Honor and Emotion: the cultural shaping of pride, shame and anger
Rodriguez Mosquera, P.M.

Citation for published version (APA):
Amsterdam: UvA

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
Chapter 6: Conclusions and General Discussion

The central theme of this thesis is the influence of honor on emotion. A comparative framework was adopted to study this influence. In the preceding chapters, a series of cross-cultural studies among young, middle-class populations living in Spain, an honor culture, and the Netherlands, an individualistic culture, were presented.

The thesis was divided into two main parts. The cross-cultural studies presented in the first part of the thesis, in Chapters 2 and 3, were aimed at establishing the significance of honor and honor values in Spanish and Dutch cultural value systems. In Chapter 2 two questionnaire studies were reported, the first using a closed format, and the second an open format (free descriptions of honor). Participants in Study 1 were presented with a list of honor and individualistic values and asked to report the extent to which each value was important in their own culture. In this study we also investigated the type of attributes (individualism- or honor-related) that determine honorability in Spain and the Netherlands. The aim of Study 2 was to investigate the conceptualization of honor in these countries. Participants were asked to report what honor means to them, and situations that lead to enhancement and loss of honor. The study presented in Chapter 3 focused on the significance of masculine and feminine honor codes in Spain and the Netherlands. Participants were asked to make separate ratings of the extent to which attributes related to gender-specific (i.e., masculine and feminine honor) and gender-neutral (e.g., reputation) honor values are seen as being desirable in their own culture in women and in men. A further objective of this study was to investigate attitudes towards sex-roles in Spain and the Netherlands. Participants were asked to complete the attitudes towards sex-roles scale, or ASRS. The ASRS assessed personal attitudes towards men's and women's roles in three different domains: work and public behavior, family roles, and sexuality.

In the second part of the thesis, in Chapters 4 and 5, two studies were reported on the influence of honor on emotion. The study presented in Chapter 4 focused on the influence of the differential cultural emphasis on honor values between Spain and the Netherlands on the elicitation, experience and communication of pride, shame and anger. Participants were asked to recall a situation in which they themselves had felt pride, shame and anger, and to describe the emotion-eliciting situation. Additional questions were posed about the emotional episode that were designed to assess the phenomenological experience (appraisals, feelings, and action tendencies), emotional action, emotional expression, and social sharing of the emotion. Participants were also presented with a set of vignettes describing events that could give rise to pride, shame and anger. We explored the extent to which emotion-eliciting situations that
involve social evaluations provoke different emotions in Spain and the Netherlands by creating two different type of vignettes: Events in which social approval or disapproval was present, and events in which social evaluation was absent. Participants were asked to report what they would feel in reaction to each vignette. The study presented in Chapter 5 centered on emotional reactions to insults. More specifically, this study was designed to investigate the influence of (1) type of concern threatened by a verbal insult (honor- or individualism-threatening), and (2) individual differences in a concern with honor, on the reported intensity of hurt pride, shame and anger in reaction to insult vignettes in Spain and the Netherlands. A measure of a psychological concern with honor, the honor scale, was also presented in this chapter.

The aim of this final, concluding chapter, is to summarize and integrate the results of these studies, and to discuss their implications. We will first discuss differences and similarities between honor-based and individualism-based value systems. Next, we will discuss the role of honor in shaping emotional experiences of pride, shame and anger. Our methodological approach, and the ecological validity and representativeness of our findings will be discussed next. Further, some possible avenues for future research are proposed throughout the chapter. Finally, we will conclude with some remarks about the contribution of the present thesis to current research on honor and emotion, and about the study of emotion from a cross-cultural perspective.

Honor-Based and Individualism-Based Value Systems

On the basis of ethnographic and social psychological research on honor (Blok, 1981; Brandes, 1980; Gilmore, 1987a, 1990a; Gilmore & Gwynne, 1985; Jakubowska, 1989; Murphy, 1983; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Schneider, 1971; Stewart, 1994) honor cultures were characterized as having a value system that emphasizes reputation, social interdependence, family honor, masculine and feminine honor (see Chapter 1). These values were described as collectivist since they signal the importance of social approval of one’s behavior, interpersonal harmony, and maintaining a strong relation with one’s in-group in honor cultures. However, honor cultures were not equated with collectivist cultures due to the specific set of values that are focal in these cultures. Honor cultures were therefore typified as a variety of collectivist cultures or, to put it slightly differently, as emphasizing a specific type of collectivism.

In this section we discuss how an honor-based value system can be differentiated from an individualism-based value system. This discussion is based on the empirical results of the studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3, and the empirical results regarding the value domains of the honor scale presented in Chapter 5. We therefore summarize and integrate results obtained
in these studies. We first discuss the significance of gender-neutral values, i.e., reputation, social interdependence and family honor, in honor cultures and in individualistic cultures. Next, we focus on the significance of masculine and feminine honor codes in these cultures.

