Host-stranger relations in Rome, Tel Aviv, Paris and Amsterdam. A comparison of local policies toward labour migrants
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9. Amsterdam

1. Introduction

This chapter describes the local policy reactions in Amsterdam to the arrival and settlement of immigrants from the late 1950s to 2002. In particular, Amsterdam’s migrant policies in the 1980s-90s demonstrate the Pluralist type of response for which this case study was chosen. However, this case study also allows us to follow the evolution of municipal attitudes toward Strangers, and their expression in migrant policies, over the past half-century in one city. Amsterdam’s trajectory includes a short phase in the late 1950s of ignoring labour migrants (Non-policy), which was followed by an assumption of their temporary presence from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s (Guestworker phase). This gave way to an acceptance of their permanence and, at least formally, of their Otherness during the 1980s-90s (Pluralist phase). In the mid-1990s a reaction to Pluralist policies set in, with an emphasis on the integration of individuals rather than minority communal identity. This current phase is expressed in the city’s “Diversity Policy”, which appears to present a local policy response that does not correspond to any of the types in the typology described in Chapter 4. This new type is discussed at the end of this chapter and in the Conclusions chapter. As we will see, Amsterdam’s trajectory of responses to migrant settlement reflects national trends to a large degree, with some local variations.

Like Rome, Tel Aviv and Paris, the choice of Amsterdam as a case study was based on a number of variables, including comparable characteristics of the city and its migrant/minority population (Chapter 5). Like the other case study cities, Amsterdam is the primary city in its country in terms of population and economic activity. Amsterdam’s comparatively small size (official population: 734,540 in 2002) is offset by its function as the centre of a metropolitan region (1.3 million inhabitants) and its leading role in the Randstad region, which contains over six million inhabitants or about 45% of the Netherlands’ total population. Amsterdam’s share of ethnic minorities is the largest in the Netherlands, in absolute as well as relative terms. In 2001, residents of non-Dutch origin totalled over 340,000, or 46.3% of the city population - a high proportion by any standard. Of these, 277,000 residents originate from non-OECD countries and the majority of them can be regarded as “labour migrants” in terms of host society attitudes and policy responses, as discussed below (O+S 2002, Barlow 2000, Musterd et al. 1998).

The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 2 summarises the national context (historical factors affecting host-stranger relations in the Netherlands; post-war immigration cycles; national immigration policies). Section 3 presents the local context (immigration cycles; characteristics of Amsterdam’s migrant/minority population; the local political/institutional context). Section 4 describes the first three phases of Amsterdam’s policy response to immigration (Non-policy; Guestworker policy; the Pluralist “Minorities Policy”). Section 5 describes Amsterdam’s “Diversity Policy” from the mid-1990s. Section 6 summarises these phases and their relation to changing host-stranger relations.
2. The national context

Amsterdam's local policies toward migrants are strongly embedded in the national context. This section describes several relevant features that are important for an understanding of Dutch attitudes toward the labour migrants, and their expression in local migrant policies. Thumbnail sketches are given of the particular Dutch style of tolerating difference (gedogen), pillarisation, colonial history and race relations. Their expressions in national policy are also described below.

2.1 Dutch tolerance of Otherness: gedogen and the pillar approach

One Dutchman – one theologian; two Dutchmen – a Church; three Dutchmen – a schism.
(proverb)

The Dutch tradition of co-existing with difference is rooted in historical necessity going back at least as far as the 16th century and the formation of the Republic of the United Provinces. The survival and eventual flourishing of the Republic (and its successor the Kingdom of the Netherlands) can be seen as one long, delicate balancing act involving a series of careful compromises between several minorities. The Dutch Republic was a confederation of cities and regions ruled by a mercantile urban bourgeoisie of different religious and political persuasions, and lacking a central authority that could impose the will of one group over another. Compromise with the Other became a necessity to avoid conflict and maintain prosperity that was largely based on trade. These compromises were often expressed in practice rather than in law.1

This Dutch manner of living with difference by “looking the other way when necessary” became known as gedogen, roughly meaning illegal but officially tolerated. Particularly in Amsterdam, the city's ruling classes knew that religious or political ideological differences would endanger their carefully built prosperity. Geert Mak describes (1999: 77-78) “the manner in which Amsterdam’s administration reacted to dissident [religious] groups over the centuries.” and notes that already in the 15th century the local authority applied a policy of gedogen in avoiding the application of its own strict penal codes in matters of morality (brothels, for instance). “In political matters, too, the city administrators gave priority to the avoidance of potential unrest. Battling it out for the sake of principles was left to others” (ibid).

This practical approach to co-existing with difference was later applied to how the Amsterdammers dealt with newcomers. The exceptional tolerance that came to characterise the Dutch Republic in the 17th century attracted immigrants who were fleeing persecution elsewhere in Europe, such as the Huegenots from France and Jews from Portugal. Many settled in Amsterdam, where the practice of gedogen was already well entrenched.

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1 For example the Treaty of Utrecht (1579), which signalled the unification of the Protestant rebels against the Catholic rule of Spain, officially forbade Catholicism. In practice, in cities with a Catholic minority they were allowed to continue worshipping (but not too openly), while their Calvinist neighbours pretended not to notice. This passive tolerance had earlier been applied toward the Lutherans and other reformers by the then Catholic elites, despite pressure from the Spanish crown to have the former persecuted (Van der Horst 2001: 29). This is not to say, however, that discrimination and segregation based on religious differences did not exist for a long time (cf. Knippenberg 1992).
The idea that each person should be "sovereign in his own domain" i.e. allowed to believe and practice as he pleases (as long as he respects the rules binding the whole society and does not disturb the neighbours) has become a feature in how Dutch society functions (Van der Horst 2001). In the late nineteenth century the idea of separate-but-equal co-existence at the communal level was institutionalised in what Lijphart (1968) termed the pillarisation (verzuiling) of Dutch society. The four pillars (Protestant, Catholic, Socialist and Liberal) were manifested in separate political parties, schools, newspapers, etc. – separate worlds in which the members of each community lived, with interaction and political compromise occurring among the elites of each community. Pillarisation can be seen as the modern equivalent of the system applied since the Dutch Republic: co-existence with the Other, despite (deep) ideological differences, for the benefit of all. Social pillarisation all but disappeared in the 1960s, but its institutional vestiges remained the basis of modern Dutch consociational democracy, including the mainstream political parties.2

In terms of host-stranger relations, pillarisation can be seen as a variant of communitarian strategies of living with Strangers (see Chapter 2). It played an important role in how newcomers were later perceived by, and incorporated into, Dutch host society. In particular, pillarisation allowed the institutionalisation of Otherness (i.e. of Islam) that characterises the Dutch Pluralist response to the settlement of labour migrants.

2.2 Dutch intolerance of Otherness: the institutionalised problematisation of Strangers

The way in which, nowadays, immigrant ethnic minorities (the exterior ‘others’) are ideologically represented displays remarkable similarities with the way in which anti-social families (the interior Others) were represented in an earlier historical phase. (Rath 1999: 165)3

Another factor to consider in understanding policy reactions to immigration in the Netherlands is the paternalistic aspect of Dutch host-stranger relations.4 With its historic roots in Calvinism, the moralistic streak that runs through Dutch society (expressed in an often unspoken attitude of superiority characterising Dutch bureaucrats) was first applied to indigenous Others, and later to newcomers. This is described by Jan Rath (1999) in his analysis of institutional attitudes and policies toward “unsocial families” (onmaatschappelijke gezinnen) in the modern Netherlands, which were later applied to immigrants. Rath describes how some families from the lower proletariat were defined as socially deviant, and became the target of reformist policies to re-educate them during the first half of the 20th century. The institutionalised problematisation of the very poor urban proletariat originated in the intentions of bourgeois liberals in the late 19th century, “to raise them from their

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2 The original Protestant and Catholic parties (representing the religious pillars) united in 1980, becoming the Christian Democrats (CDA). The Socialist and Liberal pillars are represented by the Labour and Liberal parties (PvdA - Partij van de Arbeid and VVD - Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, respectively) -- although their constituency may no longer identify themselves with the original pillars. The rise of new parties such as the Green-Left (Groen Links) and the Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) symbolizes the continued weakening of pillarisation in Dutch society.
3 Page numbers for Rath 1999 refer to the unpublished final draft.
4 In contrast to, e.g. the laissez-faire attitude characterising Italian attitudes toward Strangers, as described in Chapter 6. Cf. Korac 2003 for a similar comparison of Dutch paternalism and Italian laissez-faire attitudes in the treatment of refugees.
pitiable condition" (ibid: 153). This was soon followed by public policies in areas such as poverty and unemployment relief, education, social housing and health care, particularly in towns ruled by social democrats. Over time, “the emancipating groups had less and less sympathy for the ‘unrespectable’ behaviour of those ‘left behind’”, i.e. families that refused to fit into the norms of respectable working-class families, in terms of cleanliness, neighbourly relations, etc. “Gradually, their moral improvement acquired a less voluntary character” (ibid).

Such attitudes were common not only in the Netherlands at this time, as seen in the French case (Chapter 8). What characterises the Dutch case was the extent and the way in which the problematisation of Otherness was institutionalised. After the Second World War, local authorities set up “a series of institutions for special family and neighbourhood work for anti-social families” (p. 157). This held especially for Amsterdam, with its tradition of social-democratic government. In Amsterdam, “unsocial families” were identified by municipal housing officials and defined as “inadmissible for council housing”. Special residential areas were then established under supervision of wardens and psychiatrists who were responsible for educating the deviant families (Rath 1999).

As in France, the ideology of hygienism played an important role. “The diagnosis was now often couched in epidemiological terms: anti-socials were socially diseased and threatened to affect the stability of the whole society.” (ibid: 155, citing from Dercksen and Verplanke 1987). Rath notes (ibid: 157) that while it was accepted in principle that anti-socialization could occur in all classes, “only the maladjustment of the lowest fractions of the working class were defined as a problem”.

The paternalistic approach to Otherness as a kind of behavioural deviancy that can be corrected through intensive re-education by professionals, first applied to internal Others, was also applied in the 1950s to external Others, namely Dutch-Indonesian repatriate immigrants (see below). After the 1960s this approach changed, as a variety of different lifestyles came to be more tolerated (as long as they did not conflict too drastically from the accepted norms). At this point, Rath notes (p. 159), policymakers and social work professionals turned their attention to a new Stranger: the newly arrived foreign workers.

In the late 1970s, when the assumption toward the temporariness of labour migrants disappeared, government policy took a different approach, accepting behaviour that deviated from Dutch norms as a legitimate expression of cultural Otherness (e.g. the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women). However, the new multicultural approach expressed in the Minorities Policy assumed that the new minorities, while keeping their ethnic-cultural specificity, would also adapt to the Dutch norms in many ways (e.g. female emancipation), certainly by the second generation. When this did not seem to happen, as was perceived in the late 1980s, a reaction to multicultural tolerance occurred. This reaction was expressed from the late 1990s in migrant/minorities policies that once again display many of the characteristics of the re-education policies applied a century before toward indigenous “unsocial families”. This legacy is reflected today in the thousands of always-busy, well-meaning

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3 Rath links the increasing institutionalisation and professionalisation of these re-education efforts to the new Ministry for Social Work (established in 1952) and the expansion of the social work profession in the Netherlands thereafter.
bureaucrats, social workers and teachers employed in Amsterdam in the 'integration process' of newcomers. The clearest expression of this is found in the obligatory Civic Integration (inburgering) Policy (subsection 5.5, below).

2.3 The colonial legacy, race and membership in the Netherlands

The collective memory [...] of the colonies is still with us at all levels. It helps to determine the way in which the Dutch respond to foreigners, ethnic minorities, immigrants, non-Dutch nationals or whatever other name is given to them. No one consciously makes the connection, but for unprejudiced outsiders, it is clearly visible. (Van der Horst 2001: 274-275)

The Netherlands' colonial legacy is a mixed one in terms of its effect on the relative acceptance in Dutch society of racial and cultural Otherness. Dutch overseas trade evolved into three centuries of colonisation, in the East Indies (1619 - 1949)⁶ and in the Caribbean (1613 -1975).⁷ In the 17th century Amsterdam was the busiest port in the world and arguably the most cosmopolitan city in Europe. This mercantile tradition exposed the local host society to different cultures at a time when most European peoples were still living in relative isolation. The colonial legacy brought Otherness literally into Dutch homes, for example in the East Indian spices that have become a staple in the Dutch kitchen. As the colonisers mixed with native women and sometimes married them, some dark-skinned people became a part of Dutch society relatively early.⁸

The extended contact with external Others did not necessarily make the Dutch more open to Otherness.⁹ The colonial experience fed into pre-existing assumptions of moral superiority rooted in Calvinism, and until the mid-20th century, most perceived Dutch colonialism as bringing civilisation and progress to the colonised (Van der Horst 2001). Yet, there appears in the Dutch history of contact with the Far East a sensitivity to and even respect for the native Other which is rarely found among other Europeans in regard to ‘their’ colonial Strangers (see Box 9.1).

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⁶ Until 1949 the Netherlands was the world’s third colonial power (after Britain and France) in terms of area and population conquered, due to its control over the Indonesian archipelago. In the 17th century the main islands of the Indonesian archipelago came under commercial and military control of the Amsterdam-based East Indies Company (VOC), which also established monopolistic trading practices backed by warships in parts of India, Japan and China. In the 18th century the Dutch crown took over direct control from the VOC.

⁷ In the Caribbean the Dutch colonised Surinam, on the coast north of Brazil, and six islands including the “Netherlands Antilles”.

⁸ Dutch merchants also developed an extensive slave trade from Africa to the Caribbean but slavery was never established in the Netherlands itself.

⁹ Jeroen Doomernik remarked that after 300 years of rule over the largest Muslim country in the world, "we learned at school about our colonisation of Indonesia, but nothing at all about Islam" (personal communication).

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Box 9.1 The colonial “debt of honour”

Expressions of guilt regarding Dutch colonialism surfaced in the 19th century. This was most famously expressed in the 1860 Dutch classic by E. Dekker (Multatuli), Max Havelaar or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company, describing the exploitative side of Dutch colonialism in the East Indies.

In the early 20th century an influential group of scholars at the University of Leiden who trained colonial administrators in the native cultures of the East Indies provided another example of the Dutch relation to the colonised Other. This was based on understanding and respect, even admiration, for indigenous cultures. The leader of the Leiden group (the scholar C.S. Hourgonje) may have secretly converted to Islam. One of his followers (Cornelius van Vollenhoven) codified the indigenous Indonesian legal systems, the adat.

The Leiden group was influential in propagating “culturally sensitive” administration of the colonies in what became known as “ethical politics”. Well-intentioned or not, “ethical politics” based on knowledge of the indigenous cultures was also used by colonial administrators as an instrument for furthering Dutch colonial expansion. The “ethical politics” expounded in the early 20th century by the Leiden group can be regarded as a kind of early “development politics” based on the “debt of honour” that the Dutch owed to their colonised.


Whatever its effect on Dutch society’s relations toward Otherness, it is clear that the colonial experience affected immigrant policies in the postwar period. The decolonisation process -- a bloody war against Indonesian nationalists followed by Japanese occupation of Indonesia and internment of the Dutch settlers in concentration camps -- had a traumatic effect on Dutch society. At the peak of colonisation there were 80,000 settlers in the Dutch East Indies, primarily on the main island of Java. The rest of the Indonesian archipelago was colonised in the late 19th century in extremely cruel and violent military operations by the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL). The KNIL included local tribes (serving under Dutch officers) primarily from the Moluccan islands. The colonial legacy was literally brought home after World War Two, when some 300,000 Dutch-Indonesian repatriates and their Moluccan allies were hastily settled in the Netherlands (below). Today guilt feelings about the colonial legacy still affect the political correctness that characterises host-stranger relations in the Netherlands. The colonial legacy thus affects policymaking towards migrants and ethnic minorities, including labour migrants who had nothing to do with the former colonies.

