Honor and Emotion: the cultural shaping of pride, shame and anger
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The central topic of this thesis is the influence of honor on emotion. This influence was investigated in a series of cross-cultural studies carried out among young, middle-class populations living in Spain and the Netherlands, two countries that have been shown to differ in the significance attached to honor and honor-related values (Fischer, Manstead & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999, Study 1).

This first, introductory chapter provides a theoretical framework for the study of the relationship between honor and emotion. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part centers on the characterization of honor cultures in terms of the social values and normative imperatives that predominate in such cultures. The second part focuses on three emotions that are closely related to the maintenance and loss of honor: pride, shame and anger.

What follows in this chapter is based on a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on honor in two disciplines: cultural anthropology and social psychology. The study of honor in cultural anthropology is now part of a long-standing tradition in the subdiscipline of Mediterranean anthropology. Ethnographic research on honor in the Mediterranean started in the 1950s with a series of studies in Southern Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Algeria that resulted in the now classic volume on honor edited by Peristiany (1965a), *Honor and shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*. Since then, anthropological research on Mediterranean honor has been plentiful and has used a variety of methodological approaches (i.e., participant observation; the study of symbolism in popular imagery such as proverbs or religious rituals; the use of local informants; demographic analyses; the use of archival data, literary and historical texts) to investigate the role of honor in the belief systems, norms, traditions, and social practices of Mediterranean cultures. Ethnographic research on Mediterranean honor has mostly been carried out in rural communities, especially the early ethnographies such as the ones presented in Peristiany’s (1965a) book. However, more recently there has been a shift in focus in cultural anthropological studies on honor, with ethnographic research being carried out also in Mediterranean urban areas (see e.g., Murphy, 1983; Wikan, 1984).

Social psychological research on honor is comparatively recent in origin and has had as main focus the study of anger and aggression in the defense of male honor in the Southern culture of honor of the U.S.A. (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle & Schwarz, 1996; Cohen, Vandello & Rantilla, 1998; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). This research has used a cross-regional approach within the U.S.A., comparing Northern with Southern regions in both rural and urban communities. Social psychological research on honor is also characterized by the use of a variety of methods to study the relationship between male honor,
anger and aggression: Investigators have made use of archival data, field studies, laboratory experiments, and survey research.

A detailed account of each individual study is not possible within the scope of this introductory chapter. Rather, the objective is to identify themes and general conclusions that can be drawn from the research. For detailed information about a given study the reader is referred to the original source.

**Characterization of Honor Cultures**

**Honor: Sense of Honor and Reputation**

Honor is generally defined in terms of what has been called the "bipartite theory of honor" (Stewart, 1994): Honor is one's worth in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others. Honor is thus described as having two interdependent components or aspects: inner and outer honor. The inner component has been referred to as integrity, virtue, self-regard, sentiment of honor, sense of honor, or value of a person in his or her own eyes (Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1968, 1977; Stewart, 1994). Independently of any given label, it refers to an inner quality that indicates an attachment to a culturally defined honor code and that is based on the individual's willingness and sense of responsibility to behave in honorable ways and to avoid dishonor. This inner quality or sense of honor therefore represents a *concern with honor* and motivates the self to behave in honorable ways. The possession of such an inner quality is the basis for an individual's feelings of self-worth and it is also considered to be the basis for any sense of morality, since honor in honor cultures is generally regarded as the organizing principle of all other values and the social order more generally (Abu-Lughod, 1985; Jakubowska, 1989; Peristiany, 1965a; Stewart, 1994; Vassiliou & Vassiliou, 1973). Outer honor refers to the social esteem in which an individual is held, i.e., his or her reputation (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1968, 1977; Stewart, 1994). It is the social recognition of the inner quality of sense of honor and its expression in honorable behavior. The social recognition that one's behavior is in accordance with honor values and norms establishes an individual's reputation. Reputation in honor cultures thus becomes a highly salient personal feature that refers to the individual's morality and his/her social and personal worth. Inner and outer honor are therefore strongly interrelated: Having a sense of honor implies a concern for one's reputation and a sensitivity to social judgments, and a good reputation is characteristic of a person with sense of honor. These two components or aspects of honor are best illustrated in Pitt-Rivers' definition of honor: "Honor is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the
acknowledgment of that claim, his excellence recognised by society, his right to pride” (Pittrivers, 1977, p. 1).

Characterization of Honor Cultures in Relation to Individualism and Collectivism

The definition of honor given above implies that in honor cultures one's self-respect and self-esteem are based both on having a sense of honor and on social judgments and reputation. This implication is central for the characterization of honor cultures in relation to collectivist and individualistic cultures.

