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Migration to and from Turkey, 1783–1960: types, numbers and ethno-religious dimensions

Ahmet Akgündüz

Abstract *Migratory movements to and from Turkey during the period between 1783 and 1960 are analysed by grouping them under two headings: non-economic migrations and economic migrations. The size, ethno-religious composition and causes of each movement are considered. The article pays special attention to the mass economic migration from Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) to North and South America. Turks were represented in very small numbers in this migration given that they constituted the largest group within the Ottoman population. An examination of particular features of the incorporation of Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) into the Europe-centred world economy, and ethno-religious, ideological and cultural aspects of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the West goes some way towards providing an explanation. The article also considers whether there is any continuity or relationship between the migrations of the pre-1960 period and the post-1960 labour migration to Western Europe.*

There is a general perception that the migration of Turkish labour power to Western European countries during the period between 1960 and 1974 is Turkey's first participation in international migration. This seems to be, at first glance, borne out by the empirical evidence, as far as Western Europe proper is concerned, as there is hardly any trace of migration from Turkey to Western Europe (or vice versa) in the pre-1960 period, except for Armenian refugees in the years during and soon after the First World War. This snapshot does not, however, represent the whole picture. Contrary to the general belief, Turkey actually had experienced an almost uninterrupted series of both mass inflows and outflows of people beginning in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and continuing until 1960.

The first objective of this article is to analyse the migratory movements between 1783 and 1960, and their causes and ethno-religious dimensions. The second goal is to provide a comprehensive explanation of why the Turks were almost entirely absent in the mass migration from Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) to North and South America between 1860 and 1914. The final aim of this article is to illuminate whether there is any continuity or relationship between the migrations of the pre-1960 period and the post-1960 Turkish labour migration to Western Europe.

The migration flows will be examined by dividing the process into two phases: the 1783–1922 period, and the 1923–1960 period. The reason the year 1923 is taken as the demarcation line is that it represents both the beginning of the republican era of Turkey as well as a reduction in the scale and types of migratory movements.

For many centuries Europe called the Ottoman Empire Turkey, and this applied to the registration of the population movements to and from the

Ottoman Empire in so far as such registrations were made. But the inhabitants and rulers took the name Turkey (*Türkiye*) only with the proclamation of the republic in 1923 in today's territory. Thus, for the 1783–1922 period, reference will be made to the Ottoman Empire (state), rather than to Turkey, unless original quotations stated otherwise, consistent with the usage of the Turks and contemporary historiography.

The 1783–1922 period

In this period, there were various types of migratory movements of different ethno-religious groups to a range of destinations. They will be grouped (a) according to destination, that is, to and from the Ottoman Empire, and then (b) within each of these according to type, that is, if the chief causes of each movement were conquest, warfare or political or ethno-religious factors, as non-economic migrations; or if the chief causes were economic, as economic migrations. Although, as Castles and Miller (1993: 63) point out 'it is often impossible to draw strict lines between the various types of migration', in this case, grouping the migration under the two types of headings is possible. This does not imply overlooking the specific characteristics of each movement.

Migration to the Ottoman Empire

Non-economic migrations. After the admission of about half of the 200,000 Sephardic Jews who were expelled from Spain in 1492 (Collinson 1993: 30), the next mass migration to the Ottoman lands involved approximately 80,000 Crimeans or Tatars¹ and took place in 1783/84, shortly after the Russian annexation of the Crimea (Karpat 1983: 400, 1985a: 65). This represented the first Muslim immigration as well as the beginning of almost uninterrupted waves of immigration to the Ottoman state. The influx of Tatar refugees intensified after the Turco-Russian War of 1812, and continued until the 1853–1856 Crimean War.

From the mid-1850s onward, the migration of Muslims into the Ottoman domains swelled into a mass exodus. One of the two causes of this development was the advance of the Russian expansion southward (the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and along the shores of the Black Sea) alongside the shift in the Russian state policy concerning indigenous Muslim peoples in the annexed regions from tolerance to forcible expulsion.

From the Crimea between 1854 and 1876 alone, some 1,400,000 Tatars immigrated into the Ottoman Empire (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 116). The total number of Tatar immigrants from the beginning (1873) until 1922 is estimated at about 1,800,000 (Karpat 1983: 402, 1985a: 66). The Tatars were not Ottoman subjects but Turkish speakers and had close religious and cultural affinities with the Anatolian Turks. The earliest Tatar refugees were settled mostly in the Balkans while some were in the Çukurova region in south Anatolia. (Anatolia denotes today's territory of Turkey except for eastern Thrace, a small part on the European side.) From the late 1870s onwards, when the Ottomans lost the Balkans, the Tatars in these lands were resettled in the territory of today's Turkey, as were the continuing waves of Tatar immigrants arriving directly from the Russian Empire. Their main places of settlement were İstanbul, İzmir, Eskişehir, İzmit, Bandırma and İnegöl.

When resistance to the Russian occupation in the Caucasus became more

subdued and Russia finally succeeded in conquering Circassia in 1864, the Tsarist government triggered a wave of migration from the Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire. Yet, 'some Circassians had fled as early as 1860 to escape the forced sedentarization and Christianization programs of the Russian state' (Quataert 1994a: 795). In the same year, the Russian and Ottoman governments reached an agreement to control the migrations that 'Istanbul apparently believed would transfer only some 50,000 Circassians' (Quataert 1994a: 795). But, by the end of 1864, the migration became an unexpected flood. According to Karpát, as many as 2,000,000 people (mostly Circassians but also some Chechens and Abkhazians) left Russia in the period from 1859 to 1879, of whom about 20 per cent died of malnutrition and disease, and only approximately 1,500,000 actually survived and were settled in the Ottoman domains (1985a: 69). From 1881 until 1914 there was a further emigration of approximately 500,000 more Circassians, along with a considerable number of other Muslims from Kazan and the Urals (Karpát 1985a: 69).

Although Circassians were neither Turkish-speakers nor Ottoman subjects, they had religious and social ties with the Ottomans which had been established through Ottoman officials of Circassian descent and the activities of the Ottoman representatives in Circassia. The Circassians also supported the Ottomans in the Turco-Russian wars of the 1787–1829 period (Hacıoğlu 1993: 101).

The initial waves of Circassian refugees were settled in the Balkans as well as Anatolia. As was the case with the Tatars, the pattern of settlement changed from the late 1870s onwards: the Circassians, including the vast majority of those who had previously been settled in the Balkans, mostly immigrated into Anatolia and partly into specific Arab provinces within the Empire; Syria, Jordan and Israel/Palestine. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, however, some Circassians in the Arab lands moved again to Turkey. Given estimated numbers of Circassian origin population in Turkey and the aforementioned three countries (Shami 1995: 83), it can be concluded that the final destination of about 90 per cent of the total Circassian emigrants was today's territory of Turkey. Although, the Circassians were settled in all parts of Turkey including southeast Anatolia, they were mainly concentrated in central Anatolia and the provinces of Sakarya, İzmit, Bursa and Balıkesir.

