

Paper Comparative Experiment Appendices (online supplemental materials)

APPENDIX A

Populist communication: definition and typology (extension introduction special issue)

Populist communication constructs or frames a causal and moral divide between the “ordinary and blameless people” and the “evil and culpable others” (e.g., Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 2004; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). While the people are constructed as an in-group, “the others” can refer to different social groups that are portrayed as out-groups (Reinemann, 2017). Most often these out-groups are political elites, ethnic minorities, and/or financial elites (cf., Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) .

The centrality of the ordinary people as an in-group forms the minimum condition for populism to be identified (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Reinemann, 2017). Because this in-group of hardworking, ordinary citizens is depicted as the most important voice in the nation, their will *should* be the focal point of politics (e.g., Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2014). From this core idea, different types of populism can be derived that incorporate, in addition to people-centrism, different possible out-groups in the one or other way. Only if no out-group is present and the focus is solely on the people, populist communication has been coined ‘empty populism’ (Jagers & Walgrave 2007).

Usually, however, political actors make use of additional features resulting in thicker types of populist communication (Jagers & Walgrave 2007). These types are termed ‘anti-elitist populism’ (i.e., blaming the political elite), ‘exclusionist populism’ (i.e., excluding minorities or the economic elites), and ‘complete populism’ (i.e., combining anti-elitist and exclusionist populism).

The ‘anti-elitist populism’ contends that, because of the political elite’s self-interests, corruption, and unfair redistribution of welfare, the people are not represented in political-decision making (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014; Mudde, 2004). In that sense, the political elite

is responsible for depriving the ordinary people of what they deserve (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016). This type of populism thus highlights people-centrality and, in addition, blames political elites for any problem from which the ordinary people allegedly suffer.

Next to opposing the political elite, populist ideas can also exclude other entities from the people. For instance, ‘exclusionist populism’ can refer to out-groups such as ethnic minorities, immigrants, or refugees, but also to economic or financial elite groups, such as wealthy people. The former type of thick populism can be coined ‘right-wing exclusionist populism’, the latter ‘left-wing exclusionist populism’.

Specifically, ‘right-wing exclusionist populism’ portrays ethnic minorities or immigrants as out-groups that threaten the culture, welfare system, or security of the native people, thereby creating a horizontal divide between the “good native people”, and the “evil foreign others” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).

In a similar vein, ‘left-wing exclusionist populism’ constructs a vertical divide between the people and the rich, the wealthy, or the financial elite as a whole. After the financial crisis in Europe, populist actors have shifted blame to the rich and the representatives of international companies and banks (e.g., Ramiro, 2016; 2017). The so-called “extreme rich” or “wealthiest one percent” are also regarded as a threat to the ordinary, hardworking people. *Because* these rich people are profiting from the nation’s resources without giving anything in return (e.g., paying more tax money), a populist interpretation of an antagonistic divide between the “deprived hardworking majority” and the “profiting rich minority” is shaped.

In ‘complete right-wing populism’, people-centrism, as well as the anti-elitist and exclusionist components of populism are combined, such that the political elite is blamed for prioritizing the needs of immigrants, who receive more benefits than the silenced majority of the native people (Caiani & della Porta, 2011; Mazzoleni, 2008). More specifically, complete

right-wing populism articulates the divide between the “good” native people and the “corrupt” political elite who prioritize the needs of “evil and dangerous” immigrants and neglect the native population.

In ‘complete left-wing populism’, people-centrism is combined with blame shifting onto the political elite as well as accusations of economic elites. The extreme-rich are depicted as an additional enemy of the ordinary people who conspires with the political elite against the people. The populist reproach claims that the ruling politicians are treating the rich preferentially by not taxing them adequately while the majority of the virtuous people have to bear heavy financial burdens.

