In the Shadow of the Sheraton: imagining localities in global spaces in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
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In the shadow of the Sheraton:
Imagining Localities in Global Spaces

Hakuna heshima ni vurugu mechi kwenye jamii
Hakuna utii wala mafunzo ya manabii
Na wizi wa mfukoni wanachomwa moto kinyama
Mwingine hajaiba kapewa kesi kwa uhasama
Nani atajua na sheria ipo mikononi
Watu wabongo mbona hamna utii moyoni
Vijana wanajibana ili wapate mtaji wa blashara
Mnawalita wamachinga ingawa si watu kutoka Mtwar
Mbaya kuliko vyote pale mnapovunja vibanda vyao
Wengine waliwuwa wezi, je wanaiezama zao?
Ni mstukestuke sometime vita na mapolisi
Wao wa sisi rungu na pingu kama ibillis
Huku kwetu uswahilini ni mambo ya kila siku
Na ni kama kuibiwa cheni kwenyve ngoma ya Mchiriku

There is no respect, just trouble in society
Neither obedience nor teachings of the prophets
And pickpockets are being burnt like animals
Others who haven’t yet stolen are prosecuted based on jealousy
Who will know and the law is in their hands
People of Bongo have no generosity in their hearts
Young people must tighten their budgets to get start-up capital
You call them Wamachinga though they’re not from Mtwar
The worst is when you destroy their kiosks
Some were thieves; do you want them to return to their old ways?
It’s trouble, sometime war with the police
Them and us, batons and cuffs like the devil
Here in our home of Uswhahilini, it’s an everyday occurrence
And is like having one’s necklace stolen at an Mchiriku performance

-Bongo Dar es Salaam

-Professor Jay, Machozi, Jasho na Damu, 2001
Athumani: Dada Eileen, do you have your camera today?
Eileen: Of course, I always have my camera. Why?
Athumani: Take my picture over there with the fence behind me.
Eileen: Okay, wait a minute while I get my camera.
Athumani: Make sure you get the fence and the golfers on the other side.
Mbelwa: Why do you want to have your picture taken with the golfers?
Athumani: It's not for me, it's for Eileen. It's what her research is all about, isn't it?
Dennis: What do you mean?
Athumani: This fence, it's like the dividing line between the Wakubwa and us. We come here every day to smoke, to get a nice breeze from the ocean and to talk but we're not allowed to go past this fence. The Gymkhana is off limits, just like the Sheraton. We're on this side and they're on that side. It's what your research is about, isn't it?
Eileen: Wow, he's right.
Mbelwa: Yeah, he is.
Dennis: So take his picture.
Eileen: Okay, but I don't think I can get both you and the golfers in it.
Athumani: It's okay, it's the fence that's important.

(See Fig. 3.1)

Introduction

One afternoon early in my research I visited another maskani located on the far side of the Sheraton in the company of the three young men who most often helped me with my research. That day Mbelwa, Athumani, Dennis, and myself walked from Maskani to "Kwa Sheby," or "Sheby's place," named, like so many maskani, after the man who kept a watchful eye over those who regularly visited the area. Sheby, a man in his late thirties, routinely offered shelter to young men and women with nowhere else to sleep, watched over a neighboring construction site, sold cannabis, and provided a relatively safe place to smoke. This last was largely possible because of his begrudging cooperation with local police. His maskani was located directly opposite the beach on Ocean Road, a place where tourists were regularly relieved of their valuables by thieves. In exchange for turning over the names of offenders to the police Sheby was able to operate his business with very little hassle.\footnote{In the course of a typical day hundreds of young deiwakas might pass by this oasis that was sandwiched between the beach and Dar es Salaam's}

We would often visit his maskani in the late afternoon to relax and talk. In the paltry shade of the lone banana tree that became our spot we would revel in the breezes coming off the nearby ocean (Fig. 3.2).\footnote{That Athumani was able to offer such insight into my research was impressive but hardly surprising to me since he seemed to do it regularly. There was also something about Sheby's that made even the most unobserving person appreciate the ironies of spatial politics at work in Dar es Salaam (Fig. 3.3).}
only golf club to get some respite from the city's heat. Here they could meet friends working in other parts of the city center, exchange news, and even make new contacts. They could watch the golfers, a football game on the nearby pitch, or enjoy the site of young bridegrooms struggling to heft their well-endowed brides in a traditional beachside photo session. Police sirens would routinely sound as the vehicles of dignitaries, both foreign and local, were escorted along Ocean Road to the nearby State House. Walking to Sheby's, circling the perimeter of the Sheraton and the golf club, which we could not cut across, it was not unusual for me to observe one of the young men from Maskani stopping to greet one of his mabasi (from the English “boss”) in the midst of an outing on the links. Most of the borders that divided their worlds from the worlds of their bosses were not as palpable as the fence that ran between the golfers and us, but they were just as real.

Kwa Sheby was, like the Sheraton Maskani, a maskani where social worlds intersected and collided, where wealth and poverty stood shoulder to shoulder. The ability to recognize and negotiate these borders was essential for the survival of young men like Athumani. This ability, which I could so easily observe at Sheby's, was also easily observed at the Sheraton Maskani where most business transactions depended on exchanges between deiwakas and their more privileged customers.
The changes that have taken past over the last fifteen years in Tanzania are not only economic and political; they are also social and moral. Often it is changes related to the latter that cause the most uncertainty and unease. While discontent in regards to the breakdown of social and moral norms are often blamed on the economy, political and economic problems are in turn attributed to a breakdown in moral and social values. This spiraling circle of judgement leads to much finger pointing, yet those who most often feel the brunt of the blaming are young men and women making their living in the streets. They lack economic and political capital to be sure, but they also lack the moral and social capital one might possess as members of respectable households.

If one hopes to succeed at street life, knowledge of one’s place is invaluable, both figuratively and quite literally. Comprehending, and capitalizing on, localized geographical knowledge, what I refer to as ‘popular cartographies,’ proved essential in furthering my understanding of Dar es Salaam street life, particularly in relation to class differences, perceived failures of the Tanzanian state, and imaginations of the local and global. During my fieldwork I found that these three sets of issues were most likely to be articulated in the context of spatial metaphors.

In this chapter I outline some of the everyday understandings of those who worked at Maskani as they related to modernity, development and globalization. I undertake this to illustrate some of the specific ways that processes of globalization are related to the daily struggle to survive at Maskani. I want to suggest that the relationship between the global and local, rather than being binary, is one marked by imbrication and overlap. In many cases those working at Maskani embraced processes of globalization because of the money-making opportunities they presented. At the same time, they would counter and contest globalization on the basis that processes relating to it were thought to be inextricably tied to growing differences in wealth and inequality. Maskani and other corners like it in the city exist as examples of the local within the context of globalization. What I want to argue in this chapter, however, is that although they are local, they are not yet localized. They have not been accepted as part of the status quo order of things. Through their very existence such corners impose their own order on the city and, consequently, on the state as well.

The first half of this chapter examines certain manifestations of the local at Maskani. I begin with a short section of the history...
of Maskani to provide the reader with some basic background. Much more space could be devoted to this subject in this text and, no doubt, such an effort would further illustrate how fragmentary and contested much of my data is. Though I have no doubt that it is lacking on numerous levels, I have chosen to keep this section brief in order to allow for a broader discussion on the relationship between the global and the local. This chapter does not attempt to illustrate the way those working at Maskani make their way in the city, though it does introduce some important concepts that will facilitate this in later chapters, specifically Chapters Six and Seven. To this end I will turn to a discussion of agency and resistance, particularly in relation to popular culture, then to a broad discussion on popular mapping strategies. As the example that opened this chapter indicates, many of the tactics employed by those who must negotiate the various spheres of globalization at Maskani are spatial in nature. I want to suggest that it is primarily through popular cultural forms including mapping, language and other artistic endeavors that people at Maskani are best able to resist and transform processes of globalization to meet their own ends. Again these are themes that will resurface in the remaining chapters of this book. This chapter, then, serves the double function of providing some basic theoretical concepts that will help to shape the remainder of the text and of illustrating the ways that the global touches down in people's everyday lives.

The second half of this chapter takes a closer look at the relationship between globalization, modernity and development discourses. For many of those working at Maskani, globalization was most readily observable and articulated in terms of international development strategies, which were themselves inextricably tied to modernity and modernization discourses. In fact, I find it impossible to talk about the global at Maskani without first discussing modernity, modernization and development. As the sketch below will illustrate, Maskani was situated near various NGOs and international aid headquarters. Workers from these organizations, both Tanzanian and foreign, passed by Maskani regularly and formed one of the most important customer bases for those working at Maskani. Since Wamaskani were considered by some as ideal representatives of the sort of people development aims to help, some were also regularly invited to join focus group interviews relating to the “plight of urban youth.” From the position provided from these two intersecting vantage points, many working at Maskani were able to offer
insightful observations and critiques of the world of development. I have chosen to devote attention to their popular critiques of development and globalization in this chapter because I think they may shed important light on certain scholarly critiques of the same subjects. I make no claims to be exhaustive in this chapter, however, and offer neither a review of the literature as it relates to these subjects nor any specific claims about the truth value of these views, which are, I must admit, sometimes quite challenging. Instead, I offer these views so that readers either working in development or engaged in the study of development or globalization might benefit from the competing perspectives of some of the people development organizations claim to be interested in helping. Most importantly, though, I sketch these interpretations of the local and the global, as well as the relationship between the two, because I think they are illustrative of a specific form of cultural critique that might be seen as an example of agency in itself. In recognizing, interacting with, and critiquing various processes of globalization, Wamaskani attempt to transform them in meaningful ways.

