Host-stranger relations in Rome, Tel Aviv, Paris and Amsterdam. A comparison of local policies toward labour migrants
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8. Paris

1. Introduction

Paris was chosen to verify the Assimilationist type of policy response to immigration, as proposed in the typology. At first glance, Paris appears a strange choice for a case study of local migrant policies since its unique status within the French political system makes it difficult to separate local from national policy. The tutelage arrangement under which the capital was administered directly by government-appointed prefects until 1977 raises the question of whether there is indeed 'local policy' in Paris. Below I argue that a local Parisian policy can be distinguished even prior to 1977 and the first elected mayoral administration. The Parisian case is also particularly difficult in terms of isolating migrant policies (as defined in Chapter 3). But this is one of the main features of the Assimilationist-type response, in which "ethnic minorities" are not recognized as such. In France the only distinction is officially between aliens (étrangers) and French citizens (français), meaning that very few policies are explicitly migrant policies. Instead, we must look for implicit migrant policies, i.e. general policies that significantly affect the migrant/minority population. These are found mostly in the Spatial domain, particularly in urban development and housing policies.

Paris has been shaped by immigration for several centuries. Over the past two hundred years the city attracted newcomers from all over France, as well as from abroad. The post-war period was characterised by post-colonial immigration from Algeria as well as classic guestworker migration. The last twenty years have witnessed an increasingly diverse immigrant population arriving in an already multi-ethnic capital. Today, the bulk of the migrant population is found in the suburban belt surrounding Paris (the banlieues), as in most French metropolises (Map 8.1). But the capital has always retained a significant migrant/minority population intra muros, due to its sheer size (the official population of Paris is 2,125,851) and its global city position (INSEE 1999). While official statistics define only 14.5% of the municipal population as étrangers, the total ethnic minority population (including naturalised and second-generation migrants) may constitute around 40% of the city population (see below).

This chapter explores those policies that led to the dispersal of Paris’ migrant population ever farther from the centre and eventually “beyond the city walls” (whose modern embodiment is Paris’s périphérique, the ring highway built along the old city walls), to the banlieues. It also looks at those policies affecting the migrants/minorities who remained within Paris. The general question to be addressed here is: to what extent is the host-stranger relations model, and the Assimilationist type in particular, relevant to the understanding of Paris’ local migrant policies?
Map 8.1 Paris city districts (arrondissements 1-20) and banlieues


A preliminary answer to the more general question can be found in earlier case studies analysing local migrant policies in French cities (Ireland 1994, Mazzella 1996, Geisser 1997, Gaxie et al. 1998, Moore 2001, Bousseta 2001). Although the above terms are not normally used¹, these studies do contrast between the universalist discourse and policy framework in France (the republican model of integration), and the de facto ethnicisation of policies in the past two decades at the local level. In doing so, all of these studies relate more or less explicitly to different types of host-stranger relations, in their comparative analyses of local policy responses to ethnic diversity.²

¹ For example, Bousseta’s four-city comparison across three countries relates to the institutional-political context in each city. But he also notes (2001: 249) the “political philosophies of integration” that lie behind municipal attitudes toward migrant mobilisation, with Lille’s “assimilationism” being at the “extreme pole of an ordinal scale” with “multiculturalism” at the other extreme (represented in his comparison by the Dutch city of Utrecht).
² Geisser’s (1997) case studies in Grenoble, the suburbs of Lyon and the department of Seine-Saint-Denis demonstrate how ethnicity is manipulated by the political elites in cities with significant ethnic minority populations (from Moore 2001: 59). Gaxie et al’s comparative study of the “municipal management of immigration” (Gaxie 1999: 2) in seven French cities notes the varieties of explicit and implicit forms of ethnically-sensitive local policies toward migrants/

Research on migrant policies in the Paris metropolitan area has focused on the cities surrounding Paris (Ireland 1994, Gaxie et al. 1998, Kastoryano and Crowley 2001). This may be explained by the prominence of their migrant populations (although these are not necessarily of a larger proportion than in Paris), and by their relative autonomy in policymaking, compared to the complicated case of Paris. This makes cities such as St. Denis and La Courneuve more obvious as case studies.

In contrast to the demonstrated de facto ethnicisation of local policies in some of the other cities studied (Marseille, Montreuil, etc.), this case study shows that local migrant policies in Paris have steadfastly remained of the Assimilationist type, at least until recently. To some extent this is due to the dominance of the State in Parisian affairs until 1977. This meant that local policy more closely followed the republican model regarding the integration of newcomers. However, this chapter will show that a local policy has evolved in Paris since at least the beginning of the twentieth century, characterised by a progressive gentrification of the city on one hand, and attempts at social engineering on the other (see section 4). Paris’s local policy can be identified as an Assimilationist-type reaction to class-based, but also ethnic-based Otherness. Section 5 shows that local policies in the other domains also demonstrate the continuity of Assimilationist attitudes toward migrants in Paris. Only since the election of the city's first left-wing administration in 2001 is there a declared change from this attitude. In practice, however, the new "integration policy" displays many signs of continuity with the previous phase.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 describes the national context in which Paris' policies are tightly embedded: host-stranger relations within the framework of the republican model of integration and the challenges to it: national immigration policies; and the special case of French-Algerian relations. Section 3 describes the local context of Paris, including the history of immigration to the city; characteristics of the migrant/minority population, especially patterns of settlement; local host-stranger relations; and city-State relations. In contrast to the other chapters in this book, section 4 in this chapter is devoted to the Spatial domain, since housing and urban development are the policy areas where the municipality has had the most influence. Section 5 then

minorities in cities such as St. Denis, Montreuil and Gennevilliers. Mazzella (1996) and Moore (2001) show how local policies in Marseille's migrant neighbourhoods reveal a clear "ethnicisation of policy" beneath their universalist rhetoric.

Personal communication with Yankel Fijalkow.

Ireland (1994) looked at policies affecting migrant mobilisation in La Courneuve (Seine-St.-Denis Department). Gaxie et al's (1998) study compared migrant policies in Saint-Denis, Montreuil, Gennevilliers and Antony. Kastoryano and Crowley (2001) focused on Saint-Denis, Saint-Ouen and Epinay-sur-Seine (Saine-St.-Denis Department) and Clichy (Hauts-de-Seine Department).
summarises local policies toward migrants in the remaining policy domains. Section 6 reviews the new migrant policy since 2001. Section 7 summarises and analyses the overall development of Parisian policies, in terms of change and continuity in host-stranger relations, i.e. municipal attitudes toward migrants.

2. The national context

2.1 Host-stranger relations in France

Host-stranger relations in France are shaped by the predominance of the French republican ideology, which is universalistic and individualistic (Schnapper 1994). The French model of integration assumes that this is an individual process for the newcomer, formalised through the acquisition of citizenship. In integrating, the immigrant is expected to conform to host society norms, which in turn are universalistic, i.e. all citizens should be treated equally regardless of their ethnic origin, religion, etc. Where affirmative action is applied (in the name of equalising opportunities), it is done according to socio-economic criteria. In the republican model there is a strict distinction between the recognition of diversity at the individual and communal level: cultural and especially religious differences should be confined to the private sphere and their expression in the public sphere is frowned upon, if not actually prohibited. The 1989 ‘affaire des foulards’ (regarding the right of Muslim schoolgirls to wear headscarves in school) pointed out the continued salience of the republican model, as well as increased criticism of it in French society.

The acquisition of French nationality, however, is not a strictly formalistic matter (i.e. naturalisation suffices to make a “foreigner” into a “Frenchman”), since the notion of French nationhood (how the host society defines itself) is a balance between the principle of territoriality and the principle of ancestry (ius soli and ius sanguinis). The question of “what it is to be French” has acquired salience since the 1980s following the settlement of non-European and especially Muslim labour migrants. It was (and continues to be) raised by the political Right led by Le Pen, which questions the allegiance of Franco-Maghrebins to the French state, and has been hotly debated since, with a number of changes made in the French nationality law (Wihol de Wenden 1998).

Although the republican model of integration is in practice no longer as powerful as a structural framework for policymaking, it still "retains powerful ideological significance" (Kastoryano and Crowley 2001: 179). This means that the official perception of host-stranger relations in France is different, from e.g. that in the UK, the Netherlands or Belgium, in that the ethnic dimension is either absent (in official discourse e.g. on social exclusion) or hidden within socio-economic and territorial codewords (“marginalised youth” or simply jeunes, banlieues, etc.) (Geisser 1997, Simon 2002, Hargreaves 1996, Body-Gendrot 2001). Thus, the French institutional context does not recognize “ethnic minorities” and distinguishes only between French citizens by birth or naturalisation (français) and non-French citizens (étrangers, i.e. foreigners). Ethnic minorities do not appear as a
statistical category (they are also largely absent from the French academic discourse). Instead, census figures distinguish between “français”⁶ “Français par acquisition” and “étranger”⁷ (the latter referring to “persons declaring a nationality other than French”) (INSEE 1999). Thus second-generation migrants (included in this book within the term “ethnic minorities”) are often hidden in terms of French statistics, research and espoused policies.⁸

Unofficially, of course, ethnic categories exist in everyday use. Etranger and immigré are often used interchangeably and refer to people of foreign origin without necessarily excluding those with French citizenship. Deuxième génération is commonly used (e.g. in the media) for people born in France of migrant parents. In street language the informal usage of beur and black is more common.⁹ Finally, politicians of the extreme right in France have used the ethnic dimension openly (and to great advantage) in the past two decades, as have some migrant/minority groups themselves (Mamadouh 2002).

Despite the supremacy of the republican model in official discourse, immigration and the integration of minorities have become important political issues since 1974, and especially since the early 1980s (below). According to Catherine Rhein, ethnic divisions have come to replace class-based divisions as the main factor in French host-stranger relations. Previously, class served as the dominant cleavage in French society, and probably contributed to inter-ethnic unity as new migrants were absorbed into the working class. As the proportion of foreigners increased among blue-collar workers in France (while the French working class steadily diminished), a large and growing gap developed between French and foreign workers. Thus, the ideological construct of the “unified working class” has been replaced by the ethnically-based construct of the immigré. But immigré does not designate all foreign workers, only the unskilled. It is thus linked in the eyes of the host society to certain populations, e.g. blacks and Arabs but not Americans or Japanese (Rhein 1998b: 53).

In the early 1980s France was shocked by a series of urban disorders originating in the suburban public housing estates (HLMs - habitats à loyer modéré) on the outskirts of several cities. Over the next 15 years, occasional displays of car-burning and looting, attacks on social workers and clashes with police have created an image in the public eye linking the banlieues with a breakdown of social

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⁵ Naturalisation procedures are relatively easy in France (after 5 years of legal residency).
⁶ Children born in France of foreign parents gain French citizenship upon adulthood and are defined as “français” (INSEE 1999).
⁷ Mazzella (1996: 6) notes that the French term étranger encompasses three distinct English terms: “that who is not from here (stranger), the non-naturalised (alien) and the unknown or non-national (foreigner)”.
⁸ In 1990 the national statistics institute (INSEE) added immigré as an operational term, defined as “persons born abroad with non-French nationality at birth”? Immigré appears in national-level analyses but not in the census, which is based on self-declaration according to one of the three official terms noted above (Simon 2002). This means that most but not all étrangers are immigrés, and most but not all immigrés are étrangers. The 1999 census recorded 4,310,000 “immigrants” in France, of which 36% have French citizenship, compared with 3,260,00 étrangers, of which 510,000 were born in France (INSEE 1999). For our purposes, between these two overlapping categories, immigré corresponds more closely to our term "migrant/minority", since it includes French citizens of foreign birth. However this excludes some of the second generation, and in any case does not appear in the Paris statistics which are based on the census.
⁹ Beur is the reverse slang (known as verlan) term referring to youth of Arab origin. Black has become common in recent years referring to all migrants/minorities of sub-Saharan African origin.

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order. In official public discourse this was described as a reaction of marginalized youth in the HLMs to their economic, social and physical exclusion. However, the *crise des banlieues* was from the start closely linked to the apparent failure to integrate ethnic minorities in France, and in general, a questioning of the universalist model of integration. This coincided with a rising awareness in France of the saliency of ethnicity, and a public debate on the meaning of French national identity (Geisser 1997).

The *crise des banlieues* was perceived as signalling the breakdown of the French model of integration (Body-Gendrot 2001, Moore 2001, Simon 2002). At the same time, increasing awareness among second-generation migrants, manifested in ethnically-based mobilisation (the *beur* marches of 1983, ethnically-based local politicians) added to the new public discourse on host-stranger relations (i.e. French identity) "within which multicultural concerns have moved from the margins to the mainstream" (Kastoryano and Crowley 2001: 194). Some welcomed these manifestations of ethnicity as a chance for France to move away from the dominance of an unrealistic republican ideology, as they saw it, in an increasingly multi-cultural France. Others see these "*nouvelles ethnieités*" (Geisser 1997) as a threat to the French social model, which is based on equality and the rejection of communitarianism. While these debates occur largely at the national level (in national media and politics), they are contextualised by incidents at the local level, from the headscarf affair to local Islamic associational activity. Thus, the local and the national have become inextricably intertwined in French host-stranger relations, and urban policies have become the main instrument in national immigrant policy.

2.2 National immigration/integration policies

France has traditionally been a country of immigration from neighbouring countries, and since the colonial period, from the French colonies. In the postwar period France was characterised by a laissez-faire Guestworker policy that allowed easy entry in order to meet labour shortages. This resulted in massive immigration, especially from Algeria and Portugal (below). This ended in 1974 with the first energy crisis, but family reunification only increased as a result of restrictions on labour immigration. As the massive settlement of labour migrants came to be seen as a threat to social cohesion, the government adopted a 'double strategy' (soon adopted by many western European countries), of increasingly strict controls on entry together with a policy to integrate the newcomers already legally resident in the country (Brochmann 1998).

