without waiting for his answer, he pours out the
brandy.’

(370) Poroshkov, mozhet, tebe dat? (A. Zoshchenko, 1935)
powders, maybe, you-DAT give-INF-PERF”
‘Do you want me to give you some powders?’

This use of the infinitive is typical of contexts where the speaker wants to engage in a
situation that affects the addressee, or that might interest the addressee, and therefore
asks the addressee whether he agrees with the realization of the infinitive situation; in
such contexts the addressee prototypically answers with yes or no. The aspect of such
sentences is usually perfective, but may be imperfective in the case of negation, and if
the occurrence of the action is known as such and the speaker focuses on the
engagement in the action (‘pristup k dejstviu’), or in the case of ‘open repetition’ (see
Maurice, 1995: 194 – 205). The infinitive use under discussion occurs without
expressed potential subject; the non-expressed infinitive agent is associated with the
speaker.¹⁸⁸ The absence of a dative may be motivated because (i) the speaker is given in
the context, and (ii) the focus is on the question of whether the infinitive situation will
be the case or not, and not on the question of force (‘I am under the influence of a force
that compels me to do X). The construction under discussion can be seen as an
instance of the class of infinitive sentences, and not as an instance of the DI-
construction proper. I will not discuss these here, but I refer the reader to Maurice
(1995: 194 – 205) for a further overview and discussion.

Another construction that I will not discuss is the construction with the interrogative
particle li. Following Maurice (1996: 206), two types can be distinguished:

Ne + infinitiveperfective + li

(371) Ne poslat’ li nam v Madrid palladina Nassau-Zigena dija peregovorov (...)²¹⁸⁹ (V. Pikul’,
Favorit)
not send-INF-PERF PRT we-DAT to Madrid palladine Nassau-Zigen for negotiations?
‘Shouldn’t we send the paladin Nassau-Zigena to Madrid for negotiations?’

¹⁸⁸ Maurice (1996: 194) claims that a dative subject occurs in some cases, but I have not attested examples
of such sentences.
¹⁸⁹ http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/PIKULX/favorit2.txt
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

(372) Byl period posle otstavki, kogda ja ser'euzno dumal, ne vernut'sja li mne na
proizvodstvo.190
was period after resignation, when I seriously thought, not go.back-INF-PERF PRT I-
DAT in industry
‘There was a period after my resignation, when I seriously wondered whether it wasn’t a
good idea to go back to the industry.’

Other structures

(373) Da mne li Vam ob'jaanjar?191
PRT I-DAT PRT you-DAT explain-INF-IMPERF
‘Why should I explain this to you? [because you already know it]’

(374) Griff Rift skazal ej o chajke, letjashchej v nochnom uragane, — emu li ne znat'!192 (I.
Efremov, Chas byka)
(…); he-DAT PRT not know-INF-IMPERF
‘Griff Rift told her about the seagull, flying in the nighttime hurricane; as if he didn’t
know about that! [of course he knew!’

In cases with the structure: [ne infinitiveperfective i] the speaker proposes to realize the
infinite situation. These sentences have the following structure: (a) The speaker
thinks that Y might be a good idea, but does not have enough information to be sure
about this (Baranov & Kobozeva: 1983: 272), or is not in the position to assert that
this is the case; (b) the speaker asks the addressee whether Y is a good idea (or: Sp asks
addressee whether the dative participant is the recipient of ‘Y’; that is, whether the
dative participant should realize the infinitive situation)193; (c) the speaker expects the
addressee to say that ‘Y’ is a good idea. Such sentences can be paraphrased with mo'chet +
infinite (Bricyn, 1990: 268). The dative in this construction is triggered because the
speaker asks the addressee whether he agrees that the (appropriate) way things go is
such that the dative participant should engage in the realization of the infinitive
situation; in this case the ontic character of the DI-construction is supported by the
initial information state (a).

190 http://www.kirienko.ru:8085/interview/index.html
192 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/EFREMOW/chas.txt
193 Note that the speaker and the addressee may be the same person (e.g. in (372)).
A different interpretation is at stake in (373) and (374). In these sentences the force that assigns the infinitive situation to the dative participant can also be identified with the (appropriate) way things go. In (373) the ontic nature of the DI-construction is supported by the fact that the speaker contradicts the idea that he would have to engage in the action (this negative attitude explains the use of the imperfective aspect), and in (374) the ontic nature is supported by the fact that the speaker thinks that the idea that the dative participant might not be the recipient of the infinitive situation is nonsense.

4.16 Related constructions

In this section I will present constructions that can be seen as related to the DI-construction, or special instances of the DI-construction.

4.16.1 Sentences with a quantificational modification (dolgo)

I will briefly discuss infinitive sentences with a verb of motion and a quantificational modification; such as the following:

*Verbs of motion infinitives as topics/subjects with quantificational modification*

(375) Exat' bylo nedolgo. (Maurice, 1996: 125/Dostoevskij)

drive-INF-IMPERF was-IMPERS notlong

'We didn’t have to drive for a long time.'

(376) Idti bylo dvednadcat’ kilometrov. (Maurice, 1996: 125/Kazakov)

drive-INF-IMPERF was-IMPERS twelve kilometers

'We had to drive for twelve kilometers.'

(377) “Vitja, a xochesh’ ja tebe rasskazhu, kak ja èkzameny sdaval?” Vitja, ponimaja, chto exat’ dolgo i pridetsja slushat’, kivaet.194

(...), that ride-INF-IMPERF long (...)

“Vitja, you want me to tell how I did my exam?” Vitja, who understood that it would take a long time to get there, and that he had to listen, nods.'

Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

(378) Exat' mne bylo dolgo i, vskore, ja uzhe privyk, chto na ostanovkax, vdl' marshrutki sobiralis' grupki ljudej, siljashchixsja v po t'max razgijadet', kuda zhe on, vse taki, edet.195

ride-INF I-DAT was-NEUT long-ADV (...)
'I had to drive a long way, and soon I was already accustomed to the fact that at the stops groups of people gathered at the taxi bus, trying to find out in the dark, what its destination was.'

DI-construction with verbs of motions and quantificational modification

(379) Doch'en'ka, kup i ogurcy, tebe zhe eshche dolgo exat'.196
daughter, buy-IMP pickles, you-DAT PRT still long-ADV go-INF-IMPERF
'Little girl, buy some pickles, you still have to ride a long way.'

DI-construction and quantificational modification with other verbs

(380) – Dolgo tebe sidet? – Poka mama ne pridet. – A ran'she nikak nel'zja vyjti2197(V. Krapivin)
long-ADV you-DAT sit-INF-IMPERF? (...)
"Do you have to stay here for a long time?" "Till mama comes back." "And you may not leave earlier at all?"

(381) Emu nedolgo zhit*.198 (E. Xaeckaja. Vozvraashenie v Axen)
his-DAT not.long live-INF-IMPERF
'He won't live long.'

(382) Esli tak, zhit' tebe dolgo.199 (S. Pavlov, Lmnaja raduga).
if so, live-INF-IMPERF you long
'If so, you will live long.'

(383) Emu dolgo ne uvidet' beregov.200 (D. Skiruk, Osennij li)
he-DAT long not see-INF-PERF shores
'He won't see the shores for a long time.'

197 http://sf.glasnet.ru:8105/vk/book/ta_storona_gde_veter/ta_storona_gde_veter_2_03.htm
198 http://kulichki-lat.rambler.ru/moshkow/HAECKAQ/conquer2.txt
199 http://kulichki-lat.rambler.ru/moshkow/PAWLOW/raduga1.txt
200 http://lat.www.vladivostok.com/Speaking_In_Tongues/AutumnFox/AutumnFox5.html

453
Maurice (1996: 124–126) notes that modal infinitive sentences with a verb of motion and a quantificational modification have a different semantic structure than the other necessitative uses of the DI-construction; she argues that in contrast to regular cases of the DI-construction, these sentences express notions in-between necessity and possibility. In sentences where the infinitive occurs as the topic of the sentence, one can speak of utilitarian or technical necessity (see Shatunovskij, 1996: 240 for an overview of different types of necessity); these sentences have the following structure: in order to achieve Y, X is necessary. In these cases the necessitative reading is only arrived at indirectly in the sense that the meaning of ‘as far as Y is concerned, it was Z’ is interpreted against the background of the presupposition that one wants to get somewhere.

In my opinion, it is also important to look at the different syntactic structure, and distinguish between cases where the infinitive can be seen as the topic of the sentence, such as (375) and (377), and other cases, such as (379), where the infinitive is not the topic. Sentences where the infinitive functions as a topic cannot be seen as instances of the DI-construction proper. Typical of these latter cases are the following features, which set them apart from regular deontic interpretations of the DI-construction:

- In many cases no dative participant is expressed; in such sentences the identity of the infinitive subject remains unspecified or is contextually given.
- The infinitive is prototypically imperfective.
- There seems to be no restrictions on the expression of the copula.

Note that in the case of the construction under discussion, the negation cannot be placed before the copula, but is placed before the quantificational modification:

(384)  \textit{Idt\textit{i} (*ne) bylo (ne)dolgo.}  
\textit{go-INF-IMPER FF (not) was-IMPER S not.long}  
‘It didn’t take long to get there.’

(385)  \textit{Idt\textit{i} (*ne) bylo ne 20 kilometrov, a tridcat’ kilometrov.}  
\textit{go-INF-IMPER FF (not) was-IMPER S not 20 kilometers, but 30 kilometers}  
‘The ride wasn’t 20 kilometers, but 30 kilometers.’
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

I do not think that this phenomenon should be compared to the fact that bylo/budet cannot be negated in the case of the DI-construction.201

The sentences under discussion cannot be seen as infinitive sentences; that is, sentences where the infinitive may be seen as the predicate of the sentence, and where a dative may be expressed as the experiencer of the adverbia predicate. In my opinion it would be better to treat the quantificational modification (dolgo) as the predicate in these sentences. Such sentences are related to constructions such as the following, where dolgo must be seen as the predicate of the sentence, and the infinitive as the subject of the verb byt:

(386) Dolgo bylo pro vse rasskazyvat.202 (V. Krapivin, Boltik)
long was-IMPERS about everything tell-INF-IMPERF
'It had taken much time to tell everything.'

Sentences with a dative where the infinitive is not the topic of the sentence have a different structure. These sentences must be seen as instances of the DI-construction. In these sentences the adverb modifies the infinitive, e.g.:

[[Emu [nedolgo]modifier [zhit']][predicate]] → 'He won't live long.'

Note, however, that such sentences show similarities to sentences where the adverb must be seen as the predicate of the sentence with a dative subject, and where the infinitive must be seen as the subject of the verb byt. If someone experiences a situation as long, this means that the situation is characterized as having the property long. Extensionally there is no difference between the adverb as a modification of the infinitive situation, and the adverb as a predicate.203 Semantically and syntactically, however, the readings are different.

201 One might say that nedolgo can be seen as one conceptual entity. I would suggest that this can be motivated by the semantics of dolgo. The negation of dolgo (nedolgo) can be seen as the antonym of dolgo ('short'). This is not the case with adverbs like veselo ('veselo'); the antonymy structure of an adverb like veselo is much more fine-grained, and therefore much more fuzzy.
203 Maurice (1996: 124: 124) gives a sentence with a non-topical perfective infinitive, expressing a verb of motion, and a dative: (...) mne tam projiti dva kvarala tam malen'kij pod'emchik (...). I think this sentence must be seen as a regular case of the DI-construction. The perfective aspect here is triggered by the 'restrictive' context: 'I only have to pass two blocks, and there will be a little hill.'
4.16.2 The existential construction

In this subsection I will briefly discuss the meaning and syntactic structure of the so-called existential construction. I will discuss this construction because it shares both semantic and syntactic features with the DI-construction. Both the DI-construction and the existential construction express modal notions such as (im)possibility and (absence of) necessity, and in both constructions the dative participant can be seen as the potential agent of the infinitive situation. In the case of the existential construction, however, the dative participant can be seen as the potential agent of a situation, the realization of which depends on the availability of a place, time, or another entity that is closely associated with the action. As such, the dative participant is only indirectly the recipient of a situation.

Examples are given below of the existential construction:

(387) Est' mne kuda idti. (Veyrenc, 1979: 72)
   is I-DAT where go-INF
   'There is somewhere for me to go.'

(388) Bylo s kem poznakomitsja. (Zolotova, 1982: 253)
   was-NEUT with someone meet-INF-PERF
   'There was someone to meet.'

(389) Emu nekuda bylo speshit'. (Bricyn, 1990: 185)
   he-DAT nowhere was-NEUTER hurry-INF-PERF
   'There was nowhere for him to hurry to.'