The second cause of the drastic increase in the number of Muslim refugees pouring into the Ottoman Empire was the rise of nation states and consequent dismemberment of the Empire in the Balkans, with repercussions for the local Muslim population. The Russian invasion of the Balkans and war with the Ottomans in 1877/78 resulted in the emergence of an autonomous Bulgaria and the independence of Montenegro, Serbia and Romania as well as the fleeing and/or expulsion of Muslim inhabitants of the region. Over 800,000 people² (Zürcher 1993: 85), predominantly Turks but including Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims) Jews and some Christians (Şimşir 1989a, b) fled to the remaining Ottoman territories, mainly Istanbul and Anatolia. In addition, approximately another 250,000–300,000 Muslim villagers fell victim to the victors' ethnic cleansing campaign (Karpát 1983: 422, 1985a: 75). The exodus of Muslims from Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro continued at a slower pace after 1879. The emigration from the Balkans, however, peaked again during and soon after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913: an estimated 413,922 Muslims took refuge in Istanbul and Anatolia, and 632,408 Muslims lost their lives (McCarthy 1995: 164); at this time the Ottomans lost Macedonia and Thrace to

Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. (Some of the emigrants coming from the Balkans in the Balkan War years were, in fact, those Tatar and Circassian refugees who had formerly been settled in that region.) From the Mediterranean island of Crete taken by Greece in 1909, some 60,000 Muslims emigrated to Anatolia (T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 1969: 460).

Consequently, from 1783 to 1913 some 5–7 million Muslims immigrated into the Ottoman lands. Some of these were, in fact, the Sultan's subjects converging from lost territories, but at least 3.8 million of the total were former subjects of the Russian Tsar (Quataert 1994a: 793).

Meanwhile, there were small-scale migrations of non-Muslims to the Ottoman state as well, since the Ottoman government continued to provide a refuge for those who wanted to leave the Christian countries. In the late eighteenth century, for instance, several hundred Russian 'Old Believers' opposing Peter the Great's reforms were permitted to settle in the Ottoman domains (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 116; Karpat 1983: 396, 1985a: 64). In the mid-nineteenth century, groups of Poles, Hungarians and Cossacks were allowed to settle near Istanbul and in the European and west Anatolian regions, though they often returned to their countries (Quataert 1994a: 794).

A more distinguished migration, however, was the admission of a large group consisting of political and intellectual leaders of the 1848 Polish and Hungarian revolutions and their adherents, who escaped from the repression that followed the defeat of the revolutions and the pursuit of Austrian and Russian forces (Shaw and Shaw 1977; Karpat 1985a; Ortaylı 1995). The Ottoman Sultan also 'refused to surrender the revolutionaries to Austria despite threats of war' (Karpat 1996: 19). Many of these refugees became Ottoman subjects and played important parts in the political, military and cultural life of Turkey.

There was also immigration of even greater numbers of Jews to one particular province of the Empire, Palestine, especially from Central and Eastern Europe. This migration was motivated by political and religious aspirations on the part of Jews. The Ottoman government, however, following the formal emergence of political Zionism in 1897, continued to allow the entry of individuals, but forbade mass Jewish migration and settlement in Palestine; and this ban was formalised in 1906 (Karpat 1985a: 63). In practice, the immigration of Jews from Germany (which was regarded as a friendly country) was not hindered whereas, for example, Russian Jews were forbidden unless they had first gone to the USA or the UK and been naturalised there, before going on to Palestine (Ortaylı 1983: 123–32). The number of Jews in Palestine continued to rise in due course; in 1880, there were an estimated 25,000 Jews; by 1914, they numbered 100,000³ (Quataert 1994a: 794); yet this figure also included internal migrants, i.e. those who came from other areas of the Empire.

Economic migrations. During the nineteenth century there was a regular crossing of Greeks from the Aegean islands and Morea to western Anatolia for economic reasons, with political intentions also playing a role. At this time western Anatolia was experiencing a rapid expansion of commercial agriculture and trade, and a degree of wage-labour shortages (Tekeli 1990; Kasaba 1991). Notables (*ayan*) of western Anatolia were also active in the recruitment of labourers from the Aegean islands (Kasaba 1991). In 1880, the local British consul estimated the number of Greeks who had come to western Anatolia in the last 20 years at 200,000 (Tekeli 1990: 59). However, regardless of whether the original

intention of these migrants was to stay temporarily or for good in Anatolia, they eventually left the region either with the fleeing Ottoman Greeks in 1922 (see below), or as part of the group who were subjected to the exchange of population between Turkey and Greece in 1923 and 1924 (this point will be touched upon below).

A striking development, not in terms of migratory movement but legislative regulation, was the Ottoman Empire's official declaration of itself as an immigration country with its introduction of the Immigration Code (*Muhacirin Kanunnamesi*) on 9 March 1857.

The Immigration Code was a liberal one. Under its terms, immigration to the Ottoman state was open to those who were willing to become the Sultan's subjects, accept the country's law, had a minimum capital of 60 *mecidiye* (1,350 French francs at that time) per family, and no criminal record. In accordance with the Ottoman *millet* system, immigrants would enjoy religious freedom and be permitted to build chapels if their locality did not have chapels or churches. They would be given the best arable lands belonging to the treasury free of charge, and be exempted from all taxes and military service for six years if they settled in Rumelia and 12 years if in Anatolia (in practice, though, some strategically important regions were restricted or excluded as far as the immigration of non-Muslims was concerned). Settlers were not allowed to sell the land for the first 20 years, and those who decided to leave the country had to give the land back to the government (Shaw and Shaw 1977; Karpat 1983, 1985a; Anhegger 1985).

The Immigration Code was translated and published in major European journals, provoking inquiries from all over Europe and America. Ottoman officials, as expressed by some local authorities in Anatolia, were particularly willing to receive German emigrants (Anhegger 1985). Yet although Western European countries were experiencing mass emigrations overseas during that period, no significant migration either from Germany or any other Western European country was routed to the Ottoman lands. There were a few thousand Europeans in the Arab provinces of the Empire, and about 20,000 in Anatolia in 1900 (Quataert 1994a: 794), excluding protected subjects, i.e. those Ottoman Christian subjects who were granted foreign passports by the big powers.⁴ Of those in Anatolia some 2,000 were British, 5,000 French, and 8,000 Austrian (Isawi 1982: 81). Among them, the English dockyard workers who formed a small colony at Hasköy, a district in Istanbul (Davison 1990: 122) represented a typical labour migration.

There were also contract European migrant workers in the Ottoman Empire. In the 1890s, for example, Europeans found employment in the construction of the Anatolian railway (particularly in the following sections: the Eskişehir-Konya, the Karaman-Ereğli, and the Izmir-Kasaba). Most of these individuals were Italians holding skilled and better paid jobs (Quataert 1983: 75). Similarly, in the same years, 30 per cent of a total of 6,000 workers employed in the construction of the Salonika-Bitola and Salonika-Dedeagaç-Istanbul railroads were imported labour from Italy, Belgium, Austria and Germany (Adanır 1994: 31). Moreover, when the Anatolian railway was opened and offered full-time employment for many different occupations, several Europeans came, found work and acquired Ottoman citizenship. 'Thereafter they also were referred to as Ottoman subjects' (Quataert 1983: 75–76).

