The Law of Arms Control: International Supervision and Enforcement

den Dekker, G.R.

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Table of contents

Acknowledgements v
Table of contents vii
List of abbreviations xvi

Chapter 1 - General introduction to the study

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
AND PROBLEMS ADDRESSED
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Main questions and purposes of the study 2

2. OVERVIEW OF CONTENTS 4

3. METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 5

4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMS CONTROL
PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UN
4.1 Introduction 6
4.2 Arms control agreements before WW I 7
4.3 The impact of WW I on arms control 11
4.4 The legality of war and the emergence
of substantive arms control law 11

PART I
THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL

Chapter 2 - The place of the law of arms control in the international system

1. Introduction 16
2. ORIGINS OF AND INCENTIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL
IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 16
2.1 The international system and military power 16
2.2 The (political) concept of arms control 21
2.3 The changing scope of ‘arms control’ 23
3. THE SECURITY CONTEXT OF ARMS CONTROL
3.1 The interrelationship between national and international security 27
3.2 The interrelationship between arms control and security 29
3.3 The interrelationship between law and politics
in the field of arms control 33
Chapter 3 - Special characteristics of the law of arms control

1. Introduction
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOURCES OF ARMS CONTROL LAW
   2.1 The sources of international law
   2.2 The importance of treaties in arms control law
   2.3 Classification of arms control treaty law
   2.4 Arms control law as part of peace treaties or ceasefire arrangements: dictated arms control law
   2.5 Arms control treaties voluntarily entered into by the States Parties: consensual arms control law
   2.5.1 Unilateral arms control measures
   2.5.2 Bilateral arms control treaties
   2.5.3 Multilateral arms control treaties
   2.5.4 Treaties, Acts and Documents accessory to arms control treaties
   2.5.5 ‘Politically binding’ documents concerned with arms control
   2.6 Customary international law in the field of arms control
   2.6.1 Arms control and the nature of customary international law
   2.6.2 The absence of an established body of ‘customary arms control law’
   2.7. General principles of law relating to arms control
   2.7.1 Arms control and the nature of general principles of law
   2.7.2 General principles of arms control law and politics
   2.8 Subsidiary sources for the determination of arms control law
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCOPE OF SUBSTANTIVe AND INSTITUTIONAL ARMS CONTROL LAW
   3.1 The scope of substantive arms control law
   3.1.1 Substantive nuclear arms control law
   3.1.2 Substantive chemical arms control law
   3.1.3 Substantive biological arms control law
   3.1.4 Substantive conventional arms control law
   3.1.5 Other substantive arms control law
   3.2 Institutional arms control law
   3.3 Administrative and procedural arms control aspects
   3.4 Enforcement mechanisms and compliance issues
   3.5 Monitoring and verification arrangements
   3.6 Conflict prevention and resolution
   3.7 Peacebuilding and post-conflict arms control
   3.8 Human rights implications of arms control

viii
PART II
INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION OF THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL: THEORY

Chapter 4 - The international legal framework of supervision in the law of arms control

1. Introduction

2. UNILATERAL SUPERVISION, DIPLOMATIC SUPERVISION AND SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS IN ARMS CONTROL LAW
   2.1 The notion of supervision at the international level
   2.2 Unilateral and diplomatic supervision
   2.3 The legal basis for the exercise of unilateral and diplomatic supervision
   2.4 International supervision
   2.5 The legal basis for the exercise of international supervision
   2.6 Supervision and types of rules
   2.7 The rationale of supervision in arms control law

3. THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION
   3.1 Different phases of the process of international supervision
   3.1.1 Monitoring
   3.1.2 Verification
   3.1.3 Dispute settlement
   3.1.4 Correction/enforcement
   3.1.5 The interpretative element
   3.2 Treaty-specific and treaty non-specific arms control supervision

4. SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS IN ARMS CONTROL LAW: METHODS OF SUPERVISION
   4.1 The institutional design of methods of supervision
   4.2 Monitoring methods
   4.3 Verification methods
   4.3.1 Methods of stage 1 of the verification process (fact-finding)
   4.3.2 Methods of stage 2 of the verification process (review)
PART IIA
INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION OF THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL: SELECTED TREATIES

Chapter 5 - General features of supervisory mechanisms in multilateral arms control treaties