Collectivist and individualistic cultures can be generally described in the following terms (Kim, Triandis, Kâgitçibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Triandis, Botempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988; Triandis, 1989, 1994). Collectivist cultures are characterized by the intense emotional attachment individuals have for their ingroup. This translates into a subordination of personal goals to the collective goals of the ingroup and a definition of the self in terms of its relationship with the ingroup. This strong bond and interdependence among ingroup members leads to a greater differentiation between ingroup and outgroup in collectivist cultures than in individualistic cultures. Competition in collectivist cultures is therefore established through groups rather than individuals, leading to a strong concern for the integrity of the group. Individualistic cultures, in contrast, emphasize the goals, desires and expectations of the individual above of those of the ingroup. The self is defined to a greater extent as an entity independent of the ingroup and more in terms of the rights, capacities and needs of the individual in individualistic cultures than is the case in collectivist cultures. Moreover, in individualistic cultures group membership is less demanding in terms of obligations and duties than it is in collectivist cultures. In summary, collectivist cultures promote a view of the self in which the relationship with others and interdependence is more central than it is in individualistic cultures. The latter, by contrast, promote a view of the self in which independence and one's internal capacities and personal attributes are central. These cultural views of how the self relates to others have also been referred to as interdependent and independent construals of the self, respectively (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Aspects of both collectivism and individualism are present in honor cultures due to the bipartite nature of honor. Inner honor or one's sense of honor can be described as the individualistic aspect of honor because it refers to a personal concern with honor and stresses personal qualities such having personal integrity, and willingness and responsibility to behave in accordance to honor values. Outer honor, in contrast, can be described as the collectivist

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1 These differences between individualistic and collectivist cultures should be seen in relative rather than absolute terms; elements of both collectivist and individualistic value systems are present in most cultures (Jansz, 1991).
aspect of honor because it refers to the importance of social judgments and recognition. It might therefore be concluded that honor cultures can best be characterized as a mixture between individualistic and collectivist cultures. However, we prefer to characterize honor cultures as a variety of collectivist culture because the individualistic aspect of honor, or inner honor, becomes relational in honor cultures in the following way. One’s sense of honor, i.e., one’s concern with and attachment to honor values, has to be expressed in honorable behavior and to be recognized by others in order to be validated. Similarly, the emphasis in honor cultures placed on personal responsibility and willingness to defend and protect honor also has to be displayed in public behavior and recognized by others in order to have a value. The individualistic aspect of honor is therefore highly relational or interdependent.

Furthermore, honor cultures emphasize values that can be characterized as collectivist. First, the maintenance of a positive reputation is a core value in honor cultures. Honor cultures therefore promote a construal of the self based on the maintenance of a good reputation and the seeking of social approval. Second, honor cultures also promote the subordination of individual needs and desires to those of the family due to the importance of protecting and defending the family honor (Gilmore, 1987a; Jakubowska, 1989; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1968, 1977; Schneider, 1971; Stewart, 1994): There is a great concern in honor cultures for the integrity of the family in terms of honor and there is therefore, just as in collectivist cultures, a sharper differentiation between ingroup and outgroup than there is in individualistic cultures. Moreover, individuals in honor cultures are usually seen in social relations as representatives of their families. Finally, honor cultures emphasize the importance of values that maintain interpersonal harmony and strengthen social bonds, such as hospitality or humility (Adamopoulos, 1977; Gilmore, 1987c; Herzfeld, 1987; Jakubowska, 1989; Marcus, 1987; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1968, 1977; Stewart, 1994; Vassiliou & Vassiliou, 1973).

In sum, honor cultures can be characterized as a type of collectivist culture due to the relational nature of inner honor and the importance placed on collectivist types of values. However, honor cultures cannot simply be equated with collectivist cultures because they emphasize a particular set of values. The notion that collectivist cultures differ in the aspect of collectivism they emphasize has already been advanced by Triandis et al. (1988) in relation to Mediterranean and Latin cultures, which emphasize dignity, honor and respect. We turn now to a consideration of the particular set of values that characterize honor cultures.
Honor Values: Social Interdependence, Collective Honor, Masculine and Feminine Honor

Inner and outer honor become significant in situations that advance or threaten honor values. Honor values define normative standards for what is considered honorable and disgraceful behavior, i.e., the honor code. Honor values can be divided into four major domains on the basis of the common theme each group of values share. These value domains will be referred to here as social interdependence, collective honor, feminine honor, and masculine honor.

Social interdependence refers to a group of values which are centered on the strengthening of social bonds or interdependence, and the preservation of interpersonal harmony. Although values related to individual integrity, such as being honest or being loyal to one’s values and principles, are also emphasized in honor cultures (Pitt-Rivers, 1965), it is the expression of personal integrity in the context of social relations, and the emphasis on values that inherently bolster social bonds such as hospitality or generosity that most characterize honor cultures (Adamopoulos, 1977; Gilmore, 1987c; Herzfeld, 1987; Jakubowska, 1989; Marcus, 1987; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1968, 1977; Stewart, 1994; Vassiliou & Vassiliou, 1973). The expression of such values in social behavior enhances social interdependence because it is expected that such behavior will be reciprocated by others in the future. This is best illustrated by the often referred to “law of hospitality” in honor cultures (Herzfeld, 1987; Pitt-Rivers, 1977): The expression of generosity and hospitality to a guest, especially to outgroup members, enhances the honor of the host. The hospitality given creates a moral bond between the host and the guest, on the basis of which the guest has a moral obligation to reciprocate this hospitality in future if needed. This reciprocity therefore has important functional consequences in the creation, maintenance, and fulfillment of social obligations and cooperation.

