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Contained mobility and the racialization of poverty in Europe: the Roma at the development–security nexus

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ABSTRACT

This paper starts from the observation that, since the collapse of eastern European state socialism, the Roma have become the subject and target of Europe-wide development programs and discourses, while, at the same time, they have been problematized in terms of social, public and national security. Due to the ways in which development and security have ambiguously come together in Europe’s recent history, I will argue that the living conditions of the poorest among the Roma have not only worsened, but also, and more fundamentally, the divide between Europe’s rich and poor has become seriously racialized and almost unbridgeable. I explain how the bio- and geopolitical conditions under which development and security have merged in Europe’s engagement with the Roma have led to a situation in which the official aim of Roma-related development programs – the improvement of their living conditions and life chances – tends to result in a dreadlock.

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Various scholars have argued that, when it comes to poverty and the conditions under which it can occur and be maintained, the boundaries between the Global South and the Global North have been radically blurred (Ferguson, 2006; Mezzadra, Reid, & Sammadar, 2013; Ong, 2006). Indeed, poverty and the conditions under which precarious life and labor are produced, maintained and reinforced have become an integral part of the Global North and the dynamics between the Global North and South. At the same time, others have argued that, due to the ways in which Western authorities, donors and international governing organizations (IGOs) approach the combatting of poverty through development, the situation of the global poor is not substantially changing, even worsening, particularly along the lines of an increasing division between the Global North and South that is partially based on discriminatory border regimes developed in the West (for the latter, see De Genova & Peutz, 2010; Jansen, de Bloois, & Celikates, 2015; New Keywords Collective, 2016; van Houtum, 2010).

Escobar (1995), for instance, has argued that postcolonial discourses and practices of development have contributed to the constructing of the ‘Third World’ and to the
maintaining of the conditions of its dependency on the ‘First World’. Pogge (2010) has claimed that affluent states in the Global North have knowingly contributed to the maintenance of poverty, oppression and political and economic inequalities on a massive scale. Duffield (2010) has explored how the merging of security and development in governmentalizing approaches to poverty in and migration from the Global South has led to a radical life chances divide between the Global North and South.

Much less attention has been paid, though, to the ways in which practices of development and security articulated within the contested borders of post-1989 Europe have impacted on those who have become the target of ‘intra-European’ development programs, on Romani minorities particularly. I will argue that, due to the ways in which they have become the targets of discourses and practices of development and security, the viability of development programs has been seriously endangered, and poverty in Europe has been considerably racialized, resulting in a state of affairs that dramatically impacts on the prospects for Roma to escape poverty and societal isolation.

I will explain how, since the 1990s, the Roma have become the target of development and security practices and discourses, and how development and security have increasingly been merged in national and international governmental commitments to Europe’s Roma. I will clarify that we cannot consider ‘development’ and ‘security’ as historical terms, because practices thereof and their interrelationships have significantly changed over time. Partially as a consequence of neoliberal practices of governing and how they are assembled with other governmental practices, we have seen a ‘biopolitical turn’ in the ways in which Roma-related development programs are articulated in Europe. Increasingly, policy discourses conceive and perceive development ‘in terms of how life is to be supported and maintained, and how people are expected to live, rather than according to economic and state-based models’ (Duffield, 2010, p. 53). Consequently, ‘developmentalities’ regarding the Roma tend to socially isolate particularly the poorest among them and contribute more to governing their poverty than to improving their living circumstances.

I will connect my reflections on development with the often-degrading ways in which Romani minorities have been treated domestically in Europe and with how central and eastern European Romani migrants have been approached in western Europe. Due to the Roma’s securitization and the ways in which they are faced with states of ‘deportability’ (De Genova, 2002) and ‘evictability’ (van Baar, 2017a), they are subjected to regimes of forced mobility and immobility. While practices of deportation and deportability have led to their forced mobility and contained circulation at the European level, practices of racialized ghettoization due to eviction and durable segregation have resulted in situations that come close to forced immobility.

I will argue that the combination of practices of biopolitical development with the Roma’s geopolitical separation tends to result in a racialization of poverty in Europe. This tendency implies neither that Europe’s poor are always Roma, nor that all Roma are poor, but that they have become structurally overrepresented among the poor. The biopolitical and geopolitical conditions under which development and security have merged have led to a situation in which the official aim of Roma-related development programs – improving their living conditions and life chances – tends to result in its opposite and exacerbates a significantly racialized divide between Europe’s rich and poor.
In an early human rights report written about the Roma’s postsocialist situation, a Bulgarian Rom told a reporter: ‘Your visit here was the first time someone showed an interest in our problems’ (Helsinki Watch, 1991, p. 1). These first post-1989 years would become formative of how the Roma would become problematized in the Foucauldian sense and of how the interest in them would take shape at the international level. After 1989, human rights organizations and transnational activist networks played a vital role in representing the situation of the Roma as a ‘human emergency’ and in bringing them onto Europe’s agendas (Ram, 2010; van Baar, 2011b). One of the cornerstones of the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union (EU) would be ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ (European Council, 1993, p. 13). In its annual reports on the progress made toward accession of the central and eastern European candidate countries, as well as in its 2004 report on the Roma’s situation in the then enlarged EU, the European Commission (2002, 2004) concluded that the situation of these states’ Roma was alarming; that their rights continued to be violated; that discrimination against them remained widespread and that the policy attempts at the Roma’s ‘inclusion’ had largely ‘failed’.

