Summary

This study searches for the philosophical meaning of the ‘desirological’ concept of trouvaille. The research is conducted by studying various fragments from the pre-critical and critical philosophy of Kant from the point of view of Lyotard’s Freudian ‘anamnetical’ thought. In this way the study is placed in the Western metaphysical tradition, in which philosophy — the love of wisdom — is articulated as a search for truth. Since Plato metaphysics has the character of anamnesis, which is a memory of the a priori given, that which makes it possible to think of truth. In this view, metaphysics has always been focused on the results of thought. However, metaphysics should also inspire a reflection on the problem of the act of ‘finding the truth’. This study aims to provide such a reflection.

The concept of ‘trouvaille’ is being used here in a quasi-transcendental sense. Which is to say that the critical question regarding the philosophical conditions of possibility is being ‘over-determined’ and complemented with the ‘genetic’ question regarding the possibility of critical philosophising. Trouvaille is described as the find (rather than discovery) of that which urges on to search. That find is never expressed adequately as a result of thought, but it proves itself solely in the performance of the searching itself. We are, therefore, not concerned with the ontological arche or with any transcendental apriori. Trouvaille is the name for the source of philosophy taken as an activity of thought. In that way the philosophy of trouvaille concerns only the specific aspect of metaphysica, which is called here ‘desirology’ (the research of philosophical desire).

In this desirological perspective the traditional meaning of the term anamnesis is shifting. Thinking equals searching which, depending on the result, pretends to be a form of discovery (entdecken) or a form of invention (erfinden), a difference emphasized by the classical rhetorical ars inveniendi and still by Kant’s anthropology. However, discovering and inventing imply one another whilst the difference between the two cannot be abolished. Intuitively discovered truths, for example, have to be articulated within a discursive argument. The discursive expression, on the other hand, only makes sense in as far as an intuitionable content of reference is being thought to which that expression is related. This differential complementarity points at a deeper philosophical motive which keeps metaphysical research moving continuously,
like a wedge driven between discovery and invention. This shifts the meaning of anamnesis away from ‘the memory of the truth or of the conditions required for finding the truth’ towards ‘the research of the dynamic urge to philosophise (trouvaille) which cannot be caught as a determinable theme of thought’. From a desirological point of view anamnesis is the search for the source-trouvaille, which cannot be found and only shows itself in the effects of destabilisation (Entstellung) and in the endless retaking of philosophical thought-results.

Point de depart

Therefore, the trouvaille deserves to be described as a point de depart (a point of departure from which one cannot cut oneself loose), which implies two aporetical relationships. Firstly, every search presuppose a find, which is not absorbed into the ‘what’ (Lycotard would say the quid) of the metaphysical search-result. The trouvaille is a quod, the signal which indicates that ‘there is to think’ (il y a à penser): the minimal condition for the possibility of philosophising. From this stems the first aporia. The claim ‘to find what makes one search’ can only be demonstrated in the evidence of the in actu: ‘the fact that I have found what makes me search is proved by the fact that I search and evidently haven’t found yet’.

The second, connected aporia concerns the principle that philosophy can never be completed. The relentless frustration with the results of thought in the history of philosophy can be reduced to the impossibility to thematise definitively the inchoative moment of thought. Il y a à penser is not a determinable theme, not a result. It is an always already presupposed motive, urging thought. In the opening chapter we indicate this aporia through a wordplay, which will remain consequently but silently our regulatory framework of thought. ‘Il faut penser quoique le trou vaille’. The wordplay itself is nothing more than an Einfall, a singular invention, which serves to show up the poverty of thought. Trouvaille is a conceptual hole (trou) in philosophical discourse, which nonetheless cannot be approached as if it concerned a structural value (valeur) of a phenomenon or a sign.