**Reputation, Family Honor and Interdependence in Individualistic and Honor Cultures**

In line with ethnographic research on honor in Spain (Gilmore, 1987a, 1990a; Murphy, 1983; Pitt-Rivers, 1965, 1977), the results of our studies show that Spain is characterized by an honor-based value system. In particular, honor, family values (e.g., the protection of the family honor, family security), social interdependence (e.g., generosity, humility), and reputation (e.g., marrying somebody with a good reputation, social recognition) are emphasized to a greater extent in Spain than in the Netherlands (Chapter 2, Study 1; Chapter 3). By contrast, the Netherlands is characterized by an individualism-based value system that emphasizes self-respect, independence, autonomy, and the capacities and achievements of the self (Chapter 2, Study 1). In addition, an emphasis on moderation and helpfulness also characterizes the Netherlands, in line with cross-cultural research on the masculinity-femininity dimension of national cultures, in which the Netherlands has been described as a more feminine country than Spain (Hofstede, 1998). Feminine countries are distinguished by the significance of modesty -- which can be seen as closely related to moderation since both types of values focus on control and restraint -- and caring for the needy (Hofstede, 1998). Finally, these results replicate earlier research on values in Spain and the Netherlands (Fischer, Manstead & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999, Study 1), on the basis of which we conclude that this pattern of cultural differences between these countries can be regarded as robust.

These cultural value differences are also reflected in the type of attributes associated with honorability in Spain and the Netherlands (Chapter 2, Study 1). Maintaining social interdependence, for example by being altruistic and loyal, was seen as contributing to a person's honor (i.e., honorability) to a greater extent in Spain than in the Netherlands; whereas having self-respect, being capable, and achieving things oneself were seen as contributing to a person's honor to greater extent in the Netherlands than in Spain. This indicates that honorability is culturally conceived of in terms of one's relatedness with others to a greater extent in Spain than in the Netherlands, whereas honorability is culturally conceived of in individualistic terms to a greater extent in the Netherlands than in Spain. This conclusion is also consistent with the results of the Spanish and Dutch free descriptions of honor (Chapter 2, Study 2). There honor was more often defined in terms of one's relations with others by

---

1. The only differences found between our earlier research on values and the study presented in Chapter 2 are in relation to self-respect, wisdom and success. For more information on these differences see Chapter 2, Study 1.
Spanish than by Dutch participants. By contrast, honor was more often defined in terms of personal attributes and capabilities, self-failure was more often seen as a cause for loss of honor, whereas own achievements, being autonomous and independent were more often seen as causes for enhancement of honor by Dutch than by Spanish participants.

It is noteworthy that cultural differences with regard to other-related situations that lead to loss of honor were only found for situations that involve intimate others. In particular, not living up to intimate others’ expectations was more often seen as leading to loss of honor by Spanish than by Dutch participants (Chapter 2, Study 2). In honor cultures, an individual is as much responsible for the maintenance of his or her family honor as for the maintenance of his or her own honor (see e.g., Pitt-Rivers, 1977). Not living up to intimate others’ expectations can damage family honor, thereby leading to loss of personal honor. This finding once again shows the relevance of family honor values in Spanish culture. We will return to this point later in this chapter when discussing the role of intimate others-related situations in emotion elicitation in honor cultures.

Altogether, these conclusions drawn from our studies have important implications for the characterization of the value systems prevalent in honor and in individualistic cultures, or honor-based and individualism-based value systems. Honor cultures can be differentiated from individualistic cultures on the basis of the types of values that are focal in these cultures, and the emphasis given to them. Honor cultures emphasize the maintenance of reputation, social interdependence, and family honor to a greater extent than individualistic cultures. Individualistic values centered on freedom, independence, autonomy, and the capacities and achievements of the self are, by contrast, less emphasized in honor than in individualistic cultures. It is important nevertheless to stress that these cultural differences are better seen as relative than as absolute: Honor-based and individualism-based value systems should not be regarded as occupying positions at the opposite ends of one dimension, but rather as two separate dimensions that exert some influence on each other. This means that reputation, family values, and maintaining social interdependence are not unimportant values in individualistic cultures, although they are less important than they are in honor cultures. In a similar vein, honor is not an empty concept in individualistic cultures: Rather, honor is conceived of in individualistic terms in these cultures. This points to an important distinction to be made between a culture’s honor-based value system and honor as a marker of prestige and status. We agree with Peristiany’s (1965b) suggestion that honor in its evaluative sense, referring to the prestige in which a person is held, is probably an universal concept. This implies that members of cultures that are not characterized by an honor-based value system, such as individualistic cultures, should also have an understanding of the factors that lead to honorability or prestige. What varies cross-culturally is the means by which prestige or
honorability is maintained. Our findings suggest that the focality of individualistic values in individualistic cultures define the sources of honorability in these cultures: One's personal attributes, capacities, and the ability to be an independent and an autonomous individual seem to be the sources of honorability in individualistic cultures (Chapter 2, Study 1). In other words, what confers honorability or prestige in individualistic cultures is living up to individualistic values.