The arrangement of nationally and internationally organized non-governmental and governmental attention to the Roma has led to a historically novel kind of ‘institutional developmentalism’ within Europe’s contested borders. The Roma would become the focus of an endeavor in which the development of generic political, social and economic institutions and infrastructures – from parliamentary democracy, rule of law, human rights and minority protection to accessible public services and a market economy – had to lead to the protection of the Roma’s rights and to their inclusion in Europe’s societies.

This institutional developmentalism is integral part of what I have called ‘the Europeanization of Roma representation’ (van Baar, 2011a, pp. 1–19, 153–189), that is, firstly, the post-1989 problematization of the Roma in terms of their ‘Europeanness’; secondly, the classification of heterogeneous groups scattered over Europe under the umbrella term ‘Roma’ and, thirdly, the devising of Europe-wide programs dedicated to their inclusion, integration, development, rights, empowerment and participation. Historically, those who are called, or call themselves, ‘Roma’ have often been considered a ‘non-European’ minority, with origins outside of Europe, ‘dangerous’ for ‘progress’ and ‘civilization’ in Europe. Yet, since the 1990s, the Roma have been reclassified as a ‘European minority’ to be respected and included as ‘true Europeans’.

These emerging development interests in Roma issues have intermingled with the ways in which Europe has redefined itself politically, both ‘internally’ and globally, after the collapse of socialism. I have shown (van Baar, 2011a, pp. 174–184) that the initial post-1989 optimism regarding the prospects for reunifying Europe’s eastern and western parts quickly made place for deep concerns. One of these was westward migration from postsocialist states. These concerns had two dimensions. Firstly, the ways in which central and eastern Europe’s transitions have reinvigorated migration have resulted in the merging of novel European security and development discourses and programs, and in problematizing postsocialist states as ‘migration-producing countries’ that endanger Europe’s security. The High Commissioner on National Minorities, in 1993 a newly installed body within the forerunner of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), formulated this merging, and its impact on Roma-related issues, as follows:

The aim … should be to improve the ‘quality of life’ in migration-producing countries [sic] … for the sake of such improvements, but also for the reduction in pressures on international migration. In addition to commerce, investment and development assistance leading to economic opportunity, efforts at addressing the specific problems of the Roma, including discrimination and violence against them, will contribute considerably to improving their ‘quality of life.’ Such efforts are likely to encourage people to continue their lives where they already are. (van der Stoel, 1993, p. 11, emphasis added)

As Guglielmo and Waters (2005, p. 768) observe, the rationale behind this approach was not primarily conflict prevention – which is the OSCE’s official main aim – but, rather, migration prevention. They also explain that

there were competing visions within European institutions as to whether the problems of Roma were a security issue, a social issue or a rights issue, or indeed what the proper relationship between security, socioeconomic reform and rights is for policy addressing marginalized groups. (2005, p. 769)

Yet, even while there has been dissensus among the various actors about the way in which the Roma are to be problematized, in these actors’ commitment to Roma-related issues, security and development have increasingly been merged.

This merging strongly relates to a second dimension of the concerns regarding migration of Roma. While the EC reports on the progress of candidate states toward EU accession were in agreement about their classification of the Roma’s situation in central and eastern Europe as deeply worrying, when Roma migrated to Western Europe to ask for asylum, their claims were nevertheless and almost unconditionally rejected. The securitization of the Roma prior to the 2004 EU enlargement was not incidental, but, increasingly, central to how the ‘old’ EU states dealt with Roma since the beginning of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and since the intensifying securitization of EU migration and border policies more generally (van Baar, 2011a, 2015a). Yet, to comprehend the impact of the merging of development and security on the Roma, we need to write the history of the present from the angle of how discourses and practices of security and development have considerably changed since 1989.

