— Chapter 10 > “Welcome to What You Think You See” (Epilogue)
— Good evening. Remember me? Good. Now try not to forget what you are seeing, and you will think what I hear. Try not to remember what I am doing and I will say what you thought. Try not to forget what you are hearing and you will see what I think. Try not to remember what I am saying and I will hear what you do. Try not to forget what you are doing and you will hear what you say. Try not to remember what I am seeing and I will see what you think. Do you see what I mean? — (From Artifact by William Forsythe).

Remember her? The woman in the historical costume from Artifact. The woman who invited the audience to leave their seats in the auditorium and ‘step inside’ the performance on stage? The woman whose appearance in my text marks my invitation to you ‘to step inside’ my theoretical engagement with the enigmas that characterize our perception of the visible world? This world’s appearance, as I have argued, is the outcome of a process of seeing that always involves reading, even if it seems to be ‘just looking’— a world where the seer is involved in a process that cannot be understood solely from what is implied by what is seen, nor from the constitution of the seer only, since the seer is always involved in what is seen just as what is seen always implicates a seer.

In this final chapter, I return to the woman in the historical costume to let her be my guide again, this time for a reconsideration of seeing as a reading performed by a body involved with the theatre event through different senses simultaneously. This is a reading performed by a body responding to the address made explicit by the woman in Artifact, who bids the audience a cordial “Welcome to what you think you see.”

Seeing as Reading as Dancing — How can we conceive of seeing as an activity of a body involved with what is seen through different perceptual systems simultaneously? In this chapter, I propose an answer to this question based on a re-conceptualization of reading as it is performed in seeing. I will be using the metaphor of dancing. This will allow me to expand on several notions that have come up in the previous chapters.

These are, to begin with, Jan Ritsema’s idea that dancing is a process of thinking which takes place through the body (introduced at the beginning of chapter 8). I proposed to take his idea as a metaphor in order to describe how the address presented by a performance sets a seer into movement, and engages the seer in a process of bodily responsiveness of which we think we see is the effect. This idea of the seer responding to what is seen through bodily responsiveness grants new actuality to John Martin’s concept of ‘inner mimicry’ (first introduced in chapter 7), with which he describes how seers move along in their seats with bodies seen on stage, mimicking their movements through a process of kinesthetic responsiveness.
As a metaphor for describing seeing in terms of a process of bodily responsiveness, dancing also links up nicely with the notion of ‘choreographical inscription’ to describe positioning as it takes place in the post-dramatic theatre (introduced in chapter 4). The notion of choreo-graphical inscription is used to indicate that on the post-dramatic landscape stage the audience is granted more freedom to ‘wander around,’ but also that this does not mean freedom to do and perceive at will. It also points to the need to reconsider the body in the process of seeing, and how the body is involved in this process of world making.

In the previous chapter, I showed how Martin’s notion of inner mimicry, reread through Silverman, allows for an expansion of Silverman’s version of the Lacanian mirror stage model, towards a model that can account for the way both what is seen, and the point of view from where it is seen, come into being in relation to one another, and as the product of bodily responsiveness. This expansion turns the mirror stage into a model that can account for the relation between seer and seen as the product of synaesthesia. In this process, various perceptual systems are involved, and it is through these that the body produces what we think we see in relation to a point of view, that is, in relation to a position to which the terms ‘here,’ ‘there’ and ‘my’ are keyed. Silverman’s reading of the mirror stage thus opens up what Mieke Bal has describes as “a space for a bodily and spatially grounded semiotics” (Bal 1999: 152).

This expansion turns the mirror stage into a model for accounting for what Damish (chapter 2) describes as characteristic of perspective, in terms of a process of bodily response:

> Perspective is not a code, but has this in common with language that in and by itself it institutes and constitutes itself under the auspices of a point, a factor analogous to the ‘subject’ or ‘person’ in language, always posited in relation to a ‘here’ or ‘there,’ accruing all the possibilities for movement from one position to another that this entails (Damish 1995: 53).