Popular Cartographies: Karibu Maskani

*Maskanis* are places throughout the city where young men gather for social and economic reasons. In truth, the street corner that served as the central site of my research was not, as the title of this chapter and the book would suggest, in the “Shadow of the Sheraton” —at least not literally. Although easily viewed from the corner, the height of the luxury hotel, the position of the sun, and local zoning laws prevent the young men and women who capitalize on the Sheraton’s existence in other respects from enjoying the cool shadows the building provides. As a Tanzanian colleague remarked when he heard my title, “... in the hot sun of the Sheraton, is more like it.” Keeping in mind that most of the young men and women with whom I worked were required to spend long hot hours working in the sun, I invoke the trope of the shadow in a more figurative sense. The obvious association to be made, and one that makes good sense in terms of this study, is that of a shadow economy. Kerner has defined the shadow economy in Tanzania as “interstitial between legally-regulated channels of trade and the black market sphere” (1988:48). And, of those working in the shadows, she has stated “(t)hey are tolerated during times of prosperity and harassed and restricted when the economy is depressed” (*ibid.*). In general, shadows are thought of as dark places where it is difficult to determine what is going on with any degree of precision. Vision is impaired and insight is lost. They are sites of illegality, the unknown, and in some ways the unknowable, often resisting description except in the negative. Yet, shadows can also be shady, protective places, offering refuge from the heat of the mid-day sun or, to return to the economic metaphor, the disciplinary gaze of those regulating the formal economy.

In the shade it is possible to find those who are uniquely adapted to surviving and thriving there. The sun’s rays are unforgiving near the equator and
the shadows call out, beckoning those who search for a little relief, for a moment of respite. Centrally located at Maskani was an enormous tree that gave the corner its identity. This tree and the shade it provided regularly drew passersby hoping to escape the city's heat, and offered daily respite to those working in the area. Those who gather there have undoubtedly hatched innumerable deals and dreams under its protection in the years since Maskani's emergence.

In addition to these shadows are the ones cast by places like the Sheraton, which also help to shape daily life at Maskani. As the most luxurious hotel in Dar es Salaam at the time of my research, and the accommodation of choice for visiting dignitaries, development personnel, well-heeled travelers, and business people alike, the Sheraton serves as a stand-in for globalization in the context of this study, simultaneously representing multi-national corporations, development organizations, and the ever-increasing accessibility of travel destinations formerly thought of as exotic. At the same time, in its shadows it is possible to find the workings of vibrant informal, or shadow economies, which have evolved in relation to the Sheraton and the other formal businesses in the area. The informal laborers who work in the surrounds have developed their businesses in order to capitalize on the existence of the formal economy that the Sheraton represents, offering alternative services to visitors of the area, as well as to those employed in nearby formal sector establishments (Figs. 3.4, 3.5).

Within sight of the Sheraton one can find the offices of Citibank, American Express, DHL, KLM, USAID, UNICEF, as well as numerous consulates, embassies, and NGO headquarters. One could easily argue that many of these buildings, businesses, and organizations are casting shadows at least
as long as those of the Sheraton. This fact was underscored every time a new building or business was opened. In 2000, when Subway, an American sandwich franchise, opened on the corner, there was a marked increase in both foot and auto traffic to the area, as well as an increase in the number of tourists passing through. The Subway manager did his best to discourage hangers on from trying to hustle his customers but eventually had to settle for preventing them from entering the establishment (Fig. 3.6). Subway employees, not earning nearly enough to eat there (nor particularly wanting to) regularly ate at Maskani, joining in conversations, and generally becoming marginal participants in social life there.

During the year I spent hanging out at Maskani I had numerous opportunities to ask about its inception as a center of informal labor and its connections with the Sheraton. I was able to gather pieces of the story from several individuals but there was no one person capable of delivering a cohesive and coherent description. The brief description that follows was pieced together from the various fragments.

In 1996 when construction of the Sheraton first began, informal economy developers began transforming this particular street corner and surrounding environs into a locus of business. Along with the construction crews that came to build the Sheraton came female food vendors and a chips seller to feed them. Those who had been washing cars at Tanganyika Motors since the early 1990s were delighted with the dust caused by the Sheraton’s construction since it meant cars would get dirty faster. In addition, they were asked to guard and wash the cars and trucks belonging to construction foremen. Around this time, too, the street vendors who eternally walk the city in search of customers began adding this corner to their routes. A few even began building makeshift shops along the roadside to house their stores. These industrious workers began occupying otherwise public space and gradually testing and expanding the limits of city zoning laws. In addition to the car washers, street vendors and food vendors with whom I worked, many others also made their living at Maskani. The corner served as a taxi stand for about ten drivers, art objects ranging from Makonde carvings to Bob Marley paintings were sold by artists, as well as informal art brokers, and individual entrepreneurs sold newspapers, shined and repaired shoes, and offered to change money at black market rates. This last was considered a particularly dubious endeavor since the only way Tanzanian money changers can make a profit is to steal from unsuspecting clients. Although the money changers were seen as parasitic in their practices, it remains that no one working in the Sheraton’s shadows did so legally. Yet, everyone did so with the implicit acceptance of the state and their street-level representatives, the police. It should also be said that many of the police who included the centrally located and popular Maskani on their beat also managed to turn a profit through their own informal economic endeavors, which often took the form of bribery solicitation. Brief though it is, I hope the above section illustrates the degree to which those living and working at Maskani are actively engaged in the
transformation of public spaces into spaces of work and leisure.

Agency, Resistance and Transformation

In this text I intentionally use words like “occupy,” “transform,” and “develop” to suggest a certain degree of agency among those who work in the informal economy. But, I do not want to overemphasize this point, given the very real conditions that limit deiwakas’ ability to influence or change the policies aimed at disciplining them, or the political and economic realities that structure the policies to begin with. Significantly, it is also possible to point to many instances where deiwakas actively participate in reproducing the structural status quo one might expect them to challenge. As the above example from Kwa Sheby suggests, this is specifically true in examples involving complicity with policing strategies that rely on illegality as a means of justifying continued corruption. I would argue that informal modes of resistance do operate at Maskani, some of which are transformative in small ways, but I think such arguments should be made cautiously in order to avoid the pitfalls of what Abu-Lughod (1990) has aptly called the “romance of resistance.”

Regardless of the many ways that deiwakas regularly reproduce the hegemonic principles of the state, I do want to recognize the degree to which Maskani can also be seen as a site of resistance. Tripp has suggested that working in the informal economy is in itself a form of resistance that has resulted in the transformation of the Tanzanian state (1997). Previously I suggested that her arguments may fall short in regards to those working at Maskani, as their disconnection from the formal economy and their lack of official domicile complicated their interactions with both the state and other

Figure 3.5 Tumbo and Mningar pose in front of Sheraton across the street from Maskani. Dar es Salaam. (2002)

Figure 3.6 Car washers and Wesley McMahon, one of their best Kiswahili students, capitalize on the shade provided by the Subway delivery vehicle in the lot where they wash cars. Dar es Salaam. (2000)
laborers in the city. As a result, they rarely articulated their daily efforts to get by as a struggle against the state. While I concur that it is important to take “everyday acts of resistance” into account if one hopes to appreciate all the inventive ways people manage to get by from day to day, I am also hesitant to echo arguments suggesting such acts are intentionally transformative (Scott 1985, 1990). Studies of resistance have come under increasing criticism for romanticizing the degree to which “everyday acts of resistance” can really make a difference in people’s lived experience (Ortner 1996, Nagar 1998). In our attempts to understand how state-based oppression is played out on a local level it is important to resist the temptation to simplify analyses of resistance strategies. As Nagar (1998) points out, many contemporary resistance studies assume that there is either class- or race-based unity among economically subordinate groups, when in fact this is rarely true.9 Few of those with whom I worked were actively resisting an imagined hegemonic order, they were just trying to live their daily lives. While I would concur that those I interviewed were engaged in the daily struggle to survive were resisting the forces that led to their economic marginality, I would hesitate to suggest that they were doing so in a conscious effort to bring about changes in society. This distinction may seem unimportant to some, but it does illustrates one of the ways that hegemony works. Most of those working at Maskani were doing so to better their own chances for success in life, or the chances of their family members. They were invested in maintaining the status quo precisely because they had so expertly worked out how to profit from its margins.

We must ask ourselves how useful theories of resistance are if they do not take into account local ideas about power and resistance. Does resistance have to be aimed at transforming the state and capitalist modes of production in order to be considered effective, and does it have to be effective in order to justify studying it? How are we to make sense of the differences between local, community-based transformations and institutional transformation? When it comes right down to it, most local resistance strategies are neutralized by institutional structures, but the site of local resistance is also often the site where meaning is made, the site where transformation, if it is to take place, must take place.

In order to escape what I see as a materialist trap in regards to resistance studies—that is studies that seem to focus solely on the importance of economic transformation—I rely on examinations of popular cultural forms in this text to illustrate that there is often more than economics at stake. I do not want to pit materialist and material analysis against one another, however, as I think there is something to be gained by uniting the two. Canclini recognizes that power relations within a society are mirrored in popular culture forms when members of subordinate ethnic or economic groups seize upon economic and cultural property, appropriate it and transform it, resulting in a restructuring of power in both symbolic and real ways (1995:22-26).10 In the previous chapter I illustrated how young deiwakas may do precisely this
through their appropriation of clothing and hair styles. They symbolically embrace the identities of the respectable classes and, in so doing, transform their day-to-day relations with both police and other citizens. Yet, it would be difficult to argue that they were somehow able to transform the larger hegemonic apparatus through the simple act of wearing clean clothes.