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APPENDIX B

Respondents' background characteristics (after data quality check)

Country	Gender (female)	Age (M, N, SD)	Education (lower, medium, higher)	Political interest (M, N, SD, 1-7 point scale)	Ideology (M, SD, N, 1- 10 point scale)
Austria	51.7%	M=43.7 N=1,065 SD=13.8	L=9.5% M=49.0% H=41.5%	M=4.5 N=1,065 SD=1.7	M=4.8 N=957 SD=2.3
France	51.8%	M=48.4 N=1,003 SD=16.1	L=15.1% M=25.5% H=59.4%	M=4.4 N=1,039 SD=1.8	M=5.2 N=887 SD=3.0
Germany	49.0%	M=41.8 N=817 SD=13.1	L=30.8% M=36.1% H=33.1%	M=5.0 N=817 SD=1.6	M=4.8 N=739 SD=2.1
Greece	30.0%	M=45.4 N=1,104 SD=15.0	L=3.7% M=38.4% H=57.9%	M=5.7 N=1,098 SD=1.5	M=4.7 N=1,055 SD=2.5
Ireland	51.2%	M=43.7 N=767 SD=16.1	L=9.0% M=51.7% H=39.2%	M=4.6 N=775 SD=1.7	M=5.1 N=652 SD=2.3
Israel	51.3%	M=42.4 N=908 SD=16.4	L=17.4% M=46.4% H=36.2%	M=4.6 N=918 SD=1.6	M=5.9 N=900 SD=2.4
Italy	51.3%	M=50.3 N=846 SD=15.3	L=13.3% M=72.7% H=14.0%	M=5.2 N=858 SD=1.5	M=4.9 N=791 SD=2.8
Netherlands	51.5%	M=46.4 N=734 SD=13.1	L=20.5% M=40.9% H=38.6%	M=4.6 N=743 SD=1.5	M=4.9 N=687 SD=2.5
Norway	48.0%	M=50.0 N=866 SD=16.0	L=9.1% M=48.0% H=42.8%	M=4.6 N=866 SD=1.5	M=5.6 N=793 SD=2.7
Poland	49.5%	M=42.3 N=1,093 SD=13.1	L=31.1% M=31.0% H=38.0%	M=4.2 N=1,098 SD=1.8	M=5.2 N=892 SD=2.7

		M=43.6	L=2.5%	M=4.4	M=4.8
Portugal	47.5%	N=886	M=53.0%	N=913	N=842
		SD=12.6	H=44.5%	SD=1.5	SD=2.5
		M=41.5	L=9.0%	M=4.0	M=5.4
Romania	64.8%	N=1,336	M=39.6%	N=1,297	N=1,070
		SD=13.8	H=51.3%	SD=1.8	SD=2.7
		M=49.3	L=35.6%	M=4.9	M=4.4
Spain	49.7%	N=936	M=25.5%	N=945	N=897
		SD=14.6	H=38.9%	SD=1.6	SD=2.7
		M=50.0	L=7.1%	M=5.3	M=4.9
Sweden	46.8%	N=1,025	M=64.0%	N=1,030	N=1,005
		SD=15.2	H=28.9%	SD=1.3	SD=2.5
		M=48.1	L=8.2%	M=4.6	M=5.1
Switzerland	51.7%	N=1,013	M=63.1%	N=1,033	N=973
		SD=17.2	H=28.7%	SD=1.7	SD=2.3
		M=48.9	L=27.0%	M=4.5	M=5.1
United Kingdom	50.3%	N=891	M=35.4%	N=910	N=762
		SD=15.5	H=37.6%	SD=1.7	SD=2.32

Note. In the original sample, the share of men/women is between 48 and 52 percent in 13 countries. In Sweden, women are slightly underrepresented (46.8%). In Romania, women are heavily over- (64.8%) and in Greece they are heavily underrepresented (30%). However, looking at the three latter countries, only in the Swedish case there is a significant, yet small difference in populist attitudes between men and women, with women being slightly less populist (based on an index of 23 items, $\alpha = .927$, $M = 4.64$, $SD = 1.05$).