(390) Emu ved' nechego bylo predlozhit' 'original'nogo'. A mne — est' chto.204 (S.
   Luk'janenko, Zapax svobody)
   he-DAT PRT nothing was-NEUT offer-INF-PERF "original". but I-DAT — is what
   'After all, he had nothing interesting to suggest. But I have something to suggest.’

(391) Mne nechego bylo skazat' ej.205 (U. LeGuin, Rybaki iz vntrimor'ja)
   I-DAT nothing was-IMPERSON say-INF-PERF her
   'I had nothing to tell her.’

(392) Mne nechego stesnjatsja. (V. Erofeev, Berdjaev)

204 http://www.moshkow.pp.ru/5000/lat/LUKXQN/svoboda.txt
205 http://mirror.primorye.ru/moshkow/lat/LEGUIN/rybakizvnutrimoriya.txt
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

me-DAT nothing be.ashamed.of-INF-IMPERF
'There is nothing for me to be ashamed of.'

This construction is called 'existential' because it expresses that there exists, or in the case of negation does not exist, a place, time, person etc. that is connected to, or characterized by the realization of the infinitive situation (by the participant expressed in the dative if a dative is expressed). The construction has a modal nature, comparable to the DI-construction, and can express notions close to absence of necessity, possibility and absence of possibility. The occurrence of these interpretations can be compared to the occurrence of these interpretations in the case of the DI-construction.

In the case of 'absence of possibility' an intention/tendency is ascribed to the dative participant to perform the infinitive situation Y, but instead the dative participant is the recipient of the situation 'not Y'; in such cases one can speak of blocking of an intended situation. In the case of 'possibility' an intention/tendency is ascribed to the dative participant to perform Y, but this intention/tendency is initially blocked; this blockage is removed such that the participant can perform the action. This deblocking is epistemic, that is, there is a presupposition that the agent will not perform the action because there is no place, time, etc. to do the action, but this presupposition is negated: the agent WILL be in the position to perform the action because there DOES exist such a place; such cases occur with an accented existential verb (est). As in the case with the DI-construction, it is typical of cases that express (im)possibility that an intention can be ascribed to the potential agent to perform the situation. Because of this, the interpretation of (*im)possibility does not occur with inanimate participants to which no intention/tendency can be ascribed to realize the situation, as in (393) below.

In the case of 'absence of necessity', the dative participant is indirectly the recipient of the infinitive situation assigned to him by some force (norm, script, etc.), while there is a presupposition that the dative participant disagrees with the realization of this situation.

In the rest of this section I will briefly discuss the semantic-syntactic structure of the construction. In the existential construction we find the following constituents:

- Dative: experincer
- by neuter: existence of a situation
- Pronoun/Adverb (K-word): person/place/time/manner variable

206 Růžička (1994) argues that the modal content of the construction is carried by the infinitive; in my opinion this is an incorrect conclusion.
Chapter IV

— Infinitive: situation type

The dative expresses the recipient (Bricyn, 1990: 188) of the availability of a person/place, etc. variable, and indirectly the recipient of the infinitive situation. Apresjan & Iomdin (1989: 60) argue that the dative must be animate; they observe that the following sentence is ungrammatical:

(393) *Kartinę negde povesit' 
painting-DAT nowhere hang-INF-IMPERF
‘There is nowhere for the picture to hang.’

They further observe that a non-animate dative is possible in the following construction jabloku negde budet upast’ (‘there is nowhere for the apple to fall’):

(394) Kak bystro demograficheskoe davlenie zastavit nas zaselit' vsju Vseleennuju tak, chto i jabloku negde budet upast'?207 (R. Xajnajn, Zveždnaja pesota) how fast demographic pressure force us populate all universe such, that and apple-DAT nowhere will fall-INF-IMPERF
‘How fast will the demographic pressure force us to populate the whole universe such that the apple has nowhere to fall?’

In my opinion, the observations made by Apresjan & Iomdin (1989: 60) should be specified. In cases where the construction expresses ‘absence of possibility’ or similar notions the existential construction can occur with non-animate participants:

(395) Tut nichego ne proisxodit, potomu chto proisxodit' nechemu.208 (A. Nikitin, Oshibka) here nothing not happened, because happen-INF-IMPERF nothing-DAT
‘Here nothing happens, because there is nothing to happen.’

(396) Ruka ne bespokoi't? — Normal'no, Mixail Antonovich. Nechemu bespokoi't.209 (V. Xlumov, Prelest') hand not troubles? — normal, Mixail Antonovich. nothing-DAT trouble-INF-IMPERF “Does the hand not make you worried?” “It looks normal, Mixail Antonovich. There is nothing to be worried about.”

207 http://moshkow.telline.ru:5000/lat/HYNLINE/troopers.txt
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

(397) Ubyl' vody proixsodit tol'ko za shchet intensivnogo isparenija letom (chasto nad morem stoit gustoj smog) – ved' ytekat' vode nekuda.210

(... PRT flow-INF-PERF water-DAT nowhere

'The subsidence of the water only results from the intensive evaporation the during summer (often there is a thick smog above the water) – after all, there is nowhere for the water to flow to.'

The construction can only occur with non-animate participants if the dative participant is personified, as in (394), or more generally if a tendency can be ascribed to the dative participant to realize the infinitive situation. This reading is not possible in (393), since in this sentence the tendency to hang cannot be ascribed to the picture itself, but to the people that hang the picture.211

In the construction the dative participant is sometimes not expressed. In such cases the potential agent of the infinitive action is interpreted as a generic agent, or as the speaker of the sentence.

(398) Est' kuda idti.

is where go-INF

'There is a place to go.'

In some cases the dative participant and the pronoun 'collapse'. These are negative sentences where the pronoun refers to the agent of the infinitive action:

(399) Nekomu bylo rabotat'. (Bricyn, 1990: 183)

no-one-DAT was-NEUTER work-INF

'There was no-one to work.'

(400) V Madride net oficerov. Nekomu komandovat'. (Bricyn, 1990: 193/A. Afinogenov)

in Madrid no officers. No-one-DAT command-INF

'In Madrid there are no officers. There is no-one to give orders.'

In these sentences it is expressed that there are no agents that can realize situation type Y. In some cases the negative pronoun in the dative case does not express the potential agent, but the benefactive participant of the infinitive:

210 http://spbfp.atlant.ru:8070/israel/deadsea.htm
211 This is comparable to the use of succeed in English.
The verb *byt* ('be'), in the neuter declination, expresses the existence of the entity, which is expressed by the pronoun/adverb and the infinitive. The following semantic-syntactic information is further relevant with respect to the verb *byt* in the construction:

- In the present tense positive sentences *byt* is expressed (*est*) if accented.
- In the case of negation no present tense (*est*) is expressed.
- In the case of negation *bylo/budet* is not accented.
- The negation is not placed before the verb *bylo/budet*, but before the pronoun/adverb.

The infinitive expresses a situation type, and the K-word (interrogative noun/adverb) expresses an argument or specification of this situation type, viz. a person/place/time/manner variable. Apresjan & Iomdin (1989) argue concerning the construction of the type *negde spat* that the following syntactic slots play a part: (i) dative infinitival agent, (ii) negative existential verb *ne-*, (iii) relative interrogative pronoun, which is dependent on the verb *byt*, (iv) the null form of *byt*, and (v) the infinitive, which is the subject of the verb *byt*. In my opinion this analysis has two weak points.

Firstly, Apresjan & Iomdin treat the *ne-* morph as an existential verb, whereas the idea of predicativity cannot be ascribed to a *form* in all cases, but must be seen as an interpretative phenomenon in sentences without *byt*. In my analysis I would therefore like to make a distinction between the question of which constituent must be seen as the predicate, and which constituent accounts for the ‘predicative’ idea, that is, the idea of something ‘being the case’.

Secondly, I think it is useful to distinguish two different types of informational relations for the infinitive and the K-word in this construction, viz. (i) the K-word *predicates* over the infinitive, and (ii) the infinitive is a *specification-restriction* to the K-word. I wish to argue that because of the valency relation between the infinitive and the K-word, these interpretations are logically equivalent, but differ in terms of the information structure of the sentence.

Consider the following configurations of *(ne)kuda bezhat*:

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*(401) No nekomu mne shljapoj poklonit'sja.* (Brizyn, 1990: 188/Esenin)

'There is no-one to take my hat off for.'
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

Infinitival specification

(402) Kogda nekuda polzi, est', kuda bezhat'.212 (Ju. Shevchuk, "DDT") when nowhere crawl-INF, is, where run-INF-IMPERF 'If there is nowhere to crawl to, there is somewhere to run to.'

(403) Da, bezvyxodnoe polozhenie. Nekuda bezhat'. Da i bezhat' – protivno.213 (A. Legostaev, Zamok Pjatnistvoj rozy) (...) nowhere run-INF-IMPERF: (...) 'Yes, it is a hopeless situation. There is nowhere to run to. And running away feels like a bad thing to do.'

(404) Smotri, mne nekuda bezhat'.214 (B. Grebenshchikov, Mne nuzhny akkordy) look-IMP, I-DAT nowhere run-INF-IMPERF 'Look, there is nowhere for me to run.'

(405) Fataru bylo nekuda bezhat'.215 (A. Zorich, Karl, geroj) Fatar-DAT was-NEUT nowhere run-INF-IMPERF 'There was nowhere for Fatar to run.'

Infinitival topic

(406) Vedi' s zemnogo shara-to bezhat' nekuda.216 PRT from globe PRT run-INF-IMPERF nowhere 'There is no running away from the globe.'


212 http://www.arty.net.ru/lib-lat/KSP/shewchuk.txt
213 http://www.magister.msk.ru:8085/library/sf/legoa004.htm
216 http://www.forum.msk.ru:8084/guestbook-14oct.html
217 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/SIMAK/dant2.txt
“You can run away at any moment.” “No, Harriet. That’s not true. There is nowhere for me to run.”

(408) No raznica dejstvit’no est’ i ona zaklunchaetsja v tom, chto tamoshnim koxam iz Ameriki bezhat’ bylo nekuda.218
(…), that locals-DAT commies-DAT-PL from United States run-INF-IMPERF was-NEUT nowhere
‘But there really is a difference, and that difference is that the local communists couldn’t run away from the United States.’

(409) Ten’ roka uzhe kosnulas’ ee, i bezhat’ bylo nekuda, i srazhat’sja bessmyslenno.219 (D. Gromov, Put’ prokljatyo)
(…) run-INF-IMPERF was-NEUT nowhere, (…)
‘The shadow of fate had already touched her, and there was nowhere to run, and fighting was pointless.’

I would like to analyze these expressions as follows.

In (402) the verb byt’ is expressed in the present tense to express the idea of existence, namely the existence of the phenomenon expressed by the K-word. The infinitive can be seen as the specification of the K-word. In this expression, the infinitive can be seen as a semantic restriction to the information expressed by the K-word. The K-word expresses ‘direction’, and presupposes the idea of a situation for which the direction is indicated. The infinitive expresses the situation type that is connected to the direction expressed by the K-word. In affirmative sentences the verb est’ is accented, which means that the presupposition of the absence of the phenomenon expressed by the K-word is contradicted/negated. In such sentences the verb est’ must be seen as the predicative center of the construction.

In negative sentences like (403)–(404) the predicative center is not expressed, but implied by the context. In my opinion it is best to say that in (403)–(404) the whole constituent has a predicative interpretation, that is, [né+K-word – infinitive] is interpreted as the absence (= non-existence) of place/person, etc. specified in terms of the realization of the infinitive situation.

In (405) we find the same structure with the expression of bylo. In this expression the constituent [né+K-word – infinitive] must be seen as the subject of bylo. In this

218 http://www.forum.msk.ru:8084/guestbook-po10nov.html
219 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/OLDI/nekrorom.txt

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construction it is expressed that the dative participant was the recipient of the scene expressed by \([\textit{nê}+\text{K-word} - \text{infinitive}]\).

In (406)–(407) the infinitive functions as a topic. In this expression the coordination of the infinitive + \(\textit{nê}+\text{K-word}\) is interpreted such that the information expressed by \([\textit{nê}+\text{K-word}]\) is related to the information already expressed by the infinitive. In this sentence the K-word can be seen as the predicate of the sentence. This is comparable to expressions where the infinitive is the topic, and where the adverb is a predicate.

In (408)–(409) we find the same construction with the form \textit{bylo}. In these expressions the infinitive functions as a topic. This means that the information expressed by \([\textit{bylo} - \textit{nê}+\text{K-word}]\) must be seen as the predicate of the infinitive. The infinitive can be seen as the subject of \textit{bylo}, which accounts for the -o morphology here.