Since 1983 the right-wing Front Nationale has translated (and enlarged) anti-immigrant feelings into political success, becoming the leading force in French politics on the issue of immigration and integration. French immigration policy has largely developed in response to this, with successive governments on both right and left offering stricter immigration policies (1989 law of entry and residence, reform of the nationality code in 1993, the Pasqua law of 1993). But as Wihtol de Wenden (1998) points out, various internal and external restraints (the French constitution, European laws and bilateral treaties) have limited the extent to which France can restrict immigration.
As noted above, stricter immigration policy has gone side-by-side with new attempts to integrate the migrants in the country, many of them French nationals. Here the (sub)urban and local dimension in national immigrant policy has been pivotal. In response to the urban crisis, the new (1981) government under President Mitterrand created a number of national frameworks and forums to formulate, in effect, a national integration policy. This evolved over time into a national urban policy that came to be known as the Politique de la ville. The new paradigm through which urban problems came to be defined and addressed was that of territorially-based social and economic “exclusion” rather than racial or ethnic relations (Kastoryano and Crowley 2001). The Politique de la ville aimed to increase the economic, political and social participation of residents of specified areas, as the long-term solution to socio-economic exclusion. This served as the national framework for (largely implicit) migrant policy in the 1980s-90s (see section 4.5, below).

The decentralisation of policy that was begun in the 1980s placed responsibility on local authorities for promoting participation (the antidote to exclusion). This resulted in a large variety of pragmatic migrant policies initiated by local authorities and supported by national-level funding, which aimed at incorporating disaffected populations (Geisser 1997). While many of these policies displayed a pragmatic sensitivity to the ethnic dimension of exclusion (social, economic and spatial), the republican ideology still demanded that the problematique be addressed within an ethnically neutral discourse (Kastoryano and Crowley 2001). Nevertheless, although they were usually espoused in the universalist terminology of the national frameworks (e.g. the Politique de la ville), local policies in a growing number of cities targeted immigrants and ethnic minorities, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly (Mazzella 1996, Geisser 1997, Gaxie et al. 1998, Moore 2001). The ethnicisation of local policies has not been a consistent trend, and depends in large part on the local political context (which in turn expresses local host-stranger relations, among other factors). In the case of Paris, as we will see, the local authority did not follow this trend, at least until recently.

2.3 The Algerian context

The exceptional context of the Algerian immigration and its impact on local policies in Paris deserves special attention for two reasons. Not only is this probably the largest ethnic minority in Paris (it is the second-largest contingent of foreign residents in the city), but the traumatic events of the Algerian War – including the bloodletting on the streets of Paris -- remain an important undercurrent in French society. In 1946 Algeria was annexed to France, permitting free movement between the metropole and its “overseas department”. In terms of civil status, the “français

\[\text{10} \quad \text{In 1981 a Commission Nationale de Developpement Sociale des Quarters (headed by Grenoble mayor Dubedout) was established and formulated a national strategy of devolving integration policies to the local level. In 1983 the Zones d'Education Prioritaires (ZEPs) policy was created. In 1992, again in response to violent local incidents, a Minister for the Cities was appointed.}
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\[\text{11} \quad \text{This taboo was partially broken in 1995 by the Tribala Report.}
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\[\text{12} \quad \text{This sub-section is based largely on Peggy Derder's book (2001) L'immigration algerienne et les pouvoirs publics dans le departement de la Seine, 1954-1962.}
\]
As a result of a national recruitment policy, Algerians became the largest immigrant group during the 1950s. By the mid-1950s there were 50,000 Algerians living in Paris, presenting all the characteristics of a guestworker population, composed largely of young single men with no determinate plans for settlement. Many were seasonal guestworkers who moved freely between Paris and their towns and villages in Algeria.

The relationship between the French host society and the Algerian immigrants was characterised by a deep mutual misunderstanding based on differences in culture and religion. According to Derder (2001: 42), the Algerian community in Paris lived in “veritable social and spatial segregation.” The spill-over of the Algerian war (1954-1962) onto the streets of Paris reinforced this segregation (Box 8.1).

### Box 8.1 Policies toward Algerians in Paris: the "second front"

Between 1958 and 1962 the allegiance of the Algerian guestworker community in Paris was treated by both the French authorities and the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale as a second front in the war. The “second front” was fought in Paris not only through propaganda but in violent confrontations with hundreds of casualties between Algerians loyal to the FLN or the French authorities in the neighbourhoods and bidonvilles in the city. In October 1961, Parisian police commissioner Maurice Papon led a repression of an FLN demonstration ending in numerous casualties; in February 1962 a demonstration by Parisians against the OAS (the French settler forces opposing Algerian independence) resulted in eight deaths at the Charonne metro station.

In response to the FLN’s (largely successful) strategy of imposing separate social structures on the migrant community, the French government developed a strategy aimed at winning over the Algerian migrants by incorporating them into the state welfare system. In the Department of the Seine (Paris and surrounding suburbs) a whole network of social services was set up for the Algerian population, staffed by specially trained personnel often themselves of Maghreb background. The services were provided through hostels, a “reception and information centre” and through a network of “conseillers sociaux” who worked the Algerian neighborhoods.

In 1958-59 two state agencies were established to administer the policies. The FAS (Fonds d’action sociale pour les travailleurs musulmans d’Algerie et leurs familles en métropole) began to coordinate all state actions through centralized budgeting. SONACOTRAL (Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs d’origine d’Algerie) was to coordinate housing policy for this population. Renamed Fasild and SONACOTRA, these agencies would play a key role in future policies affecting all migrants (not just Algerians) in the following years.

**Sources:** Derder 2001: *L’Histoire* Dossier Special April 1999.

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13 A 1947 statute accorded citizenship to Muslim Algerians living in the metropole (i.e. France). Algerian immigrants did not have to pass through the National Office of Immigration but could move freely between Algeria and metropolitan France. As citizens, Algerian migrants had full access to services, but it was acknowledged that deep discrimination and cultural differences prevented any real integration (Derder 2001: 87).
Derde has concluded (p. 129) that the social action policy toward Algerian migrants in the Paris area was part of a state policy (administered through the departmental police prefecture), to repress Algerian separatism. After Algeria’s independence this network of social support structures was slowly dismantled, however several vestiges remained. FASild and SONACOTRA evolved into organizations through which the state coordinates its actions in social policy and housing policy toward migrants, respectively. The FAS now serves as the primary source of budgeting for state integration policies applied at the local level.

It is reasonable to assume that there is a link between the “fear and hostility” (ibid: 46) characterising host-stranger relations between the French and the Algerian migrants of that period, and widespread negative attitudes in French society today, toward migrants in general and Muslim, Maghrebian migrants/minorities in particular. These are on the rise since the early 1980s and are implicitly linked in the minds of many indigenous French with the “troubles” in the public housing estates, as noted above (Rhein 1998b, Hargreaves 1996).

The battle over the identity of the Algerian migrants during the late 1950s-early 1960s is echoed in later policies designed to combat what is officially termed as “exclusion” and popularly considered the problem of allegiance of Muslim migrants living in France. The latter has resurfaced following the headscarves affair in 1989, the Gulf War in 1991 and terrorist acts in Paris in 1986 and 1995. According to Wihtol de Wenden (1998: 107), “Maghrebians and their sons (mainly Algerians) are fulfilling a need in security terms for a new enemy in Western Europe” and this is particularly acute in France. Policies toward migrants in Paris in the past two decades should be seen on this background.

3. The local context

3.1 A brief history of immigration to Paris

From the 19th century onwards France became the premier country of immigration in Europe due to its constant demographic deficit and labour shortages, with Paris as the primary magnet (Figure 8.1). Immigration to Paris shaped the demography and geography of the city, fitting into existing socio-economic cleavages and reinforcing them with an ethnic character. The first large-scale labour migration to Paris was from the French provinces, contributing to the rapid increase of the city’s population. In the first half of the 19th century the population of Paris doubled from 500,000 to one million inhabitants by 1844. In 1901 provincials already represented over half of the Paris population. Their massive arrival created conditions in Paris similar to those of third world cities today: slums, urban poverty, disease, social unrest. In the eyes of the ruling elites, the provincials

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14 Thus, local offices set up by the Prefecture of the Department of the Seine provided some of the social services noted above, while also conducting surveillance on the Algerian community (78,251 files!), conducting a local propaganda war with the FLN and administering detention centres.
were clearly Outsiders threatening the established order. Indeed, the fear of the provincial-turned-urban proletariat, of a “floating and unemployed population” had already existed on the eve of the French Revolution.\(^\text{15}\)

**Figure 8.1** Immigration to France, Ile-de-France and Paris, 1861-1990

![Graph showing immigration to France, Ile-de-France, and Paris from 1861 to 1990.](image)

**Figure 8.2** Foreign resident (étranger) population in Paris, 1954-1999

![Bar chart showing foreign resident population in Paris from 1954 to 1999.](image)


**Figure 8.2** Foreign resident (étranger) population in Paris, 1954-1999


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\(^{15}\) “À la veille de la Révolution, il existe une véritable peur sociale des Parisiens face à cette population flottante et sans emploi” (Fierro, A. 1996 *Histoire et dictionnaire de Paris*, Lafont, cited in Pinçon 2001: 42).
In the twentieth century the number of foreign (non-French) residents in Paris almost doubled, from 180,000 in 1891 to 308,000 in 1999. From the late 19th century onwards, immigrants from other European countries began arriving in Paris in large numbers. Belgians, Poles, Germans, Dutch, Spanish and Italian immigrants swelled the city's population to 2.9 million by 1911. During the interwar period, they were supplemented by refugees from Spain, Armenia and Russia.

Postwar migration (1950s to early 1970s) was dominated by guestworker and post-colonial migrants, who arrived in unprecedented numbers (Figure 8.2). The demand for foreign labour, together with decolonisation, resulted in increased migration from Southern Europe as well as the first massive arrival of non-Europeans. This had tremendous repercussions for Paris, as already noted above. By 1954 there were nearly 100,000 Algerians in the Department of the Seine, half of them in Paris. During the 1960s recruitment of foreign labourers by the car industry resulted in the arrival of over 700,000 Portuguese in France, who replaced the Algerians as Paris' largest foreign community. During the 1950s-60s Paris's migrant population displayed typical guestworker characteristics: predominantly single male adults intent on saving their earnings and returning home. However, signs of family reunification were already visible in the 1960s.

After 1974, following the government decision to restrict immigration, family reunification increased and from the mid-70s the migrant population lost its guestworker characteristics in terms of gender and age distribution, as well as intermarriage. By 1990 labour migrants and their families from Portugal, Algeria and Morocco accounted for half of all the foreigners in the Paris region. From the mid-1970s economic migrants and refugees also came increasingly from sub-Saharan Africa and southeast Asia. The 1990s were characterised by migration from Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Far East. Currently, China is the single largest source of migration to the Paris region (Musterd et al.1998, Kastoryano and Crowley 1999).

Altogether, the proportion of foreign residents in Paris more than tripled between 1954 (4.8%) and 1982 (16.6%). Thereafter it dropped to 15.8% in 1990 and 15.4% in 1999, in part as a result of gentrification (see below) (INSEE 1999).

It is important to note that these figures refer to registered foreign residents and ignore the growing number of ethnic minorities with French citizenship, as discussed in the following subsection. They also do not take into account irregular immigrants, estimated at several tens of thousands in Paris, nor the transient strangers: tourists and business people. While the latter only "pass through" the city, their presence approaches 100,000 on peak days (Ambroise-Rendu 1987: 95). Ambroise-Rendu estimates that altogether "over a quarter of the people found in the capital are foreigners" (ibid).

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16 Paris’s population peaked in 1921 at three million and has decreased steadily since then. The population decrease has been especially strong over the past half century. Between 1954 and 1999 the population dropped from 2.85 million to 2.13 million, losing a quarter of its inhabitants due to suburbanisation (Pinçon 2001).
3.2 Characterising today’s foreign resident population

In 1999 the official number of foreign residents in Paris was 308,266 (14.5% of the city population), and another 156,398 (7.36%) were “French by acquisition”. Together this amounts to nearly 465,000 residents of foreign origin or almost 22% of the population (INSEE 1999). However this figure does not take into account migrants’ children who declared themselves “French by birth” in the census, i.e. it excludes a significant part of the second generation ethnic minority population. Considering the definitional problems noted in section 2.1, we can only roughly estimate the total size of Paris’s migrant/minority population. Following calculations made at the national level by Tribalat (1991), we can add the estimated size of this “hidden second generation” to the official census figures above, arriving at a figure of some 872,000 residents of ethnic origin (first or second-generation migrants). This is equal to 41% of the city population. Although these are estimates, they show that the proportion of migrants/minorities in Paris is comparable to that of other “veteran immigration” cities in Europe, such as Amsterdam.

The ethnic breakdown presented below should be treated with caution, as it relates only to the 308,000 foreign residents, representing less than half of the estimated migrant/minority population in Paris (Figures 8.3a-b). By country of origin, the largest foreign contingents are Portuguese (38,455), Algerians (33,586), Moroccans (23,195), Tunisians (18,092), Spanish (15,620) and Chinese (15,215). Of the non-EU foreign residents over half originate from the African continent (75,000 from the Maghreb, 41,000 from sub-Saharan Africa), 58,000 foreign residents originate in Asia. Another 20,000 originate from the Americas. Altogether, nearly 217,000 foreigners are non-EU nationals, representing 70% of the foreign population and 10% of the city population (Allal 2002, INSEE 1999).