The colonial legacy has created an ambivalent relation in Dutch society between race and ‘cultural capital’ among different types of newcomers (cf. Lucassen and Penninx 1997). As we will see (e.g. in the issue of “black schools”), this is important to the understanding of Dutch host-stranger relations, that is, how the host society defines who is an insider and who is an outsider. On one hand, racial origin appears to be less important in the Netherlands than in other European countries. For example, Dutch of Indonesian origin are not included in the official “ethnic minorities” category “because they are considered wholly assimilated to the Dutch culture and
society" (Phalet, 2001:3). The Netherlands has a relatively high rate of interracial marriages (11%) and in Amsterdam the figure must be considerably higher. Racist attacks are very rare and racist political parties have never attained over 4% of the national vote (the level reached by the Dutch National Socialist party in the 1930s). While second-generation ethnic Indonesians or Surinamese are considered ‘insiders’ in Dutch society, Europeans who are physiognomically similar to the Dutch (e.g. Germans and British, the two largest EU communities in Amsterdam) still feel like outsiders after years of residency.\textsuperscript{10} However, informal discrimination against ethnic minorities still appears to be common, although the racist as opposed to just xenophobic element in this is difficult to ascertain.

In short, cultural capital -- particularly fluency in Dutch -- appears more important than skin colour \textit{per se}, in how the Dutch host society defines different types of Strangers. This too helps to understand host society attitudes toward the different types of immigrants that settled in the Netherlands, as described below.

2.4 Postwar immigration cycles

Postwar immigration to the Netherlands can be divided into five types: post-colonial migration; labour migration (guestworkers); family reunification and formation; asylum seekers; and "migration that is connected with the internationalization of the economy", i.e. migrants from other industrialized countries (Musterd et al. 1998: 15-16). Post-colonial immigration originated from the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and the Caribbean (Surinam and the Dutch Antilles). Between 1945 and 1962 some 300,000 Dutch nationals were “repatriated” to the Netherlands. This included the descendants of Dutch settlers, among them 180,000 “indos” of mixed (Eurasian) origin. In addition, over 10,000 Moluccans (soldiers in the Dutch colonial army and their families) arrived in Holland in 1951. The Dutch-Indonesian repatriates were integrated into the host society within twenty years in an intensive assimilation process.\textsuperscript{11} For the Moluccans, integration has been a much longer and more difficult process.\textsuperscript{12}

Immigration from the Caribbean became significant in the 1960s and especially during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{13} Surinamese holding Dutch passports and speaking Dutch had migrated to the Netherlands in a small but steady stream for decades. At first they were predominantly of Creole origin and middle-class background and were “almost automatically incorporat[ed] into Dutch society” (Van Amersfoort and De Klerk 1984: 201). But the rush to the Netherlands in the mid-1970s included

\textsuperscript{10} Based on personal communications with a variety of foreign residents in Amsterdam as well as Dutch of Surinamese and Indonesian origin.

\textsuperscript{11} Lucassen and Penninx (1997: 146) note that in the 1980s questions were raised about the “myth of success” of this integration.

\textsuperscript{12} The Moluccan immigrants fiercely held on to their right to return home once their island would gain independence from Indonesia, and expected Dutch support for their struggle. This never happened. Today there are an estimated 40,000 Dutch of Moluccan origin (ibid.: 42).

\textsuperscript{13} Surinam became independent in 1975. Aruba and the Dutch Antilles remained a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and their residents can travel freely between the islands and the Netherlands. This can be characterised as a pendular migration that follows economic shifts, with a high rate of return migration. In 1995 there were 296,000 residents of Surinamese origin (of whom 38% born in the Netherlands), making this the largest national group of migrant origin, and over 80,000 residents of Antillean origin (Lucassen and Penninx 1997: 45-46).
many lower-class Surinamese of Hindustani and Javanese-origin as well as poor rural Creoles who were much less easily integrated into Dutch society. These immigration waves (1973-75 and 1979-80) coincided with economic restructuring in the Netherlands which hampered their integration into the labour market, creating a link between the Surinamese migrants and socio-economic exclusion that justified their inclusion in the official "ethnic minorities" category (below). In terms of host-stranger relations, we may say that postcolonial migrants from the Caribbean occupy a place between the postcolonial migrants from the Dutch East Indies at one extreme, and labour migrants from Morocco at the other extreme (see below).

Guestworker immigration began in the late 1950s and early 1960s with relatively small numbers of workers arriving at first from the southern European countries to fill manpower shortages in sectors such as mining and industry.\(^\text{14}\) Government-regulated recruitment, i.e. a national Guestworker policy, lasted from 1964 to 1973 and included other Mediterranean basin countries (see below). At first the numbers involved were small (8800 Turks and 4500 Moroccans in the country in 1965), and displayed the characteristics of a typical guestworker population: predominantly male, unskilled and semi-skilled workers of rural background, living frugally and sending their savings home. Moroccans especially engaged in circular migration (Penninx 1979).

Following the 1973 oil crisis the government stopped further foreign labour recruitment, but allowed guestworkers already in the country to send for their families. This resulted in a change in the ethnic composition of the guestworkers from the mid-70s on, from predominantly south European to predominantly non-European, as the Spanish and Italian workers responded to the economic downturn with a substantial return migration while the Turks and Moroccans responded by bringing over their families. Family reunification reached a peak in 1980 and effectively ended in the early 1990s. Today Turks and Moroccans make up, after the Surinamese, the largest ethnic minorities in the Netherlands (280,000 and 233,000 respectively, 1997) (Lucassen and Penninx 1997: 56-61. Van der Leun 2003: 12-14).

Two other types of immigrants account for much smaller but still substantial numbers of foreigners. The first are refugees and asylum seekers, whose numbers increased steadily in the 1980s and peaked in 1994 (53,000 admitted). Since then asylum policy has become increasingly restrictive. The second type are economically-motivated migrants from other countries, including OECD countries (188,000 EU nationals in 1994). Their number has grown as a result of globalisation and the relatively robust Dutch economy. The "new migration" (see Chapter 1) also includes a growing number of irregular migrants in the Netherlands. There are no national estimates, but Van der Leun (2003: 15-16) estimated at least 40,000 illegal migrants residing in the four largest cities, of whom some 18,000 in Amsterdam. Altogether, immigrants and their direct descendents make up roughly 9% of the population in the Netherlands (ibid: 12).

\(^{14}\) Interestingly, between 1946 and 1962 a labour surplus led to the emigration of nearly half a million Dutch citizens to Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand. This points to the development of a segmented labour market in the Netherlands from the 1960s onward.
Summing up, we can distinguish a brief period from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s of informal labour migration from southern Europe, much of which may be characterised as transient, in that most of the labourers returned home after a brief period. A guestworker period (1964-1973) was followed by family reunification from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. Postcolonial migration occurred in several waves between 1945 and the late 1980s, with the largest single influx arriving in the mid-1970s from Surinam. While the first waves of postwar immigrants (labour migrants from southern Europe as well as the Dutch-Indonesians) are now considered as fully integrated into Dutch host society, the guestworker migrants and their families, the Surinamese migrants from the 1970s, and various immigrants arriving in the past two decades from non-OECD countries around the world, are considered “problematic” in the eyes of Dutch policymakers.

2.5 Host-stranger relations and national immigration policies

2.5.1 Postcolonial reception policies and the assumption of temporariness, 1950s-70s

The Netherlands "emphatically did not consider itself to be an immigration country" in the postwar period. Policies reflected the official view that the country was hosting "short-stay migrants", whether post-colonial or guestworkers. At first, even the Dutch-Indonesian repatriates were assumed to be temporary and “diligent efforts were made to find a final destination for them ‘elsewhere’, at least for some of them” (Lucassen and Penninx 1997: 142). This attempt was soon abandoned and the government adopted a reception policy for this population that quickly developed into an intensive indoctrination of these immigrants into the host society’s lifestyle, with social workers instructing them in various aspects of Dutch middle-class norms, from housekeeping to childrearing. The policy of forced integration, coordinated through the Ministry of Social Work, was reminiscent of previous policy toward Dutch “unsocial families”, as described above. Rath (1999: 160) notes that migrants housed in hostels rented at government expense “had particular difficulty in escaping from” the well-meaning social workers. Later, permanent re-housing was arranged by allocating five percent of public housing to repatriates. “Social counselling and spiritual guidance” were delegated to (mostly church-affiliated) civic organizations (Lucassen and Penninx 1979: 142).

National policies in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s toward Moluccans and later Surinamese and Antilleans, refugees, and guestworkers were also based on assumptions of temporariness and were “mainly limited to reception and guidance in the welfare area, and to special measures to cope with any problems that might arise” (ibid: 143). According to Lucassen and Penninx (p. 143) this assumption led to a dual policy:

for as long as these migrants were to stay in the Netherlands some degree of adaptation and operation in society was thought necessary. Fitting in “while retaining their own identity”, as it was called for a long time, was not, however, seen in terms of a prolonged or even permanent stay, but was based on the assumption that they would return home.

National policy toward the Moluccans was based on the expectation of their eventual return, an attitude prevalent in government and the Moluccan community. Housed in special camps which were meant to preserve their indigenous culture, the Moluccans were not allowed to work until 1954. A special office was responsible for all their basic needs, from housing to food to pocket money. Later
the Moluccans were dispersed through the country in specially built communities which prolonged their segregation.

The results of this misguided policy served as a catalyst for change in national migrant policies, after frustrated Moluccan youth carried out a number of occupations and train hijackings to draw attention to the Moluccan problem. The government response was official recognition in 1978 of the permanence of the Moluccan settlement. This was followed by two policy reports (1979 and 1983, below) which first acknowledged the permanence of other minorities as well, including the labour migrants and their families.

2.5.2 Guestworker policy, 1964-1973

The Netherlands officially enacted a national guestworker policy in 1964, after having signed bilateral agreements with several countries in response to increased and unregulated labour immigration (Italy 1960, Spain 1961, Portugal and Turkey 1964, Greece 1966, Morocco 1969, Tunisia and Yugoslavia 1970). Taking over from Dutch companies that had directly recruited workers abroad, the government signed bilateral agreements with sending countries that stipulated the work hours, health insurance and housing to be provided by employers in the first year. Guestworkers received temporary residence permits automatically renewable each year, and were allowed to bring first-order family members. After five years they could apply for a permanent residence permit. Nevertheless, for "[b]oth the Dutch government and ...the foreign workers involved this migration was seen as a temporary phenomenon" (Van Amersfoort and De Klerk 1984: 201). At first, the reception of guestworkers was left to the employers and civic organizations. In the early-1960s the government assumed responsibility for the reception of guestworkers, following a violent incident between local youth and foreign workers in the eastern region of Twente. However, labour migrants were mostly spared the kind of intensive, paternalistic measures that were applied to the Dutch-Indonesian and Moluccan immigrants. The assumption of guestworker temporariness meant that "as yet there was no excessive pressure for their adjustment, and they had scope to develop their own communities" (Rath 1999: 161).

2.5.3 Accepting permanence: Minorities Policy, 1980-1994

The mid-1970s mark a sea-change in how immigrants were perceived in the Netherlands, from a temporary to a permanent problem that must be dealt with. The Moluccan hijackings served as a wake-up call to Dutch society that it had a "minority problem." By the late 1970s it was realised that the Netherlands had a permanent ethnic minority (Lucassen and Penninx 1997: 147). At this point it also became clear that the labour migrant population was settling permanently, since the 1973 ban on guestworker recruitment had only increased family reunification.

The realisation of permanence was accompanied by a rise in anti-immigrant feeling in the Netherlands. However, official policy toward migrants adopted at the end of the 1970s did not reflect these xenophobic reactions in society and the "undercurrent of racism was long ignored by officialdom" (Van der Horst 2001: 301). Instead, national policy was grounded on promoting the Netherlands as a multicultural society, i.e. espousing tolerance of Otherness. This policy response was first formulated in the 1979 "Ethnic minorities report" which redefined "guestworkers" as
permanent “ethnic minorities” and proposed group-targeted policies for them as well as for the other "ethnic minorities" (Penninx 1979: xi).

These policies were formulated in 1981 and formally adopted in 1983 as the national “Minorities Policy” (Minderhedenbeleid).15 The new policy was aimed at specific population groups, thus creating an official classification system of Strangers that was both ethnic-based and policy-oriented. The "minority target groups" whose disadvantaged position should be corrected through public policy included Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, refugees, gypsies, caravan dwellers and labour migrants from eight recruitment countries. Immigrant groups that were not considered socially disadvantaged (Indonesians, Chinese, EU nationals, etc.) were classified within the broader category of "allochtones", a technical term used to distinguish them from ethnic Dutch “autochtones”.

In 1993 this classification was adjusted, resulting in the following categories: Surinamese; Antilleans; Turks; Moroccans; South Europeans; Other non-industrialised; Other industrialised; Dutch. The first six groups (i.e. migrants from poor countries) fall under the official rubric of "ethnic minorities".16 At this point, the distinction between Strangers of post-colonial Surinamese and guestworker-origin largely disappeared within the label of “ethnic minorities”, while the repatriate migrants of Dutch-Indonesian origin disappeared as a category of Strangers in Dutch society.

The Minorities Policy proclaims the Netherlands as a multi-ethnic society, while recognising the social and economic problems facing its “ethnic minorities”. The policy aims to create a tolerant society into which ethnic minorities can integrate while retaining their own cultural and ethnic distinctiveness. Public policy should aim to maintain and support this distinctiveness. The second policy goal is to eliminate the existing shortfalls of the ethnic minorities particularly in housing, education and the labour market. The Minorities Policy reflected the pro-active welfare policy then prevalent in the Netherlands: during the 1980s its annual budget rose to over 800 million guilders (Lucassen and Penninx 1997: 151).

In terms of host-stranger relations, the Minorities Policy reflected a Pluralist attitude to migrant integration. It encouraged minorities to establish their own associations, which were seen as crucial to the “maintenance and development of their own culture and identity” (ibid.). This was to be achieved primarily through national and local government support of ethnic-based organisations. In the Juridical-political domain, naturalisation procedures were eased, allowing dual citizenship, local voting rights were extended to all foreign residents with over three years’ residency, and local authorities were encouraged to establish migrant advisory councils. In the Cultural-religious domain, a national education programme (OETC) was set up to support mother-tongue classes in schools, and various regulations were put in place to remove obstacles on minority religious practices: legalising halal butchers, giving equal status to the Muslim call to prayer as to the ringing of church bells, etc.

16 The new definition is based on the native country of the individual as well as of each parent. Countries are classified according to three categories: Netherlands (A), Other Rich Countries (A2) and Other Countries (B). Individuals from B countries are considered as a potential target population for policy, of which the so-called B1 are the actual target groups. (Musterd et al. 1998)
Until 1984, subsidies could also be granted to mosques as to churches and synagogues. Public support was extended to denominational institutions such as Muslim or Hindu primary schools and ethnic-based local radio stations were set up and subsidised (ibid: 158-9). Many of these measures were possible due to the institutional pillarisation system which recognised not only the cultural and religious rights of separate communities, but also the duty of government to support them. In legitimising group-specific (categorical) measures, the Minorities Policy simply extended this system to the new minorities.

The second aim of the Minorities Policy, combating social and economic disadvantage, was to be put into effect largely within general government policy in housing, education and employment. In housing, differentiation by housing agencies between Dutch and non-Dutch applicants was forbidden. In education, a system of extra government funding to schools based on the number of ethnic minority pupils was introduced. Support was extended for extra teaching of the Dutch language and the OETC programme (above) was set up. Anti-discrimination measures were introduced in labour hiring practices, and in 1993 an affirmative action law was passed, although the latter measures proved to be largely ineffective (ibid: 152-3).

2.5.4 Reaction to Minorities Policy, 1994 - present

Anti-immigrant mobilisation began in the 1980s with the extreme-right Centrumpartij, but remained marginal in Dutch politics until the 1990s. In 1990, only eleven extreme-right candidates gained seats in local councils throughout the Netherlands; in 1994 there were 87 councillors. During that decade a debate began to emerge on the nature of host-stranger relations in the Netherlands, focusing particularly on the perceived separatism of the Muslim minorities. Increasingly, the media raised and linked social problems such as crime with immigration and ethnic minorities. As migrants/minorities were increasingly linked to feelings of insecurity in the host society, second-generation Moroccan youth were singled out as the embodiment of the threatening Other. On the national level, Frits Bolkestein (then parliamentary leader of the centre-right VVD party) exploited xenophobic sentiments, claiming that government policy was too soft on immigrants (Van der Horst 2001: 308-9; Mamadouh 2002: 11).

Anti-immigrant, and particularly anti-Muslim feelings were fed by a series of external events beginning with the 1990 Gulf War and culminating in the attacks of 9/11 (2001). Public awareness regarding illegal immigration in the Netherlands arose following the 1992 crash of a plane into a housing block filled with undocumented migrants. However, a consensus between Left and Right in Dutch politics prevented xenophobic sentiments from surfacing (Bolkestein was successfully marginalised), until they found their political expression in the movement mobilised by Pim Fortuyn in 2001-2. Fortuyn did not run on an anti-migrant platform per se, rather he expressed popular views regarding “the ‘failure of the multicultural society’” (Mamadouh 2002: 12).