I draw on examples like this in the course of this text because I think it is specifically in the moments when people upend social mores through the appropriation and transformation of cultural forms that meaning is made and re-made in everyday life. Herzfeld, borrowing from a Jakobsonian linguistic model, suggests that it is the shock that occurs when “brilliant metaphor” unsettles the “semiotic illusion” of a stable and unchanging society that meaning is reconfigured (1997:22). The status quo is achieved and maintained through “the semiotic illusion of invariance” whereby “constant signifiers mask shifting signifiers” (1997:20). Those invested in furthering the status quo, whether wealthy or poor, perpetuate this illusion of invariance and “use the appearance of rigidity to get what they want” (ibid.). Those who recognize and comment on the myth of cultural rigidity, like artists and other producers of popular culture, are engaged in a project of social commentary that challenges the status quo. Herzfeld argues that those engaged in the manipulation of meaning are taking part in what he terms a form of “social poetics” and suggest that its study be reinserted in material analyses. He is writing in response to the recent surge in anthropological studies concerned with nationalism and the state that, in his opinion, tend to focus too exclusively on super structures and economics, rather than on how people negotiate local identities within the intimate spaces of so-called “imagined communities.”

The binarism between politics and poetics that he detects and challenges in studies of nationalism is indicative of what I hope to avoid by incorporating an examination of popular culture forms including music, language, fashion, painting, and comic strip art in this study. It was only through paying close attention to these forms that I was able to begin to understand the complex relationship between resistance, agency and the production of localities in spaces like Maskani directly resulting from processes of globalization. And, it was only by focusing on the “intimate spaces” of cultural production that I was able to get beyond binarisms like local/global, wealthy/poor, male/female and peace/violence and instead to begin to recognize how these so-called opposites inform one another dialectically.

Popular Culture as Social Poetics

For some researchers the construction of the category “popular” is inherently problematic while for others the word “popular” invokes so many cultural and political connotations that they have opted not to use it all. Throwing away the word fails to solve the problem, however, and also risks failing to recognize the historical lines of inquiry that have led to the emer-
gence of the term. In her seminal article on popular arts in Africa, Karin Barber discussed the problems with the word popular, and finally resolved to offer what she termed a “definition by default” (1987:5):

Popular arts have usually been defined in terms of what they are not. In this model, they are not traditional arts transmitted more or less intact, though slowly changing, from a pre-colonial past. Nor are they elite or high arts produced by the educated few who have assimilated European languages, forms, and conventions more or less thoroughly. Popular is usually left as a shapeless residual category, its borders defined only by juxtaposition with the clearly demarcated traditional and elite categories (Barber 1987:9).

Popular art, existing in this in-between state, is continually left open for re-interpretation. This characteristic, while frustrating for those operating from an empiricist perspective, is exactly what makes it such an interesting and challenging area of study. The empiricist roots of anthropology suggest that cultures can be defined, demarcated and confined, while the presence of popular culture belies this very concept. Those who produce popular art seem to have a certain aesthetic toward syncretism. The new, novel, modern, and urban are afforded status and quickly assimilated into popular art forms.

Rush (1997, 1999) argues that this “syncretic sensibility” is deeply rooted in the philosophical systems of West African Vodun, and further, that this sensibility has carried over into syncretist African religions found in the Americas, such as Brazilian Candomblé, Cuban Santería, and Haitian Vodou. This is a subtle but important departure from those who argue that popular art forms have emerged in Africa as a result of recent urban expansion and Western influences. According to Rush, Vodun continually changes and adapts to outside influences today as it has been doing for centuries, and which is precisely how it manages to survive and thrive in the face of a continual onslaught from outside influences. Viewing cultural changes in other contexts from this perspective is useful because it allows for the possibility that individuals can reinvent their culture and keep it alive by continuing to transform outside influences through their own creative and aesthetic choices. Further, it brings to question whether change is in fact happening more quickly as a result of so-called globalization, or if it is that appropriated Western material culture is just easier for Western researchers to see than would be material culture that is incorporated from neighboring ethnic groups. We are seemingly willing to begin engaging in a dialogue about ethnic groups in Africa being imagined and borders being porous (Ranger 1983), but are we ready to imagine the same thing about the borders between the West and the Rest, as well as Africa’s imagination of the West? I agree with Jewsiewicki, who writes, “We have obscured the invention of a West in the African imagination,” and have failed to acknowledge “Africa’s cultural and intellectual cannibalization of the
Barber recognizes this aesthetic too, noting that the “syncretism of the popular arts is actively and selectively sought; the effect of newness positively embraced” (1987:12). It is the selectivity that is important, because it awards a degree of agency, even if only minimal, to popular artists. They choose what they want to incorporate into their art, what they want to borrow, appropriate, and diffuse from the outside. Most scholars who conduct research related to popular art and culture agree that it is this selectivity, ingenuity, creativity, and even agency to which we must pay attention. Fabian insists that “popular culture theory asserts the existence of spaces of freedom and creativity in situations of oppression and supposedly passive mass consumption” (1998:2) and that “[p]opular culture . . . did not come about merely as a response to questions and conditions; it asks questions and creates conditions” (1978:316). Jewsiewicki states:

[W]e must transfer the focus of our analysis from the unique work of art to the relationship between the artist and society, particularly noting the sociopolitical dynamics of power. We need not abandon aesthetics — quite the contrary. But it is essential to realize that aesthetics and taste are not only social but political phenomena, with a history of their own” (1991:135).

Barber, Fabian, and Jewsiewicki all stress the presence of a political phenomenon in popular art, but at the same time insist that aesthetics should not be forsaken; for the very act of instituting African artistic sensibilities in the appropriation of outside influences is, in itself, political. The degree to which such political acts are intentional varies, as does the degree to which such acts are perceived from the consumer’s perspective as being political. Artists can, to a certain extent, determine the intended message of their products, but the power to interpret eternally belongs to the audience.

As Barber points out, the very word popular is “slippery,” attached to ideological constructs that contribute to the meaning of the word as it is used in individual contexts. Popular often connotes “by the people” and “for the people.” Occasionally, this Marxist-inspired understanding goes one step further, insisting that popular art should open the eyes of “the people,” bringing to their attention the mechanisms of the hegemonic systems that oppress them. Art that is not part of this political project is not “popular” but, rather, “people’s” art. Many of the contemporary expressive arts in Tanzania fit into this extreme definition of popular art. Following independence, Nyerere (inspired by the project of conscientiation first employed in Latin America), instituted many government-sponsored artistic endeavors, including theater, dance, and music that were designed to highlight parallels between so-called traditional Tanzanian society and proto-socialist political ideals (Nyerere 1968; Mlama 1991; Askew 1997, 2002). Although Ujamaa has ended in Tanzania, the tradition of using theater, dance, and music to educate about
social ills has been successfully instituted as “Tanzanian.”

The problem with limiting analysis of popular arts to only those arts that are inspired by socialist sentiments toward political consciousness is two-fold. First, it assumes that the only kind of political consciousness worth pursuing is Marxist, and second it assumes that one is either fully conscious of oppression, or that one is fully ignorant of it when, in fact, most people are situated somewhere in between. This idea, explored by the Jean and John Comaroff in the Introduction to Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, colonialism and consciousness in South Africa, suggests:

It is in the realm of partial recognition, of inchoate awareness, of ambiguous perception, and, sometimes, of creative tension: that liminal space of human experience in which people discern acts and facts but cannot or do not order them into narrative descriptions or even into articulate conceptions of the world; in which signs and events are observed, but in hazy, translucent light; in which individuals or groups know that something is happening to them but find it difficult to put their fingers on quite what it is. It is from this realm, we suggest, that silent signifiers and unmarked practices may rise to the level of explicit consciousness, of ideological assertion, and become the subject of overt political and social contestation — or from which they may recede into the hegemonic, to languish there unremarked for the time being (1991:29).

During my research I found that it was most often in the realm of “inchoate awareness” that young people regularly performed “unmarked practices” that had the capacity to be transformed into “overt political and social contestation.” It was in the context of such “socially poetic” practices where it was possible to imagine possibility for social change, where young deiwakas might have managed to keep their dreams and desires alive for another day even if failing to consider overthrowing the entire system.

It will become evident in the course of this text that it is primarily through the expression of popular language and culture that young people are best able to transform public spaces into places where the social and economic endeavors of small groups take precedence over state-sanctioned ideals regarding the modern city. This is not to suggest that their actions are not sometimes severely constrained by the state but rather that, despite these constraints, young entrepreneurs in Dar es Salaam continue to expand the scope of their enterprises with amazing speed and business acumen, transforming public spaces and their daily lives in the process. Such undertakings, however, are always approached with the hesitancy that comes from the experience of trying to carve out a living in ways that counter both national and international stances on progress, development, and modernization, topics to which I will soon turn my attention.
Spaces, Places and Non-Places

It is through the occupation of the streets for economic purposes that young men and women become visible as subjects who counter middle and upper class expectations of modernity while pursuing the very same forms of modernity themselves. The popular forms these occupations take, whether spatial or linguistic, and the meanings accorded to them are a theme that runs through this book. Following de Certeau (1984), I attempt to illustrate how the "spatial tactics" of street laborers challenge the "spatial strategies" employed by the state and the members of the so-called "respectable" classes who promote the status quo. Whether it is walking the streets to sell merchandise, transforming street corners and sidewalks into sites of personal commerce, making the decision to relax and smoke marijuana in places that are considered safe, or simply choosing certain routes when walking through the city in order to avoid police harassment, those living and working in the streets of the city are constantly engaged in a series of spatial tactics to improve the quality of both their work and leisure lives.