Interdependence is also highly valued between family members in honor cultures due to the salience of a collective family honor (Gilmore, 1987a; Jakubowska, 1989; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1968, 1977; Schneider, 1971; Stewart, 1994). The status of family honor is usually expressed in terms of the reputation or standing of the family in the community. Further, one’s own and one’s family honor are strongly interdependent: Each family member has the potential to stain the honor of the family. A personal disgrace will be ultimately reflected on all family members. At the same time, the honor of one’s family has a large influence on one’s own honor. One’s own honor is therefore highly dependent on the behavior of other family members. This dependence leads to a need to maintain strong cohesion among family members. In sum, an individual bears three responsibilities in relation to his or her own honor. The first is to avoid dishonor for his/her own sake. The second is to protect the family’s reputation and therefore to avoid dishonorable
behavior that could hurt family honor. The third is to take care that other family members do not bring dishonor on the family and thereby on the individual. Family membership and personal honor are dependent on how successfully individual family members perform these tasks. Although collective honor can also be related to other reference groups, like one’s group of close friends, or a political party (see e.g., Gilmore, 1987c), the family is described in the anthropological literature on honor as the fundamental group with which one shares a common honor.

However, the way in which family honor is maintained and protected is in some respects different for male and female members of the family. It has been stated that a determining feature of family structures in honor cultures, specifically Mediterranean honor cultures, is the way in which women's and men's roles are divided within the family to protect family honor (Pitt-Rivers, 1977). This division of roles is based on the ascription of different moral qualities to females and males. The responsibility to actively defend and protect the honor of the family falls on the male members of the family. This responsibility is a consequence of the way in which masculine honor is construed (Blok, 1981; Brandes, 1980; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Gilmore, 1987a, 1990a; Gilmore & Gwynne, 1985; Jakubowska, 1989; Jansen, 1987; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Murphy, 1983; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Schneider, 1971; Stewart, 1994). The masculine honor code define the means by which male honor can be maintained and enhanced. Masculine honor is a type of honor that calls for action. It is based on physical strength, courage and the ability to effectively defend one’s personal honor and one’s family honor and well-being. The emphasis on physical strength and courage is related to the importance of virility for manhood in honor cultures, i.e., an emphasis on sexual potency in general and on the ability to father many children in particular. Furthermore, the maintenance of male honor is not only dependent on the protection of the family’s reputation but also on provision in terms of economic support of the family. This role as bread-winner is a characteristic of how masculinity is construed in many cultures, but it seems that it is in honor cultures, especially Mediterranean honor cultures, where it is most strongly related to male honor and male identity (Gilmore, 1990a).

Finally, central to male honor is the maintenance of a reputation of strength and toughness. In behavioral terms, this translates into a need to appear strong and capable of responding to offenses and humiliations. The maintenance of such a reputation implies that male honor is competitive and also dependent on precedence and social status. The masculine honor code therefore emphasizes the protection and provision of the family, virility, precedence, and the ability to display toughness and strength in situations in which one’s manhood, one’s honor or one’s family honor are undermined.
The feminine honor code, in contrast, is centered on ideals of decorum and restraint. The core ideal in feminine honor is what has been referred to as sexual shame or the female chastity code (Bloks, 1981; Gilmore, 1987a; Gilmore & Gwynne, 1985; Jakubowska, 1989; Jansen, 1987; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Schneider, 1971; Stewart, 1994). The female chastity code involves beliefs about the importance of decorum and purity in relation to female sexuality: Decorum (e.g., wearing discreet clothes), virginity before marriage, and chastity are core values in the maintenance of female honor in honor cultures. The importance of restraint in the sexual domain is also accompanied by an emphasis on a general behavioral pattern of discretion in relation to feminine honor, which emphasizes values such as modesty. Further, the feminine honor code involves beliefs about the importance of conforming to authority within the family context. The importance of conforming to authority within the family on the part of females is related, on the one hand, to the way in which masculine honor is conceived, and, on the other hand, to the strong dependence of family honor on female relatives’ sexual shame (Brandes, 1980; Gilmore, 1987a, 1990a; Gilmore & Gwynne, 1985; Jakubowska, 1989; Jansen, 1987; Murphy, 1983; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Schneider, 1971; Stewart, 1994). First, having precedence is important for maintaining male honor, which is relevant not only in the social arena, but also in the family context because men are seen as the protectors of the family honor and well-being. Having authority and control over the family is central for fulfilling such a role. Second, a lack of sexual shame on the part of female relatives is one of the most shameful situations in honor cultures because it damages not only the woman’s honor but also the honor of her family. The fact that men are the guardians of the family’s reputation in honor cultures means that responsibility for ensuring the chastity of female relatives also falls on men. This implies that lack of sexual shame on the part of female relatives is attributed, in turn, to male relatives’ failure to protect family honor.2 This dependence of family honor on the sexual behavior of female relatives in honor cultures results in a strong control of female relatives’ social activities, and in the strengthening of male authority and female submission within the family.