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17 For one climax of this debate in the media, cf. Scheffer 2000. "Het multiculturele drama".
18 See Box 9.1, below. After an initial wave of sympathy, this incident fanned anti-immigrant sentiment, as many undocumented migrants were seen to exploit a one-time offer made by the authorities to legalise illegal aliens who had been living near the crash site (Van der Horst 2001: 305-6).
The charismatic Fortuyn was able to exploit a general public malaise with the political establishment and the rise in anti-immigrant feelings, to succeed where Bolkestein had failed. The List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) first gained a spectacular victory in the Rotterdam local elections (March 2002), and then at the national level right after his assassination (May 2002) (below). Fortuyn reframed the debate on host-stranger relations in the Netherlands, from ethnic to religious/cultural terms (Mamadouh 2002: 12). Islam was depicted as the religious, intolerant Other threatening secular Dutch liberalism and tolerance. This opened the door to a vociferous, no-holds-barred public debate on immigration and integration in the Netherlands that continues today.

In this context, migrant policies came under increasing criticism. The increasingly diverse background of immigration to the Netherlands made multicultural policies appear dangerously naïve. In the late 1980s the Minorities Policy came to be seen not only as inefficient (despite massive spending, minority shortfalls in labour and education had not been significantly diminished), but also as overly sensitive to the specific needs of cultural minorities. The result was a policy shift from the mid-1990s, away from ethnically targeted policies and toward a more universalist approach. In 1994 the government issued new guidelines incorporating most of the specific measures aimed at combating ethnic minority arrears into general social policies. This was accompanied by more restrictive welfare measures and the devolution of powers from the national government to local authorities. In 1998 the ministerial responsibility for ethnic minorities issues was combined with that of national urban policy, in one ministerial portfolio (Big Cities Policy, below).

The new government stand shifted funding from measures supporting minority cultures to more Assimilationist-type programmes. Minority-specific measures were criticised for stigmatising their target groups (as passive beneficiaries of the welfare state) and as blocking, rather than promoting, the integration of ethnic minorities. Finally, in a clear reaction to the perceived failure of the Minorities Policy in terms of cultural integration, a "Newcomers Policy" was initiated to better integrate newcomers into Dutch society. The principal instrument for this policy change was the 1998 "Newcomers Civic Integration Law" which made Dutch-language and civic indoctrination courses compulsory for all non-EU immigrants (see section 5 below).

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19 The shift in host-stranger relations in the 1990s was also tied to a debate over reform of the Dutch welfare state that was indirectly connected to the issue of integration. Briefly, it was seen that ethnic minorities originating from the guestworker years had not taken part in the restructuring of the Dutch economy: while unemployment among Dutch workers fell, it remained stubbornly high among the Turks and Moroccans. This too added to the perceived crisis in the Dutch Pluralist-style integration model (interview P. Terhorst).

20 The shift was expressed in two policy reports. The 1993 Minorities Report (Rapportage Minderheden 1993) abandoned the starting point of general policy, and the 1994 Ethnic Minorities Integration Policy Memorandum (Contourennota integratiebeleid etnische minderheden) emphasised integration and citizenship over cultural specificity, recommending a universalist policy approach (Musterd et al. 1998: 34).
3. The local context

3.1 Brief history of immigration to Amsterdam

In this city there is nobody who does not trade in something...Everyone is so preoccupied by his own profit that I could live here for all my life without ever being noticed by anyone.

(R. Descartes, newcomer to Amsterdam ca. 1635, cited in Mak 1999: 100).

Amsterdam has experienced substantial immigration for over 400 years, attracting and profiting from an influx of people fleeing religious persecution, political instability or poverty. During the city's Golden Age (1600 - 1650), merchants from Antwerp, Portuguese Jews, Scandinavians and Germans tripled the city's population from 50,000 to 150,000. By the mid-17th century Amsterdam was a veritable "city of outsiders", with over half its population born elsewhere (Mak 1999: 100). Newcomers were tolerated and even welcomed, as long as they were seen as contributing to the city's economic growth. This modern attitude toward strangers was striking in a Europe characterised by deep religious divisions.

In the 20th century, immigration to Amsterdam has reflected immigration cycles to the Netherlands (above), with some local variations. Amsterdam was initially less affected by guestworker migration because of the city's relatively small industrial base. In the late 1960s there were possibly 2000 Italian and Spanish labourers residing in Amsterdam. By 1973 there were some 9000 Turks and Moroccans legally resident in the city, or just over 1% of the population (the number of undocumented labour migrants is unknown). After the government ban on further recruitment in 1973 the Turkish and Moroccan population in Amsterdam rose sharply through family reunification. By 1978 it approached 25,000 documented residents or nearly 3.5% of the city population and signs of permanent settlement became increasingly apparent (Penninx 1979: 104-7). In 1975 the largest single increase occurred when 10,000 Surinamese settled in the city, many of them in the Bijlmer area (see below). Altogether, Amsterdam's immigrant/minority population more than doubled between 1961 and 1981 (Figure 9.1).
"Ethnic minorities": between 1947 - 1979 no data are available; in 1975 there were an estimated 38,000 "ethnic minorities" (Wintershoven 2001: 106); from 1979 "ethnic minorities" is defined by family head belonging to specified countries; from 1992 it includes all residents born in or with at least one parent from Category B countries (Surinam, Antilles, Turkey, Morocco, South Europe, Other non-industrialised countries).


In the 1980s-90s, asylum seekers and refugees became a significant element in Amsterdam's migrant population, along with economically-motivated migrants from around the world. As in other cities experiencing the "new migration" of the past two decades (Koser and Lutz 1998), immigrants now come from across the globe: the largest groups from non-OECD countries came from Ghana, Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, India, China, Iraq and Iran, respectively. Residents from OECD countries alone account for 9.6% of the city's population, reflecting Amsterdam's role as a "world city" (Nijman 2000). Altogether, the 1980s were marked by an annual increase of 1% in the share of non-native residents. This levelled off during the 1990s but in the same decade some 30,000 native Dutch left the city. As a result, Amsterdam now has one of the highest proportions of migrant-origin populations in Europe, accounting for 46.3% of the city population (Kraal 2001, O+S 2002).
3.2 Characterising Amsterdam’s migrant/minorities population

Ethnic composition and demographic characteristics

Amsterdam’s registered non-Dutch-origin population totals 347,634 (in a city of just over 735,000). Of these, eight out of ten came from non-industrialized countries (277,000 residents, or 36.7% of the city population). Among the “ethnic minorities”[21], Surinamese and Antilleans make up the largest group (84,000, or 11.4% of the city population), followed by Moroccans (59,000), Turks (36,000) and South Europeans (17,000). Migrants from additional non-OECD countries total another 80,000 residents. An additional 71,000 come from OECD countries, the largest group being Germans (O+S 2002) (Figures 9.2, 9.3). Ethnic minorities already constitute a large majority of the Amsterdammers below the age of 20. When including immigrants from developed countries, it becomes clear that sometime in the next decade Dutch-origin residents will become a minority (albeit the largest) in Amsterdam. The following characteristics refer to “ethnic minorities” who are the focus of this work (hereafter: ‘minorities’ or ‘migrants’) and exclude immigrants from developed countries.

The migrant/minority population in Amsterdam presents a clear picture of permanence: 36% are second-generation (born in the Netherlands with at least one immigrant parent); over 44% of the first-generation migrants have resided in the Netherlands for more than 15 years; 7.5% of Amsterdam’s elderly population (65 and over) are now of ethnic minority origin. Demographic data show increasing similarities with the indigenous population in terms of gender ratio, declining fertility rates and smaller households. A large majority (87%) of second-generation Amsterdammers are below 25 years of age, meaning they are either in the school system or entering the labour market (Feijter et al. 2001). Much of migrant policy at the national as well as the local level is directed at this age cohort.

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[21] As noted above (section 2.5.3), “ethnic minorities” refers to the official category of targeted ethnic minority groups and thus excludes minorities originating from Indonesia and OECD countries. The ten largest ethnic groups in Amsterdam are: Surinam (72,000), Morocco (59,000), Turkey (36,000), former Dutch East Indies (21,000), Germany (17,000), Antilles and Aruba (12,000), Ghana (10,000), Great Britain (8,000), Indonesia (6,000) and former Yugoslavia (5,000) (O+S Jaarboek 2002).
Figure 9.2 Migrant/minority population in Amsterdam, by country of origin (percentage)

![Pie chart showing the percentage breakdown of migrant/minority population in Amsterdam by country of origin.]

- Surinamese: 21%
- Moroccans: 17%
- Other non industrialized countries: 23%
- South-Europeans: 5%
- Turks: 10%
- Antillians: 4%
- Other industrialized countries: 20%

Source: O+S 2002 (Research and Statistics Bureau, Municipality of Amsterdam).

Figure 9.3 Migrant/minority population in Amsterdam, by country of origin (numbers)

![Bar chart showing the number of migrant/minority population in Amsterdam by country of origin.]

- Surinamese: 90,000
- Moroccans: 70,000
- Other non industrialized countries: 60,000
- South-Europeans: 50,000
- Turks: 40,000
- Antillians: 30,000

Source: O+S 2002 (Research and Statistics Bureau, Municipality of Amsterdam).
Socio-economic indicators

In terms of educational levels and labour market position, the "ethnic minorities" are clearly behind the overall Amsterdam average. Nationwide, close to 90% of minority parents are either low schooled or un schooled. This places second-generation pupils at a disadvantage, with Turkish and Moroccan children farthest behind. Dutch secondary schools separate children into vocational and higher-education tracks, with minority children highly overrepresented in the vocational track. As a result, while half of the Dutch reach some form of higher education, the rates are much lower for Moroccan (4%), Turkish (9%) and Surinamese youth (19%). In addition, minority youth suffer a higher drop-out rate. Over the last twenty years, however, research is showing "a generational shift for the better, as well as an increased differentiation between more or less successful minority groups, and between more or less successful youngsters within the same minority group" (Phalet 2001: 4-5). Within Amsterdam's school system, existing research shows that while second-generation children are narrowing the gap, shortfalls still exist (Musterd 2002a: 6).

A significant gap between migrants and native Dutch also exists in the labour market. Guestworker migrants were hit especially hard by the first and second oil crises and the recessions that followed (mid-1970s, early 1980s), which led to massive layoffs in the traditional industries such as shipping and automobiles. With their low educational levels and less-than-fluent Dutch, labour migrants were left behind in the economic restructuring of the 1980s-1990s, resulting in structural unemployment especially among first-generation immigrants (Burgers and Musterd 2002). In Amsterdam, economic polarisation between native and migrant-origin residents has been particularly strong as the city moved from an industrial to a services-based economy. Between 1991 and 1998 the unemployment rate of Amsterdam's native Dutch residents fell from 12% to 5%, while the unemployment rate for Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese residents in 1998 was respectively 21%, 17% and 9% (down from 1991 unemployment rates of 30%, 30% and 25%, respectively). Lower participation rates in the labour market among women of immigrant origin are also strongly felt, especially among Moroccans and Turks (ibid). Relatively high unemployment also characterises the second generation, with unemployment among ethnic youth three times higher than their Dutch age cohorts.

The effects of economic restructuring on the migrant population are mitigated by the extensive Dutch welfare regime (Musterd 2002b). This means that despite high levels of unemployment among minorities only "very few small pockets of poverty" could be found in Amsterdam (ibid: 6). Another response to the weakening position of migrants on the labour market has been a rise in ethnic entrepreneurship over the last two decades (Kloosterman and Van der Leun 1999, Rath 2000). In

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22 However, the official definition of "ethnic minorities" includes social disadvantage as a built-in criterion, creating a problem of circularity (Phalet 2001: 4).

23 In the mid-1990s, for example, only 29% of Surinamese had secondary education, compared to almost half of the native Dutch population (Musterd 2002a: 6).

24 33% for Moroccans, 29% for Turks, 17% for Surinamese, compared with only 9% of Dutch children (Phalet 2001: 4).

25 Restructuring resulted in a loss of some 60,000 jobs in industry in the Amsterdam area between 1970 and 1995 (a decrease of 40%) while the number of jobs in the secondary and tertiary sectors rose sharply (Kraal 2001: 20).
1994, migrants were responsible for nearly a quarter of all new businesses in Amsterdam. Public sector jobs provide another channel of employment for migrants in Amsterdam, primarily for Surinamese (Rath 2000: 35).

**Geographic distribution**

Compared to other European cities, Amsterdam has a moderate level of segregation (Musterd et al. 1998). Nevertheless, there is an uneven distribution of different ethnic groups across the sixteen city districts (Maps 9.1, 9.2a-b). The higher proportion of ethnic minority residents is found in several western districts and in east Amsterdam (48-56%), while the four city districts with the lowest proportion of minorities (17-25%) are found in central and south-western Amsterdam. The south-eastern district of Bijlmermeer contains the highest proportion of ethnic minority residents, with 61.6% (O+S 2000).

**Map 9.1** Amsterdam, city districts

![Map 9.1 Amsterdam, city districts](image)

Source: O+S 2003 (Research and Statistics Bureau, Municipality of Amsterdam).

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26 However, there is considerable variety among different ethnic groups, with Turks, Italians and smaller ethnic groups such as Chinese and Egyptians overrepresented, while Surinamese, Moroccans and others are underrepresented, cf. (Kloosterman and Van der Leun 1999, Rath 2000).

27 Amsterdam is divided into 16 districts. Statistical subdivisions (*buurtcombinaties*) are here translated as quarters. 221
Map 9.2a Distribution of total migrant/minority population in Amsterdam

"% of foreigners" refers to the percentage of migrant/minority residents of non-Dutch origin (first and second generation), including Dutch citizens, in total population, per sub-district. (Numbers in parentheses refer to the total number of sub-districts in each percentile)

Map 9.2b Distribution of "ethnic minority" population in Amsterdam

"% of ethnic minorities" refers to the targeted "ethnic minority" categories: Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks, Moroccans, South Europeans and Other Non-industrialised Countries (excludes minorities from industrialised countries and from the former Dutch East Indies).

Source: O+S 2003 (Research and Statistics Bureau, Municipality of Amsterdam).
The current pattern of distribution reflects different processes of migrant settlement and residential choices over the past decades (Van Amersfoort and De Klerk 1984). The Turkish and Moroccan labour migrants who arrived in the 1960s were concentrated in the city centre where hostels and cheap flats were available. In 1973 the majority still resided in the city centre and parts of its 19\textsuperscript{th} century inner belt. By 1983, following family reunification, much of this population had moved to social housing in the outer neighbourhoods, as this housing stock became available due to suburbanisation and local housing policy (Map 9.3).

Map 9.3 Residential patterns of Turks and Moroccans, 1973-1998

Source: Musterd and Deurloo 2002, p. 493, Figure 2.
The Surinamese pattern of settlement was somewhat different, as the Surinamese immigration of the mid-1970s coincided with the newly constructed housing estates of the Bijlmer, where many have remained until now (see Box 9.2). The residential pattern of the remaining Surinamese population in Amsterdam "shows a rough resemblance to that of the other immigrant groups, though concentrations tend to be much less pronounced" (ibid: 212).

Box 9.2 The Bijlmer: Amsterdam's ethnic district

The Bijlmermeer or Zuidoost (Southeast) district is physically separated from the rest of the city. In the late 1960s "the Bijlmer" was planned and constructed as a massive housing project according to modernist principles, with spacious apartments in high-rise tower blocks surrounded by green areas. This did not attract the Dutch families for whom it was designed and thousands of flats remained empty.

When the first wave of Surinamese immigrants arrived in 1974-75 they quickly settled in this area, leading to further out-migration of Dutch residents. The second migrant wave from Surinam (1979) turned the Bijlmer into "Surinam's second largest city". Altogether over 30,000 Surinamese and Antilleans reside in this district, by far the dominant ethnic group of any area in Amsterdam.

In the 1980s-90s the construction of low-rise and single-family houses in the newest neighbourhoods of the district have attracted Dutch and Surinamese residents, lowering the proportion of Surinamese in the older parts of the Bijlmer. Here newer immigrants, mostly from Africa, have settled. The Bijlmer suffers from a concentration of social problems, high unemployment and crime rates, as well as serving as a starting point for many migrant businesses and a focus of Caribbean and African cultural life in the city.

