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7. How individual- and national-level power resources shape social rights take-up, spending and outcomes

Brian Burgoon, Marius R. Busemeyer and Gianna Maria Eick

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores empirically the claim at the heart of this volume's collective argument that social rights outcomes rest upon "power resources" available to citizens – not only normative resources that confer *de jure* social rights, but also what we have called "instrumental" and "enforcement" resources that capacitate a person's access to such rights. The chapter's study of this claim uses quantitative information at both the individual and national levels relevant to social rights resources, outputs, and outcomes, focusing on the social rights realms of worker unemployment and employment. Using such information, the chapter asks whether and how the volume's resource-based framework stands up to empirical scrutiny: Do various measures of power resources empirically spur, or at least positively correlate with, subsequent social policy participation, with actual spending on employment-related social policies, and with favorable employment-related outcomes?

The chapter's answers to this question focus partly on well-known measures in the labor market realm – such as output-related spending on unemployment insurance (UI), on early childhood education and care (ECEC), and on maternal/paternal/parental leave, as well as measures of social rights outcomes of poverty and employment rates. However, we also focus on less studied issues of benefit access, including measures of *social benefit take-up* in these policy realms – that is, actual participation in or reliance on unemployment insurance, ECEC, and parental leave programs. Most importantly, the chapter explores how such take-up and spending outputs, and employment and poverty outcomes, might be shaped by measures of normative, instrumental, and enforcement power resources. Our measures of such resources

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include individual-level characteristics like a person's education, income, and union affiliation that make it easier to navigate social benefit systems. But our resource measures also include national-level conditions that constitute power resources – such as social benefit online portals, awareness campaigns, union density and coverage, and legal transparency conferring instrumental resources, as well as judicial non-corruption and inspection capacities conferring enforcement resources.

Using such measures, the chapter presents explanatory evidence in two steps. First, it gives quantitative descriptive and inferential evidence to clarify how and whether the national-level measures of resources are associated with social rights outputs with respect to social benefit take-up and spending, as well as social rights outcomes with respect to employment and poverty rates. Second, the chapter then digs deeper into how resources relate to take-up in social rights realization – with analysis of individual-level survey data that allow more controlled and extensive analysis of the conditions under which target groups of unemployment benefits get access to and make use of such benefits. Such survey data clarify how normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources, measured at both the micro-individual level and the macro-national level, moderate an individual-level estimate of social policy take-up: the chances that an unemployed citizen accesses unemployment insurance benefits.

These analyses unearth broad descriptive and inferential evidence that power resources facilitate social rights realization, in line with our and the broader volume's expectations. The analysis of national macro-level patterns suggests that settings with more generous UI, ECEC, and parental leave benefits tend to have slightly higher estimated take-up rates than do settings with less generous benefits, and that national-level instrumental and enforcement resources also tend to spur such estimated national-level take-up rates. It also shows that the same national-level measures of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources are associated with higher employment rates and lower poverty rates – primarily but not only via their implications for social benefit spending. More importantly, perhaps, the chapter's analysis of the individual survey data indicates that normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources tend to increase the likelihood that unemployed individuals actually rely upon unemployment insurance transfers. Such information and analyses, of course, capture only a slice of social rights realization and the roles that power resources play in such realization – most obviously because of the data limits on such national-level and individual-level resources. However, the patterns clarify the volume's collective claim that power resources are crucial to Europe's social rights realization that is central to the European Pillar of Social Rights.

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The chapter proceeds in four steps. The second section lays out our central expectations that flow from the volume's resource-based framework of social rights realization – where normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources can be expected to shape key social rights outputs like benefit take-up and actual spending, and thereby foster better social rights outcomes. The third section summarizes the key measures used in our exploration of this broad set of claims – including both individual-level micro information about resources and take-up, as well as national-level macro information about normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources, take-up, spending, and outcomes. The fourth section then develops both the macro-level analysis of national-level patterns, as well as the micro-level analysis of survey data. Finally, the fifth section concludes.

THEORIZING HOW POWER RESOURCES PLAY OUT FOR SOCIAL RIGHTS OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES

Understanding the state of social rights in Europe involves understanding a complex of political, legal, social, and economic facets of human experience. In our conception, social rights realization resides in the *power resources* that individuals in a society possess (knowingly or not). As discussed in the previous chapters of this volume (see also Vandenbroucke et al., 2021), we focus on three kinds of power resources: normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources. *Normative resources* include the *de jure* legal regulations, broadly held ideational standards (shared judgments of deservingness and living standards), and regulations, policies, and "deontic" edicts that legitimate and mandate rights as parts of rules of law. They can be more or less generous to target recipients and more or less complicated in their character and provision – with the most generous provisions sometimes entailing more conditionality, procedures, and complexity to access. *Instrumental resources* involve the individual-, meso-, and macro-level conditions (including national- and EU-level provisions) that facilitate the ability and willingness of individuals to actually claim or take up those *de jure* rights. They can be individually inherited or learned capacities of people, and they can be provisions at any level of governance that, intended or not, facilitate making use of normative resources. Finally, *enforcement resources* reside in conditions that foster or ensure oversight and enforcement of both *de jure*/deontic standards and their take-up. They can again be features providing monitoring/inspection and enforcement/policing of standards to be upheld and legal recourse to allow a citizen rights-holder to hold a system or other people to account to uphold rights provisions.

The broad conviction animating this chapter and the broader volume is that social rights reside importantly, perhaps fundamentally, on the quality of this complex of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources. A person in a particular place of work and living can be said to be more or less adorned

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with social rights by understanding the extent, quality, and interconnection of that person's normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources. However, the state of social rights depends – more obviously, perhaps – on the extent to which such *resources* actually foster and give rise to social rights *outputs* and *outcomes* that capture the realization of social rights.

Social rights realization is likely to involve normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources leading to or being accompanied by policy use and practices that are social rights outputs – such as patterns of participation in, or take-up of, social policies, as well as patterns of social policy spending as shares of GDP or per head of a policy's target group. And when all is said and done with such resources and outputs, however, the proof of the pudding of social rights realization is in the eating – in the actual outcomes of human flourishing or suffering that make social rights meaningful. Such social rights outcomes are most obviously conceptualized and empirically explored with respect to material measures of such flourishing or suffering. Commentators, citizens, and politicians judge outcomes in terms of poverty rates or individual experience of poverty, in terms of employment, having meaningful and fairly paid work or access to work, and in terms of actual or possible movement up the class or income hierarchies, i.e., the professional ladders of the good life.

While our describing of social rights outputs and outcomes is part of understanding the state of affairs of social rights realization, our main interest is in clarifying whether and how social rights realization involves resources having causal implications for take-up, use, or implementation of benefit provisions (social rights outputs), in turn collectively leading to spending effort outputs and thereby also social rights outcomes. Figure 7.1 captures the line of



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Figure 7.1 Social rights resources, outputs, and outcomes

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relationships that we think is key to understanding social rights realization. It graphically summarizes our simple and broadest expectation: that normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources should foster higher take-up rates, higher spending effort outputs, and in turn be associated with, and maybe even cause, better social rights outcomes.

First and perhaps most fundamentally, we argue that normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources are likely to matter in shaping how individuals behave in the presence of policies and socio-economic positions – including their decisions and abilities to participate in social benefits that might be available *de jure* (as a normative resource, that can be more or less generous as an element of social rights). The normative resources themselves can also be expected to positively shape social policy take-up – as citizens should be more motivated to navigate and try to access social benefit systems when there is more to gain from doing so. Also, studies of universality in social benefit systems suggest that generosity goes hand in hand with easily navigated benefit access (Rothstein, 1998). However, this possible positive take-up effect of normative or deontic resources is far from automatic, since potentially benefiting from a generous program is not the same as actually accessing it. Indeed, it may be that a more generous social benefit program (constituting a larger "normative resource") might entail more layers of benefit options, bureaucratic complexity, and conditionality.