De Certeau, responding to Foucauldian ideas about the absolute and panoptic control of space, provides the following in regards to the spatial tactics of urban dwellers:

one can follow the swarming activity of these procedures that, far from being regulated or eliminated by panoptic administration, have reinforced themselves in a proliferating illegitimacy, developed and insinuated themselves into the networks of surveillance, and combined in accord with unreadable but stable tactics to the point of constituting everyday regulation and surreptitious creativities that are merely concealed by the frantic mechanisms and discourses of the observational organization (1984:96).

Despite state strategies to control, to order space, every day people continually cause disruptions through movement. In Chapter Six I will take a much closer look at the ways that movement serves as primary mode of disruption among Dar es Salaam's street laborers and, therefore, do not explore this avenue further at this point. There are other insights to be gained by de Certeau's arguments, however. Through the lens he provides it is possible to imagine that street laborers who pay bribes to the police so that they may continue to operate businesses in spaces not zoned for such purposes are employing spatial tactics that disrupt national and municipal efforts of control. Similarly marijuana dealers like Mzee Sheby who trade information for assurances from the police that his clients will not be unduly harassed challenge spatial strategies of control. True, such actions do serve to perpetuate a corrupt system to a certain extent, but instantaneous maneuvering also allows for the production of what Fabian (1998) has termed "moments of freedom," and Harvey (2000) has called "spaces of hope." It was in these "moments" and "spaces" that it was possible for me, as well as for those
who shared their own spatial stories with me, to imagine “freedom” and “hope” for a better life for themselves, their families and the people they loved and cared about. Such forms of disruption are identical in many ways to what Herzfeld (1997; see above) refers to when he writes about the unsettling of the semiotic illusion of cultural rigidity. The spatial tactics employed by street laborers are by definition disruptive and it is my argument that they serve as the primary site of resistance. Space is occupied bodily but also visually through fashion and art, particularly mural and sign painting (see Chapters Four and Five), and sonically through language and music (see Chapter Eight).

Central to de Certeau’s thesis is a notion of geographical poetics, which, he suggests, unfolds in spaces devoid of particular meanings and histories. Of particular interest to him are the transitory spaces that serve as boundaries at the edges of, and in-between, official places. The transitoriness of these places allows them to “become liberated spaces that can be occupied. A rich indetermination gives them, by means of semantic refraction, the function of articulating a second, poetic geography on top of the geography of the literal, forbidden or permitted meaning” (1984:105).

What makes de Certeau’s approach to understanding the significance of spatialities so compelling is his attention to the relationship between physical and linguistic occupation of space. Because conversation and listening to stories were the primary modes of gathering the information contained in this study, I want to draw attention to the importance of narrative in imagining alternative spatial possibilities. People occupy spaces physically, but also, and always, linguistically. When I attempted to elicit hand-drawn maps of “popular cartographies” from young habitués of several different maskani, I found they were not nearly as interested in articulating their ideas about space graphically as they were in doing so through narrative explications. When showing me the maps they had drawn they would direct my attention to particular points and say things like, “you see, this is what I said,” or “this is the place I told you about.” Most completed the task of drawing the maps as a favor to me. Though they already knew the stories were a richer source of material, they chose to share the maps first, and were kind enough to let me figure out on my own what was more important. During a discussion that followed a mapping exercise at Kwa Sheby I pointed out that only two of the five participants had drawn the fence that surrounded the golf club on their maps and noted that theirs were also among the few maps I had collected that portrayed women hanging out at a maskani. Those who had not drawn the fence in explained to me the rather obvious point that the fence was irrelevant to their experiences at this maskani, while those who had drawn the fence acknowledged that they were sometimes forced to negotiate the boundary it delineated in order to gain access to the water source that lay on the other side. The reasons given for the portrayal of women on the maps were similarly straightforward. Kwa Sheby was one of the few maskani in the city center where young women could come to smoke and sleep without fear of being sexually
harassed. Mzee Sheby insisted that his male customers show a certain degree of respect for his female customers. In the instance of Sheby's maskani the mapping exercise did help to bring my attention to new insights about the articulation of power and the negotiation of space at that particular maskani. This was mostly so, however, because until the time of the mapping exercise I had made very little effort to interview those who worked and slept there, choosing instead to spend my time among those who only passed by to smoke. But, as in all instances related to the mapping exercises, it was only during the discussions that followed them that I was able to understand the ways that people conceptualized the relationship between the spatial strategies of the state and formal business owners, and the spatial tactics employed by street laborers to counter them.

Examples like the one provided at the opening of this chapter illustrate the acute awareness that deiwakas like Athumani had of the types of transitory or in-between places that de Certeau tells us can be occupied “by means of semantic rarefaction,” spaces that marked boundaries such as streets, intersections, fences, sidewalks, beaches, paths, trees, and rivers. Maskani itself was bounded by such places. It has already been stated that one particular tree dominantly figured into conversations and descriptions of Maskani as a place that was blessedly in the shade (kivulini), but the nearby intersection that served to link those who lived in the wealthy northern suburbs to Maskani's workers was just as important. Some of the car washers would transform the street itself by sitting in the middle of it on chairs they placed there for that purpose. They used this strategy along with exaggerated hand and towel waving to detour and direct potential customers into parking spots considered car washer territory. Once so emplaced the cars would be watched/washed and the owner of the vehicle would be expected to pay the young man (as well as the city parking attendant who was officially in charge of overseeing parking around Maskani). Entering into the parking space cum place, the driver also entered into an unwritten contract. De Certeau very specifically refers to these transitory boundary areas as spaces rather than places. They are emplaced, in his argument, by the people who occupy them through acts of walking and narration (or parking). Space is a “frequented place” that is transformed through movement. But, still they are not places, really. They are “passages,” “a nowhere in places” (1984:104). Space becomes place and vice versa, but according to de Certeau, a particular location can never be both a space and a place simultaneously.

Similarly, Marc Augé (1995:77-78) refers to a non-place, as a “space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity” in juxtaposition with a place which is “relational, historical and concerned with identity.” Augé argues that non-places are a product of “supermodernity.” Like de Certeau’s spaces they are also marked by their transitory nature. Specifically, he mentions air, rail and motor routes, as well as all the spaces inside vehicles, airports, railway stations, hotels, shopping centers, leisure parks, and even the “complex skein of cable and wireless networks that
mobilize extraterrestrial space for the purposes of communication” (1995:79). On his list are also “refugee camps and shantytowns threatened with demolition or doomed to festering longevity” (1995:77). For these too are the products of supermodernity. As sites of transport, transit, commerce and leisure, they work to produce simplified, relatively anonymous, temporary identities such as passengers, customers, drivers. According to Augé, non-places have the capacity to deliver a certain sense of liberation to their users but, he reminds us, “the user of a non-place is in contractual relation with it (or with the powers that govern it) . . . [T]he passenger accedes to his anonymity only when he has given proof of his identity; when he has counter-signed (so to speak) the contract . . . In a way, the user of a non-place is required to prove his innocence . . . [non-places] can only be entered by the innocent” (1995:101-102).

The difference between Augé and de Certeau is clear. While the former sees non-places as sites produced by, one might even say symptomatic of, supermodernity, de Certeau sees similar places as sites of possibility and potential that can serve as ruptures with the master narratives of modernity. It is possible to unite both views, of course; such sites could be produced by (super)modernity and simultaneously rupture it. In the many in-between spaces where I conducted my research, there were many people who experienced them as places, and others who experienced them as non-places . . . all at the same time.

The roads that border Maskani are surely transitory sites to all those customer-passengers making their way to work, but to the vendors, the young men who live, work and sleep in the streets, the road signifies much more. Their occupation and use of the street transforms it from a non-place to a place, capitalizing on and countering the effects of supermodernity instantaneously. This process can be seen in the following example taken from an exchange between myself and one of the several beggars who make their living in the intersections that border Maskani. After we greeted one another the young man stepped off the curb we were sharing into the street, saying to me with a knowing smile, “... aya dada, mi naenda kazi” (okay sister, I’m going to work). Through this simple action this young man, who pretends he is a Rwandan refugee to enlist people’s sympathies, is both physically and linguistically (as well as ironically) transforming a non-place into a place, artfully articulating his awareness of boundaries and what it takes to negotiate and break through them. As I walked away I watched him extend his hand to the driver of an expensive Land Cruiser and adopt a truly pathetic pose. I could not help but smile at this brilliant demonstration of spatial awareness. The street becomes his place of employment, while his invocation of Rwanda as a failed place provides him with justification for transforming it thus.

Despite his brilliance, however, his life remains difficult. He still begs for food, sleeps in the streets, and is routinely subjected to innumerable humiliations as a result. But, it does not make him less human nor does it make his identity either simplified or “temporary” (Augé 1995). It is his intelli-
gence, his sense of humor, and his creative and poetic use of "tactics" that forces us to recognize this. Augé tells us that a "non-place is the opposite of utopia: it exists, and it does not contain any organic society" (1995:111-112). The paradox of the street corners, sidewalks, "shantytowns," and other non-places where I conducted research in Dar es Salaam is that they do contain organic society. Any argument to the contrary would fail to recognize the humanity that continues to survive and thrive in the many shadowy spaces in-between state or privately controlled places.

The example provided above together with the example that opened this chapter are representative of some of the ways people negotiate space in and around Maskani and within the larger city as a whole. The subtlety of their negotiations demonstrates a clear awareness of the structures that otherwise govern their space. One might argue that the spaces they inhabit are produced by processes related to hypermodernity and that they do have certain non-place qualities that must be reckoned with (Augé 1995). Though I think it is important to recognize the humanity that exists in such places, I am not particularly interested in challenging these notions here. Maskani was not an ideal example of social space and no one I met there would have argued to the contrary. The point I would like to make, however, is that those who make their living in the streets of Dar es Salaam, at Maskani and beyond, must forever be aware of the ways the city is mapped, both officially and unofficially. Such knowledge requires them to have an intimate knowledge of the types of spaces and relationships produced by locality but also of the spaces and relationships produced by processes of globalization. They navigate these spaces, local and global alike, through a combination of social poetics and poetic geography that emerges precisely because they are aware of the policies and forces in place that work to restrict and control them. Careful attention to the poetic tactics routinely employed by street laborers provides a glimpse into the social and moral structures that govern society, as well as into the myths that have contributed to their construction.

