Corporate Financial Risk Management

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## Contents

1 **Introduction**  
   1.1 Motivation for this study  
       1.1.1 Need for economic framework and understanding  
   1.2 Approach and background  
   1.3 Outline of this dissertation  

2 **Survey**  
   2.1 Introduction  
   2.2 A neoclassical analysis  
       2.2.1 Introduction  
       2.2.2 The irrelevance of corporate risk management  
       2.2.3 Reducing expected taxes  
       2.2.4 Reducing expected bankruptcy costs  
       2.2.5 Concluding remarks and empirical predictions: risk management in a neoclassical framework  
   2.3 Ex post contracting problems between the firm and its financiers  
       2.3.1 Introduction  
       2.3.2 Reducing underinvestment  
       2.3.3 Asset substitution and risk management  
       2.3.4 Risk management, investment distortions and debt capacity  
       2.3.5 Conclusion and empirical predictions
Contents

2.4 Ex ante information frictions between the firm and its financiers .......... 48
   2.4.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 48
   2.4.2 Costly external finance and financial risk management ................. 49
   2.4.3 Concluding remarks and empirical predictions .......................... 55
2.5 Ex post information frictions between managers and shareholders .......... 56
   2.5.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 56
   2.5.2 Risk management: increasing the manager's expected utility of compen-
      sation packages ..................................................................... 56
   2.5.3 Reducing expected costs of managerial discretion (the overinvestment
      problem) ............................................................................. 65
   2.5.4 Agency costs of risk management ............................................ 68
   2.5.5 Concluding remarks ............................................................. 71
2.6 Ex ante information problems between managers and the firm .............. 72
   2.6.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 72
   2.6.2 Symmetric information: risk management to manipulate the market's
      learning ............................................................................... 72
   2.6.3 Asymmetric information: risk management and managerial incentives . 78
   2.6.4 Concluding remarks and empirical predictions .......................... 83
2.7 Concluding remarks ............................................................................ 83

3 Review of empirical research on corporate risk management .............. 87
   3.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 87
   3.2 Characteristics and approaches of empirical studies in corporate risk management 88
   3.3 Taxes ..................................................................................... 91
   3.4 Bankruptcy costs .................................................................... 94
   3.5 Investment distortions due to contracting problems between firms and financiers 96
      3.5.1 Introduction ...................................................................... 96
      3.5.2 Investment distortions ....................................................... 97
      3.5.3 Corporate risk management and the firm's capital structure .......... 101
      3.5.4 Conclusions .................................................................... 102
   3.6 Managerialism ......................................................................... 102
   3.7 Additional findings ................................................................. 106
      3.7.1 Introduction ...................................................................... 106
      3.7.2 Does size matter? .............................................................. 106
      3.7.3 Alternatives for derivatives in corporate risk management: substitutes
         or complements? .................................................................. 109
      3.7.4 Does risk management affect the riskiness and the value of the firm? 112
   3.8 Discussion .............................................................................. 113
4 An evaluation of the state-of-the-art of corporate risk management

4.1 Introduction ........................................ 117
4.2 Lessons from theoretical and empirical work ........................................ 118
  4.2.1 Risk management: fine-tuning the firm's financing decisions ............... 119
  4.2.2 Managerialism and risk management ........................................ 122
  4.2.3 Costs of financial risk management ........................................ 123
4.3 Surveys on the corporate use of derivatives ........................................ 124
  4.3.1 Introduction ........................................ 124
  4.3.2 Design and sample characteristics of recent surveys ......................... 124
  4.3.3 How many firms use derivatives? ........................................ 126
  4.3.4 Objectives for corporate risk management .................................... 127
  4.3.5 In which area do firms use derivatives (and how do they use them)? .... 128
  4.3.6 The impact of market view ........................................ 134
  4.3.7 Accounting guidelines and risk management .................................. 136
  4.3.8 Main findings and confrontation ........................................ 136
4.4 Puzzles in the literature; towards a research agenda ................................ 140
  4.4.1 Why do firms use a view on the market in risk management? ............... 140
  4.4.2 Risk management and accounting ........................................ 141
  4.4.3 Risk management for small firms: what do we know? ......................... 142
  4.4.4 Interaction among different forms of risk management ....................... 143
  4.4.5 How does risk management interact with the firm's securities? .......... 143
  4.4.6 The importance of product markets ........................................ 144
4.5 Concluding remarks ........................................ 145

II Extensions

5 Risk management and security design ........................................ 149
  5.1 Introduction ........................................ 149
  5.2 A risk sharing security design framework ........................................ 152
  5.3 Placement frictions or marketing costs ........................................ 159
  5.4 Corporate hedging and security design ........................................ 163
    5.4.1 Introduction ........................................ 163
    5.4.2 The benefits of hedging: higher revenues from security design .......... 164
    5.4.3 Hedging and security design with marketing costs ......................... 166
    5.4.4 Discussion ........................................ 167
  5.5 Limitations ........................................ 168
    5.5.1 Framework specific limitations ........................................ 168
### Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2</td>
<td>Model specific limitations</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Extensions</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8.1</td>
<td>Appendix 5.1</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8.2</td>
<td>Appendix 5.2</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8.3</td>
<td>Appendix 5.3</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Risk management and product markets</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Interaction of financial structure and product market competition</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>The basic model</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.1</td>
<td>General outline and timing</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.2</td>
<td>The product market</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.3</td>
<td>The financial markets</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.4</td>
<td>Equilibrium concept</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Interaction between corporate hedging and product markets</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.1</td>
<td>Second stage product market equilibrium</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.2</td>
<td>The first stage hedging decision</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Numerical examples</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.1</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8.1</td>
<td>Appendix 6.1</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8.2</td>
<td>Appendix 6.2</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8.3</td>
<td>Appendix 6.3</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8.4</td>
<td>Appendix 6.4</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Risk management and market share</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>The model</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.1</td>
<td>Product markets</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.2</td>
<td>Financing and hedging decisions</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Hedging and product markets with internal financing</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Hedging and product markets with external financing</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.1</td>
<td>Derivation of the optimal debt contract</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>