With respect to age (quota for 18-39, 40-59, 60 and above), the median age of our samples is within a five year range around the median age of the whole population in eight countries (AT, GR, IE, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO) and within a 10 year interval in the other eight countries (CH, FR, DE, IT, NO, SP, SE, UK). In five countries, the media age of our samples is lower than the overall national media age (AR, DE, GR, PL, RO), in the rest the median age is higher. One reason for this is that our sample only includes voting age participants whose median age is higher than that of the entire population. For example, the difference between the two is 46.5 vs. 52 years in Germany (2015/2017). This means, that most of our samples in fact reflect the voting population even better than the abovementioned values might suggest. In the countries where the median age is lower, this might be a result of the lower participation of older citizens in online panels.

With respect to education, quotas were more or less fulfilled in eight countries (DE, ES, IL, IT, NL, PL, RO, UK), whereas samples are skewed towards participants with mid- and high-level education in the other eight (AU, CH, FR, GR, IR, NO, PO, SE). The reason for this is that online panels often have problems to reach lower educated citizens, especially for political surveys. However, only in three countries those with the lowest level of education differ significantly in their populist attitudes from *both* other education groups in that they are more populist (GR, PL, SE). This means that in these countries overall effects of our stimulus might be less likely when compared to the general population and the other countries, because we assume them to be affected by the participants' pre-existing populist attitudes.

APPENDIX C

Data quality

One of the significant threats to the quality of survey data is satisficing (Krosnick, 1991), i.e. the hypothesis that some respondents instead of providing accurate responses exert less or no cognitive effort to answering the survey. The problem of inattentive respondents may be more frequent in self-administered web surveys, than in surveys administered by an interviewer, who would create a sense of accountability in respondents (Baker et al., 2010). Finally, the frequency of inattentive respondents may be larger in nonprobability online panels due to the presence of “professionals”, i.e. respondents who do a lot of surveys and generally will participate in a survey only if there is an incentive. Some of the professional respondents are expected to rush through a survey, jeopardizing the integrity of their responses (Hillygus, Jackson, & Young, 2014).

To deal with these issues Baker et al. (2010) suggest to use data quality analysis and validation techniques to identify inattentive respondents. They refer to four commonly used techniques to identify satisficing respondents: (1) Short survey completion times, (2) Response non-differentiation ("straightlining") in grid- or matrix- questions, (3) Excessive selection of non-substantive responses or item nonresponse and (4) Gibberish answers to open-ended questions. We use the first three data quality indicators, but we cannot use the fourth, because our questionnaire does not include any open-ended questions. Instead of the open-ended questions quality indicator, we use an indicator based on the idea of instructional manipulation checks (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) to measure whether or not participants have read the news article that served as the experimental stimulus.

We have implemented our four quality indicators as follows: i) completion time: most of the methods that have been used to flag short completion times employ an arbitrary

selected threshold to flag short response times. We use an extension of the “scanning threshold” method (Andreadis, 2012, 2014). The method calculates a threshold taking into account the number of characters in the question and the “scanning” reading speed. With this method we find that if the time spent on the questions was less than 412 seconds, the respondents would be unable to read, comprehend the questions and provide the corresponding answers. As a result, we can assume that these responses are of low quality and we flag them accordingly, ii) straightlining: we have selected three grid questions for which it does not make sense to give the same answer to all the items in the grid. We flag respondents who have not differentiated their responses in any of these grid questions making use of the respdiff module in Stata, iii) item nonresponse: cases are flagged if the number of valid answers is less than $2/3$ of the total number of answers and iv) manipulation checks: a case is flagged when most of the manipulation check responses are missing, or when most of manipulation checks have been answered, but the number of correct answers is less than or equal to the number of correct answers of someone responding randomly. The low-quality answers of inattentive respondents increase noise in a survey dataset and reduce the power of statistical tests. As a result, they should be removed. On the other hand, despite our effort to avoid false-positives, we cannot rule out the possibility of a temporary technical glitch that would make an engaged respondent appear as inattentive. Although, the probability of false - positives is very low, we wish to eliminate it. Thus, we remove a case only when it is flagged in more than one of our four indicators. This way, if we assume that the probability for a false-positive is 0.01 for each individual quality indicator, the probability for a legitimate case to be flagged as low-quality by two independent indicators would be 0.0001. Thus, if a case is flagged by two quality indicators we can be more confident that there is something wrong with it and we can remove it. In our data set this amounts to the removal of 2,131, resulting in a total sample of 15,530 respondents.