Hence, we are particularly suspect that instrumental resources, though also perhaps enforcement resources, positively shape social policy take-up. For instance, one can expect that individual-level instrumental resources involving educational experience or organizational assistance influence whether a person has the capacity to navigate the bureaucratic steps necessary to take advantage of a given social policy service or benefit. And one can expect that meso- or macro-level provisions or actions by actors, including governments, can confer enforcement or instrumental resources to make such navigation possible or worthwhile – as with more or less extensive outreach or awareness campaigns to ready a populace for existing social provisions or standards, or with systems of transparent reporting and policy evaluation.

Second, we argue that such take-up patterns – however much and in whatever ways they are rooted in power resources – are likely to give rise to more policy outputs manifested in spending on transfers and services, and interventions to promote social justice more generally. In the social policy realm, this link is almost automatic in nature, in that actual implementation of many policies and the spending effort accompanying them requires that citizens sign up for and use these policies – whether we are talking about unemployment or pension benefits, parental leave rights, healthcare or disability subsidies, or childcare services. More take-up should be a stepping stone to more actual policy effort.

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Third and finally, we argue that the actual spending and other macro-level outputs should shape measures of social rights outcomes. Such spending measures in fact should reflect the accretion of normative resources and take-up, and thereby carry their potential causal impact – this in addition to the visibility of actual macro-level spending measures of welfare outputs. From the point of view of gauging the roots of social rights outcomes, it is likely more appropriate to focus on spending per head of the targeted/eligible group rather than as a share of GDP – as the former is closer to the effects of policy interventions for particular societal groups.

Whatever the particular causal chain at work, our main expectation is that any of the micro- or macro-level measures of instrumental, normative, or enforcement resources should be positively associated with better social rights outputs and outcomes.[1] These are the direct-effect expectations informing our analysis below. We can also expect, however, that measures of resources can have indirect or complicated connections to one another than the linear and one-way pathway suggested by Figure 7.1. For instance, substantial normative resources in the form of easily qualified-for, no-waiting-time, long-lasting, and generous unemployment insurance may induce an unemployed person to actually claim such benefits, shown in higher take-up rates, to the extent that the unemployed people have instrumental resources to know about and go through the administrative steps to access a defined benefit (Vandenbroucke et al., 2018). In this way, the relationships between resources and outputs are more complicated. Similarly, resources can also moderate how take-up or spending outputs affect actual outcomes, or have implications for social rights outcomes that are direct – that is, do not have effects on outcomes via resources' effects for take-up and spending as the causal chain summarized in Figure 7.1 simplifies.

While our general expectations are quite straightforward, it is important to know that existing research – including our own – has hitherto provided little traction to test them. The rest of this chapter reports on attempts to remedy that situation and provide such traction. Our focus is on finding sources of data to measure social rights resources, outputs, and outcomes that can support inferences about the links heuristically summarized in Figure 7.1. This is akin to illustrating and testing the causal chain implied by our resource-based framework on social rights outcomes in Europe.

Our analysis focuses on important slices of social rights resources, outputs, and outcomes relevant to European social rights generally and the European Pillar of Social Rights particularly. We focus on the social rights realms close to labor market experience – for employed and unemployed people – partly

[1] The aim of our analysis is not to judge which particular resources are more important than others, but this may be an important question for future research.

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because these are realms for which we have quality data measures that allow for comparisons between individuals as well as across time and space. This focus means analyzing normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources relevant to the terms of work and employment, and of benefits for those who find themselves unemployed – those who do not have, but want and are seeking, work. It also means analyzing labor-related social rights outputs, like actual participation in or take-up of rights, as well as spending on various kinds of employment or unemployment benefits. And it means analyzing well-known measures of social right outcomes like whether a person is employed (aggregated to employment rates in a country) and whether people (working or otherwise) are at risk of poverty (aggregated to poverty rates in a country).

Our focus on all these matters concerns the position of any citizens facing employment and unemployment – not focusing, for instance, on the positions of particular groups and rights of equal access regardless of gender or ethnic background. And more biting, our focus is on resources, outputs, and outcomes at the individual level and *national* macro level – the latter being national-level legal, policy, and organizational measures of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources; patterns of participation and spending that are national-level measures of take-up; and employment and poverty rates that are national-level measures of outcomes.

To be sure, such a focus on general labor market social rights realization ignores large swathes of particular social rights and conditions – from workplace safety to housing to education. And focusing on national-level provisions also ignores the role of meso-level – say resources at the level of a province or community or economic sector – and at the supra-national European level, particularly the rapid and important developments in EU-level normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources. What we get in return for such selective, partial analysis is more clarity about an important social rights realm where data availability allows us to trace the steps of how social rights resources play out in Figure 7.1's chain of social rights realization.

In particular, we can analyze existing aggregate national-level and individual-level data to empirically explore our resource-centered expectations: that measures of social rights resources (normative, instrumental, and enforcement) are meaningfully related to measures of social benefit take-up and spending outputs, as well as measures of employment and poverty outcomes. Before turning to the analysis, we need some clarity on how to measure the key, if selective, elements of social rights realization.

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DATA ON AND MEASURES OF (SELECTED) SOCIAL RIGHTS RESOURCES, OUTPUTS, AND OUTCOMES

Our measures of employment-related social rights outcomes, outputs, and resources rely on a combination of aggregate national-level and individual-level data. The aggregate national-level data provide leverage to gauge measures of normative, instrumental, and enforcement *resources*, measures of (aggregate take-up and spending) *outputs* and measures of *outcomes* that are comparable over time and space in and beyond Europe. The micro, individual-level data allow us to measure individual-level instrumental resources. But they also, mainly, provide leverage to measure individual-level estimates of social benefit take-up (particularly of unemployment insurance benefits), and better assess how both national- and individual-level normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources influence such estimated take-up. These data come from a wide range of sources, but many of the macro-level measures are combined into the Comparative Social Citizenship Database (CSCD) (Eick et al., 2021; Eick et al., 2022; original data sources itemized below).

Measuring Upstream from Outcomes, to Spending Outputs, to Take-up Outputs

Outcomes

Our snapshots of social rights outcomes relevant to employment and unemployment are two widely studied and measured aggregate measures of political economic flourishing versus suffering: first, the *employment rate*, which is defined as the percentage of the civilian active population in employment, available between 1993 and 2018 (Eurostat, 2023a); and, second, the *at-risk-of-poverty rate*, i.e., the percentage of persons with an equivalized disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold (60% of the national median equivalized disposable income) after social transfers – available from 2001 to 2019 (Eurostat, 2023b). Appendix Table 7.A1 summarizes these outcome measures and all other (output and resources) variables used in our national-level analysis.

Spending effort outputs

One step causally upstream from Figure 7.1's stream of social rights realization is spending output measures. We are interested in the consequences of social benefit spending for outcomes, and naturally in how such spending outcomes are shaped by more upstream dynamics (take-up and, of course, power resources) – ideally addressing particular target employed and unemployed target groups. We therefore focus on spending *effort*, where the spending is per

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head of the target group. The baseline measures of this sort are drawn from Ronchi (2018) (the SIWE dataset), spanning 1995 to 2018. *UI spending effort* is the spending on unemployment insurance and redundancy programs, normalized by total unemployed persons. *ECEC spending effort* is spending on in-kind child benefits, mainly early childcare services and education, normalized by the number of children (0–5) (OECD, 2022, own calculations). And *Mat./Pat. Leave effort* shown is based on maternal and paternal leave spending, normalized by birth rate (logged), spanning 1980 to 2019 (OECD 2022, own calculations). Finally, *total social spending* effort is a standardized scale of all the SIWE categories (child, old-age, work, and sickness/health effort).

