In the Shadow of the Sheraton: imagining localities in global spaces in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
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Contemporary Class Differences in a City “United by Poverty”

Naaka naangalia Wenzangu
Wanaishi maisha mazuri
Wanahama majumba mazuri, magari mazuri
Mi, sina cho chote, sina kazi
Kila siku, ni deiwaka tu.
Ah, lakini no sweat.

(chorus)
Deiwaka, Deiwaka, Deiwaka, Deiwaka (4x)

Wananita deiwaka napiga deiwaka kila siku
Yesi, mchana na usiku.
Sometime nakula kuku kama offisa,
Sometime napiga mdomo kama mwanasiasa
Deiwaka anabeba zege, napiga debe,
Nasukama kokoteni

I sit looking at my friends
They are living a good live
They are moving to nice, big house, nice big cars
Me, I don’t have anything, I have no work
Everyday I am only a "day worker".
Ah, but "no sweat."

Day worker, Day worker, Day worker, Day worker

They call me day worker, and day work every day
Yes, afternoon and night
Sometimes I eat chicken like an officer
Sometimes I talk like a politician
A day worker carries packages, and works as a bus tout
And pushes carts of firewood

Deiwaka, Mr. II (Nje ya Bongo: 1999)
A City "United by Poverty"

Introduction

It's 7:30 in the morning and the city has been awake for hours. To street and food vendors the "market" opens when potential customers begin arriving, and in Dar es Salaam, that means when people start making their way to jobs in the city center. Most are awake shortly before sunrise, which, so near the equator, occurs around 6:00 AM year round. By seven, or saa moja — the first hour of the day in accordance with the Swahili clock — the entire city is bustling with activity. Visitors to the coast are often surprised to find that most of the day's business is conducted before noon and that despite continued and various efforts to discipline local workers to perform in accordance with a nine-to-five workday, people quietly but assuredly tend to resist.

Entering Dar es Salaam by motor vehicle from the northern, relatively wealthy suburbs one arrives at the junction where Ali Hassan Mwinyi turns into Bibi Titi Mohammed Road, intersecting with both Ohio Street and Upunga Road. Every day thousands of Toyota Land Cruisers, Pajeros and Jeeps carrying well-off Tanzanians and expatriates to work vie for space with the smaller vehicles of the less affluent, local buses known as daladalas, taxis, and the hundreds of pedestrians who crowd the streets on their way to work. The last several years have witnessed an unprecedented and exponential growth in automobile ownership in Dar es Salaam, and not surprisingly, traffic jams. Here at the edge of the city, where Maskani can be found, one can sense the chaos beginning to encroach, effortlessly penetrating the tinted glass and air conditioning of luxury automobiles, reminding the occupants that the city is alive.

These captive customers represent possibilities to the thousands of young men known as Wamachinga1 who line the streets of the intersection selling merchandise ranging from prayer mats, peanuts, and kitchen knives, to newspapers, soap, and children's toys (Fig. 2.1). They peer into every car hoping to entice drivers and passengers alike with their wares before the light turns green, the cars accelerate, and the sale is lost. Most people stare straight ahead ignoring the young men who sometimes go so far as to thrust their goods through a car's open window. Others languidly appraise the merchandise on display possibly contemplating a purchase for the home, an afternoon snack, or even a new pair of socks. Occasionally, having seen the merchandise previously and possibly even begun the bargaining process, a customer knows exactly what she wants and knows from whom she wants to buy it. As her vehicle approaches the intersection, she somehow manages to catch the eye of her preferred salesman, who, in most cases, takes off in a dead run to reach his customer. He remembers her despite the thousands of eyes that fall on his merchandise daily. He shuffles through his goods while running toward her car in order to display the pair of shoes she admired two days ago. They quickly agree on a price just below the one they had previously discussed, the shoes disappear in the window and the money is exchanged and counted as the car begins to pull away. With luck he will not
have to chase after the car for more money, and she will have a pair of shoes that are both pleasing to the eye and comfortable.

Although it seems an improbably high estimate, one official at the ministry of youth and labor with whom I spoke in 2000 suggested that at that time there were about 800,000 young men and women making their daily living in the streets of this city of approximately three million. This estimate is of informal laborers, while approximations for “street children,” are usually much lower (3500 in 1995, according to Bamurange 1998:230). It is, however, often difficult to discern exactly how the category “street children” differs from that of informal laborers and, in many circumstances, young people who are successfully earning their keep in the streets through marginally legitimate endeavors are categorized as street children by everyone from city officials and NGO personnel trying to get funding for pet projects, to middle class Tanzanians looking for a scapegoat on which to blame the city’s problems. In this study I had set out to understand the daily lives of so-called street children. Yet my early experiences at Maskani quickly revealed the problem with this category. So few of the young men and women who make their living in the streets of Dar es Salaam today self-identify as street children. Those who do are, not surprisingly, most likely to be found sleeping at one of the local shelters for young urban migrants with nowhere else to go (Fig. 2.2). Shelters like the Dogodogo Center and Youth Cultural and Information Center (YCIC) do provide a semi-permanent base for a handful of young people, but most who enter their doors see them as a transitory stop on their way to establishing more permanent residence in the city. Young people arriving in the city without sufficient funds to pay for a room seek out shelter at these centers while they work to re-establish contacts with friends and relatives in

Figure 2.1 “Machinga” street vendor selling cashews near Sheraton. Most cashew vendors are from rural areas near Lindi on the southern coast of Tanzania, which is known for cashew production and high levels of poverty. Dar es Salaam. (2002)

Figure 2.2 “Street Children” between the age of nine and eleven selling post-cards from the Kigamboni Orphanage near the Sheraton. Dar es Salaam. (2002)
the city and to find a regular means of income. Often, as in the case of Dixon, whose story is told below, the search for employment entails becoming associated with a particular *kijiweni* or *maskani*.

Dixon arrived in Dar es Salaam from Arusha in the early 1990s after escaping from a remand center in Arusha. He had just been released following an eight-month stint in one remand center when he was arrested with a friend on suspicion of thievery. At the time he was still pretty ill from his first time in jail and thought he would not survive incarceration again. Though he maintained a rented room in Arusha he was afraid to return to it knowing the police would be looking for him. He knew he had to raise enough money to get out of town before they caught up with him. Following his escape from the remand center he went to an Arusha based NGO run by Europeans because they were known to give out money to street children, but the money they gave him was not enough to get to Dar es Salaam. To get the rest of the money he would need to pay for his bus ticket to the city he decided to pick the pockets of an acquaintance of his who was a beggar who usually got drunk at the end of the day. Dixon waited until the beggar fell asleep before relieving him of a rather large sum of money. He left Arusha with two other friends who were also anxious to get out of town. During the first week following their arrival in Dar es Salaam they paid a night guard at a local business to allow them to sleep on the front steps (*baraza*) under his protection. From there they made their way to the Dogodogo Center, an NGO offering a place to sleep and simple food for young men in the city. He reported “following the red lights on top of the building next to the Dogodogo Center to find it,” and said friends in Arusha told him about the lights before he had left there. Even with this information it still took him an entire night to find it. He spent a month at Dogodogo where he met up with his brother who had come to Dar es Salaam a couple of months earlier. He and his brother started washing cars at Maskani as a way to make money. They arranged this through Rashidi, one of the night guards at Tanganyika Motors, who was himself hired to wash cars by the drivers who worked for the many businesses in the area. Dixon and his brother helped out by washing the cars that Rashidi could not wash himself. In time each built up relationships with individual drivers who would come to them when their cars needed washing. Gradually they moved from the Dogodogo Center and began sleeping at Maskani under Rashidi’s watchful protection. He reported that at that time there were many new cars in Dar es Salaam and few people around to wash them. In no time at all they had more business than they could handle. They made friends with Masha, another young man from Arusha who operated a music stand at Maskani. He allowed them to keep a few things in his stand and began acting as their banker, holding their savings for them and, in exchange, using it as capital for the daily running of his business. Just as things were starting to look up for Dixon and his
brother, however, tragedy struck. His brother contracted cerebral malaria, most likely from sleeping outside at night at Maskani. Dixon took him to nearby Muhimbili Medical Center for treatment but he died shortly thereafter. Dixon returned to the Dogodogo Center to get help contacting his father to inform him of his brother’s death. His uncle came down to retrieve the body and take it back to Arusha. Since that time Dixon has been working off and on at Maskani washing cars and doing other odd jobs. Though he still resorts to stealing when the opportunity presents itself and gambles regularly like he did in Arusha he is happy to be involved in legitimate work, feeling it keeps him safe from the police. He says, “in Arusha I was known as a thief; so it was a surprise to my friends when they came here and found me working at Maskani.”

Dixon’s story is not unlike many of the others I heard at Maskani. Though not mentioned, Dixon’s life was marked by parental abuse when he was a child and he ended up fending for himself on the streets of Arusha after his parents’ divorce in 1986. Though he continued to pay for his own schooling while living in Arusha (through Form 3), he also began hanging out with the wrong crowds. He began stealing to support his growing gambling habit and it was this that landed him in jail the first time. What struck me about the way he told me this story was that he portrayed himself as being in control the entire time. In both Arusha and Dar es Salaam he consciously capitalized on his otherwise contested identity of “street child” to make use of the NGO system and it was difficult for me to identify the “victim” generally thought to visit such organizations. That he met up with his brother at Dogodogo and initially found his way there relying on very specific instructions suggests that there was a fair degree of planning involved in his relocating to Dar es Salaam despite his claim to have needed to get out of town quickly. Many, like Dixon, who are working and sleeping on the streets, find themselves in this paradoxical situation. They can only hope to receive the assistance of NGOs and the state if they are willing to embrace the identity of the helpless victim. Yet, very few of those interviewed would resort to employing discourses of victimization unless they believed it would lead to some economic gain. Over time I came to know that many of them had been victims of abuse in their homes, others had been abandoned following divorces, while still other found themselves on the streets after losing one or both parents to death. Yet, like Dixon, they offered this information as if it were incidental. In the stories they told they were much more inclined to focus on the choices they had made to make a meaningful lives for themselves (kutafuta maisha). In fact, for many of them, the only time they spoke of being victimized was when they felt state sponsored actions interfered with this particular pursuit.