The Articulation of the Global

The potential that in-between spaces like Maskani have to serve simultaneously as places and non-places creates the possibility for poetically ambiguous readings of structured power. Additionally created are possibilities for the examining and imagining of contemporary modernity, whether one calls it supermodernity (Augé 1995), hypermodernity (Appadurai 2001 (2000)), or post-modernity (Harvey 1990; 2000a). All three of these authors, though in decidedly different ways and with great individual subtlety, write about similar phenomena related to the ways in which modernity has been transformed in recent decades through processes that have come to be known as globalization. I think all three authors would agree (assuming they could first agree on terminology of course) that the production and occurrence of non-places increases as a result of globalization. In many ways non-places are local
manifestations of globalization. Although local, they are not yet localized. This only occurs when such non-places are transformed into places, and it is this process that is of most interest to me and that to which I most directly refer in the subtitle as “imagining localities in global spaces.”

In order to understand the ways that the global touches down in people’s everyday lives it is important to understand the forms globalization is most likely to take in specific locations. In this chapter I argue that people’s understanding of globalization, at least among street laborers, is closely tied to the massive influx of developmental aid, personnel and organizations that have been flowing into Dar es Salaam since the late 1980s at a steadily increasing rate. In later chapters I focus on other manifestations of globalization including increasingly global popular art and music and, in Chapter Nine, the global drug trade. The emergent wealthy class of laborers who work in the world of development represent the possibilities that globalization in the form of development promises. Whereas in the past young people studied with hopes of entering the civil service, they now do so in hopes of getting a job with an NGO or other development organization. This is true among the upper and middle classes but also among those from lower class backgrounds. Some of those at Maskani regularly participated in developmental projects as ideal informants. I am sure that many of those with whom I came into contact in the course of my research were motivated to speak with me because they imagined I had connections to larger organizations and the sources of money they represent. Most of those who worked at Maskani expressed an interest in learning English to me at one time or another so that they would be able to communicate with those foreigners who visited Maskani. Some of them argued that knowing English would increase the tips they received from car owners, while others suggested that knowing English would open new opportunities. Some suggested that they might eventually work as research assistants for foreigners wishing to know about “street children” or act as informants for development personnel unable to communicate in Kiswahili. No doubt, some of these imaginings were inspired by observations of the work Mbelwa was doing with me, but there were plenty of other examples available of possibilities that might accompany English fluency for them to observe. Several Wamaskani spoke halting English but, I noted, never to me. They would greet other foreigners in English hoping to entice them into conversations that might eventually lead to a money-making opportunity. Some Wamaskani, especially the street artists who hung out there, worked more directly with several different NGOs in the production of educational materials. Some, like the example of Dixon given in the previous chapter, capitalized on the existence of NGOs established to help “street children” by embracing this otherwise despised identity. Many of the cars that were brought to Maskani to be washed belonged to those working in nearby developmental offices. Sometimes the cars were brought by their owners and sometimes by their drivers and more than a few of the former came for the explicit purpose of hanging out and practicing their Kiswahili.
It was primarily through these informal discussions and discussions with Tanzanian-born development workers that people at Maskani came to know about the workings of the development world and came to recognize the economic opportunities associated with it. In many ways, such opportunities and development more generally have come to represent one of the most viable legal avenues for gaining access to the wealth and material goods that have come to be increasingly associated with contemporary visions of modernity in Dar es Salaam. Yet development is also tied to modernization discourses and it remains difficult to distinguish notions of the modern from those of modernization. As I suggest below, this is not surprising given how closely entangled modernity and modernization discourses tend to be among everyday citizens and those who work in development.

**Modernization and Modernity**

The street corners and pavements where most of my research was conducted had potential to disrupt notions of both modernity and modernization through their very existence. They served to rupture the city’s modernist myths while, at the same time to reaffirm the stark realities of capitalist urban modernity experienced by the city’s laborers. These ruptures and reaffirmations where spatially visible in countless locations in the city but the proximity of Maskani to the development district of Dar es Salaam made them seem particularly salient. While the city itself can be seen as the site of the modern, especially in the context of the multi-storied buildings that housed the NGOs near Maskani, the types of informal economic endeavors undertaken by those involved in such activities as street vending, food vending, and automobile watching/washing illustrate the paradoxes of modernity’s promises. In other words, the burgeoning informalization of the economy is a product and a process of modernity, as well as evidence of its failures. How modernity is defined in Dar es Salaam depends on many factors, not least of which is class background. The so-called “respectable” classes choose to define their notions about modernity in relation to the sorts of activities engaged in by those visibly laboring in the streets of the city. Street laborers’ visibility becomes a trope of the non-modern, eliding notions of “tradition.” Since most street laborers are recent immigrants to the city, their very presence reveals the failure of modernity projects to bridge the rural-urban divide. Many members of the middle and upper classes also engage in income-generating activities that are both informal and illegal but the very invisibility of these activities is a privilege that allows them to maintain a degree of respectability that remains out of reach for those who must put their body, mind, and soul on the city streets to make a living.

Conceptions of the modern in Dar es Salaam are complex and diverse, and what is recognized as modern by one social group may be perceived as the antithesis by another. Modernity itself is viewed with deep ambivalence. On one hand, there has been a great deal of so-called progress since the 1980s.
There are more things available, more money in circulation, increased access to improved services, as well as improvements in communication and transportation. On the other hand, there is increasing poverty and a widening gap between the wealthy and the poor. It is fairly easy to figure out that the changes, both good and bad, go hand-in-hand.

Despite scholarly efforts to separate out discourses on modernity from those on modernization over the last couple of decades, they are still heavily intertwined in practice.\(^{17}\) It may not be possible to uncover a clear “genealogy of modernity”\(^{18}\) in Tanzania but by starting with a sort of linguistic genealogy of the terms related to modernity and modernization I hope to improve the chance of coming to a workable understanding of the concepts and their possible meaning(s). To begin with, *kisasa*, the word most often translated as modern(ity), is formed by attaching a prefix to the adverb form -sasa. In this sense, it is perhaps best be taken as an indicator of contemporaneity. The *ki-* prefix indicates concrete-ness, making *kisasa* best translated as “the ways of the present,” or “the things of now.” I have never heard *kisasa* opposed to *asili*, or tradition. It would be difficult to argue for such a dichotomous association in Tanzania, despite it being a central point in much Western scholarship regarding conceptions of modernity in Africa (see especially Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 1993, 1997). It is generally assumed that modernity is relationally defined with notions of tradition and the past, but I believe such an analysis would be too simplistic in this case. For a start, the word *kisasa* is rarely used in daily language, and despite my incessant efforts to introduce the term into conversations, people would routinely resist when I employed it to define them, their lifestyles, their generation, or anything associated with their efforts to survive in the city. Its usage became more popular from 1996 through 1998 when the term was used in a Salama condoms advertising campaign that referred to Salama condoms as “*chaguo la kisasa*,” or “the modern choice.” In the posters accompanying the campaign, young, fashionably clad, upper-class urbanites, ostensibly embodying the modern, were pictured in clean, ordered settings such as restaurants and universities, implying that the “modern choice” entailed more than just condom usage (Figs. 3.7, 3.8). Such posters, however, hardly signify Tanzanian notions of modernity. Views toward modernity are much more ambivalent, a fact which should be made apparent from an example of one of the occasions when *kisasa* is routinely employed in daily language. The phrase *ugonjwa wa kisasa*, or the modern sickness, is one of many euphemisms employed to refer to AIDS, the very disease that the folks at Salama condoms were trying to counter with their campaign. The tragic irony of this obvious difference between Western notions of the modern and Tanzanian notions of the modern formed the basis of my Master’s Thesis, though I am only now coming to understand the mechanisms that allowed and continue to allow for the reproduction of such misunderstandings (Moyer 1997a).

Part of the problem is that organizations such as Population Services International (PSI), the NGO behind Salama condoms, are more specifically
engaged in projects of modernization than projects of modernity. Yet all the appropriate Kiswahili words associated with modernization and progress in Tanzania were commandeered by Nyerere for usage by the Tanzanian state. Although NGOs are supposed to be working with the state to meet their aims, it should come as no surprise that they want to introduce notions of modernization that are, in fact, opposed to the nationalist project.19

Maendeleo, jitegemea, mradi, progress, self-help, project: these are all words associated with the national development discourse. Even their everyday usage signifies a degree of continuity between past nationalist (i.e. socialist) development discourses, current state-sponsored discourses, and street-level discourses on development. Among street-level progress discourses, such as those overheard at Maskani, I could readily distinguish two general categories: those that reproduced socialist rhetoric, and those that were more individualistic and more directly concerned with the effort to better one's own economic position.20 The former were most often employed when approaching government sponsors or Tanzanian nationals associated with NGOs for financial support of a project (mradi) ostensibly aimed at helping people to help themselves (jitegemea) to deliver national progress (maendeleo). More individualistic discourses were employed (often by the same people) when approaching expatriates or Western donors (though the truly savvy knew that it was not always a bad idea to invoke socialist discourses when dealing with Westerners hailing from socialist democracies; the Finns and the Swedes were thought to be most susceptible). Despite the cynical implications of this analysis, what I hope to illustrate is that discourses related to modernity and modernization are just that, discourses, and that it is possible to become a master of several at once.