To summarize, honor cultures are characterized by a value system that emphasizes issues of reputation, social interdependence, precedence, protection of the family’s well-being and

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2 Ethnographic research has also documented the negative effects that lack of sexual shame on the part of female relatives can have on other female members of the family. In particular, it can affect the chances of a good marriage for female relatives, which can lead to a strong social control among female relatives (Giovannini, 1987).
honor, virility and sexual shame. Some of these values are differentially emphasized for the maintenance of male and female honor: Having virility, precedence and being able to protect the family are central for maintaining male honor, whereas having sexual shame is central for maintaining female honor. Caring about reputation (one’s own and one’s family’s), maintaining interpersonal harmony, and interdependence are relevant to the maintenance of honor for both sexes.

It is worth noting that the value system present in honor cultures encourages not only interpersonal harmony, but also a degree of interpersonal competition in terms of reputation. Specifically, male honor is based on maintaining a reputation of toughness and strength, which leads to male competition for social status in these terms. Moreover, the significance of family honor leads to competitiveness between families in terms of fame or prestige in the community. This competition for reputation implies a keen sensitivity to social evaluations, such that even mild criticisms can be seen as attacks on one’s honor. This hypersensitivity can have negative consequences for the maintenance of interpersonal relations, leading to conflicts or even violence (see e.g., Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). The importance placed on values such as generosity, humility or politeness in honor cultures help to ‘soften’ this competitive aspect of honor (Brandes, 1987; Cohen et al., 1998; Gilmore, 1982, 1987c; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Pitt-Rivers, 1977). In other words, the fulfillment of social obligations, reciprocity, and the strengthening of social bonds through behaviors such as being hospitable can be seen as having functional consequences in honor cultures: They help to ensure that relations run smoothly and that social misunderstandings are prevented.

3 Emphasis on honor values has changed across historical periods. For more on determinants of honor in different historical epochs see e.g., Caro Baroja (1965); Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera (1998); Spierenburg (1998); and Peristiany & Pitt-Rivers (1992). Further, the importance attached to honor values seems to be related to socioeconomic class, although the picture that emerges from different ethnographic studies is not consistent. In some honor cultures there seems to be a clear relationship between wealth and honor, i.e., the notion that wealth indicators such as possessions or occupation confer honor, or evidence that differences in the emphasis given to honor values are related to differences in socioeconomic class (Brettell, 1987; Caro Baroja, 1965; Davis, 1977; Giovannini, 1987; Pitt-Rivers, 1965, 1977). However, this is not the case in other honor cultures, such as the honor culture of the Bedouins of Central Sinai (Stewart, 1994), in which honor is seen as a moral trait that cannot be affected by and is not dependent on socioeconomic factors (see also ethnographic accounts by Brandes, 1987; Marcus, 1987).

4 A similar argument has been advanced by Schneider (1971) in relation to envy and honor: The competitive aspect of honor leads to frequent attributions of envy to others (see also Campbell, 1965). Some social practices found in Mediterranean societies which are based on reciprocity, such as the frequent exchange of presents, may be functional as way of neutralizing envy. In a similar vein, Abu-Lughod (1985) proposed that the expression of vulnerability through poetry present in the honor culture of the Bedouins of the Egyptian Western desert might have the function of preventing negative consequences of an extreme adherence to honor norms that promote competitiveness and strength on social relations, such as the prevalence of belligerent attitudes.
Honor and Emotions: Pride, Shame and Anger in Honor Cultures

Current research on the relationship between culture and emotion emphasizes the role that the cultural framework plays in the emotion process (Kitayama, Markus & Lieberman, 1995; Kitayama, Markus & Matsumoto, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1994). The notion of cultural framework is seen as referring to core ideals such as values and norms that a given community or group shares, and the expression of these values and norms in traditions, customs, and institutionalized practices (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). One important way in which these shared meanings or core ideals influence emotion is by shaping and setting priorities for what we consider important, desirable or appropriate (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). Emotions are usually elicited by the consideration that a given situation advances or threatens one's concerns (Frijda, 1986). Honor cultures, in particular, promote a concern for honor, i.e., a concern for maintaining a self-image and a reputation conforming honor values. The literature on honor in social psychology and in Mediterranean anthropology refers to three emotions which are especially associated with the advancement of or threat to a concern for honor, namely pride, shame and anger. However, the extent of existing empirical evidence for this relationship varies across these three emotions. The way in which honor relates to emotional experiences of pride and shame has not been systematically investigated in Mediterranean anthropology or in social psychology. Pride and shame have generally been referred to in ethnographic research as emotional reactions that follow the enhancement of one's own or one's intimates' honor, in the case of pride, and the loss of one's own or one's intimates' honor or the withdrawal of social respect, in the case of shame (Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977). Nevertheless, shame has been extensively studied in Mediterranean anthropology as a core feature of honor cultures. Ethnographic research has centered on how a concern for shame is positive in honor cultures since it signals one's respect for and consideration of social evaluations. Finally, and with regard to anger, there is empirical evidence both in Mediterranean anthropology and in social psychology that feeling and expressing anger is a culturally approved way of responding to an affront to one's honor. We turn now to describing what it is currently known about the relation between honor and shame, and the role of anger in affronts to one's honor.5