Migration from the Ottoman Empire

Non-economic migrations. Non-economic outflows of people from the Ottoman Empire occurred after the non-economic inflows were almost complete and in a relatively short time-span; during the decade after the beginning of the First World War. These flows were exclusively comprised of Christian minority subjects of the Ottoman Empire, namely Armenians and Greeks. Furthermore, as with the final destination of the non-economic migrations to the Ottoman Empire, the origin of these non-economic migrations from the Ottoman Empire was in fact within the territory of today's Turkey.

In the nineteenth century, there had already been migrations of Armenians and Greeks from north eastern and eastern provinces of Anatolia to Russia, but these were small-scale and 'pull'-induced movements, and some migrants returned again of their own volition (Shaw and Shaw 1977; Karpat 1983, 1985a).

In 1914, on the eve of the First World War, about 150,000 Greeks left the coastal region of western Anatolia for Greece, though most of them seem have to returned in 1918–1919 (McCarthy 1983: 130–31). The first mass exodus from Anatolia, however, took place in 1915 and the subsequent years. In May 1915, the Ottoman cabinet decided to relocate (*tehcir*) the Armenian population in the war zone in eastern Anatolia to an Ottoman domain of the time, Syria, ostensibly on the argument that the Armenians took sides with the Russian troops (i.e. the Ottoman enemy of the war time) and exploited the war situation to materialise their irredentist and anti-Ottoman plan. During the implementation of the deportation decision in 1915 and 1916, and in the following war years, 800,000 Armenians fled to the (former) Soviet Union, France, the USA and neighbouring Arab countries (McCarthy 1983: 129–30), and 'between 600,000 and 800,000' Armenians (Zürcher 1993: 120) lost their lives.

The other important mass exodus from Anatolia involved Greeks. In 1922, when the Turkish national forces liberated western Anatolia from the Greek occupation of May 1919, at the end of three years of struggle on a number of fronts, some half a million Ottoman Greeks (Keyder 1994: 129), together with the retreating Greek army, fled mainly to Greece and some to the USA (McCarthy 1983: 132). Consequently, less than a decade after 1914, about 1,500,000 Ottoman Christians (Armenians and Greeks) had fled what remained as the territory of new Turkey.

Economic migrations. With regard to economic migration from the Ottoman state, the first case worth mentioning is the seasonal migration of labourers from the Black Sea region of Anatolia to Russia prior to the 1917 October Revolution. Although the nineteenth-century Ottoman population registers (*nüfus defterleri*) of the Black Sea provinces provide evidence of male migration being a general phenomenon (McCarthy 1979) and also of a considerable number of people from that region being migrant labourers in western Anatolia during that century (Kasaba 1991), the scale of the seasonal migration is unclear. The role of familial and religious ties between the populations on both sides of the Turkish–Russian border in the occurrence of the seasonal migration is similarly difficult to establish.

The second case of economic migration from the Ottoman Empire involves the temporary migration of young people under an 'on-the-job training scheme' to Germany during the First World War. In 1916, the Ottoman government

initiated the signing of an agreement with Germany for a three- or four-year vocational and technical training of 10,000 young Turks in Germany. Turkish trainees would be lodged, as far as possible, at the premises of the German tutors, and their subsistence would be provided for by the factories where they would receive on-the-job training. In return, after having finished their training, the Turkish youngsters would work at the same factories for one or two years for no wages (Toprak 1981, 1982: 200–02). Alongside this protocol, some of the Ottoman ministries also sent several hundred students and workers to Germany for the same purposes during the war years. The Ministry of Education, for example, sent 200 young people to become miners by working in German mine pits. The trainees and students were aged between 11 and 18 and were usually selected from the orphan schools (Toprak 1981, 1982; Sagaster 1997). Yet the intention of the Ottoman government was not to export workers – even the weak Ottoman industry was severely hit by the shortage of labour power due to the war – but simply to increase the education and skill levels of Turks as a part of a drive to boost the national economy (Toprak 1982, 1995). From the perspective at the receiving end, however, this ‘on-the-job training scheme’ was a kind of *Gastarbeiter* system bringing additional labourers, albeit insignificant in number, to Germany during a very crucial period. These days, for example, Japan uses such ‘vocational training schemes’ as a cheap way to meet its foreign labour demand (Stahl 1993).

The final and most important economic migration involved the migration of people from the Asian as well as the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire to North and South America between 1860 and 1914. According to Karpas, although both the receiving countries’ and the Ottoman’s registers are incomplete and thus fail to provide the actual figures, the available evidence indicates that the number of Ottoman migrants to the Americas probably totalled 1,200,000, of whom about 400,000 subsequently returned to the Ottoman lands (1985b: 185). Quataert indicates comparable totals for Ottoman migrants and returnees (1994a: 792–93).

Among receiving countries, the USA, Argentina and Brazil, were likely to be the most important recipients of Ottoman migrants. The US federal government’s figures show that from 1820 (the year federal government began to keep an account of aliens entering the ports of the USA) to 1870 only 301 arrivals from the Ottoman Empire were recorded. Between 1870 and 1920 the USA admitted 140,477 immigrants who were born in, according to the US classification, ‘Turkey in Europe’, and 185,870 who were born in ‘Turkey in Asia’; which altogether made a total of 326,347 immigrants from the Empire (see tables in Bennett 1963: 332–36). Argentina admitted 169,000 ‘Ottoman Turks’ between 1857 and 1926, and Brazil admitted 77,324 ‘Turco-Arabians’ between 1820 and 1926 (Davie 1949: 173). (In both cases the given end of the enumeration exceeds the year 1914, thus the period is larger than that under consideration.)

Syria (a name which was commonly used in the Western world to denote the area now covering the states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel/Palestine) provided roughly one half of all Ottoman migrants. ‘Turkey in Europe’ and western Anatolia ranked second, and eastern Anatolian provinces third in importance in terms of the numbers of migrants. Migration from, using the US classification, ‘Turkey in Europe’ gained pace only after 1900.

From the mid-1880s onwards, once the scale of migration from the Empire (particularly from the region called Syria) became the cause of alarm for the

Ottoman authorities, the Ottoman government attempted to curb it by denying passports to would-be émigrés. The authorities were concerned about the dwindling population and tax income, and feared that the appearance and behaviour of poor emigrants would damage the country's image abroad (Çoker 1989; Akarlı 1992). However, the attempt to stop migration proved to be a failure; Muslim immigration waves into the Ottoman domains counterbalanced the concern about underpopulation, and remittances yielded positive economic implications for the sending regions as well as tax revenues. As a result the Ottoman government effectively removed migration restrictions in 1898, which meant the people could travel freely so long as they were not political suspects and pledged to keep their original citizenship (Akarlı 1992; Karpat 1985b).