**Masculine and Feminine Honor Codes in Honor and Individualistic Cultures**

Ethnographic research has drawn attention to the role of masculine and feminine honor codes in the cultural schemas of honor cultures, especially Mediterranean honor cultures (Blok, 1981; Brandes, 1980; Gilmore, 1987a, 1990a; Gilmore & Gwynne, 1985; Jakubowska, 1989; Murphy, 1983; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Schneider, 1971). These gender-specific honor codes define what is believed to be appropriate behavior for women and men in honor cultures. Furthermore, masculine and feminine honor codes define a pattern of family and inter-sex relations that has important implications for the division of sex-roles in honor cultures. Mediterranean honor cultures are described in ethnographic research as having a traditional division of sex-roles (see e.g., Gilmore, 1987a; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977). Thus masculine and feminine honor codes are central to the understanding of gender stereotypes and attitudes towards sex-roles in honor cultures. However, it has not yet been established whether these gender-specific honor codes are unique to honor cultures, and whether attitudes towards sex-roles are in fact more traditionally oriented in honor than in non-honor cultures. In the present thesis we investigated these issues by comparing an honor culture, Spain, with an individualistic culture, the Netherlands. We turn now to summarize the main conclusions of our research on these topics, and their implications for the characterization of honor and individualistic cultures in terms of masculine and feminine honor codes.

Consistent with ethnographic research on gender-specific honor codes in Spain (Brandes, 1980; Gilmore, 1987a, 1990a; Murphy, 1983; Pitt-Rivers, 1965, 1977), masculine honor values are central in Spanish culture: Spanish participants rated attributes related to masculine honor, such as having precedence or protecting one's family and property, as being more desirable in their culture than Dutch participants did (Chapter 3). Moreover, masculine honor attributes were seen as being more desirable by Spanish than by Dutch participants in both men and women, which led us to conclude that masculine honor values serve as a kind of norm in Spain. This greater emphasis on masculine honor values at the cultural level in Spain than in the Netherlands may be related to the characterization of Spain as a more masculine country than the Netherlands (Hofstede, 1998). Masculine cultures emphasize values that express strength, agency and precedence. Such ideals are also central to the masculine honor
code. It may be that honor cultures are more masculine than non-honor cultures, and that this is related to the greater emphasis on masculine honor values in the former than in the latter type of cultures. This possible relation between the masculinity-femininity dimension of national cultures and masculine honor values would be an interesting topic for future research.

In contrast to this greater emphasis on masculine honor values at the cultural level in Spain than in the Netherlands, masculine honor-related concerns seem to be relevant concerns for men in both countries. In particular, situations that conflict with masculine honor values, such as not having virility or authority over one's family, were seen as equally damaging to self-esteem by both Spanish and Dutch male participants (Chapter 5). Additionally, Spanish and Dutch male participants did not differ with respect to feelings of anger, shame and hurt pride in reaction to being accused of not being able to protect one's intimates, a core value in relation to masculine honor (Chapter 5). These results show that virility, protecting the family, and having authority over the family are concerns that are central to male gender identity both in Spain and in the Netherlands.

With regard to the feminine honor code, attributes related to feminine honor (i.e. conformity within the family, being discreet, and having sexual shame) were rated by both Spanish and Dutch participants as being desirable attributes in women in their own culture (Chapter 3). In addition, lack of sexual shame in sexual relations and in clothing were rated as equally damaging for their self-esteem by both Spanish and Dutch female participants (Chapter 5). In a similar vein, both Spanish and Dutch female participants' feelings of anger, shame and hurt pride were equally intense in reaction to being accused of being a person who lacks sexual shame (Chapter 5). In sum, the female chastity code is not only equally present at the level of gender stereotypes in Spain and the Netherlands; it also seems to be an important female concern in both countries, suggesting that it is central to female gender identity in Spain and the Netherlands.

Despite this equal cultural emphasis on the feminine honor code in Spain and the Netherlands, there are signs in our data that cultural differences center on the social implications of lack of female sexual shame. The status of female relatives' sexual shame is an important determinant of the status of the family honor (see e.g., Gilmore, 1987a; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977). Family honor was operationalized in the honor scale presented in Chapter 5 in terms of female relatives' sexual shame (Chapter 5). It was found that Spanish participants rated damage to their family honor, such as letting others insult the family and one's female relatives being seen as lacking sexual shame, as more damaging to their self-esteem than Dutch participants did (Chapter 5). This suggests that female sexual shame

2 Attributes related to feminine honor values were seen, however, as being less desirable for men in Spain than in the Netherlands. Detailed discussion of this finding is presented in Chapter 3.
acquires greater significance in Spain than in the Netherlands in the family context and, specifically, in the context of the maintenance of family honor. Moreover, this suggests that women’s and men’s self-esteem are to a greater extent dependent on female relatives’ sexual behavior in Spain than in the Netherlands.