5 A separate section on "honor and pride" is not presented here due to the lack of systematic empirical research on the emotional experience of pride and honor. This lack of empirical evidence was an important motivation to conduct studies on the influence of honor on the emotional experience of pride which are reported in this thesis, specifically in Chapters 4 and 5.
Shame in Honor Cultures: The Importance of Having a Sense of Shame

Shame has been described as a value that characterizes honor cultures, specifically Mediterranean honor cultures (Gilmore, 1982, 1987a; Gilmore & Gwynne, 1985; Herzfeld, 1987; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Schneider, 1971). The study of shame as a core value in honor cultures started with the pioneering work of Peristiany and his collaborators in the Mediterranean in the 1950s. On the basis of fieldwork in small Mediterranean herding and agrarian communities, the relevance of honor and shame in the cultural schemas of Mediterranean communities was established. The fundamental work of Peristiany and his collaborators led to further ethnographic research on honor and shame, or the honor and shame syndrome, as it is also referred to, in Mediterranean communities.

Honor and shame have been described in Mediterranean ethnographies as core and complementary values of Mediterranean value systems. Shame as a value in Mediterranean honor cultures defines the desirability and appropriateness of "having a sense of shame," which is conceived of as a personal feature or inner disposition. An individual with "a sense of shame" is expected to care about what others "might say" and therefore to regulate his or her own behavior in a way that is consistent with the honor code. A sense of shame therefore refers to a sensitivity to and concern for reputation issues, and it is central for the maintenance of honor. It follows that lacking a sense of shame, i.e., being shameless, is equated in Mediterranean honor cultures with not having a sense of honor. The emphasis on having a sense of shame as a fundamental attribute of an individual who has honor implies that evaluations in terms of shame are central in self-evaluation, social evaluation, and social comparison processes in Mediterranean honor cultures.

Although it is to be expected that all societies have some form of shame in this evaluative sense (Peristiany, 1965b), its special relevance in honor cultures stems from its implications for social relations. First, social evaluations concerning a person's morality in terms of shame become a powerful means of social control in honor cultures (Brandes, 1987). The effectiveness of such evaluations is related to the negative social implications of being shameless in Mediterranean honor cultures: It imposes a social stigma on the individual that can even lead to social isolation (Peristiany, 1965a). Second, having a sense of shame is promoted in Mediterranean honor cultures as a fundamental attribute of an honorable person: A sense of shame therefore becomes a central aspect of one's identity and it can be expected to strongly regulate personal behavior, especially in interpersonal contexts. In the final analysis, having a sense of shame is what prevents the self from behaving in a disgraceful manner. Third, social evaluations in terms of shame can be expected to play an important role in the socialization of social behavior in honor cultures. In particular, shame in this context would be relevant for the
socialization of honorable people, i.e., people who are sensitive to and conscious of reputation issues and honor norms (Miller, 1993).

Ethnographic research has also indicated the relevance of shame in Mediterranean conceptions of femininity, especially with regard to female sexual behavior (Brandes, 1980, 1987; Delaney, 1987; Gilmore, 1982, 1987a, 1990a; Gilmore & Gwynne, 1985; Giovannini, 1987; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Schneider, 1971). Shame in this context is seen as a gender-specific moral quality: Although both women and men can be shamed and are expected to be sensitive to social judgments (i.e., to have a sense of shame), shame in relation to sexuality, i.e., sexual shame, is seen as more desirable for women than for men in honor cultures. Virginity prior to marriage, chastity after marriage and decorum at all times are expected from women who have a sense of sexual shame and want to maintain their honor. The display of sexual shame is, in contrast, disgraceful for men in honor cultures since the masculine honor code emphasizes the expression of precedence, strength and toughness rather than restraint and shyness in the maintenance of male honor. Further, what has been described as most characteristic of Mediterranean gender ideologies is the way in which female sexual shame is an indicator of the status of male honor and reputation. In other words, a man's honor and reputation is to an important extent assessed in terms of his female relatives' sexual shame, because males are seen as the protectors of female sexual shame. This implies that masculinity is construed in such a way in Mediterranean honor cultures that sexual relations with a woman can affect the honor of her male relatives and her family's reputation if it happens in a way considered dishonorable (e.g., in the form of extramarital relations or sex before marriage). In this respect it has been stated that masculinity in Mediterranean honor cultures is inherently ambiguous: It encodes at the same time notions of vulnerability because of the dependence on women's sexual behavior, and of precedence and power because of the urge to display manhood publicly (Gilmore, 1987b).6

In addition, sexual shame encodes an implicit theory of female sexuality: Women are seen as having an inner sense of shame with regard to sexual relations, a sense that prevents them from being in “compromising” situations as culturally defined. Such an ascription to women reinforces beliefs about women being passive, vulnerable and weak, especially in relation to sexuality and intersex social relations. This also strengthens male protection and control over female sexuality. Women's sexuality can in this way become almost a male's and a family's patrimony, which has further been associated to the prevalence of sexual jealousy in

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6 The way masculine honor is construed in Mediterranean cultures seems to lead in some cases to ambivalent attitudes towards women's role in society (i.e., as being seen both as threatening through their sexuality and also as central for the group's continuity) which is often expressed in cultural practices, such as in the Mediterranean carnival (see e.g., Counihan, 1983).
Mediterranean honor cultures (Giovannini, 1987). This urgent need to protect female sexuality in order to maintain male honor and family honor is an important antecedent of the gender segregation and inequality found in Mediterranean honor cultures (Delaney, 1987; Gilmore, 1987a; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977).