To provide a sense of the national variation of the outcome and spending output measures, Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of each theme-specific measure of spending effort on the horizontal axes, set against our two measures of employment rate (upper panel Figure 7.2a) and poverty rate outcomes (lower panel Figure 7.2b) on the vertical axes. We can observe the usual pattern of social spending effort, particularly for UI and ECEC, where the southern European and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) manifest



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Figure 7.2a Spending outputs and employment rate outcomes

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

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Figure 7.2b Spending outputs and at-risk-of-poverty-rate outcomes

substantially less spending effort than their northern European counterparts. And we can observe that there is a similar skew in the *employment rate* and *at-risk-of-poverty rate* on the vertical axes – with the better outcomes (high employment rates and low at-risk-of-poverty rates) clustered in the northern European settings and the worse outcomes clustered in southern European and CEEC settings. The actual relationships between spending effort and outcomes are the subjects of extensive study, obviating the need to explore them fully here. But we expect and see that, descriptively, more spending effort tends to correlate with higher employment rates and lower at-risk-of-poverty rates – the main exception being the non-significant negative association between parental leave spending effort and poverty.

Estimated take-up outputs

Causally upstream from spending outputs and outcomes are measures of the actual participation in social benefit programs – or what is often termed social benefit take-up. Such take-up measures, of course, enter into what gets measured downstream with respect to actual spending on programs just discussed.

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But estimating take-up directly is crucial to understanding social policy outputs – particularly so as to clarify social rights realization that we argue involves citizens that may or may not have the resources to take advantage of the normative resources captured by the *de jure* generosity measures. The problem is that measuring take-up in a way that fully distinguishes those fully eligible or not, and those actually using a benefit to which they are entitled turns out to be very hard in general, and particularly for comparing take-up rates across countries over time – as is important for the present analysis. Hence, we construct or rely on rough national-level estimates of program participation, or "pseudo" take-up, that do not fully distinguish the fully eligible from ineligible but *do* capture program participation of target groups at the level of a country and year for our study of social rights outcomes. In particular, we consider three direct, national-level macro measures of such social benefit (pseudo) take-up for the policy realms, respectively, of unemployment insurance, parental leave, and ECEC. First, *estimated UI take-up (OECD)* is based on the "pseudo" coverage rates, focused on people receiving unemployment insurance and assistance benefits (mostly categorized as UI and a few as active labor market policy (ALMP) as a share of "unemployed" (based on International Labor Organization (ILO) definitions) (OECD, 2021).[2] Second, *estimated Mother/Father/Parent leave take-up* measures the standardized average number of parents making use of maternal or paternal leave benefits in a country, per 100 live births (OECD, 2023b). Third, *estimated ECEC take-up* is based on the average of the standardized percentages of children enrolled in early childhood education and care services: the percentage for 0–2-year-olds (ISCED 0 and other registered ECEC services), and the percentage for 3–5-year-olds (ISCED 2011 level 0) or primary education (ISCED 2011 level 1) (OECD, 2023a, 2023b, 2023c). *Estimated UI take-up* and *estimated ECEC take-up* correlate positively with one another, as do the estimated ECEC and leave take-up; but estimated UI and leave take-up are negatively correlated.

To visualize the association between take-up output measures, Figure 7.3 shows the distribution of each theme-specific measure of take-up (horizontal axis) set against its counterpart spending output measure (vertical axis), which is causally downstream from take-up. We see a familiar pattern of social spending effort, particularly for UI (middle panel) and ECEC (center panel),

[2] As noted by Burgoon (2022), the "pseudo" of *estimated UI take-up* lies in the participation patterns. Reported shares can exceed 100% because some measured recipients may not be registered as unemployed (and some "unemployed" may not be eligible for benefits). The EU LFS data discussion has reported that about 23% of UI recipients in 2012 were working, while 40% were jobless but not officially unemployed by ILO standards. Unemployment benefit recipient counts, hence, include people not actively looking for work (OECD, 2021).

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

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Figure 7.3 *Spending effort and take-up/participation rates by social benefit theme*

that southern European and CEEC countries manifest substantially less spending effort than their northern European counterparts.

Precisely because measuring take-up at the national level is roughly estimated, our study's empirical measurement of social benefit take-up also considers micro-level individual data, based on the probability that an unemployed individual actually depends on unemployment insurance as a significant source of his or her household income, and whether an older (60+) individual actually depends on pension benefits – after controlling for a range of other characteristics of an individual and his or her place of residence. The individual-level data on which we focus for such conceptualization and measurement of take-up are from the European Social Survey (ESS), providing multi-country, multi-year data with excellent sampling properties and well-framed questions on individual characteristics and attitudes related to the welfare state (ESS, 2008; ESS, 2016; ESS, 2020).[3] These data are not so much useful to generate (alternative

[3] We focus particularly on ESS waves with questions on social rights attitudes – ESS round 4 (2008) and 8 (2016) – but also the most recent available round 10 (2020).

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measures of) national-level averages of take-up, but more because they allow much more valid judgment of how resources influence the probability of an unemployed person to actually rely upon, i.e., to take up, unemployment benefits (more on this below). Appendix Table 7.A2, in any event, summarizes all the variables used in our individual-level analysis.

Selective Normative, Instrumental, and Enforcement Resources

Most important for this chapter's and volume's arguments about social rights realization are the *power resources* that we suspect foster the aforementioned social rights (take-up and spending) outputs and (poverty and employment) outcomes. The three broad conceptual categories of such resources on which we focus – normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources – have particular and complementary relevance to realization of social citizenship. However, such power resources have also been subject to much less empirical and conceptual development in the study of social policy and social rights across the legal, humanities, and social science fields (Keune et al., 2023; Ferrera et al., 2023).

The selected measures on which we shall focus are national-level normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources, plus some individual-level instrumental resource conditions that allow comparison across countries and time. These should not only be seen – as noted above – as selective in their ambit (excluding for instance EU-level resources or sector-specific or region-specific resources). They should also be seen as work-in-progress, in that the many conceptual aspects of such resources are hard to measure systematically – that is, validly and reliably capturing the many important and disparate conditions that constitute power resources in our conceptual framework. The measures we construct for this chapter are those for which existing empirical sources allow quantitative operationalization and comparison. A few are characteristics distinctly relevant to social policy access, but most are conditions often studied in other contexts that we judge as particularly relevant national-level or individual-level capacities conferring and constituting normative, instrumental, or enforcement resources for social rights realization. Finally, the resources on which we focus are important to employment and unemployment social rights

The dataset combining 2008 and 2016 provides information from nearly 100,000 respondents in 32 European countries, including 26 EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and Ukraine. Coverage is smaller for some aspects of our analysis; we report results for the fullest sample for which data are available for the respective story.

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realization, but also relevant to many other kinds of social rights outputs and outcomes beyond this chapter's employment and unemployment realm.