The “Global” in Dar es Salaam

Following Appadurai's (1996, 2001) imagining of “imagination” as a faculty that provides emancipatory possibilities in the context of contemporary globalization, I employ the term imagination as one infused with power. Imagination and the ability to create an alternative vision in the face of oppression go hand-in-hand, whether the oppressors are the local police, the national government, or predatory global capital. While Appadurai seems to

Figure 3.7 “Make him Understand!” Salama Condom poster. (1996)

Figure 3.8 “Make sure he gets it!” Salama Condom Poster. (1996)
be more interested in exploring how alternative globalizations might be imagined, I am trying to come to a better understanding of how alternative localizations are imagined in the context of global spaces, that is, how the global touches down locally. "Global spaces" refers to the sort of in-between non-places that are seemingly proliferating in Dar es Salaam today in conjunction with increasing globalization and the transformations of the Tanzanian state, which themselves are, at least in part, a result of global political and economic pressure. The local and the global are imbricated in one another and must be understood to be shaped and re-shaped in response to issues relating to factors as diverse as family, religion, class, gender, and nation among others. The increasingly uneven distribution of wealth that has become so common in contemporary Dar es Salaam is, in fact, typical of globalization processes worldwide. In order to comprehend the radical changes that have occurred in Tanzania since the 1980s it is necessary to examine them in relation to local and national factors to be sure, but also in relation to global factors as well.

Globalization itself is a broad topic and not one that I am prepared to discuss at length here. There is one factor that weighs heavily in our understandings of globalization, however, on which I would like to focus. Most scholarly accounts of the topic seem to agree that the run-away quality of finance is among globalization's most salient characteristics. How money moves, what it means, and how it is valued has become unmoored in recent times, leading many to argue that the sovereignty of nation-states is being challenged as a result of increasing deregulation and transnational flows of capital. I would like to push this argument in a particular direction, calling into question the similarities between global finance and the flow of development dollars to global cities of the South. As suggested above, development organizations were recognized as one of the primary manifestations of the global in Dar es Salaam. This is true because the world of development represents an opportunity to gain access to the material wealth and goods associated with the world beyond Dar es Salaam, but also because the world of development represents power, particularly power to influence and shape the nation state. Chapter Five attempts to provide an illustration of this through a discussion of state-based oppression and popular views relating to the belief that international aid organizations are in a position to challenge the state's power. Just as multi-national corporations use their power to influence national laws to their benefit, some international aid organizations, especially those concerned with human rights issues, use their power to lobby individual nation-states on behalf of the state's citizens. A primary difference between the two, however, is that international aid organizations claim to use their power to attempt to influence the nation-state for primarily altruistic reasons, while multinationals tend to do so with economic profit in mind. Regardless of this difference, what is apparent is that international aid organizations, many of which are shaped by Western development and modernization theories, do attempt to challenge the sovereignty of nation-
states in many so-called developing countries, as does the dispersal and movement of development dollars. I would suggest, furthermore, that this process leads to a particular form of globalization in global cities of the South that significantly differs from forms of globalization that have been observed at the centers of global finance in global cities of the North. Though this study is not directly concerned with trying to understand these differing processes of globalization, attempts to do so would do well to begin their studies with an examination of the flows of development aid, as well as the structures that govern those flows.

One of the issues with which this study is concerned is the degree to which transnational subjectivities have emerged in global cities of the South like Dar es Salaam where processes of globalization are largely shaped by international development organizations and aid. Saskia Sassen (1998:XXI), in Globalization and its Discontents, discusses how disadvantaged workers in the service sector such as women, immigrants, and people of color "occupy" global cities through the simplicity of their very presence. Through this occupation, she argues, they develop new types of politicized transnational subjectivities. Even though individuals may not gain direct access to power through their work in the service sector in global cities, disadvantaged workers can emerge as subjects precisely because of their presence in the transnational spaces of global cities.\(^{21}\) The question is whether individuals with transnational subjectivities exist mainly in global cities of the developed North, or if they can also be found in cities of the South? I would argue that emergent transnational subjectivities do exist in the South but that the economic changes that have initiated their emergence are quite different from those, like de-industrialization, that have led to their emergence in the North. The particularities of what constitutes the global in Dar es Salaam are primarily determined in relation to international developmental aid and the recent and rapid NGO-ization of the city rather than to the mechanisms of de-industrialization that have marked global cities in the North.

Few people would argue that Dar es Salaam is a "global city," despite it being a major Indian Ocean seaport and the despite great ethnic diversity of its citizens. According to AbdulMaliq Simone:

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\text{It is clear that African cities, with the possible exception of Johannesburg, are nowhere near close to being world cities. Rather, they are largely sites of intensifying and broadening impoverishment and rampant informality operating on highly insubstantial economic platforms through which it is difficult to discern any sense of long-term viability. African cities have also been subject to substantial restructuring over the past decade. In line with normative orientations of governance, these changes have emphasized decentralization of formal political authority and responsibility, if not necessarily capacity and real decision-making power (2001:16).}
\]
Simone points to many of the factors that characterize contemporary Dar es Salaam when he argues that despite rapid political change, increasing informalization and flexibility within the economy, and an increase in differential poverty statistics, such cities are not “global.”

The changes that have occurred in most African cities over the last several decades can certainly be tied to worldwide processes of globalization, however. So while Dar es Salaam may not be a “global city” in line with those described by Sassen I think it is reasonable to argue that there are “global spaces” within the city that are easily recognizable to those living and working in the city. Like the Sheraton and many of the other businesses and organizations that occupy buildings in the area surrounding the street corner where I worked, global spaces are often marked physically by their gated and guarded entrances, immaculately kept shrubs, and a neat and ordered appearance, while the ever-present flag or flags flapping in the ocean breeze remind passersby of international affiliations. But global spaces are also found in the shadows of these places, on the sides of the roads, or sometimes right in the middle of them, on the sidewalks, and in a myriad of unexpected and often in-between crevices that are produced and re-produced by globalization. According to Harvey, “we can better understand globalization as a process of production of uneven ...geographical development” (2000a:61). It is those spaces where that unevenness, and occasionally the traces of its production can be conceptualized and articulated, that I am calling global. This is not to suggest that such unevenness is a requirement for something to be considered global, only that in the context of Dar es Salaam, it is one of the most salient characteristics of the way that the global is manifested.

Perhaps I am making too great of a distinction between global cities and global spaces within cities, and perhaps the real difference lies between global cities of the North, and global cities of the South. The global cities Sassen and the majority of scholars engaged in globalization studies speak of are primarily located in the North, where they are defined more by the internationalization of capital and global finance than by debt restructuring and development projects, the markers of increasing globalization in the South. There are, of course, also uncontested global cities of the South defined in accordance with terms otherwise reserved for the likes of New York, Los Angeles, London, Paris and Tokyo. Johannesburg, Rio de Janeiro, Bombay come immediately to mind but, I would argue, these cities are in most cases being doubly globalized by processes characteristic of both the North and South.

As in the northern cities described by Sassen, there are also hundreds of thousands of disadvantaged workers living in cities like Dar es Salaam. Yet, unlike their northern counterparts, very few of them are employed by businesses and organizations engaged in global enterprises. In fact, most of those who are employed by such organizations, even those employed in the service sector as guards, cooks, cleaning personnel and drivers, are considered to be among the privileged by those making a living in the
streets. It is generally argued that development in the name of modernization brings jobs. The reality in most global cities of the South is that very few people actually have access to those jobs. Even service sector jobs demand a reasonable command of English and quite often employment references from respected members of the community. Such references are difficult if not impossible to obtain for those without membership or connection to the "respectable" classes. In short, to be officially employed by international businesses and organizations or by their well-off employees demands a certain degree of educational and cultural capital that most poor and working class Tanzanians simply do not have.

One could argue that like in the global cities of the North, those working in the informal economies of global cities of the South benefit indirectly from the presence of international businesses, development organizations and their personnel. Taking the example of the Sheraton, it is notable that a section of the city previously thought of as unprofitable has been transformed both by the building of the hotel and by the growth of the international community in Dar es Salaam that has accompanied the economic liberalization of the last ten years. Many of the young men at Maskani make their daily living by washing and guarding the automobiles of people working for or visiting international organizations in the area. Others sell merchandise to them through their car windows. Female food vendors who have occupied the street corner serve nutritious and inexpensive meals to local people who work for the businesses and organizations in the area. Other women, the ones who primarily emerge around sunset to begin their nightly walks up and down Ohio Street, the street the Sheraton is built on, sell their company and bodies to men driving home from work. Those who speak reasonable English and can afford nice clothing and the necessary tip to the doorman work the bar of the hotel itself. In one sense, all of these people are benefiting from development, are being employed as a result of this particular modernist endeavor. There is little doubt, however, that these are not the type of jobs imagined by organizations and individuals who set out to engage in this endeavor, be they the IMF, World Bank, development planners, or the Tanzanian state. If development does indeed bring about modernization and modernity, then it brings about a modernity that looks quite different from the Western Euro-American modernities that many of those engaged in the development process expect.

Regardless of their expectations, however, most are pretty well aware of what has resulted in the name of development in Africa. During prior trips to Tanzania and during the preliminary phases of research for this project I had the opportunity to discuss the effectiveness of developmental aid with well over fifty employees of at least twenty different HIV/AIDS and youth related NGOs. Although, in the end, I decided to conduct my research outside of the realms of the development world, I continued to follow the workings of several of the organizations most engaged in projects aimed at preventing HIV/AIDS and at helping marginalized urban youth. Among those working in
development who I interviewed, very few believed that development had really brought about any significant structural change and many thought that they often did more harm than good. Discussions regarding the fostering of dependency relations and personal disillusionment were rampant among the development personnel I came to know in Tanzania, especially after hours, outside of the context of the office. I expected to find idealistic innocents out to save the world. What I found instead were mostly seasoned professionals, many of whom were as aware as their harshest critics of the limits of development.