In time, first Dixon and his brother, and later Dixon alone, managed to bring several other young men whom they had known from their maskani near the main market in Arusha to the Sheraton Maskani in Dar es Salaam. They ran
into most of them by chance in Dar es Salaam and, happy to be united with old friends, offered them a safe place to sleep at Maskani until they got on their feet. Some stayed on to wash cars, while others simply used Maskani as a home base in the city. The fact that many of the young men at Maskani were formerly associated with the same Arusha maskani is remarkable for several reasons. Most significantly, it demonstrates the importance of social networks that extend well beyond the city of Dar es Salaam. That the Arusha maskani was one characterized by gambling, thieving, and violence is also important and may partially help to explain why so much emphasis is placed on maintaining a peaceful environment at the Sheraton Maskani. Many of those working at Maskani are, in effect, fugitives from the law and have good reason to want to keep a low profile. Chapter Four of this book is devoted to illustrating how this peaceful environment is achieved and maintained at Maskani.

The other thing that is significant about Dixon's story is his observation that there were a great many new cars in Dar es Salaam in the early 1990s and that there was no one to wash them (Fig. 2.3). This observation demonstrates two points that I want to focus on in this chapter. One, that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following economic and political liberalization, things did change significantly in Dar es Salaam. Evidence of new wealth abounded. For those working at Maskani this was most noticeable in the form of all the new vehicles needing washing. Second, these new forms of wealth were not evenly distributed. There was a class of people who owned cars, a class of people who were the drivers for those cars, a class of people who washed cars, and a class of people who approached cars looking for charity. Prior to the mid-1980s such extreme class-based differences hardly existed in Dar es Salaam, and those that did would not have been as readily noticeable.

In this chapter I attempt, through what are sometimes quite broad strokes, to provide a broader context for understanding the ways class has been reconfigured in recent years in relation to larger national and international economic changes. In order to situate the observations made at Maskani into larger moral discourses on street youth and urban migrant labor in Tanzania, it is important first to examine the history of these emergent social stratifications, which are most often attributed to recent economic liberalization. By historicizing and contextualizing the changes that have indeed taken place in Tanzania since the mid-1980s I want to illustrates that these changes have as much to do with continuity as they have to do with radical change, suggesting that contemporary class differences are reflective of power structures that have been at work in Tanzania since at least the colonial period. Many
things have changed since the mid-1980s, but these changes have resulted as much from the exacerbation of existing differences as from new configurations of power.

They Call Me “Deiwaka”

Those who regularly engage in informal labor often refer to themselves as “deiwaka” (from the English “day worker”) with a certain sense of entrepreneurial pride. The term is consciously employed in place of kibarua, the closest Kiswahili equivalent, and a word that carries negative connotations associated with ways in which casual labor was formalized in the past by both colonial and post-colonial regimes. Kibarua labor developed during the latter years of coastal slavery when an enslaved person would be contracted out to work for someone else and then required to share his wages with his “owner.” Upon completion of a contract he would be given a card, or kibarua, listing the hours worked, as well as the money earned, half of which would be turned over. In the twentieth century, “kazi ya kibarua” became a general Kiswahili term for casual labor that required a formal accounting of hours (Cooper 1987:26). Despite the various forms it took throughout British East Africa and independent post-colonial states, kibarua labor was basically an attempt to formalize and account for casual labor. The kibarua labor system was generally thought to be exploitative among those with whom I worked and the word kibarua was sometimes used in a pejorative manner. Conversely, many deiwakas saw themselves as having greater control over their labor power, without official forms, cards, or taxes, and the possibility to demand payment for work as each individual job was completed. Along with a sense of the pride, however, was an awareness of how uncertain the circumstances of their employment were and how flexible they would have to be if they wanted to continue competing in the market. The term deiwaka, which can mean both day worker and day work, captures the instability of contemporary urban labor in Tanzania where one must be able to hustle from day to day to get by and be willing to take on any task when the opportunity arises.

The return to informality as the dominant and preferred urban labor system in contemporary Dar es Salaam signals an important shift in the way people think about work, mobility, time, and space. The reasons for this shift are too complex to be fully explained in this text and attempting to understand them in the present without the benefit of hindsight makes the likelihood for oversimplification even greater. Despite this, I think it is worth trying to highlight some of the reasons why such a shift might be occurring at this time. The rise of informality in labor can be traced to the early 1980s when a series of internal and external economic crises befell the state of Tanzania. Ordinary Tanzanians were required to rely on informal income-generating activities to survive, and the nation’s decision makers realized they would have to accept this informalization process or be faced with potentially unruly urban populations.
A City “United by Poverty”

Aili Mari Tripp (1997) argues that by the mid-1980s the Tanzanian state had little choice but to embrace liberalized economic policies and to rethink laws governing informal labor practices as a result of demands made on the state by Dar es Salaam residents struggling to get by. She states,

(As) real wages in Tanzania fell by 83 percent between 1974 and 1988, urban dwellers and their kin expanded their pursuit of a variety of survival strategies, including reliance on farming and increasing involvement in small income-generating projects, such as making pastries, carpentry, or tailoring ... As Tanzania fell deeper into economic crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the state increasingly lost its capacity to regulate social relationships and to extract and appropriate resources (1997:3).

This period, between the mid-1970s and 1980s marked the beginning of a gradual change in Tanzania’s economic and political policies that is still underway in the country today. Most people, when speaking of these changes, point to 1985 as the breaking point for Tanzania’s centrally controlled socialist state. That was the year that Julius Nyerere, the first President of the country, stepped down from office and a year before Tanzania, under the guidance of newly elected President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, signed its first agreement with the IMF. It is often argued that the reforms that came about in 1985 were largely the result of the international pressures put on Tanzania at that time. Tripp argues, and I concur, that such an analysis fails to recognize the very important role played by the citizenry of Tanzania in bringing about these changes (1997:11). She sees participation in the informal economy as an example of non-compliance and as a mode of resistance (following Scott 1985) directed against the state. Further, she argues these tactics encouraged the state to undertake efforts to liberalize the Tanzanian economy as early as 1980 when efforts had initially been made to reach an agreement with the IMF.

Despite Tripp’s well-argued thesis that the move toward liberalization began much earlier than 1985 and that it was largely motivated by internal pressures, most of the Tanzanians I interviewed continued to recognize 1985 as the benchmark year for change. Furthermore, none of them claimed to have encouraged or influenced the liberalization process through his or her everyday efforts to survive. Few people mentioned international pressure as the cause for these changes either. Rather, they most often spoke as if the state happened to them. This may have been because the young men and women with whom I worked were for the most part more socially marginalized than those interviewed by Tripp ten years earlier. Unlike her respondents, many of those who worked with me did not have permanent residences in Dar es Salaam. Nor did they have extensive family and kin networks in the city on which they could rely when they got into trouble. They did not have official or unofficial identification cards (kitambilisho), which would have indicated to police that they were legally permitted to stay in the city, and very few of them
had any connections to the formal economy. In fact, many of the changes that, according to Tripp, were introduced in the 1980s for the benefit of struggling Dar es Salaam residents, have proven less beneficial for the hundreds of thousands of urban immigrants who have made their way to the city since that time. For example, since the mid-1980s it has become easier for residents of Dar es Salaam without formal employment to get identification cards from neighborhood organizations (ten cell leaders, party representatives, churches, etc.), but for those who sleep on the streets it remains difficult.

Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s it became easier for rural youth searching for employment to come to the city. Their presence was tolerated at first but, as their numbers continue to swell unabatedly, permanent residents of the city, those who came earlier and those who were born there, began to show signs of intolerance and anxiety, fearing that their city was being transformed by outsiders with few ties to it other than economic. While I do find Tripp’s arguments illuminating in many respects, it remains that many dewakas, like those at Maskani, are perceived as a threat (economically, socially, and morally) to the Dar es Salaam status quo. While the people she interviewed seemed to be operating from within the established system in order to bring about changes, those with whom I worked, without homes or ties to the formal economy, often imagined themselves operating outside of the system. Perhaps it is for this reason that so many of them felt that they had very little influence over state-sponsored changes that have come about over the last 25 years.

Instead, those I interviewed would most often discuss the economic and political changes that have taken place in Tanzania over the last 25 years in terms of the three different presidential regimes that have served the country since independence. Things changed, people say, when Nyerere stepped down and Mwinyi took over. Unable to initiate the types of reforms that even he knew were necessary if Tanzania was to escape the downward spiral of its economy, Nyerere gave up his presidential office. For ten years Mwinyi brought economic and political liberalization to Tanzania, as well as heretofore unknown levels of corruption. Then, in 1995, things changed again when Benjamin Mkapa took over the presidency and it became harder for the average Tanzanian to make a living off of graft and corruption.

Post-Nyerere History

In 1985, Julius Nyerere, the founding father of African socialism, stepped down from office permitting the popular reformist Ali Hassan Mwinyi to take over. Mwinyi, still fondly referred to as Mzee Ruksa, or “the old man who granted permission” or “allowed,” has in many ways come to stand for the period between 1985 and 1995 (kipindi cha ruksa) when Nyerere’s long-ailing socialist program was finally put to rest and when Tanzania made a turn toward a more liberalized economy and a more democratized state and society. Among the young men and women who played a central role in this
research, many of whom where just entering primary school when Mwinyi came to office, the days of *ruksa* are fondly remembered. Once when I remarked to a group of young men I was interviewing that I thought that they were perhaps too young to really remember what it was like during Nyerere’s reign, I was quickly rebuked. “Who do you think had to stand in line all day hoping to be permitted to buy a bar of soap?” I was asked. Of all the indignities and shortages people were forced to endure under socialism, not having soap for bathing often topped the list. It quickly became clear to me that it was these sort of experiential, embodied memories that many young people retained from the socialist years that framed their childhoods. The political reforms that came about in the 1980s were welcomed, not for any ideological reasons that I could ascertain, but for ways they changed people’s everyday lives. Soap became available. Today, it is one of the most common items sold at intersections throughout the city and people buy up to ten bars at a time as if they are unsure how long it will be so easy to get.