The occurrence and ethno-religious composition of the migration to the Americas

In general, the 1860–1914 Ottoman migration to the Americas was 'pull'-induced in nature. The factors that produced the so-called Syrian migration, which represents a half of the total, can be clustered into three groups:

- (a) Factors at the sending end: a high density of population due to the settlement of immigrants, especially from Algeria and Tunisia, following the French annexation in 1830 and 1881, respectively; political hardships arising from the clashes between different religious groups fomented and manipulated by the big powers; from 1909 onward, the Ottoman government's active conscription policy among Muslims as well as Christian subjects in the region; from the beginning of the twentieth century the collapse of the silk industry, which had been the staple of the Lebanese economy, and consequent deterioration in unemployment; the intra-regional mobility of the population as connected with the development of capitalist production relations.
- (b) Factors at the receiving end: the image of the Americas as a land of opportunity, and the existence of employment and opportunities for economic and social mobility; almost unrestricted admission policy; the establishment of a Syrian immigrant community from very early on, functioning as a 'pull' factor.
- (c) Linkages between both ends: integration of the region called Syria, as a territory of the now peripheral Ottoman state, in the world economy through manufacturing, trade, transport, communication and finance; the presence of newspapers and periodicals which could publish news of happenings in the world; the wide-ranging activities of American missionaries in the sending region which established cultural, ideological and objective links, and a consequent reduction in the sociological distance between the receiving end and the Christian inhabitants of the region in particular; availability of well organised agents or brokers (*simsar*) in the region of emigration and destination, brokers in the former were employed by the shipping lines and travelled through villages encouraging and helping the young to emigrate, while brokers in the latter provided all conceivable services to the newcomers; social networks connecting the pioneers of immigration with their communities of origin (for example, according to a report of the United States Immigration Commission, 95 per cent of a total of 9,188 Syrians entering the country in 1908–1909 stated that they were coming to join

relatives and friends) (Karpas 1985b: 186); returnees who were bringing stories of the wealth of the Americas.

Both the pioneers and the vast majority of 'Syrian migrants' were Arabic-speaking Christians; Muslims joined the movement at a later stage and constituted a smaller percentage (see Akarlı 1992; Daniel 1970; Elkholy 1966; Hourani 1992; Isawi 1982, 1992; Karpas 1985b; Quataert 1994a). After the Syrians, the most conspicuous group in the migration to the Americas was the Armenians of Anatolia. Their migration was also produced by a cluster of factors similar to those which were true for the Syrians, though the following two issues may require further consideration in the case of the Armenians.

The first issue was that although the American missionaries concentrated their efforts both on the Arabs and Armenians (Daniel 1970), their role in bringing about in particular the initial cohorts of Armenian migration was likely to have been more significant.

Protestant American missionary work for the Armenians began in 1820; the missionaries were well received and encouraged by the Ottoman government in their early years (Akgün 1996). Their activities included the founding of schools, hospitals, printing-presses, libraries and colleges (Daniel 1970; Kocabaşoğlu 1991; Mirak 1983). The Americans reached every village where a sizeable Armenian population existed. The number of American mission schools in present-day Turkey rose from 71 in 1860 to 450 in 1913, and the number of students climbed even more spectacularly: from 2,742 to 25,922, respectively (Daniel 1970: 94–95).

The earliest group of Armenian migrants to America was composed of the graduates of missionary schools who were encouraged by the missionaries to complete their higher education in science, medicine, dentistry or religion at American colleges and universities (Mirak 1983: 36–38). Once the migration for education was established, it became self-propelled. The second group of Armenians consisted of merchants, businessmen and professionals whose migration was also fostered by the American missionaries. After students, businessmen and professionals, who became important members of the fledgling Armenian colony in the USA, another group of Armenians began to join them in the 1880s. These were poor peasants, artisans and labourers, most of whom were familiar with seasonal migration within the Empire. The initial working class migrants originated from the places which were the focus of intense missionary efforts (Mirak 1983: 39–44).

The second issue was that from the mid-1890s onwards, particularly during the second half of the 1890s, political factors may have played a greater role in the occurrence of at least some cases of Armenian migration. The total number of Armenian migrants to the USA from 1843 to 1914 was approximately 66,000 (Mirak 1983: 287–90).

Out of the total migration from the Ottoman Empire to the Americas between 1860 and 1914, the proportion of Muslims is estimated at only 15–20 per cent (Karpas 1985b: 183; Quataert 1994a: 792). More strikingly, the number of Turks in this mass migration was very small. Approximately 22,000 Turks (or Turkish-speaking Muslims) moved to the USA between 1880 and 1924. The vast majority were young, male, unskilled and illiterate workers and they had one of the highest return rates (Cordasco 1990: 715). Between 1908 and 1910, for example, 4,261 Turks migrated to the USA, and 3,010 subsequently returned home (Potts

1990: 133). About three quarters of the total number of Turkish migrants in the USA returned to their country in response to encouragement and, in some cases, financial incentives provided by their own government. The US census of 1930 records 9,449 foreign-born people whose mother tongue is Turkish, residing mainly in New York City (Davie 1949: 173).

Turkish migrants did not establish religious or ethnic institutions, nor did they form an ethnic community (Cordasco 1990). In fact, those who chose the USA as their new home seemed to make themselves invisible. Consequently, this first international economic migration of the Turks vanished completely without leaving behind any trace, either in the collective social memory of Turks or the social life in Turkey. There is a marked discontinuity with the second cohort of migration from Turkey to the USA, which started in the late 1950s and included students and professionals. There was no move in the direction of Turkish labour migration to the USA in the 1960s, when such movements to Western Europe was taking place.

As in the case of migration to South America, although the receiving end tended to refer to the people originating from the Ottoman Empire by the term Turk, such as 'Ottoman Turks', 'Turco-Arabian', the extent and even existence of Turks migrating to South America is difficult to establish (Davie 1949). If they did migrate, then they probably did so on a small scale and they were likely to have a similar fate to those Turks who migrated to the USA.

The ethno-religious structure of the migration from the Ottoman state to the Americas raises the following thought-provoking question, which has not been advanced until now, of why the number of Turks, or Turkish-speaking Muslims, in the migratory movement was so small, and why the Turkish migrants in the USA – instead of establishing social networks with their country of origin to pave the way for chain migrations – either returned or made themselves invisible. This despite the fact that (a) Muslims constituted a strong majority comprising around three-quarters of the population (Karpas 1978; Shaw 1978), and the Turks were the largest group in the Ottoman Empire⁵ (Davison 1992); (b) the official policies on exit and entry treated all Ottoman subjects equally; (c) the Turkish masses were, on average, in a lower socio-economic position when compared with the Christian subjects from the nineteenth century onward (further information is given on this point in the ensuing pages); and (d) the Ottoman conscription system was mainly affecting the Turks. Despite the general conscription system introduced in 1855, Christians preserved their exemption from the military services in return for paying poll tax (*bedelat-i askeriye*) (Karpas 1978: 241) until 1909 when the Young Turks came to power.

Hundreds of thousands of uprooted Turkish refugees from the Balkans were faced with hardships and misery in Istanbul and Anatolia due to lack of resources. Why did they not (at least temporarily) migrate to the USA to earn a better livelihood where opportunities were evident? The nationals of newly emerged Balkan countries were going there in mass. Sixty per cent of the migration of a total of 439,581 people from Greece to the USA until 1950 took place between 1901 and 1914, at a time when Greece was constantly gaining new territories. The percentage of nationals of Yugoslavia and Romania who migrated in the same 1901–1914 period was even higher than that of Greeks (Bennett 1963: 332–36; Handlin 1959: 15).