My understanding of the situation leads me to suggest that most of the disillusionment I encountered arose from their continued belief in and commitment to unitary views on development and modernization. It seemed that the failure to recognize and accept the possibility of different trajectories of the modern prevented many of those engaged in development work from envisioning their African counterparts as equals. The underlying assumption of development after all is that African countries are not developed, not modern, certainly not Western. If we are to believe Achille Mbembe, in many contexts Africans themselves are not even imagined as human. Speaking on the blindness that has resulted from the failure of those involved in policy making, including policy makers associated with international aid organization, to engage in serious research, Mbembe observes:

African politics and economics have been condemned to appear in social theory only as the sign of the lack, while the discourse of political science and development economics has become that of a quest for the causes of that lack. On the basis of a grotesque dramatization, what political imagination is in Africa is held incomprehensible, pathological, and abnormal. War is seen as all pervasive. The continent, a great, soft, fantastic body, is seen as powerless, engaged in rampant self-destruction. Human action there is seen as stupid and mad, always proceeding from anything but rational calculations (2001:8).

Mbembe’s assertions, while perhaps a bitter pill to swallow, take the form of medicine much needed and, whether they stem from the beliefs he outlines or others perhaps equally troubling, it remains that many engaged in development work treat neither African states nor African individuals as equals.

I have suggested that such inequality results, in part, because those working in development, confined in their thinking by the very definition of development, are largely unable to imagine trajectories of the modern that might differ from those informed by Western modernization theories. From this perspective, it could be argued that the practice of development could be much improved if those engaged in it would be willing to radically rethink what it means to be developed, to be modern. Organizations that remain committed to Western views of the modern are, as in Mbembe’s estimation, often perceived by those who are ostensibly being “helped” as unable to or, worse,
unwilling to, recognize what does work in Africa, what is reasonable, and what is rational.

**International Double Talk**

In offering the above critique I do not want to give the impression that it is only Western views on modernization that limit the capacity of developmental organizations to bring about real change, nor that it is only Western development workers who embrace such views. Though I think such critiques are important they are not particularly reflective of the views offered by the young Tanzanians with whom I worked, nor are they reflective of the types of experiences and interactions they had with the development world. In fact, few of them challenged the overall objectives of development, Western-inspired or not, and several of them even championed the aims of development. Further, most of those I interviewed on the subject suggested that they preferred to deal directly with Westerners working for development organizations rather than with Tanzanian-born employees. This was most often justified by commonly held views that Tanzanians working in development were doing so primarily to make money, that they were not particularly interested in the humanitarian aims advertised by their organizations and, also, that they were often corrupt, demanding that recipients of development funds, no matter how small, pay them a percentage.

In this final section I want to look more closely at such accusations. To begin, it is important to recognize which Tanzanians are likely to work in development. Only those with specific cultural capital, including the right references and connections, land such jobs. Many people at Maskani readily expressed the belief that development work could only be attained with the political, economic, and social contacts, people who were well educated,
spoke English, and knew how to fool foreigners. Those who passed by Maskani who worked with and for foreign organizations, of whom there were quite a few, were both derided and admired by Wamaskani. They were sometimes portrayed as sell-out approval stamps for foreign organizations but their superior socio-economic positions were often coveted by Wamaskani. There is no doubt that many Tanzanians working with development organizations serve as more than approval stamps for Western designed projects. Yet, many of those working at Maskani expressed the relatively uniform belief that no one who worked in development did so solely to bring about positive social change in Tanzania. On some level or another everyone, Tanzanians and Westerners alike, were seen to be in it for the money (Fig. 3.9).23

This point was made clear to me when a local NGO conducted a series of interviews about condom use with some of the young men at Maskani. When I arrived at Maskani one day I noticed Athumani was wearing a Salama Condoms tee-shirt. When I asked him where he got it he explained that someone from Salama had come by Maskani a few days before and approached him to be in a focus group, asking him to come to their offices with a few of his friends. He reported that he had, in fact, just come back from there. Interested in his perception of the largest condom supplier in the country, I asked him how it went. “Mbaya,” he said. “Bad.” When I asked why, he explained that he showed up at the Salama offices with two of his friends around lunchtime. They were invited into a conference room and questioned for about an hour. Athumani maintained that the other young men only gave yes or no answers while he worked hard to give the man who was interviewing them a true view of what it was like for young men like him. After the interview they were given “two sambusas and a soda” for their time.24 When Athumani protested, pointing out that they had been pulled away from their work for over two hours in the middle of the busiest part of the day, the person who interviewed them pulled him aside and gave him the tee-shirt. Athumani explained to me that this was typical. He said he knew for a fact that the organization set aside money to pay informants for their time but that middlemen, like the person who conducted the interview, liked to pocket the proceeds. He said he was not angry with the organization because he thought the people running it were trying to do a good thing. He was angry because he felt he had been abused by the Salama employee. He told me he had been asked to return the next week for a follow-up interview but that there was no way he was going to show up.

This story was not unlike several others I heard that blamed development personnel, specifically Tanzanian citizens, for pocketing money earmarked for informants. Several musicians and artists also reported being required to pay a “commission” to Tanzanian NGO personnel before receiving their wages for performances sponsored by the organization. Because the events where they perform are usually associated with development agendas like AIDS prevention, NGO workers, who were themselves receiving quite handsome salaries (plus their “commissions”), would even suggest that perform-
ers should volunteer their time to a good cause and be thankful for the exposure. Not surprisingly, such arguments held little sway among people who were just getting by economically.25

In order to understand better the role played by some Tanzanians working in development I turn to Bayart’s (2000) *African Affairs* article concerning the relationship between international development and the African state, most specifically African leaders. With copious examples, Bayart argues against dependency theorists (and, indirectly development projects engaged in changing Africa’s relationship to modernity) who maintain that the legitimacy of African states falters mainly because they lack a proper social and cultural foundation (2000:237). Instead, he suggests that individual African leaders consciously and consistently engage with the world economy in line with what he terms “historic practices of extraversion” (*ibid.*) In contemporary post-liberalized Africa this translates to African leaders bamboozling international aid organizations and foreign governments while operating under the guise of being democratically elected. Though Bayart’s arguments were very much in line with views expressed by young Tanzanians. African political leaders who transform the power that results from their dealings with international donors and foreign capital into greater power over their constituency do so through mastery of a sort of international double-talk, or in Bayart’s translated words, “a form of pidgin language that various native princes use in their communication with Western sovereigns and financiers” (Bayart 2000:226).26

Many Tanzanians currently working for international development organizations do the same, if only to a lesser degree. This is not the result of their failure to recognize the workings of Western theories of development, but rather their mastery of them. Such practices are directly in line with the “historical processes of extraversion” that Bayart discusses. Capitalizing on their relative power and cultural capital within Tanzania, certain privileged members of society gain access to jobs in the foreign sector. With the incomes received from these positions, some of which are extraordinarily out of proportion with the local economy, they are able accrue wealth without resorting to illegality and, thus, to achieve and maintain respectability. The choice to work for a humanitarian organization for primarily economic motives would not have been interpreted as unethical or immoral among those working at Maskani. When Tanzanians use their positions in the foreign sector to profit from the poor, however, as in the example of Athumani and the Salama Condoms employee, they are despised.27

What I want to suggest with this line of argument is that critiques of Western development must also examine the complicity of African leaders, both politicians and those employed in development, in perpetuating a system that benefits them enormously. In Tanzania, international development policies and discourses are most often delivered to local populations by either politicians or other Tanzanians working in development. In contemporary post-socialist Tanzania there is a high degree of street-level disillusionment, one might even say cynicism, toward the positivistic development discourses put
forth by international developmental organizations that is similar to the disillusionment expressed by many regarding the state’s capacity and desire to bring about meaningful social change. This disillusionment seemed to stem from the many painful personal and familial memories people associated with failed socialist-inspired modernization projects from the 1970s and 1980s that had demanded participation. That people were skeptical regarding development projects sponsored by the state during my research made sense given the recent failures of the state to deliver development but it was only when I realized the social and economic ties between those who held public office and those who worked in development that I was able to understand people’s skeptical attitudes toward development projects not sponsored by the state. Current developmental regimes, characterized by promises of liberalization, democracy, and greater social freedom, are not recognized as particularly new in any way but, rather, as the same old modernization projects in new clothes. The main difference is that international and non-governmental aid organizations now provide the state with a new ideological veneer for their old tricks. Sometimes the state even benefits directly by insisting that all new development projects go through a national review board. In this way a state body determines which local projects and NGOs get funding from international aid organizations. Though statistics are not available regarding the relationship between successfully funded projects and personal connections that might exist between well-placed government officials and NGO workers, many of those with whom I worked assumed the worst, that only those with the right connections could hope to see their projects funded.

I have suggested that there are clear connections between recent trends in globalization and the rapid increase of developmental organizations working in Tanzania over the last ten or so years. I have also suggested that it is possible to compare flows in developmental aid with flows in global capital and queried whether there might also be similarities between the types of international subjectivities developing in global cities of the North as defined by Sassen (1998) and the types of subjectivities emerging in global cities of the South where globalization is sometimes manifested quite differently. Those who work for development organizations and other businesses that have recently emerged as part of the process of globalization in Dar es Salaam do exhibit a politicized international presence, but it is as a result of their access to power within Tanzania rather than as of their marginalization within the system. Unlike the service sector employees described by Sassen, the international subjectivities of Tanzania’s global employees are centered on privilege. Some of them may, in fact, believe in the development ethos of the organizations they for which they work but one cannot ignore the possibility that they are least partially motivated to do so by the increased possibilities for economic gain and increased power within Tanzania.