Reproblematizing security and development in Europe

The changing policy approaches to both security and development, and the reflection upon them in simultaneously reshaping security and development studies, have had much to do with shifting understandings of conflicts and the causes behind them (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, Escobar, 1995). Duffield (2001, 2007) suggests that we need to historicize our understandings of security, development and their nexus, and to interrogate the rationales behind the post-Cold War emergence of discourses and practices of, most notably, ‘human security’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘human development’. He observes that, while conflicts in the Global South between the 1950s and 1980s were primarily explained in terms of conflicts between different national (mostly postcolonial) states, since the 1980s, they have increasingly been portrayed as conflicts between ethnicized, religionized, culturalized or otherwise minoritized and majoritized groups. A shift
has taken place according to which security has no longer only, or primarily, been related to ‘national’, state-related security, but also, and increasingly, to a people-centered kind of security, often conceptualized as ‘human security’. In development studies and correlated literatures, the advent of ‘human security’ is frequently considered as the consequence of a blossoming humanism within international relations and organizations that would increasingly take into account internationally recognized human rights norms, acknowledge the role of individuals and communities in safeguarding their own security, and include threats to human life such as poverty, displacement and diseases.

This shift of the central focus related to prioritizing the security of people, rather than states, and, thus, to a broadening of security to incorporate society, has led to a similar change in approaches to development:

[In this domain, we have seen] a move away from an earlier dominance of state-led modernization strategies based on the primacy of economic growth and assumptions that the underdeveloped world would, after passing through various stages, eventually resemble the developed. Rather than economic growth per se, a broader approach to development emerged based on aggregate improvements in health, education, employment and social inclusion as an essential precursor for the realization of market opportunity. (Duffield & Waddell, 2006, p. 44)

The postcolonial idea of the 1960s and 1970s that the development of the ‘Third World’ had to be based on the improvement of individual national economies that would be gradually incorporated into the ‘developed’ world economy has largely made place for the neoliberal idea that societies must be developed and ‘defended’ and that, accordingly, ‘dangerous underdevelopment’, based on inter-ethnic, inter-cultural or inter-religious group conflicts, has to be combatted.

The logic behind this change of approach to concentrating on the relationships between conflict, security and development, argues Duffield (2007, pp. 4–8), has also been key to the emergence of ‘liberal interventionism’, that is the legitimization of intervention in areas and populations qualified as ‘underdeveloped’ on the basis of the alleged necessity to improve life and living circumstances; to develop and empower communities; to create and improve ‘capacities’ and social capital; to reduce the risk that poverty will result into ‘destabilizing’ conflict and migration; and to govern through ethnicized, religio-nized or culturalized communities, and through civil societies generally. These approaches to security and development, and the justification of various interventions aimed at ‘getting the social relations right’ can also be traced within EU development approaches that have emerged since the mid-1990s:

[Development instruments now need to take into account] their potential for balancing the interests and opportunities of different identity groups within a state, for encouraging democratic governments that enjoy widespread legitimacy among the population, for fostering consensus on key national issues … and for building mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interest. (European Commission, 1996, p. 4)

The intermingling of security and development, and the legitimization of humanitarian, military and developmental interventions, have been debated in the contexts of development and the ‘new wars’ in the Global South or in those of ‘(post-)conflict resolution’ in, for instance, successor states of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Duffield, 2001, 2007; Fassin & Pandolfi, 2010). Yet, these changes have been underresearched in the case of Europe’s
Roma, which could be considered as Europe’s largest post-1989 development project carried out within its territorialized borders and enacted by diverse actors.

Here, we have seen a double movement that epitomizes the blurred boundaries between the Global North and South. While institutions such as the EU have internalized formerly largely externalized development programs, IGOs such as the World Bank and the United Nations, which traditionally focused on the Global South, have ‘discovered’ the ‘developing world segments of … European societies [that] are predominantly made up of Roma’ (UNDP, 2002, p. 21). What is at stake here can be conceived as a contemporary, postcolonial form of what Foucault (2004, p. 103) called the ‘boomerang effect’. This designates the process in which ‘a whole series of colonial models [of governing] was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself’ (Foucault, 2004). Similarly, in the Roma case, a series of postcolonial models, discourses, technologies and practices of development that have been ambiguously enacted in postcolonial settings in the Global South – ranging from social capital building to governing through communities, civil societies and participation – have been ‘brought back’ to Europe to be articulated transnationally to deal with the Roma (van Baar, 2011a).

After 1989, the Roma came not only into view of IGOs because, from then on, they were considered ‘as representing a security issue’ (Kovats, 2001, p. 95) or, for that matter, a development issue, but also because new notions and practices of development and security, and of their intersections, have emerged (van Baar, 2011a, pp. 153–189, 233–269). Newly developed discourses and practices of ‘human security’ and ‘human development’ represent a biopolitical fusion of development and security by perceiving human beings – who are considered as ‘not well able’ to guarantee their own ‘basic needs’ – in terms of underdevelopment, and hence, a security concern (Chandler, 2013; Duffield, 2007). Governmental interventions are portrayed as necessary to secure their well-being and to reduce the possibly negative effects on the wider human and political communities to which the poor belong, but also to enable them to adapt and become resilient to external pressures and threats. If we view ‘human security’ less from the quasi-positivist humanistic angle that still dominates in development studies and the social inclusion agenda for Europe’s Roma, and rather from the standpoint of how it embodies a governmentalizing technology, we can interrogate it more critically:

Similar to sustainable development, with which it is related, as a concept human security is able to bridge divisions, blur established interests and bring together erstwhile separate sectors and actors. Being able to enmesh, order and coordinate different loci of power, human security is an important governmentalizing technology … While security and development have always been interconnected, human security reflects the contemporary reworking of this relationship. In particular, it unites these terms on an international terrain of non-insured groups, communities and peoples. (Duffield, 2007, pp. 113–114)

The various elements discussed here – the focus on intra-state conflicts between ethnocized, religionized or culturalized groups; the adoption of human security or human development notions guaranteeing ‘basic needs’ and ‘capacities’; and the legitimization of development interventions – have coalesced in the approaches to the Roma of numerous intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, including the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe (COE), the Open Society Institute (OSI), the World Bank and UN agencies.
For two decades now, the discourses of these transnational agencies have articulated a will to turn the tide for Europe’s Roma (van Baar, 2011a). In the reports of IGOs, the mentioning of attempts at ‘improving’ the Roma’s living circumstances is omnipresent, even though the notion of ‘improving’ rarely refers to concrete ‘improvements’ in the present, but rather to that which is desired and anticipated in the future. The stated aim is ‘to close the gap between Roma and non-Roma in access to education, employment, healthcare and housing’ (European Commission, 2014, p. 1) or to mobilize programs ‘aimed at improving the situation of Roma and at closing any gaps between Roma and the general population’ (FRA, 2014, p. 7).

The metaphors of gaps, traps, vicious circles and bridges have become integral parts of the development discourses of these IGOs. The first large regional reports about the Roma of the UNDP (2002) and the World Bank (2005), for instance, were respectively called Avoiding the dependency trap and Breaking the poverty circle, and the ways in which such traps should be avoided and circles broken have often been symbolized through the metaphor of bridges and the institutionalization of bridging ‘mediators’ in the domains of health care, schooling, policing and community or labor market interventions (epitomized by the 2011 launched and EU/COE-funded ROMED initiative, which is dedicated to ‘Roma mediation’ in each of these domains).

The rationale of these discourses is that, through the development programs and techniques that have been, or have to be, devised – whether focusing on social inclusion, capacity building, human security, participation, empowerment, community development or policing – the Roma will become less dependent, less vulnerable, less poor, less isolated and more ‘capable’ to become full members of the societies in which they live and to exercise their citizenship better than is presently the case.

I refer to this institutionalized will to improve the Roma’s situation as a post-socialist ‘institutional developmentalism’ because, technically similar to the modernist (postcolonial) developmentalism spanning the 1950s to the 1970s, these discourses suggest that, after passing through various stages that are put on a continuum, the currently ‘underdeveloped’ Roma will gradually join in with ‘developed’ majorities. Several of the main development programs of the EU, the World Bank and OSI – such as the ‘Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015’ and the ‘EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020’ (European Commission, 2011) – are based on this developmentalist logic and ‘enlightened’ way of thinking that, in a foreseeable future, imagines the ‘inclusion’ of the Roma in Europe.

Yet, this rationale contrasts with the ways in which many Roma-related development programs have been articulated on the ground. The neoliberalization of development has resulted in a strong biopoliticization of development (van Baar, 2011a). Consistent with the biopolitical dimensions of development discourses and programs, a people-centred, human development and human security approach to the situation of the Roma concentrates, most notably, on material as well as spiritual self-reliance at individual and communal levels; local, community-based forms of development; ‘active’ citizenship including socioeconomic and sociopsychic activation; community and capacity building; awareness raising; human and social capital formation; stimulating ‘desired’ ways of living; and guaranteeing ‘basic needs’ such as sanctuary and rudimentary infrastructures. These diverse programs center on the biopolitical conditions that would have to be fulfilled to improve the Roma’s circumstances and increase their ‘capabilities’. The
bio-politicization of Roma-related development programs does not necessarily mean that, ‘on paper’, these programs have always been problematized along these lines, but, rather, that this biopolitics has been articulated through and in the concrete everyday ways in which these programs have been assembled with ‘local’ cultures, conditions and traditions of governance (van Baar, 2011a, 2012).

However, these biopolitical practices of neoliberal development, and how they have been merged with security, are no longer based on practicing development along the lines of a developmental continuum according to which the ‘underdeveloped’ Roma can gradually join in with their ‘developed’ fellow citizens. Rather, the biopolitics of development has largely departed from the diagram of a gradual scale between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and introduced that of a fault line between ‘their’ lives and ‘ours’. The manifestation of this discontinuity relies not only on a biopolitical view of development, but also on how present-day biopolitical practices of development have been coupled with geopolitical barriers put up for Roma at the local and transnational European level.