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17 Tribalat used census figures to estimate the population of migrant children based on fertility rates. She estimated around 85% of the children of migrants born in France appear in the statistics as “French”. Deriving from her calculations we can estimate a statistical relationship between the first and second generation of immigrants in France. Applying this to the census figures for Paris, we arrive at a figure of 484,634 second-generation residents (as opposed to the number of “second generation” residents derived directly from the census i.e. all those born in France who declared themselves as non-French, just under 77,000) (INSEE 1999, Table 2 bis). The figure for first generation immigrants (“born abroad” but excluding those born as French nationals, e.g. the “pieds noirs” from Algeria) is 387,707. Together, the first and second-generation migrants equal 872,341 persons. I thank Patrick Simon for assisting me in calculating these estimates.

18 In descending order they come from China, the Indian subcontinent, southeast Asia, Japan and Turkey.
Figure 8.3 Foreign resident population in Paris, by country of origin, 1999
8.3a Percentages

Source: INSEE 1999, Recensement de la population de 1999, p. 9, Table 2.
In terms of socio-economic status, we can roughly divide the migrant/minority population in Paris into two or three types. The first includes foreign residents in the highly skilled category, i.e. those attached to various branches of foreign companies, embassies, etc. who reside in the *beaux quartiers* (especially the 16th arrondissement). The majority are from OECD countries. The second type are migrants/minorities of guestworker and postcolonial origin who reside in the working class neighbourhoods, mostly in eastern Paris. A third category might include labour migrants from EU countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal) who tended to follow a home-ownership strategy as they became upwardly mobile, joining the *petit bourgeoise* (see below) The residential distribution of the migrant population in Paris expresses patterns of socio-economic differentiation that were established over a century earlier, as described below.

3.3 Settlement patterns of postwar migrants/minorities in Paris

Provincial and European immigration over the 19th and early 20th century created the socio-economic and geographic context in which the post-war migrants settled. By the end of the Second World War the east/west, working class/bourgeois division of Paris was already established (Rhein 1998a: 440): the middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods (*beaux quartiers*) were located on the Right Bank, especially in the northwestern districts. On the Left Bank, a large working class (formed largely by previous migrations) was densely housed in the *quartiers populaires* that formed a giant crescent across eastern Paris. This included the eastern half of the 17th district and much of the 18, 19 and 20th districts, encompassing the eastern *faubourgs*, with neighbourhoods such as the Goutte d’Or already established as migrant strongholds. Toubon and Messamah (1990: 43) dub this Paris’s “croissant populaire” (Map 8.2).

Postwar migrants arrived settled into, and became a part of, this socio-economic geography. During the 1950s-1960s Paris suffered an acute housing shortage, as the private housing stock could not accommodate the massive influx of newcomers. Some of the postwar migrants found accommodation in hotels and flats in cheap, dilapidated housing in the working class quarters of central and eastern Paris. A few were housed in half a dozen *foyers* (worker hostels) provided by the government. The rest improvised their own lodgings, resulting in the growth of informal shantytowns (*bidonvilles*) “under the tolerant eye or indifference of the municipality” (Derder 2001: 39). *Bidonvilles* were accelerated by the beginnings of family reunification among the more veteran Algerian migrants, as hotel rooms and hostels could not meet the needs of the families (ibid).

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14 In metropolitan Paris these account for only 10% of the active foreign residents, but in the city of Paris their proportion must be considerably higher (Rhein 1998b).
Map 8.2: The "croissant populaire": working class quarters in east Paris, 1990

Source INSEE, Recensement de la population de 1990.


Source: INSEE, Recensement de la population de 1982 et 1990.
Gradually, a succession process occurred in the workers neighbourhoods, with migrants moving into cheap housing vacated by working-class and lower-middle class residents who moved to newly constructed social housing, much of it outside Paris. From the 1960s onward, Paris underwent increasing gentrification and socio-economic polarisation. According to Rhein (1998a: 445-6), a double process of polarisation (economic and ethnic) has taken place in the Paris metropolitan area, with an increasing concentration of foreigners in the working-class suburbs accompanied by their decreasing presence in the middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods inside Paris (and its wealthy suburbs) (Map 8.3). Those who remain are increasingly restricted in their housing choice, as socio-economic segregation becomes stronger. This is partly due to market processes that create socio-economic polarisation characterising all global cities but has specifically Parisian features as well (see below) (Rhein 1998b, Body-Gendrot 1996, Carpenter et al. 1994).

The result of the gentrification of Paris has been a drop since the 1980s in the "foreign resident" population of Paris, as noted above. In particular, the number of non-EU foreigners has declined since 1990 in all but one of the Paris districts (Allal 2002). Within Paris, certain migrant populations are increasingly concentrated in certain neighbourhoods and in particular housing stocks. Simon (2002) notes a double pattern of mobility from the 1970s onward. While many upwardly mobile migrants (mainly Portuguese, Spanish and Asians) adopted an owner-occupation strategy and gradually moved into middle-class housing areas, other migrants moved into the social housing sector and tried to upgrade their position as better social housing became available. Over time, filtering processes applied by the housing corporations led to the concentration of certain migrant populations (typically Maghrebian and Africans) in the lower rungs of the social housing stock and in specific neighbourhoods, mostly in the east of the city. As a result Turks, Algerians and Moroccans are increasingly concentrated in the lower rungs of social housing projects, while African migrants “tend to cluster in the old central neighbourhoods and in renovated or recently-built areas, living in disused apartment buildings which have not yet been renovated” (ibid).

In short, during the past two decades when Paris experienced intensive gentrification, the foreign population in the Paris agglomeration has shifted from the city to the suburbs, and within Paris from the central to the peripheral eastern districts. Today the highest proportion of non-EU residents (over 20% of the population) are found in the 10th, 18th and 19th districts, followed by the 3rd, 11th districts.

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20 Nowadays, a third of the migrants in the Paris region first settle in the city of Paris, before moving to cities around the capital, notably in the Seine-St. Denis department.

21 As some migrants improved their economic situation they began competing with the working class for housing, including the newly built social housing. At the same time, the suburbanisation of the indigenous working-class and lower-middle-class population softened the effects of this competition (Simon 2002).

22 While the foreign population in Paris increased between 1954 and 1990 by 152.7%, the average rate of increase was only 50.3% in the inner arrondissements (1st-9th), plus the wealthy 16th and 17th, compared to 268.5% in the outer arrondissements. This trend strengthened over the past decade: between 1982-1999 the foreign population declined in most of the inner arrondissements but still increased slightly in the 10th, 11th and 18th arrondissements, all in the east (Pinçon 2001: 44 citing INSEE). The decline is greater regarding the foreign population of non-EU origin.
and 20th districts, i.e. the north-east of Paris (Maps 8.4a-d). In 1999 the average percentage of foreign residents per district (arrondissement) was 15.8%, with some districts having a little over 10%, while several districts in the east and centre of Paris have around 25% per district. In some quartiers (typically old industrial zones or old decaying neighbourhoods) the foreign presence reaches up to 30% (Poinsot 2000). But in contrast to some of the banlieues, the dense urban structure of the capital means that there is almost no quarter in Paris with a majority of minorities or with just one ethnic minority (Body-Gendrot 2000: 185). Nevertheless, some quarters have a distinctly “ethnic character”, including the Goutte d’Or (20th), Belleville (11th) and Paris’s “Chinatown” around the Place d’Italie (13th).

In sum, the social geography of metropolitan Paris (city and suburbs) reflects traditional socio-economic divisions, “the strength of former class struggles” (Rhein 1998b: 22). From the mid-1970s, as family reunification became predominant and the labour migrants emerged from the bidonvilles, while renovation policies, upward mobility and gentrification resulted in the suburbanisation of the French working classes, Paris’s quartiers populaires became increasingly identified as quartiers d’immigration.

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23 According to the 1999 census, non-EU foreigners make up over 14% of the resident population in three north-eastern arrondissements (10th, 18th and 19th) and a little under 12% in the 3rd, 11th and 20th wards, also in the east. In absolute numbers, the 18th, 19th and 20th districts contain 22,000 to 28,000 foreign residents each, followed by the 11th (18,000) and the 10th, 13th and 15th with 15,000 each.

24 Each arrondissement is divided into four quartiers.

25 See Box 9.2 in Chapter 9.
Maps 8.4a-d Distribution of the foreign resident population in Paris*, 1975 - 1999

(a) 1975

(b) 1982

(c) 1990

(d) 1999

étrangers as % of the total population


3.4 Local host-stranger relations

In large part, Paris has avoided sharp ethnic conflict by exporting its migrant population to the banlieues. Historically, the capital has not experienced conflict between different ethnic groups or between migrants and veteran Parisians (Body-Gendrot 1996). This may also have to do with the city’s dense urban structure, which does not permit the kind of physical isolation, coupled with ethnic segregation, characterising the suburban housing estates. On a level of daily interaction, even the most “ethnic” neighbourhoods of Paris do not come close to the conditions of exclusion and isolation that engendered the cycle of violent expression and repression that characterised the northern quarters of Marseilles, the suburbs of Lyon and the public housing estates of La Courneuve.

However, although Paris itself did not experience the disturbances of the banlieues, it was not isolated from what occurred just “outside the city walls”. For example, the violent reactions of migrant residents in 1983 and again in 1988 that occurred in La Courneuve, northeast of Paris, each time following the violent deaths of beur immigrant residents in the hands of French residents or police. Equally disconcerting was the rise of the Front Nationale in the Seine-St.-Denis department, to 17-18 percent of the vote in the 1980s (Ireland 1994: 118-121). Clearly the connection between ethnic segregation, the threat of “ghetto formation” and the potential for disorder was made by the Parisian public and policymakers. To bring home the point, the national beur marches that originated in the provincial cities and passed through Paris’s banlieues ended on the streets of the capital.

Also since the 1980s-90s, the gentrification of some migrant neighbourhoods such as Belleville has resulted in the cohabitation of new middle-class residents with veteran residents of lower classes and migrant origin. This has raised the issue of host-stranger relations, this time in terms of “cohabitation” at the level of the residential block, on the street and in public spaces. But who is now the insider, who is the outsider? The issue of mixité sociale (social diversity) in the areas undergoing gentrification, although not as extreme as in the suburban housing estates, has again come up on the policy agenda and the public discourse (Fijalkow and Oberti 2001: 18-19). Again, the ethnic differences within this “diversity” are not explicitly named but are clearly there.

3.5 Institutional and political context

Historically, the relationship between Paris and the central authority in France has been a contentious (and bloody) one. Under the ancien régime, French central authority (embodied by the king and his administration) mistrusted and feared the Parisian populace -- and with good reason.26 The rise -- but mostly the fall -- of regimes in France is linked in the collective memory to events that occurred in specific Parisian squares, street corners, buildings and bridges.27 The uprisings of 1789,

26 Moving the government outside of Paris did not always save it from the foule, as Louis XVI discovered (in contrast, the Tiers government survived the revolution of 1871 thanks to its move to Versailles).
27 Noteworthy among the buildings figuring in this history is the City Hall itself (see Chapter 5, Box 5.1).
1848 and 1870 were all specifically Parisian events, led by local leaders and backed by the Parisian mob, la foule. As the demonstrations of 1968 showed again, the streets of Paris remain a legitimate arena for bringing about political change. The succession of these events weighs heavily on relations between the city of Paris and the State, for what occurs on the streets of the capital can directly threaten the stability of central government.

The French state has traditionally responded by keeping a tight hold of the running of its capital city and the government's meddling in mundane local matters in Paris continues to this day. City-State relations are also influenced by partisan politics. During most of the post-war period municipal and central authority were in the hands of competing parties. Thus, President De Gaulle feared that a directly-elected mayor would use Paris as a base of power in a bid to become President. The political/institutional space for local policy in Paris is thus very narrow, even by French standards.

France is a highly centralized country in which municipalities (communes) have traditionally served as local administrative units of the State, rather than as autonomous political units. Paris was given special status in 1884 by which it was ruled directly by the government through the Prefect of the Seine Department, and after 1964, through the Prefect of Paris. The Prefect served in the role of mayor, presiding over the city council. Usually, the prefect of Paris balanced his roles as governmental representative and as appointed mayor of Paris, taking into consideration the opinions of the council majority (Nivet 1992). This tutelage arrangement lasted until 1977, when for the first time the mayor was elected through the city council (see below).

The above discussion means that we must define 'local policy' in Paris differently for different periods. The beginnings of local urban policy can be traced to the Third and Fourth republics (1871-1958). This 80-year period between Haussmann and De Gaulle has been described as "a local parenthesis" in which council-led policymaking increasingly replaced state policy in Parisian affairs (interview J-C. Toubon). During the Fourth Republic (1947-58), the national government adopted a decidedly anti-Parisian policy, which meant less meddling in Parisian affairs but severely limited the resources available to the local council. Between 1958-1968 the state was heavily involved in local matters, and local policies were formulated largely within the departmental bureaucracy headed by the Prefect (Lacaze 1994). From the 1970s onward decentralisation in France gradually shifted power back to the local authorities. After 1964 Paris's council functioned as both a municipal and departmental council when the huge Seine-St. Denis department was divided into four new departments (Department 75: the City of Paris, and Departments 92, 93, 94: the inner suburbs). In sum, 'local policy' in Paris prior to 1977 can be defined as those actions decided upon by the city council as well as prefectural policy when the council had significant influence.

28 That is just what Mayor Chirac did to President Mitterrand.
29 France is divided into 22 regions which are subdivided into 100 départements. The prefect is the Minister of Interior's representative at departmental level. In the case of the capital, the Prefect of Paris is appointed directly by the President, with a separate Prefect of Police responsible for security matters.
Since 1977 Paris is governed by the city council presided by the mayor. Councillors are elected every seven years, from party lists, by city districts (arrondissements). The elected councillors heading the main lists in each district also serve as city councillors, and elect the city’s mayor in their first session. Since the party lists of the districts are effectively decided by the mayoral candidates before the election, this means that the elected mayor always presides over a majority in city council and the districts. Paris’s twenty districts are primarily responsible for some local services but have little power. While the district mayors can influence the degree of policy implementation in their area, they have little influence in overall municipal policymaking. The majority of district mayors come from the mayor’s list. In short, local policy in Paris since 1977 is effectively mayoral policy.