Since 1995, when the current president Benjamin Mkapa came to office, Tanzanians have increasingly felt the pinch of IMF and World Bank instigated structural adjustment programs (Fig. 2.4). The days of *ruksa* were over, and the days of *ukapa* had begun. *Ukap*a, the word used to refer to the “belt-tightening” rhetoric of recent years, also expresses the incongruity of a rhetoric that seems simultaneously to stand for policies that produce greater hardship among the poor and opportunities for economic growth among the burgeoning *nouveaux riches*. Following a 2002 speech when Mkapa suggested that Tanzanians tighten their belts, the joke on the street pointed out the irony of such a sentiment from a president who was eternally loosening his belt to make room for his growing belly.

What is interesting, and perhaps not entirely coincidental, about Tanzanian electoral history is that presidential terms have in many ways coincided with global trends regarding views towards governance and development. Nyerere reigned supreme from independence (December 1961) to the mid 1980s, a time period during which modernizing and modernist views toward development went relatively unchallenged. His top-down approach to development and modernization, though at times heavy-handed, made sense in a world where grand narratives regarding progress and development were rarely questioned. The period of Nyerere, known as *kipindi cha fimbo*, in reference to the stick, or *fimbo*, Nyerere always carried, was characterized by a strong centralized government attempting to lead the way on the road to development and modernity. When the road became difficult, or was blocked by non-compliant citizens, the state, like Nyerere, carried a stick with which it could intimidate people to clear the way in the name of national progress. The mid-1980s saw both a gradual decline in the power of progress narratives worldwide, as well as the somewhat cataclysmic decline of socialist power with the fall of the Soviet Empire. There is no doubt that trends in global politics would have made the continuation of Nyerere’s heavy-handed socialist regime difficult. It is also quite probable that these trends, along with resulting IMF
and World Bank pressure, encouraged the Tanzanian state to embrace more far-reaching reforms at a much quicker pace than it might have done otherwise. This is not to underestimate the importance of local pressures for change that were put on the Tanzanian state. Despite international pressures to reform, Nyerere still had strong support from many liberal democracies in Europe and from China as well. History has shown that many dictators who refused to relinquish their powers in the 1980s are still struggling along today and still resisting international pressure to reform. If anything, Nyerere’s willingness to accede to both local and international pressure and relinquish his presidency when he did adds weight to the popular belief that if you had to have a dictator, it might as well have been Nyerere, whose intelligence and benevolence were recognized among even his most serious detractors.

It should not be assumed, however, that Nyerere gave up politics along with the presidency. He remained Party Chairman of CCM, the ruling political party, and surrounded himself with like-minded politicians who challenged many of the economic and political reforms that were instituted under Mwinyi’s rule (Tripp 1997:79). For the first time in Tanzanian history the views of the party and the views of the state were not necessarily in line with one another and Nyerere was largely responsible for this development. From his influential position he continued to do his best to block legislative reform. He finally resigned from the post of Party Chairman in 1990 when he lost control of the Central Committee to Mwinyi, the leader of the reformers. But even this move did little to decrease his influential power over the Tanzanian
political system. Mwinyi's rule is remembered for its permissiveness, but it is also remembered for being incredibly corrupt. In an effort to increase party accountability and to challenge the corruption, which by that time had become endemic in the party, Nyerere surprisingly arose as a champion of multiparty politics in the early 1990s, a move that was initially resisted by Mwinyi and his cronies who no doubt saw the move for what it was: a direct challenge to their own power (Tripp 1997:83-4).

Mwinyi, who has gone down in recent history as the herald of hitherto unknown freedoms was, like Nyerere, also a child of his time. He served his presidential terms of office at a time when Apartheid was brought to an end, the Berlin wall came crashing down, and the Soviet Empire was dismantled. During the late 1980s, freedom, tolerance, and permissiveness were touted as democratic ideals throughout the world, but they were delivered to Tanzania by AN Hassan Mwinyi, Mzee Ruksa himself. Money rolled in from donors around the world. There was so much of it and so few measures of accountability established at the time that it should come as no surprise that much of it ended up in the pockets of private individuals rather than in the coffers of the state.

When people talk of the ruksa years (1985-1995), they do so with a gleam in their eyes and a smile on their faces. People I interviewed in Dar es Salaam remembered how everything seemed possible then, how they were finally able to get all the luxuries (like soap) they had been unable to get while Nyerere was in power, how there seemed to be so much freedom. When asked about corruption during this time period, people freely admit that it existed, but they say that during the ruksa years there was enough for everybody. The market was flooded with cash and merchandise from Western investors as part of Tanzania's reward for making the turn toward democracy, nominal though it may have been. There was so much, that if something went missing, or got skimmed off the top, no one would really notice. People laugh as they tell stories about individuals with particular audacity, and shake their heads at missed opportunities when talking about people who managed to build houses and buy cars with the profits made from skimming and all-out theft. Fortunately for Mwinyi he got out of office just in time. By the mid-1990s international policies directed toward so-called developing countries like Tanzania changed dramatically. Mkapa found himself in office just in time to feel the effects of structural adjustment and demands for economic accountability. No one argues that the period could have lasted forever, but that does not stop them from blaming Mkapa for being in charge when it was brought to an end.

Many of the young men I interviewed expressed a certain degree of bitterness toward the current regime, feeling that they had missed the chance to make it big during the ruksa years. What made this more difficult was the commonly held view that there continued to be as much corruption under Mkapa as there had been under Mwinyi, the only difference being that profits now tended to stay in the pockets of those who were already wealthy.
rather than ‘trickling down’ to the masses as it had done between 1990 and 1995. As Michael, an astute young man of 23, explained to me:

Under Mwinyi there was a lot of money in circulation; fees and taxes were not collected so people could make greater profits. There was a lot of illegal smuggling. Containers that were marked for transit or for other countries were off-loaded at the port in Dar es Salaam. By selling these goods in Tanzania people would increase their profit because they wouldn’t have to pay taxes. They made “super” profits. This meant that goods had to be moved through the system and that bribes had to be paid to officials on many different levels. There were also a lot of other opportunities to make money. My father had a truck and my friends and I used to borrow it and go down to the port. People would hire us to move their goods for them and they would pay us to do it. We made a lot of money in those days just because we had a truck. I also had a friend whose father operated a clearing agency at the port. He would hire us to drive cars that were coming into the country, I would make 10,000 Tsh. a car and some days I could make as much as 30,000 Tsh. (at that time 1500 Tsh. was the official monthly wage meaning that Michael, as a teenager, could make 20 times the monthly minimum wage in one good day). I would be lucky to make that in a month now. The market was flooded with goods and people believed there was a lot of wealth in the country and that the economy was strong. At that time it was easier for everyone. Even the thieves had it easy because there were so many things to steal. When Mkapa took office it became more difficult to avoid paying taxes and the smuggling decreased. This meant there were fewer goods available at higher prices. The result was that there was less extra capital in the economy. This makes a big difference in the lives of people who do not have much money. Those in power (wakubwa) have just found new ways around the laws that do not result in the filtering down of money. During Mwinyi’s time the entire system was corrupt, so everybody benefited, but since Mkapa came to power the wakubwa have just started stealing directly from the government or from big businesses. They don’t have to pay any bribes and they don’t have to hire anyone to move their goods for them. The problem was that during Mwinyi’s time the government was poor. People had money, but the government didn’t. It was because of this that things had to change. It couldn’t go on that way. For example, in 1995 the Japanese decided to build a new road through our neighborhood. All the government had to do was add to the money that the Japanese supplied. But they didn’t have it. Instead they said that every house should pay 20,000 shillings. People didn’t pay because they didn’t trust the collectors. With so much corruption around who would trust anybody? Now after five years with Mkapa in office the government is finally able to make a contribution and the road is nearing completion.
What is clear from Michael's statement is that when people say that Mkapa is putting the squeeze (kubana) on the people of Tanzania what they mean is that it is not as easy for the average person to benefit from theft, bribery and illegal work. Since 1995 it has become much more difficult to get around trade regulations and there are fewer imports because business people do not want to pay taxes. The business people I interviewed routinely complained about taxes being too high (a 20% VAT was introduced in 1996) but, as Michael suggested, perhaps they were mainly upset because they were no longer able to secure “super” profits like those made prior to 1995. Even though many young people may feel they missed their opportunity to make it big, many also agree that Mkapa’s policies are better for the nation as a whole. According to Michael, “one should not really be able to become a millionaire in a month” (in Tanzanian shillings). In short, it was only a matter of time before the bubble burst.

By 1995, when Mkapa came into office and began “putting the squeeze on,” the average citizen of Dar es Salaam was forced to come face to face with the stark realities of unequal accumulation. The wakubwa who had made big money during the Mwinyi years continued to do so under the new regime. As import regulations were tightened up and taxes increased, the opportunities for skimming became fewer and it became increasingly difficult for people to enter into the leagues of the wealthy. It should be pointed out, however, that there was no lessening of a desire to do so. These desires for wealth (and the consumer goods that accompany and signify it) coupled with the reduced opportunities for making money under Mkapa is one of the lead causes of discontent among youth in Dar es Salaam today.

