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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## CHAPTER 1 - THE ISSUE OF (HARMFUL) TAX COMPETITION

1. WHAT IS TAX COMPETITION?
   1.1 Basic Concept of Tax Competition
   1.2 Main Categorisations of Tax Competition
   1.3 Main Forms and Features of Tax Incentives
   1.4 Concept of Tax Competition in an International Context

2. Upside and Downside of Tax Competition: 'Harmful' Tax Competition
   2.1 Introduction
   2.2 'Good' Tax Competition
   2.3 'Harmful' Tax Competition
   2.4 More on Harmful Tax Competition: Foreign Direct Investment vs. Portfolio (Passive) Investment
   2.5 'Active' versus 'Passive' Tax Competition and the Prisoner's Dilemma
   2.6 Where is the Borderline?

3. (Harmful) Tax Competition: Theory, Evidence, and Methodological Issues
   3.1 Overview
   3.2 Theories and Evidence on Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in the US Experience
   3.3 Significance of US Studies and Experience for the EU
   3.4 Methodologies to Study Tax Competition in an International (and EU) Context

4. Economic Evidence of (Harmful) Tax Competition in the European Union
   4.1 Introduction
   4.2 (Harmful) Tax Competition and the Ruding Report
   4.2.1 The Ruding Report (1992) and the Commission Reaction
   4.2.2 Main differences in Member States' tax systems
   4.2.3 Survey on the Impact of Taxation on the Firms' Locational Decisions
   4.3 The Monti Memorandum, the Commission Report and (Harmful) Tax Competition: the 'Monti Cross'
   4.4 Further Economic Evidence of Tax Competition in Europe
   4.5 The 2001 Commission Study on Company Taxation in the EU
   4.5.1 Overview
   4.5.2 Relationship with the Ruding Report; key developments in the EU
   4.5.3 Comparison of Member States' 'benchmark' tax systems (Qualitative analysis)
   4.5.4 Comparison of effective tax burdens in the Member States (Quantitative analysis)
   4.5.5 Comparison with the Ruding Report and the Baker & McKenzie studies
   4.5.6 Synthesis

5. Main Conclusions

## CHAPTER 2 - EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF (HARMFUL) TAX COMPETITION

1. Introduction
2. Fundamental Treaty Provisions and Tax Competition
3.4.5 Administrative practices and tax behaviour of tax authorities 104
3.4.6 Tax-free areas: the Madeira ZFM and the Trieste FIC 106

3.5 THE COMMISSION DECISION IN THE IRISH CORPORATION TAX CASE 107

3.5.1 Background 107
3.5.2 The 1998 Commission Recommendations 109
3.5.3 Further considerations on the recommendations and follow-up 110
3.5.4 The Irish corporation tax case as the milestone in the Commission’s change of policy 111

3.6 FISCAL STATE AID, THE 1998 COMMISSION NOTICE, AND HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION 113

3.6.1 Overview 113
3.6.2 Criteria for application of Art. 87 to direct tax measures 114
3.6.3 Specificity criterion: benchmark tax system vs. special tax incentives 116
3.6.4 The justification of the “nature or general scheme of the tax system” 119
3.6.5 The Notice and the administrative practices of tax authorities 122
3.6.6 Implementation of the Notice: the Commission large scale investigation on fiscal state aid of July 2001 124

3.7 NEW RULES ON REGIONAL FISCAL AID AND THE FUTURE OF TAX-FREE AREAS 125

3.7.1 Introduction 125
3.7.2 The new guidelines on national regional aid and the “outermost regions” 125
3.7.3 The rules on regional fiscal aid contained in the Notice 127
3.7.4 Impact of the new rules on the Canary Islands regime 128
3.7.5 Is there a future for tax-free areas? The Madeira ZFM case 130
3.7.6 Tax credits and tax holidays: the case of the Basque Provinces 132
3.7.7 Fiscal regional state aid: some conclusions 134

3.8 THE 2001 COMMISSION LARGE SCALE INVESTIGATION: NOTIONAL TAXATION, RING-FENCED ‘OFFSHORE’ REGIMES, AND METHODS TO RELIEVE DOUBLE TAXATION 136