The international subjectivities of the Tanzanian middle classes that have arisen from increasing globalization have little in common with international
subjectivities of the disadvantaged workers of Sassen's arguments. In many ways they have more in common with highly paid business executives in the North who have disproportionately benefited from the transformation of the global economy. Such comparisons may be simplistic but they are also fair in many ways. Those making their living in the streets of Dar es Salaam, in the other global spaces, have more in common with service sector employees in the North than do Tanzanians working for development organizations. And while, it is unlikely that they will organize around any common principles anytime soon (except perhaps for the right to pursue individual wealth), I do think one could make a reasonable argument that they have also developed international subjectivities that result in their having more in common with *deiwakas* from Cairo to Cape Town than with rural laborers in their own country.

If globalization has brought about one thing to both the North and the South it is a heightened awareness of difference and the emergence of geographically divided global cities. Excessive wealth juxtaposed with the everydayness of poverty seems to occur with greater frequency and intensity as the gulf of economic difference grows wider, and this juxtaposition is nowhere more easily observed than in the occupation and contestation of urban space. Occupation and contestation are enacted in global cities of the North, just as they are in global cities of the South. Of course, in the North there is more established control by the state over space resulting in the normalization of inner city slums, re-gentrification, and suburbia. In short, there is less contestation in the North, but I would argue this exposes hegemonic views toward class and space rather than greater equality. The history of industrial labor in the world is forever embedded in its cities both old and new. You just have to dig a bit deeper through centuries of power and polish to find it in many northern locales. In Dar es Salaam, like in most global cities of the South, inequality confronts. Poverty knocks on your car window and tries to sell you luxuries it could never afford. It sits on the sidewalk waiting to stand face to face with you as you leave work. It washes and guards the luxury Land Cruiser you just bought to ensure you arrive safely home, where poverty will open the gate for you and guard you where you sleep. Your sense of safety and security are guaranteed by it. And threatened as well.

notes

1 Of course, he saw his arrangement with the police as a form of harassment in itself.

2 As I will discuss in the next chapter, *maskanis* like Sheby's are integral to the operation of *vijiweni* where informal economic activities take place throughout the city. Few people would smoke cannabis at their own *kijiweni/maskani* for fear of attracting the attention of the police to their place of business.

3 Fig. 3.3 shows Mzee Sheby's map of his maskani. Note the fence dividing
the “jymkana” from the “masikani,” (sic) and the well (Bombani) located on the gymkhana side of the fence, which those who slept at Kwa Sheby used for clean water. Negotiations for water often presented as many problems for Mzee Sheby as did his negotiations with the police. At the time of my 2001 visit to Dar es Salaam Kwa Sheby had begun doubling as a Masai maskani as well, and the young Masai were less circumspect than they could have been regarding water access. These young men who had been hired by a local construction firm to guard their site had no qualms about hopping over the fence in plain view of the golfers. That they normally dressed in typical Masai garb (from red-checked toga to knife and club) usually guaranteed they would not go unnoticed.

4 Mabasi was the name given to individuals who brought their cars to Maskani to be washed. Each car washer worked to develop a personal relationship with the owner of a car over time. For the car washers this meant they could rely on steady customers who might be inclined to help them out in times of trouble and for the car owners it translated to extra security as they would know exactly who to blame if something was stolen from their automobiles.

5 I thank Dennis Maryogo for this and many other poignant observations.

6 In 2001, the Sheraton was bought out by a South African firm and re-named the Royal Palm. I half-heartedly considering changing my title to “in the shade of the palm” since it would be more or less metaphorically equivalent but have chosen to maintain the original title. During the time of my research, and for the five years preceding it, peoples’ imaginings were shaped on the possibilities promised and threatened by the Sheraton’s existence. When I returned to Dar es Salaam in 2002, I found that people still referred to the Royal Palm as the Sheraton, and the joke among the young men working the corner was that the only thing that had changed were the name and the fact that employees’ salaries had gone down. This is a critique one increasingly hears in reference to South African management that behaves in Tanzania as if Apartheid were part of its legacy.

7 More detailed information on Maskani based car washing activities is provided by Dixon in Chapter Two.

8 Chapter Six focuses more explicitly on the activities of these other vendors.

9 Trouillot (1995:103) similarly suggests that most studies of the Haitian Revolution romanticize the unity and objectives of the revolutionaries, assuming they were fighting for “freedom” and other abstract ideals, when in fact, what they actually wanted was three days a week to work their own garden plots. Trouillot argues that the reasons for such abbreviated analysis go beyond ignorant romanticism to include the assumption by most researchers that it was not possible for Haitians to organically develop locally meaningful reasons for revolution and resistance, and that they therefore must have borrowed such ideas from the recently fought French Revolution.

10 Several authors have followed Canclini’s lead, some more effectively than even he has. See Cosentino (1992,1995) for examples.
These arguments have been perhaps best articulated by Appadurai and Breckenridge in early volumes of the journal Public Culture. Also see Pinney's (2000) discussion, "Popular, Public and Other Cultures."

Fabian suggests that one of the primary reasons that studies of popular culture have been more or less unnoticed in the field of cultural anthropology is that these studies, by necessity, must focus on what is unstable in cultures, while the discipline itself is more often interested in stable social structures (1998:11).

Ndjio's (n.d.) examination of challenges to state control of public space in Cameroon provides a compelling comparison to the arguments I make here. Of particular interest are the author's ideas regarding the role sites of pleasure, or "carrefour de la joie," play in disrupting dominant spatial narratives. I, too, explore sites of pleasure in Chapters 7-9 of this study.

A connection could be made between de Certeau's and Auge's interests in transitory spaces and the works of authors such as Clifford (1997), Cancrini (1995), Bhaba (1994), Ghosh (1993), Appadurai (1996), and Roberts (2000), all of whom have made strong arguments for the need for social scientists to examine the interstitial spaces between cultures in order to understand better processes of globalization, both historical and contemporary.

In fact, one the primary struggles faced by Wamaskani was obtaining the legitimate identification (kitambulisho) necessary for them to live and work in the city. Without it they were constantly subject to police harassment and threatened with imprisonment and/or forced removal from the city.

It is impossible to say whether this young man was really a Rwandan refugee, though the other young men working near him told me he was not. Refugee identities were often contested among people at Maskani who believed it was just a way for people to make money. Sommer's (2001) work with Burundian refugees in Dar es Salaam suggests that refugees, who are required to live in settlement camps, are unlikely to undertake practices that would draw the attention of the authorities when living clandestinely in Dar es Salaam. For this reason alone, I find it improbable that this young man was indeed a refugee.

The need to make the distinction between modernity and modernization has become increasingly important for scholars in anthropology in recent years. See Appadurai (1996) and Mitchell (2000) for further reading.

This term was introduced by Peter Geschiere and Peter Pels who organized an intensive week-long seminar at the Amsterdam School for Social Science in August 2001 to further develop their lines of thinking on the topic. The phrase "genealogies of modernity" suggests, as does Asad's "genealogy of religion," the need to examine the relational aspects between different aspects of modernity that exist from place to place. This is a departure from recent scholarly arguments devoted to the examination of multiple modernities.

All HIV/AIDS related programs and research must be approved by the
state organization established specifically for this purpose. During the per-iod of my research this umbrella organization was the National AIDS Control Program (NACP). The NACP was restructured in 2001 and a new organization, TACAIDS, was formed in hopes of streamlining the various research, education, prevention, and treatment efforts of the many individuals, states and NGOs currently engaged in HIV/AIDS work in Tanzania. Although my own research theoretically fell under the rubric of the NACP there seemed to be little organization interest in directing or controlling it in any way. The reorganization of NACP into TACAIDS was partially undertaken to ensure that the actions of individuals and organizations could be more closely monitored by the state. I am unable to say to what extent these efforts have been successful.

20 Most of the people with whom I worked had some project in mind for bettering their situation economically and it was not unusual for them to approach individuals perceived to have access to funding with their plans when they passed by Maskani. Several people did manage to secure financing in this way, while others were able to find patrons to pay for skills training programs.


22 Even my research assistant, Mbelwa, who has been hanging out on the corner socially for years, made extra cash translating for special events in the Sheraton’s conference rooms. The job he was most proud of was a translation into Swahili of a speech given by Charles Stith, the former (1999-2001) US ambassador to Tanzania, for a local newspaper.

23 One should not assume that this stance was perceived as being immoral or problematic in any serious way; by most it is simply considered human nature.

24 Meat filled pastry usually eaten as a light snack.

25 During a panel discussion among Kelly Askew, Hanan Sabea and me at the 2001 African Studies Association meetings it was suggested that development organizations have begun to fill the role of the artistic patron left vacant by the socialist state. Though I do not pursue this avenue of inquiry in this study, I think it is well worth doing so. Many of the behaviors and responses of those working for development organizations and those being subjected to their services may, in fact, be following rules of performance and patronage that were primarily established during the socialist years.

26 Pels (2002) demonstrates the ways similar international pidgins were employed by Waluguru leaders in central Tanzania during the late colonial period.

27 In the next chapter I explore the Swahili notion of roho mbaya, a term used to describe selfish people who heartlessly take from those who are less fortunate than themselves. Athumani specifically used this term to describe the man from Salama Condoms who failed to sufficiently compensate him for his time.