Some may find it surprising, however, that despite desires for wealth, dreams of overnight success and get-rich-schemes did not hold particular sway in the minds or words of those I worked with at Maskani. Instead most would talk about working hard over time and slowly building wealth. They consistently expressed an uncanny degree of distrust toward money made too quickly since rapid accumulation was most often attributed to criminal activity, witchcraft or both (Fig. 2.5). I believe this is one of the reasons I rarely saw money that was gained through criminal means used for start-up capital for a new business venture. There were several instances during my time at Maskani when someone came into an unusually large sum of money. This money, which in most cases resulted from the sale of merchandise stolen out of a car parked in the area, would almost always be spent quickly and shared among friends. Money that was earned through work or through an honest loan or gift would be more likely to be used to start a business, or to be reinvested in an established one. “Dishonest” money is certainly appreciated and fully enjoyed, but to build one’s future on it would be considered both immoral and stupid. Yet, this is precisely what many Tanzanian wakubwa did throughout Mwinyi’s reign and continue to do under Mkapa. I believe it is for this reason that most of the young men from Maskani spoke with such disregard about the lifestyles of those with newly acquired wealth. Though they
would often form friendships with individual customers who brought their cars to be washed at Maskani, generally speaking, they tended to look down on most wakubwa, regarding them as thieves who made their living pilfering the state. The young men and women who worked at Maskani were certainly concerned with “moving up” and bettering their positions in Dar es Salaam society, but they were also critical of those, like the wakubwa, who they believed relied on criminal or occult means to do so.

Along with the rapid changes that have recently taken place in Tanzania have come the emergence of new degrees of inequality, and a consequent rise in jealousy. In addition to falling subject to accusations of corruption, those who make money too quickly may also find themselves becoming the subject of witchcraft accusations. Many of those I interviewed suggested that people might resort to witchcraft, or what Tanzanians refer to as uchawi, both as a means to acquire new wealth and as a means to level inequalities within social networks. Peter Geschiere (1997:9-10) argues that such ambiguity regarding explanations of the occult, what he refers to as its “polyinterpretability,” is characteristic of witchcraft discourses, and is part of what makes them so powerful.14

In Dar es Salaam, it is not unusual to hear that successful politicians or athletes have strong dawa, or medicine acquired from a mganga, or healer. A more common word for healer is fundi, the Kiswahili equivalent to “specialist who fixes something,”15 which is precisely what dawa is intended to do. It has the simultaneous goal of protecting its user from jealous persons and improving its user’s chance of success, whether in politics, athletics, business, health, or love. In general, people consider the use of dawa for protective purposes an innocuous endeavor; it is, in fact, fairly routine. Many people at Maskani would even make fun of those who used dawa, contesting its effectiveness and the intelligence of its users. It was only the accumulation of otherwise unexplainable wealth that was attributed to witchcraft. There was general agreement that one of the food vendors who used to work at the corner had made use of uchawi to help her business. I was told that she always had more customers than anyone else, and that when eating at her establishment one would feel satisfied after eating only a small amount. One would always feel hungry soon after leaving, however, having been tricked into believing you were eating when, in fact, you were not.16 When I asked how they could be sure she was a witch, I was told that certain people had the power to see witches, that they were discernable to the knowing eye that rec-

Figure 2.5 Sign in back window of local bus. “It is not only old people who are witches! Even young people are.” Dar es Salaam. (2000)
ognized their nakedness while appearing to be fully dressed to the casual observer.

During another conversation at Maskani the subject of msakula came up. In response to my inquiries regarding the meaning of this term, which I had never heard before, I was told that a msakula was a person whose soul had been enslaved by a close relative to work for them. I was told this practice was most common among Indo-Tanzanian storeowners who would kill one of their children so that he or she might be transformed into msakula. It was suggested that in rural areas msakula were put to work for witches as nighttime labor, but in the city they were made to perch on the roofs of businesses where they smile and wave to entice customers. Several people at Maskani reported having seen msakula sitting on top of businesses throughout the city, while others seemed to doubt their existence entirely. What seems to be important, however, is the relationship between uchawi, enslavement for purposes of labor, and economic success. The examples of the female food vendor and the retail storeowner are both illustrative of particularly urban forms of accumulation. They both employ idioms of the occult to explain unusual economic success. It should also be pointed out, however, that such idioms may also work as leveling mechanisms. Once it becomes known that a food vendor is a witch, or uses dawa to fool her customers, or that a msakula sits atop the roof of a certain establishment, it is only a matter of time before business begins to suffer and competitors benefit.

It is most often those who are perceived as competitors, both economic and social, who are likely to be accused of jealousy. As such, they are often victims of witchcraft accusations. "Wachawi wapo wengi." "There a lot of witches there" was a sentiment I routinely heard in reference to Uswahilinl, the areas of town where most poor people live. These parts of the city are characterized by an unplanned, almost willy-nilly arrangement of houses, limited access to electricity and clean water, and incredibly dense populations. Many believed that living so close to one's neighbors produced an environment where jealousy was inevitable and opportunities abounded for the employment of witchcraft. Those from Maskani who lived in these areas of town explained to me how difficult it was to get ahead in such an environment. Many of them claimed the main reason they chose to undertake income-generating activities at Maskani rather than in their local neighborhoods was to avoid the prying eyes of jealous neighbors whose actions might reduce their chances of success.

United by Poverty?

The differences between deiwakas and wakubwa, whether manifested in discourse on corruption or witchcraft, are reflective of larger class differences at work in contemporary Dar es Salaam society and the unease which accompanies them. Though these differences have roots in Tanzanian colonial and early post-colonial history (pre-1985), they have undoubtedly become more
pronounced and visible over the last 15-20 years. I use the concept “class” in my analysis to make discussion of the economic and social differences that exist within Tanzanian society easier to manage, less wordy and less cumbersome. I would not like to suggest, however, that the model of class structure I employ could not be broken down in other ways, nor that those classes to which I refer are mutually exclusive of one another. In fact, it was not uncommon to find members of the same family belonging to different classes depending on their job, level of education, the number of children they had, their gender and their marital status. Rather than imagining classes in Tanzania as existing in discrete bounded categories, I employ them as fluid categories to facilitate a greater understanding of the economic and social differences that exist in Dar es Salaam. When possible I try to employ local terms like deiwaka and wakubwa when appropriate.

From the beginning of my research in Tanzania I found that people most often articulated class differences in terms of what one might call the “super-poor,” people with almost nothing, and “everybody else,” who were for the most part also considered relatively poor. “We are united by our poverty,” was a phrase I would often hear repeated by officials in positions of power, politicians, mid-to-upper level civil servants, businesspeople, doctors, lawyers, and university professors. Such sentiment, which was surely in part the result of being exposed to years of socialist ideology, seemed to belie what I was witnessing every day on the streets and at Maskani. When I would point this out to my privileged interlocutors (privileged due to their positions in society), they would defend their views, arguing that the stark stratification of Tanzanian society was a relatively recent phenomenon (post-1985). According to many of them, these noticeable differences would have never been permitted if Nyerere were still in power. Along with the emergence of a newly rich class in urban Tanzania, and greater stratification within classes since the mid-1980s, there has also been an increase in the degree to which class differences are visible. It would be absurd to argue, however, as so many middle and upper class Tanzanians tend to do, that class differences simply did not exist prior to then. As arguments put forth by Burton (n.d.), Lugalla (1995), Leslie (1963), Mamdani (1996), and Shivji (1992) convincingly illustrate, class differences in Tanzania, specifically among urban dwellers, were produced and shaped during the colonial period. Perhaps what members of the educated bourgeoisie mean to imply with their statements regarding the absence of social stratification prior to 1985, however, is that class differences that might have been produced during colonialism were for the most part eradicated following independence. Viewing 1985 as a dividing line seems to allow those who have managed to do comparatively well for themselves as the economy has become more liberalized to explain not only their current wealth, but also the poverty they are forced to confront every time they enter the city. People seem to long for a more egalitarian society even as they embrace economic measures to assure their own success and the success of their families at the expense of the great majority
of Tanzanians. This nostalgic longing for a more egalitarian society is notable, as it was one of two liberal ideological premises (along with modernization) on which Tanzanian socialism was built (Shivji 1992:45).

Nyerere, leading the nation toward socialism following independence, always argued that prior to colonialism and foreign rule, there were no class differences in Tanzania. Rather than highlighting class, and calling it into question as one might expect of a socialist ideology, *Ujamaa* policies tended to reify an African past devoid of class-based difference, a mythical past when "life was easy, (and) no one used wealth for the purpose of dominating others" (Nyerere 1968:137). The trick was to ask people to return to past traditions, which were in many ways as "invented" as those invented by foreign regimes, while at the same time encouraging the development of a nation based very much on modern notions (Shivji 1992; Askew 2002).

Our Africa was a poor country (sic) before it was invaded and ruled by foreigners. There were no rich people in Africa. There was no person or group of persons who had exclusive claim to the ownership of the land. Land was the property of all the people . . . (l)ife was easy. It was possible for a man to live with his wife, his children, and other close relatives. Wealth belonged to the family as a whole; and every member of a family had the right to the use of family property. No one used wealth for the purpose of dominating others. This is how we want to live as a nation. We want the whole nation to live as one family. This is the basis of socialism (Nyerere 1968:137).