Orientation préliminaire

The opening chapter approaches the desirological question from a historical perspective. The argument starts with the formula of Lyotard, which identifies modernity by inserting desire into Reason (insinuation du désir dans la raison). By means of his Copernican turn and the related problem of the relationship
between knowing (nature) and desiring (freedom), Kant breaks the path of modern development. His criticism seems to subordinate searching and finding to the limiting and finite abilities of the thinking subject. Criticism implies that thinking and being no longer cover one another adequately, as it used to be the case in dogmatic metaphysics. This restraint of the ontological reach of the theoretical *logos* opens the way towards freedom for the practical Reason. The Kantian ambition to discover truth shifts towards the priority of inventiveness and creativity as with Schopenhauer and (the early) Nietzsche: the yeast of being is the blind desire, which is no longer restrained by a reasonable and teleological structure.

Lyotard will be interpreted as the desirologist of the *trouville*. He articulates his desirology by rendering Freud’s metapsychological writings receptive to philosophical reflection. Through this approach he aims for the ontology of the real: being as a sovereign absolute which manifests itself in the incongruent relationship between thinking and being (*inaequatio*). *Trouville* cannot be moulded into a concept but is a name designing the choc of the real, the *rencontre* with the shapeless being. Lyotard interprets Freud alternately from a deleuzian and a lacanian viewpoint. Sometimes desire is being described as the effect of libidinal energy; sometimes it is considered to be a reaction to a original traumatic want of being. These two perspectives correspond roughly with Lyotard’s first pagan-aesthetic train of thought and with the second pragmatic-ethical period of his thought. We argue that Lyotard in a third period of his philosophising career tried to combine in thought both the libidinal excess (*trop*) and the traumatic want (*trou*) through the concept of *phrase-affect*. The relation between thought and being must be inadequate, since being retreats continuously because of its excess and leaves gaping holes in ontology. We consider this paradoxical double characteristic (*trou du trop*) of distinctive value for our notion of *trouville*.

**Part 1: Anamnèse de la trouvaille**

*Anamnèse de la trouvaille* – the first part of this study – presents a justification for reducing Lyotard’s thought to the *trouville*. Interpreting his thought as a desirological reflection does this. Lyotard transforms the philosophical discourse in two ways. Firstly, he introduces a few Freudian patterns of thought, which enables him to describe subsequently the work of a philosopher as analogous to that of an artist. From these thought patterns springs the notion of a fundamentally ontological incongruence – in fact it is this incongruence which we christened *trouville* – which makes plausible the necessity of a desirological transformation of philosophy.
Chapter 1 (*L’anamnèse*) discusses the difference between thinking as an act (*en acte*) and thinking as a result which is essential for the difference between descriptive and desirological metaphysics. Freudian influences reveal themselves in the concept of thought as an activity, which is indebted to ‘something’ (*la chose*) which incites to thinking and is the object of *Urverdrängung*. This ‘something’ is absolute affectivity, absolute in the sense of ‘not relatable to representative structures’. This ‘something’ acts as a fugitive which is both disturbing and constitutive for the psychological apparatus with its representative and defensive functions (*représentation et pare-excitation*). In itself, this absolute presence is - from a philosophical perspective - without representation, it is an *ek-sistent*, a ‘primal’ object of a radical loss (*perte*). The philosophical anamnesis is the unachievable effort to retrieve this loss or forgetting. Therefore Lyotard parallels and advocates the philosophical practice of the Freudian clinical model: free association; endless labor (*Durcharbeitung*), consciousness of after-effects (*Nachträglichkeit*).

Chapter 2 (*Die Verneinung*) brings the relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy into a coherent perspective through Lyotard’s affirmative approach to Freud’s metapsychology. The central concept here is *difference*. We consider it to be Lyotard’s philosophical translation of a clinical concept of truth. He considers truth to be a lapse, a sudden occurrence (*Einfall, événement*), in which a stated proposition at the same time can mean its opposite. This concept of truth deconstructs the oppositional Aristotelian logic on which philosophical and structural arguments are built. In this way the logic of *difference* can sensitize thought for structures of dissimilation. According to Lyotard this logic is at work in the production of art as well as in the production of theory (as, for example, in psychoanalysis). We reread Freud’s text *Die Verneinung* from the same differential perspective and we take it as a psychological theory about the emergence of the ability to make judgements.