A different information structure can be found below:

(410) Nexudo napomnit', chto evrejam nekuda bylo bezhat' ot Gitlera, britancy dazhe ne puskali ix v Palestinu.\(^{220}\)

(\textit{.} that jews-DAT nowhere was-NEUT run-INF from Hitler, (\textit{.} )

'It is not bad to remember, that the Jews had nowhere to run from Hitler, the British didn't even let them into Palestine.'

It might be argued that we have the following structure here: [dative \[\textit{nêkuda} \text{predicate byloauxiliary} \text{[bezhat' specification]}\]]. The form \textit{bylo} constitutes a unit with the predicate \textit{nêkuda}, the infinitive is expressed to specify the situation connected to the direction expressed by the predicate. A reason not to treat \textit{bylo} + infinitive as one unit with the character of a semantic addition to the K-word predicate is that I have not attested cases with the structure [dative \textit{bylo} infinitive \textit{nê}+K-word] or with the structure [dative \textit{nê}+K-word infinitive \textit{bylo}]. On the other hand, it could be argued, sentences like these occupy an intermediate position between cases with infinitive subjects/topics, and infinitive specifications. In this case I think it is not possible to answer the question of whether the -o morphology of \textit{bylo} must be attributed to the infinitive or to the K-word + infinitive; in this construction both readings are at stake. The specific meaning of the construction can also motivate the placement of the negation in the construction. The negation of the existential construction is analyzed by Rûzhichka (1994: 67). He motivates the position of the negation by pointing at the fact that the negation is placed before the element whose existence is negated: extensionally

speaking, the negation of the copula amounts to the negation of the universal adverb. In my opinion, the motivation given by Růžichka (1994: 67) is correct, although it does not take account of important criteria, viz. the specific information structure of the existential construction.

In sentences without negation, the verb byt' is expressed in those cases where there is a presupposition that there is no place, time, etc. for the infinitive situation, and where the presupposition is contradicted: there is a place, time, etc. for the infinitive situation. In the case of negative sentences, the verb byt' does not have the same existential character. In these sentences the non-existence of some entity is not emphasized by contradicting the presupposition that such an entity does exist. The idea of emphasizing the existence of an entity probably cannot be semantically combined with the idea of the absence of an entity.  

4.16.3 Infinitives + dative as complements to nouns or predicates

In this subsection I will briefly discuss the occurrence of datives in constructions with infinitives that function as specifications to nouns or participles. The following sentences are examples of this construction:

*Forms of causation + vsem*

(411) Selixov segodnja s utra dal komandu vsem otdyxat', kupatsja. (Bricyn, 1990: 155/A. Salynskij)
Selixov today this morning gave order everyone-DAT rest-INF-IMPERF, swim-INF-IMPERF
'Selixov gave an order this morning that everyone should rest and swim.'

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I suspect that the placement of the negation is further influenced by the expression of a dative subject. As in the case of the DI-construction, the expression of the dative presupposes an initial information state where the dative participant is not the recipient of the infinitive situation, which is contradicted. In sentence (..) the presupposition that there is some place to go is negated; it is expressed that there is no place to go. If the negation would occur before the verb byt', e.g. Emu kuda ne bylo speshit' ('There was nowhere for him to go.'), it would be expressed that some place exists, and that you cannot go there. I think that this clashes with the modal interpretation of the infinitive in this case. In this construction we start out from the presupposition that there is some place to go. This means that the existence of this place is established, and that the verb byt', which expresses existence, cannot be negated, but only the entity which was presupposed to be there.
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(412) Kto-to predpolozhil vyvalit' iz odnoj mashiny seno i vsem zakopat'sja v nem. (Proeme, forthcoming/Ajmato) someone proposed throw.out from one.of cars straw and all-DAT dig-INF-PERF in her 'Someone proposed to throw out all the straw from the car, and that everyone would dig into it.'

(413) Kazhdyj god u nas takie pobegi. U inzhenerov mashinka sbezhala. I teper' prikaz vsem lovit'. (A. & B. Strugackie, Ulitka na sklene) every year at us such run aways. with engineers' machine ran away. And now order everyone-DAT catch-INF-IMPERF 'Every year we had such runaways. The engineers machine ran off. And now an order to everyone to catch it.'/And now an order that everyone must catch it

(414) Resheno bylo vsem ostavat'sja nochevat'. (Proeme, forthcoming/Bulgakov) Decided was all-DAT stay-INF-IMPERF sleep-INF-IMPERF 'It was decided that everyone would stay the night.'/ 'It was decided for everyone to stay the night.'

(415) Novyj pravitel' sozval druzej, i bylo resheno vsem v meste otpravit'sya k dobroj volshebnice Stelle v nadezhde, chto ona pomozhet.222 (A.Volkov, Sem' podzemnyx korolej) (...), and was-NEUT decided all-DAT together go-INF-PERF to good witch Stella 'The new head called his friends, and it was decided that everyone would go together to the good witch Stella in the hope that she would help.'

Nouns of 'thought' + dative

(416) Nu? Jasno? Kakoj smysl vam molchat'? Budem govorit'? (Proeme, forthcoming, Semënov) well? clear? which meaning you-DAT keep silent-INF-IMPERF? We will talk 'Well? Is it clear? What reason is there for you not to talk? Shall we talk?'

(417) Razumeetsja, Simpkins! No kakoj smysl vam exat'? Ved' Slejton ubit.223 (A. Beljaev, Ostrov pogibshix korolej) of.couse, Simpkins! but what meaning you-DAT go-INF? PRT Slejton murdered 'Of course, Simpkins! But why should you go? Slejton has been murdered ...'

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222 http://www.atlant.ru:8070/library/volkov/7kings/index.htm
223 http://www.magister.msk.ru:8085/library/sf/belya003.htm
Vyi sprashivae te, oldfellow, est' li smysl vam i dal'she ostavat'sja v vasheh prikljuchenii' – govoril on.\(^{224}\) (V. Aksenov, *Krugye sutki non-stop*)
you ask, oldfellow, is PRT reason you-DAT and further stay-INF-PERF in your
adventures? – said he

"You ask, old fellow, if there is a reason for you to go on with your adventure?", he
said.'

Bricyn (1990: 153–157) discusses the use of the infinitive as a specification to a noun, without explicitly mentioning the possibility of expressing a dative (in one of his examples (1990: 155), however, a dative is given). He distinguishes two types, viz. cases that occur with nouns that express ‘causation’ (*komanda, prikaz, nakaz, zavet, zadacha, lozun, prizyn*), and those that occur with nouns that express ‘thoughts’ (*mysl', mnenie, duma*). In most of the examples that he gives no dative is expressed; in such sentences the identity of the non-expressed infinitive subject remains unspecified or can be inferred from the context.

It could be argued that the occurrence of the dative subject here points at the ‘subordinate’ character of such infinitives, that is, these cases can be seen as uses of the DI-construction in a subordinate context. The opinion that infinitives occurring with nouns can be seen as infinitive sentences is rejected by Bricyn (1990: 156), who argues that the meaning of the infinitive component in these cases does not depend solely on the semantics of the individual forms, but principally depends on the semantics of the noun to which it belongs. According to Bricyn, the meaning of the infinitive-component can therefore not be seen as identical to the meaning of the infinitive sentence.

I agree with Bricyn’s observation that the infinitive cannot be seen as identical to the meaning of the infinitive sentence, but I would like to make some further remarks. The main question pertaining to the sentences given above is whether the dative must be seen as the indirect object/benefactive object of the noun/participle, or whether it must be seen as the potential subject of the infinitive. It seems to me that in the case of the sentences with *mysl* ('reason'), just one reading is possible, namely a reading where the dative is analyzed as the benefactive object of the noun. Sentence (416) means ‘what sense does it make for you to realize the infinitive situation’, and not ‘what is the meaning of you realizing the infinitive situation.’ Further evidence for the benefactive

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\(^{224}\) http://www.moshkow.pp.ru:5000/lat/AKSENOW/nonstop.txt
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status of the dative can be found from similar expressions that have a different information structure. Consider the following sentences with the noun smysl:

(419) I esli dvuxgolovoj pirat ne vral (a kakoj emu smysl vrat', esli podumat'), polozhenie sil'no oslozhnilos'.

and if twoheaded pirate not lied (but which he--DAT reason lie-INF-IMPERF, of think), situation strongly became.complicated

'And if the two-headed pirate didn't lie (and why should he, if you think about it), then the situation has become radically worse.'

(420) Kakoj smysl emu voobshche ix puskat'? which reason he-DAT in.general them let.go-INF-IMPERF?

'What reason is there for him to let them go at all?'

In (419) and (420) the dative does not co-occur with the infinitive, which means that it must be seen as a benefactive object of the noun.

A different situation is at stake in the case of the forms of causation. In analyzing this construction a distinction has to be made between the semantic-logical structure of the sentence, and the semantic-syntactic structure of the sentence. In terms of the semantic-logical structure, in the case of 'forms of causation' the identity of the indirect/benefactive object is identical to the non-expressed participant of the infinitive. This is comparable to the structure of objective infinitives, where the indirect object of the finite verb is identical to the non-expressed infinitive agent (see 4.4.4.1).

In terms of the semantic-syntactic structure, however, the dative may form a constituent with the infinitive, or with the noun. Regarding this last question, the following criteria have to be taken into account, viz. (i) what is the prosodic structure of the construction, (ii) what is the valency structure, or array of combinatorial possibilities of the noun/participle, and (iii) what is the information structure of the construction. I will briefly discuss the criteria below.

Firstly, the question of to which constituent the dative belongs may be evidenced by the prosodic structure of the expression. Consider the following sentence (without a dative):

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225 http://moshkow.relline.ru:5000/lat/STRUGACKIE/hell_exp.txt
226 http://moshkow.relline.ru:5000/lat/WASILXEW/d_glory.txt
227 Note that objective infinitives also occur with accusative objects (e.g. sprasit').

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In this sentence we find the predicate prikaz and an infinitive complement. This complement has a clause character, which is evidenced by the existence of an intonation break between the two parts of the sentence, and by the specific intonation associated with an order, symbolized by the exclamation mark. This can be compared to the following sentence with an imperative:

(422) Rotnyj peredal komandu “stoj”.228 (P. Andreev, Dvenadcat’rasikazov)
commander gave order “stand.still-IMP”
“The commander gave the order: “Stand still”.

The independent character of the infinitive clause is therefore dependent on the intonational pattern at stake. In the sentences with nouns derived from verbs of causation given above, an intonation break may be inserted in the following way:

(423) Selixov segodnia s utraj dal komandu // vsem otdyxat’, kupatsya.
(424) Resheno bylo // vsem ostavatsya nochevat’.
(425) Novyj pravitel’ sozval druzej, i bylo resheno // vsem vместe otpravit’sya k dobroj volshebnice Stelle v nadezhde, chto ona pomozhet.

According to this principle, (423)—(425) can be seen as infinitive sentences, and as instances of the DI-construction. Note that according to this principle the following sentence, where vsem modifies a noun, cannot be seen as an infinitive sentence:

(427) No dazhe esli i tak – (...), peredadut komandu vsem okrestnym rajotdelam i sluzhbam gosbezopasnosti iskat’ chemuyu ‘emku’ s takim-to nomerom.229 (V. Zvjagincev, Bof mestnogogucheniya)

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(...) give order all-DAT neighboring-DAT regional.department-DAT and services-DAT of.state security look.for-INF-PERF black "emka" with that number
'But even if that is the case, they will give an order to all the neighboring regional departments and services of state security to look for the black "emka" [car] with a given license plate.'

Here the intonation break must be placed before the infinitive:

(428) No dazhe esli i tak — (...), peredadut komandu vsem okrestnym rajotdelam i sluzhbam gosbezopasnosti // iskat' chernuju 'emku' s takim-to nomerom.

(429) No dazhe esli i tak — (...), peredadut komandu // vsem okrestnym rajotdelam i sluzhbam gosbezopasnosti iskat' chernuju 'emku' s takim-to nomerom.

The second reading is pragmatically strange because it means that an order was given, and that the content of the order was: "Vsem okrestnym rajotdelam i sluzhbam gosbezopasnosti iskat' chernuju 'emku' s takim-to nomerom!"

Secondly, in order to answer the question of to which constituent the dative belongs, it is important to look at the 'valency structure' of the noun or participle in question. Nouns like prikaz, and komanda can occur with 'indirect objects' expressed in the dative (prikaz/komanda komu), e.g.:

(430) Kto dal emu komandu dostavit' zaderzhannogo imenno v Suxanovskuju (...)?
V. Zvjagincev, Boi mestnogo znachenija
who gave him-DAT order deliver-INF-PERF prisoner exactly to Suxanoskaja
'Who gave him an order to bring the prisoner to Suxanoskaja?'