Taking these results together, the implications for the characterization of honor and individualistic cultures in relation to masculine and feminine honor codes can be described as follows. Differences in masculine and feminine honor between honor and individualist cultures seem to be centered on (1) the emphasis on masculine honor values at a cultural level, these being emphasized to a greater extent in honor than in individualistic cultures, and (2) the implications of female relatives’ lack of sexual shame for self-esteem and the status of family honor, these implications being greater in honor than in individualistic cultures. Our findings show that female sexual shame in honor cultures is not only a personal concern on the part of women, but also a collective concern on the part of the family. A woman’s lack of sexual shame has more negative implications for her relatives’ self-esteem and the status of her family honor in honor than in individualistic cultures. Female sexual shame in individualistic cultures seems, by contrast, to be more a personal concern than a family concern, for the status of a woman’s sexual shame seems to have fewer consequences for her relatives’ self-esteem and her family honor in individualistic than in honor cultures.

Turning now to attitudes towards sex-roles in honor and in individualistic cultures, our results suggest that cultural differences in this regard are domain-specific. The results of the ASRS, our measure of attitudes towards sex-roles, indicated that attitudes towards sex-roles are more traditional in Spain than in the Netherlands in relation to sexuality and marriage, but not in relation to family roles, or at work or in public behavior (Chapter 3). More specifically, Spanish participants agreed to a greater extent than Dutch participants did that women ought to be more controlled and passive and that men ought to be more active and initiating in sexual relations, that women should remain virgins until marriage, and that marriage is more important for women than for men. This view is consistent with the theories of sexuality implicit in the masculine and feminine honor codes. We should bear in mind, however, that the Spanish participants in this study were not especially traditionally oriented, given that the mean of attitudes to sexuality and marriage was around 2 on a 5-point scale. Given the middle-class and student nature of the sample, the conclusion that differences in attitudes toward sex-roles between honor and individualistic cultures are domain-specific needs further investigation, using more diverse samples of participants.

Finally, the most powerful predictor of attitudes towards sex-roles in our study was gender, indicating that males were more likely than females to hold traditional attitudes towards sex-roles (Chapter 3), which is consistent with previous research on gender differences in
attitudes towards sex-roles (see e.g., Nelson, 1988; Parry, 1983; Willemsen, 1992). Once the effect of gender had been taken into account, individual differences in the perceived desirability of gender-specific honor attributes only accounted for around 2% of the variance in attitudes towards sex-roles. Nevertheless, the perceived desirability of attributes related to gender-neutral values (i.e., reputation, family honor, and social interdependence) did not significantly account for variance in attitudes towards sex-roles. This we regard as evidence of a positive relation between the extent to which sexual shame and conformity within the family is emphasized for women, and protection of the family and virility for men in a given culture, and traditional attitudes towards sex-roles. The rather small amount of variance in attitudes towards sex-roles explained by our measure of the perceived desirability of gender-specific honor attributes means that this conclusion has to be regarded with some caution. Further research on this issue is warranted.

### The Role of Honor in Pride, Shame and Anger

In Part 2 of this thesis we investigated how the differential cultural emphasis on honor and honor values in Spain and the Netherlands shapes emotional experiences of pride, shame and anger.

Pride, shame and anger were selected for cross-cultural comparison for the following reasons. The review of the theoretical and empirical literature on honor and these emotions in anthropology and in social psychology presented in Chapter 1 showed that pride, shame and anger are the emotions particularly related to the maintenance and loss of honor in honor cultures. This review also showed that the amount of existing empirical evidence on the relationship between honor and pride, shame and anger varies across these three emotions. The way in which honor influences emotional experiences of pride and shame has not been the focus of systematic research in either discipline. Pride and shame have generally been referred to in ethnographic research as emotions that follow enhancement and loss of honor, respectively (see e.g., Peristiany, 1965a). Shame in its sense of “having a sense of shame,” has also been the focus of study in Mediterranean anthropology (see e.g., Gilmore, 1987a; Peristiany, 1965a). Shame in this sense is understood as a personal disposition or attribute, rather than an emotion. The studies reported in this thesis were therefore designed to yield more systematic evidence of the influence of honor on the emotional experiences of pride and shame. With regard to anger, empirical research in social psychology and in Mediterranean

---

3 This small percentage of explained variance has to be seen in the context of the way in which the perceived desirability of gender-specific honor codes and attitudes towards sex-roles were assessed: In the first case, participants acted as cultural informants, whereas in the second case participants reported their personal attitudes (see Chapter 3).
anthropology has shown that offenses, such as insults, are the object of intense anger experiences in honor cultures (see e.g., Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965a). Anger is therefore strongly related to the loss of honor.

The results of our comparative studies indicated that honor influences pride, shame and anger in the following ways. First, the greater importance of honor in Spain means that intimate others play a more important role in emotion elicitation. Second, honor shapes the social implications of pride and shame in important ways, thereby influencing the extent to which these emotions are shared with others in honor cultures. In addition, the functional consequences of direct anger expressions in the face of offenses in honor cultures affects the way in which anger is expressed in these cultures. Third, how strongly one reacts to insults in honor cultures is affected by the types of concerns that are threatened by a given insult. Furthermore, the extent to which the self is concerned with honor influences the intensity of emotional reactions to threats to one’s honor. We turn now to a separate discussion of each of these points.