A final note is warranted here concerning the controversy surrounding the role of honor and shame in Mediterranean honor cultures. This controversy is not centered on the validity of ethnographic studies of honor and shame in the Mediterranean. Rather, the controversy arises from the proposition by some anthropologists that honor and shame, and especially the sexual norms and patterns of intersex relations embodied in these codes, are the organizing principles of Mediterranean cultures and therefore can account for the cultural unity of this region (Block, 1981; Brandes, 1987; Gilmore, 1982, 1987b). Criticisms of this proposition can be summarized in the following three points (Herzfeld, 1980, 1984, 1987; Llobera, 1986; Marcus, 1987; Pina Cabral, 1989; Stewart, 1994; Wikan, 1984). First, this proposition is considered to be an overgeneralization of conclusions from ethnographic studies. Not all regions of the Mediterranean have been intensively studied in relation to honor and shame. Moreover, there is a lack of cross-cultural comparisons with other European cultures, especially Northern European cultures, which makes it difficult to be certain that honor and shame are traits that account for Mediterranean unity. Second, proposing honor and shame as general traits of the Mediterranean is reductionist and ignores local variations within the Mediterranean in the way that honor and shame are expressed in specific social practices. Third, such proposition is considered to be ahistorical: It does not take account of the extent to which cultural continuity in the meaning of honor and shame in the Mediterranean is affected by differences in the historical conditions and development of diverse Mediterranean societies.

Female sexual shame was given an important role in Schneider’s account of the origins of honor in the Mediterranean (Schneider, 1971). This author proposed that the importance of honor evolved as an adaptation to a Mediterranean economic and political situation marked by highly competitive relations between agricultural and pastoral economies, and by a lack of effective state institutions. This led to a fragmentation of social organization that further led to what has been called “social atomism” in the Mediterranean (Gilmore, 1982), meaning the prevalence of small, atomistic units of organization, usually nuclear families, each having highly competitive relations with other families. In this context, focusing on a common honor binds the family together, defines the social boundaries of the ingroup, and secures loyalties. Male members of the ingroup would be further united by the protection of the sexual shame of female relatives for the sake of family honor. In this sense female honor seems to have a positive consequence for the cohesiveness of the ingroup. Religion has also been considered in the literature on Mediterranean honor as a reinforcer of female chastity codes (see e.g., Brandes, 1987; Delaney, 1987).

Mediterranean unity has also been proposed on the basis of a conjunction of ecological (e.g., similar climate and topography), socio-structural, and cultural parallelisms (e.g., similar marriage patterns, rigid sexual segregation). For an overview of the criteria and research on the geographical and cultural demarcation of the Mediterranean, see Gilmore, 1982. The controversy about honor and shame is embedded in a more general discussion in cultural anthropology about the legitimacy of the Mediterranean as an object of anthropological study. This discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter. For more information on this issue see Driessen (1987); Fernandez (1987); Gilmore (1990b); Giordano (1987); Herzfeld (1987); Kielstra (1987); Leeds (1987); Llobera (1986, 1987); Loizos (1987); Pina-Cabral (1987, 1989); Pi-Sunyer (1987); Verrips (1987).
In sum, the study of shame in ethnographic research has mainly focused on the relevance of having a sense of shame in Mediterranean honor cultures. A sense of shame is a central aspect of one’s identity and an important regulator of behavior in these cultures. Further, social evaluations in terms of shame form a strong mechanism of social control. Finally, sexual shame is strongly associated with female honor. The emphasis on sexual shame for women in Mediterranean honor cultures can be seen as an important determinant of beliefs about the importance of restraining women’s social activities and controlling female sexuality. Such control and restraint is believed to be the responsibility of males, which strengthens status differences among the sexes.