This analysis cannot account for sentences with resheno since this participle does not have a dative listed in its valency structure, or put differently, this participle does not occur with datives; the following sentence is ungrammatical:

(431) Bylo resheno nam chto, ...
was-NEUT decided we-DAT that ...

This suggests that with *resheno*, the form *vsem* forms a constituent with the infinitive, and not with the participle. The restriction of the dative to *vse* can be motivated as follows. The impossibility of (431) must be accounted for by the semantic function of *vse*. In most cases of the construction under discussion [noun/participle of causation + infinitive] no dative is expressed because the identity of the participant for whom the decision is taken ('indirect object'), which is extensionally identical to the non-expressed infinitive subject, can be inferred from the context, e.g.:  

(432) Uzhe **resheno bylo otpravit'sja** cherez ves' arhipelag Soroka Ostrovov, verbuja na puti storonnikov Konfedracii.231 (S. Luk'janenko, *Rycari soroka ostrovov*)  
already decided-PART was-NEUT go-INF through whole archipelago of.fourty islands, (...)  
'It was already decided to go through the whole archipelago of the Fourty Islands, recruiting supporters of the Confederacy on the way.'

(433) **Èj, Ivanov! Ja dal komandu snjat'** protivogazy, a ty chto – osobennyj? – Da ja ego davno snjal! – Nu i morda zhe u tebja?232  
(…) I gave order take.off gas masks, but you what – special? (...)  
‘Hey, Ivanov! I gave an order to take off the gas masks, but what do you do, are you special or what?’ ‘I took it off long ago.’ ‘What a face you have!’

However, if the speaker wants to emphasise that "all" potential agents must be associated with the 'indirect object'/non-expressed infinitive subject, it is necessary to express this formally, since it cannot be inferred from the context. For such cases it is natural to choose the dative form. The dative is in accordance with the meaning of *resheno*: this participle expresses an act that is directed at a participant, such that this participant is affected ('it was decided for everyone').

Thirdly, the information structure of the construction may give an indication as to which constituent the dative belongs. In all cases the form *vsem* occurs before the infinitive – I have not attested cases with the dative before the noun/participle – and in all cases the dative seems to form a syntactic-semantic unit with the infinitive.

Considering what I have said above, I conclude that the construction [vsem + infinitive] may occur as a clause with a subordinate character in the case of expressions of causation such as *dat' komandu* or *bylo resheno*. In the case of *dat' komandu* the infinitive clause functions as the specification of the object of the verb; it expresses the content

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231 http://www.moshkow.pp.ru:5000/lat/LUKXQN/Forty_Isles.txt
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of the order. In the case of bylo resheno the infinitive functions as the subject of the verb byt'; it expresses the content of the decision. The occurrence of the dative of vse in these cases is influenced by the noun/participle with which the infinitive clause occurs, but also forms an independent semantic-syntactic unit with the infinitive. In my opinion, the occurrence of the dative in these cases is facilitated by the co-reference of the indirect/benefactive object of the form of causation and the infinitive subject. This can be motivated by the fact that no cases with nikonu are attested. Respondents pointed out that such sentences can only occur with a clear intonational pause:

(434) Seliov segodnja s utra dal komandu: "Nikomu ne otdyhat', kupat'sja".
    Seliov this.morning gave order: “no-one-DAT not rest-INF-IMPERF, swim-INF-IMPERF
    This morning Seliov gave the order: "No-one is allowed to rest or swim.'

The intonation break is probably necessary because the dative cannot be interpreted as the indirect object of dat' komandu. This case suggests that the expression of vsem is facilitated by the co-reference of the indirect object with the infinitive subject.

In the following section I will discuss the use of the so-called second dative. Although this construction can also be seen as a construction related to the DI-construction, I will devote a separate section to it.

4.17 The second dative

4.17.1 Introduction

In this section I will discuss the assignment of the dative case to the Russian forms odin ('alone') and sam ('self') when they occur as modifiers or adjuncts (Neidle, 1982, 1988) of the non-expressed subject of the infinitive or as modifiers of the expressed dative subject: the so-called 'second dative' (Chagisheva, 1971; Comrie 1974) or 'semipredicative' (Franks, 1990) in the dative case. The forms odin and sam are usually called 'second predicates' in the literature (Comrie, 1974; Neidle 1982, 1988). The term 'second predicate' or 'semipredicative' is used to refer to modifiers that are detached from the noun phrase to which they — according to some models — refer (e.g Comrie, 1974; Neidle, 1982, 1988; Franks, 1999). Before discussing the meaning and use of the semipredicatives odin and sam, I will briefly consider the use of semipredicatives/second predicates with adjectives.
In Russian adjectives can occur as second predicates or semipredicates in the instrumental case, or in the nominative case (Comrie, 1974). Consider the following sentences:

**Instrumental case**

(435)  
Esli b ty ne vstrelilas' / Ja b tebja pridumal / Chtob v aprel' mesjac / Ne xodit'
ugryumym.  
if IRR you not met / I IRR you made.up/in.order in April month/not go-INF-IMPERF
gloomy-INSTR  
'If you had not met me / I would have made you up / So I wouldn't have to go around
gloomy in the month of April.'

(436)  
Ivan verulja ugrjumym. (Comrie, 1974)  
Ivan-NOM returned gloomy-INSTR  
'Ivan returned gloomy.'

**Nominative case (case agreement with nominative antecedent)**

(437)  
Chto stoish' ugrjumyj.  
what you.stand gloomy-NOM  
'Why are you looking so gloomy?'

(438)  
Na rynok on verulja ugrjumyj. Oshchushcheni viny tsazhest'ju leglo na ego
serdce.  
on market he-NOM returned gloomy-NOM. feeling of guilt as.a.weight lay on his heart
'He returned gloomy to the market. The feeling of guilt felt like a weight on his heart.'

Comrie (1974) and other scholars (e.g. Neidle, 1988) argue that the choice of either the instrumental or nominative is a matter of convention, and that the instrumental is preferred in modern Russian. It may indeed be the case that conventionalization is at stake here, but I think that the different cases are also related to a difference in conceptualization. According to the literature on case (Jakobson, 1995), the

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233 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/lyr/T8/T8.146.lat.html#s.8
234 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/xref/ug/ugrynynyj.lat.html
235 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/ZHURNAL/samuhiha.txt
236 Following Comrie (1974), I conclude that in the case of dative subjects, the case of the adjunct is instrumental, and not dative.
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instrumental case is used if the property expressed by the adjective is conceptualized as a property of the situation expressed by the verb, whereas in those sentences where the case of the adjective agrees with its antecedent, the property expressed by the adjective is seen as a property of the antecedent. In some instances, however, it is difficult to distinguish between these different readings; consider the following sentence:

(439)  On ushel surovyj i ugrjumyj /Golovoj na grud' svoju ponik. he-NOM went.away grim-NOM and gloomy-NOM / head on chest his hanged
‘He went away grim and gloomy/His head hanged on his chest.’

In this sentence the nominative occurs, whereas the action itself is described as being ‘gloomy’. Note furthermore that with some verbs no choice is possible between the instrumental case and another case; in such cases the instrumental case is listed in the valency structure of the verb. This is the case for example with the verb vygljadit’ (‘look like’):

(440)  A ostrov vygljadit ugrjumym i sedym. but island looks gloomy-INSTR and grey-INSTR
‘But the island looks gloomy and grey.’

Chagisheva (1971) shows in her article that there have been diachronic changes in the assignment of case to second predicates. In the eleventh century (until the sixteenth century) the second dative could be used with different predicates in modal infinitival structures [first dative + verb byt' + second dative], in impersonal structures, or in structures with a modal predicate [first dative + modal (directive) verb + verb byt' + second dative]. In this period the dative was used in contexts where in modern Russian the instrumental case is used (emu byt' zhiw instead of emu byt' zhiym). In the same period, however, a tendency can be perceived to assign the instrumental case to second predicates. This tendency occurs first in the speech of written narratives, and is restricted to specific syntactic contexts. Chagisheva argues that the use of the instrumental case for second datives means that the subordinate relation between the second predicate and the first dative is weakened, and that the subordinate relation with the verb is strengthened. Chagisheva (1971: 231) explains the changes of case assignment in terms of the division of labor between the dative and the instrumental case. In Old Russian the dative is polyfunctional, but this polyfunctional status has changed because the instrumental case has taken over one function of the dative, viz. the expression of the relation with the predicate (instead of the relation between the second predicate and the first dative). In modern Russian the situation of Old Russian, where the dative is assigned to second predicates only, occurs with the forms odin and sam, and optionally with the adjective pervyj (‘first’).

http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/xref/ug/ugryumyj.lat.html
http://euclid.ucsd.edu/~broido/xref/ug/ugryumym.lat.html

237 Chagisheva (1971) shows in her article that there have been diachronic changes in the assignment of case to second predicates. In the eleventh century (until the sixteenth century) the second dative could be used with different predicates in modal infinitival structures [first dative + verb byt' + second dative], in impersonal structures, or in structures with a modal predicate [first dative + modal (directive) verb + verb byt' + second dative]. In this period the dative was used in contexts where in modern Russian the instrumental case is used (emu byt' zhiw instead of emu byt' zhiym). In the same period, however, a tendency can be perceived to assign the instrumental case to second predicates. This tendency occurs first in the speech of written narratives, and is restricted to specific syntactic contexts. Chagisheva argues that the use of the instrumental case for second datives means that the subordinate relation between the second predicate and the first dative is weakened, and that the subordinate relation with the verb is strengthened. Chagisheva (1971: 231) explains the changes of case assignment in terms of the division of labor between the dative and the instrumental case. In Old Russian the dative is polyfunctional, but this polyfunctional status has changed because the instrumental case has taken over one function of the dative, viz. the expression of the relation with the predicate (instead of the relation between the second predicate and the first dative). In modern Russian the situation of Old Russian, where the dative is assigned to second predicates only, occurs with the forms odin and sam, and optionally with the adjective pervyj (‘first’).

238 http://math.ucsd.edu/~broido/xref/ug/ugryumyj.lat.html
239 http://euclid.ucsd.edu/~broido/xref/ug/ugryumym.lat.html
In the literature, the term ‘second dative’ is employed to refer to the use of the words *sam* and *odin* in the dative case when they function as second predicates. The case assignment of these forms differs from other adjectives such as *ugrijumi*. The semipredicatives can agree in case with their antecedent, also if the antecedent is a dative subject: 240

(441) Oleg, tebe nel’zja tuda iditi odnomu
    Oleg, you-DAT may not there go-INF-IMPERF alone-DAT
    ‘Oleg, you may not go there alone.’

However, the second dative (*sam*, *odin* in the dative case) also occurs in contexts where there is no such agreement at all. Consider the following sentence:

(442) Samoe vazhnoe - umenie rabotat’ odnomu. (Neidle, 1982: 416)
    most important - ability work-Inf alone-DAT
    ‘The most important thing is the ability to work alone.’

In this sentence there is no antecedent available for the second predicate; nevertheless we find a second dative. What is the motivation for the occurrence of the second dative? Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to look at the different contexts for second datives:

(i) In sentences with an adverbial predicate, with or without dative subject
(ii) With objective infinitives and some subjective infinitives
(iii) With passives
(iv) With infinitive predicates with a dative subject (DI-construction proper)
(v) With infinitive predicates with overt subordinators

240 Another exception is the adjective *pervyi* (‘first’), that can also show agreement with the dative subject, e.g.: *[V]*am strejat’ pervomu. (Timofeev, 1950: 268/Lermontov); you-DAT shoot-INF-IMPERF first-ADJ-DAT; ‘You may shoot first.’ Another example from this century: Delo jasnoe, v poselke-to vse kommu(nist), nikomu pervomu k stenu idti ne xochetsj (...). (V. Khomogorov, Podborka rasskazov); (...) no-one-DAT first-DAT to wall go-INF not want-REFL; ‘It's all very clear, in the settlement everyone is a communist, and no-one likes to stand against the wall to be shot.’ Chagisheva (1971: 213) further remarks that (primarily) in the spoken language the second dative also occurs with other adjectives; she gives the following example: 

*Zhivomu, synok [teba] byt’ (...); alive-DAT son [you-DAT] be-INF; ‘You will be alive/my son.’ Another example, from a translation of Astrid Lingren is given here: Vzdumash’ nas opijat’ vodi’ za nos – zhivomu tebe ne byt’, tak i znaj; http://www.moshkow.pp.ru:5000/lat/LINDGREN/blumkvis.txt; (...) alive-DAT you not be-INF (...); ‘If you take it into your head to deceive us, you won’t stay alive, don’t forget it.’ The construction with *zhivomu* probably shows idiomatic features.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

(vi) In sentences where the infinitive is a complement to a noun or an impersonally used reflexive finite verb

(vii) In infinitival complement sentences without dative subjects

I will briefly present these contexts.