Under *Ujamaa*, all land was nationalized in 1967. This too was undertaken with the argument that, "in the past," Africans did not own land individually but rather communally. But owning land on the communal level of family, or clan, is not the same as communally owning land on the national level, something that was, no doubt, obvious to those living in the rural areas. Within every family and clan in Tanzania there is always a leader or leaders. Sometimes the leader is the father or grandfather, sometimes it is the maternal uncle, but it is almost always a man. Nyerere, himself the son of a chief, must certainly have been aware of these gendered- and class-based power structures at work in rural communities. Was this not, in part, what allowed him to become one of only three college graduates in all of Tanzania at the moment of independence? Of course, Nyerere was a child and product of colonialism and not of the mythical African past on which he based his appeals and, given his obvious intelligence, it makes sense that he would have been critical of the very colonial system that served to benefit him. My point, however, is not to deconstruct the foundations of *Ujamaa* policies, nor to suggest that Africa was not an ideal unified utopian continent before the advent of colonialism (which it most certainly was not). These tasks have been undertaken by many scholars more qualified than myself and critics of Tanzanian socialism abound. Rather, my purpose is to illustrate how contem-
porary reticence toward discussing class and class differences among urban elite is rooted in *Ujamaa* philosophies. Despite the presence of a rhetoric that represents Tanzania as a country “united by its poverty,” there are very real class differences at work in Dar es Salaam that help to produce an economic environment where young urban migrants are forced to rely solely on their informal economic endeavors to make a living.\(^\text{19}\)

**Policing Labor: From colonial to contemporary**

Whatever the causes . . . the high level of spatial mobility of Africans has often confronted modern colonial and post-colonial apparatuses of knowledge, bound as they generally have been to modern Western assumptions about the use and political control of space (Ferguson 1999:38-9).

The liberal promises of egalitarianism that marked Tanzanian socialist doctrines and continue to mark contemporary liberal discourses were formed in response to a British colonial regime that tended to capitalize on power differences that did exist in communities where it wished to institute its rule. It is important to note, that in most cases, the British encouraged the articulation and development of local power structures in rural areas, while instituting entirely different class-based power structures in urban centers where local authority would have been in question due to the diversity of urban populations and shallow historical precedence. Nyerere was responding to colonial efforts to propagate and exploit class differences in urban areas when he made claims of a pre-colonial, classless utopia. In the above quote, James Ferguson draws attention to the ways that both colonial and post-colonial projects have struggled to control the mobility of Africans through the control of spaces. These efforts were most importantly connected with the control of labor power. In this section, I attempt to illustrate the ways in which Tanzanian efforts to control the mobility of poor urban youth are in many ways a continuation of strategies and philosophies employed during colonial rule to discipline the urban labor force.\(^\text{20}\)

Most of the young informal laborers I interviewed in Dar es Salaam were first generation migrants who came to the city looking for employment. Many participated in various informal economies because labor and residency laws made it impossible for them to enter the formal economy and because there simply were not enough jobs available to them in the formal economy. Perhaps more importantly, the jobs that did exist rarely paid as much as they were able to make working on the streets. Michael, whose analysis of contemporary economic change was provided above, is a case in point, sometimes earning 20 times the monthly minimum wage in a single day of informal activities. Tripp reports that in the late 1980s those working in the informal economy were able to make between 4 and 23 times the monthly minimum wage (1997:41). My research at Maskani confirms this trend. Even the car washers, who occupied one of the bottom rungs on the earnings lad-
A City "United by Poverty"
der, made on average 60,000 Tsh. a month, more than twice the minimum wage.
Since the early 1980s more and more young people and adult women have begun engaging in informal income-generating activities as a preferred alternative to formal labor (Bagachwa and Naho 1995; Kerner 1988; Tripp 1997). In the face of these changes the state has responded in two primary ways: they have tried to formalize the informal economy, requiring people to register their businesses and to pay fees, and they have implemented various legislation in an effort to make participation in the informal economy more trouble than it is worth (Kerner 1988; Tripp 1997). Those working in the informal economy engage in income generating activities to support themselves and sometimes their families, yet their status as members of the urban labor force remains contested. They refuse to be counted, refuse to punch a clock, refuse to pay taxes, and refuse to limit their economic endeavors to legitimate places of business. In short, they circumvent the methods usually employed to discipline labor and, as a result, are routinely subject to harassment by the police during work hours and sometimes forbidden to continue their work.

In Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism Mahmood Mamdani argues that, following independence in most African countries, individual states followed one of two basic trajectories which he refers to as "conservative" and "radical" (1996:25-26). While he at times simplifies his analysis for the sake of streamlining his general argument, I believe his line of reasoning can help to shed light on the "radical" trajectory embraced by the post-colonial Tanzanian state. According to Mamdani, conservative post-colonial regimes more or less upheld the colonial status quo established through "indirect rule" in British colonies, and "association" in French colonies. "The hierarchy of the local state apparatus, from chiefs to headmen, continued after independence," in essence, maintaining decentralized governance, or what Mamdani calls "decentralized despotism (ibid.)." Decentralized regimes "tended to bridge the urban-rural divide through a clientelism whose effect was to exacerbate ethnic divisions," giving rise to increased regionalism and "tribalism" through systemic corruption (ibid.). Generally speaking, local rulers in rural areas were given power, money and opportunity to enforce the wishes of the state. Radical regimes, like Tanzania, embraced more centralized power ("despotism"), "de-emphasizing the customary and ethnic difference between rural areas while deepening the chasm between town and country in the pursuit of administratively driven development" (ibid.). While Tanzania was largely able to overcome many of the problems associated with "tribalism" in neighboring countries like Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, economic differences between urban elites and rural farmers seemed to grow wider. Aware of the social unrest to which such differences might eventually lead, Nyerere fought against this trend heartily, pressing to keep the wages of urban workers low and minimizing the importation of luxuries that might work to lure
rural dwellers into the city.\textsuperscript{21}

Despite his efforts, however, the great divide in Tanzania has been, at least since independence, the divide between the urban and rural population. I would like to tentatively argue that since the late 1980s this divide has been reduced as a result of the greater degree of mobility permitted to citizens of Tanzania. As it has become increasingly easier for young people (and others) to move to Dar es Salaam and other urban centers in Tanzania in search of employment, ties between rural and urban centers have only become stronger. Remittances sent home by young people working in the city alleviate economic difficulties in rural areas, while also providing alternative futures for young men and women from the rural areas who have little hope of finding gainful employment there. Remittances also allow for the maintenance of rural power structures (gendered and generational) and ways of life that might not otherwise be possible.\textsuperscript{22}

At the same time there has been an increase in the divide between the classes within urban centers. I argue the reconfiguration of class that was initiated by liberalization in the 1980s continues to reflect increased stratification in the present, specifically in regards to the relationship between dei-wakas and more long-term residents of the city. Keeping in mind the limits of class delineation I outlined earlier, I would like to suggest that there are four primary classes in Dar es Salaam today. First, there are the so-called “super poor.” Lugalla (1995) includes mentally and physically handicapped people who have no way of supporting themselves, beggars and their families, and street children in this category. Although I had little interaction with people from this class during my research, I was often surprised to learn that people from more upper class backgrounds tended to imagine that those working at Maskani were among the poorest of the poor. It seemed impossible for them to conceive that these young men and women were actually earning enough to support themselves and, in some instances, entire families. That many of them slept at Maskani led others to classify them as “street children,” a uniformly despised moniker. Those at Maskani would have considered themselves working class. They were dei-wakas, or walaala-hoi, “those who sleep very heavily as a result of their hard labor.” These informal, or casual laborers make their living through modes of employment that are not regulated or controlled by state apparatuses. In most cases, such workers would be classified as “unemployed” by the state.\textsuperscript{23} Though less educated laborers in the formal economy could also be included in this category, I maintain that there is an important distinction between those with connections to the formal economy and those without, just as there is an important distinction between those who have a formal residency and those who sleep in the streets. Next, there are the petty bourgeois, made up mainly of educated civil servants, professionals, intellectuals and their children, who have not made significant economic gains over the last 20 years. For the most part, these are the same people who would have been legally permitted to live and work in Dar es Salaam prior to the loosening of labor
laws that has gradually occurred since the mid-1980s. Following Cooper (1987), they would have been considered the "respectable working class." Members of this liberal elite are among those still inclined to embrace the ideological claims that made Ujamaa so persuasive to begin with. They are apt to speak of equality and the absence of conflict as the most important social ideals. They often express disgust toward those who have been so quick to embrace consumerism, including both wakubwa and deiwakas. The wakubwa, those who have accumulated great wealth in recent years, largely through corruption, tax evasion, and other illegal means, are usually either well-placed government officials who have used their positions to the benefit of their families, or big businesspeople who have made huge profits through the smuggling and trade of both legal and illegal goods (see Lugalla 1995:35-37; also Shivji (1992) and Tripp (1997) especially on the historical roots of the divisions in the wakubwa class between government workers and businesspeople).  

Although casual labor has always been present in Dar es Salaam, it has come to be increasingly tolerated and legitimized in recent years as both the Tanzanian state and international funding agencies have begun to recognize the value of the informal economy. Since the start of the colonial period, sporadic attempts have been made by the state in eastern Africa to formalize labor policies by drawing a distinction between formal and informal laborers. This has been achieved primarily in ways that present the former as a "respectable working class" and the latter as the "dangerous classes" (Cooper 1987:13; Burton 2000, 2001).

Cooper (1987:17) argues that the making of the East African working class during the colonial period resulted from British views regarding the need to differentiate between a "civilized" and an "uncivilized" working class in order to prevent infection of the "respectable" former by the "dangerous" and criminalized latter. During the late 19th and early 20th century, the notion of a functional informal economy was foreign to policymakers, who generally maintained that urban residents not engaged in formal labor practices would be left with no recourse but to engage in illegal activities to support themselves. Through a steady stream of measures instituted in the late colonial period and since then carried through by post-colonial regimes, informal labor became increasingly criminalized. This was especially so in socialist Tanzania where the urban "unemployed," the term normally applied to unregistered laborers, were lumped together with economic saboteurs plotting to overthrow the socialist state (Shivji 1992:51; Kerner 1988). To live in the city without state-recognized gainful employment was largely forbidden.