The chapter closes with an analysis of the subject of sensorial difference. Hearing as the ability to make meaning transparent and sight as the ability to distance oneself through images, work hand in hand out of necessity, without giving up their mutual differences. In connection with this Lyotard maintains that the horizontal signifying discourse (the priority of structuralism) cannot function without the vertical referential configuration of phenomenology. Language is about ‘something’ which is non-language. From the incompatible character of the way they complement one another spring, however, distortions of the figurative and the discursive modes of representation respectively. Lyotard interprets these distortions as libidinal (*figural*) effects. These can be reduced psychoanalytically to the loss of primary narcissism and can be reinserted and translated in philosophy as the ontological problem of the *perte du réel*. The differential point of contact between discours and figure is characterised by Lyotard as the *figure-matrice*, which is both place of birth and
source of figurative destabilisation for representation. This *figure-matrice* has to be considered as an original fantasy. Not being synonymous with the *trouvaille*, it can be nonetheless substituted for it.

Chapter 3 (*Au-delà de Lacan?*) approaches – in a lacanian perspective – the parallels between philosophy and psychoanalysis. Lyotard accuses Lacan of a metaphysical nihilism which would presuppose uncritically the structuring labor of a forever absent *Grand Signifiant* and thus reduce differential and figurative effects. In this manner Lacan would reduce the essence of the dream to the *Traumgedanke* as a rhetorical concept (and therefore subject to discourse). In opposition to this lacanian structuralism Lyotard argues in favour of a re-appreciation of the figural character of the *Traumarbeit* (*Rucksicht auf Darstellbarkeit*), which stands in an inadequate relation to the *Traumgedanke*. In essence Lyotard criticises Lacan’s use of the semiological (saussurian) understanding of the sign, as he shows in an analysis of the famous lacanian algorithms of two rhetorical functions (metaphor and metonymy). We interpret these algorithms in a different fashion, however. These are two sides of the same coin: metonymy installs a want of being (*manqué d’être*) to which the metaphor ‘answers’ with a creative production of meaning (*étincelle créatrice*). We have to conclude that Lacan, too, creates space for the ‘excess’ of the real (*La Chose*) which is responsible for the traumatic lack of representation (*trou du reel*).

In *A l’instar de l’art* the desirological character of Lyotard’s thinking becomes clear from his understanding of the modern and post-modern will of the infinite (*volonté d’infini*). In modernity this will is subjected to the demands of the technological-systematic performance, of totalising capitalisation and of communicative transparency (Habermas). The post-modern answers with the creative experiment, which sees in inventive results only secondary and unfinished fruits of the absolute (comparable to the structure of *nachträglichkeit*). In the vein of Jean-Luc Nancy we take the word experiment thus literally as ‘the infinite search in and of an absolute exteriority’ (*ex-perire*), the search for the *trouwaille*. It is exactly this experimenting which turns art, philosophy and psychoanalysis into related activities. Although Freud attributes to art the conciliating role to compensate for the loss of lust caused by the impact and demands of reality in the process of psychogenesis, Lyotard’s interpretation does not concern itself with reconciliation between lust and reality. The real will not allow itself to be tamed by reality. According to Lyotard, art serves a negative anamnesis. Art reminds us of the absolute and non-representable exteriority of being. Art, like the dream, is thus guided by the four principles of Freud’s primary process which destabilizes the rules of representation. Both psychoanalysis and art teach philosophy the openness to the unexpected, to the possibility of the impossible. They teach the *attention librement flottante*, i.e. the openness to the truth of the event.
In *La phrase comme Einfall* it will become clear how Lyotard translates philosophically this psychoanalytical and artistic school of thought. The phrase-philosophy of *Le Differend* corresponds with the infinite liveliness of the experiment. The single phrase – the *in actu* of its absolute and singular presence – is only situated (*in situ*) après coup and only then made subordinate to a defining regime of giving significance, reference and communication. Viewed from this perspective phraseology is the philosophical sediment of the ‘volonté de l’infini’. Lyotard criticises Kant’s transcendental reconstruction of the *Darstellung*. According to him, Kant characterises the *Anschauung* as a solely receptive ability and – by doing so – he erases the fact that this forming and figurative ability operates already under the active regime of the *Verstand*. In this way Kant pushes aside the *Empfindung* as the absolute, irreducible, and real moment of the experience. We defend Kant, however, by arguing that the critique indirectly respects the singularity of the real, precisely by putting limits on experience. Kant never pretended to be speaking about the experience of *Wirklichkeit* when he talks about the *Darstellung* (*exhibitio*). Moreover, the aporia of the ‘trouvaille’ teaches us that respect after all holds pace with the betrayal (situating; realising) of that which desires to be respected, i.e. the *existential* presence. The waking-up call of experience (affectivity, *Empfindung*) can, therefore, also be heard in Kant’s work as a signal of a reality which blocks and destabilises a definitive homogenisation of experience. It is only therefore that it is possible time and again to pursue an anamnesis of criticism.