(i) Averbial predicates

The second dative occurs in sentences with an adverbial predicate and a dative subject:

(443) Mne trudno rabotat' odnomu.
1-DAT difficult-ADV work-INF alone-DAT
'I find it difficult to work alone.'

In such sentences the second dative and the dative subject are co-referential. The second dative also occurs in sentences with an adverbial predicate, without dative subject, where the second dative is co-referential with the non-specified, generic agent

(444) No vse èto, konechno, nado videt' samomu.241 (V. Pelevin, Zhiqn' nasekamy)
but all that, of course, need-ADV see-INF-IMPERF self-DAT
'But all that you have to see yourselves of course.'

(445) Estestvenno, mozhno samomu nakruchivat' schetchik, no za ètim bdit'no sledjat i strogo nakazyvajut.242 (Text about an internet site where you can make money by clicking on an icon)
of course, may-ADV self-DAT screw-INF-IMPERF counter, but after that careful follow and severe punish
'Of course you can screw with the counter yourselves, but people follow this carefully and punish offenders severely.'

In (444) a dative noun can be inserted within the paradigm to express the identity of the non-expressed infinitive agent, but in (445) the expression of a dative noun changes the meaning of the sentence: [dative + mozhno] is interpreted as a case of permission, whereas mozhno is interpreted as a case of possibility (see 4.10.2.6 for a discussion).

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241 http://mirror.primorye.ru/moshkow/lat/PELEWIN/insectos.txt

475
Objective infinitives

The second dative occurs in the case of so-called 'objective infinitives' (see also 4.4.3). In the case of objective infinitives the subject of the infinitive is co-referential with the object of the matrix sentence:

(446)  \[\text{Ja velel emu prijti odnomu. (Neidle, 1988: 125)}\]
'I ordered him to come alone.'

In many cases there is agreement between the dative case of the indirect object of the finite verb, and the dative case of the second dative. Neidle (1982: 394) argues that this is not a necessary feature; she gives the following example with the objective infinitive \textit{poprosit}' ('to ask'), which has an accusative object listed in the valency structure, and occurs with a dative semipredicative:

(447)  \[\text{My poprosili Ivana pojti odnomu/*odnogo. (Neidle, 1988: 126)}\]
'We asked Ivan-ACC to come alone-DAT/*alone-ACC

Below, two other examples are given:

(448)  \[\text{[U]moljala ego otkazat\textquotesingle sja ot ee ruki i samomu zashchitit\textquotesingle ee ot vlasti roditelja. (Pushkin, Dubrovskij)}\]
'begged him-ACC refuse-INF-PERF from her hands and self-DAT defend her from power of:parent

(449)  \[\text{Vas kak uchenogo ne tjanet samomu zanjat\textquotesingle sja inoplanetnymi chudesami? (A. & B. Strugackie, Piknik na obochine)}\]
'you-AC as scientist not attracts self-DAT deal.with-INF-PERF out-of-space wonders?

In the case of so-called subjective infinitives, where the nominative subject and the non-expressed infinitive subject are co-referential, the second predicate normally occurs in the
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

nominative. I have attested subjective infinitives with a nominative semipredicative with the following verbs (see Bricyn, 1990, for a classification of verb types):

- verbs that indicate the beginning of an action: e.g. *nachinat’*
- verbs that indicate the continuation of an action: e.g. *prodolžat’*
- so-called ‘definite verbs’ (see Bricyn, 1990: 43): e.g. *izpolžit’*
- the verbs *moch’* and *umet’*
- verbs that indicate actions that are directed at the realization of other actions by removing potential obstacles; the so-called ‘probacionnye glagoly’ (Bricyn, 1990: 52): e.g. *pytaj’sja*
- verbs that indicate a psychological state: e.g. *xotet, pozhelat’, osmelit’, sobiraj’sja, prinjat’sja, reshit’, dumat’*
- verbs that indicate psychological relations: e.g. *ljubit’*
- verbs that indicate goal-orientation: e.g. *pōjti*
- verbs with the meaning feature of ‘to speak’: e.g. *obeshchat’*
- with *stat’, future tense of *byt’ (budet)*, and short predicates with *byt’ (byt’ dolžhen, byt’ sposoben, byt’ gotov, byt’ nameren etc.)
- with the expression *v silax* (’have strenght’)

However, with some verbs in some specific contexts I have attested subjective infinitives with *dative* semipredicates. Consider the sentences below:

*reshit’* with *sam* in the dative

(450) [Ja] reshil na sledujushchēe utro, esli k ėtomu vremenī ne vernetsja Dik, samomu *otpravljaj’sja v gorod i uznat’, ne sluchilos’ li s nim chego-nibud’.*\(^{244}\) (Ch. Bich, *Prpawohaža sutra*)

I-NOM decided on following morning, if till that time not will.return Dik, self-DAT go-INF-PERF in town and find.out-INF-PERF, not happened PRT with him something 'I decided that the following morning, if Dik had not returned by that time, I would go into the city myself to find out if something had happened to him.'

\(^{243}\) I suspect that the nominative case occurs with all subjective infinitives (see Bricyn, 1990 for a more complete list of verb classes).

\(^{244}\) http://moshkow.relline.ru:5000/lat/MAJNRID/vanished.txt
**Chapter IV**

*reshit' with sam in the nominative*

(451)  
On reshil sam sozdat' vozduhoplavatel'nyj apparat i sam poletet' na nem. (F. Iskander, Stojanka cheloveka)  
he-NOM decided self-NOM create-INF-PERF aeronautic machine and self-NOM fly-INF-PERF on her  
‘He decided to make an aeronautic machine himself, and to fly it himself.’

*norovit' with sam in the dative*

(452)  
Voobshche, zhenivshis', on uzhasno razlenilsja i vse norovil ne zapisyvat' samomu, a – diktovat'. (N. Mandel'shtam, Vospominanija)  
in.general, after.getting.married, he terribly grew.very.lazy and all aimed.at not write.down-INF-IMPERFF self-DAT, but dictate-INF-IMPERFF  
‘In general, he became very lazy after getting married, and just aimed at not writing anything down himself, but dictating it.’

*norovit' with sam in the nominative*

(453)  
No kak tol'ko v ruki popadaet telekamera, vsjak norovit sam vtisnut'sja v pole s'emki.  
but how only in hands fall camera, each-NOM aims.at self-NOM force.into-INF-IMPERF field.field of.filming  
‘But as soon as a camera falls into your hands, everyone wants to force himself into the field of filming.’

*stat' with sam in the dative*

(454)  
Ja tipografi ne arestovyvaju potomu, milostivyy gosudar' Evstratij Pavlovich, chto u nas takovyx net, a samomu stavit' na den'gi departamenta, chem zanimaetsja Kremeneckij, daby poluchat' vneocherednye nagrady, – uvol'ite, ne stanu. (J. Semenov, Nepremerimost)  
I printing.houses not arrest because, dear sir Evstratij Pavlovich, that at us such not, but self-DAT put-INF-IMPERF on money of.department, what engaged.in Kremeneckij, in.order receive out-of-order reward, – if.you.please, not will.be

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245 http://kulichki-lat.rambler.ru/moshkow/NIKITINYU/rage.txt
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

'I don't arrest printing houses because, dear sir Evstratij Pavlovich, we don't have such printing houses, and to organize something with the money of the department, in order to get a useless reward, which Kremeneckij is doing, I won't do, if you please.'

_stat_ with _sam_ in the nominative

(455) On dazhe drat'sja ne stanet sam menu. (R. Zheliazny, Znaki dorogi)
he-NOM even fight not will.be self-NOM
‘He won't even start fighting himself.’

Below, I will say more about the cases with a dative.

(iii) Passives

Neidle (198: 127) argues that in the case of passives the second dative is strongly favored over the nominative:

(456) On byl ugovoren prijti *odin/?odnomu. (Neidle, 1988: 127)
he was persuaded to come alone-NOM/?alone-DAT
‘He was persuaded to come alone.’

Sentences like these, however, are rather ‘constructed’.

(iv) With the DI-construction with first datives

The second dative occurs in the case of the DI-construction:

(457) Mne eshche odnomu domoj vozvrashchat’sja.
I-DAT still alone-DAT home return
‘I still have to go back home alone.’

In this sentence the case of the second dative agrees with the case of the first dative.

(v) With overt subordinators

The second dative occurs with subordinators such as the conjunction of purpose *chtoby*, the conditional complementizer *esli*, and the conjunction of anteriority *prezhdie chem*.

wanted from us escape, yes? In order self-DAT slip.away-INF-PERF, how tried yesterday
‘You wanted to escape us, didn’t you? So that you could slip away by yourselves, like you tried yesterday.’

(459) Odin iz vyvodov po povodu ceny podobnoj veshchi – kak minimum $7000, libo $3000 esli delat’ samomu. (248)
one of conclusions with regard price of such things – as a minimum $7000 or $3000 if do-INF-IMPERF yourself-DAT
‘One of the things we can conclude about the price of such things is that it will cost $7000 as a minimum, or $3000 if you do it yourself.’

(460) Vskore do Èddi doshlo, chto éto – ta samaja fraza, kotoruju Roland probormotal togda
na poljane, gde Sjuzanna vyrubila medvedja, prezhdie, chem samomu otrubit’sja. (249) (S. King, *Temnaja bashnya*)
soon till Eddy come, that that – that same phrase that Roland mumble then on glade,
where Suzanna cut down bear, before himself-DAT crumble.down-INF-PERF
‘Eddy soon understood that it was the same phrase that Roland had mumbled on the glade, where Suzanne had slaughtered the bear, before he crumbled down himself.’

In such sentences the second dative is co-referential with the subject expressed in the main clause, or if no subject is expressed, with a generic agent.

(vi) With nouns and finite verbs

The second dative occurs when the infinitive is a specification to a noun; below some examples offered by Neidle are given:

249 Internet site: http://mslib.mos.ru/moshkow/lat/KING/bash3.txt
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

(461)  Popytka konchit' rabotu odnomu ne uvenchalas' uspexom. (Neidle, 1988: 142) attempt finish-INF-PERF work alone-DAT not crowned with.success 'The attempt to finish work alone, wasn't crowned with success.'

(462)  Samoe vazhnoe - umenie rabatat' odnomu. (Neidle, 1982: 416) most important -- ability work-INF-IMPERF alone-DAT 'The most important thing is the ability to work alone.'

(463)  U Kolja net sil priiti samomu. (Neidle, 1982: 394) around Kolja there.is.not strength come-INF-PERF alone-DAT 'Kolja doesn't have the strength to come alone.'

Franks notes that in some cases the nominative can occur (I will discuss his examples below). I have attested the following cases where both a nominative and a dative occur; compare:

**Vozmozhnost'** + nominative

(464)  Esli rasprostranitel' imeet vozmozhnost' sam razmnozhat' nomer - ja vysylaju emu lish' odin ekzempljar, kotoryj on razmnozhaet i rassylaet.250 if distributor has possibility self-NOM duplicate-INF-IMPERF number -- I send him just one copy, that he duplicates and sends.away 'If the distributor has the possibility to duplicate the journals himself, I'll just send him one copy, that he can duplicate and distribute.'

**Vozmozhnost'** + dative

(465)  ... u russkogo chitatela pojavilas' vozmozhnost' samomu razobrat'sja v vopros o podlinnosti opublikovannyx tekstov ... 251 (V. Demin, Tajny russkogo naroda) ... at Russian reader appeared possibility self-DAT understand-INF-PERF in question over originality of.published texts ' ... the possibility appeared for the Russian reader to decide himself whether the published texts are original ... '  

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250 http://sf.glasnet.ru:8105/tc/vesty/vesty01.htm  
251 http://lib.nordnet.ru/lat/DEMIN/tajny.txt
Sila + nominative:

(466) Vse v moej dushe burno kipelo; ja chuwestoval, chto ego iz etogo vozniknet novyj porjadok, no ne imel sil sam ego navesti.\(^{252}\) (M. Shelli, Frankenshtein ili Sovremenny Prometey)

(...) but not had strength self-NOM him direct-INF-PERF

‘Everything in my soul was boiling stormily; I felt that from this a new order would develop, but I didn’t have the strength to direct it myself.’

(467) Edva tol’ko Dava-Dorchzi priobretaet sil sam nadet’ sapogi, on beret koteklo.\(^{253}\) (V. Ivanov, Vozraschennie Buddy)

(...) will.gain strength self-NOM dress-INF-PERF boots, he takes kettle

‘As soon as Dava-Dorchzi gaines the strength to put his boots on himself, he takes the kettle.’