Moreover, the economic structure which functioned in the occurrence, for example, of the Syrian migration was valid for the Turks as well, due to the

Ottoman Empire's position in relation to the Europe-dominated world economic system. As a dynamic capitalist world economy grew up in Western Europe,

the Ottoman territories because of [their] proximity to and long-standing military, diplomatic, commercial and cultural contacts with Western Europe, felt the tremors of European expansion more immediately and intimately than other 'Eastern' world regions. (İslamoğlu-Inan 1987: 1)

The European world-economy incorporated and subsequently peripheralised the Ottoman state. According to Wallerstein et al., the *Gülhane* Rescript, promulgated by the Ottoman government in 1839, represented 'a legitimization of the now peripheral status of the Ottoman Empire in the world-economy' (1987: 93). Particularly from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the core countries invested substantial amounts of capital primarily in railroads and other forms of infrastructure, and in money lending to the government, as well as lesser amounts in commerce, mining and industry. As a result, the economies of the Ottoman realms were increasingly pulled into the international division of labour and patterns of production went through changes (Pamuk 1987: 55–81). The inflow of European goods grew to the detriment of the local handicrafts-based manufacturing, while at the same time low wage export-oriented industries began to increase, in various parts of Anatolia for instance (Frangakis-Syrett 1991; Kurmuş 1982; Pamuk 1987; Quataert 1994b). In agriculture, especially in west, central and south Anatolia, the demands of European markets were the driving force behind commercial expansion and production for export (Kurmuş 1982; Pamuk 1987; Kasaba 1988). In short, the demographically Turkish-Muslim dominant western, central and south Anatolia and Thrace were incorporated comprehensively into the Europe-centred world economy.

It needs to be added that economic re-structuring of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by the increasing cultural influence of the West and by the Ottoman government's own Westernisation and modernisation efforts in military, political and legal areas with the hope of restoring the Empire's might or securing its survival.

To round off this sketch of the socio-economic characteristics of the late Ottoman Empire, another fact was that the mobility of Turkish/Muslim labourers across Anatolia was well established. For example, in 1860, the British consul estimated that in Aydin province alone there were 110,000 migrants from the Black Sea region and eastern provinces of Anatolia (Kasaba 1991: 114). In Adana province, where imported implements and machinery from Germany were used, large farms were employing 50,000–100,000 migrant wage labourers every harvest season by the early years of this century (Pamuk 1987: 104). As another example, a British consular official, commenting on railroad construction in central Anatolia, stated in 1904 that

... it is remarkable that large numbers of men – Turks, Armenians, and Circassians – have come on foot from such distances as Siraz and Erzurum on the mere chance of being engaged to work as labourers. (cited in Quataert 1983: 74)

Likewise, according to an Ottoman archival source, on 11 June 1909 several hundred Muslim workers crossed the border to Greece illegally (without passports) with the intention of working only 20 days in Thessaly and then coming back again (Adanır 1994: 31). In conclusion, socio-economic and legal bases were well established in the Ottoman Empire for the participation of the Turks in the migration to the Americas.

By contrast, however, the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a periphery of the European world-capitalist system did not diminish long-standing ethno-religious, ideological, and cultural alienation, and therefore sociological distance between the West (thus the immigrant receiving end) and the Turks. Rather, these forms of alienation were perpetuated and reproduced. I would contend that this represents a key factor in explaining why Turks were almost entirely absent in the mass migration from Turkey to North and South America between 1860 and 1914. Secondary contributory factors included a relative labour scarcity in Anatolian agriculture, which meant that work was always available.

The case of the Turks is in fact rather unusual. As some migration literature – aiming to explain in the occurrence, size and directionality of contemporary spontaneous economic immigration flows – shows, it is generally the case that the incorporation of an outlying area into the orbit of a capitalist power as a periphery and the restructuring of its economy to fit the international division of labour create the necessary economic and social bases for mobility of labour across the border in an outlying country. Established economic and social linkages between two such areas also advance subjective linkages, including cultural and ideological ones. All these pave the way for international economic migrations. People who migrate are usually affected by the linkages between both sides (see, for example, Portes 1978; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Böröcz 1989; Sassen 1988, 1993). In fact, there was a similar mechanism – as documented above – in the occurrence of the Syrian migration. The Armenian migration to the USA particularly until the mid-1890s represents one of the most striking examples in this vein.

The formation of the elements which deterred the Turks from joining the migration to the Americas

The formation and reproduction of ethno-religious, ideological, and cultural alienation between the West and the Turks, can be ascribed to three main interrelated elements. The examination of these elements will also further illuminate why Ottoman Christian subjects on the whole exhibited greater mobility and stronger involvement in the migration to the Americas.

The first element was the West and the Turks' representation of each other as the Other, which can be traced back to the fourteenth century when the Ottoman state emerged as the rising Islamic power (Ahmad 1993; Lewis 1993; Miles 1989). This was in fact a new version of the ongoing power struggle which expressed itself in the ideological field as the struggle between Christendom and Islam. In the discourse of the West, the name of Turk was used as a synonym for Muslim, and a Western convert to Islam was said to have 'turned Turk', no matter where the conversion took place (Lewis 1961: 13; Lewis 1993: 7).

From the Renaissance onwards, due to the decisive shift in the power relationships between the West and the Ottoman state, the representation of the Turks as an imminent religious threat was superseded by new images. The Turks began to be portrayed by many, including the Enlightenment writers, as barbarous, despotic, irrational and other negative stereotyped images,⁶ a much lesser number of publications rejected the notion and represented the Turks positively notwithstanding (Coles 1968: 107–53; Islamoğlu-Inan 1987: 1–7; Lewis 1993: 25–26, 72–84; Pesmezoglou 1995: 1–12; Timur 1987: 3–20; Wheatcroft 1995).

On the other hand, the Turks' perception of the West was restructured according to the new circumstances: they admired its technological and economic achievements and tried to adopt them, but also viewed it as the Other which threatened their country's very existence.

The second element in the formation and reproduction of ethno-religious, ideological and cultural alienation between the West (and thus the immigrant receiving end) and the Turks was the adverse effects of the increasingly peripheral situation of the Ottoman Empire in the world economy on its Muslim and Christian subjects. Or, to put it another way, the big powers' usage of Christianity to realise their imperialist domination over the Ottoman Empire, and its consequences in the West as well as in the multi-ethnic, multi-religious structure of the Empire.

European traders chose their agents in the Ottoman state among the Christian Ottoman subjects. Also, in the second half of the eighteenth century the European states succeeded in turning the capitulations (which had originally been unilateral, changeable or repealable privileges granted by sultans to the subjects of friendly European countries) into the status of bilateral treaties which could no longer be unilaterally denounced by the Ottoman government.

It was further the case that from the last quarter of the eighteenth century onwards, the big powers pressed the Ottoman state to obtain the status of protector over the Ottoman Christian subjects. First, Russia (with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774) acquired a right of protection over all Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, followed by France's right over Catholics and Britain's right over Protestants; eventually all Christian subjects of the Empire became protégés of Russia and the European powers. This step was followed up by ambassadors and consuls of the big powers in the eighteenth, and especially in the nineteenth, century according to citizenship or extraterritoriality to hundreds of thousands of local Christians (Greeks and Armenians) even in the core areas of the Ottoman state. This provided the Ottoman Christians with the capitulatory privileges and the status of being out of reach of Ottoman law and Ottoman tax authorities (Kasaba 1988; Keyder 1987; Wallerstein et al. 1987).