**Anger: An Appropriate Way of Restoring One’s Honor**

Honor cultures are characterized by the existence of the “point of honor” (Pitt-Rivers, 1965, 1977) or “reflexive honor” (Stewart, 1994). Both labels refer to the strong and specific impact offenses have on one’s honor and self-esteem in honor cultures. Specifically, when a person is insulted or humiliated in honor cultures his or her honor is immediately diminished and can only be restored through appropriate action. The generally culturally accepted way to respond to an offense in honor cultures is through the expression of angry feelings, engaging in revenge or committing violence. The empirical evidence on the relevance of anger for restoring honor in offense situations comes from ethnographic (Murphy, 1983; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Stewart, 1994) and social psychological research (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997; Cohen et al., 1995, 1998; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

There are three characteristics of honor cultures that lead to offenses being taken so seriously. The first is the fact that honor can be lost. The second is that reputation is a highly salient dimension of the self in honor cultures, with the result that social evaluations and others’ behavior, especially those of intimate others, have strong impact on the self. The third is that honor has to be socially claimed and recognized in order to have any value. When the self is humiliated or insulted, one’s claim to honor and to be treated with respect is denied. One’s reputation is hurt and undermined. Thus offense situations in honor cultures threaten one’s concern with being treated as an honorable person and with maintaining a reputation as such. In other words, offenses in honor cultures are conceived as threats to one’s value in the eyes of others, which in turn strongly influence one’s feelings of self-worth and one’s identity as an honorable person. The seriousness of offenses in honor cultures is also due to the social implications of not responding appropriately to an affront: The offended not only loses face and honor, but also brings shame to the family and therefore puts the family’s collective honor at stake (Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1968; Stewart, 1994).
Thus not responding effectively to an offense affects both one's own and one's family honor. This points to an important factor in which honor and non-honor cultures can be differentiated in relation to offenses, namely the type and array of social and personal implications that not reacting to an offense has. We can expect that insults and humiliations have more negative consequences for one's self-esteem and self-image in honor cultures than in non-honor cultures, since one's self-esteem is to a greater extent interpersonally determined and based on one's reputation in the former than in the latter cultures. Furthermore, not being able to restore one's honor when attacked also has broader social consequences in honor than in non-honor cultures: Not only one's own but also one's family honor is at stake. The individual therefore also bears a greater responsibility in an offense situation in honor cultures than in non-honor cultures, and the pressure to react appropriately to an offense becomes correspondingly greater.

The notion that the expression of anger is an appropriate response to an offense seems to be strongly connected to the types of values present in honor cultures, and more specifically with values related to the masculine honor code (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997; Cohen et al., 1996; Gilmore, 1987b; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965a; Stewart, 1994). What restores honor in an offense situation is the readiness to fight for one's honor. The expression of anger can be described as an expression of power, strength and toughness. In other words, it is an expression of masculine honor. Indeed, men are more often expected to respond to offenses with anger than women are in honor cultures, even if it is a woman who suffers the offense, since this type of emotional expression is consistent with the way masculinity is construed in these cultures: Pride in manhood in honor cultures stresses the importance of masculine courage, physical strength, and the unwillingness to submit to humiliation. Furthermore, men are seen as the protectors of the physical and moral integrity of the family.

The seriousness of an offense in honor cultures depends on specific situational characteristics. First, although a person can be dishonored when offenses are not public (i.e., when other persons besides the offender and offended are not present), the extent of the damage of an offense to the person's reputation increases when it is public or is made public (Cohen et al., 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Stewart, 1994). Second, due to the importance of female chastity for the status of family honor, insults concerning the sexual behavior of female members of the family and sexual offenses to female

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9 It is not clear, however, whether public offenses would also elicit more angry feelings than offenses that take place in private. In two experiments, Cohen and colleagues manipulated the public or private nature of an insult and did not find an effect of this manipulation on emotional and physiological reactions to the insult. The public or private context of the insult only affected beliefs about the extent to which the insult affected reputation: Male participants from the South of the U.S.A. (honor culture) believed to a greater extent than participants from the North of the U.S.A. (non-honor culture) that their reputation for being strong and tough was damaged when they were insulted publicly (Cohen et al., 1996, Studies 2 & 3).
relatives entail serious damage to one’s honor (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Stewart, 1994). Third, offenses have greater impact in those interpersonal situations in which the offender is considered as an equal in the honor hierarchy. For instance, an insult from a person who is considered as lacking a sense of honor or as a social inferior would be met with indifference rather than with anger in honor cultures (Bourdieu, 1965; Cohen et al., 1998; Pitt-Rivers, 1965, 1977; Stewart, 1994). Further, the idea that honor can only be restored through effective action is based on a specific conceptualization of honor in offense situations: Honor seems to be thought of as transactional, as something like a “possession” that can be transferred through an offense from the offended to the offender (Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Stewart, 1994). Honor is, in this sense, objectified, and the honor that is lost by the person offended seems to add to the honor of the offender. In other words, in offense situations in honor cultures a kind of “social transaction” in terms of honor takes place. It is therefore in such situations that the vulnerability of honor to social judgments is most apparent.

Anger expressions in reaction to an offense not only restore one’s honor and reputation, but also seem to have a long-term instrumental value in issues of protection and economic associations in honor cultures. In particular, maintaining a reputation as a male for being strong and assertive has practical utility for political alliances or the establishment of economic association and cooperation in some honor cultures (Campbell, 1965; Pitt-Rivers, 1965, 1977; Zeid, 1965). The most systematically studied functional consequence of the male expression of toughness and strength is the maintenance of a reputation of being capable of protecting oneself, one’s family and one’s property (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997; Cohen et al., 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Maintaining such a reputation helps to prevent future attacks on one’s own or one’s family honor, and indirectly on one’s property. The origin of this protective function of maintaining a reputation of toughness has been related to those honor communities, such as herding communities, in which there is a lack of economic resources and where protecting one’s own property depends on oneself. In such circumstances a reputation of being capable of defending oneself has survival value. Finally, ethnographic research has also documented the positive consequences of expressing male anger for the control of others and the maintenance of male authority within the family (Murphy, 1983).