**Part 2: Trouvaille de la critique**

What happens if one takes literally, that is in a historical sense, Lyotard’s argument about the post-modern preceding the modern? In part two we reconstruct on the basis of various pre-critical texts how the trouvaille functioned as the inducement of the invention or discovery of some transcendental thought-patterns. In the pre-critical period Kant was on the trail of the absent presence, which undermined the foundations of the ontological model of adequate truth (*adequatio rei et intellectus*) through the ability of the *intuitus intellectus*. This necessitated the critical project. Kant attempted to compensate for the loss of existence by introducing the patterns of real opposition and incongruence, the structuring work of which finds its way into *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. It is, therefore, not surprising that we find in Kant’s own description of the discovery of criticism (in the B-edition of the KRV) some rather dismal attempts to disguise the *Einfall*-character of that discovery.
In chapter 6 (Perte de Dasein) we unearth Kant’s trouvaille of the exteriority of Being (Dasein) from his writings on the possible proof of the existence of God. One cannot deduce from the ability to think the existentiality of Being. The ontological inversion that Kant, therefore, argues for ascribes to Being an absolute position. This means that Being is superfluous in comparison to thinking. It also means that the human being, who doesn’t have a creative intellect at his disposal (intuitus intellectus; intellectus originarius) can only retain the imago Dei-character of his intellect in a broken form, i.e. in the form of the heterogeneity of Anschauung and Verstand.

For him it becomes necessary then, as we show in the chapter Existence et opposition réelle, to make a distinction between a (logical) Nominal-Erklärung of reality and a mathematical Real-Erklärung which is based on Newtonian principles. The view of the nihil negativum, which is determinable by the intellect, corresponds with the first; the nihil privativum, given in the arena of sensibility, corresponds with the latter. (The concept of nihil absolutum, which Kant explains as the opposite of the absolute position of Dasein is problematic and ‘dissimulative’.) Kant introduced in so-doing a logic of force which he transforms in the Kritik into a logic of ability and into the tension between concrete-making (attentio) and abstracting (abstractio) ambitions of Reason and which we shall indicate as the crux critica of Reason.

While the deficiency of logic for metaphysics was compensated in Kant’s precritical texte on the Negativen Größe by invoking a mathematical concept, in his Grunde the concrete sense of orientation betrays the lack of a geometrical-mathematical determination of space. In the chapter Incongruence et hétérogénéité, we discuss how this could have inspired Kant to criticise Leibniz who believed it possible to conclude to the existence of the absolute space – in relation to which orientation can occur – from the composing special elements (this re-emerges in the KRV as a criticism of Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe and as criticism of Leibniz’s principum identitas indiscernibilium). However, orientation requires a sign (signal) of feeling, which Kant reduces to the principle of incongruence. Two three-dimensional objects, which in their geometrical description are identical, can be non-interchangeable in reality (for example a left-hand and right-hand glove). Their identities conceal (dissimulate) a difference, which is indicated by feeling. After Kant’s critical turn-around, the principle of incongruence will return as a determination of the reasonable subject, which in its unity comprises the incommensurable differences between the abilities. An essay on Lyotard’s book on Marcel Duchamp in which Lyotard refers to Kant and to the theorie sur les coupures of constructivist mathematics, illustrates the deconstructive and inventive importance of incongruence.