1. Introduction 162
2. MONITORING
2.1 Monitoring provisions in global arms control treaties that apply to uninhabited territories 163
2.2 Monitoring provisions in other global arms control treaties 165
2.3 Monitoring provisions in regional arms control treaties 168
2.3.1 Monitoring provisions in Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties 168
2.3.2 Monitoring provisions in the CFE Treaty 170
3. VERIFICATION
3.1 Verification provisions in global arms control treaties that apply to uninhabited territories 172
3.2 Verification provisions in other global arms control treaties 175
3.3 Verification provisions in Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties 183
3.3.1 Institutional design of the Tlatelolco Treaty 183
3.3.2 Methods of verification in the Tlatelolco Treaty 185
3.3.3 Institutional design of the Rarotonga Treaty 188
3.3.4 Methods of verification in the Rarotonga Treaty 189
3.3.5 Institutional design of the Pelindaba Treaty 192
3.3.6 Methods of verification in the Pelindaba Treaty 193
3.3.7 Institutional design of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty 195
3.3.8 Methods of verification in the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty 196
3.4 Verification provisions in the CFE Treaty 199
3.4.1 Institutional design of the CFE Treaty 199
3.4.2 Methods of verification in the CFE Treaty 200

4. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
4.1 Dispute settlement provisions in global arms control treaties that apply to uninhabited territories 203
4.2 Dispute settlement provisions in other global arms control treaties 204
4.3 Dispute settlement in regional arms control treaties 207
4.3.1 Dispute settlement provisions in Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties 207
4.3.2 Dispute settlement provisions in the CFE Treaty 208

5. CORRECTION/ENFORCEMENT
5.1 Provisions on correction/enforcement in global arms control treaties that apply to uninhabited territories 209
5.2 Provisions on correction/enforcement in other global arms control treaties 210
5.3 Provisions on correction/enforcement in regional arms control treaties 211
5.3.1 Provisions on correction/enforcement in Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties 211
5.3.2 Provisions on correction/enforcement in the CFE Treaty 213

6. THE INTERPRETATIVE ELEMENT 214
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE GENERAL FEATURES OF SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS 215
7.1 General features of monitoring provisions in arms control treaties 216
7.2 General features of verification provisions in arms control treaties 217
7.3 General features of dispute settlement provisions in arms control treaties 218
7.4 General features of correction/enforcement in arms control treaties 218

Chapter 6 - General features of supervisory mechanisms in global arms control treaties featuring international organisations: OPCW, IAEA, CTBTO

i. Introduction 219
1. THE CWC AND THE OPCW
1. A brief note on history 220
1.1 The 1925 Geneva Protocol 220
1.2 Decoupling chemical and biological weapons 222
2. SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN THE CWC 222
2.1 Objectives and purposes of the CWC: the CWC preamble 222
2.2 Article I - general obligations 223
2.3 The problem of dual use of chemicals 224
2.4 Schedule 1, 2, 3 chemicals and facilities 226
3. THE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM OF THE CWC: 227
   THE SUPERVISING BODY
3.1 The OPCW 227
3.1.1 The Conference of the States Parties (CSP) 229
3.1.2 The Executive Council (EC) 230
3.1.3 The Technical Secretariat (TS) 232
4. THE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM OF THE CWC: 233
   METHODS OF SUPERVISION
4.1 Monitoring provisions in the CWC 233
4.1.1 Declarations on ownership or possession (Art. III) 234
4.1.2 Plans, Declarations and information relating to destruction 236
4.1.3 Declarations with respect to chemicals and facilities used 237
   for activities not prohibited under the Convention (Art. VI)
4.1.4 Exchange of information: information to and from the TS 238
4.1.5 Information relating to assistance and protection 239
   against chemical weapons
4.1.6 Monitoring methods in the context of inspections 240
4.2 Verification provisions in the CWC 240
4.2.1 Stage 1 of the verification process: fact-finding 242
4.2.1.1 Fact-finding with respect to chemical weapons 242
4.2.1.2 Fact-finding with respect to CWPF and other facilities 245
4.2.1.3 Methods of additional fact-finding 253
4.2.1.4 Fact-finding in regard to assistance and protection 258
   against chemical weapons
4.2.2 Stage 2 of the verification process: review 259
4.2.3 Stage 3 of the verification process: assessment 261
4.3 Provisions on dispute settlement in the CWC 264
4.4 Provisions on correction/enforcement in the CWC 266
4.5 The interpretative element in the CWC 268
II. THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM AND THE NPT 270
1. A brief note on history 270
1.1 The failure to outlaw nuclear weapons 270
1.2 Atoms for Peace and beyond 271
2. THE IAEA 272
2.1 Objectives and functions 272
2.2 Institutional structure of the IAEA 272
2.2.1 General Conference 273
2.2.2 Board of Governors 273
2.2.3 Secretariat 274