Sila + dative:

(468) ... u menj a ne xvatilo by sil samomu najti i nazhat’ nuzhnuju knopku.\(^{254}\) (K. Lomer, Planeta katastrof)

... at me not be.sufficient IRR strength self-DAT find-INF-PERF and press-INF-PERF necessary button

‘... I wouldn’t have had enough strength to find and press the necessary button myself.’

(469) Ja ne mogu odin kazhdyi den’ byt’ so vsemi vami; mne nedostae t sil odnomu besedovat’ s takim mnozhestvom.\(^{255}\) (Religious site about Lazarus)

(...) I-DAT lack strength alone-DAT talk-INF-IMPERF with such multitude

‘I can’t be alone with you all every day, I lack the strength to talk alone with so many people.’

In this case the second dative is co-referential with the non-specified infinitive agent. The second dative can also occur as a complement to reflexive verbs, e.g.:

(470) Pol’zovatelju ne razreshaetsja samomu zadavat’ parol’.\(^{256}\)

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\(^{253}\) http://moshkow.orsk.ru/Library/lat/IWANOWWS/budda.txt
\(^{254}\) http://icc.migsv.ru/library/lat/LAUMER/plcatast.txt
\(^{255}\) http://www.magister.msk.ru:8085/library/bible/comment/zlatoust/zlato047.htm
\(^{256}\) http://www.lito.sammitkiev.ua:8105/docs/rfc1244/rfc_4_3.htm
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

user-DAT not permitted-REFL self-DAT give-INF-IMPERF code
'The user is not permitted to give the code himself.'

In this sentence the second dative is co-referential with the indirect object of the finite verb. In some cases no indirect object is expressed, e.g.:

(471)  Samomu delat’ èto ne rekomenduetsja. 257
self-DAT do-INF-IMPERF that not recommends-REFL
'It is not recommended that you do it yourself.'

In this sentence the indirect object of the finite verb (something is recommended to someone) is interpreted as the generic agent and as co-referential with the (generic) non-expressed infinitive subject.

(vii) With infinitival complements without dative subject

The second dative further occurs in the case of infinitives that function as complements, e.g.:

(472)  Uzhe i èto slishkom mnogo dlja menja – samomu xranit’ svoi mnenija (...) . 258 (F. Nicshe, Tak govori Zarautstra)
alreadyy to much for me – self-DAT keep-INF-IMPERF own opinion (...) 
'That is already too much for me – to keep my opinion to myself.'

4.17.2 Motivation for the second dative in formal frameworks

In the syntactic literature the occurrence of the second dative has received considerable attention from scholars working in a variety of frameworks, but mainly in the so-called 'formal' frameworks such as Generative Grammar (e.g. Comrie, 1974; Franks, 1990; Schoorlemmer, 1995) and Lexical Functional Grammar (Neidle, 1982, 1988). The general problem addressed by these scholars is how one can motivate the distribution of the second dative. I will now briefly discuss some of these analyses, and then present my own analysis. The aim of this section is to show the advantages of semantic approaches to the occurrence of the second dative compared with 'formal' approaches.

258 http://moshkow.donetsk.v1a/lat/NICSHE/zaratustra.txt
The first formal analysis of the second dative is given by Comrie (1974). His analysis is based on two rules:

(i) The case of the non-expressed infinitive subject (PRO) is dative.
(ii) The main verb and a subjective infinitive form a cohesive unit, in the sense that the agreement in case between PRO and the semipredicative is blocked, and there is case agreement between the subject of the main verb and the semipredicative.

In Comrie’s (1974) analysis infinitives must be seen as subordinate clauses (S’); in the case of subjective infinitives, the infinitive clause (S’) is turned into a VP by a rule of restructuring. Since the infinitive occurs in a VP, odin and sam do not agree in case with PRO, but agree in case with the nominative subject of the matrix verb.

Comrie (1974: 132–33) argues that the postulation of non-expressed infinitive subjects in the dative case can be motivated by the occurrence of dative infinitive subjects in Old Church Slavonic, and the occurrence of dative infinitive subjects in modern Russian. Comrie (1974: 132) remarks that “[e]ven in modern Russian we find examples of an overt subject, in the dative, mainly where the dependent infinitive also has a complementizer, e.g. in time and purpose clauses”. Comrie gives sentence (10) as an example of such a dative. Note that Comrie does not motivate the occurrence of the dative in such contexts by pointing at the semantics of the dative, notwithstanding the fact that the dative-infinitive construction has a modal meaning in all its instances, that can be motivated by the interaction of the meaning of the infinitive and the meaning of the dative (see my analysis of such cases in 4.11). As I will argue below, the exclusion of semantics here leads to an incomplete analysis.

Comrie’s (1974) analysis is partly followed by Franks (1990), while Schoorlemmer (1995) follows the analysis given by Franks. Franks rejects the idea that the subject of the infinitive must be implicitly dative, and that case can be assigned to PRO; instead he argues that the dative case is assigned directly to the second dative if nominative agreement with its controller is blocked by one of the following factors: (a) the absence of anaphoric (i.e. subject) control; (b) the presence of an overt complementizer; and (c) the absence of a nominative controller. Franks proposes that agreement is possible only when the understood PRO subject of an infinitival clause is lexically governed and that the second dative arises only when the second predicate appears in a full CP (=S’) clause. Franks too does not take account of the semantics of the dative or the infinitive in the analysis of the second dative.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

Schoorlemmer (1995: 64) makes a distinction between sentences where the dative has no experiencer semantics (the so-called ‘structural dative’, where the dative case is assigned to subjects of infinitival clauses only) and sentences where it has experiencer semantics. These latter are sentences with overt or non-overt adverbial predicates. A problem with Schoorlemmer’s analysis is, however, that it remains unclear in which cases the dative has experiencer semantics and in which cases it does not.

Neidle (1982, 1988) gives an analysis of the second dative in the model of Lexical Functional Grammar, in which she takes Comrie’s (1974) analysis as her starting point. Following Comrie (1974), she treats the forms sam and odin as adjuncts, and assigns the dative case to infinitival subjects (PRO) (Neidle, 1988: 187). Neidle rejects the hypothesis proposed by Comrie (1974) that all infinitives must be seen as sentences (S’), and that the assignment of the nominative case to sam and odin in subjective infinitive sentences can be motivated by a rule of restructuring. Instead, she argues that one should distinguish between VP and S’ infinitivals; VP infinitivals must be seen as verbal complements (VCOMP’s) whose subjects are supplied within functional structure by the control equations. The rule for agreement within functional structure is stated as follows: “an adjunct agrees in case with its functional subject, which is identical with some other grammatical function within its clause nucleus” (Neidle, 1982: 419). This rule says that the dative case is assigned to odin and sam in clauses without subject, or in clauses with a dative subject; in clauses without object the infinitive must be seen as a VP, such that PRO is assigned the nominative case. The rule given here, however, cannot account for so-called objective infinitives, where odin and sam always occur in the dative case. Neidle solves this problem as follows. She argues that in Russian there is a rule that there is no object control of VCOMP’s (Neidle, 1988: 134–135). This means that in objective infinitive sentences with an accusative object (e.g. prosit) or a dative indirect object (e.g. velet), the infinitive clause must be seen as an S’, such that PRO is assigned the dative case. Neidle’s (1982, 1988) argumentation can thus be summarized as follows: (i) PRO is dative; (ii) sam and odin are adjuncts; (iii) an adjunct agrees in case with its functional subject, which is identical with some other grammatical function within its clause nucleus; (iv) there is no object control in Russian.

In my opinion the analyses given above are characterized by the following interrelated shortcomings:

(i) Non-motivated rules are postulated to explain the linguistic phenomenon in question.
Model-theoretic notions that are postulated as explanatory devices have in fact no real explanatory value, because they are partly defined in terms of the phenomena they aim to describe and explain.

Linguistic phenomena that are formally unified (different occurrences of the dative case) are treated as non-related phenomena, such that arbitrary distinctions between linguistic data are made.

The models do not adequately explain the occurrence of the second dative, and make the wrong predictions.

An example of (i) is the rule given in Comrie (1972) and Neidle (1982, 1988) that the case assigned to the non-expressed infinitive subject (PRO) is dative. I already argued above against this rule, since it is not semantically-conceptually motivated, and does not make the correct observations in some cases, especially in the case of the nominative-infinitive construction. Furthermore, this rule necessitates the postulation of other non-motivated rules, to account for cases where the dative cannot be expressed with the infinitive.

An example of (ii) is the rule that explains the occurrence of the second dative by stating that the second dative occurs, under some specific conditions, if the infinitive constituent is a sentence (S') (e.g. Franks, 1990). In my opinion, this rule makes the correct observation that the occurrence of the second dative is connected with the predicative status of the infinitive clause. However, the rule has no explanatory value: the sentential status (S') of the infinitive with a second dative is the result of the meaning of the second dative and the infinitive, and not its cause. Language users cannot learn and follow some rule that predicts in which cases the dative case is assigned to second predicates on the basis of some unexplained notion of sentencehood. Rather, in order for the notion of sentencehood to have explanatory value, an explanation must be given, independently from the occurrence of the dative, of what the criteria are for sentencehood.

An example of (iii) can be found in Schoorlemmer (1995), who explicitly makes a distinction between dative case with experiencer semantics, and dative case without experiencer semantics, the so-called structural dative case. In my opinion, such an analysis makes arbitrary distinctions, and does not account for the fact that all uses of the dative case have particular semantic features in common.

An example of (iv) is that the proposed analyses do not adequately motivate the occurrence of the second dative in the case of some subjective infinitives. Neidle's
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

analysis does not account for instances of the dative with subjective infinitives (e.g. with *norovit*) or for instances of the nominative with deverbal nominals.

The analyses of the second dative discussed above are all characterized by the fact that they do not take the *meaning* of the dative and the *meaning* of the infinitive into account in motivating of the case assignment to the second predicates *odin* and *sam*. I will argue that the shortcomings outlined above can be resolved if we try to motivate the occurrence of the second dative on the level of conceptualization. The addition of the level of conceptualization to the syntactic analysis provides a deeper understanding and motivates the occurrence of the dative without needing to postulate non-motivated additional rules. The specific proposition that I wish to make is that the second dative has *experimenter semantics*, and that one can account for the occurrence of the second dative by the meaning of the infinitive and that of the dative.

In those cases where a dative subject occurs, the second dative can best be seen as a modifier of the dative subject (first dative) of the infinitive predicate, agreeing in case with the dative subject (cf. Neidle, 1988). In those cases where no dative subject occurs, the second dative must be seen as the modification of a contextually given subject, which is associated with PRO. Although the second dative can be seen as a modifier of the dative subject, the distribution of the second dative differs from that of the first dative, as in many cases the second dative occurs where no first dative occurs. This can be motivated by the difference in meaning and function between the second dative and the first dative subject. In many sentences where the second dative is expressed, the first dative is not expressed, because the identity of PRO can be inferred from the context. An example of this can be seen in sentences (458) and (460) above, where the infinitive occurs with subordinators. In these sentences the identity of PRO can either be inferred from the main clause, or is interpreted as a non-specified agent. This differs from the forms *sam* ('self') and *odin* ('alone'), whose special lexical attribution cannot be inferred from the context, and is therefore necessarily expressed. As I will show below, in some special cases one also finds a first dative subject in the case of subordinators; such sentences have a modal character.

In those cases where the dative can be seen as the subject of the infinitive, the infinitive action is *assigned* to the participant expressed in the dative, which presupposes the idea of some *force*. In such cases one can speak of an association or unification of PRO with the dative participant. The force that assigns the action to the participant may be a person, script, expected course of events, the speaker, etc., and is contextually given.

As I have argued before, the assignment of a situation type to some participant in the dative creates a predicative relationship: the situation is related to the participant that is to
realize the infinitive situation. The predicative moment that is constituted by relating the
infinitive predicate to the dative subject, creates the idea of a phenomenon perceived in
time; this phenomenon can be seen as the ‘verbal’ element of the construction.

Unlike Franks (1990) and Neidle (1988), I do not find that the notion of sentencehood (S') has any explanatory status in the analysis of the second dative. The
assignment of the dative case to the second predicates odin and sam can be motivated on
the basis of the semantics of the relevant forms (infinitive, lexical meaning of sam and
odin, dative) and the meaning of oppositional forms (meaning of the other cases). Hence,
the resulting sentencehood (S') of the infinitive clause is only the result of the
conceptualization under discussion, and not its cause.

Below I will discuss the different contexts for the second dative, and discuss why one
can speak of experiencer semantics in these cases. I will show that the dative case is
assigned to odin and sam when they are unified with PRO; in those cases where a (first)
subject dative is expressed, there is agreement between the second dative and the subject
dative.