Chapter 9 (Histoire de la critique) closely follows Kant in some of his sporadic descriptions of the process of invention of transcendental criticism. At
first Kant seems to confirm its *Einfall*-character by including the Copernican turn-around in metaphysics in the history of science. Yet in the end he denies its existence in a *petitio principii*-argument (as shows Sallis). This occurs by attributing to the sciences the legitimising metaphysical *Einfall* of criticism – regarding the priority of the knowing subject over reality - as an already discovered hypothesis. A second suppression of singularity of the *Einfall* takes place on the basis of the – in our view fundamental – inspiration to make fertile for transcendental logic the analogy between the unifying function of the prepositional-logical judgement and the synthetic function of experience. By means of this inspiration criticism as a method becomes possible, which is to say that from now on – under the leadership of *Verstand* – the singular event can be excluded from the world of experience. However, together with Françoise Proust we would like to turn this around. Exactly because criticism sets limits it reserves space for the ek-sistential (see chapter 5). From Kant’s respect for trouvaille of the escaping *Dasein*, we thus deduce the desirological tension in Reason (the already mentioned *crux critica*). Since Being cannot be deduced from Reason the ambition to know has to limit itself to that what can be experienced. But thus Reason is also permanently burdened with a deficiency of Being which inspires the desire to expand beyond its limits. The reasonable desire for restrictive thinking by providing concepts with corresponding *Anschauungen* accompanies the aspiration to expanding these concepts to the field of the Ideas, which are per definition not fixable in any sensible representation. Finally, Kant’s sensitivity towards trouvaille is illustrated by his view that philosophical education cannot achieve more than teaching ‘how to philosophise’, i.e. philosophy *in actu* and tension-filled self-activity of Reason.

**Part 3: Anamnese de la critique**

After putting in place the contours of trouvaille in a Lyotardian context in part 1 and the introduction of trouvaille in a reconstruction of the history of the development of criticism in part 2, part 3 of this study undertakes to perform a few *anamneses* in Kant’s transcendental critiques. Point of departure are four critical tense relationships which each in their own way refer back to the problem of trouvaille and which give cause to formulate four different forms of reflexivity in the final chapter.

Part 3 opens with a chapter on the sensorial difference (*Difference sensorielle*), as we found it already in Lyotard’s *Discours, figure*. Using three historical
examples it will be argued that this originally phenomenological-empirical difference remains palpable on the - whether or not metaphysical - level of conceptuality (for example in the concept of *intuitus intellectus*). The sensorial difference is the phenomenological expression of the desire which trouvaille provokes and which is indelible because of the incongruent relation between the senses. However, thought has often attempted and always in vain to erase the difference by giving priority to one sense over the other. Eyesight rules in Plato’s works on the intuition of the Idea. De Saussure – at least in Bally’s and Sechehaye’s version – tries to eliminate the sensorial difference by giving priority to hearing in the concept of *image-acoustique*. Therefore, Lyotard criticises this semiological position by appealing to the semiotics of Peirce, who reserves space for the visual aspect, too. In Kant’s *Mutmaßliche Anfang*, which on the basis of the book of Genesis reconstructs speculatively the origin of human Reason, sensorial difference is discovered as the source of the ability to reflect which is so essential to human autonomous Reason.