Cooper (1987) points out, however, that residency and labor laws were laxly enforced during most of the colonial period, because it was too difficult to carry them out effectively in East Africa and because colonial officials showed little interest do so. It was not until the period following the Second World War that efforts to "decasualize" labor in Mombassa increased in response to fears in the metropole that urban dock workers would fail to facilitate the
delivery of raw materials into the world market just when the British econo-
my needed them most (ibid.). These fears led administrators of the East
African colonies (and throughout the British Empire – see Cooper and Stoler
1997) to step up efforts to make labor more reliable. Similarly, it was not
until after the Second World War that serious efforts were made to develop
a stable and reliable working class in Dar es Salaam. Although these actions
were undoubtedly motivated by British interests in maintaining a steady flow
of commodities out of African ports as Britain and Europe struggled to rebuild
their economies, they were also facilitated by an emergent class of educated
Africans. While Cooper’s work under-emphasizes the role of the latter (which
may have been less important in Mombassa than in Dar es Salaam), Andrew
Burton (n.d.) suggests that considerable African pressure was put on British
colonial agents in Dar es Salaam to rid the city of so-called undesirables dur-
ing the late colonial period. To make his argument, he relies mainly on let-
ters written by educated Africans to the editors of English language newspa-
ers that encouraged the removal of unemployed urban migrants by the colo-
nial regime. From the 1930s until shortly after independence there was a
strong tradition of organized labor unions in Dar es Salaam consisting partly
of Asian laborers, but also African laborers (Iliiffe 1979; Coulson 1982).
These unions, no doubt, had much invested in encouraging the enforcement
of residency laws that would help to ensure their jobs.28

The late colonial split between formal and informal labor in Dar es Salaam
mirrors a similar division observable today between deiwakas and those petty
bourgeoisie who are engaged in more respectable forms of labor. This divi-
sion was fostered by colonial labor strategies, but it was also shaped and
continues to be shaped by educated Africans. Efforts to reduce these divi-
sions were undertaken as part of the socialist regime, but in recent years
these efforts have become largely undone as fissures reappear between the
classes.29 In addition, the moralistic logic employed by the respectable
classes to bolster their status during colonial times proves equally effective
in post-socialist discourses, giving them a basis for maintaining their moral
superiority over the newly rich wakubwa, whose accumulation strategies are
often viewed as immoral, as well as illegal. Although the newly rich have eco-
nomic and educational capital and, in many cases, more than the respectable
petty bourgeoisie, their moral and social capital is on par with, if not below,
that of the deiwaka. The respectable petty bourgeoisie are as quick to den-
grate wakubwa for having so quickly adapted to post-socialist modes of pro-
duction and consumption as are deiwakas. At the same time, many of them
seem to be engaged in trying to find ways to transform their own forms of
social, educational and symbolic capital, which had been so highly valued in
the past, into economic profitability today.30

Emergent Discourses of Difference in Contemporary Dar es Salaam

Gone are the days when oppressive vagrancy laws were strictly enforced in
Tanzania’s urban centers, otherwise hanging around on a street corner like Maskani would in itself be considered not only suspect, but criminal as well. Throughout the socialist years and well into the mid-1980s people were not permitted to move freely around the country, and movement from rural to urban areas was particularly discouraged. Burton (n.d.) demonstrates that by 1958 colonial policies made the apprehension and repatriation of “undesirables” a more or less daily occurrence in Dar es Salaam, and, further, that Nyerere’s TANU31 party exploited the resentment caused by such raids to rally political support from those operating in the economic margins of society. The fact that TANU was able to garner this support, combined with the corresponding urban unrest that it fostered, helped to eventually encourage colonial administrators to relinquish power to Nyerere and grant Tanganyika its independence. Almost immediately after independence, however, the post-colonial regime began the development and deployment of their own disciplinary methods for preventing dissatisfied rural youth from emigrating to the city in search of employment opportunities. The rhetorics of modernization and development were as strong in post-independence Tanzania as they were prior to independence and, like their colonial predecessors, the TANU government believed living in the city would have a corrupting influence on rural youth. Given the fact that there were not enough jobs for them in the formal economy, the leadership argued it was inevitable that such youth would have no choice but to turn to illegal means to support themselves. Of course, there was always the threat of urban unrest, as well, and TANU was as concerned as the colonialist regime had been that this unruly labor force might challenge state authority. Since it was politically problematic to be seen repeating the sins of colonialism, however, TANU transformed the rhetoric of “undesirables,” which dominated colonialist thinking regarding urban policy, into a rhetoric of “unproductivity” (Burton n.d:9; also see Kerner 1988 and Shivji 1992). Those who came to the city looking for jobs rather than participating in the rural production of crops that could be sold to raise foreign capital and further the goals of the nation were deemed unproductive parasites responsible for undermining national development. From the early 1960s through the mid-1980s, and reaching an apex with the Human Resources Deployment Act, or Nguvu Kazi, in 1983, the state employed the rhetoric of unproductivity to justify various methods for keeping rural migrants out of the city. People were routinely rounded up and returned to their home villages, if not relocated to Ujamaa villages or other government-sponsored rural development projects. In recent years, the rhetoric of unproductivity has been replaced with arguments centering on urban sanitation. Densely populated areas of the city are described as dirty and disease-causing, while those working and sleeping in the streets are accused of blocking sidewalks and access to legitimate businesses, forcing pedestrians into traffic, and generally making the streets unsafe.

Since the mid- to late-1990s the Dar es Salaam city council has led the drive to “Weka Mji Safi,” or keep the city clean. These efforts have resulted
in the repeated destruction of informal businesses, the confiscation of merchandise for sale, as well as the arrest and forced removal of informal laborers who fail to produce legitimate identification. I would suggest that this change in rhetorics reflects an expansion of anxieties in regards to the rapid influx of labor that has occurred in Dar es Salaam since the early 1990s. Again, I would maintain that is not only the number of young laborers flooding the city that is causing anxiety, it is also the manner in which they are willing to labor. Operating almost entirely outside of the bounds of the formal economy, they present a threat to the status quo and their lack of domicile (sleeping on the streets) is often offered as evidence of their lack of commitment to the development of Dar es Salaam as a modern city.

That efforts to control and limit informal labor in the city have been more or less continuous since colonial times suggests that they have also been fairly ineffective in regards to discouraging people from migrating to the cities. People who are removed from the city quickly return, regardless of the consequences. So why do efforts to do continue into the present? What is gained? Following Foucault (1979) writing on the prison system, and Ferguson (1994) on international development, it becomes necessary to examine what is produced, even if unintentionally, by a discourse that focuses on a class defined variously as “dangerous,” “undesirable,” “unproductive,” and “dirty” by successive regimes of power. The answer would appear to be rather simple: the production and maintenance of a definable and manageable (i.e., taxable) labor force that would adhere to the status quo to avoid being associated with so-called undesirables. For all of its efforts to distance itself from the oppressive urban policing policies of the colonialist regime, the TANU government ended up merely reproducing them, changing only the rhetoric to serve nationalist purposes. As late as 1984, those who found themselves in Dar es Salaam without proper reason could expect to be heavily fined, forcefully returned home, jailed, or in extreme cases, forcefully resettled (Kerner 1988; Tripp 1997). At the very least, they could be expected to be harassed by the police or the city militia. Since the mid-1980s the enforcement of vagrancy laws in Dar es Salaam has gradually declined, but most still exist and may on occasion be resurrected to serve political objectives, as when long-term city residents pressure city politicians to “keep the city clean.”

The sanitation rhetoric that has been employed since the mid- to late-1990s to justify efforts to control those who rely exclusively on the informal economy has recently taken an interesting turn that I believe reinforces my arguments regarding emergent differences between recent urban migrants and long-term residents of the city. An example from the Kariokoo section of Dar es Salaam makes the point. Toward the end of 2001 it was announced that efforts would be undertaken by the police to clear sidewalk vendors from this area that serves as the largest planned market in the city. The reason given was not that the vendors were undesirable (although they were described as being loud, dirty, and disrespectful), but that they were migrants
to the city. The residents living in Kariakoo, a more or less lower-middle class neighborhood, had begun to demand that the sidewalks in front of their houses be made available for their own family businesses. They do not want to disrupt the informal economic practices developed by young men from the rural areas, they merely want to take them over for themselves and their own children. Just two years before, in December 1999, the same “respectable” people were calling for a complete end to unregulated economic endeavors. What this example illustrates is how attempts to occupy and control urban space are being constantly deployed to make and re-make class in the city.

I would suggest that this shift signals a rise in tensions of the sort Mamdani predicts when governments make the move from centralized to decentralized power. At first glance, this may seem contradictory, because it looks like the primary discourse of difference at work in this example is predicated on an urban-rural divide, something we would expect under centralized despotism. On closer inspection, however, it is possible to see that the urban status of Kariakoo residents is incidental in this case. Instead, they are invoking their rights to urban space based on an argument of locality, which resonates strongly with Mamdani’s suggestion that one should expect a rise in regional/ethnic tensions as regimes become less centralized. In this case, the region in question is Kariakoo and informal laborers are increasingly liable to be subjected to secondary regionalist/tribalist discourses, as is implied by the very term *wamachaunga* (literally, people from Mchinga) that is reserved for those who sell merchandise on the road side, whether they come from that region or not. So, while Dar es Salaam may be safe from tribalist discourses as I argued earlier, this does not mean that other discourses of difference are not arising based on class, length of time living in the city, and regional origins.