Normative resources

Our main measures of normative/deontic resources are metrics of social policy generosity in several social benefit realms relevant to the take-up and spending outputs discussed above: unemployment insurance; maternal-paternal or parental leave; and early childhood education and care (ECEC). The first, *UI generosity*, is based on the sub-metrics of benefit generosity (e.g., replacement rates, waiting periods, duration, coverage, etc.) developed as part of the Social Citizenship Indicators Project (SCIP) and the overarching Social Policy Indicators Project (SPIN), available for 30 OECD countries and 22 EU member states between 1970 and 2016 (Nelson et al., 2020; cf. Scruggs & Ramalho Tafoya, 2022). We take simple standardized sums to scale the sub-measures (taking positive values that manifest more generosity and negative values for provisions manifesting less generosity). We also consider a composite of



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Figure 7.4 Normative resources in UI, ECEC, and parental leave

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UI benefits, childcare, pension, and healthcare provisions when focused on general poverty rate and employment rate outcomes for which we deem the encompassing *social benefit generosity scale* to be most relevant. The measure of *ECEC generosity* is based on OECD gauging "net childcare costs" that measure the extent to which childcare benefits/rebates and tax deductions contributions offset childcare costs per country year (OECD, 2022), available for 30 OECD countries and 26 EU member states between 1960 and 2019. Finally, the measure of *mother/father/parental leave generosity* is based on OECD social indicators of weeks of public or mandatory paid leave (OECD, 2022), with the same country coverage as UI generosity. Figure 7.4 summarizes the patterns averaged for the sample years focused on the available European Union sample. There are not clear patterns of countries tending to be consistently more generous in such distinct normative resources, and indeed *UI generosity* correlates only modestly positively with *ECEC generosity* but negatively with *parental leave generosity.*

Instrumental resources

Instrumental resources can empower citizens to navigate and take up such normative resources. Measuring instrumental resources can be difficult, particularly since we conceptualize these as attributes from the point of view of individual citizens while the most relevant are specific to social benefit administration and program design in different countries. With our available data, however, we focus on several individual features and three key macro-level features that can be seen as conferring instrumental resources relevant to social benefit take-up. The selected individual features are six generally relevant individual demographic and socio-economic status conditions that not only capture socio-economic risk but can also be expected to affect the capacities of individuals to understand, look into, and figure out how to access the social benefit bureaucracy. *Highly educated*, having completed at least some tertiary education, is relevant to cognitive ability and familiarity with more complex educational systems. *Non-low income*, having a household income above the third decile, provides time and financial resources to investigate and pursue access to program details. *Native-born*, being born in the reporting country, selects for familiarity with legal/bureaucratic and social traditions/practices relevant to social benefit navigation. *Union membership* has been shown to be relevant to providing members with informational and logistical social benefit resources, not just in Ghent-system countries (Van Rie et al., 2011; Kim & Margalit, 2017). Also at the individual level, the ESS data includes a couple of non-demographic measures that constitute instrumental resources: *Interested in politics*, the subjective degree of following and caring about public and political issues, relevant to understanding social policy bureaucracy and rules; and *Daily internet use*, which captures familiarity with

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and exposure to internet-based material that can be essential to navigating social benefit provisions.

As for the national-level macro measures of instrumental resources, we focus on three that we consider particularly relevant to take-up issues. The first is a macro-level national measure of instrumental resources, based on reporting by the European Social Policy Network (ESPN) on initiatives in European countries (including all EU member states) to improve social benefit transparency and accessibility (Spasova et al., 2022). We focus on *portals and campaigns (ESPN)*, the sum of the two standardized measures of two simple counts: social benefit campaigns counts of whether a country has existing social benefit awareness campaigns on general social benefits, unemployment provisions, ECEC provisions, pension provisions, and sickness/disability provisions; and social benefit portals counts programs where a country has existing internet portals to help citizens navigate general social policy, or a given program of social policy. The measure is based on simple counts, of course, saying nothing about the (presumably varying) quality of the campaigns and portals. And the measure is purely cross-sectional and has unspecified specific dates since the reporting shows that they include programs created many years earlier than 2020. But the measure directly captures or proxies for the concept of instrumental resources relevant to our study. Figure 7.5 summarizes *benefit portals and campaigns*, in the left-hand panel, suggesting that the usual distribution of social benefit generosity and effort does not clearly apply – with some social transfer stalwarts like Belgium and Germany being on the low end of such *portals and campaigns*, while Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia are at the high end of such resources (see Appendix Figure 7.A1 for detail of portals as opposed to social benefit campaigns).

We also consider two other macro-level country conditions that can be expected to confer instrumental resources on citizens in particular national settings. One is *informational transparency*, the index on the extent of free and independent media, budgetary transparency, and political constraints in governments (Williams, 2015), available for 30 OECD countries and 26 EU member states from 1980 to 2015. We see this as relevant to citizens having access to accurate and fair information about their own government's policies and budgets, in principle encompassing provisions relevant to tracking and understanding the administration of social policy regulations and *de jure* benefits – and in any event a proxy for informational resources to navigate assistance systems. The other is a *labor-power index*, a composite of labor representation and centralized wage bargaining (based on Visser, 2019), with the same country coverage but between 1960 and 2018. This is a classic and widely studied aspect of industrial relations and power resources in studies of political economic governance – including studies of social policy development. For us, it is relevant partly as a compositional effect of the informational

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

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Figure 7.5 Selected national-level instrumental resources

and logistical assistance involved with union membership noted above (Kim & Margalit, 2017). At the national level, labor power has often entailed traction and proxies for union representatives being able and actually helping union members and other workers to access benefits – particularly but not limited to unemployment benefits and in (former) Ghent system countries in particular (Rainbird, 2000; Scruggs, 2002). These two other macro-level conditions (center panel and right-hand panel) correlate positively with the *portals and campaigns* measure, and with each other. But they are weakly enough correlated as to suggest that the conditions capture very different aspects of national-level instrumental resources.

Enforcement resources

Finally, Figure 7.6 summarizes two country–year measures of enforcement resources. They capture different institutional realms of enforcement function. *Judicial non-corruption* is based on the expert coding of non-corruption of decisions handed down in a country's judicial system (Coppedge et al.,

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

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Figure 7.6 *Judicial non-corruption and labor inspection capacity as enforcement resources*

2020), covering 30 OECD countries and 26 EU member states between 1960 and 2019; and *labor inspection capacity*, a composite of the number of labor inspections per 10,000 workers and inspections of workplaces per year (ILO, 2020), covering 24 OECD countries and 20 EU member states between 2008 and 2018. These measures capture enforcement capacities for, respectively, the broad judicial system and labor standards – both relevant to employment-related social rights. The empirical patterns across countries (Figure 7.6's left-hand panel) suggest skews in *judicial non-corruption* and *labor inspection capacity* that track broader and composite measures of state capacity. But the patterns show variation without any familiar regional skew (e.g., high for Germany, Spain, and Romania, but modest for France and Sweden). The over-time trends (not shown) indicate increasing enforcement with respect to judicial non-corruption but modestly declining labor inspection capacity. Once again, the two enforcement measures are positively but only weakly correlated, suggesting that they capture quite distinct enforcement resources.

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EMPIRICALLY GAUGING HOW RESOURCES SHAPE SOCIAL RIGHTS TAKE-UP, SPENDING, AND OUTCOMES

Using such measures, we can analyze how our resources measures play out for estimated take-up and spending outputs, and for employment rate and poverty outcomes. We do so in two steps. The first step focuses purely on the national-level country–year information to assess such playing-out. It gives descriptive and aggregate quantitative evidence suggesting that national-level measures of resources are positively associated with social rights outputs with respect to social benefit take-up and spending, and also with social rights outcomes with respect to employment and poverty rates. The second step is to use the micro-level survey data to dig deeper into how resources relate to take-up. This allows more controlled and extensive analysis of how normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources, measured at both the micro-individual level and the macro-national level, affect the chances that an unemployed or pension-age citizen actually makes use of unemployment insurance and pension benefits. In all cases, we present and discuss in the main text graphical summaries of the results, relegating fuller presentation of the quantitative models to the Appendix.

Macro-level Exploration: Country-level Resources and UI, ECEC, and Parental Leave Take-up

To explore how national-level measures of resources might be associated with, or even perhaps shape, social rights outputs and outcomes, we consider descriptive patterns and the summary results of simple inferential regression models. Our analysis here is meant to be illustrative, foregoing a wide range of more extensive modeling design issues and opting instead for a simple and intuitive estimation approach. That approach involves regression models where we regress the outcome of interest (e.g., UI take-up rates) on a given normative, instrumental, or enforcement measure – taking each resource measure separately given limits on degrees of freedom. The models are ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors, and we address endogeneity and omitted variable bias by lagging the explanatory factor of interest and including controls for economic growth, trade openness, left government, dependent population, and EU membership.