The 1992 crash of a cargo plane into one of the Bijlmer apartment blocks, in which 40 people died, revealed that hundreds of the district's residents were undocumented immigrants. Bijlmer became (and remains) a symbol of immigration in the Netherlands, and the issue of illegal immigrants has since remained on the political agenda.

The creation of the Bijlmer bears resemblance to the development of Paris' "Chinatown" in the Triangle de Choisy (13th district). There, too, a wave of immigrants from Asia turned an unattractive 1960s high-rise residential project (Olympiades) intended for middle-class Parisians into a thriving ethnic enclave. The main difference is that the Olympiades is located well inside Paris, while the Bijlmer's geographical isolation, together with its socio-economic problems, make it more similar to Paris's suburban housing estates. In many ways the Bijlmer, like Paris's suburban housing estates (HLMs), is located "outside the city walls".

Sources: Van der Horst 2001; Pinçon 2001.

Over the past twenty years the rather uneven dispersal of the migrant population from central Amsterdam to the outer neighbourhoods has continued, resulting in what Musterd and Deurloo (2002) identified as "clusters" of Moroccan and Turkish concentrations in the western and eastern neighbourhoods, and of Surinamese in the south-east (Bijlmermeer). However, even in these concentrations the segregation levels are not very high, and they conclude (p. 502) that the three largest minority groups in the city (Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans) are "certainly not establishing
Altogether, segregation levels have remained relatively stable, although there has been some increase in the 1990s.

The absence of strongly ethnically-segregated neighbourhoods in Amsterdam has to do with the pattern of housing created by local urban policy. In the 19th century, when future patterns of segregation were being set by Haussmannian-style renovation policies in Paris and other cities, Amsterdam "failed" to carry out similar massive renovation of its historic areas, for a variety of reasons (cf. Wagenaar 1993, 2001). From the early 20th century onwards and at least until recently, the city council pursued a consistent policy of public housing construction across all parts of the city. This has resulted in relatively low levels of residential segregation despite the widening economic gap between Dutch-origin and (certain) ethnic minority residents. Indeed, this housing policy (combined with more general suburbanisation trends) has meant that the main fault-lines of residential segregation in Amsterdam, based on housing types, are between families with children (Dutch and minority-origin) and non-family households (Van Amersfoort and De Klerk 1984: 220). The overall division of residential patterns in the city into roughly three groups - minority family households / Dutch family households and non-family (largely Dutch) households also explains the phenomenon of "Black and White" schools, described below (Clark et al 1992; interview De Klerk).

3.3 Political and institutional context

City-State relations

The Netherlands have been described as a decentralized unitary state, with central government very active and influential in its legislative capacity but leaving broad powers of implementation to local authorities (Barlow 2000: 10). In practice, a high degree of centralisation is combined with a Dutch tradition of co-governance and consensus. This leaves local authorities with some autonomy in terms of how they spend the considerable sums of government funding they receive (Amsterdam is on the whole less dependent than smaller authorities). Some 90% of local authority budgets come from the national government, of which about a third are unspecified grants open to local discretion. The system of calculating the amount the State allocates to each municipality includes the city's "ethnic minorities" population, however, each local authority spends this money as it sees fit (Musterd et al. 1998: 32-34).

An example is provided by the institution of crown-appointed mayors. This appears to be a more centralized and less democratic system than locally elected mayors, but in practice the mayor is

28 Musterd and Deurloo (2002) measured spatial segregation in Amsterdam by ethnic groups in small areal units and found that Turks and Moroccans were most segregated from the remaining population, followed closely by Surinamese and Antilleans. Nevertheless, the percentage of Moroccans and Turks in "their" clusters was only 29 and 21 percent of each area's population, respectively, and two-thirds of the Turkish and Moroccan residents in Amsterdam live outside these clusters. The Surinamese clusters are all located in Bijlmer as a result of their settlement there in the 1970s. Surinamese clusters are more dominated by Surinamese (39%), but only 12% of the total Surinamese population lives in these clusters.

29 Co-governance refers to the way in which the national, provincial and municipal levels function in a highly interdependent system of decision-making. Although formally hierarchical, this depends on reaching a consensus at all levels on most decisions (Barlow 2000).
decided upon by the ruling government parties in consultation with their local representatives, so that
an unpopular candidate will not be imposed on a city. Appointed mayors more often serve as
arbitrators in the local political scene, avoiding the phenomenon of centralized mayoral
policymaking that characterises the other cities in this comparison.

The Dutch system of co-governance means that government policy may often be the outcome of
local initiatives that were then adopted at the national level (after consultation between all the key
actors). An example of this is the Newcomers Policy described below.

Politics and policymaking in Amsterdam

The political and institutional context in Amsterdam is characterised by council-led rather than
mayoral policymaking, a very left-wing political scene and a consensus-style of governance. The
liberal political scene explains in part Amsterdam's overtly multicultural, pro-immigrant local
policies over the past 25 years which are remarkable even by Dutch standards. The consensus style
of decision-making explains in part the absence of any significant or extreme opposition to these
policies. While the city of Amsterdam has an image of looseness bordering on a kind of "controlled
chaos", this is largely a stereotype left over from the 1960s-1970s, an era of loose municipal control
in many policy areas. Since then the municipality has steadily tightened its control over local
affairs and policymaking has become increasingly technocratic. In the past decade this has been
alayed by the devolution of much policymaking from the municipal to the city district level.

Council-led policy-making. Amsterdam is governed by a Gemeenteraad (City Council) of 45
members, and a College (the Council's executive, consisting of the mayor and eight aldermen who
are appointed by the coalition parties). The mayor chairs both City Council and College, but can
only vote in the College. Overall municipal policy is made by City Council, with councillors
involved in more specific policymaking through "advisory committees" which meet regularly,
chaired by the alderman responsible for each topic. Ongoing policy decisions and coordination
occurs in the College, which is also responsible for implementing government policies at the local
level. The mayor is responsible for public order and heads the municipal police, as well as holding
general portfolios such as Personnel and External Relations. Municipal elections are held every four
years, while the mayor is appointed for a period of six years that can be renewed by the government.

Left-wing politics. Historically, Amsterdam's party lists have been more left-wing than their
national counterparts, and the city's appointed mayor has always come from Labour (Partij van de
Arbeid--closer to continental social-democrat parties than to the English Labour party). City council
has long been dominated by the PvdA which formed broad coalitions that left out the extreme Left
and extreme Right. Until the mid-1990s there was no Extreme Right presence in city council:
currently it has 1-2 seats in city council. The present city council (2002-06), headed by the PvdA in

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30 In 1968, after repeated clashes between the police and radicals, the mayor was replaced as Amsterdam appeared
increasingly ungovernable.
31 Until recently the aldermen were also city councillors, but since the last elections (March 2002) the two roles are
separate, so that aldermen (chosen from the party list) do not sit as councillors.
32 Leefbaar Amsterdam ("Quality of Life Amsterdam") is a breakaway list from the national Leefbaar party (in which
Pim Fortuyn originally began), but Leefbaar Amsterdam is more extreme in its racist and anti-immigrant stand.

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coalition with the Conservative Liberal (VVD) and Christian Democrats (CDA), presents a stark contrast to the swing to the right that took place in Dutch politics in 2002. In Amsterdam, the PvdA retained its 15 seats on the council and there was little change in the other parties. Amsterdam voters followed the siren call of anti-immigrant politicians in the national elections but not in the municipal elections, where Fortuyn's LPF did not run.

Another characteristic of the local political context is that all the major lists in Amsterdam contain minority-origin representatives (Berger et al. 2001: 39-40). In 1985 local voting rights were extended in the Netherlands to non-citizen residents. Since then the number of ethnic-origin councillors in Amsterdam has steadily increased (from three in 1986 to eleven in 1998). However, there is only one aldermen of ethnic minority origin. The role of ethnic-origin councillors is unclear. On one hand they are clearly recruited to local party lists as ethnic representatives (whether this is a cynical attempt to draw the "ethnic vote" or a sincere belief in the need for minority representation depends on one's point of view). Yet, once elected they are not supposed to behave as sectarian representatives, as this would smack of clientelism (Heelsum 2002).

Amsterdam's governance style follows the Dutch style of consensus-building. Numerous advisory committees and other means of participation throughout the long (often laborious) decision-making process allow the co-optation of outside elements into the system. During the 1960s-70s this style of governance functioned primarily to co-opt opposition from the Left, e.g. the Provo and squatter movements, whose middle-aged representatives now sit in the council and municipal bureaucracy. In the 1980s-90s co-optation worked to diffuse potential right-wing opposition to local policies. Mechanisms of cooptation such as advisory councils, open hearings, etc. have also diffused any potential open confrontation with ethnic minority groups. Finally, the generous allocation of money has often been used to acquiesce opposition, as in the case of the Moluccans (see below).

Since the 1970s, Amsterdam's local decision-making process "takes place in an open-government style" (Kraal and Zorlu 1998: 26). Council debates are broadcast live on local cable radio, public hearings are often held before important decisions, preparatory committee meetings are open to the public. However, some feel that the various participatory mechanisms are primarily a way of letting off steam and gaining legitimacy for policies that are ultimately made by municipal politicians and technocrats (cf. Pirschner 2002: 102; interviews E. Adusei, A. Menebhi).

In 1990 local policymaking was decentralised, with considerable decision-making and resources transferred from City Hall to the city District Councils (stadsdeelraaden). District councils (currently

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31 Following the assassination of Pim Fortuyn (just before the 2002 elections) there was a sharp fall of the PvdA and VVD. This led to formation of the first Centre-Right government in the Netherlands (VVD and Pim Fortuyn List), which collapsed in October 2002. The January 2003 elections restored the strength of the mainstream parties, while the LPF only got seven seats. At the time of writing a new government coalition is being negotiated.

32 Fortuyn distanced himself from the extreme anti-immigrant platform of Leefbaar Amsterdam and did not field any candidates in the Amsterdam municipal elections.

33 This reflects the actual proportion of the ethnic groups represented by the councillors (Surinamese, Moroccans, Turks and Ghanaians, accounting together for some 22% of the population), but under-represents the overall ethnic minority population by 2-3 seats.

34 This transparency is meant to be symbolised in the architecture of the Municipality building (see Box 5.1, Chapter 5).
fourteen in all) are elected during municipal elections, with each council then electing the district mayor.\textsuperscript{37} Here too there is a considerable representation of ethnic-origin councillors: 52 ethnic-origin district councillors were elected in the 1994 elections. District councils are now responsible for many issue areas including education, culture, housing and public facilities. The municipality remains in charge of police and health care, major infrastructure and housing to some extent, as well as long-term strategic policy. This means that after 1990 much of 'local migrant policy' in Amsterdam has been made at the district level. Decentralisation has considerably diminished the effectiveness of City Hall's official minorities policy, as the different districts vary in their policies toward migrants (Wolff 1999).

4. Migrant policies in Amsterdam

This section describes local policies toward migrants in Amsterdam from the early 1960s to 2002. Subsections 4.1 - 4.5 below correspond to the phases in Amsterdam's policy reaction to immigration. Each phase is subdivided according to the main policy domains/areas that expressed migrant policy in that period.

4.1 Non-policy, late 1950s - early-1960s

As noted above, labour immigration in the postwar period began with small numbers of workers from Italy and later Spain, recruited by employers in heavy industries or arriving on their own during the late 1950s. By the early 1960s there were several hundreds or possibly a thousand workers from southern Europe in Amsterdam, lodging in cheap accommodations mostly in the city centre. Most of these "gastarbeiders" returned home after several years, but some remained, eventually gaining permanent resident status. According to the pillarised system at that time the needs of these newcomers were the responsibility of employers as well as local churches and other institutions in the "Catholic pillar". The municipality of Amsterdam was probably aware of their presence but there were no local policies regarding this population. This period, can be identified as 'Transient' in terms of the migration phase as well as the local (non-)policy reaction.

4.2 Guestworker policies, mid-1960s to mid-1970s

The shift to a Guestworker phase of migration occurred in the mid-1960s with the implementation of a national guestworker policy (see above). In Amsterdam this change was felt in the quantity and composition of the migrant population. The number of foreign workers in the city grew from hundreds to thousands and migrants from Turkey and North Africa soon outnumbered those from southern Europe. Despite signs of settlement from the early 1970s (such as family reunification), the local policy reaction in Amsterdam during this period was based on the assumption that the workers would reside in the city for a limited number of years before returning to their home countries. As noted above, the "myth of return" was shared by the government and most

\textsuperscript{37} In 1998 several districts were combined, making thirteen altogether. In 2002 the city centre (Binnenstad), until then under direct responsibility of city council, became the city’s fourteenth district council (two others are unpopulated)
of the labour migrants until at least the mid-1970s. This Guestworker attitude was expressed primarily in local housing policy as described below.

**Housing policy**

The primary problem in Amsterdam was lodging: from the end of the war until the mid-1960s the city suffered a severe housing shortage. National guestworker policy required employers to provide housing to their workers during the first year. Workers were lodged in boarding houses, rented rooms and in a few specialized accommodations arranged by large-scale employers. The largest of these was "Camp Ataturk", a barracks set up in 1966 in a former refugee camp in North Amsterdam to accommodate between 400 to 500 Turkish workers recruited by NDSM, a shipbuilding company. The municipality was only involved as a lessor of the land to NDSM, which ran the camp for almost ten years (Van Amersfoort and De Klerk 1984).

In principle, guestworkers also had access to Amsterdam's large stock of social housing, which was open to all newcomers after two years of legal residence in the city. However, the nature of the housing allocation system shut out migrants from all but the most marginal housing. Not only did the formal criteria (time on the waiting lists, family size) work against single male newcomers, but the social housing corporations which represented different 'pillars' systematically discriminated against outsiders, reserving the better units for their traditional clientele. Although the formal criteria for housing allocation were universal, the housing corporations had a wide margin which allowed widespread informal discrimination. The guestworkers, who did not belong to any of the existing pillars, were at the bottom of the ladder when it came to social housing allocation.

Most guestworkers therefore found lodging either in the lower end of the private (rent-controlled) market or in the worst of the public housing. Although both sectors were theoretically under municipal supervision, in effect the city took no action against the overcrowded and often illegal lodging of the guestworkers. Owners of rent-controlled housing did not bother to request the permits necessary to turn them into boarding houses and the illegal subletting of rooms in social housing was (and remains!) rampant. Around 1970, it is estimated that over 2000 Moroccans and Turks were living in illegal boarding houses, mostly in the city centre and surrounding 19th century belt (interview L. de Klerk). The municipality ignored the overcrowding that resulted from

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38 From the beginning of the 20th century, municipal housing policies have created a large social housing stock which accounts for some 60% of all housing in Amsterdam. The cheapest stock was public municipal housing (council housing), while the better social housing stock is owned and managed by non-profit local housing corporations. In addition, much of the private rental housing is rent-controlled, so that the large majority of housing in the city is formally under municipal supervision. Currently, about 85% of the housing units in the city are rental, only 15% are owner-occupied. Rules regarding access to social housing changed over the years. In the late 1960s social housing was only available to residents of more than two years in the city, over 28 years old, and married. The minimum age was later lowered and singles could also apply, although married couples have priority (ibid).

39 Until the mid-1970s, guestworker migrants wishing to bring over family faced a Catch-22 situation: to apply for a family-size flat one's family had to be legally resident, but the Aliens Law allowed family reunion only if adequate accommodation had been found! Many dependents were thus illegally resident.

40 Amsterdam's housing corporations were established in the early 20th century following the pillarisation system, i.e. one corporation was associated with the Socialist party and its activists, another with the Catholic party and its activists, etc.
guestworkers renting rooms intended for single occupancy but actually lodging family members as they arrived (Van Amersfoort and De Klerk 1984: 202).

The city's inaction was primarily due to its inability to provide adequate housing solutions at the time. The post-war housing shortage meant that awful housing conditions were the lot of indigenous residents as well. The city's non-policy during the 1960s and early 1970s should also be understood in the political-institutional context of the period (see above).