The Salience of Intimate Others in Emotion Elicitation in Honor Cultures

The studies reported in this thesis show that cross-cultural differences and similarities are both apparent in the elicitation of pride, shame and anger in honor and in individualistic cultures. With regard to the similarities, shame was elicited in both Spain and the Netherlands by violations of social norms by self, and by negative behavior from others towards self (Chapter 4). Further, the most common pride-eliciting situation reported by participants in each culture was achievement by self, followed by socially appropriate behavior, experiencing a positive event, and identifying with others’ achievements (such as one’s football club winning an important match; Chapter 4). With regard to anger, offenses by non-intimates and negative behavior by others were common anger elicitors in both cultures (Chapter 4).

Cultural differences in emotion elicitation were found only for shame and anger. In relation to shame antecedents, cultural differences were evident for self-failure situations, and especially for situations involving intimate others. Dutch participants more often referred to self-failure as a shame-eliciting situation than Spanish participants did (Chapter 4). By contrast, situations involving intimate others elicited more shame in Spain than in the Netherlands. In particular, Spanish participants reported more often than Dutch participants that they would have negative feelings, especially of shame, when being unjustly accused of being a thief in front of intimate others (Chapter 4). Due to the strong interdependence of one’s own and one’s intimates’ honor, the potential loss of personal honor in this situation would also lead to intimate others’ loss of honor. Similarly, Spanish participants reported that they would feel more shame when accused of bringing shame on one’s family than Dutch
participants did (Chapter 5). In this situation, the self is seen as a dishonorable member of the family, damaging the family honor. In similar vein, cultural differences in the elicitation of anger appeared for situations involving intimate others: Being offended by intimate others was more often reported as an anger-eliciting situation by Spanish than by Dutch participants (Chapter 4). In sum, most cultural differences in the elicitation of shame and anger were evident in situations involving the people with whom one's shares a common honor, namely one's intimates.

This salience of intimate others was also apparent in situations leading to loss of honor and damaged self-esteem in Spain. First, cultural differences between Spanish and Dutch descriptions of other-related situations leading to loss of honor were only found for situations related to intimate others: Spanish participants more often reported not living up to intimate others' expectations as a cause for the loss of honor than Dutch participants did (Chapter 2, Study 2). Second, Spanish participants reported that their self-esteem would be damaged to a greater extent by injuries and threats to family honor than Dutch participants did (Chapter 5). This effect of damaged family honor on feelings of self-worth is also consistent with results obtained in relation to feelings of hurt pride: Spanish participants reported that they would feel more hurt pride when accused of bringing shame on the family than Dutch participants did (Chapter 5). This more central role played by situations related to the relation between the self and one's intimates, and family honor in the elicitation of anger and shame, in loss of honor, and in self-esteem in Spain than in the Netherlands is consistent with the greater emphasis placed on family honor values in the former country (Chapters 2, 3).

Taking all these results together, we propose that a key dimension of difference between individualistic cultures and honor cultures with respect to emotion elicitation is the extent to which a given situation affects family honor, or the relationship between oneself and one's intimates. Situations in which family's honor or a relationship with intimates are at stake can be considered core emotional events in honor cultures. Our results also show that when the self is responsible for actual or potential damage to one's intimates' honor, shame (rather than anger) is elicited, but that when intimate others offend the self, anger (rather than shame) is elicited.

Further, our results show that situations in which family honor is damaged, or the relationship between oneself and one's intimates is threatened, seem to be more salient in relation to emotion elicitation than situations in which family honor is enhanced. Cultural differences in the salience of situations involving intimate others with regard to emotion elicitation were not found for pride, a positive emotion, but rather for the negative emotions of hurt pride, shame and anger. This reflects the interdependence of one's own and one's family honor. An individual is not only responsible for his or her own personal honor, but also for the honor of his or her relatives and the collective family honor. One's own disgraceful
behavior means not only a loss of personal honor, but also the loss of one's intimates' honor. Similarly, the status of one's family honor reflects on oneself. An individual is therefore not only the guardian of his or her own honor, but also the guardian of the family honor. This interdependence may lead to a sensitivity to or focus on those situations that can potentially harm the family honor, which would account for its centrality in the elicitation of negative emotions such as hurt pride, shame and anger.

Finally, a useful direction for future research would be the further investigation of the centrality of family honor in other aspects of the emotion process in honor cultures. For instance, appraisals related to family honor may be key appraisals in the emotion process in honor cultures. Such appraisals could include evaluating the implications of a given situation for one's family's reputation, or how one's own emotional reaction might affect the relationship between oneself and one's intimates.

The Social Implications of Pride, Shame and Anger in Honor Cultures

More cultural differences were found in our research with respect to the communication of pride, shame and anger than for the thoughts, feelings and action tendencies involved in the phenomenological experience of these emotions. With regard to phenomenological experiences, cultural differences were found for shame: Dutch participants more often reported having thoughts about themselves, and having negative thoughts about the situation's effect on oneself than Spanish participants did (Chapter 4). Thoughts involved in the phenomenological experience of shame are therefore more self-centered in the Netherlands than in Spain, consistent with the notion that individualistic values are relatively more important in shaping the experience of shame in the Netherlands than in Spain. Further, the phenomenological experience of shame involved wanting to escape, having negative feelings, having other-related thoughts, and wanting to gain control over the situation in both cultures (Chapter 4). With regard to pride, having positive thoughts about oneself, thoughts about the situation's effect on oneself, and having positive generic feelings such as feeling happy, were common thoughts and feelings reported by both Spanish and Dutch participants in relation to the experience of pride (Chapter 4). As for anger, in both cultures the phenomenological experience of this emotion involved thinking negatively about others, wanting to escape from the situation, and having negative generic feelings, such as feeling bad (Chapter 4).