In chapter 2, I discussed Damish’ formulation in relation to Benveniste’s theory of deixis in language. I showed how deixis articulates the way perspective “institutes and constitutes itself under the auspices of a point analogous to the ‘subject’” (Damish), thus helping to theorize the address presented by perspective in terms of positioning, and how these positions can be seen to mediate between seer and seen in the theatre. These positions, I have argued, present an invitation to the seer to take them up and to see as if from there. The performance addresses the seer with a succession of such positions and, in this way, the performance offers an invitation to move along with it.

I also showed how Benveniste’s relational and discontinuous notion of subjectivity allows for an understanding of the address presented by *Artifact* as an address that involves two positions which could be taken up
simultaneously. *Artifact* addresses the audience as both listener and viewer and these different positions interact in what seems to be ‘just looking.’

In this chapter, I return to Benveniste for a reconceptualization of the seer as a body involved with the world through different perceptual systems simultaneously. I will introduce the term *interference* to account for the way in which perspectives presented by the various perceptual systems through which we are involved with the world, interact with one another and with points of view given in the discourse through which we make sense of the world. I take this notion of interference from Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of thinking described in their final co-authored book, namely: *What is Philosophy?* (1994).

Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of thinking is performative *par excellence* and links up well with contemporary developments in theatre semiotics where meaning is no longer conceived of as something represented by means of signs, but where meaning is thought instead as the effect of the theatrical event, here and now, in relation to an audience. The Deleuzian conception of thinking makes it possible to be much more radical than theatre semiotics has, as yet, allowed for. However, what is needed to make Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy productive for the theatre, and for my dissection of visuality in the theatre in particular, is to understand more precisely how this movement performed in thinking proceeds, who the subject of this movement is, and if it is possible to conceive of this thinker as a body.

In this chapter, I propose an argument for this purpose that is highly speculative. My aim is to take the outcome of my ‘dissection’ and think the next step beyond. I will be presenting an epilogue in which I speculate what this extrapolation could lead to. My argument is speculative, which means that I will not present a faithful exegesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, but use it, dance along with it, using their ideas as stepping stone to jump off into what might follow my dissection of visuality.

**Thinking as Movement** — In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy, art and science as three modes of thinking each moving in their own way: art thinks through affects and percepts; science thinks through knowledge; philosophy thinks through concepts. The three modes of thinking take place at different ‘planes’ and they utilize different ‘elements’. The brain is the junction – not the unity – of these three planes.

The differences between the three planes are a recurring motive throughout their book. Near the end, however, Deleuze and Guattari observe that there are also cases in which art, science and philosophy cannot be understood as distinct in relation to the chaos that the brain plunges into. After having stressed the differences between the planes throughout their book, they conclude that what seems to be more important now are the problems of *interference* between the planes that meet in the brain.
In this submersion it seems that there is extracted from chaos the shadow of the ‘people to come’ in the form that art, but also philosophy and science, summon forth: mass-people, world-people, brain-people, chaos-people – nont thinking thought that lodges in the three, like Klee’s nonconceptual concept or Kandinsky's internal science. It is there that concepts, sensations, and functions become undecidable, at the same time as philosophy, art and science become indiscernible, as if they shared the same shadow that extends itself across their different nature and constantly accompanies them (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 218).

In Deleuze and Guattari, it is the brain that is the locus of the interferences between different thought movements. They describe the brain as a “state of survey without distance” and subjectivity as its effect (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 210). At the same time that the brain becomes subject, the concept becomes object as created, as event or creation itself. Within this movement subjectivity appears as an ‘eject.’

On each plane these ‘ejects’ appear in a different way: on the plane of immanence of philosophy as the subject of creation of concepts (‘I conceive’), on the plane of composition of art as the subject of feeling (‘I feel’), on the plane of reference or coordination of science as the subject of knowledge (‘I know’).

Deleuze and Guattari conceive of these 'ejects' in terms of speech-act theory. In everyday life speech-acts refer back to psychosocial types who actually attest to a third person: ‘I decree mobilization as President of the Republic,’ ‘I speak to you as father,’ and so on. In the same way the philosophical shifter is a speech-act in the third person where it is always the conceptual persona who says ‘I.’ This leads them to a reformulation of speech-acts, drawing attention to the way speech-acts produce positions and the way these positions mediate in the movement of thoughts (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 64).