**Contained mobility and the geopolitics of Europe’s securitized borders**

As I have suggested above, the securitization of Roma prior to the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 was central to how they, and particularly the migrants among them, were treated in EU member states. I have also explained how the rationale of the ‘developmentalities’ toward the central and eastern European Roma has been considerably based on migration prevention. These securitizing moves regarding migration, though, have not been limited to discursive framings and rationalities of European minority governance. Rather, and contrary to the EU’s prevailing self-image, they have been fully incorporated in the EU’s architecture and its technologies of supranational governance. The Europeanization and securitization of migration and border policies in post-1992 Europe can be considered as a spillover effect of European economic integration, and particularly of the development of the EU’s internal market (Huysmans, 2006). The largely economically inspired incorporation of the Schengen Treaty into the EU system in the 1990s and the ‘removal’ of the EU’s internal borders have engendered a cycle of transformations in which policies of migration, transnational crime, trafficking and terrorism have been conjointly communitarized, that is brought under the EU’s supranational ‘Community method’.

At this institutionalized nexus of freedom and security, desired forms of the circulation of persons, capital, goods and services, such as those that are usually associated with business, tourism, student exchanges and high-skilled migration, are ambiguously distinguished from unwelcome and undesirable forms of circulation that would endanger the proper functioning of the EU’s internal market and its interdependent freedom of movement. Not only transnational crime, terrorism and trafficking have been classified among these ‘dangerous’ forms of circulation, but also irregularized migration including that of the global poor (Duffield, 2007; Jansen et al., 2015; New Keywords Collective, 2016). This distinction has been articulated ‘ambiguously’, because, through these policy transformations, the EU has brought its approach to migration together with the combatting of transnational crime, shadow economies, trafficking and terrorism. Migration policies have been directly linked with the EU’s reshaped security policies and, thus, with a strong trend to irregularize migration as a (potentially) destabilizing phenomenon – a tendency that has only become more explicit with the deepening of Europe’s
‘migration/refugee crisis’ (New Keywords Collective, 2016). We can consider this problematization of migration in terms of security as a direct form of securitization, institutionally propagated at the EU level, and emerging next to several indirect, mostly social and cultural forms of securitization (see Huysmans, 2006; van Baar, 2017a). These types of securitization have strongly intermingled with national and subnational ones in which various actors have been involved, ranging from state-related actors such as politicians, policymakers, the police and other security experts to the media, ‘vigilant’ citizen groups, populists and extremists.

 Particularly since 2010, when the expulsion of Romani migrants from France was widely mediatized, scholars have discussed the treatment of Roma from the angle of securitization and noted how they have been problematized in terms of alleged threats to public order, public health, social security systems and national security (Aradau, 2015; Parker, 2012; van Baar, 2011b). The securitizing trends toward the Roma – toward both migrants and domestic minorities – are part of a wider trend to irregularize their statuses as citizen, migrant, asylum seeker or refugee. Through traversing practices and strategies of orientalization, securitization and nomadization, the Roma have been problematized as ‘backward’ and ‘inferior’, as ‘criminal’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘treacherous’, as ‘drifting parasites’ and ‘willful wanderers’ and, thus, as irregular in the diverse meanings associated with deviating from what has been rendered ‘normal’, ‘natural’ and ‘regular’ (van Baar, 2015b). These problematizations have normalized rigid and racializing measures against the Roma, ranging from eviction, ethnic profiling and heightened surveillance to confiscation and demolition of their properties, deportation and school and residential segregation.

 Since the collapse of state socialism, and largely due to these racializing processes of irregularization, we have seen increased and radical efforts to control and steer the ability of both poor domestic Roma and Romani migrants to circulate at local, regional, national and transnational levels in Europe (see also Kóczé, 2017). Processes of irregularization have become an integral part of the current movement to legitimize treating Roma differently to other EU citizens; to relegate them to substandard, segregated or provisional housing, education, health care and, in the most extreme, increasingly normalized cases, to evict them from their houses or sites and expel them from countries (van Baar, 2011b, 2015a).

 The formation of conditions of deportability (De Genova, 2002) and evictability (van Baar, 2017a) – the lived experiences and predicaments under which the forcible removal of persons from the state, or from a sheltering place more generally, can materialize in the first place – have become vital to the political economy of international migration management and its intersections with the development–security nexus. While practices of deportation have led to the forced mobility of Roma and to their contained circulation at European level, those of racialized ghettoization due to eviction and enduring segregation have resulted in situations that come close to their forced immobility and restricted ‘production of locality’ (Appadurai, 1996). The fact that many European citizens have begun considering these rigid, often illegal measures as ‘normal’ (FRA, 2009) demonstrates the ‘successfulness’ of securitization and the depoliticization of how socioeconomic and migrant mobilities of Roma are approached. Their displacement tends to be considered to be apolitical and technocratic in nature, and as a ‘reasonable’ prerequisite for enforcing social and public order (van Baar, 2014).
Several migration and border scholars have argued that contemporary border regimes have notably contributed to the blurring of the boundaries between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, a development that has gone together with processes of selective and racializing filtering of labor mobilities (De Genova, 2002; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2012). Rather than assuming that a society can only claim its totality through exclusion, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson have argued that the position of irregularized migrants could be more adequately discussed in terms of ‘differential inclusion’. Indeed, at the contested boundaries between the Global North and South we have seen:

a legal production of illegality and a corresponding process of migrant inclusion through illegalization that creates the conditions under which a racial divide is inscribed within the composition of labor and citizenship. From this perspective, the devices and practices of border reinforcing shape the conditions under which border crossing is possible and actually practiced and experienced… [T]he concept of differential inclusion points to a substitution of the binary distinction between inclusion and exclusion with continuous parametric modulations – that is, processes of filtering and selecting that refer to multiple and shifting scales, ratings and evaluations. (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2012, pp. 67–68)

The logic of differential inclusion corresponds to the one that I attribute to the Europeanization of Roma representation: we have seen an ambiguous shift from considering the Roma as the externalized outsiders against which Europe defined itself to representing them, since 1989, as the internalized outsiders to be included as productive, participating and ‘true’ Europeans (van Baar, 2011a). Mechanisms of differential inclusion have not been at odds with socialist or welfarist approaches to the Roma and their labor market position. Yet, while pre-1989 regimes of differential inclusion – for instance, the nomadization of the Roma – were used to regulate East and West European Romani minorities domestically, since 1989 they have been mobilized to manage newly emerged, transnational forms of labor and migration of Roma within Europe’s contested borders (van Baar, 2011b).

In the context of development programs in the Global South, Duffield (2010) has argued that, due to these programs’ focus on self-reliance and biopolitical forms of development that do not substantially contribute to durable ways out of poverty but to the maintenance of a precarious status quo, development at its nexus with security tends to result in the ambiguous containment of underdevelopment and in the permanent emergency of self-reliance. Indeed, since the self-reliance that these programs promote tends to lead to various types of delicate, temporary repair networks, they constantly need to be propelled again and legitimized as such. What I have called ‘the perpetual mobile machine of forced mobility’ (van Baar, 2015a) – regarding both migrant and socio-economic mobility – points to a similar mechanism in relation to the present-day position of (particularly eastern and central European) Roma. This machine ‘drains’ labor from Roma and the ways, in and through this machine, in which development and security have been merged tend to perpetuate the Roma’s precarious situation and to depoliticize the currently reinforced states of evictability, deportability and precarity. Seen from the angle of differential inclusion, both eviction and deportation, as well as their spatial counterparts of encampment and ghettoization, are ‘technologies of citizenship’ (Walters, 2010) which, in the Roma’s case, tend to regulate their mobility, societal belonging and difference racially and spatially.

Roma-related development programs, seen as technologies of security in the sense of containing underdevelopment, unceasingly intersect with mechanisms of expulsion and
marginalization, understood as technologies of citizenship in the sense of regulating mobility, belonging and difference differentially. As remarked, this intermingling is not something that is automatically or intentionally inherent in how development and human security-oriented programs have been devised, but, usually, becomes manifest only at the moments of assembling them with ‘local’ cultures, conditions and traditions of governance. I would like to delineate how this process of merging works in practice by exploring the case of Roma in Eastern Slovakia.

Many Slovak Roma live in radically segregated rural enclaves and urban ghettos. Most have been involved in development programs, which focus on community development through social work and community centers, which are indirectly, through NGOs and national governments, funded by IGOs. One of the largest, long-term involved development NGOs is ETP, which describes its work as follows:

ETP Slovakia engages the most motivated Roma in the construction of new homes, thereby improving their work habits, teaching construction skills and, as a result, helping them secure and retain full time jobs. In addition to this livelihood development, ETP Slovakia operates a network of family support community centers … which involves the entire Roma family in accessing savings and micro-loan programs, legal, and social services. In addition, we provide pre-school clubs, dropout prevention programs, parental courses, and mentoring for teenagers as well as a wide variety of social and cultural activities for the entire community through the community centers.4

As this profile illustrates, Roma-related development takes families, communities, livelihood systems and social networks and, thus, life or population, as its main points of reference, and not the state. To a considerable extent, these human security and development projects aim at strengthening community-based self-reliance through helping to meet ‘basic needs’,5 even while these programs support Roma to find their ways vis-à-vis public services (see also van Baar, 2011a, pp. 249–253).