**Welfare services**

Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s City Hall assumed little or no responsibility for the social and economic problems of its resident guestworker population. Basic needs such as healthcare were to be provided through welfare services to which labour migrants had access according to the bilateral contracts signed between the Netherlands and the sending countries. The city saw no reason to ensure their foreign residents of this access. The overriding expectation was still that of a temporary problem: the workers and their dependents were expected for the most part to return home within a few years. Beyond that, it assumed that any need for social integration (presumably minimal and temporary for the majority of the migrants) would be taken care of by civic society, as happened with the labour migrants from southern Europe before them. After all, the integration of those Spaniards, Italians, etc. remaining in the Netherlands had been taken up by professionals from the private sector, mainly Roman Catholic social workers who saw themselves as responsible for their co-religionists. Indeed, some outreach efforts were made by churches toward the new Muslim newcomers as they had previously toward their co-religionists (interview L. de Klerk).

4.3 Accepting permanence: local migrant policies from the mid-1970s

The municipality's assumptions and expectations regarding the "temporariness" of its labour migrant population began to change in the early to mid-1970s, as it became less and less viable to ignore the signs of permanent settlement, and with them the mounting needs of a growing foreign population. Signs of permanence were first apparent in the housing situation, but soon appeared in other areas: schools, migrant mobilisation, etc. Amsterdam's policy reactions in these different domains began with informal measures and eventually led to a formal "Minorities Policy".

**Housing policy**

The municipality of Amsterdam was aroused from its complacent attitude regarding housing by a number of incidents. In Amsterdam, several fires in overcrowded lodgings resulted in deaths, raising awareness of the dire housing conditions in which foreign workers were living. At the same time, in the "hot summer" of 1972, riots broke out in a working class neighbourhood in Rotterdam between local residents and Turkish and Moroccan migrants, on the backdrop of general social unrest. Amsterdam's city council felt that it had to avert a possible crisis, beginning with the housing situation. The municipality began with lodging controls and inspections in the municipally-owned social housing sector. Illegal lodgings were upgraded, others were closed and their tenants moved to other municipal social housing units, destined in urban renewal plans for eventual demolition (ibid). In some cases the presence of migrant families was acknowledged and larger apartments were found.
However, these were temporary or ad-hoc solutions that could not solve the basic housing problem faced by a growing migrant population.

As signs of family reunification and settlement became clearer, the problematic housing situation of the labour migrants was raised at the national and municipal levels (Musterd et al. 1998: 35). In 1975 the municipality began to regulate the housing situation in earnest. At first, the registration of social housing flats to single guestworkers (when in fact they housed their whole family) was informally regularized, i.e. they were allowed to apply for family-size units. This was not an official policy decision; instead, the municipality applied pressure on the housing corporations to open up their stock of larger flats to guestworkers and their families (interview L. de Klerk). At first the corporations resisted but following a 1978 report ordered by the municipality, which revealed the extent of discrimination by the housing corporations, the latter began to cooperate with the municipality to regularize the migrants' housing situation. The informal procedures applied by the municipality from the mid-70s to allow guestworker families access to larger flats, were formalized within the entire social housing allocation system in Amsterdam by the 1980s (ibid).

The policy in social housing allocation corresponded to two other factors that eased the housing situation for migrants. As noted above, large-scale construction of social housing and suburbanization of the indigenous population opened up more of the social housing stock within Amsterdam to newcomers. As a result, the guestworkers and their families moved out of the city centre (one-room flats and boarding houses) to larger flats in surrounding neighbourhoods and especially to the new public housing neighbourhoods in west Amsterdam. The succession process was dramatic in some areas and by the late 1970s the housing situation became politicised.

A debate ensued at the national and local level over the need for dispersal policies to prevent the emergence of "ethnic ghettos" and "black schools" (see below, Box 9.3). Proponents of dispersal included local residents and merchants as well as social workers and some pro-migrant activists worried about the effects of segregation (ibid.). In Amsterdam, proposals for a dispersion policy were debated in the second half of the 1970s and appeared in two policy reports, but did not reach the policy stage.41 By 1979, a municipal report "made it explicitly clear that the supporters of a dispersion policy no longer had any business in Amsterdam" (Musterd et al. 1998: 37-38).

From the mid-1970s and throughout the 1980s a major national policy channelled government funding to the cities for the renovation of their deteriorated housing stock. Entitled "building for the neighbourhood" (bouwen voor de buurt), the programme gave local residents priority to remain in the renovated (sometimes newly-built) housing, at higher but still affordable rents. While this was not an ethnically-targeted policy, it clearly affected a higher proportion of minority residents, due to their higher presence in the blocks targeted for renewal. In Amsterdam, the impact on the migrant population was mixed: the Surinamese tended to take advantage of this and move into the renovated

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41 Dispersion policy was raised in a 1974 report as well as in the draft of a 1978 policy report entitled "The foreign workers and their families" (Raamnota 1978). Internal conflicts within the ruling PvdA regarding the scale of such a policy resulted in its exclusion from the final draft (interview L. de Klerk).
housing, while Moroccans tended to move to areas with lower rents that were still not renovated.\textsuperscript{42} Due to the dispersed pattern of social housing and the relatively compact size of Amsterdam, the renovation policy was applied in deteriorated neighbourhoods across all parts of the city. This meant that the movement of some of the migrant populations as a result of the higher rents in post-renovation areas did not cause the kind of spatial polarisation that occurred in other cities following renovation, e.g. Paris (interviews H. van Amersfoort, P. Terhorst).

\textbf{Policy toward migrant organisations}

A shift also appeared in municipal attitudes toward labour migrant mobilisation in the early 1970s. A growing activism among the labour migrants was becoming apparent, at least among left-wing Moroccan and Turkish organisation. At first, informal ties were formed between migrant activists and local residents (among them municipal workers), especially regarding the social and religious needs of the guestworker population.\textsuperscript{43} A few years later an attempt was made to create a voluntary "Foreign Workers Platform" (\textit{Platform Buitenlandswerknemers}) that would strengthen this cooperation. This attempt was plagued by personal frictions, but can be seen as the forerunner to the eventual establishment of an official support centre for migrant organizations in 1981 (the ACB, below). Prior to this, i.e. from the mid-1970s, there was a trickle of municipal funding for the few labour migrant organizations that applied for subsidies, but the municipality did not show much interest in the activities of labour migrant organizations until 1980. Vermeulen (2002: 23) notes that prior to 1980, "Turkish organizations had no structural place in or influence on the local political system" and social and cultural activities for these communities were provided by one large (Dutch) welfare organization.\textsuperscript{44}

This contrasts with the city's policy toward Surinamese organizations. As early as 1968 the municipality began delegating some services to \textit{Welsuria}, a newly founded Surinamese organisation which "received a leading role in the provision of social policy to Surinamese in Amsterdam" (ibid: 15). This was followed by generous funding to rival Surinamese organizations, with subsidization mounting rapidly from the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{45} In 1974 the permanent nature of the Surinamese population in Amsterdam was officially acknowledged in a memorandum, preceding national government recognition by four years (ibid).

\textsuperscript{42} Renovation programmes also affected migrants as well as indigenous newcomers in another way. Since the criteria for receiving units in the renovated blocks favoured veteran tenants, those not answering to these criteria were given a choice of social housing in other (pre-renovation) neighbourhoods. This increased the phenomenon of "urban nomadism" whereby those on the bottom of the highly-regulated housing market have to move every 1-2 years. Newcomers were disproportionately affected (interview P. Terhorst).

\textsuperscript{43} A "Mosques Workgroup" was set up in 1974, including officials from the municipality acting as private individuals, to coordinate actions with migrant leaders to locate places for worship.

\textsuperscript{44} In 1978 public funding for Turkish organizations was still less than 2\% of the subsidies received by Surinamese organizations (ibid).

\textsuperscript{45} Between 1975 and 1984 Surinamese organizations received over 5 million guilders a year, in what Vermeulen (2002: 16) describes as "impulsive local policy" that threw money to quell increasingly militant demands by competing organizations. Subsidies to \textit{Welsuria} were followed by subsidies to a rival association (BEST) in 1972. In 1973 the occupation of BEST's office by rival Surinamese activists led to subsidization of the latter (!) and so on. City council put a stop to this in the mid-1980s (ibid).
Summing up the above, it is possible to identify a period of Non-policy from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, followed by Guestworker-type policies that began in the mid-1960s and effectively ended in the mid-1970s. At that point the municipality began regularizing the housing situation of migrant families, although a new housing policy was not formally put into place until later. A similar process occurred in local policy toward labour migrant organizations: informal ties were followed by partial acknowledgment of migrant organizations (small subsidies), culminating in official recognition in 1981.

4.4 "Minorities Policy", 1980 to mid-1990s

Although Amsterdam’s *de facto* acknowledgement of labour migrant settlement began in the mid-1970s as shown above, the first *de jure* recognition by the municipality appeared in 1978. The "Policy memorandum concerning foreign workers" stated that the starting point for local policy was "the fact that the presence of a considerable number of foreign employees in Dutch society is of a permanent nature" (Concept beleidsnota inzake buitenlandse werknemers in Amsterdam’, 1978, cited in Musterd et al. 1998: 35). This was followed by a number of draft reports, culminating in the 1982 municipal "Memorandum concerning an integrated minorities policy". Amsterdam’s new policy roughly paralleled the shift in thinking at the national level (as noted above, the national government formally accepted the permanence of the ethnic minorities in 1980).

Amsterdam’s new Minorities Policy (*Minderhedenbeleid*) acknowledged not only the permanence but also the *Otherness* of its new population, and "was based on the idea that minorities should integrate while also maintaining their cultural identity" (Kraal 2001: 20). The Minorities Policy adopted the government’s definition of "ethnic minority target groups": Surinamese and Antilleans; Turks; Moroccans; South Europeans; migrants from other non-industrialized countries. From this point (1980 onwards), Amsterdam’s local migrant policy does not distinguish between its migrant/minority residents, regardless of their different (post-colonial or guestworker) origins.

The declared aims of Amsterdam’s Minorities Policy were to integrate these minorities through an equal-rights membership in society, and reducing minority disadvantages in the labour market, education and housing. Throughout the 1980s and part of the 1990s a number of institutional arrangements and a broad range of actions were designed and (in part) implemented with these goals in mind. However, specific actions by the municipality itself were few in the first years following the 1982 memorandum. Following the 1984 elections, the new alderman responsible for the minorities policy (Peter Jong) established a "Minorities policy coordination bureau" to formulate specific policies per target group and oversee their progress (Municipality of Amsterdam 1999: 39). The new bureau consisted of a handful of civil servants (headed by a woman of Turkish origin) and remained relatively isolated from the other departments. According to Jong’s successor, this unit “did not try to

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46 A number of draft reports were produced between 1979 and 1982, including "Foreign workers and their families in Amsterdam" (April 1979), and two secondary reports on policy towards minorities in housing and education. Stagnation in the final draft formulation of these reports led to a 1981 decision to reorganize minorities policy, expressed in the final 1982 report “Nota inzake een geïntegreerd minderhedenbeleid” (Municipality of Amsterdam 1999: 39).
change the mindset of the civil servants in the different departments,” instead, they formulated a long list of actions to be initiated across various policy domains. Since the proposed policies targeted different ethnic groups, their implementation “would have required a complete reorganization of the municipality” (interview J. Van der Aa). A policy document was prepared outlining some 150 proposed actions was approved by the College and city council and sent to the departments for implementation -- where it was largely ignored by the municipal bureaucracy.47

Nevertheless, a variety of actions and projects targeting ethnic minorities were initiated by the municipality during the 1980s and 1990s. They express a clearly Pluralist view of integration, in rhetoric and sometimes in practice. Some of these are described below, following roughly the order of policy issue areas from the typology.

**Ethnic minority advisory councils**

In 1986, a year after the right to vote in local elections was extended to all non-citizen residents in the Netherlands, Amsterdam established three ethnic-based “minority advisory councils” (*minderheden adviesraden*). This was meant to express the view in city council, that the *active participation* of ethnic minorities was crucial to their integration in local society, and that political participation could be community-based. In other words, merely voting as individuals was not judged sufficient as a guarantor of political participation for those belonging to disadvantaged minority groups. This reflected the Pluralist attitudes toward migrant integration that dominated then.

The *adviesraden* were composed of representatives of pre-selected migrant organizations from each community as proposed to the mayor and aldermen and appointed by city council. Financed by and housed in City Hall (with their own budgets and secretarial staff), their role was to advise city council on existing and proposed policies affecting their communities. This advice was supposed to be taken into account by the mayor and alderman in the decision-making process, and reasons for rejection of advisory council proposals was to be given within a month. The first three advisory councils represented respectively the Surinamese, Antillean and Moluccan communities; the Turkish and Moroccan communities; and the remaining ethnic minority residents. Dissatisfaction with their representativeness and effectiveness led to a restructuring in 1991, resulting in a total of five ethnic advisory councils: TDM (Turks); SRM (Moroccans); SAAMGha (Surinamese, Antilleans/Arubians, Moluccans and Ghanaians); ZEG (South Europeans); and VluChiPa (Refugees, Chinese and Pakistanis) (Berger et al. 2001: 46, Pirschner 2002: 83). These ethnic amalgamations are an interesting reflection of the categorisation of Others applied in the city's minorities policy.

47 According to Van der Aa, when he became alderman in 1994 he talked with department heads who had not read the 1989 memorandum. Thus, an “affirmative hiring policy” that appeared in the memorandum was reduced to a statement in municipal advertisements for personnel, stating that women and ethnic minorities would get priority. How and if this prioritizing was to take place was not followed up (ibid).
In practice, the ethnic advisory councils never attained substantial influence. Discontent with the relations between the ethnic advisory councils and the municipality surfaced quickly and remained strong until their dissolution in 2002. Advisory council members felt that they were given insufficient resources to maintain ongoing contact with their communities on one hand and with municipal decisionmakers on the other, as expected of them (most of this work was done by volunteers), and that their advice was never taken seriously. Municipal councillors and officials complained that the advisory councils were not functioning properly and insufficiently involved in presenting concrete advice (ibid., ibid).

According to Van der Aa, the advisory councils and the Minorities Bureau spoke with each other, but neither one was sufficiently in touch with his environment (the bureau with municipal politicians and bureaucrats, the advisory council members with their communities). As a result,

throughout the 1980s there was a formal policy [directed at ethnic minorities] but in fact the municipal government had hardly any contact with the [minority] residents, except through the advisory councils, who were made up of the older first-generation activists (interview Van der Aa).

This changed after 1990 with decentralisation: "When the districts got responsibility, they sought contacts directly with their residents, including minority residents, mosques, young activists..." (ibid). One of the primary aims of Alderman Van der Aa when he assumed responsibility for the Minorities policy in 1994, was to abolish the minority advisory councils (see below).

Empowering migrant associations

An important component of the Minorities Policy was to encourage migrant organizations to serve as vehicles of minority empowerment. Migrant associations were expected "to promote and preserve cultural identities, to emancipate their constituencies and to serve as advocacy groups" (1984 Gemeenteblad, cited in Vermeulen 2002: 23). This reflected the Dutch vision of pillarised integration in which individual empowerment was based on empowerment of the individual's community, and the government (national and local) was to support each community's social, cultural and religious needs. By the 1970s pillarisation was considered somewhat irrelevant in regard to relations among the Dutch (this was expressed in the constitutional reform of 1983 which formally separated between church and state). But with the acknowledgement of new minorities in the country, the consociational approach with its empowerment of civic minority organizations was seen as the obvious way of integrating the newcomers. Municipal support for ethnic-based organizations was thus seen, in the eyes of the host society, as the most natural way of accomplishing integration (just as in France it was seen by the host society as the most unnatural way of accomplishing integration).

Support for migrant organisations as leading players in the integration process was based on institutionalising and subsidising their roles as advocates of, and service suppliers to, their respective

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communities. In the early 1980s the "Amsterdam Centre for Foreigners" (ACB) was established to provide organizational support and services to migrant organizations. But as noted above, labour migrant organizations were ignored until the mid-1980s, compared to the money lavished on Surinamese organizations. From 1985 the Minorities Policy extended official recognition to labour migrant associations "as providers of certain services to their communities" (ibid). A significant increase in municipal and State subsidisation followed, totalling some 500,000 guilders annually for Turkish organisations alone in the second half of the 1980s. Unlike the case of Rome, the delegation of social and welfare services to migrant organizations came in addition to, rather than substituting for, the provision of targeted services provided directly by the municipality.

Welfare services
Two phases can be identified in the provision of services by the city's welfare department. In the first half of the 1980s the city acknowledged that its ethnic minority residents faced specific problems but there was as yet little experience nor budgeting for migrant-targeted measures. In 1986 the alderman for welfare Peter Jong instituted a new policy of "general services where possible, targeted services where necessary". Between 1986 and 1990 the municipality established various projects and programmes specifically targeting migrants as well as ethnically-specific services using cultural mediators?). The overriding motivation for Jong's "categorale" (as opposed to general) policy was practical rather than ideological, based on the alderman's assumption that fighting the array of problems faced by the city's ethnic minorities could not be accomplished without "target-group activities" (interview R. van Oordt).