4.17.3. Semantic motivation for the second dative

4.17.3.1 Objective infinitives and subjective infinitives

The typical context for the second dative is exemplified by sentences which express that a
force is directed at the occurrence of an action by another agent. This is the case for
example with the objective infinitive (446)–(449). The infinitive and the second dative
form a complement to a finite predicate with the function of object. The non-expressed
agent of the infinitive is unified with the second dative predicate, and co-referential with
the dative indirect object or accusative object of the finite verb. The occurrence of the
semipredicative in the dative case is natural, since the finite verb expresses an action
directed at the occurrence of the infinitive action by the dative participant: subject
participant does action1 such that (indirect) object participant does action2.

The second dative does not occur in the case of subjective infinitives because in this
construction (a) the subject of the main verb, and the subject of the infinitive are
coreferential, and (b) the main verb and the infinitive form a close conceptual unit; in the
case of phasal predicates because these predicates indicate a phase of an already given
infinitive situation; in the case of modal verbs like moch' ('can') and xotet' ('want') because
the infinitive expresses the content of the state expressed by the main predicate, rather than
a situation at whose realization the phenomenon expressed by the main verb is directed.
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Put differently, it is not that one 'wishes' or 'is able' *in order* to realize the infinitive action, but rather the wish or the ability are characterized *in terms* of the infinitive situation; that is, the concept expressed by the main predicate and the concept expressed by the infinitive cannot be independently conceptualized, but are manifestations of the same scene.

As I have shown above, there are exceptions to the rule that the nominative occurs in the case of subjective infinitives. On the basis of the examples that I have attested, I would suggest motivating the dative here by two interdependent features, viz. (i) the scene expressed by the dative and the infinitive must be interpretable in terms of features of the basic Dative-Infinitive meaning, especially the idea of 'directedness', and (ii) the infinitive in these sentences is conceptually more independent from the main verb than in the cases with a nominative, that is, the realization of the infinitive situation is conceptualized independently from the concept expressed by the main verb.

A reading with either a dative or a nominative is possible with the verbs *resbit* and *norovit* because these verbs can express both the idea of an action characterized in terms of the *content* of another action, and an action that is *directed* at the realization of another action; in the latter instance the dative case can be chosen.

I suppose that the dative is chosen in (450) because of the addition *esli ke etomu ne vernetsja Dik*; this addition restricts the realization of the infinitive situation to a specific condition, focusing on the fact that the infinitive situation is not already implied by the decision itself, but only occurs under specific conditions. Such a reading is impossible in (451) with a nominative, because in this sentence there is no indication of restrictive conditions, and the infinitive just expresses the content of the action denoted by the main verb.

The dative in (452) can be motivated in a similar way to that in (450). In this sentence the subject of the main verb combines all his efforts *in order* for the infinitive situation to be realized; note that one can speak of a restriction here as well (situation X, in stead of Y). In (453), with a nominative, the action expressed by the main verb and the action expressed by the infinitive are co-occurring, that is, the scene expressed by *norovit* cannot be conceptualized independently from the scene expressed by the infinitive. Put differently, the scene expressed by *norovit* ('aiming') constitutes the potential beginning of the action expressed by the infinitive ('forcing yourself into the field of filming').

For the occurrence of the dative in (454) a different motivation has to be given, probably in terms of the topical status of the infinitive clause. In this sentence the interpretation of the infinitive as a complement of the finite verb is a reinterpretation or 'resumption'. The infinitive situation has not been realized at the moment of speaking.
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but only put forward by the speaker as something that could in principle be realized. I will discuss the function of the second dative in complement-sentences below.259

4.17.3.2 Passives and Modal infinitives

For passives like (456), an analysis similar that of the objective infinitive can be given. In (456) the logical subject of _sogovoren_ (viz. people) can be seen as a force directed at the realization of the infinitive action.

A similar analysis can be given for the occurrence of the second dative with ‘modal infinitives’, or DI-construction, as in (457). In this construction the infinitive and the dative subject form a clause with a modal character. In such sentences PRO is unified with the dative subject (first dative); here the second dative agrees in case with the dative subject. The dative case is the optimal case for this construction, since the DI-construction expresses the idea of a force (norm, plan, script, way things go, etc.) directed at the realization of the infinitive situation.

It must be remarked that the modal nature of such sentences is sometimes difficult to grasp, especially in sentences where no first dative is expressed. Consider the following sentence, which according to Schoorlemmer (1995: 64) has a so-called structural dative case, that is, a dative without experiencer semantics:

(473)  Ivan ne imeet predstavlenija o tom [kak [PRO zhit' odnomu]].
Ivan not has notion about that how live-INF-IMPERF alone-DAT
'Ivan doesn't have a clue about how to live alone.'

In my opinion the statement that the dative has no experiencer semantics is incorrect. This sentence has a modal character, which can be made clear by a paraphrase with a modal form: ‘Ivan doesn’t have a clue how he _should_ live alone.’ In this sentence the dative occurs because it is expressed that Ivan does not know what he must do such that he will do the infinitive action. Note that in sentences like these the subject dative may also be expressed: _Ivan ne imeet predstavlenija o tom kak EMU zhit' odnomu._

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259 Possibly one can speak of an ‘alternative situation’ here as well.
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

4.17.3.3. Infinitives with subordinators

The second dative also has experiencer semantics in sentences with subordinators such as 

achtoby ('in order'), prezhde chem ('before') and esli ('if'). Consider the following sentence given by Franks (1990: 244): 

(474) Ljuba priexala [CP chtoby [[IP PRO pokupat' maslo *sama/samoj]]. 
Ljuba arrived in order buy-INF-IMPERF buy butter *self-NOM/self-DAT 
'Ljuba arrived in order to buy some butter herself.'

Franks (1990) and Schoorlemmer (1995) treat the dative here as having no experiencer semantics. Again, in my opinion this is incorrect. This sentence expresses that the subject of the matrix clause performs an action directed at the occurrence of some other action put differently, the action expressed in the matrix clause enables the action expressed in the infinitive clause. As I discussed earlier in 4.11.2, a first dative can be expressed in such sentences if particular conditions are met.

A motivation for the second dative in terms of experiencer semantics can also be given for sentences with the subordinators esli and prezhde chem, as in (459) and (460). In these cases the experiencer semantics of the second dative has a more abstract nature, because the force that directs at the occurrence of the infinitive action cannot be identified with a specific person, but rather with something like 'the expected course of events' or the speaker of the sentence.

In the case of prezhde chem, as in (460), the idea of 'experiencer' is connected with the fact that prezhde chem focuses the conceptualization on a moment before the realization of an expected action. In such sentences the dative case is assigned to the non-expressed infinitive agent (PRO) because the expected course of events can be seen as the force that assigns the action to the agent. As I discussed above the first dative (subject dative) can occur with the conjunction of anteriority pered tem, kak. Such sentences have a clearer ontic nature and express that according to some script the action is due to happen.

For sentences with esli a similar motivation can be given. In the case of esli, as in (459), an action type is assigned to the participant expressed in the dative (x does not do Y now, but the speaker assigns the action to the infinitive agent in a hypothetical world). It is expressed that in those worlds where the course of events is such that x will do Y, some other situation is also the case. As I argued above in 4.11.3, sentences with esli can also occur with first datives. In such cases the first dative is triggered by the presupposition that the action will possibly not take place in reality because (a) the
speaker thinks it is very unlikely that the infinitive action will happen, or (b) he wants to take into account the possibility of refusal to do the infinitive action.

4.17.3.4 Infinitive specifications to nouns and predicates

The second dative also has experiencer semantics in sentences where the infinitive must be seen as a specification to a noun. In such constructions the non-expressed agent of the infinitive is unified with the second dative and is co-referential with the non-expressed generic agent (461)–(462), or with a genitive ‘subject’ (463). Contrary to Franks (1990) and Schoorlemmer (1995), I think that the occurrence of the dative in these sentences is motivated by the experiencer semantics of the dative. In all cases the noun is characterized by the infinitive; this characterization is connected with the realization of the action type expressed by the infinitive. In (461): the ability that allows the subject to work. In (462): the attempt directed at the realization of the infinitive action. In (463): the strength that allows the realization of the infinitive action to happen.

Franks (1990: 245) mentions the possibility of the nominative case with these nouns. He argues that in some specific contexts the infinitive can occur in the nominative case, also when it can be seen as the complement to some head. Compare (475)–(477) versus (478)–(480):

(475) Ivan prinjal reshenie [PRO prijti na vecherinku odin]. (Franks (1990: 245))
Ivan took decision [PRO come-INF-PERF to party alone-NOM]
‘Ivan took the decision to come to the party alone.’

(476) Ivan dal obeshchanie [PRO prijti na vecherinku odin]. (Franks (1990: 245))
Ivan gave promise [PRO come-INF-PERF to party alone-NOM]
‘Ivan gave his promise that he would come to the party alone.’

(477) Ivan vyrazil zhelanie [PRO prijti na vecherinku odin]. (Franks (1990: 245))
Ivan uttered wish [PRO come-INF-PERF on party alone-NOM]
‘Ivan uttered his wish that he wanted to come to the party alone.’

(478) Soldat poluchil prikaz [PRO poexat‘ v gorod *odin/odnomu]. (Franks, 1990: 245)
soldier received order [PRO come-INF-PERF to city *alone-NOM/alone-DAT
‘The soldier received the order to come to the city alone.’

(479) Ivan poprosil razresheniya [PRO prijti na vecherinku *odin/odnomu. (Franks, 1990: 245)
Meaning and interpretation of the DI-construction

Ivan asked permission [PRO come-INF-PERF to party *alone-NOM/alone-DAT] 'Ivan asked permission to come to the party alone.'

(480) Ivan vyrazil svoe zhelanie [PRO prijti na vecherinku *odin/odnomu]. (Franks, 1990: 245)
Ivan uttered his wish [PRO come-INF-PERF to the party *alone-NOM/alone-DAT] 'Ivan uttered his wish to come to the party alone.'

Franks (ibid.) suggests that in the first sentences the verb-noun sequence is being restructured into a complex verb. In my opinion such an analysis is just a trick, since it remains unclear what the criteria are for such restructuring. Instead, I would suggest looking at the different types of predicates in these sentences, and the different conceptualizations underlying the dative and the nominative.

The dative is typical of cases where a force is directed at the coming into being of a situation. Such a context is clear in (478) and (479): In (478) the soldier receives an order that can be seen as a force that makes him do an action; in (479) Ivan asks permission such that he will be able to go to the party alone. Put differently, the order is a force directed at the realization of the infinitive action; the permission is also a force directed at the realization of the infinitive action.

A different conceptualization can be found in the sentences with a nominative second predicate. In (475) and (476) one cannot speak of a force that is directed at the coming into being of the action expressed by the infinitive. In (475) it is expressed that Ivan took the decision that he would come to the party alone. In (476) Ivan gives the promise that he will come to the party alone.

Although in my opinion an analysis of the phenomenon in question in terms of the meaning of the dative and that of the nominative is essential, the precise factors that determine the assignment of case in these sentences are not fully clear to me. It remains unclear for example to me how the difference in case assignment between (477) and (480) can be motivated. On the basis of the meaning of the dative and the nominative, and the examples of the same phenomenon discussed above, one could argue that the nominative is chosen in (477) because the infinitive clause (prijti na vecherinku odin) can be seen as the content of the wish: Ivan uttered his wish that he wants to come to the party alone. In this a dative is not chosen because the utterance of his wish is not directed at the realization of the infinitive action. In the same vein it could be argued that in (480) the dative is chosen because here the expression of the wish is directed at the realization of the infinitive action: Ivan uttered his wish such that he will come to the party alone. Yet, it remains unclear, how the expression of the
possessive pronoun svoj (‘own’) contributes to this last reading. I suspect that the expression of svoj (‘own’) focuses attention on the perspective of the subject of the wish, through which the subject is conceptualized as a force that is directed at the realization of the infinitive action. Compare the following sentences:

(481) [P]реступник не только не хотел опередить ся, но даже как бы из[уважение] зглдание сам еще более обвинить себя.260 (F. Достоевский, Преступление и наказание)
criminal not only not wanted justify.himself, but even how IRR express-INF-IMPERF wish self-NOM more blame-INF-PERF self
‘The criminal not only wanted not to justify himself, but seemed to express his wish to blame himself even more.’