Consider first how our aforementioned national-level measures of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources are associated with patterns of UI, ECEC, and parental leave take-up. Figure 7.7 provides a first snapshot, visually mapping the bivariate relationship between the three respective generosity measures of normative resources on the one hand, and its counterpart

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

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Figure 7.7 *Take-up/participation rates and generosity measures associated per social benefit theme*

measure of take-up on the other. Consistent with expectations, these three measures of normative resources are modestly positively associated with their counterpart take-up measures. This makes sense in that, as noted in Section 2, more generous programs offer more to gain through participation, even though participation can be complicated and costly – as participation in more generous social benefits may come with additional layers of benefits and bureaucratic administration to navigate.

Our fuller national-level analysis of how resources are associated with take-up patterns is summarized in Figure 7.8. The figure provides a snapshot of the key results of regression models focused on our measures of UI take-up (left-hand panel), ECEC take-up (middle panel), and parental leave take-up (right-hand panel). For each panel, we see the summary of the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for each measure of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources – each estimated in separate models.[4]

The basic pattern modestly comports with our expectation that resources spur and hence positively correlate with social policy take-up. With respect

[4] The full results are available in Appendix Table 7.A3.

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

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Figure 7.8 *Take-up/participation rates and normative, instrumental, and power resources*

to the role of normative resources – the first row in each panel – we can see that the respective policy generosity measures are positively and significantly associated with higher estimated take-up rates for UI and for parental leave, but there is no statistically significant association in the case of ECEC. In that case, the significantly positive relationship summarized in Figure 7.7's bivariate scatterplot is not corroborated by a regression set-up with controls. As for instrumental resources, we see a broadly positive portrait, but not unanimously so. *Informational transparency* is significantly associated in all policy realms with higher take-up rates, and labor power is significantly associated with higher *estimated UI take-up* and *estimated parental leave take-up* but not significantly so for the ECEC realm. And *benefit portals and campaigns* tend to be positively but insignificantly associated with estimated take-up rates. Finally, with respect to enforcement resources that we expect to foster confidence and hence participation in a given social benefit realm, we see that *judicial non-corruption* is significantly associated with more take-up in all three policy realms, while *labor inspection capacity* is so associated with *estimated UI take-up* and *estimated ECEC take-up* but not with *estimated parental leave take-up.*

Figure 7.9 summarizes results from a similar analysis focused on measures of spending effort – a downstream output measure that takes into account

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

Source: Authors.

Figure 7.9 *Take-up/participation rates and normative, instrumental, and power resources*

take-up patterns.[5] The patterns here are again not unanimous in their verdicts, but they are in line with our expectation that normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources ought to be associated with higher levels of UI, ECEC, and parental leave policy spending effort. The UI and parental leave generosity measures of normative resources are significantly positively associated with spending effort, though insignificantly positive for ECEC. *Benefit portals and campaigns* are positively but insignificantly associated with spending effort measures. *Information transparency* is positively and significantly associated with *parental leave spending effort* and *ECEC spending effort* but insignificantly so with *UI spending effort*. *Labor power* and *judicial non-corruption* are both significantly positively associated with all three realms of spending effort. And *labor inspection capacity* is significantly positively associated with only *ECEC spending effort*.

Figure 7.10 summarizes our final macro-level results, of how resources are associated with country-level social rights outcomes of *employment rates*

[5] Full results are not shown but follow set-up in Appendix 7.A3 and are available upon request.

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

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Figure 7.10 *Employment rates and at-risk-of-poverty rates as functions of normative, instrumental, and power resources*

and *at-risk-of-poverty rates*. For this analysis, we focus on how resources might be expected to influence general and very causally downstream outcomes: employment and poverty rates. So our analysis considers not only how a given resource is associated with these outcomes, net of controls, but also whether their effect is due to affecting take-up and spending outputs. This can be roughly gauged by considering whether the associations between a given resource and a given outcome are dampened (as we would expect) once we include the spending measure of interest as a control variable. For each resource measure, hence, we show two results. The upper one is the coefficient estimate and confidence interval for a given resource without controlling for total spending effort (on UI, ECEC, parental leave, and other parts of the welfare state); and the lower one is for a given resource with the control for total spending effort. The resource measures are the same, except for normative

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resources, where we consider not just each of our UI, ECEC, and parental leave realms (not shown) but also a composite measure of generosity.[6]

The results broadly comport with our resource-based framework. With the exception of the enforcement resource *labor inspection capacity*, we see that all our measures of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources are significantly associated with higher employment rates and lower at-risk-of-poverty rates. And also in line with our expectations, in all these cases we see that this positive effect is somewhat more modest once controls for total social spending effort are added – suggesting indeed that part of any causal implications that resources might have for employment and poverty outcomes likely travel through their spurring of take-up and spending effort. The results also suggest, however, that such mediation is not the full story for how resources can matter to outcomes. In a number of cases, it is clear that resources still have significant positive associations with *employment rates* and negative ones with *at-risk-of-poverty rates* even after controlling for spending effort. This suggests that particularly *portals and campaigns*, *informational transparency*, and *judicial non-corruption* might influence employment and poverty rates via spending effort but also through possible direct effects.

Micro-level Exploration of Estimated Take-up

Our analysis so far has explored how the aforementioned national-level macro measures of normative and instrumental resources shape (estimated) take-up rates, spending outputs, and outcomes. We now explore our resource-based framework through another, more focused way, by exploring the ESS individual-level survey data (introduced in Section 3.1 above) that clarifies how power resources shape UI-related social benefit reliance (or, if one prefers, participation or dependency) (see Burgoon et al., 2023). In all cases, such analysis can only reveal broad associations, but these support causal inferences about whether normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources matter. Because most of our explanatory conditions of interest are at the country–year level while our outcomes are at the individual–country–year level, our baseline analyses are multi-level random intercept models (with country-waves as the level 2 variables). The estimators produce logistic regression coefficients depending on the benefit-reliance outcome on which we are focusing, and robust standard errors with unconstrained covariances. All our estimations include several controls that help isolate the effects of social rights resources: *female*; *age*; *native-born*; *unemployed*; *high-educated*; *high-income*; *live-with-partner*;

[6] Full results are not shown but follow set-up in Appendix 7.A3 and are available upon request.

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children-living-at-home; *union member*; *left–right scale* (see Appendix Table 7.A2 for details).

With this set up, we consider how normative, instrumental, or enforcement resource measures moderate the influence of unemployment status on the likelihood of relying upon public unemployment benefits. Figure 7.11 summarizes the key UI-reliance results, clarifying how individual-level characteristics conferring instrumental resources affect the likelihood that an unemployed respondent reports that "unemployment or redundancy benefits are the main source of household income" (the full results for UI are in Appendix Tables 7.A4 and 7.A5). Several micro-level instrumental resources spur the likelihood that being unemployed translates into UI reliance. In particular, the figure shows (on the vertical axis) the chance that unemployment status translates into UI benefit reliance. This chance is always high and statistically significant (see Appendix Table 7.A4), but the figure shows what this chance is when



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Figure 7.11 *How micro-level instrumental resources affect UI benefit take-up*

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the individual-level indicator is low versus high, or non-existent versus present. We can see that the chance that unemployed status translates into social benefit dependency is markedly higher when a respondent is a union member (yes) versus not a union member (no); when education is high rather than low; when income is not very low (rather than very low); when a respondent is native-born rather than foreign-born; and when a respondent is interested in politics rather than disinterested in politics. The only micro-level instrumental resource measure that does not significantly increase the likelihood of take-up is daily internet use (see last column of Appendix Table 7.A4).

Figure 7.12 summarizes how *national-level* normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources affect an individual unemployed respondent's likelihood of relying upon unemployment or redundancy benefits. Once again this focuses on the role of a given resource in shaping UI take-up, based on the full models shown in the Appendix (see Appendix Table 7.A5). The first, left-hand result focuses on *UI generosity* – a normative resource measure – followed by



Source: Authors.

