

governance design, it is too strong to say that whenever the scope conditions are met there is an expectation that experimentalism will emerge. In some formulations Sabel and Zeitlin refer to ‘possibility’ or scope conditions (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010: 9), so as to indicate the probabilistic nature of the relationship between scope conditions and governance arrangements. As experimentalist arrangements are functionally appropriate under such conditions, they may therefore emerge. It should be noted, however, that there is no guarantee that they will.

The theoretical framework of experimentalist governance thus links difficult, challenging policy-making conditions to a particular governance architecture, in which the role of relevant non-state actors is both prominent and enduring. Under these scope conditions, ‘in which force is an ineffective instrument of policy’ (Keohane and Nye 2001 [1977]: 21), policy makers cannot successfully pursue a strictly hierarchal approach. Moreover, strong diversity within a polity – a policy-making condition that can be regarded as contributing both to strategic uncertainty and to polyarchy – can be expected to discourage policy-makers’ recourse to one-size-fits-all measures. Diversity, which indeed characterises many policy issues in the context of the EU and its 28 Member States, means that the effects of particular measures diverge across the polity, contributing to policy-makers’ uncertainty as to how to best achieve policy goals. Such divergence and related divergence in the effects of policy can moreover amplify the problem of polyarchy: having others impose a preferred solution from a fundamentally different perspective is arguably less attractive than when the situation is highly uniform and policy outcomes may thus be expected to be similar. Policy-makers facing such challenges may thus be inclined to work iteratively, or recursively, as the appropriateness of solutions cannot be fully determined *ex ante*. The recursive experimentalist governance alternative, with explicit respect for variations in local context and a logic of pursuing provisional and corrigible policy solutions is juxtaposed to more prescriptive and hierarchical policy-making in Table 1, as presented by Rangoni (2017: 5).

**Table 1.** Distinguishing between experimentalist and hierarchical policy-making.

Indicators	Experimentalist policy-making	Hierarchical policy-making
How far rule-making and revision is informed by comparative implementation experience	More	Less
How much non-governmental stakeholders are consulted	More	Less
How much scope for local discretion is granted	More	Less
To what extent monitoring focuses on comparative review rather than compliance enforcement	More	Less

Table 1 (Source: Rangoni 2017: 5)