This instrumental value of anger expressions, especially male anger expressions, in honor cultures raises the question of whether angry feelings are really elicited in such situations or whether such expressions are merely self-presentational strategies. There is empirical evidence that angry feelings are to a greater extent elicited in offense situations in honor than in non-honor cultures. This evidence comes from experimental research by Cohen, Nisbett, and colleagues (Cohen et al., 1996): White male participants from the South (honor culture) and the North (non-honor culture) of the U.S.A. were insulted by a confederate in two experimental
studies. Several behavioral and physiological measures were taken after the insults. After being insulted, Southerners showed more facial and non-verbal cues of feeling angry (based on coders’ ratings), higher cortisol levels (an indication of stress), and higher testosterone levels (an indication of preparedness for aggression) than Northerners did.

In sum, anger is elicited in honor cultures when one’s concern for maintaining a good reputation, especially a reputation of strength and toughness is threatened. Such an emotional reaction is particularly expected from men in honor cultures, because men are seen as the guardians of their own, their female relatives’ and their family honor. Finally, male anger expressions in the face of affronts have functional consequences for identity and social relations. First, angry feelings and expressions in reaction to offenses conform to what is expected from a man who has a sense of honor. Such a response would therefore enhance his reputation for being strong, while at the same reinforcing a positive male identity. Second, such a response maintains or enhances precedence, social status and control over others. Finally, it also seems to have positive long-term consequences for the protection of one’s property and family, and for the maintenance or creation of political and economic alliances.

Overview of Present Research

This review of the empirical and theoretical literature on honor shows that there are still some major unanswered questions about honor. First, most research on honor has been done in Mediterranean cultures. The extent to which honor plays a role in the current value systems and gender ideologies of non-Mediterranean cultures, such as those in Northern Europe, has not yet been systematically studied. Second, the influence of honor on the emotional experience of pride and shame is an understudied area both in anthropology and in social psychology. Third, the salience of anger in reaction to affronts in honor cultures raises the question of how affronts are responded to in non-honor cultures. Finally, despite the amount of empirical research on honor, a measure of a concern for honor has not yet been developed. These observations underpinned our motivation in carrying out the studies reported in this thesis.

We reasoned that an appropriate way to investigate these issues would be by adopting a comparative framework in the study of honor, i.e., studying the influence of honor on emotion by comparing cultures that differ in the significance attached to honor and honor values. Such a framework would contribute to a better characterization of honor cultures, and would lead to a better understanding of the influence of honor on emotion. A series of comparative studies between Spain, an honor culture, and the Netherlands, an individualistic culture, is presented in Chapters 2 through 5.
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The studies reported in the first part of the thesis are aimed at establishing the significance of honor and honor values in Spain and the Netherlands. More specifically, in Chapter 2 two cross-cultural studies are reported. The first of these focuses on the significance of honor and individualistic values and the determinants of honorability in Spain and the Netherlands. The second study investigates the conceptualization of honor in these countries, i.e., how honor is defined and the situations that lead to enhancement and loss of honor. The study reported in Chapter 3 examines the extent to which masculine and feminine honor codes are present in gender ideologies in Spain and the Netherlands. In this study we also investigate attitudes towards sex-roles in these countries.

In the second part of this thesis, in Chapters 4 and 5, we report studies in which the influence of the differential significance of honor and honor values on pride, shame and anger in Spain and the Netherlands is investigated. The study reported in Chapter 4 focuses on the role of honor and individualistic values in autobiographically-recalled experiences of pride, shame and anger. In this study we also investigate emotional reactions to social evaluations in Spain and the Netherlands. In Chapter 5 we report a study of the extent to which hurt pride, anger and shame are elicited in reaction to different types of offenses in Spain and the Netherlands. A measure of a psychological concern for honor is also presented in this chapter.

Finally, a note should be added about the way in which this thesis is written. The chapters are written in a way that makes it possible to read them independently. They are based on articles that are either already published or have been submitted to journals for publication. Although adjustments have been made to the original papers, there is still some degree of repetition in theory, especially in the introduction to each chapter. It is hoped that any irritation this might cause will be offset by the advantages of being able to treat each chapter as an independent entity.
We suggest this an appropriate way to test stage these requests would be by creating a cooperative research on the study of honor, i.e., studying the influence of its concept by comparing a theory that Advance in the significant contribution to honor and which would become a framework would contribute to a better characterization of honor concepts and would lead to a better understanding of the influence of honor on emotion. A series of suggestions would be provided throughout honor culture, and the characteristics of an individual versus that presented in Chapters 2 through 8.