Traditionally, the Centre-Right parties have held the majority in Paris’s city council, with the Left in opposition. In 1977 Jacques Chirac (RPR) was elected mayor and ruled with an overwhelming majority until 1995, when he successfully ran for president of the Republic. Chirac’s 18-year reign effectively neutralized the influence of city council even as a forum for debate. 30 Chirac’s protégé, Jean Tiberi, was mayor from 1995 to 2001, but during his term the Left controlled six districts, reviving to some extent the opposition in city council. Significantly, these districts (4th, 10th, 11th, 18th, 19th, 20th) were located in the ‘eastern crescent’ of Paris, which was the target of Chirac’s gentrification policies and contained large migrant/ minority populations.

In 2001 the Left came to power in Paris for the first time, with thirteen of the districts now headed by Socialist/Green candidates. The new mayor, Bertrand Delanoë (Socialists) heads a coalition in city council including the Socialists, Greens, Left Radicals, Communists, and Citizens’ Movement. 31 This Left-Green administration was elected on a platform calling for change in Paris, including in local policies toward migrants.

4. Urban policy in Paris – 150 years of distancing the Other

To find local migrant policy in Paris we must look within general policies that have had a significant impact on the migrant population, and where the City of Paris has had significant influence. In France, the policy response to immigrant settlement has mostly been expressed in housing policies (Ireland 1994: 41) or more broadly in territorially-defined urban development policies, i.e. in the Spatial domain. To demonstrate the emergence of a specifically local (rather than national) urban policy in Paris, this section will trace the history of urban renovation in the capital from the mid-19th century to the present Politique de la ville. This 150-year period demonstrates the continuity – despite changes in regimes and shifting local-national relations, of an urban policy in

30 Chirac ruled for three consecutive terms using the centre-right RPR party (Reunion pour la Republique) which he created and dominated. In the 1977 municipal elections RPR candidates won a large majority of the districts, and in 1983 and 1989 Chirac’s candidates took all twenty of the districts, assuring him an absolute majority in city council. Chirac extended the Right’s domination of Paris, enjoying the support not only of ex-Gaulists but also of many residents who voted with the Left in national elections (interview M. Ambroise-Rendu).

31 Paris has become the most important base of the Left in France, following the sweeping victory of Chirac and his UMP party in the 2002 presidential and legislative elections.
Paris characterised by the deliberate distancing of threatening Others. These were first explicitly labelled as the poor or working classes, but the role of threatening Other was also associated with migrants and ethnic minorities. Although there is some debate regarding the intentions of the policymakers over the years, the results are clear and continuous: a progressive distancing of the working class, migrants and other 'undesirable elements' from the city centre to outlying neighbourhoods (faubourgs) and eventually beyond the city walls (the banlieues beyond the périphérique highway). The sub-sections below summarise this development over the main phases of urban policy in Paris.

4.1 The foundations of urban policy in Paris: Haussmannian renovation, 1853-1870

The widescale urban development carried out by Baron Haussmann, Prefect of the Seine (1853 to 1869) under Napoleon III, laid the foundations for later urban policy in Paris. The aim of this policy was the deliberate gentrification of the city through urban renovation. This renovation entailed the massive destruction of poor, overcrowded neighbourhoods that were vestiges of medieval Paris, and their reconstruction as modern residential quarters. This involved the massive transfer of poor residents (many of them provincial migrants) from the central neighbourhoods to the outer faubourgs, the outlying towns and villages incorporated into Paris in 1860. In their place were built the famous Haussmannian avenues and apartment blocks, embodying in their order and respectability "the triumph of the rental bourgeoisie" (Lacaze 1994: 77).

Behind this unprecedented renovation policy was an explicit agenda and an implicit agenda. The explicit aim was to make Paris -- a city characterised by extreme overcrowding and unsanitary conditions even by mid-19th century standards -- into a healthy, modern capital. Under Haussmann the water and sewage systems were reconstructed, the streets paved with asphalt, building height regulations laid down and public green spaces added. The implicit agenda was to reconquer the city for the bourgeoisie that had deserted the city center and who constituted the political support of the regime. Haussmannian renovation was aimed at the poor populations concentrated in certain quarters which had long troubled the authorities, such as the Cité, Les Halles and Faubourg St. Antoine (the Bastille). With the 1848 uprising just over, the fragile regime of Napoleon III meant to displace, once and for all, unwanted populations from areas too geographically close to the seats of power (Chevallier 1958. Lacaze 1994, Wagenaar 2001). According to Lacaze,

The price [of Haussmannian renovation and modernisation] was paid by the people of Paris, whose exodus toward the periphery was knowingly organised (p. 77-78, my transl).

4.2 Emergence of local urban policy: hygiénisme and renovation, 1870s - 1950s

The implementation of Haussmann's renovation policy was patchy and incomplete. But its double agenda -- combining genuine modernization with distancing of the Other (Chevallier's

32 L. Chevalier's Classes laborieuses, classes dangereuses (1958) is the classic work describing the political and class-related basis of this policy.
“dangerous classes”) -- served as the basis for urban development policies in Paris through much of the following century. In the late 19th and early 20th century Haussmann’s modernization scheme was extended and adopted by a newly independent city council (Fijalkow and Oberti 2001, Cole 1999). The extension of Haussmannian renovation despite the change in regimes is due in part to an ideological continuity, the belief in modernism and hygienity.

The ideology of hygénisme (and its physical expression in urban renovation) emerged in full force at the beginning of the 20th century (Lacaze 1994, Simon 1994). As a basis for urban policy, this was was rooted in the distinctly modernist urge of the late 19th and early 20th century, to quantify, measure and territorialisé social patterns in general, and in particular social deviancy, as defined by the host society: in France by “social hygienists” (e.g. Lefebre), in America by the Chicago School sociologists (Simon 1994: 125). According to the hygienists, the spread of contagious disease was caused by overcrowding, lack of light and air, bad social hygiene habits among the working classes (between 1872 and 1913 Paris’s population jumped from 1.8 million to 2.8 million and tuberculosis became widespread). Disease, poverty and social disfunctions (e.g. the promiscuity of the working classes) were believed to be interrelated and could be localized in specific ilots insalubres, “unhealthy street-blocks requiring demolition” (Carpenter et al 1994: 219, citing Bastié 1984).

In 1894 the city council established the Casier sanitaire des maisons des Paris to locate these unclean pockets overlooked by Haussmann. By 1905 the Casier had identified six ilots with 1600 buildings destined for demolition, by 1918 it had defined seventeen ilots. These blocks were destined for renovation, i.e. demolition and relocation of the local population to new social housing. The planned displacement was massive: nearly 187,000 residents (Lucan 1992).

Local renovation policy was ostensibly based on public health reasons, the criterion being the number of cases of tuberculosis per block. In fact, Fijalkow (1994, 1998) shows that the main criterion for designating an area for renovation was not the state of the buildings or the number of tuberculosis cases, but the character of the resident population, described variously as “dangerous”, “contagious” and “hostile to hygiene”. Thus Ilot 1 (Les Halles) was described as populated by a “floating population”, Ilo 2 (in the Marais quarter) was a Jewish “ghetto”, Ilo 3 on the Left Bank was the centre of Paris’ rag-pickers, another was “a proletariat fortress”, etc. (ibid., Fijalkow and Oberti 2001: 11). According to Simon (1994: 126) the ideology of hygienism was thus used to demarcate the geography of Otherness in Paris and prepare it for disappearance, either by physical displacement or by improvement of the inhabitants in their renovated environment.

Toward this second aim, a municipal office for social housing was established in 1911 and the city became involved in the construction of low-cost public housing. While some of the social housing was built in the renovated blocks, much was built on the eastern outskirts of the city and was

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33 The municipal office of HBM (Habitat a bon marché = Affordable Housing) later evolved into OPAC (Office publique d’aménagement et de construction) which continues today as the municipal arm of social housing policy.
intended to re-house the residents displaced by renovation in the inner quarters. This was meant to supplement the renovation policy, which councillors on the Left began to suspect would eventually deprive Paris of its working classes (their electoral constituency), if they were displaced beyond the municipal borders (Nivet 1992: 297). During the 1920s and 30s, however, the city’s social housing policy became oriented toward lower-middle class rather than working class residents. This led to construction of costlier social housing and reduced the proportion of truly affordable public housing within the city (Fijalkow and Oberti 1994).

Urban policy in Paris thus had a double agenda, of physical and social change, creating Order from disorder. While under Haussmann this was more explicit, in the twentieth century it was hidden within discourses of public hygiene and urban incompatibility (Simon 1994: 128). Thus the labels given to the areas destined for renovation became increasingly more vague, changing from *ilots tuberculeux* to *ilots insalubres* (unhealthy blocks) in the early 20th century to the current “zones for concentrated management” (ZACs, below) (Simon 1994: 124-5, Dumont 1994: 27, Lucan 1992: 76). However, a comparison of the areas destined for renovation in Paris shows a repetitive pattern (Maps 8.5a-c). By 1954, only three *ilots* had been partially destroyed or renovated due to weak economic conditions and the intervening wars. The other renovation areas reappeared in urban development plans of the 1950s-60s-70s as “priority zones for urbanisation”, “renovation sectors” (1967) and finally as ZACs and DSQs (Developpement Sociale des Quartiers). Lacaze (1994: 78) notes how Haussmann’s original aim of renovation and modernisation, with its resultant dispersal of unwanted populations, “would be pursued, patiently and methodically” long after he was gone.

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34 Les Halles and the Beaubourg quarter were renovated in the late 1970s. The Faubourg St. Antoine (just east of the Bastille) was never destroyed, but has finally been conquered through gentrification in the 1990s (Fijalkow & Oberti 2001.)
Maps 8.5a-c Renovation policy in Paris: from îlots insalubres to DSQ, 1908 - 2006

a) 1938 "Avant-projet du plan d'aménagement de Paris": *les îlots insalubres*

Source: Lucan 1992, "Les points noires des îlots insalubres".

b) 1987 "Plan Programme for the East of Paris": renovation/development projects


c) 2000-2006 "Contrat de ville": DSQ (Développement Sociale des Quartiers) areas

In the post-war years questions were raised in city council regarding the extent of renovation policy in Paris. While the modernists favoured renovation (destroying the existing urban fabric and rebuilding), the traditionalists favoured restoration (improvements to existing buildings defined as having aesthetic and historical value). By the early 1950s a consensus was reached: the peripheral districts in eastern Paris should undergo “renovation” while some quarters in the centre and Left Bank should undergo “restoration”. This hierarchical view of the city was based on (subjective) criteria of architectural and historic value. But it also implicitly reflected a hierarchical view of the resident population in the various neighbourhoods. Thus, bourgeois residential quarters were designated for “restoration,” while “renovation” policies were applied to the predominantly working-class faubourgs (Lucan 1992, Nivet 1994: 278-293).

Under De Gaulle (1958 – 1969), urban policy in Paris re-entered the national policy agenda. The Gaullists were for this period the majority party in both national and local (Parisian) governments, assuring a closer fit between national and local policies. Like Napoleon III, De Gaulle came to power after a period of prolonged instability, and his policies for Paris combined an urban agenda and the need to establish order. By this time the Paris agglomeration had some of the worst slums in Europe. During the 1960s-70s the main priority of urban policy was clearing the slums and bidonvilles (populated largely by Algerian migrants) and replacing them with better housing. This was expressed in two master plans for the Paris region (1957 PUD and 1967 SDAU) which envisaged “a quasi-total demolition of the existent urban structure” in the peripheral neighbourhoods (interview M. Cougouliene). This meant a further relocation of much of Paris’s working class population to suburbs and new towns beyond the municipal borders, thus fulfilling the aims of the previous renovation policies, but on a larger scale (Simon 1994: 127). In the words of the chief planner for the region, the goal was (still) the “reconquest of Paris”.

To lodge the poorest populations displaced by urban renovation in Paris (which now included a significant proportion of labour migrants), huge public housing estates were built. For this purpose the City of Paris purchased lands in neighbouring municipalities for construction of low-cost social housing (habitations à loyer modéré - HLMs). These Grands Ensembles were built à la Corbusier, with high-rise buildings surrounded by public areas, often isolated from existing neighbourhoods, and were considered a great improvement over the slums. In this way, bidonville-style disorder was

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35 De Gaulle established a new administrative framework in the Paris agglomeration to carry out his policies. In 1965 a new District of Paris was created. Lacaze (1994: 98) describes its Director General, P. Delouvrier, as De Gaulle’s Haussmann.

36 The 1957 Plan d’Urbanisme Directeur de Paris (PUD) was created by the prefectural planning department. This evolved into the 1967 Schema directeur d’aménagement et urbanisme de la région de Paris (SDAU), the Master Plan for the Paris region.
replaced by Modernist-style order (Lucan 1992). Social housing policy thus fulfilled two agendas: distancing the Other and ‘improving’ his environment.

Significant amounts of social housing were also built inside Paris, with the specific aim of retaining some of the working-class and lower-middle class population within the city. In this, municipal policy was at odds with national policy, which aimed at limiting the growth of Paris (Nivet 1992). However, as urban policy in Paris became increasingly oriented toward middle-class needs, the renovation displaced the poorest residents to public housing outside the city, while social housing built in the renovated areas accommodated higher economic strata (interview J-C. Toubon). As a result, the HLMs of Paris contain a 16% worker population in contrast to 31% for HLMs in the Île de France region (Fijalkow 2002: 55).