4 Spanish participants more often reported wanting to escape and having negative feelings than Dutch participants did. This finding is probably related to the type of shame antecedents Spanish participants reported. For more on this issue, see the discussion of Chapter 4.

5 A country by age group interaction was also found for thoughts centered on trying to rationalize the situation: 23-year-old Dutch participants more often reported trying to rationalize the situation than their Spanish counterparts did (Chapter 4).
In relation to the communication of pride, shame and anger, cultural differences were found for all three emotions. Shame was expressed to a greater extent in Spain than in the Netherlands, whereas the reverse was true with regard to pride (Chapter 4). Concerning anger, cultural differences did not appear in the extent to which anger is expressed, but with respect to the actions undertaken during the anger episode. Specifically, Spanish participants more often reported criticizing or ending relationship with the offender or the person who provoked their anger than Dutch participants did. Dutch participants, by contrast, more often reported actions that were not directed at others, such as screaming or throwing things (Chapter 4).

The fact that more cultural differences were found in relation to the way that these emotions are communicated than in how they are experienced phenomenologically can be explained in terms of the different social implications of communicating pride, shame and anger in honor cultures and individualistic cultures. The greater emphasis on maintaining social interdependence in honor cultures than in individualistic cultures (Chapter 2, Study 1) suggests that the expression of pride and shame have different implications in these cultures. Expressing shame can be considered as an expression of vulnerability and dependence. Such an expression can be expected to enhance social relatedness in honor cultures. On the other hand, in individualistic cultures expressing shame conflicts with the emphasis placed on independence and autonomy. The expression of shame therefore carries more positive social consequences in honor cultures than in individualistic cultures. The expression of pride, on the other hand, has more positive social consequences in individualistic than in honor cultures, because it reinforces one’s autonomy and independence. Pride expressions in honor cultures might damage interdependence because such expressions highlight the uniqueness and individuality of the self. Moreover, the interpersonal nature of honor implies that one’s achievements can negatively affect the status of others’ honor, which could also lead to an inhibition of the expression of pride feelings in honor cultures. These different functional consequences of expressing pride and shame are similar to what Markus and Kitayama have called “social engagement” and “social disengagement” (Kitayama, Markus & Matsumoto, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Our results concerning the expression of pride and shame in Spain and the Netherlands are fully consistent with these different implications of expressing pride and shame in honor and individualistic cultures.

With regard to the communication of anger, anger expressions directed against the offender is a culturally approved way of restoring one’s honor when attacked in honor cultures (see e.g., Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). A direct action against the offender signals one’s attachment to one’s honor and one’s readiness to defend it. Such anger expressions therefore have functional consequences for restoring one’s honor in offense situations in honor cultures. The greater tendency of Spanish participants in our study to react with direct anger expressions
when confronted with offenses or negative behavior by others is therefore consistent with the positive implications for one's honor of such expressions in honor cultures.

These social implications of communicating pride, shame and anger in honor and individualistic cultures suggest that the expression of shame should be encouraged in honor cultures and discouraged in individualistic cultures, and that the expression of pride should be discouraged in honor cultures and encouraged in individualistic cultures. Different socialization patterns for the communication of pride and shame in honor and individualistic cultures may therefore be expected. Some of our data suggest the existence of such difference between honor and individualistic cultures. In particular, most of our 7-year-old Spanish participants did not know the meaning of the word “pride,” whereas most of their Dutch counterparts did not know the meaning of the word “shame” (Chapter 4). This might mean that pride is less often expressed or verbalized in Spain, an honor culture, whereas shame is less often verbalized or expressed in the Netherlands, an individualistic culture. However, these data were not subjected to statistical analyses and they therefore only suggest a possible difference in socialization patterns. This issue merits further research.

**Emotional Reactions to Verbal Insults in Honor and Individualistic Cultures**

Ethnographic and social psychological research has documented the impact of insults and other offenses on one's honor in honor cultures (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle & Schwarz, 1996; Cohen, Vandello & Rantilla, 1998; Murphy, 1983; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1977; Stewart, 1994). Honor cultures are characterized by what has been called “reflexive honor” (Stewart, 1994): When an individual is insulted in honor cultures, his or her honor is immediately diminished and can only be restored through appropriate action, angry reactions being the culturally approved way of recovering one's honor. This impact of insults in honor cultures is related to the significance attached to reputation and recognition of one's behavior in these cultures. In particular, one's claim to honor has to be socially recognized in honor cultures in order for it to have any value (see e.g., Peristiany, 1965a; Stewart, 1994). When the self is humiliated or insulted, one's claim to honor is denied and one's reputation is undermined. This raises the question of how offenses are responded to in cultures that attached less significance to honor, reputation and social recognition of one's behavior, such as individualistic cultures. This issue was investigated in Chapter 5.