Thinking in and out of Step — Conceptual personae are complicated entities that lead a hazy existence somewhere in between the concept and the pre-conceptual plane. They are part of the implicit presuppositions forming images of thought. Sometimes they appear with a proper name, like Socrates, who is the principal conceptual persona of Platonism.

Yet the conceptual persona is not to be confused with a character. Conceptual personae and characters only nominally coincide and do not have the same role. The character of a dialogue sets out concepts. Conceptual personae, on the other hand, carry out the movements that describe the author's plane of immanence and they play a part in the very creation of the author's concepts. They can have all kinds of features. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between pathic features (the idiot, the maniac), relational features (the friend), dynamic features (the diver, the dancer), juridical features (the claimant, the judge, the plaintiff)
and existential features (the bourgeois). These features of conceptual personae have relationships with the epoch or historical milieu in which they appear that only psychosocial types enable us to assess. Through these features, conceptual personae and psychosocial types refer to each other and combine, yet without ever merging. Unlike a psychosocial type, the 'I conceive' of philosophy is not an empirical circumstance but instead has to be understood as a presence that is intrinsic to thought, a condition of possibility of thought itself, a living category, a transcendental lived reality. Conceptual personae appear as the agents of philosophical enunciation. Deleuze and Guattari speak of "intercessors, crystals or seeds of thought" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 69, my italics).

Deleuze and Guattari conceive of the 'I' of philosophy in terms of friendship. They refer to the Greek origin of philosophy: the friends of wisdom, those who seek wisdom but not formally possesses it. Friendship appears as a precondition of thought; it is part of a relational model of thinking as taking place between friends. Friendship, as Deleuze explains, is not based on having the same ideas. Rather, it is the condition of having something to say to one another as a result of which thought starts to move. Friendship carries something of a mystery within itself, and this mystery Deleuze understand in terms of being possessed by a certain 'charme.' This 'charme' is the spark that lights between friends, turning them into friends (Deleuze and Parnet 1995).

In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari present friendship as the most outstanding feature of the conceptual personae. The friends as they appear as mediators of movement in philosophical thought are claimant and rival striving for the same object. Friendship designates a form of competent intimacy that involves love as well. Love, not for one another, but for the goal both friends are striving towards. Friendship, therefore, involves competitive distrust of the rival as much as an amorous striving towards the object of desire. Striving and rivalry are part and parcel of philosophy as a continuous state of becoming, of thought as movement.

It is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, in this sense that philosophy has to be understood as something Greek that coincides with the contribution of cities: the formation of societies of friends or equals, but also the promotion of relationships of rivalry between and within them, the contest between claimants in every sphere, in love, games, tribunals, judiciaries, politics, and even in thought. Friendship designates "the rivalry of free men and a generalized athleticism" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 4).

What is Philosophy? is the fourth and last book Deleuze and Guattari wrote together. It is "the last achievement of a form of experimental 'authorship' that has few precedents in philosophy," as Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, in the translator's introduction to the English edition, put it (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: viii). They quote Deleuze's own account of this extraordinary collaboration, saying: "We don't work, together, we work between the two. [...] We don't work, we negotiate. We were never in the
same rhythm, we were always out of step” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: viii). Deleuze describes his philosophical ‘duet’ with Guattari in terms of movement, in terms of dance, but only in order to disqualify them as dance partners. Instead of moving along in the same rhythm naturally, every step had to be won through negotiation. His intellectual partnership with Guattari thus seems to be conform their model of philosophical thinking as the product of competent intimacy between claimant and rival, a friendship that has to be won time and again over competitive distrust.

In the books that are the expression of this ‘duet,’ however, it is hard to distinguish between the two competitors. The differences in rhythm have dissolved into a collective movement presented under the double name that has become their trade mark. Their books thus express a collectivity that is absent from their conception of conceptual personae and their role in thought as movement.

At this point, I think, the model of the duet as performed on stage presents a useful alternative to Deleuze and Guattari’s generalized athleticism. The duet can function as a conceptual metaphor that helps us to become aware of the specific understanding of thinking as movement as described by Deleuze and Guattari and expose aspects of the movement of thought that remain invisible in their conception in terms of the rivalry of free men and generalized athleticism performed by disembodied brains. In the following, I will confront the ‘duet’ performed by Deleuze and Guattari with When You See God, Tell Him (1995) by Itzik Galili.