These practices take place in a societal environment of severe civil and institutional hostility, Romaphobia and ‘reasonable anti-Gypsyism’ (van Baar, 2014), in which the Roma’s securitization is omnipresent. In Slovakia, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, the Roma are allegedly involved in a constant conflict with their non-Roma fellows, for the shadow economies in which several Roma are engaged, the benefits on which many of them rely, and the demographic boom that they would cause, are often considered as proofs that they are threats to the overall functioning of the state. Moreover, the ways in which nationally and internationally supported programs to ‘activate’ the Roma (e.g. through active labor market policies) have been enacted locally in Eastern Slovakia have led to serious forms of their exploitation and dehumanization. In the presence of societal hostility and in the absence of both jobs and adequate training programs, the public works and other activation activities in which many Roma have been involved in order to get conditional access to social benefits, have been used by private and public employers to organize cheap labor forces. While some companies have first fired Roma and then reemployed them through activation arrangements that offer them 60% of the minimum wage, municipalities have frequently mobilized activation schemes to let Roma do largely superfluous work and, therefore, perform well-known Gypsy stereotypes publicly (van Baar, 2012). One mayor whom I met in 2015 and who was aware of the drawbacks of activation work, nevertheless mobilized it because he considered it as a tool to demonstrate to non-Roma that, at least, the Roma show their willingness to work.
The persistent logic of this, what Barker (1981) once called, ‘new racism’ is ‘for ordinary people to hold genuine fears that their sense of identity, security or welfare is threatened for social order to be at risk’ (Duffield, 2007, p. 200, his emphasis). This racial discourse has turned out to be ‘reasonable’ and, thus, acceptable for ‘you do not even need to dislike or blame those who are so different from you in order to say that the presence of these aliens constitutes a threat to your way of life’ (Barker, 1981, p. 18).

In this context, in which development has been considerably biopoliticized and the Roma’s marginalization legitimised through securitization and ‘reasonable’ anti-Gypsyism, development has become the equivalent of ‘repair packages’ that, because they can hardly become sustainable, involve ‘a regime of international social protection of last resort’ (Duffield, 2007, p. 18) that requires its permanent reenactment.

My local and more general observations do not imply that the role of activism within the heterogeneous Romani movement and that of social and community work are of no value or have only negligible impact. Social and community workers, including those associated with non-governmental and faith-based organizations, often make a difference at the local level, as intermediaries between individuals, families and communities and within areas such as health care, education, faith, rights and access to social services, justice and relief (Škobla, Grill, & Hurrle, 2016). Furthermore, movement actors have played a key role in attempts at contesting present-day security, development, migration and citizenship regimes (van Baar, 2011a, 2015b, 2017b). Through ‘travelling activism’ (van Baar, 2011a), they try to re-politicize those Roma problematizations and societal mechanisms that seriously hinder the improvement of the Roma’s situation or maintain anti-Roma racisms. These actors have mobilized the Europeanization of Roma representation to claim, for instance, (the right to) rights; seats in diverse political bodies; decision-making power more generally; a place in national and European histories and memories, and also their incorporation into the study of exclusion from which they have usually been excluded. Often, these actors and networks mobilize newly developed initiatives of participatory governance to try to turn ‘problem spaces’ – in which the Roma are one-sidedly considered as ‘problem groups’ or depoliticized subjects of development – into what Honig (1996) calls ‘dilemmatic spaces’. These spaces offer no ready-made solutions to problems of securitization, development and differential inclusion, but make conflict, contradiction and the impact of processes such as securitization visible and audible, and, thus, public and open to dispute and deliberation (van Baar, 2011a, pp. 248–267).

My reflections do not suggest that the complex infrastructures of current migration, citizenship, security or development regimes, and those developed by Roma themselves, have not been mobilized to challenge, dispute or reverse the objectives for which these regimes and their mechanisms have ‘officially’ been launched (Solimene, 2017). I have extensively argued that ‘counter-conducts’ – practices that challenge dominant power relations – appear within, rather than outside, the horizon of prevailing governmentalities (van Baar, 2011a). Practices of contestation become manifest during, rather than only after or external to, articulations of all kinds of governmentalizing interventions: ‘Relations of contest or struggle … are constitutive of government, rather than simply a source of programmatic failure and (later) redesign’ (O’Malley, Weir, & Shearing, 1997, p. 505).

At the same time, the diverse struggles of the actors within, across and outside more formal Romani social, civil and religious movements have taken place within, rather
than outside, the context of far-reaching processes of neoliberalization and the ways in which these have been assembled with local and national cultures, conditions and legacies of governance. Consequently, even though Roma have found ways to challenge, negotiate and circumvent the ways in which they have become the targets of ambiguous security and development regimes, they and their allies have simultaneously been faced with immense difficulties to dispute the persistent trend toward racializing poverty in Europe (van Baar, 2011a, pp. 233–269).