Figure 7.12 *How national-level normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources affect UI benefit take-up*

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our three instrumental resource measures and the two enforcement resource measures. As can be easily glimpsed from the figure, all our national-level measures of resources have positive coefficients, significantly so for *benefit portals and campaigns*, *informational transparency*, and *labor inspection capacity*. Such patterns suggest that two of our instrumental resources, including the one closest to claims of validity of resources relevant to social benefit take-up (*portals and campaigns*), as well as one of our enforcement resource measures (*labor inspection capacity*), tend to spur UI take-up. These patterns provide modest evidence, hence, that individual-level and national-level measures of power resources foster social rights take-up with respect to unemployment insurance.

It is important that all UI-reliance results summarized here are robust to a range of alternative specifications with respect to the controls, the embedding of the multi-level models, and estimator. The pattern of resources positively shaping program participation also holds for the other policy realm that the ESS data measures, reliance on pensions.[7] Looking jointly at the individual micro-analysis in Section 4.2 and the macro-level analyses in Section 4.1, hence, we have some meaningful empirical support for this chapter's and volume's expectation that normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources can be important bases for social rights take-up and spending, and thereby also poverty rate and employment rate outcomes.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has developed a core argument of this volume – that power resources are crucial to social rights realization in Europe – and explored its traction in individual-level and national-level analysis of quantitative data. The principal expectations have been very broad with respect to which power resources might matter and how they might play into social rights realization. We have worked within the view that the simple condition of holding substantial normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources relevant to a range of social rights constitutes *having* meaningful social rights. But we have focused in this chapter on the proposition that "the proof of the social rights pudding" with respect to having normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources "is in the eating": that having normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources can be expected to facilitate actual social rights take-up when it is needed; and

[7] In particular, study of the ESS data reveals that the individual-level resource conditions increase the likelihood that 60+ respondents rely on pension benefits, but we also find that virtually all of the national-level conditions also increase the likelihood that older respondents rely on pensions (see Appendix Table 7.A6 for the results).

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in turn be an important underpinning of social rights spending effort; and in turn an important spur to outcomes relevant to human flourishing.

Our tests of this broad proposition focused on the social rights realm of employment and unemployment, and on both national-level and individual-level quantitative exploration of the various steps of social rights realization. The key focus has been on both individual-level data on instrumental resources and national-level data on instrumental, normative, and enforcement resources. And we have presented two kinds of quantitative exploration into social rights realization as functions of power resources. The national-level exploration suggests that measures of national-level normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources tend to modestly promote social rights realization in the realms of unemployment insurance, ECEC assistance, and parental leave assistance. The national-level measures of resources tend to spur social benefit take-up (a social rights output), spending effort (another social rights output), and in turn better social rights outcomes with respect to higher employment rates and lower at-risk-of-poverty rates. The individual-level exploration, meanwhile, has dug deeper into whether measures of individual-level instrumental resources and national-level normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources spur take-up of unemployment insurance benefits. We found that individual-level instrumental resources are important to take-up, while at the national level it is particularly the social benefit portals and awareness campaigns, together with legal transparency and labor inspection capacity, that matter to UI take-up. In short, power resources increase or spur social rights take-up or participation, the first test of social rights realization; and by doing so, normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources also spur spending effort outputs and major aspects of social rights outcomes.

We should conclude by reminding readers of the many limits of such a conceptual and empirical exploration. Conceptually we have focused on very broad and big-picture measures of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources, and simple ways that such resources play out in social rights realization. We did not include, for instance, the many more complex feedback loops and interactions between conditions that might affect how resources shape social rights outcomes. Empirically, our focus has been for practical reasons very limited in the realms of the social rights we have explored. Within these limits, however, the chapter provides substantial traction to further explore how power resources can be leveraged to promote social rights realization in Europe and the world.

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APPENDIX

Table 7.A1 Summary statistics national-level data (country years), 1960–2017

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Employment rate (working age)	662	70.965	6.642	49	89.3
At-risk-of-poverty rate	332	16.339	3.995	7.9	26.4
UI spending effort (SIWE)	500	28,218.770	29,617.9	1,776	174,530
Child spending effort (SIWE)	500	2,600.099	2,685.4	0	11,384
Total spending effort (SIWE)	500	0.000	1.95	–2.901	6.145
Mother/father/parent leave spending (OECD)	949	0.314	0.260	0	1.3055
Estimated UI take-up	377	0.603	0.448	0.012	2.173
Estimated ECEC take-up	436	53.326	24.304	8.4	97.65
Estimated paternity/maternity/parental leave take-up	188	95.896	73.064	21.2	360.69
UI generosity (SCIP)	937	0.641	0.138	0	1
ECEC generosity (OECD)	2,147	92.288	5.659	72	100
Mother/father/parental leave generosity (OECD)	1,091	3.327	1.106	0	5.118
Total generosity (Scruggs)	721	33.832	5.716	20.810	46.84
UI generosity alternate (Scruggs)	743	10.097	3.001	2.032	15.05
Social benefit campaigns & portals scale (ESPN)	2,001	0.434	0.243	0	1
Informational transparency	1,079	66.476	11.143	32	85.83
Labor strength (union density/coverage)	1,343	0.417	0.192	0	1

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Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Judicial non-corruption	1,970	3.115	0.602	0.865	3.824
Labor inspection capacity	258	0.224	0.196	0	1
Real GDP growth	1,245	2.815	3.417	–21.26	25.49
Left government	1,307	35.423	35.189	0	100
Dependent population	1,640	53.087	7.424	38.457	86.2
Trade openness	1,316	86.060	48.825	23.109	416.4
EU member	2,445	0.788	0.409	0	1

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Table 7.A2 Summary statistics (European Social Survey, ESS), 2008, 2016, 2020

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
UI reliance	99,325	0.018	0.133	0	1
Social benefit reliance	99,325	0.046	0.209	0	1
Unemployed	99,325	0.062	0.241	0	1
Female	99,289	0.535	0.499	0	1
Age	98,984	48.216	18.473	15	105
Native-born	99,198	0.905	0.294	0	1
High educated	99,041	0.181	0.385	0	1
Non-low income	94,237	0.739	0.439	0	1
Live with partner	99,325	0.631	0.483	0	1
Child at home	99,045	0.371	0.483	0	1
Union member	99,325	0.164	0.371	0	1
Left–Right scale	85,267	5.177	2.259	0	10
Government redistribution	99,325	3.883	1.009	1	5
Working parent	99,080	0.329	0.470	0	1
Old-age (60-plus)	99,325	0.306	0.461	0	1
Interested in politics	99,059	2.393	0.915	1	4
Daily internet use	99,325	0.445	0.497	0	1
Bad health	99,208	2.240	0.934	1	5
Support deeper EU integration	89,773	5.16	2.673	0	10

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Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
UI generosity (SCIP)	79,419	0.053	0.509	–0.878	1.438
Sickness/health generosity (SCIP)	79,419	0.024	0.540	–1.649	1.322
Pension generosity (SCIP)	79,419	–0.293	0.510	–1.316	1.072
Mother/father/parental leave generosity (OECD)	77,383	3.754	0.833	1.720	5.118
ECEC generosity (OECD)	83,603	92.250	5.047	72	100
Social benefit generosity scale (SCIP)	79,419	–0.215	1.082	–2.673	2.697
Estimated take-up UI (OECD)	86,701	0.659	0.489	0.028	2.034
Estimated take-up ECEC (OECD)	86,084	56.067	26.613	10.850	96.767
Estimated take-up mother/father/parental leave (OECD)	37,417	99.322	75.285	23.188	335.083
Estimated take-up scale	30,268	0.805	1.658	–1.899	4.204
UI/Work spending effort (SIWE)	74,220	25,753.63	21,187.34	3,790.901	100,837.2
Social transfers effort (SIWE)	74,220	–0.066	0.617	–1.222	0.952
Old-age spending effort (SIWE)	74,220	13,598.94	5,348.022	3,786.572	24,437.73
Total social spending effort (SIWE)	74,220	0.009	1.937	–3.306	3.401
Social benefit campaigns (ESPN)	99,325	2.508	2.038	0	6
Social benefit portals (ESPN)	99,325	1.744	0.804	1	3
Social benefit campaigns & portals scale (ESPN)	99,325	0.005	0.780	–1.074	1.644
Labor inspections	58,017	0.291	1.146	–0.774	3.677