**Dancing Reading — When You See God, Tell Him** is set on an extraordinary musical score. This score consists of part of a lecture given by I. F. Stone at the Ford Hall Forum and set onto music by Scott Johnson. Stone’s text invokes us to stop turning argument into war, to stop settling arguments through war and to find a different way of dealing with arguments other than having recourse to war. The text proposes a re-conceptualization of human relationships and interactions in terms of family. “We have to begin to think of ourselves as a family [in order to overcome] those reversion to barbarity and tribalism, who are still hung up in ancient, anachronistic hatreds like we see in Ulster, like we see in Israel, Palestine. That we can see in many parts of the world.” Stone argues for a change in the way we live and deal with one another, and argues that what is needed is that we begin to understand ourselves as part of one family. Once we start conceiving of ourselves as part of one family, once we begin to understand the relationships between different peoples in terms of family relationships, we will start living these relationships in a different way as well.

When the light goes up we see a man and a woman living in separate worlds, each in a small beam of light on either side of the stage. He is examining a flower, she is running around in circles. After a little while, she breaks away from ‘her’ beam of light and runs toward him, turns her back
towards him and bends over in what I take to be a sexual invitation. He does not accept the invitation and turns away. She repeats the gesture three times until he literally jumps over her, picks her up on his shoulders and puts her in a different place. He starts doing some frantic dance on his own with his face turned away from her towards the backside of the stage. Nevertheless, her gesture did catch his eye, or so it seems, for after a little while he turns around and imitates her pose in what appears to be an attempt at conciliation. This is the start of an interaction in which they get acquainted with one another.

According to Deleuze it is the perception of a certain 'charme' that marks the moment of the appearance of friendship. The perception of this 'charme' is the spark that sets the movement of thought between the two friends of wisdom into motion (Deleuze and Parnet 1995). The opening sequence of When You See God, Tell Him shows such a moment that marks the beginning of movement of thought, thought that, in this case, literally proceeds through movement. The first line of Stone’s text reads: “You know, I have so little here to say this evening, but there's so many things that have been said over and over again, that need to be said again and again.” In the performance it is the perception of this certain 'charme' that turns the situation of “having so little to say here this evening” into a situation of collaborative movement.

The interaction between the two partners in movement on stage does not always proceed harmoniously. When Stone's voice observes that “it is too small a planet – it grows smaller and smaller all the time” the dancers are physically in each other's way, one blocking the movement of the other. There are moments when they fall back in what the text calls “ancient, conditioned reflexes and psychoses of mankind and his homicidal tendencies.” Nevertheless, as they become more familiar with one another, they seem to “begin to enjoy the differences in the human family like we enjoy the differences in a garden of flowers. There is very little time to muster this broader vision,” Stone says, but “either we live together, or we die together” and the dancers drop ‘dead’ on the floor. Stone ends his text with the question: “Is it necessary – is it necessary?” During these final words, the dancers walk away together towards a single beam of light, facing a common goal. She picks the petals from the flower he had been holding at the beginning of the piece, as if to indicate that what this future will be, remains the question but nevertheless they will face it together.

The choreography presents a reading of I.F. Stone’s text in terms of a relationship between a man and a woman, translating the big words in the text into embodied situations we live by. Yet, to understand the performance solely as a visualization of the argument made in the text, would mean to ignore the many moments in which the dance presents a critique of, or an elaboration of, the text. The performance does much more than translate the argument made in the text into dance movement. It reconceptualizes the argument made in the text in terms of dance, and through this reconceptualization the performance breaks open the argument as made in the text, undermines it, and expands upon it.
In doing so, the performance can be read as an example of what Deleuze and Guattari describe as art's ambiguous relationship with chaos. Art, science and philosophy cast planes over the chaos, but at the same time they want us to tear open the firmament and plunge into chaos. "It is as if the struggle against chaos does not take place without an affinity with the enemy, because an other struggle develops and takes on more importance – the struggle against opinion, which claims to protect us from chaos itself" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 203, italics in the text). Deleuze and Guattari refer to D.H. Lawrence's *Chaos in Poetry* in which he explains what produces poetry:

> People are constantly putting up an umbrella that shelters them and on the underside of which they draw a firmament and write their conventions and opinions. But poets, artists, make a slit in the umbrella, they tear open the firmament itself, to let in a bit of free and windy chaos, and to frame in a sudden light a vision that appears through the rent (Deleuze and Guattari 1995: 204).