(482) Он ощущал некое упоительное состояние легкой безмятежности, слабой усталости, когда не то что бы он сел поднятьсю, нет, сила есть, но нет ни малейшего зглдания встать, десятвовать, кому-то что-то доказывать, кого-то от чего-то засхдиться и засхдиться самому.261 (Б. Толчинский, Нарбонский вепр)
he felt some delightful state of light serenity, of weak weakness, when not that what IRR not strength get up, no, strength is, but not not slightest desire rise-INF-IMPERF, act-INF-IMPERF, someone something prove-INF-IMPERF, someone from something protect and protect oneself self-DAT
‘He felt a delightful state of light serenity, a light weakness, not like he didn’t have any strength to get up, no, he had the strength, but he didn’t have the slightest desire to act, to prove something to anyone, to protect anyone from anyone, and to protect himself.’

In (481) the occurrence of the nominative can be motivated by the fact that it is not expressed that the subject expressed his wish in order to realize the infinitive situation, but it is expressed that the content of his wish is to blame himself even more.

The analysis that I have given here for difference in meaning between the nominative and the dative can be extended to the sentences with the nouns vozможность (‘possibility’). With vozможность the nominative with один and сам is natural (e.g. (464)), and at least strongly preferred, if the infinitive occurs with the verb иметь (‘to have’). In this construction the second predicate together with the infinitive expresses the content of the possibility, rather than the situation that is enabled by the possibility. A different conceptualization can be found in (465), where a dative occurs. Here, the dative can be motivated by the occurrence of the main verb появиться (‘to appear’). This verb focuses on

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the *coming into being* of the infinitive situation; this conceptualization is typical of the combination of the dative and the infinitive.

Finally, I will make some observations about the construction with the noun *sila* (466)–(469). In the examples of this construction that I have attested, the nominative occurs in sentences where the infinitive must be seen as the specification or object-complement of a finite verb with a nominative subject. The dative occurs in sentences where the non-expressed agent of the infinitive is associated with a logical subject in the dative case or genitive case, and where *sila* + infinitive has the function of subject. The occurrence of the second dative must probably be motivated by the subject status of the infinitive in such cases, comparable to the status of the infinitive in the case of adverbial predicates. For a further discussion, see below.

4.17.3.5 Complement-Specification to an adverbial predicate

The second dative also occurs in sentences with an adverbial predicate, as in (434) above. The non-expressed agent of the infinitive is unified with the second predicate and is co-referential with the dative subject of the adverbial predicate (if expressed at all). The occurrence of the second dative can be motivated by the experiencer semantics of such sentences. In such sentences it is expressed that the assignment of the infinitive situation to the participant in the second dative leads to the state expressed by the adverbial predicate, which is experienced by the subject of the infinitive action; the second dative agrees in case with the dative subject (if expressed at all).

The second datives do not occur in the case of states that have a nominative subject:

(483)   Ja dolzhen èto delat’ sam/*samomu.
   I-NOM must-ADJ that do-INF self-ACC/*DAT
   'I must do that myself.'

The adjective *dolzhen* does not denote a state that is induced by some force, but portrays the necessity as a property of the subject. If the second dative were expressed in this sentence, this would lead to an interpretation where the realization of the action type expressed by the infinitive would lead to the state of the nominative subject; this interpretation clashes with the meaning of the nominative.
4.17.3.6 Complement

In my opinion sentences where the infinitive can be seen as a complement (472) have essentially the same structure as sentences with an adverbial predicate. In both cases the speaker assigns the infinitive situation to an agent in order to predicate about the situation; in the case of the sentences under discussion the agent remains unspecified (generic). Some cases can be seen as intermediate cases between specification to adverbial predicates and infinitive complements or predicates; this is the case for example in the following sentence:

(484)  Isxodja iz materialisticheskoj idei o tom, chto vremennoe udovletvorenie matpotrebnostej proizoshlo, mozno perexodit’ k udovletvoreniyu duxpotrebnostej. To est’ posmotret’ kino, televizor, poslushat’ narodnuju muzyku, ili popet’ samomu i dazhe pochitat’ kakuju-nibud’ knigu, skazhem, ’Krokodil’ ili tam gazetu.262 (A. & B. Strugackie, Ponedel’nik nachinaetsja v subbotü)

proceeding from materialistic idea over that, that temporary satisfaction of material demands happened, can ADV go over to satisfaction of mental demands. that is see-INF-PERF film, tv, listen-INF-PERF folk music, or sing-INF-PERF self-DAT and even read-INF-PERF some book, let’s say, ‘Crocodile’ or there newspaper

‘Proceeding from the materialistic idea that the material demands have been temporarily satisfied, one can move away to the satisfaction of mental demands. That is, see a film, watch tv, listen to folk music, or sing yourself, and even read some book, let’s say, the ‘Crocodile’ or some newspaper.’

In this sentence the second dative can be motivated by the idea that the infinitive action is assigned to non-specified people in a hypothetical world (it is possible that people will do the infinitive actions).

4.17.4 Concluding remarks

In this analysis I have shown that the occurrence of the second dative can be analyzed on the level of conceptualization. In some cases my analysis is still tentative, but I think that the relevance of taking the semantics of the dative and the nominative into account in the syntactic analysis has been strongly underlined. I have shown that if we look at the meaning of the different constituents we can motivate the occurrence of the second dative in a natural way. The second dative is coreferential with, and agrees in case with

262 http://kulichki-lat.rambler.ru/moshkow/STRUGACKIE/ponedelx.txt
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the expressed or non-expressed subject of the infinitive. In all cases the occurrence of
the dative can be motivated by the experiencer semantics of the dative and the meaning
'situation type' of the infinitive. The forms odin and sam occur in the dative case when
there is some force directed at the realization of the infinitive situation by the
participant expressed by odin or sam. This presupposes the idea of a scene where the
agent is not performing the action, and a scene where the agent will perform the action,
giving rise to the predicative feature of infinitive clauses with a dative subject.

As I have argued, the difference in case between infinitive complements to nouns
in the dative and the nominative can be explained by pointing at a difference in
conceptualization, and cannot be attributed to a difference in syntactic status of the
infinitive complement, that is, the question of whether the infinitive occurs in a CP or
not. Notions like CP or S' can be seen as theoretical terms for constituents associated
with a predicative element. However, for the language user, who has to choose the
correct case for sam and odin, the question of whether some constituent is an S' or not
is irrelevant. The language user chooses the dative case if there is some force directed
at the realization or coming into being of the infinitive action. The idea of coming into
being associated with the combination of the dative and the infinitive creates a
predicative moment, because the idea of being the recipient of an action type can be
seen as a phenomenon in time. As such the status of clauses with a second dative can
be compared to S'; this is not, however, an explanatory notion, but only a formulation
of the predicativeness of the combination of the second dative with an infinitive.

In this analysis I have not systematically addressed issues that are relevant if one
wishes to account for the case assignment of second predicates. I will, however, just
mention them here. Firstly, the assignment of case to second predicates, and more
generally the assignment of case has changed diachronically. This suggests that the
meaning of the different cases in Russian has changed. It is therefore important to
address the question of whether my analysis can be falsified by looking at diachronic
data. Secondly, the meaning of case differs structurally from many other meanings in
the linguistic system, because of the clear-cut oppositional forms of a specific case.
This differs from, for example, the phenomenon of lexical meaning; lexical meanings
do not occur in a clear-cut and well-defined structure of oppositions, giving rise to the
flexibility of lexical meaning. The process of assignment of case can best be analyzed in
terms of choosing the most suitable case in the given context. As such, I think that a
semantic analysis in terms of optimality would be appropriate for the meaning of case.
Such an analysis would have to take into account the diachronic changes in the system
of case assignment.
A final remark about the status of this analysis is in order. An analysis of syntactic phenomena in terms of the meanings of constituents is not an easy task, but that should not prevent the linguist from taking account of meaning in the syntactic analysis. In my opinion, the level of semantics and conceptualization is the basic level of language, and consequently is also basic to syntax. I do not think, however, that the level of semantics is in contradiction to analyses in models such as generative grammar; it must rather be considered a deeper level of analysis and motivation.

4.18 Conclusion and further remarks

In this chapter I have presented a construction with an infinitive predicate, a dative subject and in some cases the auxiliary byt'. The meaning of the DI-construction can be defined as follows.

**A force is directed at the realization of the situation expressed by the infinitive, of which the dative participant is the potential subject.**

I have argued that the language user interprets the abstract meaning in different ways, depending on the contexts in which this meaning occurs. The different uses of the DI-construction can be seen as *interpretations* of the combination of the dative meaning and the infinitive meaning. As such, the construction is not polysemous, but rather multi-interpretable.

The idea of recipienthood of a situation presupposes an initial information state where the dative participant is *not* associated with the realization of the infinitive situation (or in the case of negation, where the dative participant *is* associated with the realization of the infinitive situation), which is contradicted, that is, the realization of the infinitive situation by the dative participant is presented as something which accords with the normal or inevitable way things go, rather than as the result of the intention or tendency of the dative participant. Different basic interpretations of the construction (SD + INFpred) in affirmative sentences are given below:

(i) \[ \text{SD} + \text{INF}_{\text{imperf/action}} + \text{context of epistemic imposing (ved', zhe eshche, contrast, etc.)} \rightarrow \text{According to some (DE)ONTIC FORCE the infinitive action will be realized} \]
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(ii) $SD + INF_{\text{imperf/state}} + $ context of epistemic imposing (presupposition that the situation might not be the case, use *rzavno ne, užbe ne, etc.*) \rightarrow \text{THE WAY THE THINGS GO} is such that the situation will occur

(iii) $SD + INF_{\text{perf}} + $ context of epistemic blocking (*ne, edva li, vijad li*) \rightarrow \text{CIRCUMSTANCES} block the realization of an intended action (and impose [not INF])

(iv) $SD + INF_{\text{perf}} + $ context of epistemic deblocking (contrast, *tol’ko, chtoby, xot*) \rightarrow \text{THE CAPACITY OF THE DATIVE PARTICIPANT} overcomes potential blocking by some force (there was a scene or presupposition where/that the agent could not do the action); one can speak of an \text{ENABLING FORCE} if some blocking must be overcome.

(v) $SD + INF + chtoby + $ presupposition that effort is necessary to get dative participant to do the infinitive situation \rightarrow \text{GOAL ORIENTED FORCE} directed at the (non) realization of the infinitive situation

(vi) $SD + INF + pered tem, kak \rightarrow \text{THE EXPECTED, PLANNED WAY THINGS GO} is directed at the realization of the infinitive situation

(vii) $SD + INF + esli + $ epistemic imposing or blocking (presupposition that the infinitive situation may in fact not be the case, on in the case of negation, be the case) \rightarrow \text{DEONTIC/ONTIC FORCE} is directed at the realization of the infinitive situation

(viii) $SD + INF + by + $ coordinate structure \rightarrow \text{THE WAY THE THINGS GO} could have been such that the infinitive situation would have been the case

(ix) $SD + INF + by \rightarrow \text{THE SPEAKER imposes a situation on the dative participant in a counterfactual world (in a world desired by the speaker)}$

(x) $SD_{2/3} + tol’ko + INF + by + \rightarrow \text{THE DATIVE PARTICIPANT ‘imposes’ a situation on himself in a counterfactual world (in that world where things go as the dative participant wants)}$

(xi) $SD_{nikomn/ran} + INF \rightarrow \text{THE SPEAKER imposes a situation on the dative participant by directing the dative participant to realize the infinitive situation}$

Whether a scene can be conceptualized as falling under the DI-construction is not an ontological issue; in some cases the assignment of a dative subject to an infinitive predicate can only be motivated in terms of information states.

I have argued that the infinitive can be seen as the predicate of the DI-construction, in the sense that it expresses the situation that is associated with the potential agent, but that the predicative center is an \textit{interpretation} and not expressed by a form. The
predicativity – the ‘modal’ idea of the construction – is the result of the unification of the non-expressed infinitive agent with the dative subject (or in those cases where no dative is expressed, with the contextually given agent). This means that no underlying modal operators or verbal heads can be posited for the construction. The modal nature of the construction must be seen as an interpretation of the construction, and cannot be attributed to one of the components, or to a non-expressed element. The use of modal logic operators in the analysis of modality is therefore insufficient.

Only by analyzing the meaning of the construction on the level of the individual components can the specific ontic character of the different uses, and the seemingly peculiar restriction of the possibility interpretation to specific contexts be motivated. Furthermore, motivation can be given for why some cases of the DI-construction do not have a clear modal meaning. Such cases can be seen as peripheral uses of the DI-construction, where some of the features of the basic meaning are backgrounded, and others highlighted.

Besides the DI-construction proper (with dative nouns or pronouns), I have also given a short analysis of cases with the dative form of the modifiers sam or odin. Although the analysis that I have given has a tentative character, I have argued that the assignment of the dative case to these forms can be motivated by taking account of the meaning of the DI-construction.