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Table 7.A3a National-level estimates of take-up as functions of resources (country-years): estimated UI take-up

–	(1) Estimated UI take-up	(2) Estimated UI take-up	(3) Estimated UI take-up	(4) Estimated UI take-up	(5) Estimated UI take-up	(6) Estimated UI take-up
Generosity measure	.058*** (.011)	–	–	–	–	–
Campaigns & portals (ESPN)	–	–.037 (.103)	–	–	–	–
Information transparency	–	–	.056 (.05)	–	–	–
Labour strength	–	–	–	.197*** (.024)	–	–
Judicial non-corruption	–	–	–	–	.042*** (.005)	–
Labor inspection capacity	–	–	–	–	–	.181*** (.037)
GDP growth	.003 (.008)	–	–.005 (.007)	–.006 (.005)	–.003 (.005)	–.011 (.009)
Left government	0 (.001)	–	0 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.002 (.001)
Dependent population	.009 (.008)	–	.046*** (.006)	.024*** (.004)	.028*** (.005)	.046*** (.006)
Trade openness	.001 (.001)	–	.001 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	.001 (.001)

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–	(1) Estimated UI take-up	(2) Estimated UI take-up	(3) Estimated UI take-up	(4) Estimated UI take-up	(5) Estimated UI take-up	(6) Estimated UI take-up
EU membership	.721***	–	.132	.161*	.2	.297***
	(.078)		(.111)	(.063)	(.104)	(.057)
Constant	–1.015*	.598***	–4.198	–.67**	–2.323***	–2.164***
	(.438)	(.094)	(2.197)	(.236)	(.262)	(.33)
Observations	164	25	135	290	297	169
R-squared	.282	.012	.239	.345	.298	.367

Note: DV = estimated UI take-up. All models are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses). *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

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Table 7.A3b National-level estimates of take-up as functions of resources (country-years): estimated leave take-up

–	(1) Estimated leave take-up	(2) Estimated leave take-up	(3) Estimated leave take-up	(4) Estimated leave take-up	(5) Estimated leave take-up	(6) Estimated leave take-up
Generosity measure	35.9*** (5.602)	–	–	–	–	–
Campaigns & portals (ESPN)	–	21.121 (14.073)	–	–	–	–
Information transparency	–	–	86*** (17.331)	–	–	–
Labor strength	–	–	–	26.3*** (7.133)	–	–
Judicial non-corruption	–	–	–	–	10.0*** (2.078)	–
Labour inspection capacity	–	–	–	–	–	–24.6*** (6.072)
GDP growth	4.131 (2.334)	–	2.294 (1.417)	3.095 (1.737)	2.401 (1.56)	2.311 (1.858)
Left government	.058 (.259)	–	.424 (.279)	.094 (.215)	.101 (.216)	–.348 (.297)
Dependent population	1.452 (1.763)	–	1.572 (2.393)	–2.575 (1.519)	–2.559 (1.835)	2.97 (2.417)
Trade openness	–.171*** (.048)	–	–.064 (.067)	–.253*** (.055)	–.133* (.056)	–.173 (.237)

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–	(1) Estimated leave take-up	(2) Estimated leave take-up	(3) Estimated leave take-up	(4) Estimated leave take-up	(5) Estimated leave take-up	(6) Estimated leave take-up
EU membership	–1.088	–	–27.975	41.067*	50.46**	–6.548
	(10.644)		(17.438)	(16.614)	(15.517)	(15.145)
Constant	–111.725	84.3***	–370***	211.4*	–146.37	–3.31
	(103.53)	(18.483)	(848.96)	(83.243)	(137.7)	(127.1)
Observations	143	14	67	154	156	85
R-squared	.142	.165	.463	.163	.18	.187

Note: DV = estimated parental leave take-up. All models are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses). *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

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Table 7.A3c National-level estimates of take-up as functions of resources (country-years): estimated ECEC take-up

–	(1) Estimated ECEC take-up	(2)Estimated ECEC take-up	(3) Estimated ECEC take-up	(4) Estimated ECEC take-up	(5) Estimated ECEC take-up	(6) Estimated ECEC take-up
Generosity measure	.258 (.179)	–	–	–	–	–
Campaigns & portals (ESPN)	–	.336 (3.239)	–	–	–	–
Information transparency	–	–	12.75*** (2.323)	–	–	–
Labor strength	–	–	–	.26 (1.191)	–	–
Judicial non-corruption	–	–	–	–	3.166*** (.208)	–
Labor inspection capacity	–	–	–	–	–	2.803 (1.568)
GDP growth	.121 (.303)	–	.06 (.298)	.286 (.321)	–.025 (.238)	.07 (.407)
Left government	.046 (.036)	–	.093* (.04)	.051 (.033)	.039 (.025)	.059 (.049)
Dependent population	3.07*** (.211)	–	2.701*** (.295)	3.287*** (.211)	2.297*** (.191)	3.453*** (.261)
Trade openness	.068*** (.018)	–	.049** (.017)	.071*** (.017)	.062*** (.015)	.029 (.041)

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–	(1) Estimated ECEC take-up	(2)Estimated ECEC take-up	(3) Estimated ECEC take-up	(4) Estimated ECEC take-up	(5) Estimated ECEC take-up	(6) Estimated ECEC take-up
EU membership	-11.1*** (3.012)	–	–9.61*** (2.731)	–9.229** (3.15)	7.86* (3.392)	–9.051 (5.085)
Constant	–124*** (15.802)	59.3*** (4.683)	–641*** (102.976)	–113*** (11.34)	–180*** (10.338)	–114*** (15.277)
Observations	335	26	174	339	348	176
R-squared	.327	0	.405	.331	.573	.374

Note: DV = estimated ECEC take-up. All models are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses). *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

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Table 7.A4 Micro-level power resources and take-up of unemployment benefits

-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Unemployed	3.686*** (.129)	3.56*** (.131)	3.187*** (.198)	3.618*** (.129)	3.493*** (.126)	3.174*** (.232)	3.723*** (.172)
Unem.×Union member	–	.815*** (.251)	–	–	–	–	–
Unem.×Native	–	–	.592*** (.151)	–	–	–	–
Unem.×High Education	–	–	–	.664*** (.21)	–	–	–
Unem.×Non-low inc.	–	–	–	–	.5*** (.144)	–	–
Political interest	–	–	–	–	–	–.223*** (.068)	–
Unem.×Polit.int.	–	–	–	–	–	.219*** (.083)	–
Daily internet use	–	–	–	–	–	–	–.082 (.145)
Unem.×Daily internet	–	–	–	–	–	–	–.084 (.18)
Female	–.259*** (.074)	–.268*** (.074)	–.26*** (.074)	–.265*** (.073)	–.279*** (.074)	–.273*** (.074)	–.257*** (.076)
Age	–.006*** (.002)	–.007*** (.002)	–.006*** (.002)	–.007*** (.002)	–.007*** (.002)	–.006** (.002)	–.008*** (.003)