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APPENDIX D Experimental stimuli



Economy


Purchasing power will decline – foundation *FutureNow* releases new report



According to a new report by *FutureNow* purchasing power will decline in the coming years. A spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report:

“We have to raise awareness about what this prospect means. There will be less money to spend. Action has to be taken now to address this threat.”

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Economy


Purchasing power will decline – foundation *FutureNow* blames politicians in new report



According to a new report by *FutureNow* purchasing power will decline in the coming years. A spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report:

“We have to raise awareness about what this prospect means for [country]. There will be less money to spend. It is obvious that politicians are to blame. They have been too short-sighted, self-serving and corrupt in recent years. They don't care about anyone but themselves and are too detached. Action has to be taken now to address this threat.”

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Economy


Purchasing power of [nationals] will decline – foundation *FutureNow* releases new report



According to a new report by *FutureNow* purchasing power in [country] will decline in the coming years. A spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report:

“The common citizens in [country] need to be made aware of the fact that they will have less money to spend. So many people in [country] are working so hard everyday to have a good life. There is something profoundly wrong when these efforts do not pay off. Action has to be taken now to address this threat to the well-being of our people.”

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
Purchasing power will decline for [nationals] – foundation *FutureNow* blames politicians in new report



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


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


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“The common citizens in [country] need to be made aware of the fact that they will have less money to spend. So many people in [country] are working so hard everyday to have a good life. There is something profoundly wrong when these efforts do not pay off. It is obvious that the super-rich are to blame. They have been too egotistic, self-serving and corrupt in recent years and do not care about anyone but themselves. Action has to be taken now to address this threat to the well-being of our people.”

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


Economy
Purchasing power will decline for [nationals] – foundation FutureNow blames politicians and immigrants in new report

According to a new report by FutureNow purchasing power in [country] will decline in the coming years. A spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report:

“The common citizens in [country] need to be made aware of the fact that they will have less money to spend. So many people in [country] are working so hard everyday to have a good life. There is something profoundly wrong when these efforts do not pay off. It is obvious that politicians and migrants are to blame. Politicians have been too short-sighted, self-serving, and corrupt in recent years. Migrants are too demanding, they exploit our system and are hard to integrate. And still, politicians only take care of the migrants instead of our own people. Action has to be taken now to address this threat to the well-being of our people.”

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From left to right, top to bottom: (1) control, (2) control and anti-elites, (3) empty populism, (4) anti-elites populism, (5) anti-immigrants, (6) anti-wealthy, (7) right-wing complete populism, (8) left-wing complete populism

APPENDIX E

Contextual variables

Country	Immigration (number of immigrants in 2015)	Unemployment (percentage in 2016)	Right-wing populist success in last national election	Left-wing populist success in last national election
	<i>N</i>	%	%	%
Austria	166,323	5.0	20.51	0.00
France	363,869	9.9	0.35	0.00
Germany	1,543,848	5.0	4.70	0.00
Ireland	76,888	11.6	0.00	0.00
Israel	2,852	6.1	0.00	0.00
Italy	280,078	12.5	4.08	0.00
Netherlands	166,872	6.9	10.10	9.70
Poland	218,147	9.2	37.58	0.00
Spain	342,114	24.7	0.00	20.65
Portugal	29,896	14.2	0.00	0.00
Sweden	134,240	8.0	12.86	0.00
Switzerland	153,627	4.5	29.50	0.00
UK	631,452	6.3	1.80	0.00
Norway	60,816	3.4	22.90	0.00
Romania	132,795	7.0	1.18	0.00
Greece	64,446	26.3	0.00	35.46

Appendix Tables

Table A1. *Multilevel model of impact of people centrality and anti-elitism on political engagement*