**Keeping Up Appearances**

In addition to the political motivations that may encourage the invocation of dormant vagrancy laws, police also routinely resurrect the same laws in order to detain someone they suspect of committing a crime. Although police harassment is still somewhat arbitrary, those at Maskani believed it was possible to reduce one’s chances of attracting the attention of the police through tactics of assimilation. By appearing “respectable,” they could be taken as such. In our discussions they would often stress that the way a person carries him or herself is important. If one seems busy with some sort of income-generating activity and keeps a clean, neat appearance this can go a long way toward encouraging the police to move on in search of a less lucky target. Athumani, a Maskani car washer, explained the importance of good grooming to me, pointing out that most of those who worked at Maskani bathed regularly, wore clean clothes, and kept their hair short or wore it tucked under a hat if they had dreadlocks. By taking these precautions, he
said, they could look like anyone else in the city. No one would be able to pick them out if they were walking down the street as people who slept outside (i.e., without official residence or the identification card that would come with official residency). He said they were lucky because they were car washers. This gave them almost unlimited access to water, making it easy for them to wash themselves every day and for them to do their laundry regularly.\(^{38}\) As he told me this he drew my attention to the clothes spread out over the fence behind us, making me realize that this was actually laundry hung out to dry in the middle of the city's business district. Police, along with many other Tanzanians, continue to consider any young man wandering the streets as suspicious and any young woman doing the same as a potential prostitute. This is especially so if an individual is unkempt. It is with this in mind that many young people making their living in the streets adopt a clean-cut, even fashionable, appearance that can serve to protect them from unwanted harassment.

My friends at Maskani were quick to point out that it was usually the very same wakubwa, liberal elites, and foreigners who brought their cars to them to be washed who would condemn deiwakas for wasting the little money they had on new clothes and shoes. These were also the same people, however, who were likely to portray them as troublemakers when they failed to master this particular form of symbolic capital.\(^{39}\) Barthes imagines fashion, or the wearing of clothes, as a system of signs that can be understood and interpreted much like any other mode of speech (1994 [1964]:25-6). That people living and working in the streets, people without homes, showers, or a closet to keep their clothes in, should acquire a wardrobe sufficient to give them the appearance of being middle class to the casual observer, attests not only to their ability to “speak” the language of fashion, but also to their ability to appropriate it in order to prevent attacks on their personal space.\(^{40}\) Further, I would suggest that the unease experienced by various elites in response to this appropriation results precisely because of the effective use of this weapon, and not from any real concern about how lower class youth spend their money.

In City of Walls: Crime, segregation, and citizenship in Sao Paulo, Teresa Caldeira (2000:64-68) makes a compelling argument regarding similar unease as expressed by members of the Sao Paulo middle classes. She suggests that it is most likely a result of the breaking down of class barriers that occurs when people who formerly defined themselves as middle class experience a decline in income and correspondingly feel their status threatened. Caldeira's argument also carries weight in post-socialist Dar es Salaam where members of the urban petty bourgeoisie who formerly imagined themselves as members of a classless society despite their relative wealth and social advantage, are being forced to come to grips with the degree to which they valued their symbolic capital in the past, while simultaneously realizing how little buying power such status gives them in an increasingly capitalist economy. That so called “street children” can afford
to buy the same clothing that middle class parents are barely managing to buy for their own children directly confronts their notion of social order and the way things "should be." Despite my very materialist reading of the situation in Dar es Salaam, I would not like to suggest, as Bourdieu (1984) does, that poor people are limited to functional choices when it comes to fashion and aesthetic consumption. Although, poor urban street youth do embrace a sense of fashion that very "functionally" limits the degree to which they are harassed by the police, and treated with disrespect by middle class Tanzanians, they also manage to maintain a very strong sense of style that draws on everything from American hip-hop culture, to Jamaican Rastafarian philosophies—a topic to which I will return in Chapter Four.

Maintaining the Moral Status Quo

The changing economy in Tanzania has indeed increased many people's access to goods and services, and it has also provided fertile ground for the emergence of wakubwa, among whom status is based more on money and success in business, than on education and position within society. Along with a certain alienation of the former liberal elites who have not managed to take equal advantage of the new economic opportunities, there is also an increasing distance between classes. In essence, the rich are getting richer, the poor are getting poorer despite their increased access to certain consumer goods and media, and many former elites see their fortunes dwindling. It should be said however, that many members of this bourgeoisie do not even want to compete in the game of conspicuous consumption; rhetorically at least, most claim they would prefer a return to the logic of the old system, a system in which, not coincidentally I think, they were on top. Regardless of the degree to which their economic status is slipping, however, many still hold positions of authority within the civil service, and still see themselves, and are seen by others, as keepers of the moral status quo. It is not that individual members of the petty bourgeoisie are respectable, but rather it is the way they make their money that is.

Various kinds of illegality are commonly involved in the accumulation of new forms of wealth, ranging from outright thievery in the form of robberies and petty theft, grand larceny and the diversion of government funds, to the smuggling and selling (and subsequent tax evasion) of legal substances such as coffee, cloves and clothes, and of illegal substances such as marijuana and heroin. That these opportunities for making money have recently become more available has been largely attributed to increasing corruption among government officials from the President on down to the police. Most young people making their living in the street equate "the state" with the police and their power to invoke dormant laws to enact social control or simply to get enough money to eat for the day. For urban youth, police harassment and corruption are facts of daily life that have in many ways come to constitute the state in their eyes. From their vantage point, every-
one is on the take, laws hold little power over those with money and a crime is a crime only when one is caught. However, when involved in the act of disciplining urban street youth, the state and the police are almost always acting with the complicit, if not explicit, support of the “respectable” citizens of the city, as well as the less respectable wakubwa. That there is little public outrage at the humiliations to which urban poor are routinely subjected should not be surprising given that most established residents of the city see this legion of informal laborers as a direct threat to their self-respecting, middle class way of life and, in addition, as an emergent working class whose flexibility and mobility threaten to transform Tanzanian work space in ways for which they and their own children are unprepared. The irony, however, is that, given the chance, most of the deiwakas I came to know would gladly embrace the bourgeois morals in question, rather than attempt to challenge the institutions that support them. Because of their overwhelming desire to one day enter into the realm of the respectable classes they willingly partake in a system whose injustices they are otherwise quite capable of articulating.

The rapid and radical transformation of the Tanzanian urban economy since the mid-1980s has resulted in a great deal of social unease. On one level, more people in the cities have access, through both legal and illegal means, to a great many more resources. It has been possible to witness a growth in city infrastructure, and an increase in new housing construction, both of huge mansions in the wealthy suburbs located mainly along the coast to the north of the city, and of unregulated Swahili-style housing in the river valleys where most urban poor live. There are many more cars on the roads, and people have unprecedented access to various forms of media, mobile telephones, television and computers. Many also have greater choice in newspapers and radio stations. Consumption of these products and services has brought a greater feeling of freedom among many who would most likely have had very little access to them in the past. At the same time, these new forms of consumption have led to the transformation and upending of symbolic capital. This has created feelings of uncertainty among those who were among the liberal elites in the past and occasional feelings of potential and freedom among those who were not. In this sense, the problem of class-consciousness in Tanzania is a problem of the liberal elites who fail to see how Tanzania’s post-socialist economy helps to create spaces of hope for young men from the rural areas that would never have been available under the socialist regime. While they nostalgically long for the lost days of egalitarianism what they often fail to recognize is that they were largely exempt from the union of poverty that supposedly bound all Tanzanians together. It was this central hypocrisy that offended so many of the young people I interviewed. Those who have been able to transform their flexibility and mobility as workers over the last several years into increased access to capital – in both symbolic terms and in terms of cold, hard cash – are acutely aware of were they come from, but also of where they want to go. Rather than speaking of a nation “united by its poverty,” paraphrasing Mr. II, the Kiswahili rap star
whose lyrics opened this chapter, deiwakas are more likely to look around
them, see people they know living in big houses and driving big cars, see the
police eating nice food and getting fat(ter), and lament that they “have noth­
ing.”

Notes
1 The term wamachinga is the plural form of machinga, the word most often
used to refer to the mobile street vendors who walk the city. The term itself
is a reference to a small region in the southeastern part of the country that
is the home area of many of the young men. Regardless of where they come
from, however, all those who pursue this profession are referred to as
wamachinga. Although the great majority of wamachinga are young men,
there has been a steady increase in the number of women. See Chapter Five
for a longer discussion on wamachinga in Dar es Salaam. Also see Ann
2 The services provided by these two organizations differ greatly. The former
offers emergency shelter and food to young men who have nowhere else to
go and, to a select few, further schooling and eventually job placement. At
one time, several young men who had been trained at Dogodogo were
employed at the Sheraton across from Maskani. Though I was never able to
interview these young men, it is my understanding that they rather quickly left
these jobs in favor of going into business for themselves on the streets.
YCIC offers cultural activities for young people as a way to get them off the
streets and keep them out of trouble. They also provide identification cards
to youth who remain on good terms with their organization and bail them out
of jail when picked up on vagrancy charges. In addition, they sponsor a youth
performance group that in 2000 seemed to be the darling of the NGO circuit.
In recent years both organizations have begun meeting would-be urban
migrants at the train stations and bus stands in an attempt to encourage
them to turn around and return to their families. According to the director of
YCIC street life is like a drug and once someone becomes addicted to it, it
is almost impossible to get him or her to leave it. For this reason, it is impor­
tant to get them to return home before getting a taste of street life.
3 I provide a definition of class below, but suffice it to say here that my under­
standing of class in Tanzania is quite flexible.
5 It has been suggested that one of the reasons so many young men may
have expressed distaste at the notion of kibarua labor is because of its close
association with slavery, an institution that continued along the Swahili coast
until late in the 19th century (see Alpers 1975 for more). While Dar es Salaam
was never a center of the slave trade, Bagamoyo to the north and Zanzibar off the coast were among the largest slave entrepôts in eastern
Africa.
6 I return to a discussion on agency in the next chapter.
Tripp (1997) has shown how connections to the formal economy often help to provide stability for those who predominantly rely on the informal economy for their income.

Mwinyi earned the nickname Mzee Ruksa following a speech he gave early in his tenure as president. In the speech, which was given in response to the burning of food stalls that served pork, he declared "Government has no religion," and that "he who wants to eat pork, it is permitted," or "anayetaka kula gguruwe . . . ruksa."