Since 1990 most of the competencies in welfare policy have moved from City Hall to the city districts, making it more difficult to speak of a "municipal policy" in this area (see section 4.4 below).

Labour market policies
During the 1980s, as the Netherlands successfully restructured itself into a post-Fordist economy, the labour migrants turned from an economic benefit to a drag on growth in the eyes of many Dutch. Successful integration came to be seen as a matter of getting minorities back into the labour market (Burgers & Musterd 2002, interview J. Rath). In Amsterdam the presence of many long-term unemployed was a drain on the city's welfare budget, due to the national system of welfare benefits allocation. The municipality tried to influence this through migrant-targeted labour policies in two

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49 The ACB was municipally funded (but autonomously run) until the mid-1980s, when the government took over its funding. According to an ACB worker, this expressed the catch-up of the national level to the local recognition of guestworker migrant permanence (interview R. van Oordt)
50 Communication with Floris Vermeulen.
51 According to this system, municipalities must pay welfare to long-term unemployed residents from a lump sum provided by the government. Reducing the number of residents getting these payments leaves the municipality with more money to spend on other welfare projects.
areas. The first was an affirmative hiring policy within City Hall (one of the largest employers in the city), but this had, at best, mixed results.52

Secondly, the municipality tried to promote ethnic entrepreneurship. Between 1987 and 1990 unemployed residents of ethnic minority origin were given short training courses and offered stalls for hotdog vending for which there are normally long waiting lists. This was not appreciated by the local (Dutch) vendors, to say the least. Another unsuccessful project involved training migrants in the construction industry. Another project was an "Oriental market" developed by the municipality in a new waterfront site (a spontaneous market in a migrant neighbourhood was closed for sanitation reasons) and stalls rented out exclusively to ethnic minority residents. The project was dogged by bureaucratic problems and heavy opposition from the indigenous market vendors union, which feared the competition (interview C. Pool). The "Oriental market" opened in 1992 and closed within a year, an economic and political flop providing "...a hard (and expensive) lesson to the council that good intentions cannot automatically be translated into successful projects" (Musterd et al. 1998: 40). These examples created a backlash to affirmative action policy, and the next council (1994-1998) abandoned any idea of ethnically-targeted labour market initiatives (below).

**Education policies**

Amsterdam's schools policies by and large have followed national policy. Local authorities have limited competencies in this area. In the pillarised Dutch education system local authorities are responsible for allocating buildings for public schools as well as denominational and specialised schools.53 Schools receive over 80% of their funding from the Ministry of Education, with the remainder allocated through the municipality and since 1990 through the city districts. Curriculum is largely decided at the national level, while the daily management of each school is in the hands of the school board and director (appointed by the Alderman for Education only in the public municipal schools). In terms of policy, the alderman for education must rely primarily on his "powers of persuasion" before the school boards and directors (interview J. van der Aa). Since 1990, local school policy is made at the city district level.

Local schools policies affect migrants/minorities in three issues: segregation, multicultural education, and Islamic schools, discussed below.

The phenomenon known as "Black" and "White" schools was limited in the late 1970s but became widespread in the 1980s (see Box 9.3). As the proportion of ethnic-origin pupils reached a critical mass in certain schools (more as a result of reduced enrollment of Dutch pupils in some neighbourhoods due to suburbanisation), the remaining Dutch children were enrolled by their parents in nearby schools which still had few minority pupils, creating a perception of "white flight". The

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52 16.2% of municipal personnel are now from targeted ethnic minorities, although they make up 26% of the labour force in Amsterdam. Most of them are in lower positions and in departments with minority-related tasks, such as Welfare and Communications (Berger et al 2001: 41-43).

53 Schools may be "public municipal", "public denominational" (i.e. Catholic, Protestant) or "special schools" (Islamic, Montessori, etc.). All receive public funding equally and are regulated by the Ministry of Education.
result has been a higher level of school segregation than residential segregation. Today, children of non-Dutch origin make up over half of the pupils in Amsterdam's schools.

Box 9.3 "Black schools / White schools"

From 1973, family reunification led to a rapid increase of mostly Moroccan and Turkish pupils in the school system. Although the proportion of migrants at the neighbourhood level was not at first significant, the impact on particular schools in a few neighbourhoods was great, as several dozen guestworker children suddenly appeared in classes, often directly from Morocco or Turkey. Together with the departure of native Dutch pupils due to suburbanisation, this created a perception of 'invasion' in some neighbourhoods, leading some parents to transfer their children to other schools, thus strengthening the segregative effect.

Zwarteschool came to refer to a school with over half of the pupils of minority origin. Witteschool refers to a predominantly ethnic Dutch student body. The use of these terms (also in official documents) is surprising -- if not shocking -- to an outsider. When I asked about this, Dutch respondents (white as well as black) assured me that they are not racist terms. Nevertheless, "black school" certainly has negative connotations in terms of lower educational achievements, unruly behaviour, etc. A typical example is the following headline in the national paper NRC Handelsblad on two schools in Amsterdam: "No-one puts her white Anita in a black class" ("Niemand zet zijn blanke Anita in een zwarte klas").

Ironically, the term zwarteschool normally refers to a predominantly Moroccan and/or Turkish school, but neither Moroccans nor Turks consider themselves "black" and resent this labeling of their schools. At the same time, many Surinamese parents who are black prefer to enroll their children in mixed or "white" schools, rather than in "black schools" where Moroccan or Turkish children are predominant!

Sources: Interview J. Roosblad. NRC Handelsblad.

The municipality of Amsterdam first addressed the "black schools problem" in the mid-1980s, when it became a hotly debated topic. City council "found it unacceptable that a small number of schools should have all the practical problems derived from the presence of large numbers of non-Dutch students, and they feared that 'white flight' would further reinforce racist attitudes in Amsterdam" (Clark et al. 1992: 97, citing the official Gemeenteblad, 1989). In Amsterdam the alderman for education proposed requiring parents to enroll children in their neighbourhood school. This idea immediately drew fire from parents (Dutch and minority-origin) as well as the municipal bureaucracy. Instead, city council decided to direct extra resources to designated schools that were suffering from "white flight". The so-called "magnet school" or "neighbourhood school" plan was meant to attract Dutch pupils back to these schools through various incentives such as small classes, enriched extracurricular activities, and so on. Two studies later commissioned by the municipality concluded that parents' choice of school was based more on class than on ethnic differences (Clark et al. 1992: 99-101). In Amsterdam, black/white schools remain on the public agenda.
In 1985 the national "educational priority" policy allocated additional funding to schools in designated disadvantaged areas or with a high proportion of minority pupils. A second track of the government’s education policy related to “intercultural education” and directly addressed the issue of multi-ethnic schools. This provided support for schools that wanted to apply intercultural practices such as mother-tongue classes or religious tuition. The government thus paid for extra support staff to be used as "cultural experts" in schools with a high percentage of minority students (Phalet 2001). Between 1985 and 1994 the municipality supplemented these policies with local initiatives, diverting some funding from local social/cultural budgets to targeted schools. This targeting policy came under increasing scrutiny in the 1990s and in 1994 the new alderman for education put an end to it (see below).

Regarding the establishment of Islamic schools, some problems arose in the mid-1990s, when several Islamic schools expanded and demanded extra facilities, in effect competing with neighbouring schools. Institutional pillarisation in the Dutch educational system has made it relatively simple for minorities to set up their own schools (bijzondere scholen) which are then publicly funded. Since 1990 the city districts are responsible for providing the appropriate facilities (i.e. the building), as required by Dutch law. Different city districts have responded differently to this, but like the issue of mosques, Islamic schools in Amsterdam are not considered a particularly controversial issue (see below) (interview J. Roosblad).

Religion

The first wave of guestworkers, many of them devout believers from Catholic countries, did not raise a religious problem in the eyes of the host society, but religious Otherness has become an issue with the settlement of guestworkers from Muslim countries. Amsterdam now hosts the largest Muslim population in the Netherlands (over 60,000, including Moroccans, Turks and Muslim Surinamese residents). During the 1970s Islam had a largely "hidden existence" in Dutch society (Rath et al. 1999: 26). De facto recognition arrived in the 1980s, coinciding with discussions on the separation of Church and State prior to a revision of the constitution in 1983. While the constitutional revision "strengthened the bargaining position of Muslims" (ibid.) by guaranteeing equality between all religions, it put an end (in theory) to government financing of religious institutions. Public support for minority places of worship "became a debatable matter" to be decided largely by local authorities.

During the 1980s this debate "generally took place in a restricted circle made up of politicians, officials and organizations directly involved. There was no question of a wide public discussion"

54 Government funding for schools is allocated according to the number of pupils in the school, with a multiplier factor (x1.9) for pupils from the designated “ethnic minorities” defined in the Minorities Policy. Each school then decides how to spend the money. In 1986 there were eleven such “education priority areas” in Amsterdam (Musterd et al. 1998: 39).
55 A special nationwide programme was developed for this, entitled "Education in allochton tongue and culture" (OATC). At first this was implemented within school hours. In the late 1980s after prolonged debate it was transferred to classes outside of regular school hours.
56 However they note (p. 28) that the first mosque (complete with minaret) was built in 1975 with government subsidy for Turkish guestworkers in the eastern city of Almelo.

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In the 1990s the presence of Islam in the Netherlands became an issue of broader concern, following events such as the 1989 Rushdie affair and the first Gulf War. However, the debate on "minority religions" (a code-word for Islam) remained constricted by political correctness, until in 2001 Fortuyn erased these limits in the wake of the September 11 events, and placed the debate on the integration of Muslims in Dutch society onto centre stage.

Local authorities in the Netherlands have competency in several areas involving Muslims, including places of religious worship, religious instruction, schools and the relation to Muslims "as partners in the political process" (ibid: 91). Local policies in this domain have varied among Dutch municipalities, as Rath et al. (1999) showed in their comparison of Rotterdam and Utrecht. Below we look briefly at Amsterdam's policies regarding places of worship and Muslim associations.

At first, Muslim guestworkers in Amsterdam prayed in hostels, factories etc., but from the mid-70s it became clear that more suitable solutions were required, especially during Ramadan. Municipal workers first became involved informally in voluntary civic efforts to locate temporary places of worship, through a "Mosques Workgroup" that was active in the mid-1970s. From the late 1970s and into the 1980s, Turkish and Moroccan groups set up ad-hoc mosques in various places such as abandoned school buildings (Doomenik 1999; interview J. Doomenik). Although formally illegal, such arrangements were tolerated by the municipality (recalling Amsterdam's *gedogen* policy toward unofficial Catholic churches some four centuries earlier).

By the mid-1980s the Muslim population had grown and splintered, creating a growing demand for buildings in which to locate mosques. By this time the permanence of the Muslim minorities had been recognised. City Hall accommodated rising demands for mosque facilities by helping to locate disused public buildings, and took a generally favourable stance regarding requests for purpose-built mosques. In this way the number of Turkish mosques alone grew from one in 1976, to six in 1981, to ten in 1988 (ibid).

In 1984 the municipality decided to stop further subsidies for new religious facilities, following the 1983 constitutional reform and its formal separation of Church and State. At the time Amsterdam's Minorities Policy supported migrant associations with generous subsidies but it explicitly excluded religious organisations from receiving municipal funding (Vermeulen 2002). However a considerable number of migrant organisations were in fact of a religious nature (known as "mosque associations"). The debate in city council over municipal aid to minority religious associations was over the role that they could and should play in the public life of the city. Some council members feared that funding religious organisations would strengthen separatism; others felt that isolating the Muslim communities was more dangerous. In 1985 a compromise was reached: the

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57 The conservative politician Frits Bolkestein (VVD) broke these taboos already in the early 1990s, describing the Islamic presence as a cultural threat, but his arguments were marginalised by the established media and politics.

58 While Rotterdam defined its Muslim residents as ethnic minorities and thus eligible for public support, Utrecht defined them as a religious minority and withheld municipal support, e.g. for mosques.

59 The first such mosque was Surinamese, constructed in the early 1980s in Bijlmermeer, the centre of the Muslim Surinamese community. In the late 1980s the municipality approved a request by the Moroccan community to build a mosque with minaret in east Amsterdam, despite opposition by local residents.
municipality would not subsidise religious facilities (e.g. mosques) or organisations as such, but they could apply for municipal funding for any non-religious activities (Landman 1992).

To suit the new criteria, minority religious associations redefined themselves as social-cultural organisations, and applied for municipal subsidies for various activities held inside the mosques (as well as a Hindustani centre). These activities ranged from computer classes to a course for teaching Moroccan women to ride bicycles. Since there was little to no monitoring of these activities, this meant that the municipality continued to indirectly subsidise the mosques (ibid: 289-90). This gedogen solution seemed to suit all the parties involved.

In the 1990s the mosque issue was delegated to the district councils. Generally, these have tried to balance between the demands of Muslim organizations, and those of local residents (including some Muslims) who oppose additional mosques. One example is the conflict over a proposed mosque in the Baarsjes district in west Amsterdam. According to Flip Lindo's (1999) case study, the district council's opposition to the Ayasofia mosque should not be understood as anti-Muslim sentiment (despite the contentions of some of the mosque proponents), rather it was based on practical planning matters, i.e. incompatible land use (see Box 9.4).

### Box 9.4 The Ayasofia Mosque conflict

In 1990 the mosque association Milli Gürüs proposed to construct a large (4000 m²) mosque on a disused plot in the Baarsjes district in west Amsterdam. Hosting a large Turkish and Moroccan population, the Baarsjes already had a Moroccan mosque. The district had just prepared a zoning plan proposing the establishment of a smaller (1000 m2) Turkish mosque on a different site. The Milli Gürüs proposal provoked a NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) reaction among local residents, worried about the traffic and parking problems that such a large mosque would generate. The Ayasofia mosque was also opposed by left-wing Turkish residents who viewed Milli Gürüs as a fundamentalist organisation.

The Baarsjes district council rejected the Milli Gürüs proposal, since the proposed site was designated for residential use. Milli Gürüs then bought the plot despite the zoning restriction. The district council saw this as flaunting its authority -- a sensitive issue in the Baarsjes, whose council had been waging a long campaign against lawlessness in the area. After several years (including court litigation) a compromise was reached, according to which Milli Gurus will sell most of the plot to a housing association that will build apartments, and construct a smaller mosque on the remaining area.

Lindo concludes that the Ayasofia mosque conflict was a planning conflict (over competing land uses), i.e. the Baarsjes district council was not opposed to a visible Islamic presence per se in the neighbourhood. In this case, host-stranger relations cannot adequately explain this particular policy outcome.

**Sources:** Lindo 1999: interview F. Lindo.

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60 A "work group on religious facilities" was established to address the issue, resulting in a policy report: "Municipal policy regarding religious facilities of ethnic minorities" (Gemeentelijk beleid inzake religieuze voorzieningen van etnische minderheden, 1985)
Housing and urban renewal policies

During the 1980s urban policies dealing with the social problems came to be seen as no less important than physical renovation, as urban poverty and crime came to the fore, and the fear of "ghettos" arose (interview L. de Klerk). A succession of national policies channeled vast sums of government money to the cities for carrying out urban renewal.\(^61\) The urban renewal policies were meant to combat these problems with a package of measures to be drawn up by local authorities for specific areas, including physical renovation, strengthened neighbourhood social services, extra resources for schools, etc. The aim was to coordinate new and existing measures and territorialise them for maximum effect. These programmes emphasised the need for a social component in the urban renewal of areas identified as suffering from an "accumulation of problems."

Unlike the other policy domains, the ethnic element in these housing and urban renewal policies was not taken into account, at least not explicitly, because housing and urban renewal are officially "color blind" policy areas in the Netherlands. The proportion of ethnic minority residents, for example, was not included as a criterion in designating urban renewal areas. The language of these policies was somewhat ambiguous, however, referring to an "accumulation of problems" in these areas, implying also the concentration of "ethnic minorities" (i.e., not all minorities, just the target groups). "The ethnic minorities were always seen as part of the problem [of urban decay], but not as the cause" (ibid). Thus, urban policies were directed more at attracting middle-class Dutch-origin residents to these areas, rather than dispersing the existing residents. This can be termed a gentrification policy that aims to prevent dispersal of the existing resident population (ibid).