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-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Native-born	−.223**	−.227**	−.589***	−.219**	−.218**	−.214**	−.227**
	(.09)	(.09)	(.133)	(.09)	(.088)	(.092)	(.089)
High educated	−.402***	−.398***	−.402***	−.814***	−.379***	−.358***	−.376***
	(.121)	(.12)	(.121)	(.163)	(.122)	(.123)	(.122)
Non-low-income	−1.595***	−1.592***	−1.594***	−1.588***	−1.903***	−1.574***	−1.583***
	(.088)	(.09)	(.088)	(.088)	(.121)	(.089)	(.086)
Live-with-partner	−.296***	−.3***	−.297***	−.291***	−.275***	−.291***	−.297***
	(.093)	(.093)	(.093)	(.093)	(.095)	(.093)	(.094)
Child at home	.352***	.362***	.354***	.355***	.362***	.342***	.346***
	(.086)	(.086)	(.086)	(.087)	(.084)	(.086)	(.088)
Union member	.194	−.232	.188	.197	.201	.211	.197
	(.138)	(.233)	(.139)	(.138)	(.137)	(.138)	(.137)
Left–Right scale	−.02	−.02	−.019	−.02	−.02	−.019	−.02
	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.015)	(.016)	(.015)
Support govt. redist.	.094***	.093***	.091***	.094***	.09***	.093***	.092***
	(.032)	(.031)	(.031)	(.032)	(.031)	(.032)	(.031)
Constant	−4.19***	−4.082***	−3.888***	−4.147***	−4.043***	−3.714***	−4.092***
	(.3)	(.298)	(.314)	(.297)	(.287)	(.32)	(.33)
/var(_cons[cntryes~)	.839***	.818***	.848***	.833***	.83***	.84***	.858***
	(.259)	(.255)	(.263)	(.257)	(.255)	(.256)	(.268)
Observations	80468	80468	80468	80468	80468	80318	80468
Log likelihood	−4400.3	−4390.6	−4394.7	−4395.6	−4393.3	−4384.8	−4398.5

Note: DV = Main source of household income is unemployment/redundancy benefit (0 = other income source; 1 = depend on unemployment or redundancy benefits). All rows report multi-level random intercept models (country-year as level 2 variable), with logistic coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses). Standard errors are in parentheses**:** *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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Table 7.A5 UI take-up as a function of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources

–	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Unemployed	3.418*** (.586)	3.705*** (.073)	–1.968 (2.539)	3.707*** (.14)	2.77* (1.292)	3.668*** (.169)
UI generosity	.002 (.078)	–	–	–	–	–
UI generosityUnemp.×	.021 (.054)	–	–	–	–	–
Portals&Campaigns	–	–.31** (.099)	–	–	–	–
Port.&CmpgnsUnemp.×	–	.126** (.045)	–	–	–	–
Informational transparency	–	–	.023 (.032)	–	–	–
TransparencyUnemp×	–	–	.072* (.033)	–	–	–
Labor strength	–	–	–	.143 (.174)	–	–
Labor str.Unemp.×	–	–	–	.059 (.128)	–	–
Judicial non-corruption	–	–	–	–	.459 (.405)	–
Jud.non-corr.Unemp.×	–	–	–	–	.269 (.383)	–

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–	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Labor inspection capac.	–	–	–	–	–	.144 (.162)
Lab. insp.cap.Unemp.×	–	–	–	–	–	.167** (.06)
Female	–.291*** (.085)	–.243*** (.066)	–.264*** (.074)	–.27*** (.079)	–.267*** (.075)	–.23** (.089)
Age	–.006* (.003)	–.007*** (.002)	–.006** (.002)	–.007** (.002)	–.006** (.002)	–.006* (.003)
Native	–.253* (.105)	–.276** (.096)	–.217* (.093)	–.254** (.095)	–.206* (.094)	–.193 (.13)
High education	–.5*** (.111)	–.436*** (.111)	–.404*** (.122)	–.403** (.126)	–.41*** (.121)	–.461** (.146)
Non-low income	–1.675*** (.099)	–1.629*** (.072)	–1.623*** (.089)	–1.631*** (.094)	–1.625*** (.089)	–1.521*** (.093)
Live with partner	–.262* (.116)	–.328*** (.075)	–.286** (.094)	–.301** (.099)	–.283** (.095)	–.419*** (.121)
Child at home	.307** (.11)	.349*** (.075)	.359*** (.09)	.36*** (.093)	.365*** (.089)	.468*** (.092)
Union member	.199 (.143)	.28** (.102)	.195 (.138)	.22 (.143)	.186 (.141)	.043 (.212)
Left–right scale	–.036* (.016)	–.02 (.015)	–.026 (.015)	–.018 (.015)	–.026 (.015)	–.034 (.02)
Constant	–3.208*** (.812)	–3.534*** (.215)	–5.438* (2.526)	–3.585*** (.29)	–5.185*** (1.354)	–3.786*** (.377)

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–	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
RE variance compon.	.493*** (.133)	.646*** (.167)	.663** (.242)	.743** (.267)	.667*** (.188)	.884* (.366)
Observations	49987	65638	74953	70485	74953	49889
Log likelihood	4201	–4290	–4293.7	–4295.2	–4293.1	–4284.1

Note: DV = Unemployment insurance is main source of household income (0 = other source of income; 1 = dependent on unemployment or redundancy benefits). All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses). *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

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Table 7.A6 Pensions take-up as a function of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources

–	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age 60+	4.255*** (.042)	3.948*** (.03)	.194 (.416)	4.022*** (.032)	2.491*** (.139)	3.873*** (.036)
Pension generosity	–.745*** (.131)	–	–	–	–	–
Pens.gen. 60+×	.477*** (.068)	–	–	–	–	–
Portals&Campaigns	–	–.047 (.051)	–	–	–	–
Port.&Cmpgns60+×.	–	.041* (.021)	–	–	–	–
Informat. Transpar.	–	–	–.041** (.013)	–	–	–
Transparency60+×	–	–	.049*** (.005)	–	–	–
Labor strength	–	–	–	–.128 (.072)	–	–
Lab. Str.60+×	–	–	–	.174*** (.033)	–	–
Judicial non-corrup.	–	–	–	–	–.552*** (.104)	–
Jud.non–corr.60+×	–	–	–	–	.458*** (.044)	–
Labor inspect. capac.	–	–	–	–	–	.079 (.086)

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–	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Lab.insp.60+×	–	–	–	–	–	.068* (.029)
Female	.186*** (.028)	.201*** (.028)	.213*** (.025)	.212*** (.026)	.211*** (.025)	.19*** (.031)
Native	.209*** (.054)	.255*** (.055)	.119** (.046)	.224*** (.052)	.121** (.046)	.035 (.055)
High education	–.347*** (.038)	–.377*** (.039)	–.34*** (.035)	–.361*** (.036)	–.339*** (.035)	–.378*** (.042)
Non-low income	–.945*** (.033)	–.881*** (.032)	–.899*** (.029)	–.933*** (.03)	–.899*** (.029)	–.823*** (.035)
Live with partner	.032 (.031)	.072* (.03)	.036 (.028)	.04 (.029)	.03 (.028)	.013 (.034)
Child at home	–1.127*** (.037)	–1.124*** (.035)	–1.11*** (.033)	–1.128*** (.034)	–1.103*** (.032)	–1.065*** (.04)
Union member	–.863*** (.044)	–.91*** (.046)	–.816*** (.04)	–.878*** (.042)	–.819*** (.04)	–.702*** (.051)
Left–right scale	-.009 (.006)	–.003 (.006)	–.005 (.006)	–.003 (.006)	–.007 (.006)	–.013 (.007)
Constant	–2.515*** (.101)	–2.211*** (.097)	.992 (1.028)	–2.288*** (.094)	–.427 (.342)	–2.087*** (.114)
RE variance comp.	.146*** (.035)	.177*** (.042)	.193*** (.042)	.181*** (.041)	.174*** (.038)	.208*** (.057)
Observations	66,858	65,796	79,387	73,835	79,387	50,057

Note: DV = pensions main source of household income (0 = depend on other sources; 1 = depend on pension benefits). All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses). Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

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

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Figure 7.A1 Social benefit awareness campaigns and digital portals

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