The problem of schematics, which is being dissected in the following chapter (*Kraft einer verborgenen Kunst*), is grafted upon the sensorial difference. In Kant’s chapter on schematics – a chapter which one should read with the transcendental deduction (in the A-version) in mind - we distinguish three operations through which the imagination synthesises the multiplicity of *Sinnlichkeit: Bildung*, geometrical schematisation, and transcendental schematisation. The obvious analogy with Lyotard’s triad *figure-image, figure-forme*, and *figure-matrice* will be investigated and tested for similarities and differences. In general one could state that Kant has synthesising ambitions, while Lyotard on the other hand wants to save the heterogeneity of the figurative and the discursive. For instance, the *figure-image* points as an opaque sign to the phenomenological exteriority of an object. Briefly, we rediscover in a pre-critical text (*Krankheiten*) the *Entstellung* of this figure through the dream work – which is for Lyotard, too, of philosophical importance -, but Kant swiftly orders Reason to correct the image and bring it in line with its reality value. Where Kant describes the geometrical scheme as a procedural rule of construction and realisation, Lyotard’s analysis of the *figure-forme* attempts to enfeeble this mediating function. There is no reconciliation between intuition and concept, which could ever remove entirely the incongruence between both. Finally, transcendental schematics serves its function – by means of the hegemony of a mathematical understanding of time – of bridging the radical heterogeneity between the given impure intuition and the pure category. Lyotard’s *figure-matrice* destabilises this schematisation of time by its ‘para-chronological’ (i.e. not to be dated or situated in the successive temporality) understanding of *Empfindung*. This is the feeling of trouvaille, which brings Forgetting back into memory, which was the source of Kant’s transcendental exercise.
Chapter 12 (*Orientation et trouvaille*) discusses the tense relation between the concrete vision and the abstract ideas. After a historical discussion of the text *Orientieren* we will summarize how Kant distinguishes three levels of orientation (geographical, mathematical, and logical) which each demand a feeling of orientation, inherent to Reason. Moreover in his introductory notes, Kant states that no abstract concept can nor want to dispose of its pictorial character. Through the methodology of analogous transposition, the expressive use of empirical concepts is an inducement to discover and articulate pure categories, ideas and heuristical rules. The concept is every time transferred to a higher level of use (from geometrical to mathematical to logical) which we will illustrate using the process of symbolisation (KdU §59). Again, the tension of the *crux critica* lies at the root of this pre-heuristic inventiveness.

Chapter 13 (*Etat de naissance*) investigates the harmonious relation between feeling and universality as suggested in the concept of *sensus communis*, which Kant would have meant to be a reflexive answer to the paralogical problem of the transcendental subject. Firstly, we compare the use by Kant and by Lyotard of the term ‘paralogy’ under the denominators of the *sophisma* and of the *Verwechslung*. Both for Kant and Lyotard, the problem relates to the legitimacy of claims to knowledge. Kant rejects the paralogy of the subject for being a transcendental illusion, which — by confusing the empirical with the transcendental and vice versa — presents as scientific knowledge the substantial character of the subject. In contrast, Lyotard embraces paralogy because it does justice to the opacity in thought, which resists systematic and communicative paradigmata of for instance Luhmann and Habermas, and which stimulates to the infinite experiment characteristic for science in post-modern conditions. Following this paralogical train of thought we subsequently show how Lyotard breaks off the *sensus communis* by means of his absolute *phrase-affect*. In doing so he undermines the appeal to this Kantian notion, which often occurs in order to buttress the idea of an universal subject and the possibility of an inter-subjective community. Within the unstable harmony of the abilities of knowledge, the aesthetic sense which promises a *sensus communis* at most points at the subject being permanently in *statu nascendi*.

The final chapter (*Interiorité incongruente*) takes the sensorial difference and the three critical tense relations as cause to formulate four types of reflexivity. Kant’s *Logik* describes how empirical concepts can be created by means of logical reflection. The moment of abstraction (*abstractio*), which is at work in this reflection, implies ignoring the sensorial difference. The topological reflection — which links in with the problem of the schematic relation between *Anschauung* and *Verstand* — regards the distribution of contents of reason to the abilities that fit them. In this reflection the heterogeneity of the abilities is discovered and confirmed time and again. On
the basis of the reasonable tension of the *crux critica*, the analogical reflection is concerned with moving a mode of reflection on a concrete object onto a higher and more abstract level of use. This pre-heuristic way of utilising the analogy explains the possibility to create out of an empirical use of concept the pure arsenal of concepts of the transcendental criticism. This concerns directly the invention of criticism. Finally, Lyotard meets the *phrase-affect* through his paralogical reflection (it may be even better to speak of mere ‘flection’), which cannot be reduced to subjective generality. This indicates the penetrating influence on Reason of the trouvaille which is concerned with the ontological incongruence.

The *Conclusion* remakes the connection between trouvaille and the desirological transformation of metaphysics in a framework, which derives from the discussion on desire in Plato’s *Symposium*.

(Translation: J.M. Doude van Troostwijk, Oxford 2002)

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