In Amsterdam, dispersion policies are officially forbidden, both by the municipality and the housing corporations. Further, "there is no indication that a dispersion policy is pursued informally" (Musterd et al. 1998: 37). As noted earlier, the option of dispersion was not even debated in Amsterdam after 1979.\(^62\) Summarising housing policies in Amsterdam, Musterd et al (1998: 40) concluded that "[m]ost projects do not have a specifically ethnic component: ethnic groups profit just like autochthon inhabitants".

In short, it appears that Amsterdam's Minorities Policy did not venture into the spatial domain. But despite the universalist rhetoric of the housing and urban policies, the ethnic element was nevertheless implicitly there due to the over-representation of certain ethnic minorities (especially Turks and Moroccans) in the neighbourhoods targeted by these policies.\(^63\) Thus, although the Pluralist-type of ethnic targeting espoused by the Minorities Policy was on the whole not applied in

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\(^{61}\) In 1985 the previous renovation policy ("City Renewal Policy" stadsvernieuwingbeleid) was succeeded by the "Problem accumulation-areas policy" (Probleemacumulatiegebiedbeleid), which was replaced in 1990 by the "social renewal policy" (socialevernieuwingbeleid). This was later renamed the "Big Cities policy" (Grotestedenbeleid). The social component was demanded by the PvdA which entered the centrist-led coalition government in 1989 (Minister for Urban Policy and the Integration of Ethnic Minorities, Grotesteden en integratiebeleid (brochure), 2001).

\(^{62}\) Similarly, proposals to apply dispersion policy to schools ("desegregation") never got past the debating stage (ibid: 38).

\(^{63}\) Musterd et al (1998: 40) also note an example (the NEO N West project, targeting three neighbourhoods in the west of the city) where the influx of migrants was explicitly taken into account. However, the project was as much about welfare measures as about housing.
spatial policies, Amsterdam's housing and urban development policies in the 1980s were perceived as disproportionally channeling public money toward ethnic minorities in this domain as well.

5. Reacting to multicultural policies: "Diversity Policy" from mid-1990s

5.1 Background

The implementation of a new migrant policy began de facto after the 1994 elections, although it was officially proclaimed only in 1999. One reason behind the new policy lay in the decentralisation process that began in 1990, devolving much of the policymaking affecting migrants/minorities from the municipal to the district level. This has resulted in numerous, uncoordinated actions. The formulation of a new migrant policy in Amsterdam can thus be seen as an attempt by City Hall (including the powerful municipal bureaucracy) to create a new framework for coordinating district-level actions toward migrants. However, this political-institutional explanation is just one part of the picture and does not explain the essence of the new policy. For this, we must turn to the shift in host-stranger relations that the new policy reflects.

The 1994 elections expressed a change in the political climate nationally as well as in Amsterdam. As noted above (section 2.5.4), after a decade of ethnic-targeted policies, a reaction set in among the public as well as some policymakers against the Minorities Policy. One reason was, as stated in the 1989 Municipal Minorities Policy Memorandum "after a decade of efforts of both government and private initiatives the position of ethnic minorities groups seems not improved [...and] the effects of the minorities policy...appear not to be encouraging" (1989 Raamnota Gemeentelijk Minderhedenbeleid, cited in Wolff 1999: 28).

But it was not the objective position of minorities which lay behind the shift in migrant-related policies so much as a general shift in host society attitudes toward newcomers, reflecting a shift from Pluralist-type communal tendencies to more Assimilationist-type individualist tendencies (Pirschner 2002; Musterd et al.1998: 41). Reflecting a general anti-immigrant trend in Europe, there was a growing perception in the Netherlands that 'its' ethnic minorities were not integrating according to plan. After the successful restructuring of the Dutch economy to a post-Fordist economy, labour migrants were transformed in some public perceptions from an economic benefit to a drag on growth.

In Amsterdam, reactions to the local Minorities Policy differed. City Hall credited the Pluralist approach with having raised the problems of minorities on the local agenda, but acknowledged that ethnically-specific policies had stigmatised individual members of the targeted communities by focusing on the problematic cases (e.g. school drop-outs, unemployed), and overlooking the diversity existing within the groups. Criticism was also heard from minority representatives, especially on the stigmatising effects of ethnically-targeted policies. According to them, the city should focus on social issues rather than ethnic background in coping with problems of youth, unemployment, and so

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64 Communication with Martijn Arnoldus.
65 Communication with Pieter Terhorst.
on. As the migrant population in the city diversified, with a rise in the migrants arriving from diverse parts of the world (Africa, Iraq, China), representatives of these groups complained that they were overlooked by minority policies designed around the needs of the post-colonial and guestworker migrant communities. However, there was also criticism that the policies had failed because they were not taken seriously enough by the municipality (Pirschner 2002: 85-6).

In Amsterdam the new alderman responsible for the minorities portfolio after the 1994 elections, Jaap Van der Aa (PvdA), determined to change the city’s approach toward ethnic minorities, from group-targeted to general policies. During his two terms as Alderman for Minorities Policy (1994-2002), Amsterdam moved from an ethnic-targeted approach to more general policies which came to be known as Diversity Policy (Diversiteitbeleid). Van der Aa’s universalist approach was based on his previous experience in “managing ethnic diversity” as a teacher and then as director of a school with a large minority presence. In addition, he became aware during the election campaign of a feeling among voters that “the PvdA has just been helping the minorities”. Thus, the decision to abandon the Minorities Policy “was not just philosophical but also political”. Within City Hall there was general support for this policy change, but within the Labour party (especially at the national level) the new ‘Diversity approach’ encountered resistance (interview J. Van der Aa).

In 1997 the municipality initiated a year-long process of consultation and consensus-building to officially re-evaluate its Minorities Policy. This included consultations with key actors, including the various advisory councils, who were asked to propose concrete changes in existing policy. The process culminated in eight public evenings, a closing conference and a TV debate, and was summarised in a report by a special committee set up to propose a new local policy (Municipality of Amsterdam 1999: 39).

5.2 Diversity Policy - aims and organization

The new “Diversity Policy” (Diversiteitbeleid) was formally established in 1999 in a number of reports under the title: "The strength of a diverse city" (De kracht van een diverse stad, 1999). The reports present Amsterdam’s diversity not as a liability but as a strength to be promoted. Diversity was defined not only in ethnic terms, but also in terms of gender and various subcultures. Policy should focus on particular problems (e.g. delinquency) and not on target groups a priori. Indeed, the term "integration" itself is not mentioned in the report. Three main objectives are outlined (Municipality of Amsterdam, 1999):

- Guaranteeing equal opportunities for all (in education, labour, housing and care);
- Combating discrimination and encouraging mutual respect;

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66. These feelings found expression in the unprecedented four seats gained by the far-Right Centrum Partij in the 1994 municipal elections.
67. The appointment of a new mayor to replace Ed Van Thijn, who had strongly advocated the local Minorities Policy during his terms (1983-1994), was another sign of change.
68. This was to be done in two reports: one by the five ethnic advisory councils, one by the women’s advisory council.
69. The Zwarts Committee report was entitled “Amsterdam heeft de wereld in huis” (loosely translated as “The whole world within Amsterdam”).

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- Promoting resident participation in all aspects of city life.

Regarding the first objective, existing shortfalls in education and labour should be addressed through general (problem-oriented) policies. Group-specific policies may still be necessary in some cases. Regarding the second objective, measures should be put in place and enforced to combat racism and guarantee equal access. Regarding the third objective, participation of migrants/minorities is encouraged at the individual level, i.e. through participatory neighbourhood-level projects. Participation is also encouraged through ethnic-based organisations, but these are expected to create opportunities for members to interact beyond their own communities. The advisory council for ethnic minorities should be maintained only as long as general advisory councils (e.g. by topic) do not sufficiently reflect the city's ethnic diversity (ibid; Wolff 1999: 28-31).

The proposed shift away from a strictly Pluralist-type policy was expressed in a number of organisational changes. In 1999 the Minorities Policy Coordination Bureau was combined with similar units for women's, handicapped and gays policies, creating a small "Diversity Unit". The Diversity Unit functions within the Department for Social, Economic and Cultural Affairs (MEC), in the Division of General Affairs.

The practical effect of these changes is questionable. Like its predecessor, the Diversity Unit appears to have minimal influence in actual policymaking. In part this is due to decentralisation, with most policies affecting migrants/minorities being formulated and implemented at the district level. It also has to do with bureaucratic resistance to change, with much of the remaining 'local migrant policy' being made in municipal divisions other than MEC's Division of General Affairs, primarily in the Welfare Division (DWA). According to a former DWA department director (and current DWA "strategic advisor"), there is "a complete separation between our content [DWA's policies] and what they talk about in the MEC, Diversity Policy" (interview T. Bolten).

The following pages summarise Amsterdam's local migrant policies since the mid-1990s. Subsections 5.3 and 5.4 summarise the two relevant policy domains and issue areas. Subsection 5.5 is devoted to the new "Integration Policy" which is connected to the Diversity Policy.

5.3 Juridical-political domain

Civic status, local voting. The Inburgering programme described below is meant to incorporate new immigrants as active new citizens, from their registration to providing them with the basic tools (language and civic education) for active political participation. Despite a very pro-active local policy in this regard (pre-empting national policy, below), the voter turnout rates in municipal elections fell between 1994 and 1998.\(^7\) The municipality responded with another campaign to stimulate ethnic minority participation in the 1998 election, funding migrant organisations and ethnically-based media to raise political awareness among minorities (Berger et al. 2001: 46; Heelsum 2002).

\(^7\) Voting rates decreased in the general public and among ethnic minorities. The rate for Turks, who had the highest voter turnout among ethnic minorities, fell from 67 to 39% between 1994 and 1998 (Berger et al. 2001: 15).
Advisory councils. Under the new policy. Amsterdam’s five ethnic minority advisory councils were recently dismantled and were to be replaced by one advisory council that would combine their budgets. This was meant to improve the overall functioning by making it possible for the new council to hire professionals to formulate concrete proposals (interview Van der Aa). At the time of writing, it is not clear whether this restructuring has taken place. The Moroccan Advisory Council (SMR), for example, is still functioning in its capacity as an NGO, but its position vis-à-vis City Hall is unclear (interview A. Menebhi). The confusion and apparent disinterest among most of the interviewees regarding the current status of the migrant advisory council(s?) is one indication of this. In short, it appears that most of the relevant actors, within the municipality and in the migrant organizations, do not place much consequence in the role of the advisory council.

5.4 Socio-economic domain

Welfare policies. During the 1980s, the municipal Welfare Division (Dienst Welzijn Amsterdam - DWA) was directly involved in implementing social policies affecting minorities, as it allocated the large sums of government and municipal funding earmarked for minority-targeted programmes and projects. Since the 1990s many if not most of the social policies have been initiated and implemented by the city districts, which have their own welfare and education departments, and by various "quangos" (quasi-NGOs: institutionalised, publicly-funded civic organizations) involved in different aspects of social policy. In the area of youth policy for example, each city district decides which actions it will take, resulting in a variety of uncoordinated projects (interview Van der Aa). Despite the decentralisation, the Welfare Division remains a huge bureaucracy that busies itself with formulating and coordinating social policy at a city-wide level, providing assistance to the city districts and initiating new projects.

Policymaking within the Welfare Division follows the universalist line advocated in the Diversity Policy in that many welfare policies are no longer minority-targeted. Instead, DWA staff “take into consideration the integration aspects” when necessary. However, they also develop migrant-targeted projects, for example, the Youth Education department proposed a programme to identify and counsel Antillean problem youths. Other ethnic-targeted projects initiated at the district level are developed together with the Welfare Division, e.g. a proposed old-age home for residents of Indonesian origin. According to Bolten.

We are not going back to Minorities Policy, but we are not afraid to have some [ethnic] target-group policies…Target-group policies are generally avoided, but sometimes it’s inevitable.

Such ethnic-targeted projects are seen as “temporary measures” that are necessary to address specific problems that will eventually disappear. Bolten describes this as an evolutionary process: if

71 Serious welfare cases (broken families, juveniles in danger) have become the responsibility of welfare agencies at the regional level.
72 The Welfare Division contains between 250-300 staff none of whom are actively involved in street-level social work.
Diversity Policy is the antithesis to the target group approach, the DWA is formulating its own future policy that he describes as a "synthesis" of the two.

**Labour market policies.** For the most part, local policies in the socio-economic domain are now based on general, not ethnic-based criteria. In local labour market policy, for example, a more universalist approach has been adopted according to which unemployment is not an ethnic minority issue but a problem of low educational qualifications. Today the only remaining minority-targeted project in Amsterdam is a small support centre for small-and medium businesses. This service (Emporium) is aimed at (but not exclusive to) ethnic entrepreneurs, and is run by a local NGO funded jointly by the municipality and the EU. This is a far cry from the minority-targeted labour market policies of the 1980s (interview J. Rath).

**Education policies.** A similar shift has occurred in local school policies. In the 1990s national policies changed from focusing on ethnic minority children to targeting socially disadvantaged children based on non-ethnic criteria (Phalet 2001: 7-8). In Amsterdam, the Alderman for Minorities Policy also held the education portfolio after 1994. Jaap Van der Aa quickly abandoned the previous "magnet schools" policy, saying that educational attainments in the targeted schools had not risen despite the extra resources allocated to them. Instead, he advocated a universalist attitude according to which ethnic-based solutions were not the solution to failing students or problem schools:

> My experience as a school director showed me there were as many differences as similarities between Moroccan students, and programmes targeted at Moroccans missed the mark. We had to concentrate on those pupils who needed special attention, whether they were Moroccan or Dutch (interview Van der Aa).

Instead of targeting "black schools", Van der Aa proposed that all schools in Amsterdam set themselves a goal of reaching the national average in school attainment. This meant that all below-average schools should improve their performance by concentrating on individual pupils rather than ethnic group-targeted measures. However, the alderman had few means to promote this policy beyond persuading the schools' directors and boards. In effect, each school was left to its own methods, which are determined now at the district level. One example is an initiative by the district council of Oud Zuid to transform a failing "black school" into a "Community School" (see Box 9.5).

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73 Altogether some 260 "general" and "specialized" schools, including some 15 Islamic schools.
Box 9.5  From a “black school” to a “Community School” in the Pijp

The Pijp is an ethnically diverse neighbourhood located in the 19th century belt surrounding the historic centre. The phenomenon of “black/white schools” began here after labour migrant families settled and enrolled their children in local schools and Dutch families moved out or enrolled their children in better (“whiter”) schools outside the Pijp. In De Edelsteine primary school, enrollment dropped from 170 to 75 children, with 80% of the remaining pupils being Moroccan. De Edelstein’s “black school” reputation meant the flight of Dutch pupils followed by Surinamese and Turkish pupils as well, according to the school’s director.

In 1998 the district council of the Pijp neighbourhood decided to fight this trend. In 2000 the school re-opened under a new name in a new, renovated location. The “Community School” is based on the American concept of the same name, and includes a primary school, kindergarten and community centre (buurthuis). The latter two components are run by a local semi-public NGO (Combiwel), which is responsible for developing links between parents, the school and the local community.

The Community School was developed with the expressed aim of attracting Dutch (and other minority) children back to the neighbourhood, offering an enriched programme of activities which go well beyond school hours, smaller classes and no less importantly, a new image. As a result, enrollment rose to over 100 pupils (thus lowering the percentage of Moroccans to 40%). The remaining pupils come from Surinam, Turkey, Tunisia, etc., as well as a dozen “Dutch” pupils (several from interracial marriages).

Despite this ethnic diversity, the school does not emphasize its multicultural character. During Islamic holidays, for example, Muslim pupils are allowed to leave early and celebrate with their families at home, but Dutch holidays (e.g. Sinterklaas) are celebrated within the school. According to the school’s director, the policy is to be sensitive to pupils’ family (rather than ethnic) background. Thus, emphasis is placed on expanding Dutch vocabulary, since most pupils come from families where Dutch is not well-spoken. He explains this policy in practical terms: better Dutch is what the pupils need most, and emphasizing multicultural aspects (e.g. celebrating Islamic holidays) would only scare away the non-Muslim parents.