As a result, whereas 'before the nineteenth century, the economic difference between Muslims and non-Muslims was not overwhelming (although there were proportionately more Christians involved in trade and lending)' (Keyder 1994: 127), in the nineteenth century, non-Muslims gained the upper hand at the expense of the Muslims. Muslim merchants lost not only their previous dominant position and privileges guaranteed by the central government but also became disadvantaged in many respects, including tax liabilities. They were thus driven out of both the overland and maritime trade and were relegated to, by and large, a subsidiary position (Kasaba 1988: 102). In addition, transportation, money lending, banking and emerging urban manufacturing came into the hands of members of non-Muslim minorities and foreigners.

The emergent economic supremacy and protected status of Ottoman Christians was linked to a swing in the classic balance of the ethno-religious division of labour,⁷ and hierarchy in the Ottoman lands. In the capital, Istanbul, for instance, the Christian population (Greeks and Armenians) moved into positions of prominence and prospered at the expense of the Muslim and Sephardic-Jewish population of the city (Keyder and Öncü 1993: 14). Also, 'it was the European governments rather than the Ottomans who were the real power in the Christian [part of the] city' (Wheatcroft 1995: 150). Furthermore, the

missionaries intensified the forces of nationalism and separatism among the Ottoman Christians (Daniel 1970: 122). Consequently, where once the majority of Greeks and Armenians had certainly been difficult to distinguish from Muslims and shared with them a common culture (Keyder 1987: 34), the Christian subjects of the Empire now identified less and less with their Muslim compatriots and rulers, and ever more with the West.

The ideological reflection and signification of this process in the West was the portrayal of the Turks as inferior to Christians, and a double standard in relation to the Turks. Particularly after the 1870s, the West exerted an increasing pressure to dismember the Ottoman Empire with a policy heavily tainted by 'a romanticised crusader perspective, professing as its object the liberation of Christian populations under the yoke' (Keyder 1987: 34). As Ahmad aptly points out 'the Ottoman-Turkish experience with Europe was bitter one and it has left deep scars on the Turkish psyche' (1996: 26).

In order to understand the magnitude of the representation of the Turks as the Other during the years of mass migration to the Americas, the Balkans is another region which must be taken into account. Nationalists of the Christian nations in the Balkans (particularly Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbians who gained their independence by fighting against the Ottoman state in the nineteenth century and were still engaged in a power struggle in the region against it) had long structured Turks as the Other. They were also influenced by anti-Turk discourses in the West as well as Russian pan-Slavism and 'Orthodox solidarity'.

As for the Greek and Armenian minorities in Anatolia, their emergent socio-economic supremacy and privileged position in relation to the West, at the same time, laid the foundation for different political aspirations than those of the Muslim subjects. Nationalists among the Greeks and particularly the Armenians were pursuing a separatist policy of irredentism at the expense of the Muslims, and relying on the intervention of the big powers. Thus, from the nineteenth century onwards, the portrayal of the Turks as the Other, or alien, gradually extended beyond the West and became widespread.

On the other hand, the Ottoman Muslim subjects were hostile to and resentful of the Western states' growing presence and their commercial, educational and religious activities in the country. In addition, conservative Muslim forces under the banner of Islam were hostile to Westernisation and reform policies of the Ottoman rulers.

The third and last element in the formation of ethno-religious, ideological and cultural alienation, and thus sociological distance between the West (and the immigrant receiving end) and the Turks was the echoes of the above-studied two elements in the receiving end. The arrival of large numbers of Christian migrants from (former) Ottoman domains might also have served to proliferate and buttress the negative portrayal of Turks (Muslims) in the Americas.

As Karpas states: there were

... endless tales of oppression, injustice, and maltreatment at the hands of the Ottoman government and their Muslim fellow citizens were aimed primarily at arousing sympathy and support among Christians in Europe and the Americas. These tales were published in the press of the United States and elsewhere, often backed up by reports from missionaries or local priests – who were prone to interpret any act of authority on the part of the Ottoman government as 'oppression' and any demand for the payment of the legitimate taxes as 'extortion'. The appeal to Christian sympathies in the United States took a more

vehement anti-Ottoman, anti-Muslim turn after the beginning of the twentieth century, when immigrant intellectuals began to publish journals and write books espousing various brands of nationalism and to consider themselves the political spokesmen for those back home. (1985b: 179)

In the same vein, Wheatcroft writes:

the political opposition to the Ottomans was strong in Protestant circles, and it was largely the Protestant missionaries who provided the material which supported the wilder accusations against the Ottomans. Frequently the accusations degenerated into the realm of the absurd. (1995: 229)

Concrete evidence available supports the lack of ethno-religious, ideological, cultural and thus sociological familiarities between the receiving end and the Turks (Muslims), and the consequent impact on migration from the Ottoman state to the Americas. The report of the Ottoman legation in Washington in 1892, for example, states that in many cases Muslims preferred to pass as Christians – particularly as Armenians, whose living habits were similar to those of other Anatolians and who often spoke Turkish as a first language (Karpas 1985b: 182). More interestingly, Karpas claims that many Ottoman Muslim immigrants took on Christian names and converted to Christianity (or their children did) in order to become culturally less conspicuous (1985b: 183). American academic sources mention that there was a likelihood of hostility towards the Turks in the USA (Cordasco 1990: 705). In Brazil, the second generation of Lebanese did not accept 'the slightly derogatory term of "turcos", by which their parents had been known' since they were emigrants from the Ottoman Empire (Hourani 1992: 10).

The 1923–1960 period

The beginning of this period also represents the commencement of the nation-state era of Turkey, with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. The founders of the republican Turkey on the one hand firmly defended and consolidated independence of their country against the West, and put a comprehensive Westernising reform programme into practice on the other. Ideologically, they represented the West not as the Other but as a model and target to catch up in development. After having kept herself out of the Second World War, Turkey joined the Western clubs; became a founding member of the Council of Europe and a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

During the period of 1923 and 1960, there was no economic migration either to or from Turkey, except for two isolated cases: first, the migration of high-level professionals, the so-called brain drain, to advanced industrialised countries beginning in the second half of the 1950s (see above); and second, the migration of Turkish Jews to Israel between 1948 and 1950, although in this case the role of economic factors is debatable (see below). Therefore, migratory movements of this period will be grouped only according to destination, that is, to and from Turkey.

Migration to Turkey

The beginning of this period was in fact marked by state-generated immigration and emigration. Following the conclusion of the Turkish War of Independence,

Table 1. *Number of foreign-born people settled in Turkey between 1923 and 1960, according to country of origin*

Countries	1923–1933	1933–1960	1923–1960
Bulgaria	101,507	272,971	374,478
Greece	456,720*	23,788	480,508
Romania	33,852	87,476	121,351
Yugoslavia	108,179	160,922	269,101
Other countries	—	31,466	31,466
Total	700,258	576,667	1,276,925

Source: Geray (1962: 11); *Arı (1995: 113).

Turkey and Greece agreed upon the exchange of populations at the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923, with the exception of Greeks in Istanbul and Turks in western Thrace. As such, within two years, 456,720 Turkish-Muslims in Greece were repatriated to Turkey (Arı 1995: 113), and 149,851 Greek-Orthodox in Turkey repatriated to Greece (Geray 1962: 6), regardless of the desire of some individuals.