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
Intercept	3.861 (0.135)***	3.886 (0.137)***	3.878 (0.137)***	3.953 (0.139)***
<i>Level 1 fixed effects:</i>				
People centrality		-0.034 (0.030)	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.136 (0.043)**
Anti-elite			0.017 (0.027)	-0.135 (0.052)**
People centrality * anti-elite				0.205 (0.061)***
<i>Random effects</i>				
Country-level variance	0.287 (0.103)	0.287 (0.103)	0.287 (0.103)	0.287 (0.102)
Individual-level variance	2.716 (0.031)	2.716 (0.031)	2.716 (0.031)	2.714 (0.031)
Intra-country correlation	0.096 (0.031)	0.096 (0.031)	0.096 (0.031)	0.096 (0.031)
Deviance	-29394.849	-29394.217	-29394.001	-29388.335
LR test				11.33(1)***

Note. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. $N = 15,302$ Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table A2. *Multilevel model testing the impact of complete populism on political engagement*

	Model I	Model II	Model III
Intercept	3.879 (0.138)***	3.894 (0.138)***	3.882 (0.138)***
<i>Level 1 fixed effects:</i>			
Anti-elite	0.070 (0.031)*	0.040 (0.038)	0.064 (0.038)
Immigrant blame	-0.232 (0.038)***	-0.276 (0.050)***	-0.232 (0.038)***
Rich blame	0.048 (0.038)	0.048 (0.038)	0.039 (0.050)
Anti-elite * immigrant blame		0.089 (0.065)	
Anti-elite * rich blame			0.018 (0.065)
<i>Random effects</i>			
Country-level variance	0.288 (0.103)	0.287 (0.103)	0.288 (0.103)
Individual-level variance	2.703 (0.031)	2.702 (0.031)	2.703 (0.031)
Intra-country correlation	0.096 (0.031)	0.096 (0.031)	0.096 (0.031)
Deviance	-29356.900	-29355.977	-29356.862
LR test		1.85(1) ^{ns}	0.08(1) ^{ns}

Note. Not shown: in all models we control for the two control conditions (reference category is condition 1 in table 1). Standard deviations in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. $N = 15,302$.

Table A3. *Multilevel model testing the moderating impact of level of unemployment*

	Model I	Model II	Model III
Intercept	3.882 (0.130)***	3.883 (0.130)***	3.919 (0.132)***
<i>Level 1 fixed effects:</i>			
Anti-elite	0.070 (0.031)*	0.071 (0.031)*	-0.002 (0.054)
Immigrant blame	-0.232 (0.038)***	-0.234 (0.038)***	-0.300 (0.053)***
Rich blame	0.048 (0.038)	0.047 (0.038)	0.005 (0.054)
Anti-elite * immigrant blame			0.133 (0.076)
Anti-elite * rich blame			0.084 (0.076)
<i>Level 2 fixed effects:</i>			
Unemployment	0.028 (0.019)	0.030 (0.020)	0.032 (0.020)
<i>Cross-level interactions:</i>			
Anti-elite * unemployment		0.007 (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)
Immigrant blame * unemployment		-0.015 (0.005)**	-0.024 (0.007)***
Rich blame* unemployment		-0.008 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.007)
Anti-elite * immigrant blame* unemployment			0.018 (0.010)
Anti-elite * rich blame * unemployment			0.000 (0.010)
<i>Random effects</i>			
Country-level variance	0.254 (0.091)	0.254 (0.091)	0.254 (0.091)
Individual-level variance	2.703 (0.031)	2.701 (0.031)	2.699 (0.031)
Intra-country correlation	0.086 (0.028)	0.086 (0.028)	0.086 (0.028)
Deviance	-29355.93	-29349.417	-29346.000
LR test		13.03(3)**	6.83(4) ^{ns}

Note. Not shown: in all models we control for the two control conditions (reference category is condition 1 in table 1). Standard deviations in parentheses. $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. $N = 15,302$.