3. SAFEGUARDS AS A SUPERVISORY MECHANISM 274
3.1 General aspects of the safeguards system 274
3.2 Monitoring provisions in INFCIRC/153 281
3.2.1 National system of accounting for and control of nuclear material 282
3.2.1.1 Records system 282
3.2.1.2 Provision of information 284
3.2.1.3 Reports system 285
3.3 Verification provisions in INFCIRC/153 286
3.3.1 Stage 1 of the verification process: fact-finding 286
3.3.2 Stages 2 and 3 of the verification process: review and assessment 293
3.4 Provisions on dispute settlement 294
3.5 Provisions on correction/enforcement 295
3.6 The interpretative element 297

4.1 Inducements to strengthen the system 297
4.2 The Model Additional Protocol 300
4.2.1 Objectives of the Model Additional Protocol 301
4.2.2 Monitoring provisions in the Model Additional Protocol 302
4.2.3 Verification provisions in the Model Additional Protocol 303

III. THE CTBT AND THE CTBTO 306
1. A brief note on history 306
1.1 The development of nuclear weapons 306
1.2 Test ban and non-proliferation 306
2. THE SCOPE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN THE CTBT 308
3. THE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM OF THE CTBT: THE SUPERVISORY BODY 310
3.1 The CTBTO 310
3.1.1 The Conference of the States Parties (CSP) 311
3.1.2 The Executive Council (EC) 312
3.1.3 The Technical Secretariat (TS) 314
4. THE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM OF THE CTBT: METHODS OF SUPERVISION 316
4.1 Monitoring provisions in the CTBT 317
4.1.1 NTMs 317
4.1.2 International Monitoring System (IMS) 318
4.1.3 The IMS and assessments regarding compliance 320
4.1.4 Confidence-Building Measures 321
4.2 Verification provisions in the CTBT 321
4.2.1 Stage 1 of the verification process: fact-finding 322
4.2.2 Stage 2 of the verification process: review 327

xiii
PART III
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL

Chapter 7 - Supervisory mechanisms in arms control treaties and enforcement under general international law

1. Introduction: co-operation and enforcement 333
2. VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL LAW:
   NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
   2.1 Criteria for categorising violations 334
   2.2 The significance of violations of substantive arms control law 335
   2.3 The significance of violations of institutional arms control law 338
3. REACTIONS TO VIOLATIONS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REMEDIES IN SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS AND REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
   3.1 Introduction: possible concurrence of reactions to violations 340
   3.2 Supervisory mechanisms in arms control treaties and reactions to violations pursuant to the law of State responsibility 341
   3.2.1 Non-military countermeasures as reactions to violations 341
   3.2.2 Restrictions on the employment of countermeasures due to the existence of a treaty regime 344
   3.2.3 Restrictions on the employment of countermeasures ‘in kind’ due to the existence of a treaty regime 350
   3.3 Supervisory mechanisms in arms control treaties and general law of treaties reactions to breaches of treaty 353
   3.3.1 Introduction 353
   3.3.2 Withdrawal, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty 353
   3.3.2.1 Withdrawal from a treaty 354
   3.3.2.2 Termination or suspension of a treaty as a consequence of its material breach 356
   3.3.3 Breach of prohibitions of use: the effect of inter-State armed conflict on the validity and operation of arms control treaties 360
   3.4 Supervisory mechanisms in arms control treaties and the role of the Security Council in enforcing compliance 364
Chapter 8 - Summary and conclusions

1. The law of arms control 373
2. Special characteristics of the law of arms control 374
3. International supervision of the law of arms control 375
4. International organisations as supervisors in arms control law 376
5. Some common characteristics of supervisory mechanisms in arms control treaties 378
6. Enforcement of the law of arms control 379

REFERENCES 381
(Bibliography, Official Documents, Table of Cases)

Annex figure 1: Model for the General Analysis of Supervisory Mechanisms in Arms Control Treaties 397

INDEX 399

SAMENVATTING (summary in Dutch) 405
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 413