3.8.1 Tax base aid: coordination centres and similar intra-group regimes; the Belgian example 136
3.8.2 Analysis of these regimes and of notional methods to determine the taxable base under EC (fiscal) state aid rules 138
3.8.3 Other intra-group finance regimes: the Netherlands CFM and the French Centrales de Trésorerie 144
3.8.4 Tax rate and tax liability aid: ring-fencing and offshore regimes; the Gibraltar case 149
3.8.5 Methods to relieve international double taxation: the Irish regime on foreign-source income 152

3.9 SYNTHESIS: TREATY RULES ON STATE AID AS AN EFFECTIVE TOOL AGAINST HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION 154

CHAPTER 4 - NON-LEGALLY BINDING RULES AND HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND THE OECD REPORTS 157

4.1 INTRODUCTION 157

4.2 THE EU “PACKAGE” TO TACKLE HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT 157

4.2.1 Historic overview: the three parts of the “Package” 157
4.2.2 THE CODE OF CONDUCT: LEGAL NATURE, SCOPE, AND CRITERIA TO IDENTIFY HARMFUL TAX REGIMES
4.2.3 CONSEQUENCES OF THE APPLICATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND IMPLEMENTATION RULES
4.2.4 EVALUATION OF THE CODE

4.3 FOLLOW-UP TO THE CODE OF CONDUCT: THE “PRIMAROLO” REPORT AND THE “2000 GUIDELINES”

4.3.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE “CODE OF CONDUCT GROUP” AND ITS WORK
4.3.2 THE “PRIMAROLO REPORT” AND THE “2000 GUIDELINES”
4.3.3 FINANCIAL SERVICES AND ROYALTY INCOME
4.3.4 INSURANCE ACTIVITIES
4.3.5 ‘HEADQUARTER COMPANY’ REGIMES: THE ‘CENTRES’ AND INTRA-GROUP SERVICES
4.3.6 HOLDING AND OFFSHORE COMPANY REGIMES
4.3.7 THE MEMBER STATES’ REACTIONS TO THE PRIMAROLO REPORT
4.3.8 COMMENTS ON THE PRIMAROLO REPORT AND THE 2000 GUIDELINES

4.4 FINANCIAL SERVICES REGIMES

4.4.1 OVERVIEW
4.4.2 FINANCIAL SERVICES PERFORMED TO THIRD PARTIES: THE IRISH IFSC AND THE MADEIRA ZFM
4.4.3 INTRA-GROUP FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE LUXEMBOURG AND NETHERLANDS ‘FINANCE COMPANY’ REGIMES
4.4.4 THE NETHERLANDS ‘CFM’ REGIME
4.4.5 ‘FINANCE BRANCH’ REGIMES AND THE 2000 GUIDELINES

4.5 ‘HEADQUARTER COMPANY’ REGIMES AND INTRA-GROUP ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY ‘CENTRES’

4.5.1 OVERVIEW
4.5.2 THE BELGIUM REGIMES FOR COORDINATION CENTRES AND SERVICE CENTRES
4.5.3 DISTRIBUTION CENTRE REGIMES

4.6 ‘HOLDING COMPANY’ REGIMES AND THE PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION

4.6.1 USE OF HOLDING COMPANIES AND CRITERIA TO ASSESS THE HARMFULNESS OF THEIR TAX TREATMENT
4.6.3 THE DANISH PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION AND ITS RECENT CHANGES
4.6.4 SPECIAL HOLDING COMPANIES REGIMES: THE LUXEMBOURG “1929 HOLDING COMPANY” (AND THE SOPARF) REGIMES
4.6.5 SPAIN: THE ETVE
4.6.6 RECENT TRENDS IN THE EU AND THE FUTURE OF THE PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION AND HOLDING COMPANIES

4.7 TAX AUTHORITIES’ DISCRETION: THE OLD AND NEW NETHERLANDS RULING PRACTICES

4.8 THE OECD EFFORT TO COUNTER HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION

4.8.1 INTRODUCTION
4.8.2 THE 1998 OECD REPORT: SCOPE AND CRITERIA TO IDENTIFY HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION
4.8.3 COUNTERMEASURES RECOMMENDED BY THE 1998 REPORT AND THE “FORUM ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES”
4.8.4 THE 2000 REPORT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES AND THE LIST OF TAX HAVENS
4.8.5 REACTIONS TO THE 2000 REPORT AND THE MOU AND FOLLOW-UP
4.8.6 THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT AND THE MILDER APPROACH OF THE OECD