Table A4. *Multilevel model testing the moderating impact of level of immigration*

	Model I	Model II	Model III
Intercept	3.877 (0.137)***	3.877 (0.137)***	3.913 (0.138)***
<i>Level 1 fixed effects:</i>			
Anti-elite	0.070 (0.031)*	0.070 (0.031)*	0.003 (0.054)
Immigrant blame	-0.232 (0.038)***	-0.232 (0.038)***	-0.297 (0.053)***
Rich blame	0.048 (0.038)	0.048 (0.038)	0.005 (0.053)
Anti-elite * Immigrant blame			0.131 (0.076)
Anti-elite * Rich blame			0.084 (0.076)
<i>Level 2 fixed effects:</i>			
Immigration	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
<i>Cross-level interactions:</i>			
Anti-elite * immigration		0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Immigrant blame * immigration		0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Rich blame * immigration		0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Anti-elite * immigrant blame * immigration			0.000 (0.000)
Anti-elite * rich blame* immigration			0.000 (0.000)
<i>Random effects</i>			
Country-level variance	0.283 (0.101)	0.283 (0.101)	0.283 (0.101)
Individual-level variance	2.703 (0.031)	2.702 (0.031)	2.702 (0.031)
Intra-country correlation	0.095 (0.031)	0.095 (0.031)	0.095 (0.031)
Deviance	-29356.782	-29355.721	-29354.072
LR test		2.12(3) ^{ns}	3.30(4) ^{ns}

Note. Not shown: in all models we control for the two control conditions (reference category is condition 1 in table 1). Standard deviations in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. $N = 15,302$.

Table A5. *Multilevel model testing the moderating impact of populist success*

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
Moderation by:		Right-wing	Right-wing	Left-wing	Left-wing
Intercept	3.876 (0.133)***	3.876 (0.133)***	3.912 (0.135)***	3.877 (0.133)***	3.913 (0.135)***
<i>Level 1 fixed effects:</i>					
Anti-elite	0.070 (0.031)*	0.070 (0.031)	-0.002 (0.054)	0.070 (0.031)*	-0.002 (0.054)
Immigrant blame	-0.232 (0.038)***	-0.232 (0.038)***	-0.296 (0.053)***	-0.234 (0.038)***	-0.300 (0.053)***
Rich blame	0.048 (0.038)	0.048 (0.038)	0.006 (0.054)	0.046 (0.038)	0.005 (0.054)
Anti-elite * immigrant blame			0.130 (0.076)		0.132 (0.076)
Anti-elite * rich blame			0.085 (0.076)		0.084 (0.076)
<i>Level 2 fixed effects:</i>					
Size right-wing populists (size rwp)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)
Size left-wing populists (size lwp)	0.003 (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)	0.005 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)
<i>Cross-level interactions:</i>					
Anti-elite * size populists		-0.006 (0.002)*	-0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Immigrant blame* size populists		0.005 (0.003)*	0.009 (0.004)*	-0.009 (0.003)**	-0.014 (0.005)**
Rich blame * size populists		0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.005)
Anti-elite * Immigrant blame * size populists			-0.008 (0.005)		0.011 (0.007)
Anti-elite * Rich blame * size populists			0.003 (0.005)		0.000 (0.007)

Random effects

Country-level variance	0.269 (0.096)	0.269 (0.096)	0.269 (0.096)	0.269 (0.096)	0.269 (0.096)
Individual-level variance	2.703 (0.031)	2.701 (0.031)	2.699 (0.031)	2.701 (0.031)	2.700 (0.031)
Intra-country correlation	0.090 (0.029)	0.091 (0.029)	0.091 (0.029)	0.090 (0.029)	0.090 (0.029)
Log likelihood	-29356.366	-29350.020	-29364.683	-29351.421	-29348.382
LR test		12.69(3)**	6.67(4) ^{ns}	9.89(3)*	6.08(4) ^{ns}

Note. Not shown: in all models we control for the two control conditions (reference category is condition 1 in table 1). Standard deviations in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. $N = 15,302$