During these years the migration of Muslims from the Balkans to Turkey continued, despite relatively peaceful relations based on mutual benefits with the neighbouring countries including Greece and other Balkan countries, at least until the Cold War years. Between 1923 and 1960, 1,276,925 migrants settled in Turkey, about 98 per cent of whom were from the Balkans (see Table 1). The factors generating Muslim emigration were mainly political instability in the countries of origin; mistrust and implicit and explicit discriminatory policies of the governments; close religious, cultural and in most cases linguistic affinities with Turkey; sometimes kinship and familial ties between immigration pioneers and those left behind; and Turkey's generous admission policy.

The Law on Settlement (*Iskan Kanunu*) that came into effect in 1934 specifies that only those of Turkish descent and culture (*Türk soyu ve kültürü*) can migrate to and settle in Turkey. The law gives the authority to the Council of Ministers to decide who can qualify as belonging to Turkish ethnicity and culture (Kirişçi 1995). But the nation-state (or nationalist) concept of the new law did not change the traditional admission policy in practice; Muslims have been considered eligible for the given criteria. Thus, 'people from Turkish speaking communities in the Balkans as well as many Albanians, Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks and Tatars have benefited from this law' (cited in Kirişçi 1995: 61).

Migration of German academics. A distinguished migratory movement, though not in terms of its numbers, to Turkey involved refugee German academics and took place in 1933. When the Turkish government was faced with a lack of adequate academic personnel to implement its 1933 University Reform Program – aiming to modernise the only university of that time the Istanbul *Darülfünun* (later known as the Istanbul University) inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and to expand academic education fields – considered German academics opposing Hitler as a timely option. The Ankara government attracted German academics by offering political asylum and work. In addition to the Germans,

some Austrian and a few Italian, French and Hungarian anti-fascist academics also took refuge in Turkey (Widmann 1973).

Although refugee academics were initially granted two-, three- or five-year work contracts, their work was appreciated by the host and they stayed until the end of the war. Some of them even stayed longer (Widmann 1973; Sayar 1991).

The number of German refugee academics (including Austrians) who worked at the Istanbul University between 1933 and 1945 was 98, a considerable number of whom had been senior professors in Germany. In Ankara, in the same period there were 28 German and 18 Austrian refugee academics, as well as some refugee experts, particularly Germans, working at the governmental institutions (Widmann 1973: 100, 131–32, 167).

In Ankara, aside from the refugee academics there was also a group of 21 non-refugee German professors who were brought to work in 1933 through the official channels; by 1942, however, they had left Turkey (Widmann 1973: 35–41). Another group of non-refugee Germans in Turkey during the same period were archaeologists who were attached to the Deutsche Archäologische Institut in Istanbul (Neumark 1980: 95).

German academics played a considerable role in the reorganisation of Istanbul University, the formation of Ankara University and Ankara State Conservatory. The refugee academics, for example, not only taught, did research and published scientific material, but they were also involved in weekly conferences of the Istanbul University for the public as well. Thus, they influenced university students and young Turkish academics as well as public life in Istanbul and Ankara (Widmann 1973; Sayar 1991; Peukert 1997). Most of those refugees who returned to Germany after the war maintained their ties with Turkey, and initiated the establishment of partnership between their new universities in Germany and the former ones in Turkey.

All these contributed to a familiarisation of the higher educated segments of Turkish society and even ordinary people in Istanbul and Ankara with Germany in particular and with the West in general. Various contacts between certain social organisations of Turkey and Germany in the second half of the 1950s enhanced familiarisation of the Turks with Germany.⁸ Widmann (1973), who himself worked as an academic at the University of Ankara between 1961 and 1965, indicates that in the early 1960s there was a special friendship with Germans among the Turks.

Labour migration from Turkey in the initial years (1960–1963) went only to Germany but not, for example, to France which at that time was pursuing an open-door policy towards migrant workers (Böhning 1983: 162). In the initial years more than 60 per cent of Turkish workers in Germany were from Istanbul, Ankara and their vicinities. And 33.3 per cent of the Turkish migrant workers had graduated from secondary school or higher education in their country of origin (Abadan 1964: 26, 61). In 1968, the number of Turkish medical doctors working abroad was 2,600 (that is 22.4 per cent of the total in Turkey); 37 per cent were in Germany and 27 per cent in the USA (Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz 1986: 480). By the same year, the number of Turkish engineers and architects working abroad was 1,462 (9.6 per cent of those in Turkey), of them 38 per cent were in the USA and the UK, 35 per cent in Germany and Switzerland (Oğuzkan 1976: 84–85).

Consequently, German academic migration to Turkey seems to have played a part in the formation of both the initial wave of labour migration to Germany as

well as the migration of high-level manpower to Germany and other advanced industrialised countries.

Migration from Turkey

The first migration movement from Turkey involved the emigration of the above-mentioned Anatolian Greek-Orthodox who were subject to the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece. In addition, an unspecified number of other non-Muslims (Armenians and Jews) also left Turkey voluntarily (i.e. without being subject to forced-emigration) in the same early years of the new Turkey (Arı 1995). However, because the number of non-Muslims in Anatolia had drastically decreased in the decade after 1914, with Turkey becoming about 98 per cent Muslim, the potential for non-economic migration from Turkey was not great in this period. According to the first comprehensive census of new Turkey conducted in 1927, distribution of the total population of 13,629,488 by mother tongue went as follows: 11,777,810 Turkish; 1,184,446 Kurdish; 134,273 Arabic; 119,810 Greek; 95,901 Circassian; 64,745 Armenian; 68,900 Jewish; 20,254 Bulgarian; 163,037 others (T.C. *Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü* 1929: LXXIV).

In view of economic difficulties, provoked largely by the world-wide depression, the Ankara assembly in 1932 reserved a wide range of professions and trades for Turkish citizens. By 1935, out of 26,431 Greek nationals residing and working in Istanbul, some 10,000 had left Turkey for Greece (Alexandris 1992: 185).

According to Geray neither Turkish nor international records indicate any emigration from Turkey between 1927 and 1948 (1962: 6), though it is hard to interpret this as evidence that there was no emigration at all. From the late 1940s onward, however, due to the similar causes of immigration to Turkey, and the implicit plan of the Turkish government to diminish the economic power of non-Muslims (e.g., the Capital Tax of 1942), the emigration of minorities from Turkey had become evident and thus their numbers in Turkey have constantly declined.

The most obvious case involved the emigration of 33,159 Jews to Israel between 1948 and 1950 (Weiker 1988: 22). However, generally speaking, their departure was because of ideological-religious and economic 'pull' factors, notwithstanding the existence of some 'push' factors. The first group of these emigrants, who constituted the majority, were members of the poor and the lower class Jews in Turkey; and the second group were those 'who could be called the young idealists' (Weiker 1988: 19–31).

From 1923 to 1960, 182,585 people emigrated from Turkey (Geray 1962: 6), including those Anatolian Greeks who were subject to the exchange of populations but excluding citizens of Greece living and working in Istanbul.

Conclusions

Labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe between 1960 and 1974 is not Turkey's first participation in international migratory movements. Turkey had in fact experienced an almost uninterrupted series of both mass inflows and outflows of people beginning in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and continuing until 1960.