In Chapter 1, we provided a detailed description of ethnographic and social psychological research on honor, offenses and anger. This research has documented that the seriousness of an offense in honor cultures is dependent on the following situational characteristics (see e.g., Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Peristiany, 1965a). First, the extent to which
an offense is made public, those offenses committed in public damaging one's reputation to a greater extent than those offenses committed in private. Second, insults concerning the sexual behavior of female relatives, or sexual offenses to female relatives are considered serious threats to one's honor in honor cultures. Third, offenses are responded to with anger in honor cultures in those situations in which the offender is considered as having equal honor to the offended. Finally, empirical research on honor and offenses has focused on the elicitation of angry feelings and expressions in offense situations that form a threat to male honor.

In the study reported in Chapter 5 of this thesis we investigated the influence of a different type of situational characteristic of an offense on emotion, namely type of concern threatened by an offense. Specifically, we investigated emotional reactions to verbal insults that threatened either individualistic or honor concerns in Spain and the Netherlands. Concern for honor was measured in this study. A concern for honor has not been measured in previous research on honor, offenses and anger (see Chapters 1, and 5). Finally, not only anger, but also shame, an emotion that relates to loss of honor, and hurt pride, an emotion that involves damaged self-esteem and damaged dignity, were measured in this study.

The most important conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the alleged sensitivity to insults present in honor cultures does not apply to all types of insult, but seems to be especially apparent when family honor is at stake: Spanish participants reported more hurt pride and shame in reaction to being accused of bringing shame on one’s family than Dutch participants did (Chapter 5). Second, members of individualistic cultures are also sensitive to insults, yet only to those insults that threaten individualistic concerns, i.e., one’s image as an autonomous, independent and competent person: Dutch participants reported more intense anger than Spanish participants did in reaction to insults that threatened individualistic concerns (Chapter 5).6 Finally, insults are not only the object of emotional experiences of anger, but they can also lead to shame and hurt pride. Moreover, individual differences in the extent to which the self is concerned with maintaining honor determine the intensity of these emotional reactions to insults that threaten one’s honor: The more one is concerned with maintaining honor, the stronger one’s emotional reactions of hurt pride, shame and anger are to insults that threaten one’s honor, especially when the integrity of one’s family honor is threatened by an insult.

6 Dutch participants in this study also reported more hurt pride and anger in reaction to being accused of being a person who is not reliable, not to be trusted. The implications of these results are discussed in detailed in the Discussion of Chapter 5. Further, results concerning emotional reactions by Spanish and Dutch participants to insults that threaten female and male honor were already discussed in this chapter in relation to the relevance of masculine and feminine honor codes in individualistic and honor cultures. They will be therefore not discussed here again.
We regard these findings as contributing to knowledge about the factors in an insult situation that lead to intense emotional reactions in honor cultures. Future research could further investigate the type of emotional actions that follow an insult in individualistic cultures as compared to honor cultures. On the basis of empirical research on honor and offenses in honor cultures it can be expected that the urge to respond to an insult would be greater in honor cultures than in individualistic ones, because of the presumably greater implications of not reacting to an insult in the former cultures (Chapter 1): When one's honor is undermined by an insult in honor cultures and the individual does not react to the insult, the honor of the family can be also undermined (Peristiany, 1965a; Pitt-Rivers, 1968; Stewart, 1994). This implies that an individual bears a greater responsibility to react appropriately to an insult in honor cultures than in individualistic ones. Thus if anger is elicited by an insult, the need to react to this anger may be greater in honor than in individualistic cultures, thereby creating more chances of leading to interpersonal conflict, such as violence, in honor cultures than in individualistic ones. Such negative consequences of the need to restore one's honor by making angry expressions in offense situations have been found by social psychological research in the Southern culture of honor of the U.S.A. (see e.g., Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

A Psychological Concern for Honor

The literature review presented in Chapter 1 showed that a measure of a concern with honor has not yet been developed. An important way in which the present research contributes to the existing literature is through the development of a reliable instrument for measuring psychological concern for honor. A concern for honor was defined as wanting to maintain a self and a social image in line with normative prescriptions derived from honor values or, in other words, in agreement with the honor code. Our measure of concern for honor was shown to have good internal consistency and predictive validity (Chapter 5). The best predictive validity appeared to be in relation to emotional reactions to insult situations in which the self is portrayed as being a dishonorable member of one's family, pointing once again to the importance of a concern for honor in situations involving the relationship between self and intimates. Moreover, concern for honor generally proved to be a better predictor of emotional reactions to threats to one's honor than did country or gender.7

Our measure of psychological concern for honor, the honor scale, showed that the more a person is concerned with maintaining honor, the more hurt pride, shame and anger he or she

---

7 With one exception: Gender was a better predictor than concern for honor in relation to emotional reactions to being accused of lacking sexual shame (see Chapter 5).
will feel in situations threatening his or her honor. Honor values are therefore interiorized at an individual level, leading to individual differences in the extent to which the self is attached to honor. A task for future research would be to examine further the reliability of this scale, along with its validity in studying emotional phenomena in honor cultures.