**Policing.** In this issue area, local policy expresses a shift in the opposite direction, from an Assimilationist-type policy ignoring the ethnic dimension, to a Pluralist-type policy that takes it into consideration. In the Netherlands, policing is a local policy area in medium to large cities. Dijkink (1990) looked at the involvement of City Hall in Amsterdam’s policing policy over several decades. During the 1980s the politically-correct discourse in Amsterdam’s city council required that the

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74 Based largely on Dijkink 1990: interview G. Dijkink.
75 In the 1990s a nation-wide reorganisation of the police replaced the municipal police (headed by the mayor) with regional police, headed by a committee of all the mayors. The regional police of the Amsterdam-Amsteland region is still dominated by the (former) municipal police of Amsterdam which is by far the largest force, and Amsterdam’s mayor has the main voice.

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The ethnic dimension of crime was formally ignored, even as the proportion of migrants involved in crime rose. The Amsterdam police were sensitive to this political correctness, and territorially-based policing (which could be seen as stigmatising migrant neighbourhoods) was not applied to the Bijlmer, despite its high crime rate. In contrast, a territorial policing policy was applied in Amsterdam's other high-crime area in Zeedijk, an inner city area which does not have a clear "ethnic" character (ibid: 157).

In the 1990s there are signs that this Assimilationist-type attitude (officially ignoring the ethnic dimension) may be changing. A prominent example is the "Hardcore policy" (Hardenkernbeleid) initiated recently to deal with juvenile delinquency in several neighbourhoods, which focuses explicitly on Moroccan youth. The project was adopted in 2000 as a high priority project by the mayor, showing that ethnicity is no longer a taboo subject in local policing policy (interview E. van Kempen). Another example can be found in a proposal made in an internal police report in the mid-1990s, for defining different neighbourhoods in terms of 'community policing'. The original proposal included the ethnic composition of the residents as a criterion. Although this criterion was later dropped, the incident revealed that ethnicity is perceived within the police as a determinant of crime rates -- and that this perception can be expressed formally.

5.5 Integration policy

The second component of the Diversity Policy is an Integration Policy which explicitly targets certain migrant populations (the "ethnic minorities" defined earlier under the Minorities Policy). Amsterdam's Integration Policy includes a "Newcomers" programme, an "Oldcomers" programme (for pre-1998 immigrants) and an "Adult Education" programme. The latter is a general policy but participants are overwhelmingly of ethnic origin. This confusing mix of general and ethnic-targeted policies is expressed in an equally confusing organisational structure that has undergone several revisions. At the time of writing, an 'Education and Inburgering' unit (E+I) within the department of Instruction, Youth and Education was responsible for all three programmes.

**Newcomers Civic Integration policy (inburgeringbeleid).** The city of Amsterdam initiated its migrant reception policy (then called nieuwkomerbeleid) in 1993 as an experimental programme and made it obligatory in 1995. The declared aim was to "advance the self-sustainability of immigrants"
in the areas of education, labour and daily life in the city. This was to be accomplished by combining the existing potpourri of integration measures (some optional) into a comprehensive and compulsory process. Apparently, the city’s immigrants had not followed sufficiently the integration aims of the municipality until then, as “only 20% of the newcomers were reached” by municipal integration projects prior to 1995. In wording reminiscent of the relation toward immigrants in the 1950s, the municipal welfare department claims that “Newcomers must be given the possibilities for a systematic civic integration” (http://www.e-i.amsterdam.nl. italics added).

The Newcomers policy began as a pilot in the municipalities of Tilburg and the Hague, was later adopted by Amsterdam and a dozen other cities, and developed into a nationwide policy, with implementation delegated to the local authorities (Adusei 2000: 18). In 1998, the “Newcomers Civic Integration Law” made the inburgering programme obligatory within 12 months of arrival in the Netherlands for all adult newcomers belonging to the targeted “ethnic minorities” categories. The law established the formal framework of the policy, including the timeline and financing procedures. The framework requires every immigrant to complete an “inburgering trajectory” within 18 months (see Box 9.6). Municipalities are responsible for immigrant registration in each city, overseeing the required educational courses and outsourcing the other services involved, as well as coordination and monitoring (ibid).

**Box 9.6 “Links in the chain” of the Inburgering process**

The Newcomers or Civic Integration policy includes several components. The process begins with an inburgeringscontract signed between the new immigrant and the municipality. This specifies his/her “trajectory of activities which must be concluded satisfactorily (e.g. testing level, diploma) within a predetermined period.” The municipal website describes four “links in the chain” (schakels in de keten) of the integration process (the irony of these terms appears to have been lost on the zealous integration professionals):

“Selection and Identification”. The newcomer is registered at the municipal registry and gets a “welcome talk” outlining his rights and obligations. He is then assigned a “trajectory guide” who will escort him throughout the process. A “research unit” compiles the data on each newcomer, providing the city with comprehensive statistics on its migrant population.

“Assessment and placement”. This includes “intake talks” in which the guide should uncover the newcomer’s situation: professional background, family, health issues, etc. The guide then proposes an individual “trajectory” (“inburgeringstraject”) for the migrant. This proposal is but one component in the 5-6 week (!) inburgeringdiagnoseprogramma of language and other tests conducted by the research unit.

Based on the above, an individual “educational programme” is prepared for each migrant. This includes instruction in Dutch (averaging 600 hours) as well as a course entitled “social-occupational orientation” (70 hours). The courses are outcontracted to the Regional Education Centres (ROC), a nationwide schools network. At the end the migrant must pass proficiency tests in order to receive his inburgeringcertificaat from the municipality.

“Referral” (overdracht). Formal advice is then given to the migrant for further steps to integrate, including a recommended work or study trajectory as well as “social participation or social activity”. Following the advice is not mandatory.

**Sources**: www.e-i.amsterdam.nl/pages/uitlevering/inburgering.htm; Adusei 2000.
Adusei (2000) found that less than 10% of the new immigrants who were obliged to participate actually complete the entire inburgering programme (ibid: 57). The reasons include unsuitable hours (many migrants work during the day, often the women take care of children) and locations of the courses. Most of the Dutch courses are in the evenings when participants are tired. It is not surprising that only a small percentage pass the proficiency exams “on schedule” and absenteeism levels are high. In May 2002 the municipality instituted regulations for a “sanctions procedure” which can be applied to any of the outcontracted agents involved, in case of failure by one of their clients (e.g. an immigrant who drops out of a course). This appears to be a sign that there are problems of accountability within the process.

**Oldcomers and Adult Education policies.** The stated aim of these two programmes is “to overcome arrears in education and the labour market for Amsterdam residents, integrating them into the modern city” (www.e-i.amsterdam.nl/pages/nieuws). Both programmes offer optional Dutch language, “orientation in society” and computer literacy courses. The “Oldcomers policy” targets pre-1998 migrants who are no longer eligible for the Newcomers policy. Some of the courses are ethnic-specific, e.g. a Dutch language and computer course for Turkish women.81 The “adult education” policy offers similar courses to all residents regardless of origin, but over 80% of the participants are also ethnic minorities. In effect, the Adult Education and Oldcomers programmes serve as frameworks for continuing ethnically-specific and targeted measures. The reason given for the Adult Education programme is that the course hours budgeted by the national Newcomers programme were deemed insufficient (interview T. Bolten).

The various courses in the three programmes are subcontracted through the city districts to various NGOs, including some migrant organizations. The latter may also propose specific courses based on demands from their clientele. In practice, most courses are outsourced to Dutch organizations. The reasons given for this vary. According to an official responsible for outcontracting courses in the Southeast district (himself a veteran migrant), most migrant organisations “are not yet qualified to implement” the courses and “don’t believe themselves in these policies.” For this reason the lion’s share of teaching is contracted to “a large, professional Dutch organization” (interview E. Adusei). According to the representative of a migrant organisation involved in the programme, “we teach our migrants better than [the Dutch teachers] and we do it for less money, but they [the Municipality] won’t admit it” (interview R. Yuksul).

Amsterdam’s “Integration Policy” acquaints its newcomers, if not with the local host society, then with the vast machinery of social workers, instructors and bureaucrats who oversee their inburgering trajectory over the first two years. The inburgering process involves among others the Foreigners Police, City Registrar, the district Newcomers Bureaus, the regional employment bureau and various quasi-governmental NGOs outcontracted for other components (‘social guidance’, etc.) of the programme. Further provisions in this policy include childcare facilities for parents taking the
required courses, a municipal “Fund for newcomers expenses” and an ombudsman to handle complaints. With its mix of paternalistic good intentions, compulsory arrangements and institutional self-sufficiency, the *inburgering* programme continues the century-old tradition of Dutch social policy to "help" its Strangers, who are not expected to integrate by themselves according to the host society’s expectations.

6. Summary

Amsterdam’s policy trajectory over the past fifty years demonstrates how this city’s migrant policies expressed broad shifts in the attitudes and expectations of the host society. Until a decade ago, changes in host-stranger relations in the Netherlands followed quite closely the actual trajectory of migration phases, from transience to temporariness to permanence. Migrant policies in Amsterdam from the 1960s to the mid-1990s evolved correspondingly, from Non-policy to Guestworker to Pluralist policies. In the mid-1990s a new type of policy response evolved toward migrants/minorities, discussed below.

Postwar labour migration to Amsterdam included a brief **Transient phase from the late 1950s to the early 1960s**. This phase was characterised by predominantly southern European male workers who for the most part returned home after a few years. At this stage there was no involvement on the part of the local authority and those who remained were integrated locally through civic institutions, particularly in the ‘Catholic pillar’. The shift to a **Guestworker phase of migration occurred in the mid-1960s** with the introduction of a national guestworker policy (1964 - 1973). This was expressed in the quantity of labour migrants in Amsterdam (from hundreds to thousands) and a change in their ethnic origin (predominantly Turkish and Moroccan). By the early 1970s signs of settlement appeared, but the ‘myth of return’ was still shared by hosts and migrants alike, a characteristic of this migration phase.

The expectation of a temporary stay was expressed in local policies that were meant to accommodate the guestworker population for a limited period in basic living conditions, with responsibility for most migrant needs left to their employers. The municipality ignored the rampant exploitation of migrant workers in the local housing market but provided some short-term solutions. Formally, labour migrants had equal access to basic social services and even to social housing, although the latter remained on the whole inaccessible to the newcomers. As to their cultural/religious Otherness, the migrants were left to their own devices. In terms of the typology, this can be summarised as a Guestworker-type policy phase.

In the 1970s, the awareness of a **permanent labour migrant presence** grew in Amsterdam but it took several years for this to find expression in formal policy changes. The main shift in local policy occurred in the housing area, where the municipality moved from short-term solutions geared for single men, to informal long-term solutions allowing access to family-size social housing. In other domains the change was slower. Municipal workers became involved informally in the social and

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81 These are primarily women who arrived through family reunification as teenagers with little or no schooling. Over 1500 ‘oldcomers’ have participated in such courses (www.e-i.amsterdam.nl/pages/nieuws/certificaat.html).
cultural needs of the migrant population in the mid-1970s, but officially the municipality continued to ignore manifestations of cultural Otherness, such as ad hoc mosques and political mobilisation. This contrasted with local policies toward post-colonial immigrants, whose associations were recognised earlier and received municipal support. In this period (1970s) migrant policies still expressed different host attitudes and expectations toward differently defined types of newcomers: 'repatriates' from Indonesia, post-colonial immigrants from the Caribbean, 'guestworkers' predominantly from Morocco and Turkey.

A Pluralist policy phase began in the 1980s, with formal acknowledgement of the labour migrant permanence in Amsterdam, paralleling official recognition at the national level of permanent “ethnic minorities” (and a re-definition of categories of Strangers by the host society). The new Minorities Policy, based largely on the national policy, clearly espoused a Pluralist vision of Amsterdam as a multi-ethnic city which accepts the permanence of the migrant population and embraces their Otherness. Throughout the 1980s policymakers assumed and expected that the successful integration of the migrants could be achieved without sacrificing their cultural Otherness. Indeed, community-based cultural and religious distinctiveness was seen as the basis for integration in a multi-cultural city.

This Pluralist attitude can be seen as continuing a particularly Dutch brand of host-stranger relations, of separate-but-equal communal co-existence (later institutionalised in the pillar system). This tradition of co-existing with Others had allowed the Netherlands to prosper despite deep ideological and cultural differences within the society, and indeed to absorb external Strangers. Once the labour migrants were acknowledged as permanent, the historical legacy of pillarisation legitimised a Pluralist approach to their (expected) integration. In Amsterdam, the *gedogen* approach to co-existing with Strangers was especially deeply rooted, and was applied to newcomers as well as to indigenous Others.

The city's Minorities Policy (ca. 1980 - 1994) expressed this Pluralist approach toward migrants in espoused as well as enacted policies. City council implemented ethnically-sensitive targeted policies in all but the Spatial domain (in which migrants were already effectively incorporated). In the Juridical-political domain, ethnic-based organisations were encouraged to play a key intermediary role between individual migrants and the local polity. Thus, ethnic-based advisory councils were established *in addition* to local voting rights, while various pro-active policies aimed at empowering ethnic minority communities. In the socio-economic domain, ethnic-specific and "target group" policies were applied in various issue areas including education, welfare and the local labour market. In the Cultural-religious domain, City Hall strongly supported minority religious and cultural institutions and delegated ethnic-specific services to them. While many local policies were implemented within the framework of the national Minorities Policy, Amsterdam was especially zealous in the application of Pluralist-type migrant policies.

The 1990s witnessed a reaction against the Pluralist approach to integration, nationally as well as locally. In terms of host-stranger relations, this maybe seen as a reaction in part of the host society to
the perceived permanence and **pervasiveness** of Strangers (as described in Chapter 2). The perception of an overly pervasive presence of Otherness is linked to popular sentiments that the newcomers have not sufficiently integrated according to host society norms, in part due to policies that were overly protective of their cultural and religious Otherness. At the national level, one reaction to the perceived failure of the Pluralist approach has been to press for stricter integration of migrants into the host society. According to the new approach, integration policies should emphasise commonalities rather than differences, encouraging newcomers to conform more closely to the norms of the host society, e.g. in the status of women. However, the new approach does not aspire to assimilate newcomers in the modernist sense, in that the right to maintain one's Otherness is recognised (and may even be supported).

In Amsterdam, this new approach was reflected in the 1994 municipal elections: although the same party (PvdA) continued to dominate in city council, several key players including the new Alderman for Minorities Policy pressed to abandon the existing migrant policy. The new approach, advocated by migrant representatives as well, was to focus on problems rather than 'problem groups'. Policies should be sensitive to diversity within minority communities and not just between them. Consequently, a more universalist approach was advocated, with actions to be based on individual rather than ethnic-group criteria.

The change from Pluralist-type migrant policies began in Amsterdam after the 1994 elections, but was only formalized in 1999, in the new Diversity Policy. This was expressed in espoused as well as enacted policies toward migrants/minorities. Policy reports no longer speak of "integrating ethnic minorities" but of "creating conditions to ensure the full participation of all individuals in the city", etc. Thus, in the Juridical-political domain the civic integration (**inburgering**) programme is meant to ensure the political participation of newcomers in the local polity, while the ethnic minority advisory councils are to be restructured into just one (multi-ethnic) advisory council. In the Socio-economic and Cultural-religious domains ethnically-targeted policies are being phased out.

This new phase in local migrant policy, however, is not the result of any significant change in the **objective** situation of Amsterdam's migrants/minorities (as in the previous phases). Rather it reflects a subjective shift, in host society attitudes toward the presence of Strangers. If the Minorities Policies of the 1980s represented an avowedly Pluralist attitude toward the integration of ethnic minorities, today they are expected to abandon some of their Strangeness and conform to host society norms. In short, the embrace of Otherness is no longer in favour in the Netherlands. Amsterdam's new 'Diversity Policy' is the local expression of this shift in host-stranger relations.

But the change away from Pluralist-type migrant/minority policies is not as clear in the **enacted** policies as it appears from the **espoused** policy. One reason is that local actions affecting migrants are now determined at the city district more than at the municipal level, where the Diversity Policy was formulated. In addition, it appears that the professional welfare bureaucracy in the municipality will not so quickly abandon the Pluralist approach to migrant integration. This may have less to do
with the embrace of Otherness espoused by the Minorities Policy two decades ago, and more to do with the paternalistic tradition toward Strangers in Dutch welfare institutions.

The Diversity Policy presents a reaction against the Pluralist approach, yet it cannot be identified with the Assimilationist type in our model. The presence of such a policy in Amsterdam, as well as in other cities, raises the need to consider an additional type of 'local policy response to ethnic diversity' which was not covered within the original typology proposed in Chapter 4. This new type will be discussed in the Conclusion chapter.