Different explanations have been advanced regarding the motivation behind urban renovation policies in this period, which led to a progressive gentrification of Paris from the 1960s onward. Castells and Godard showed statistically that the most common factor uniting the renovation areas was the proportion of immigrants, and concluded that renovation policy expressed a deliberate strategy of depopulating the migrant neighbourhoods (cited in Simon 1994: 131).

Castells and Godard’s intentionality argument is not widely accepted in French research today. Instead, most researchers claim that the main motivation behind urban policy in the 1950s and 1960s was economic and that planners did not distinguish between indigenous and migrant populations (interviews J-C. Toubon and Y. Fijalkow). However, does this reflect the “ethnic blindness” of the policies or of French social research? There is consensus regarding the results: urban policies in Paris transferred the working population from older neighbourhoods in the congested city to new, outlying areas and reduced the foreign population in the renovated areas.

For the purpose of this study, two points are important regarding this period. First, to what extent can the urban policies of the 1950s-70s be defined as ‘local policy’? According to one planner active in that period, until 1977 city council had little say on urban policy in Paris (interview Cougouligiene). But Philippe Nivet, an historian on the policymaking of Paris’s council, describes the 1960s as a period in which the council implemented the hierarchical view of urban policy that had developed among council members in the 1950s. This meant ‘soft renovation’ applied to the central quarters and some bourgeois residential areas in the west, and massive ‘hard renovation’ in the peripheral working class quarters, mostly in east Paris (Nivet 1994: 384). The urban historian Jean-Claude Toubon describes this period as characterised by “a fusion of national and local urban policy with a powerful desire on all sides to proceed with renovation policy” (interview Toubon).

38 Cf. Simon 1994 for a detailed case study analysis of this process, in Belleville.
39 Coing (1962) conducted a sociological study of change in the 13th arrondissement following the 1950s renovation policy. He demonstrated that urban policy tried to influence economic dynamic in the neighborhood, not to make social change -- although that was the policy’s ultimate result.
any case, we can identify a fairly consistent urban policy vision in the local council from the late 1950s onwards, which can be described a hierarchical renovation policy.

The second point is the role that host-stranger relations played in this policy. In particular, can it be described as an Assimilationist-type policy in relation to the presence of migrants/minorities in the areas designated for renovation? Nivet’s detailed analysis of city council protocols of this period reveals a republicanist and class-based discourse, with no explicit references to the ethnic dimension. This raises two possibilities: either the ethnic factor was genuinely not taken into account, or (as Castells and Godard claimed) Paris’s renovation policies deliberately dispersed unwanted minorities, but this agenda remained implicit, concealed behind the ‘logic’ of city planning. In either case, this conforms with what we have defined as an Assimilationist type of policy in the Spatial domain.

4.4 Gentrification policy under Chira c and Tiberi, 1977 - 2001

During the 1970s the city council’s new planning agency APUR expressed increasing autonomy and began to promote its own line of thinking in Paris’s urban policy. Following compromises reached in city council in the early 1970s, APUR promoted a “softer” renovation policy which complemented destroy/rebuild actions with rehabilitation and restoration. This was expressed in the new Master Plan for the City of Paris (1977 SDAU - Schema directeur d’aménagement et urbanisme de la Ville de Paris), which set the city’s objectives over a 25-year period. APUR’s renovation policy was based on the construction of social housing by private developers in the renovated areas. But while the plan’s objectives “were couched in an attractive and socially responsible rhetoric” and “aimed...to offer decent housing to the least well-off groups in society such as the elderly and migrants” (Carpenter et al. 1994: 223), the outcome was more social housing at higher rents, and more displacement of the poorest residents from the renovated areas. Whatever the intentions of APUR, it provided the tools by which the new mayor of Paris was to pursue a local urban policy of gentrification in the 1980s-90s.

Paris’s urban policy in the Chira c and Tiberi administrations (1977 – 2001) was characterised by expanding gentrification to new areas of the city, particularly the poorer quarters in the "eastern crescent" where most of the migrant/minority concentrations remained. Mayor Chira c commissioned a specific plan for the “valorisation” of eastern Paris, the Plan Programme de l’Est de Paris which

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20 APUR (Atelier Plan d’Urbanisme de Paris) was created in 1967 as a think-tank for urban policy in Paris. It gradually replaced the planners at the departmental/regional level as the main planning agency for Paris.
21 The plan’s major innovation was to expand the areas destined for preservation (rather than renovation) to include some 19th century areas around the city centre and the “historical cores” in the faubourgs (interview Cougougliene).
22 According to a veteran APUR planner “there was a real wish to maintain the existing population” and “one cannot reduce the intentions of the plan to gentrification”. But he admits, “in hindsight” that the policy tools used for implementing the plan were “inadequate and benefited mostly the strongest” (interview Cougougliene).
23 The SDAU master plan designated areas throughout the city for more sensitive rehabilitation and areas destined for more “brutal” renovation, the latter designated as ZACs (Zones d’aménagement concerté). ZACs are the legal instrument identifying a zone for renovation and the actions to be carried out in that zone. Current ZACs in Paris favor the middle classes: a third of the residential function in the renovation area is slated for intermediate-rent social housing, a third for private housing and only a third for low-rent social housing. (Fijalkow 2002: 102-6)
expressly targeted migrant concentrations. The Plan Programme for the East of Paris gave a strategic push to the upgrading of designated areas through large valorisation projects that attracted middle- and upper-class residents and placed increasing pressure on the original inhabitants. This gentrification occurred in pockets of working-class neighbourhoods of the old faubourgs such as La Villette, Bercy and Faubourg St. Antoine (renamed Bastille-Opera) (White and Winchester 1991: 40). According to Carpenter et al. 1994 : 225), some of the designated renovation areas were chosen “more because of their high concentrations of immigrants than because of poor absolute standards of housing” (Box 8.2).

In some of these areas, local resistance to the city’s renovation plans ultimately led to ‘softer’ renovation and less displacement of the original inhabitants. Ironically, this resistance was led by recently arrived residents, who did not want to see the social heterogeneity of their new neighbourhood completely destroyed.44 This response by recent gentrifiers (often of the intellectual-artistic variety) can be seen as a bottom-up expression of the ‘embrace of Otherness’ (described in Chapter 3, above, and noted also in the Tel Aviv case study), in response to a top-down policy whose ultimate aim is seen by many as a further homogenisation of the population within Paris (below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 8.2 Bringing order to the “eastern crescent”: le Plan Programme de l’Est de Paris</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Plan Programme for the East of Paris (presented to city council in 1983) describes the eastern quarters of Paris as the city’s “new frontier” (p. 14) in a truly Baumanesque analysis of the two halves of the city: the “general impression of disorder and destructurisation...[of east Paris] contrasts strongly with the grand elements of urban composition, organisation and coherence of the built areas and public spaces that mark, altogether, the central and western quarters of Paris.” This disorder is seen as an opportunity for &quot;development&quot; and &quot;valorisation&quot;. Although the language used is one of urban planning, the Plan Programme is as much about creating social order in east Paris as it is about urban design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The East is described as having various “handicaps” including most of the remaining “îlots sensibles”. Many have “a marked overpopulation, being the reception areas of an especially poor population and particularly of many immigrants” (p. 10-11). The high proportion of foreigners in certain quarters and schools is noted in passing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While the Plan Programme claims (or intends) to maintain the “uniqueness of this part of the city in...its social and economic diversity” (ibid., p. 15), its economic logic presents a blueprint for gentrification: according to the renovation strategy, the new housing in renovated areas will be developed privately and aimed primarily at the middle class rather than the original residents (of whom it has already noted, foreigners make up a significant proportion).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Source:</strong> Atelier Parisien d’Urbanisme, 1987.</td>
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44 Such resistance occurred in in the 1980s in Belleville (cf. Simon 1994, 2000) and the Goutte d’Or (cf. Toubon and Messamah 1990) and in the 1990s in Faubourg St. Antoine (interview Fijalkow).
According to some, Chirac’s urban policy was not explicitly directed at ethnic minorities. Rather, he believed that upgrading the social composition of the city was more in tune with its status as a global capital. This led him to pursue a gentrification policy whose internal logic resulted in an ethnic population change (interview Ambroise-Rendu). Others (White and Winchester 1991; Musterd et al. 1998) claim that Chirac’s gentrification did have an ethnic dimension. In order to to “clean up” (assainir) the capital as Chirac intended, municipal policy pursued the de-ethnicisation of certain ethnic enclaves that were not in keeping with the desired image of Paris (interview Salviani). Patrick Simon (2000: 109) notes how the municipality’s renovation plans systematically tried to modify the social composition of Belleville, a neighbourhood “which the authorities perceive as too ‘immigrant’.”

The result of the urban policies pursued by the Chirac and Tiberi administrations has been further gentrification of traditional working-class areas and a further relocation of poor residents from Paris to the suburbs. One effect of this process was the first drop in a century in the proportion of foreign residents in Paris, between 1982 and 1990, and a further drop between 1990-1999. This accelerated a process begun earlier, as noted in section 3, above. Altogether, the proportion of “labourers” dropped from 30% to 14.5% of the active inhabitants in Paris between 1954 and 1990, while the “middle” and “superior” professional categories rose from 19% to 51%. Gentrification was also expressed in an increase in private housing, as owner-occupied dwellings rose from 18.5% to 25.4% of the housing stock in Paris between 1962 and 1982 (Pinçon 2001: 40-41, White and Winchester 1991: 39, Rhein 1998) (see maps 8.4a-d, above).

4.5 Paris and the Politique de la Ville

While local policy in Paris continued on the path of renovation, a shift in thinking emerged at the national level from the early 1980s. The State’s new activism in urban policy was expressed in a nation-wide programme of positive discrimination for selected ‘problem neighbourhoods’ that came to be known as the Politique de la ville (‘City Policy’, hereafter: Pdlv). As noted in section 2, this was the government’s response to the urban disturbances of the 1980s. These became linked in the eyes of the public and policymakers to the social-economic exclusion of residents in suburban housing estates, in particular ethnic minority youth. In response, the Pdlv aims at social and economic integration of specific populations in designated areas which are to be reintegrated in the wider urban context. The Pdlv uses a multi-dimensional approach targeted at specific territories, based on employment, housing and educational measures in the area.

45 According to White and Winchester (1991: 40) “one of the objectives of renewal is the dispersal of foreigner concentrations”. According to Musterd et al. (1998: 157-8) “under mayor Chirac a policy of upgrading of certain quarters where many immigrants lived in a poor socio-economic situation was consciously pursued.”

Conceived as a “Marshall Plan for the suburbs” (Moore 2001: 105), the Politique de la ville has developed into France’s overall coordinating framework for various urban policy measures. Although the contents, titles and emphases of the actions within the Pdlv framework are constantly revised, the Pdlv itself “remains untouchable and appears to survive changes of government” (ibid.: 107). Moore (2001: 116) notes that the Pdlv as it has developed since the 1980s combines three “models of local development” encompassing conflicting ideologies. He describes these as “a Republican integration model, a communitarian development model and a social cohesion model.” The first two can roughly be identified as the Assimilationist and Pluralist types of policy response to ethnic diversity. In effect, the Pdlv signals a new attitude at the national level toward the presence of migrants/minorities, a shift in host-stranger relations. Although it does not break with the universalist model of integration, the Pdlv undermines some of the republicanist rhetoric in that it includes some explicit references to the ethnic dimension of exclusion.

The new approach to tackling urban problems (implied in the new designation for urban renovation areas: "développement sociale des quartiers") conflicted with Chirac’s urban policy. The Pdlv aimed at strengthening the autonomous social development of designated neighbourhoods with a bottom-up approach, based largely on partnerships with local civic associations. Local instruments of intervention were to be developed to target specific populations, including migrants. In contrast, the Chirac administration was interested in continuing its urban development policies as described above, in a top-down approach that emphasized physical renovation. As noted above, this approach at best ignored the migrant population, and at worst targeted it for dispersal. For this reason, Paris only became really involved in the Pdlv framework from the mid-90s, a decade later than most cities. As mayor of a wealthy city, Chirac could afford to largely ignore Pdlv funding and maintain his own urban policy line, with the exception noted below. In the Goutte d’Or project, the differences between the Parisian approach (an Assimilationist-type policy), and the Pdlv approach (a more Pluralist-type policy) became apparent in regard to this ‘ethnic enclave’.

47 The Politique de la ville is based on contrats de ville that are signed between national, regional and local authorities as well as the Fonds d’Action Sociale (FAS) and civic associations. Eligible neighbourhoods are authorized at the national level and the state provides some 80% of the funding, but local authorities are expected to propose new areas and projects to be included in the programme. The Pdlv has expanded from 148 designated neighborhoods throughout France in 1984 to some 1500 neighbourhoods (216 city contracts) in 1994. Pdlv actions include physical improvements (in housing, public spaces, facilities) which are meant to “disenclave” isolated neighborhoods, as well as measures aimed at social and economic integration, such as training schemes, educational projects and economic incentives for private investment (Equipe de Developpement Locale Belleville-Amandier 2001: 9, Moore 2001: 111).

48 Labels for the designated territory have changed over the years, from ZUS (zones urbaines sensitives) to DSQ (développement social de quartier) to DSU areas (développement social urbain). A separate territorial designation, ZEPs (Zones d’éducation prioritaire) covers the educational measures, often overlapping with the ZUS or DSQ area. 49 For example, state funding is offered to municipalities to encourage migrant integration at the neighbourhood level (Ireland 1994: 103) Other instruments within the Pdlv framework are aimed at unemployed youths (missions locales) and problematic schools which are defined partly by the percentage of minority-origin pupils (ZEPs).