Art can let in a sudden light by creating structures that break up existing ones. In this way, art can illuminate the chaos for a moment, rendering it sensory. Art can perform what Stone's text argues for, namely breaking through the opinions and presuppositions we hide behind and open up a new vision. What the performance also demonstrates is that these new visions imply new points of view as a result of which thought starts to move in new ways.

In Johnson's musical score, Stone's text is literally cut up, and the pieces are framed in new ways. His first sentence – "You know, I have so little here to say this evening, but there's so many things that have been said over and over again that need to be said again and again" – is cut into pieces, some of which are repeated and transformed into a rhythmic structure. This is further elaborated on in the performance in which the movement of the dancers presents a visual equivalent to this process of cutting up. When the text says "There are so many things that have been said" the man and the woman face the audience together. During "That need to be said" they raise their arms. During "That have been said" they move backwards, and during "That need to be said" they raise their arms again while moving forward.

The movement pattern enhances the rhythmic structure of the text and the musical score, while at the same time the meaning of the text and the movements performed, start to interfere with one another. Through these interferences of the argument performed through the text with the movements performed on stage, attention is directed in new ways, so that Stone's first sentence ("You know, I have so little here to say this evening, but there's so many things that have been said over and over again that need to be said again and again") turns into an ambiguous statement. The composition of the performance offers opportunities for different readings of the same text, at the same time offering different points of view from which this text could be read. Central to this ambiguity is the question of positioning.
Stone’s first sentence now can be read as a self-reflexive remark about the situation of the theatre. Its position at the beginning of the performance turns his statement into a commentary on performing the same performance night after night. At the same time, it remains an integral part of Stone’s ongoing argument as made in the text. A third layer is added when the text begins to interfere with the individual performance of the dancers. Right after the man has jumped over the woman, the text begins with “You know.” After a minute or so, this “you know” is repeated, then followed by “I have so little to say here this evening.” At this moment, the man walks away from the woman towards the back of the stage as if ‘having so little to say this evening,’ is the reason he walks away from her. While the text says “but there are so many things that have been said,” he starts doing his frantic dance, moving from left to right and back again, again and again, following the rhythm of the text montage: “that have been said, so many so many things, that have been said, that need to be said, over and over again, over and over again, over and over again, over and over again.” Thoughts that might be playing through his head find a physical expression in his movement, showing him hovering between the fact that these things “have been said” so many times, yet that they “need to be said again and again.” His movement comes to a stop as he bends over in imitation of the woman’s pose, marking the beginning of yet another old story starting all over again, the age-old story of love.

With their performance, the dancers present partnership as an alternative to the rivalry, violence and tribalism that the text speaks of. The piece shows the development of this partnership represented through the interaction of the dancers on stage. As it is the case with the friends of wisdom, this relationship does involve love, not only for the object both friends are striving towards, but for one another as well. The development of the interaction between the partners in movement does include moments of rivalry; moments at which they interact as claimant and rival striving for the same goal, driven by the desire for same object.

The duet also demonstrates that in order for the personae of claimant and rival to appear, partnership is required, partnership that is needed to execute the movements that produce the two figures on stage as claimant and rival. Together, the dancers comprise the condition of possibility of movement itself, just as the conceptual personae are the condition of possibility for philosophical thought. They are a presence intrinsic to movement. Yet, it is only within these movements that they appear as claimant and rival, positions that appear as points of view implied by the sequence of movements. It is within this collaborative effort, and as a result of shared technologies, that claimant and rival appear as points of view. Furthermore, in the duet the two figures on stage appear as claimant and rival at the very same moment that they also appear as partners in the execution of the movement. It depends on how one wants to look at it. The performance demonstrates that points of view, as they are constituted in and by the movements.
performed, at the same time imply a point of view from where they can be perceived as such.