A Methodological Evaluation: Validity and Representativeness

A key aspect of the present research that warrants discussion is the validity and representativeness of the findings reported in this thesis. A basic question regarding validity is the extent to which the measures used in these studies to study honor values and emotional phenomena were linguistically and conceptually equivalent for the cultural groups involved. A common problem in multilingual cross-cultural research is construct or item bias (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). This may occur when the same word or expression does not refer to the same behavior or situation in the different languages involved in the research. This can undermine the interpretability and validity of findings. Furthermore, differences in the procedures used with the different cultural groups can also jeopardize the validity of findings. We adopted different strategies for enhancing the validity of our studies.

First, all our interviews and questionnaires were translated by native speakers of the language into which materials were being translated, and were back-translated by independent experts who were bilingual in Spanish and Dutch. Second, native speakers were involved in all the steps of the collecting and coding of qualitative data. Interviews were always carried out by native speakers. Content analyses of interviews and open questionnaires were also always carried out by trained native speakers. Third, our earlier research on prototypes of pride, shame and anger in Spain and the Netherlands indicated that the Spanish and Dutch words for anger, pride and shame used in the present studies have equivalent core meanings in Spanish and Dutch language (Fischer et al., 1999, Study 2; see also Chapter 4). Furthermore, the linguistic and conceptual equivalence of the Spanish and Dutch emotion words, and the word used for "honor" in Spanish and Dutch language were also assessed by consulting bilinguals, standard works of reference (i.e., dictionaries), and by careful back-translation. Fourth, equivalent procedures in the two cultural groups were followed for all studies. Fifth, the instructions included in our interviews and questionnaires never made mention of the fact that the study was concerned with cultural differences between honor and individualistic cultures, or between Spain and the Netherlands, thereby minimizing the chance that responses were shaped by social stereotypes. Finally, our measures were always piloted in Spanish and Dutch cultural groups, so that differences in meaning could be detected and corrected. All in all, these procedures should have minimized the likelihood of methodological biases due to linguistic
differences or differences in procedure. We therefore believe that the cultural differences observed can be attributed to cultural, rather than methodological, factors.

Further, we regard the ecological validity of our findings as satisfactory, for the following reasons. First, the research on the elicitation, experience and communication of pride, shame and anger reported in Chapter 4 involved autobiographically-recalled episodes and thus the real-life experiences of Spanish and Dutch participants. Second, the vignettes used in the study presented in Chapter 5 were also closely based on real-life experiences reported by Spanish and Dutch adults in a previous interview study.

Finally, we believe that the findings of the present research can be generalized to young, middle-class populations living in honor and individualistic cultures that have similar value systems as the ones that characterized the honor and individualistic cultures involved in our research, namely Spain and the Netherlands. The samples used in the present studies were not representative of the respective national populations, but they were well matched with each other. Furthermore, the fact that our study on the conceptualization of honor (Chapter 2, Study 2) and our study on the elicitation, experience and communication of pride, shame and anger (Chapter 4) included 7- to 23-year-old participants increases the generalizability of the findings by showing that many of the differences between Spain and the Netherlands are not limited to student (or student-aged) groups. Additionally, our Spanish and Dutch participants and their parents were always natives of these countries. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn in this thesis should not be assumed to be generalizable to populations in individualistic and honor cultures that have different socio-demographic attributes than the participants involved in the present research.

**Contributions of the Present Research and Concluding Remarks**

We regard the research reported in this thesis as advancing the knowledge on honor and emotion in the following ways. First, the studies contribute to the scarce knowledge about the current significance and conceptualization of honor in Northern European individualistic cultures. Moreover, we have described the way in which individualism- and honor-based value systems can be differentiated. Second, the research shows that masculine and feminine honor codes are not unique to honor cultures, and points out the ways in which honor and individualistic cultures seem to differ in this regard. Third, the research provides evidence of the way in which cultural differences between individualistic and honor value systems affect the elicitation, experience and communication of pride, shame and anger. A multicomponential approach to the cross-cultural study of emotion (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984) has been shown to be fruitful in this respect, since it encourages one to study the role of cultural differences in
the different aspects or components of the emotion process. Fourth, the present research has identified two important factors involved in cultural differences in emotional reactions to insults between honor and individualistic cultures: the type of concern being threatened by an insult, and individual differences in concern for honor. Finally, a first step has been made in the construction of a reliable measure of a psychological concern for honor.

In conclusion, we believe that cross-cultural research on emotion would benefit from using the approach adopted in the present research. In particular, studying the differences and similarities between cultural value systems seems to offer a fruitful way of determining which concerns are central to the emotional lives of different cultural groups, and thereby of arriving at a better understanding of how culture influences emotion. Enhancing such understanding should make it easier for members of different cultures to communicate effectively with one another and to appreciate each other's differences.