50 Chirac also opposed signing a contrat de ville to avoid staining the capital’s image by association with the Pdlv which was linked to problem neighbourhoods in the banlieues (interview M. Allal).
In 1983 the Goutte d'Or neighbourhood in northeast Paris was the only one listed by the national commission as eligible for Pdvl funding in the capital. The fact that this neighbourhood represented one of the most visible African and Maghrebian enclaves in Paris made it an example of different policy intentions regarding migrants -- although this was never made explicit. The Goutte d'Or development project quickly became an area of political contention as the municipality's renovation plan clashed with the social integration approach required by the Pdvl (Box 8.3).

**Box 8.3 The Goutte d'Or: the politics of renovation in a migrant neighbourhood**

The Goutte d'Or neighbourhood (18th arrondissement) has served as a migrant-receiving area since the 19th century, when it hosted newcomers from the provinces (as described in Zola's novels). In the mid-50s it became Paris's main Maghrebian enclave and later became the main African enclave in the city. In the early 1980s the municipality realized that it could no longer ignore the accumulation of problems in the area, including dilapidated housing, crime and a concentration of poor and transient populations.

Initially, the city prepared a ZAC plan (*Zone d'aménagement concrète*), including renovations that would involve significant re-housing. The area covered by the plan included 5300 residents, of which 58% were foreigners. The ZAC followed the municipality's urban policy approach, which targeted most of the migrant population for rehousing, i.e. eventual dispersal. In the Goutte d'Or, however, the city's plan was successfully opposed by several residents' associations who took advantage of the consultation procedures required by the Pdvl framework.

Eventually, this resulted in a new ZAC plan in which "a consensus was reached against a radical social transformation of the area" as intended in the original plan. This compromise was due to a convergence of interests, including those of the residents' associations, composed mostly of recent (French-origin) residents. While interested in improving conditions for more gentrification, they wanted to maintain the "ethnic" character of the area. The new ZAC thus aimed at maintaining some of the original inhabitants, described by Toubon and Messamah as "those who wanted to and could be integrated [in the new scheme]". However, most of the destroy-and-build projects planned for the area were retained and eventually implemented. According to Toubon and Messamah (pp. 23-24), this allowed the city to go ahead with its original renovation policy within the Pdvl framework. In consequence, many of the ethnic business were forced to relocate.

One significant result of the Goutte d'Or project was the establishment of a "local development team" (EDL), which was set up by the municipality to coordinate between municipal, national and local civic organizations. The function of the EDL was based on a coordination structure created by a number of local civic organisations and eventually housed in the same location (Association St. Bruno). This later served as the model for EDLs in other areas designated for urban renewal.

**Sources:** Toubon and Messamah 1990; interviews J-C. Toubon, M. Neyreneuf and S. Brial-Cottineau.
The complications of the Goutte d’Or project (not least, an upsurge in local NGO activity) served as a warning signal to the Chirac administration. For the remainder of the 1980s Chirac avoided getting the city involved in other PdlV projects, with a few minor exceptions. Instead, local urban policy was largely pursued according to the format established by APUR’s 1977 master plan (SDAU), i.e. renovation that resulted in the displacement of local residents (many of migrant origin) in the renovated areas, as noted above.

Only in 1995 did City Hall really enter into the PdlV framework. This did not signal so much a different approach in urban policy as a political manoeuvre by Mayor Chirac (then campaigning for president), whose gentrification policies had come under fire (interview E. Bailly). The 1994-2000 contrats de ville had already been awarded for other cities, so Paris signed a less binding convention, just before Jean Tiberi replaced Chirac as mayor of Paris. In practice, municipal policies did not change under the Tiberi administration. In the 1995 elections, the only districts that did not vote for Tiberi were those districts in the east in which urban renewal projects were taking place within the PdlV framework. It is no surprise therefore that the Tiberi administration blocked further projects envisaged by the PdlV in those areas.

In the next round of contrats de ville (2000-06) Paris signed as well, but it is commonly held that Mayor Tiberi (like Chirac) used the PdlV framework as a façade (interviews M. Neyreneuf, S. Brial-Cottineau). A 1999 evaluation report on the PdlV prepared for the Ile-de-France region notes that the programme was “little occupied with the [Paris] neighbourhoods that serve an important function of interaction [and] reception of immigrant populations”, and suggests that “the public actors must henceforth recognise the ‘ethnicisation’ in fact of these territories and adapt their policies in consequence” (Bravo 1999: 60).

As noted in section 1, several studies in other cities (Montreuil, Marseille, etc.) have revealed that the implementation of urban policy in neighbourhoods with high migrant/minority concentrations is more ethnically-sensitive than would appear from the official rhetoric of the PdlV framework (which remains largely within the universalist discourse). In the case of Paris, it appears that there has been little or no such “ethnicisation of policies”. According to staff at the local development team (EDL) in the Goutte d’Or, the only migrant-specific actions carried out were “superficial and restricted to a few isolated actions” (interview S. Brial-Cottineau).

In sum, it appears that the municipality of Paris succeeded in maintaining its policy of gentrification (and implicitly, dispersal of migrant/minority concentrations) within the context of the

51 The Convention envisioned interventions in six new areas (in addition to the existing projects) within the PdlV framework. The areas were designated for “développement social urbaine” (DSU, the label that replaced DSQ). In each one an EDL team (équipe de développement locale) was set up to coordinate the actions of the various actors involved.

52 The new PdlV contract includes six new zones, all situated in the northern/northeastern neighborhoods, in addition to existing zones such as the Goutte d’Or. The contract includes a section entitled “integration and the fight against discrimination.”

53 It should be noted that my examination of the Politique de la ville in Paris cannot compare with the detailed research carried out in the case studies noted above, e.g. Mazzella 1996, Moore 2001 and Gaxie et al. 1998.
Politique de la ville during the 1980s-90s, albeit less 'brutally' than in earlier periods. Today, the Assimilationist approach still dominates in the 18th arrondissement, which includes the Goutte d’Or and other neighbourhoods with a high migrant population. According to the EDL staff, local policy continues to ignore the ethnic dimension on the whole (ibid). According to the district’s deputy mayor (a former activist who fought against the original ZAC in 1983), we do not reflect on the specific demands of foreigners. I can’t say that there aren’t some considerations, but in principle we have a universalist approach: residents are residents (interview M. Neyreneuf).

5. Local migrant policies in Paris

Beyond the urban policies described in the previous section, most policy domains affecting migrants (social services, education) are in the hands of national agencies. Before the Delanoë administration (see section 6, below), Paris had no local policies explicitly targeting migrants or ethnic minorities, and no separate budget for integration-related activities as such. Local policies affecting migrant/minority populations are largely implicit, as befitting a city following the universalist model of integration in regard to its migrant population. This section summarises what can be identified as local migrant policies in the Juridical-political, Socio-economic and Cultural-religious domains, since 1977.

5.1 Juridical-political domain

Regarding the political participation of its migrant residents, the municipality adopted a clearly Assimilationist-type policy until 2001 (the Delanoë administration), i.e. acquisition of French citizenship was considered the only path to political participation. City Hall also stayed out of the increasingly vociferous debate over regularising (in effect allowing naturalisation) of the irregular migrants. The municipality under the Chirac and Tiberi administrations also ignored any possibility of allowing participation for non-citizens through a consultative framework of some kind. In this, Paris was not exceptional – less than a dozen towns in France have experimented with migrant advisory councils, of which only one is of considerable size (Strasbourg, since 1992).

In its relation toward migrant organisations, too, the local authority has displayed a clearly Assimilationist response. Since the 1980s national policy has diverged somewhat from the republican model and allowed more flexibility in relation to migrant mobilisation. In 1981 French law first allowed foreign residents to form their own associations. Under the Mitterrand government’s policy to promote “local democratisation” and the partial recognition of the need to take ethnicity into account in combating social exclusion, public funding to migrant/minority organisations began to flow through national agencies such as Fasild and the Politique de la ville framework. This resulted in a surge of migrant associational activity. In Paris, the Pdlv has

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54 As the capital, Paris has become the centre of political activity to regularise the large number of sans papiers, including a lengthy “siege” inside a church in the Goutte d’Or neighbourhood a few years ago.
Increasingly supported migrant/minority associations in the 1990s, "in recognition of the role they play in the social, educational and economic integration of immigrants in their respective neighbourhoods. They are thus attaining greater visibility as interlocutors of local public policies" (Poinsot 2000:13).

The municipality of Paris, however, has remained staunchly universalist in its espoused policy toward migrant/minority mobilisation. Paris has a long history of migrant-based associations, but traditionally they were discouraged from engaging in any form of political activity and focused instead on cultural activities (Poinsot 2000). Following family reunification in the 1970s, some migrant organisations evolved into service providers, e.g. French language teaching, support groups, etc. City Hall however, refused to recognise migrant/ethnic-specific activities and organisations as a separate category, in terms of municipal funding (outside the Pdlv). In keeping with its Assimilationist policy tradition, such organisations are classified according to general functions together with indigenous organizations (e.g. women's organizations), avoiding any formal recognition of the ethnic/migrant function.

According to a veteran official in City Hall, an informal relation with migrant associations has existed within the municipal bureaucracy for years, but it is "not a declared policy" (interview R. Bercovici). However, the same official stated that "the municipality treats all [ethnic and non-ethnic organizations] equally." It is difficult to determine if the ethnic identity of a migrant association is ignored by the municipality or actually discouraged. But in a neighbourhood with a large and active migrant/minority population such as the Goutte d'Or, only two associations among some thirty were identified as "ethnic associations" by the staff of the Local Development Team (interview S. Brial-Cottineau). Other local associations which clearly have a migrant/ethnic specific function and nature do not promote themselves as such. Is this an internalisation by migrant/minority activists of the universalist model, or a tactical consideration in the face of an Assimilationist policy that discourages ethnic-based mobilisation?

5.2 Socio-economic domain

5.2.1 Reception policy

France has a national immigrant reception policy that includes primary lodging centres (foyers), language education, helping new immigrants to access state benefits and vocational training. These services are the competency of various national agencies such as DDAS (welfare benefits), FAS (funding migrant-related services and projects) and SONACOTRA (responsible for the foyers). During the 1980s the State began delegating some of these responsibilities to lower levels and the Third Sector. Local authorities as well as civic associations became involved in providing services through multi-partnerial contractual agreements. At the local level, the Prefect is responsible for implementation of this policy (mostly within the Politique de la ville framework), coordinating between national agencies and local associations that provide migrant reception services.
In Paris, municipal involvement in these policies is quite limited, and largely based on subsidizing services provided by civic associations. An example are the twenty-four neighbourhood *Centres Sociaux* which conduct various local activities in nine districts in Paris. Subsidised by the state and the municipality, these centres provide reception, social support and cultural activities for migrants as well as other residents. While “playing an increasingly significant role in the local policies of integration” they are not migrant-specific (Poinso 2000: 15).

### 5.2.2 Social services policy

Welfare policy in France is determined largely at the national level and implemented locally through national agencies such as Fasild (*Fonds d'action et de soutien pour l'intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations*). In Paris, the municipal Welfare Division “follows the policy determined by elected officials, which continues to be provision of services according to socio-economic criteria, certainly not ethnic criteria” (interview M. de Brunhoff). A “Mission pour l'intégration et la solidarité” coordinates the delivery of welfare benefits to specific populations (residents with housing difficulties, endangered juveniles, etc.) -- but migrants/minorities are not defined as a separate population group. The one exception in terms of a municipal migrant-specific service is the provision of French language training through the local *Centres Sociaux*. But this service is, by its very nature, assimilationist.

In Paris there is growing awareness within the municipal bureaucracy of the need for ethnically-sensitive solutions to specific problems of the migrant/minority population. While this is not publicly acknowledged, an informal policy has developed over the last two decades of delegating ethnically-sensitive services to migrant and “solidarity associations” (French NGOs aiding migrants, often with minority-origin activists). This is done by funding migrant- or ethnically-specific projects, such as a support service for Turkish women abandoned by their husbands. In addition, the role of mediating between migrants and public services is increasingly delegated to associations (interview M-J. Minassian/G. Patek-Salom).

The delegation of ethnically-specific services is usually masked in universalist terms, e.g. “support for women”. The municipality’s assimilationist mode of subsidisation makes it impossible to evaluate the amount of funding the city provides to these activities or to migrant associations. While it was impossible to get even a rough estimate of the amount of subsidises provided by the municipality to associations dealing with migrants, there is agreement that substantial sums are involved (interviews R. Bercovici, J. Adriant-Mebtoul, K. Bourcart). While some migrant activists support the existing universalist discourse (in part for fear that ethnic-specific assistance would stigmatise them), they also denounce the “schizophrenia” and “hypocrisy” of the system, by which support for migrant-specific services is disguised (interview M-J. Minassian/G. Patek-Salom).

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55 One indication is found in the budget of the new Mission Integration (established by the Delanoë administration), whose budget is devoted in large part to subsidising “integration activities” of civic associations (see section 6 below).
Paris’s Assimilationist-type of services policy stands out when compared to the policy response of some of the neighbouring municipalities in the banlieues, such as Montreuil. While Montreuil’s "integration policy" (enacted since 1978) avoids the establishment of migrant-specific services, it openly discusses and formulates migrant- and even ethnic-specific policies (e.g. in regard to the Malian population). This is institutionalised in a separate "service municipal d’immigration" (Gaxie 1998: 257-277).