In Deleuze and Guattari’s account, these two points of view threaten to become conflated as a result of which the ‘I conceive’ of philosophy can appear as the immaculate conception of and by a lonely thought athlete surfing the plane of immanence. Here, the duet presents an alternative model in which both aspects of friendship – sharing and rivalry – are shown in relation to one another and as different moments mediating in the movement of thought between the two partners, and between partners and the audience.

**Sharing Technologies** — In a philosophical enunciation, movement is produced through thinking and this happens through the intermediary of a conceptual persona. In a philosophical enunciation it is the conceptual persona who says “I conceive” and thus constitutes a point of view according to which planes of immanence are distinguished from one another or brought together. These points of view, the “seeds of thought” as Deleuze and Guattari call them, then have to be reconstituted by a reader. In the duet, it is the two dance partners who produce an ongoing flow of movement – a constant state of becoming – in which movements of one partner are generated by movements of the other. The partners need one another, depend on one another, for it is their interaction that produces the movement just as they are produced as partners in and by it.

This ongoing flow of movement constitutes points of view as well, points of view that can be reconstituted by an audience as a result of which the audience can move along with what is presented. However, how a particular audience will reconstitute these points of view, and move along with what is presented, will not only depend on points of view as constituted by the performance, but also on conventions, knowledge, and experience that the audience shares with it, or not. The duet as performed in the theatre thus points attention to the “seed of thought,” and the “I conceive,” of the conceptual persona as two different yet intimately related moments. In the duet, their relationship is visualized in a way that renders the “I conceive” of philosophy sensory again in a way that stirs the imagination.

As I.F. Stone speaks of how the world gets smaller in terms of travel time, and how we are becoming one family through sharing each other’s technology, culture, poetry, and philosophy, the dancers begin performing a collective movement that at first looks like a representation of a vehicle, a wheelbarrow perhaps. They act out progress and reduction of travel time through portraying of a shared technology in bodily movement.

Yet, when the voice of Stone says “we share each other’s technology,” this is visually represented in an entirely different way. At this moment the woman repeats the sexual invitation the performance began with, and this time the man responds without hesitation. Sharing technologies is not shown through the embodiment of technology, but by means of a reference to a very much bodily or physical technique. With this striking image the performance
draws attention to bodies and desire as involved in conception, as well as to the pleasure that can be the result of sharing technologies of various kinds.

This moment of sharing technologies also shows how what is produced in the kind of thinking that takes place between people will depend on the specificities of these people as bodies involved in the interaction. The specificities of the partners in thought will determine what kind of technologies will be used, how the interaction will proceed and what its outcome will be. These specificities depend both on the physical possibilities of these bodies, and the way they are cultured to proceed in specific ways, and on how culture has marked their bodies as sites of projected desires.

Interferences — Deleuze and Guattari conceive of the brain as a multitude of planes on which thinking proceeds simultaneously. This raises the possibility of conceiving of subjectivity as even more radically discontinuous than suggested by Benveniste. It embraces an understanding of the subject thinking as a conglomerate of 'I's' emerging from various thought processes in which the brain – in its continuous state of survey – is involved.

In art, thinking proceeds through sensations and these sensations are formed by contracting that which composes it. This contraction is not an action but a pure passion, “a contemplation that preserves the before in the after” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 212). Art, therefore, takes place on a plane that is altogether different from mechanisms, dynamisms and finalities. Art takes place on the plane of composition and this plane is populated not with conceptual personae but with artistic figures. The difference between conceptual personae and aesthetic figures is that the former are the power of concepts and the latter are the powers of affects and percepts. In art, it is not the conceptual persona that says 'I conceive' but the aesthetic figure that says 'I feel.' Through the speech-acts 'I feel' and 'I conceive' philosophy is defined in terms of thinking as conceiving while art is defined in terms of thinking as feeling.

Notwithstanding the fact that art and philosophy constitute fundamentally different modes of thinking taking place at different planes and utilizing different elements it is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, possible to think on one plane through the elements of the other. They understand these moments that cross-overs take place, not in terms of new types of objects but in terms of new modes of thinking, new modes of thinking that result from interferences taking place between the planes that join up in the brain (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 216). I take a sequence of When You See God, Tell Him as an example of moment of interference between different modes of thinking.