Bridging contained mobility and biopoliticized development

Several bilateral and European agreements have made developmental aid and programs for countries in the Global South conditional on their willingness to support the ‘repatriation’ of irregularized persons that migrated from these countries to Europe. Through this outsourcing of migration and border policies to countries in the EU’s vicinity, the EU and its members have managed to include new technologies of intervention in these countries (Duffield, 2007; Jansen et al., 2015; van Houtum, 2010).

This mechanism has not remained limited to the Global South, but has been extended to states at Europe’s contested borders, such as Romania, Bulgaria and the successor states of Yugoslavia. In 2012, for instance, the French and Romanian governments signed a deal that has facilitated the ‘implementation … of 80 concrete projects aimed at the reintegration of returnees from France’ (quoted in ERRC, 2012a), particularly Romanian Roma. Another example relates to the 2010 deal between the German and Kosovo governments in which they agreed upon the ‘repatriation’ of 14,000 persons to Kosovo, among whom some 10,000 were Kosovo Roma and their children, most of whom have grown up in Germany. The majority of these Roma asked for asylum in Germany in the 1990s during the Yugoslav wars. They were ‘tolerated’ on the basis of a questionable legal act, the so-called Duldung arrangement, that temporarily suspends their deportation and legally enacts a permanent state of deportability (van Baar, 2017b).

Simultaneously, several German states have started the ‘Kosovo Return Project URA 2’ or, shortly, ‘URA’, which means ‘bridge’ in Albanian:

In order to support … the reintegration of people returning home, German authorities … have got together in the ‘URA 2’ project to make their specific contribution towards a successful and sustainable return management in the Republic of Kosovo. (BAMF, 2015, p. 2)

The addition of the word ‘management’ to ‘return’ seems to indicate that the management of the deportation policies, rather than the return itself, has to become ‘successful and sustainable’. URA’s rationale is to create the conditions to ‘encourage voluntary return’ and to focus on the returnees’ ‘real needs’ (Roma Center, 2014, p. 38), which include support for reintegration; social counseling; psychological care; psycho-therapeutic advice; help with administrative formalities, medical care, and school attendance of children; grants for promising business plans, and ‘costs for furnishings of up to €600 for voluntary returnees and of up to €300 for forced returnees’ (BAMF, 2015, p. 2). Yet, several organizations have documented that the reality of how URA 2 has been mobilized on the ground has been grim, particularly regarding Romani ‘returnees’ (ERRC, 2012b; Roma Center, 2014; UNICEF, 2012). Not only has the situation of Roma in postwar Kosovo been dramatic; the care for the deported Roma has also been minimal.
If we compare the illegal, yet officially sentenced deportation of Roma from Belgium in 1999, firstly, with the post-2007 illegal, though tolerated and still ongoing deportation of Roma from France and, secondly, with the fully legalized expulsion of Roma from Germany of the present decade, we can observe a non-linear, disturbing trend in which the ‘legal production of illegality’ (De Genova, 2002) has been strikingly normalized and incorporated in the present-day nexus of security and development regarding Europe’s Roma.

Here as in the general situation that I have described, we deal no longer with ‘modernizing or industrializing state[s] concerned with reducing the wealth gap between the developed and underdeveloped worlds’ but, rather, with human security states ‘tasked with containing population and reducing global circulation of non-insured peoples through promoting the developmental technologies of self-reliance’ (Duffield, 2007, p. 123). The official philosophy of Roma-related development projects starts from the premise that ‘they’ can gradually become like ‘us’ and, thus, that ‘they’ are primarily on the same socioeconomic ladder as ‘we’ are; ‘they’ simply require the support of development projects in order to climb higher. Nonetheless, the ways in which the biopolitics of development intersects with the intra-European geopolitical conditions of contained mobility have resulted in a situation in which, for the poorest among the Roma, it has become increasingly more difficult to escape poverty and societal isolation. Thus, despite the metaphors of bridges and bridgeable gaps, the ways in which the Roma have become the subject of both institutionalized development and security have led to a largely unbridgeable, significantly racialized divide between Europe’s rich and poor.

Notes

1. A Foucauldian (1997) analysis of problematization does not focus on the construction of a phenomenon or group as a ‘problem’ that has a more or less clear (policy) solution. Instead, problematization can be described as ‘the set of discursive and non-discursive tools and practices through which something has been shaped in a thinkable and pliable form and actively constituted as an object of expertise and knowledge’ (van Baar, 2011a, p. 12).

2. Elsewhere, I have discussed the Foucauldian notion of diagram (van Baar, 2011a, p. 36–39).

3. For an elaborated discussion of this theme, see Bigo (2008), Huysmans (2006) and van Baar (2015a, 2017a).


5. The definition of these ‘basic needs’ might differ from case to case. For a discussion of the problems related to defining basic needs, see van Baar (2011a, p. 244–247).

6. The notorious case of illegally deported Slovak Roma from Belgium and the subsequent trial against the Belgian state have been well documented (Cahn & Vermeersch, 2000).

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