5.2.3 Education

Education is another state-dominated policy area, with municipalities primarily responsible for pre-school and primary school facilities. The French system is run according to strict universalist principles in terms of access to education and curriculum, with no distinction made between French and foreign pupils, except in the area of language education. Since the 1980s, however, a national programme, the “Education priority areas” (Zones d’Education Prioritaires - ZEPs) has provided opportunities for more local authority involvement, as well as for more migrant-specific (but not necessarily pluralistic) educational actions in some schools. ZEPs are designated at the national level for specified areas (encompassing primary and secondary schools), according to criteria of social/economic disadvantage. One of these is a high rate (at least 30%) of foreign children in the school. The ZEP policy is an integral part of the Politique de la ville (see Section 4) and takes a global approach to tackling scholastic failure in schools within a designated area. One of its main objectives is to assist migrant-origin children who have learning difficulties due to their inadequate mastery of French.

Some cities have used ZEPs as a tool for ethnically-sensitive local migrant policies. Mazzella (1996) shows how a ZEP programme in a migrant neighbourhood in Marseille (Belsunce), had integration goals that went far beyond fighting scholastic arrears in the school. There do not appear to be such examples in Paris. Language education remains the primary, if not only, tool that the municipality regards as important for migrant integration within the school system. But this migrant-targeted action in an otherwise universalist framework is “the exception that proves the rule”, since improving newcomers’ fluency in French is in itself an assimilationist goal.

Another way in which local authorities may ‘ethnicise’ their policies in this issue area is through support for extra-curricular projects. The municipality of Paris funds a school enrichment programme (“ateliers bleus”) that could hypothetically be utilised in an “ethnically sensitive” manner. It could, for example, fund multi-cultural initiatives in schools with a high proportion of migrant-origin pupils, as Rome has done since the mid-1990s (see Chapter 6). This has not happened in Paris, possibly due to the “distrust of anything that is ethnically-specific” according to one official (interview P-F. Salviani).

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56 This explicit mention of migrant children is a rare exception to the universalist model in the French educational system.

57 Even Tel Aviv has begun this, on a smaller scale (see Chapter 7).
5.3 Cultural-religious domain

As noted above, Paris has avoided supporting ethnically-specific cultural activities in an open fashion. When it comes to the practice of religion, the municipality takes a minimalist stand. According to French law, local authorities are responsible for the physical upkeep and construction of places of worship (similar to their responsibility regarding school buildings). While cities such as Marseille are negotiating with local Muslim organisations over the establishment of prominent mosques, in this issue is officially "solved" with a relatively modest building dating back to the 1920s, tucked away behind the municipal botanical gardens.\(^{58}\) The main Islamic "monument" in the capital is the Institut du Monde Arabe. A personal project of President Mitterrand, the ultra-modern building is neither local nor religious, but a gesture of the French state toward Islam as a culture. It does little for the needs of local Muslim believers: “the grass-roots faith is practiced in impoverished prayer-halls and converted warehouses in gloomy suburbs” (Le Quesne 2000: 62). Within Paris, the demand for religious facilities is provided by 17 Islamic associations that organise rooms for prayer and Koranic education for children (Poinsot 2000).

An example of municipal neglect of cultural and religious issues is provided by the situation in the Goutte d’Or, perhaps the most ethnically-sensitive neighbourhood in Paris and one with a large Muslim population. According to the staff of the EDL (local development team, see previous section), there is a "very, very serious problem of racism between the different communities" in the neighbourhood. Nevertheless, there are "no publicly announced actions against racism". Instead, the municipality provides partial support for the annual Goutte d’Or festival, which has taken on a multi-cultural nature (interview S. Brial-Cottineau). Another long-standing issue is the inadequacy of exiting mosques, with demand far outstripping supply (on Fridays the faithful kneel on the sidewalk outside the main local mosque). According to the EDL official, this is "an enormous problem" which remains "taboo" and is not dealt with by any local authority agency (including the EDL). The Municipality of the 18th arrondissement, which is directly responsible, has expanded the one official mosque and recently bought a building to house another. According to the deputy mayor, their policy is minimalist:

We have a duty to provide all residents with the conditions for practicing their religious freedom as guaranteed by the constitution. It doesn’t go beyond that (interview M. Neyrereuf).

\(^{58}\) Paris’s official mosque is described as “a colonial edifice run by the Algerian government where fashionable Parisians sip mint tea after a Turkish bath...” (Le Quesne, N., “Islam: France’s second religion”. Time. June 12, 2000, p. 62).
6. The new integration policy, 2001 - ...

The new “Left-Green” administration of Mayor Delanoë was elected in March 2001 on a platform of change for Paris. The promotion of “local democracy”, including an integration policy for the city’s foreign residents, played a significant role in the municipal campaign of the Socialists and their coalition partners, the Greens. Delanoë acted quickly to set up the new integration policy, appointing an activist of Algerian origin, Khedidja Bourcart, as *Adjointe au Maire de Paris, chargée de l’intégration et des étrangers non-communautaires*. In June 2001 the mayor and Bourcart announced the main lines of the integration policy at a press conference; in November a *Mission Integration* was established to implement the new policy on a daily level; in January 2002 a "Citizenship Council for foreign residents of non-EU origin" was proposed by the mayor and approved by the new city council.

6.1 Formulating the new policy

For the first time in Paris’s history the integration of migrants has been defined as a policy area within the municipal structure. On the political side, Bourcart heads the new *Delegation a l’intégration*, responsible for formulating overall policy. On the administrative side, the *Mission Integration* coordinates policy implementation on a daily basis. The *Mission* has a small staff and a budget of €500,000, of which €350,000 are for subsidizing associations that provide migrant services.\(^{59}\)

The new integration strategy is based on three “axes” (Municipal press release, 19/6/01):

- *comprendre et informer* - understanding and informing the foreign residents in Paris;
- *soutenir* - supporting the foreign residents i.e. actions in the Socio-economic domain;
- *associer* - creating a possibility for participation in the local polity, i.e. actions in the Juridical-political domain.

The first policy axis is based on the realization that very little is known in Paris regarding foreign residents and their needs.\(^{60}\) To address this, a year-long “diagnostic” has begun (December 2001 – December 2002) which is meant to serve as the basis for developing the integration policy. The diagnostic is coordinated by APUR\(^{61}\) and has an estimated budget of €290,000 (funded by the municipality, the Prefecture of Paris, and Fasild). The diagnostic involves four phases, including

\(^{59}\) Delanoë's administration includes 33 deputy mayors (*adjoints au maire*), i.e. city council members appointed by the mayor to oversee a policy area. A *delegation* consists of the deputy mayor and his/her staff and is meant to cut across the administrative divisions of the municipal bureaucracy. *Missions* are administrative units set up to implement a multi-sectoral policy issue.

\(^{60}\) This was repeatedly expressed in interviews with various officials (Bourcart, Mebtoul, Allal, Bercovici).

\(^{61}\) Atelier Parisien d’Urbanisme (see section 4, above).
information gathering that should result in a statistical analysis of the foreign population and its characteristics, mapping the existing "integration services and actors", an "evaluation of the dynamics of integration" emphasising strong and weak points in the existing situation and finally, "proposals of actions responding to the sectoral and territorial interests identified" (Allal 2002: 6-11). This "programme of concrete actions" should be presented by the end of 2002 to the city's political leadership.\textsuperscript{62}

At this point several remarks can be made regarding the research-and-formulation stage of the new policy. First, the budget and comprehensiveness of the diagnostic imply that City Hall takes the issue seriously. According to Bourcart, this is the first time that the migrant issue in Paris has been approached "in its entirety" (interview K. Bourcart). According to the head of the diagnostic programme, it should be the basis for a fundamental rethinking of local policy toward migrants and minorities:

We must rethink the traditional French model of integration, and find a solution that is compatible with the French specificity of universalism, etc. and the reality of today, including the persistence of unemployment and unsolved housing problems [among the migrant population]. We are approaching a new phase...how should we imagine the new municipal policy? Should Paris see itself as a cosmopolitan city, or should it continue to close its eyes to these phenomena? We are raising all the questions...we have no taboos (interview M. Allal).

Second, the independence of this evaluation is unclear, and it is still unknown what proposals will be made. The diagnostic process is coordinated within APUR\textsuperscript{63}, which has been responsible for some of the local policies that it is supposed to critique. The 'diagnostic teams' include various actors, including State and associational representatives, that may be unwilling to propose radical changes to the current system. For example, to include second-generation migrants (French nationals) within the target population of the integration policy, as has already been suggested.\textsuperscript{64}

Third, the diagnostic shows that Mayor Delanoë has tried to involve all the relevant actors in this stage of policy formulation. Thus, a Pilot Committee and Technical Committee include representatives of the Prefecture, state agencies, district mayors and civic associations. The aim is to coordinate expectations among all the actors regarding the new policy (interview M. Allal). This partnering style is characteristic of French policymaking since the 1980s, but it also appears that Delanoë has no intention of 'going it alone' with his new integration policy.

\textsuperscript{62}At the time this case study was conducted (summer 2002), some of the diagnostic was completed but unavailable for public use, most phases were still incomplete.

\textsuperscript{63}The diagnostic is coordinated by a sociologist of ethnic minority origin from outside the municipality, engaged by APUR for the project.

\textsuperscript{64}"Should the public policies to be determined concern only foreigners, that is, all those not possessing a French nationality, or should they not necessarily widen their scope to groups whose historical route or social and economic realities bring them close the non-nationals?" (Allal 2002: 31).
6.2 Socio-economic domain

The second aim of the integration policy is to improve foreign residents' access to local services, and in particular to organise existing municipal support to NGOs that provide services to migrants. According to Bourcart, "the mechanisms are in place" but migrants are uninformed of their rights. This situation is aggravated by a multiplicity of service providers with little or no coordination. In addition, municipal personnel who come into contact with migrants are untrained to deal with foreign residents. To address these problems a number of actions are planned for 2002-3, including publishing a guide in several languages on migrants' rights and local services, and training sessions for municipal employees in selected services, aiming at "a minimal sensitisation to cultural differences" (interview K. Bourcart).

Regarding the delegation of migrant-related services to NGOs, the aim is to devise a more coordinated approach between the funders (the municipality, Prefecture, Fasild, etc.) and the associations. The Delanoë administration is very critical of the situation in which migrant-related activities are 'hidden' within various budget items (e.g. "scholarisation"). The aim is to make the integration element explicit in future subsidisation policy. At the time of writing, however, no such change has been felt by the associations (interview M-J. Minassian). Bourcart hopes to arrive at a formal agreement by 2003 between the different partners. In any case, local associations receive a very small part of their budget from the municipality (often less than 10%), and it does not appear that the new policy will change this. In short, the Delanoë administration intends to continue with the current delegation policy while making the migrant element explicit and more efficient.

This marks a certain departure from the Assimilationist policy until now, but does not go as far as adopting a Pluralist-type policy, since there is no intention to establish services specifically targeting migrants. Indeed, Bourcart is opposed to migrant-specific services, with the exception of French-language teaching. According to her, fluency in French is "the key to integration" and this will be a central element in the integration policy (interview K. Bourcart).

6.3 Juridical-political domain: the "Citizenship Council"

The clearest break from the Assimilationist policy toward migrants in Paris is found in the third axis of the new policy (associer), and it is primarily symbolic. This is manifested in the "Citizenship Council of non-EU Parisians" (Conseil de la Citoyenneté des Parisiens non-Communautaires), promoted by the mayor under the banner of local democracy in Paris. The Council is expected "to formulate advice and propositions on municipal questions regarding [the foreigners’] life in Paris [as well as] applying itself to any problems of local interest, beyond questions of integration". The new body comprises 90 appointed members (all non-EU citizens legally residing in Paris for at least one

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65 Paris is one of the very few sizeable cities in France (after Grenoble and Strasbourg) to establish a consultative council for non-EU residents. Montreuil established a migrants' advisory council but later replaced it with a 'mixed' council.
year), representing 36 countries. City council members are expected to develop a working relationship with members of the Citizenship Council, including participation in joint work groups on various themes. The Council is presided by the mayor.

This initiative can be seen as part of the new administration’s policy to promote participative local democracy in Paris. The Citizenship Council is presented by the Delanoë administration as an interim solution for the city’s non-EU residents, and the mayor used the establishment of the Citizenship Council as an occasion for repeating his demand to extend the right to vote locally to non-EC residents (Liberation, 14.1.02). Indeed, Delanoë’s objective in establishing the Citizenship Council is clearly symbolic and ‘militant’: “More than an instrument of integration, the council is a means of recognising the people that the electoral law continues to ignore”, according to Bourcart (ibid).

Challenging the republican notion of citizenship (and the policy of the Chirac government), the new administration proposes a notion of urban citizenship (*citoyenneté dans la cité*), at least until non-EU residents are granted local voting rights. At the same time, the new administration goes out of its way to deflect claims that it is fostering ethnic-based communitarianism: “we are not speaking of a council of communities” stipulates Bourcart (ibid).

Beyond its symbolic effect, the representativeness of the Citizenship Council is questionable, as its detractors in city council pointed out. The way in which it was set up, while not democratic, demonstrates that City Hall wanted to involve as many actors as possible in the process. This involved holding ‘citizenship meetings’ in the district and a public campaign calling foreign residents to propose themselves as candidates. A Pilot Committee comprising representatives of associations, local politicians and other ‘qualified persons’ (the majority of foreign origin) oversaw the process. Eventually a ‘candidature commission’ selected a list of 90 members that was approved by the mayor.

At the end of November 2001 Delanoë brought the proposal for creation of the Citizenship Council before city council. The ensuing debate focused less on the utility of this measure and more on its symbolic significance, revealing conflicting notions of citizenship. Host-stranger relations have rarely been voiced so explicitly in Paris’s *Hôtel de Ville*. Delanoë made no attempt to hide the political significance of the proposed council:

By giving the voice to those who have been deprived of it, our ambition is to favour a true citizenship based on residence which is indispensable to the revitalisation of our local democracy (Conseil Municipal, Seance des 19-20/11/01, p. 1358).

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67 Fourteen members are from Algeria, followed by Morocco (10), China (9) and Tunisia (8). Twenty members are from sub-Saharan Africa, others come from non-EU European countries, North and South America.