At one point in the performance there is a minute long sequence in which the only text is a continuous repetition of 'again and again.' During this minute the dancers execute an intricate series of highly energetic movements in which they constantly change place yet remain very close to one another. They move around each other figured in entanglement, engaged
in an ongoing series of collisions, which release force of action and reaction. This repetitive movement in the rhythm of “again and again” does more than present a visual equivalent to the words “again and again.” It also brings the reasons why “these things” that have been said “over and over again,” still have to be said “again and again” to mind: the many actions and reactions that collide time and again “that we can see in many parts of the world.”

The contraction on the plane of composition not only shows the before in the after, but also, the other way round; the performance foreshadows what in the linear argument of the text still has to come. Furthermore, the impact of the collisions, and the force of action and reaction on these bodies make one feel how tiresome this situation is more than the text. The performance mediates in a movement of thought in which thinking as conceiving and thinking as feeling begin to interfere.

In the theatrical duet these inferences take place through the involvement of a third party, namely the audience. It is the body as locus of perception of the observer that marks the ‘place’ where thinking as feeling and thinking as conceiving start to interfere as concepts, and sensations and functions become undecidable. The argument, as represented in dance movement, is made sensible again as the words begin to interfere with the energy evoked by the execution of the movements. When the man finally lays his head to rest on the woman’s shoulder, with a movement of longing, stretching towards her, it feels like relief. This gesture puts an end to a representation of human conflicts ‘as we see them in many parts of the world,’ while resolving the emotional impact caused by the collision of these two bodies here and now on stage, involved in a conflict that addresses the viewer on an emotional and sensational level. These emotions and sensations get mixed up with the conception of the story represented.

In Deleuze and Guattari, it is the brain that is the locus of interferences of different modes of thinking. When You See God, Tell Him, suggests that their model of thinking as taking place through interferences might be useful as well to conceive of the body as the locus of input of various perceptual systems that produce perspectives on the world in relation to a sense of ‘here, ‘now’ and ‘me.’ The ‘I’ as deictic marker of this ‘place’ can function as a shifter between the perspectives presented by various perceptual systems. This would allow for a reconsideration of the subject of sense perception as a complex conglomerate of perspectives that interfere with one another. This opens up towards a conception of the synaesthetic processes that take place in the seeing body in terms of influence, resonance or even contradiction rather than unification. The ‘I’ as deictic shifter also suggests the possibility of relating these perceptual perspectives and the points of view that are part of the discourse through which we live in terms of interferences. This would permit an even further radicalization of Benveniste’s notion of discontinuous subjectivity and move towards an understanding of bodies as loci of conglomerates of ‘I’s’ capable of complex experiences that result from interferences between discursive formations and bodily practices.
For many days now, I’ve been studying the details through the magnifying lens, collecting them and building a tower, fragile as if made of cards. And there – creation: I’m a new being.

Recounting to myself the visions that may be gone; imagining to feel, with the tips of my fingers the touch of the future. Groping cautiously, I flee the picture. Then again, slowly, I navigate the magnifying lens in the tiny chamber, and each detail is familiar... Now I’ve learned to discover the magic hidden in things, which in my previous life I did not see. This is the principle, the heart of the matter – hereafter to follow the least of lines ... I feel as though I’m intercepting a transmission from my other self ... I stop.
In the past, I suddenly remember, I used a lot of motion; now only my right hand moves, scanning, as a lens to my eye. It is as if I was born fitting snugly into this hammock, and at times I forget who I am. I don’t fear this - where I am there is no fear, no amazement, only silence. Nothing can rock this tranquillity, and all desires melt away – but for the thirst for that which is not yet ... Wouldn’t it be better to stop?

I shall need only one touch; then I’ll gather my strength. Naked, clean, wrapped in thought and in frenzy – I go running for a few minutes, hours, days and nights ...

(Itzik Galili “For Many Days Now” from Uhlai / choreography: Itzik Galili / premiere September 15th, 1995, Stadsschouwburg Heerlen)