Mamdani (1996:14) points out that South Africans were already setting a continental example in the mid-1970s by engaging in unarmed civil struggle to demand changes from the state. Events occurring in South Africa are often of great interest in Tanzania. This is especially so given the central role played by Tanzania in so many of the nationalist movements throughout southern Africa. At various times Dar es Salaam has been home to many continental dissidents, as well as numerous others from throughout the world, and I was always struck by how much those working at Maskani seemed to know about world events. If their knowledge is any indicator of the average Tanzanian's knowledge, then it would be quite reasonable to argue that Tanzanians learned much about the way to deal with an undemocratic state by observing the events that occurred in South Africa.

Wakubwa, literally the "big people," are those who have exceptional economic and political power in Tanzania. They comprise the newly rich class that has emerged in Dar es Salaam since the 1980s.

The use of this particular verb {kubana, to squeeze} in reference to the economic policies instituted by Mkapa is interesting because it was the same term used by those at Maskani when they talked about have to forgo leisure activities as a result of limited finances. There seemed to be a general consensus among many of those with whom I spoke all over Dar es Salaam that Mkapa's policies had led to people having less money for the pleasures that made life worth living (sterehe).

See Geschiere's (1997) work on witchcraft and modernity in Cameroon.

See McKim (2001) for relationship between honest money and Islamic belief in Zanzibar.

Geschiere also discusses the "entwinement of democratic tendencies and notions of witchcraft," suggesting that these insecurities and uncertainties, which arise as a result of the emergence of multiparty politics, can lead to a rise in witchcraft accusations, as well as an actual increase in people's use of the occult (1997:7). Although I find his argument compelling I do not feel I have sufficient data to suggest that witchcraft accusations are on the increase in Tanzania. It certainly merits further exploration, however.

Fundi is not used exclusively to refer to healers; any craftsman may be called fundi as well.

This example may also be tied to larger anxieties about eating in public, an act rarely undertaken in rural areas for fear of eliciting jealousy or of bringing shame on one's family. For more on the connections between food, eat-
ing and witchcraft see Weiss' *The Making and Unmaking of the Haya Lived World* (1996, especially Chapters Four and five). Beidelman states that among Kaguru peoples food should always be eaten publicly (shared so as to assuage witchcraft accusations). It should, however always be stored privately so that the amount of food an individual family has will remain a secret to jealous eyes (1997:82-3).

17 This example may be tied to larger social tensions between African and Asian Tanzanians who owned and/or managed several of the businesses at Maskani. Having said this, however, most of the exchanges that I observed between African and Asian Tanzanians at Maskani were marked by respect.

18 Chapter 7 focuses more closely on life in *Uswahilini*.

19 Although many middle and upper class people are also engaged in informal economic activities, many recent migrants rely on the informal economy as their sole source of support. As was suggested above, those who have ties to the formal economy as well are often in a much better position in terms of maintaining economic stability.

20 Such efforts were obviously also interested in controlling rural labor as well. See Kerner (1988) for a discussion of the relationship between the need for agricultural labor and efforts to relocate the urban unemployed to rural areas where they would be expected to farm.

21 In accordance with Mamdani's argument, one might expect to observe a contemporary emergence of tribalist discourses in Tanzania, as well as a lessening of tensions between urban and rural areas in light of the recent moves toward a less centralized state. While it was not uncommon during the time of my research to hear people suggest that members of particular ethnic groups might have greater access to money, or to better jobs than members of other ethnic groups, I think there is reason to hope that tribalist discourses, like those found in neighboring countries, have been rendered relatively powerless in regards to their ability to shape contemporary Tanzanian society. To take Maskani as an example, although it was true that the majority of the car washers had connections to Arusha and that many of those selling auto parts had connections to the southeastern part of the country, there were many exceptions as well. Those working at Maskani traced their origins to nearly every region of the country and in the time I spent at there I never heard anyone disparage anyone else based on ethnic identity or religion.

22 White (1990) makes a similar argument for the commodification of female bodies in colonial Nairobi, suggesting that the remittances female prostitutes sent home (especially to Tanzania) helped to fund the continuation of pre-colonial patriarchal power structures in rural areas. Pels suggests, however, that with the increasing globalization of some rural areas (in his case the Luguru mountains), outside influences have contributed to a breakdown of generational power structures (2000:141; see also van Donge 1993). Recent preliminary research by Josien de Klerk seems to suggest a recent break down in rural urban links among Haya peoples (personnal communica-
tion). Though the reasons for this are not yet clear, early evidence suggests that it may be tied to recent changes in migration strategies, which I believe may be tied to larger changes taking place in Tanzania as a whole. It may also be that recent migrants maintain strong ties to the rural areas, while those who have been in Dar es Salaam longer do not. Many who are born in Dar es Salaam do not even speak the language of their region, making it harder for them to maintain ties even when they desire to do so.

23 For various reasons, the Tanzanian state still seems to be invested in painting a statistical picture of the nation that suggests very little urban unemployment. Several people told me that when they registered to vote for the 2000 elections they would be asked what they did for a living. If they stated they were a housewife (mama mwenye nyumba), or unemployed, those registering them would check the box for mkulima, or farmer. I believe this to be a continuation of socialist policies that maintained that no one in Tanzania was unemployed.

24 While wakubwa and delwaka (or walalahoi, mnyonge) are words one is likely to hear in daily exchanges when social and economic difference is discussed there do not seem to be any colloquial terms that refer to the petty bourgeoisie class, which I believe is connected to their being seen as unmarked carriers of the moral status quo. Dwyer makes similar assertions about the middle classes in Bombay (2000, especially chapter 3).

25 For more on the history of informal labor in Dar es Salaam see Burton (2000, 2001), Beidelman (1967), Leslie (1963), and Tripp (1997).

26 This understanding has largely been facilitated by academic studies of informal economies that exponentially grew throughout Africa in the 1980s. Most notable among these studies are Clark (1988), King (1996), MacGaffey (1987), MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000), Tripp (1997).

27 Cooper (1987) offers, as a case in point, colonial South Africa, where a pass system was instituted illustrating that a great deal of manpower and commitment by local officials was needed if a system to limit and control the movement of informal laborers was to be effective.

28 My guess is that part of the reason why the “respectable” working classes of Dar es Salaam may have developed a greater degree of opposition to the “dangerous” classes earlier than they did in Mombassa may be that the port of Mombassa had a much longer history than did the port of Dar es Salaam. Many of those in Mombassa who resisted colonialist attempts at labor formalization were people who had long-term historical connections to the port, while in Dar es Salaam there were very few “locals” committed to Swahili modes of labor.

29 These efforts were not always as well intentioned as they might at first appear. Following independence organized labor lost much of its power as the Tanzanian government limited the right to strike, prevented civil servants from joining unions, and dissolved all but the National Union of Tanganyika Workers, which was affiliated with TANU, the ruling political party at the time. For more see Coulson (1982), Iliffe (1979) and Tripp (1997).
30 Tripp (1997) has successfully illustrated the many ways in which middle class Tanzanians are able to capitalize on their positions to make greater profits through their own informal economic endeavors. They use the contacts they make through their formal, “respectable” jobs to find customers for their informal services. Through these activities they are often able to make greater profits than those who are forced to conduct their business in the street and, since they are rarely seen panhandling their merchandise or services in public spaces, they are able to maintain a certain degree of respect that is withheld from ordinary *deiwakas*.

31 Tanganyika African National Union was the sole mainland political party at independence. TANU united with Zanzibari Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) to form CCM on 5 February 1977.

32 The use of hygiene and medically motivated discourses to criminalize both urban space and informal labor was also commonly employed during colonial times (see White 1990:67-8).

33 Cooper’s (1987) study of Mombassa dock labor, and Luise White’s (1990) study of prostitution in colonial Nairobi may help to shed light here as well. Both illustrate how the production of a discourse of difference helped to assure the growth of a working class that was both controllable and manageable—a valuable asset regardless of who is in power.

34 Established by the city council in 1975 in order to better regulate trade.


36 *Sunday Observer*, 5 December 1999.

37 For a longer commentary on the importance of being respectfully coiffed see Weiss’ discussion on men’s hair in Arusha barbershops. Though his arguments are not based on the experiences of young men living and working in the streets, he suggests that the young men he worked also feared police harassment for wearing their hair too long (2002:115-116).

38 At the Sheraton Maskani water was bought from a local business. It is not uncommon for employees of businesses or private households to sell water to make a little extra money. Although I am fairly certain that the person who owned the business at Maskani where the water was bought knew about the transactions, I did not feel comfortable asking him about it fearing that it might jeopardize any arrangements that had been made behind his back. Regardless, water did not seem to be a scarce commodity at the Sheraton Maskani, though it did seem to be more difficult to procure at other car washing centers in the city.

39 Bourdieu (1977; 1984, especially Chapter Seven) defines symbolic capital as a “collection of luxury goods attesting the taste and distinction of the owner,” while suggesting that class and identity are both defined and, in some senses, determined by an individual’s employment of various forms of symbolic capital. Of course, most foreigners are inclined to condemn urban youth for conspicuous spending/consumption whether they have sufficient resources to do so or not. Perhaps, in this case (in line with the argument
that follows), Europeans visiting or living in Tanzania are made uncomfortable by Africans' abilities to master symbolic capital normally considered to be the domain of Europeans.

40 Second-hand clothing, or mitumba, was essential for maintaining a clean-cut and fashionable appearance for those who lived and worked at Maskani. See Hansen (1999) for a discussion of second-hand clothing in Zambia, specifically regarding connections to Western fashions and modernity.

41 Stambach, speaking of young male school-goers in Arusha suggests that “progress from youth to adulthood (is) signaled by accumulation . . . (the) ability to consume luxury items in general is an expression of their full social integrity” (2000:149-157). These arguments together with Weiss' (see note 36 above) may suggest that the desire to accumulate and master certain forms of symbolic capital may have as much to do with becoming an adult as they do with class struggle.