68 This includes neighborhood councils and a recently established ‘youth council’. According to City Hall, these can also serve as arenas of political participation for non-EU residents until they are extended the right to vote locally. De facto, these councils have not had significant influence on local decisionmaking.

69 Criteria included gender parity, proportional representation of the different districts and countries of origin, and diversity in "socio-professional milieus and motivations" of the members ("Objet: Creation du Conseil de la *Citoyenneté des Parisiens non communautaires. Projet de deliberation*, Nov. 2001, Secretariat General, Mairie de Paris).
The Greens' representative went further: "It is fitting today to raise the concept of a global citizen...it is no longer possible to speak of a true politics limited only to the national territory." On the contrary, "this notion of foreigners (étrangers) appears to us more and more strange." (ibid: 1364-5). The Right denounced the proposed council as undermining the republicanist notion of national citizenship. Thus the RPR representative accepted the "necessary and legitimate" objective of encouraging "the participation of foreigners in the life of the city where they live," but objected strongly to use of "citizenship" in the proposed title: "this council is everything except a council of citizenship." (ibid.: 1360) Finally, the Opposition proposed amending the title to "Council of Participation of non-EC Parisians", in which case they would support the proposal, but this semantic change was rejected by the Coalition. In their eyes, too, the proposed Council was indeed about a new kind of local citizenship, as summarised by Bourcart at the close of the debate: "we must therefore dissociate citizenship from nationality" (ibid. 1368).

The ceremonial opening of the Citizenship Council (12 January 2002) in City Hall attracted local and national media attention. The event was used by all as an opportunity to repeat their support or opposition, again in terms that went far beyond the local context, explicitly touching on host-stranger relations. Mayor Delanoë spoke of separating between notions of "nationality" and "citizenship in the city" (Agence France Presse, 14.1.02), while an RPR councillor warned "The way to integration is not through this false citizenship!" (Le Parisien, 14.1.02). Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the National Front, called it a "political masquerade that mocks the laws of the Republic" (Agence France Press, 14.1.02). The event was also an opportunity for the new migrant 'representatives' to be heard in the local media. They raised very different expectations regarding their new role. One (Chilean) saw the council as an opportunity to advance democratic ideals, another (Chinese) hoped to raise problems of her community, a third (Bulgarian) warned that the council would "not be a playing card for the Left" (Liberation, 14.1.02).

At the time of writing the Citizenship Council is seven months old. It has elected a steering committee and sub-committees (housing, social affairs, etc.) which meet regularly. Their proposals, if approved by the plenary, will be raised before city council and the districts. The Citizenship Council was accorded an annual functioning budget of €106,000 and a permanent secretary. Meanwhile, a 'wait and see' attitude prevails in the municipality regarding its functioning. For Bourcart, it appears that the importance of the Council lies in its awareness-raising function more than its ability to address the practical needs of migrant residents in Paris:

The aim is not to set up a 'secondary council', but to utilize this legal instance as an instrument through which the foreigners can feel that they are part of the city (interview K. Bourcart).

70 "The use you [Delanoe] make of the word citizenship is a grave abuse of language...You may contest or disagree, but since 1789 citizenship and nationality are linked in an unchangeable manner in our specific national tradition" (ibid.: 1358). The UDF representative saw "many positive aspects" in the initiative but also described it as "out of step with the true republican values of integration" (ibid.: 1363)
The new “Citizenship Council” has been criticized as a purely symbolic measure and its impact is still unclear. Outside the political elite, its presence is hardly known. It is too early to know if the new policy will significantly extend the opportunities for political participation to non-French residents, resulting in the kind of “local citizenship” that Delanoë espouses.

6.4 Cultural-religious domain

According to one migrant activist, the main change felt “in the street” since Delanoë took office has been in the cultural domain, e.g. a multicultural festival organized in the 20th district (interview Patek-Salom). Mostly, however, the new policy is expressed in symbolic gestures. These included an official reception in the Hotel de Ville for the Muslim community (the first in Paris’ history), and a declaration (October 2001) of a “Cultural Year on the contribution of migrants and immigration to the historical construction of Paris”. Behind the longwinded title were only a few actions of a very academic nature. Regardless of their utility, these gestures reflect the main concern of the new administration: to promote a “cultural recognition” of the foreigners in Paris.

6.5 Spatial domain

It is still early to judge if and how the Delanoë administration will utilize the Politique de la ville in Paris to advance its new migrant policy (see section 4.5, above). Opinions differ in regard to the possibility of a change in attitude toward the ethnic element within the PdlV framework.71 According to one EDL staff, there is no need for migrant integration to appear as a separate theme in the new PdlV contract because the “problematic of immigrants is now [under Delanoë] a transversal theme” (interview E. Bailly). According to the coordinator of the diagnostic, the fact that PdlV policies in Paris still do not recognize the ethnic element demonstrates a “continued hypocrisy” (interview M. Allal). Both agree that there has been no significant change in urban policy under the new administration.

An observer of urban policy in Paris notes that gentrification has continued en force in Paris since 2001, with a rise in housing prices that is unprecedented in the past 30 years, and an annual rise of over 5% in rental prices.72 If continued, this could lead to a further decline in the proportion of rental households in Paris, from 75% today to 60% within two decades, of whom only 15% will belong to the working class (where migrants are predominantly found). In their place, the new houseowners of Paris will come from the gentrifying classes (e.g. yuppies and dinkies).73 This trend is not, of course, a result of urban policy alone, but Delanoë’s current policy of “la valorisation de l’hyper centralité pour les classes urbaines” (festivals, cultural events, etc.) contributes to the continuing gentrification of Paris, as does the continuation of local urban policies meant to eliminate dilapidated housing, using new tools such as renovation through semi-public corporations, etc. (ibid).

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71 The current contrats de ville signed between Paris, the state and Ile-de-France region run from 2000 to 2006.
72 Personal communication. Yankel Fijalkow (forthcoming in a presentation at the Congres Français de Sociologie, February 2004).
7. Summary

Immigrants settling in Paris have historically been perceived by the host society more in terms of class than ethnicity. In the post-war period, as immigration from beyond Europe increased and the working classes were integrated into the welfare state, host-stranger relations in France were transformed from a class-based to an increasingly ethnic-based relationship. From the 1980s onward urban disturbances originating in public housing estates with minority concentrations and the rise of ethnic mobilisation came to be seen as a threat to the French model of integration. This model conforms to the Assimilationist type in the model proposed in this study, i.e. immigrants are accepted as permanent but expected to lose their Otherness through assimilation into the host society.

In some cities the reaction to these changes was to adopt ethnically-sensitive local policies toward the migrant/minority populations, i.e. a partial abandonment of the universalist model. The 'ethnicisation' of local policies has occurred largely within the broad framework of the Politique de la ville, which allows local authorities to implement ethnically-sensitive policies on the ground while continuing to espouse universalist policies to combat socio-economic exclusion, racism, etc.

In Paris this has not been the case. Our review of local migrant policies in the capital shows that local policymakers before and after 1977 (the end of direct State rule in Paris) remained true to the universalist model of integration. The continuity of Assimilationist-type attitudes toward the migrant/minority population was expressed across all the policy domains, at least until 2001. A characteristic of Assimilationist-type migrant policies is that they are hidden within general policies. In the French case this usually means territorially-based policies: "there is always a map".

In Paris, urban development policies contained a (usually implicit) political-social agenda that can be summed up as the distancing of the poor and other undesirable populations from central Paris, to areas progressively farther from the centres of power and privilege, and attracting more desirable populations in their place. The gradual embourgeoisement of Paris that began under Haussmann continued with the emergence of a local (council-led) hierarchical renovation policy in the late 19th-early 20th century. It continued with the master plans of the 1950s-60s (in which State and local policy largely combined), and accelerated under the mayoral-led urban policies of the 1980s-90s. The Chirac and Tiberi administrations largely succeeded in pushing their agenda of top-down renovation policies despite the Politique de la ville framework, which tended to emphasize bottom-up development including ethnically-sensitive policies. Within the current Pdlv framework gentrification continues in more subtle forms, with renovation policies favoring 'mixite sociale', i.e. increasing the proportion of certain populations over others in designated areas. These policies have resulted in diminishing the remaining migrant/minority concentrations within Paris, as noted by the overall decline in foreign residents in the past two decades. In keeping with the Assimilationist discourse, however, the ethnic dimension of the urban policy in Paris is rarely made explicit.

73 Young-urban-professionals; double-income-no-kids.
In the context of host-stranger relations, urban policies in Paris over the past 150 years can be seen as an attempt to distance Otherness, or make it disappear through assimilation (bringing Order to disorderly environments). The roots of this can be found in the historical relation of the ruling French classes to the 'threatening Other', a relation of fear and repugnance from the poor. The traditional fear of the authorities from the violent actions of the Parisian masses was replaced by fear of the Parisian middle and upper classes from the disease and social disorder embodied in the proletariat that populated much of the city.

As the bulk of the French working classes eventually assimilated into the bourgeoisie, their place (and space) was taken up by immigrants. When the urban disturbances of the 1980s rekindled the threat of the Other (now associated with second-generation migrant youth), the menace was already located "outside the city walls" in the public housing estates of the banlieues, populated largely by former working class residents of Paris and an increasing number of immigrants/minorities. Within Paris, the systematic distancing of undesirable Others and their replacement with more desirable residents continued. Under Chirac and Tiberi, local policies targeted neighbourhoods (e.g. Belleville and the Goutte d'Or) whose 'ethnic character' was perceived as incompatible with the status and prestige of the capital, for renovation and its ensuing gentrification. Thus the Plan Programme for the East of Paris aimed at creating physical and social order in the city's "last frontier".

An additional agenda of urban policy in Paris has been the creation of improved, orderly residential environments for the residents displaced by renovation. This was expressed in the social housing policies adopted by city council in the early 20th century and later. This can be seen as an attempt at making Otherness disappear not by distancing Strangers, but by eliminating disorderly environments in which 'anti-social behaviour' breeds and replacing them with environments that correctly socialize their inhabitants. The replacement of disorder with (physical/urban/social) order is a recurring theme in Parisian urban planning, reappearing for example in the 1983 Plan Programme for the East of Paris. Beyond the explicit objectives addressed by local urban policies (from fighting disease to upgrading Paris's global competitiveness) we can thus discern an often implicit Modernist strategy (to use Bauman's term), to eradicate Otherness by physically distancing Strangers (the poor, and increasingly migrants) and encouraging the assimilation of those who remained into the dominant Order.

The ethnic dimension of these policies has been largely ignored in the French sociological literature, with the exceptions mentioned in the pages above. The extent to which the policymakers did or did not target specifically migrant/minority concentrations remains debatable: did various urban development plans from the 1950s to the 1980s deliberately result in the (undisputable) distancing of immigrants/minorities, or was this only a 'by-product' of ethnically-neutral gentrification policies? Policymakers in Paris rarely if ever relate explicitly to the ethnic dimension, in keeping with the dominant universalist ideology. In either case, the wilful or willing sidelining of
the ethnic dimension in urban policymaking in Paris fits the Assimilationist type as proposed in the model.

Paris has pursued Assimilationist-type policies in the other domains as well. In the Juridical-political domain, ethnic-based mobilisation was ignored or discouraged. More recently the role of migrant organizations has been implicitly acknowledged within the municipality, but this is not expressed openly, e.g. in budget itemization. In the socio-economic domain, the delegation of various services to civic organizations (since the 1980s) conceals whatever municipal support there is for migrant-specific services (and migrant associations) behind universalist terms. The only explicitly migrant-targeted local service is French language teaching, which has a clearly assimilationist aim. Paris's relative wealth could allow it to promote more migrant-specific services, but this has not happened. Similarly, cultural and religious services are provided according to strictly universalist criteria. Thus, for example, the city's response to the religious needs of Muslims is minimalistic.

In sum, the universalist discourse has remained dominant in the rhetoric and in the daily practice of local policy in Paris, until recently. Only since 2001, is there a declared change from the Assimilationist response that has traditionally featured in City Hall's attitude toward its migrant/minority population. The new Left-Green administration of Delanoë clearly intends to legitimise the presence, needs and contribution of the migrant population in Paris. The new "integration policy for foreign residents of non-EU origin" openly challenges the republican model of integration, by proposing to "dissociate citizenship from nationality". This is symbolized in the recent establishment of a "Citizenship Council" for non-EU residents.

At such an early stage (just over a year since the new policy was announced) it is difficult to evaluate the extent and seriousness of the new integration policy. According to officials, they are still in the stage of formulating policy proposals (the 'diagnostic' phase). However, there are signs that City Hall's strategy will emphasise the symbolic more than the practical aspects of managing ethnic diversity. As far as structural integration is concerned, an Assimilationist attitude remains. The key policymakers see French language acquisition as the primary channel for migrant integration, regarding other ethnically-specific measures as stigmatising. It appears that Delanoë's integration strategy will be based on adapting existing (universal) services and working within existing partnerships notably the Politique de la ville, rather than creating new frameworks (the Citizenship Council is the only exception). At the rhetorical level, the planned measures of the new integration policy are justified in universalist terms such as "ensuring access to rights" and "the fight against discrimination". The administration carefully avoids any suggestions that it is pursuing an ethnically-based, communitarian policy.

In sum, Paris's new migrant policy may not present such a break from the past in terms of enacted policies. The main change appears to be in espoused policy. But even at the rhetorical level, the new administration does not signal what we would identify as Pluralist attitudes and expectations toward
integration. Rather, it proposes to change the basis for the Assimilationist policy from the republican model (assimilation as an individual citizen in the state) to an undefined "citizenship in the city" model. The extent to which this "city" (the local host society) should also change to accommodate its new members, remains unclear.