The scale of non-economic migrations particularly during the 1783–1922 period, which were caused by conquest, war and/or forced expulsion, was immense involving approximately eight million people. Some 5–7 million Muslims (mainly Turks, Tatars and Circassians as well as a much smaller number of other Muslims such as Chechens and Pomaks) fled from the Crimea, the Balkans and the Caucasus to the Ottoman lands; whereas about 1,500,000 Christians (Armenians and Greeks) fled from the Ottoman lands. Only less than half of the immigrants whom the Ottoman government received were the Sultan's subjects coming from lost territories. The final destination of nearly all immigrations and the place of the emigrations were in fact the territory of today's Turkey, though they occurred during the sultanate Turkey or Ottoman Empire era. There were usually religious (for example, in the case of the Circassians), and in some cases also linguistic and cultural affinities (for example, in the case of Tatars and the Balkan Turks) between emigrants and their destinations. There were non-economic migrations of non-Muslims to the Ottoman Empire as well. The significance of these movements was not their numerical size, in this respect they were small, but the reflection of the Ottoman government's open door policy concerning those who were forced to leave Christian countries for political or religious reasons. Immigration played an important role in the nation-building process in Turkey. A study reveals, for example, that 30 per cent of the total population of Turkey in the 1970s were grandchildren of those immigrants who arrived in Turkey in the nineteenth century (Pamuk 1994: 223).

In the 1783–1922 period, economic migration to the Ottoman Empire was insignificant, despite the Ottoman government having introduced a liberal immigration code in 1857 to attract emigrants from Europe. Economic migration from the Ottoman Empire, however, was impressive. The most, and only, important case involved the migration of an estimated 1,200,000 Ottoman subjects to North and South America during the 1860–1914 period; one-third of them subsequently returned. Ottoman Christians constituted an overwhelming majority in this mass migration; the proportion of Muslims is estimated at only 15–20 per cent, of which the Turks (or Turkish-speaking Muslims) held about 2 per cent. Internal mobility of Turkish-speaking Muslims within the Empire almost did not lead to their external mobility. Also, instead of establishing social networks with their country of origin to pave the way for chain migrations, Turkish migrants in the host countries either returned or blended into the host societies. The main and explanatory reason for these was that the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a periphery of the Europe-centred world economy did not diminish long-standing ethno-religious, ideological and cultural alienation, and thus sociological distance between the West and the Turks, on the contrary, went hand in hand with the perpetuation and reproduction of these forms of alienation. On the other hand, intensive economic, social, juridical and cultural linkages between the Ottoman Christians and the West, and wide ranging activities of the American missionaries particularly among the Arabs and Armenians yielded to the higher mobility and strong involvement of the Ottoman Christians in the migration to the Americas. The case indicates that the incorporation of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country into the orbit of core countries as a periphery may exert different impacts on the external mobility of different ethno-religious groups in the periphery. The case also suggests that ethno-religious, ideological and cultural factors may inhibit an international economic migration, even if all other predisposing factors are present.

In the 1923–1960 period, there was no economic migration to and from Turkey with the exception of the migration of high-level professionals from Turkey to the USA and Western Europe which began in the 1950s. However, the republican Turkey continued to receive Turkish and Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus. During these years the scale of in-migration was far larger than that of out-migration, because the percentage of non-Muslims had already gone down to about 2 per cent in the beginning of the period. Thus the republican Turkey in these years was a typical immigration country. There is clear and uninterrupted continuity between non-economic migrations of Ottoman Turkey and republican Turkey. Yet, unlike the Ottoman era, the main causes of the migrations in the republican era were mistrust, implicit and explicit discrimination, and the dynamics of already-established migration.

There is, however, neither continuity nor, except in one case, any relation between the migrations of the pre-1960 period and the post-1960 labour migration to Western Europe, the latter having its own entirely separate system. The only relation between the two is that the migration of German and German-speaking academics (most of whom were refugees) to Turkey played a certain role in the formation of the initial wave of labour migration to Germany as well as the migration of high-level professionals to Germany and other industrialised Western countries.

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Notes

- 1 McGowan gives a higher figure for the initial wave of Tatar refugees: 'between 1770 and 1784, in what may have been the single greatest surge of migration during the eighteenth century, up to 200,000 Tatars emigrated out of the reach of the Russians' (1994: 650). His figure may be reflecting the total number of Tatar emigrants, from the Crimea as well as other regions, such as Kazan.
- 2 Karpat gives the number of people who took refuge in the remaining Ottoman territories as 'about 1,500,000' (1985a: 75).
- 3 McCarthy (1990) in his study on the population of Palestine, analysing available statistics (the Ottoman statistics, the European statistics of the Ottoman period, the Mandate statistics, and the Zionist statistics) reaches rather a different conclusion: in 1880, 87 per cent of Ottoman citizens in Palestine were Muslim; and in 1914, 83 per cent. The total Jewish population (including non-citizen Jews) of Palestine in 1914 was approximately 60,000. And, Jewish migration to Palestine gained significance only after 1922, i.e., when the region came under British rule.
- 4 The terms 'big powers' or 'great powers' is commonly used within historiography to denote powerful European countries of the period roughly from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the (end of) the First World War. During the first three quarters of the nineteenth century Austria, the UK, France and Russia were considered to be the big powers. These countries were then joined by Germany and, during the last two decades, Italy.
- 5 Although it is difficult to establish the exact number making up each ethnic group in the Empire, Turks constituted the largest community. Davison cautiously suggests that the ethnic composition of the Empire in the 1840s was as follows: Turks made up 35 per cent, Arabs 14 per cent (including Egypt, Cyrenaica, and Tripolitania), Romanians 11 per cent, Serbs and Croats 9 per cent, Bulgars 8 per cent, Armenians 6 per cent, Greeks 5 per cent (after independent Greece fell away in 1830), Kurds unknown, and others (1992: 20).

- 6 Pesmazoglou states that 'the Ottoman presence [became] a polarising element of European consciousness, a contrasting yardstick for its own distinctive values. The presence of the Ottoman Turk [became] the catalyst for a process of self-examination'. He also adds that:

... in the 17th century 200 books were published by travellers who toured the East, originally at the authors' expense and then, later, financed by the various states. The stereotyped picture of the Turk in these accounts is predictably monotonous and black: lazy, apathetic, cowardly, cruel, paedophile, sodomite. (1995: 8)

- 7 The new ethno-religious division of labour clearly revealed itself, for example, in the allocation of jobs in the Anatolian railroads. By 1908, the highest and most lucrative posts were occupied by Europeans (especially Germans including German-speaking Swiss and Austrians) who represented capital; half of the middle-level positions were held by Europeans, and the other half by the Ottoman Christians (Armenians and Greeks); Muslim Turks performed the lowest categories of work (Quataert 1983: 72–93).
- 8 The perception of Germany's position in relation to the Ottoman Empire among, at least, a certain group of Turks might also have played a role in this process of familiarisation. Because Germany, as a latecomer on the scene of imperialism, banked on the central Ottoman government rather than the Christian minorities to pursue its interests in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, during his official visit to the Ottoman Empire in 1898 declared that he was the best friend of Muslims in the Empire as well as the whole world. Also, the Ottoman Empire was in alliance with Germany in the First World War.

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