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van Heelsum, A.; van Amersfoort, J.M.M.

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Moroccan Berber Immigrants in The Netherlands, Their Associations and Transnational Ties: A Quest for Identity and Recognition

Hans van Amersfoort & Anja van Heelsum

Berbers were traditionally disregarded by the Moroccan elite and viewed as an uncivilised peripheral population. Only within the last few years has the Moroccan government, through the foundation of the Royal Institute of Amazigh culture, recognised the Berber inheritance as a valuable part of the Moroccan society. In this article we explore the orientation of the Moroccan Berber immigrants to their home country and to their countries of settlement and in particular in The Netherlands. We conclude that in the course of generations, the political orientation towards Morocco has lost some of its importance and that maintaining a core Berber identity among the immigrants has become the centre of the organisations’ activities in The Netherlands.

Introduction

All immigrants maintain contacts with their homelands for at least a few generations, but these contacts vary in strength and character among various immigrant populations. The position of the immigrants in the new
society and their home countries are important variables explaining the
nature and intensity of the bond the immigrants have with their
homelands. In the case of the Moroccan Berber immigrants, this last point
is of particular importance given the specific cultural and political position
of the Berber population in Morocco. Which ideas prevail among these
immigrants with regard to cultural and political developments in their
homelands? In which way does their specific Berber culture influence their
adaptation to the new society? These are the general questions with which
we started our project. Using the theoretical approach of transnationalism,
we were also interested in exploring whether and to what extent an
international network of communication between Berber immigrants
in various Western countries functioned, possibly giving rise to a
transnational Berber community.

First we will elucidate the term Berber and why we assume their case to
be of special interest. Subsequently, we will present our theoretical frame
of reference and the way in which we examine the transnational ties of
immigrant populations. Thereafter, we specify our research questions and
describe our research population and data. Finally, we summarise our
findings and answer our research questions.

**Berber, a Multi-layered Term**

*The Historical Background*

The term Berber originated when the Romans extended their empire across
northern Africa. Today, only ruins testify of the Roman presence in the
region. They called the un-Romanised populations “barbarians”, a term
borrowed from Greek. More interesting than the linguistic roots of the
term *Berber* is that two connotations of the term have survived to the
present day. The first is the derogatory meaning of primitive, rural people
without the attainments of higher culture. The second is that of people
living in a world of tribes and feuding clans outside the realm of central
authority and not acting on the basis of established laws and procedures.
It is important to note that these connotations of the term “Berber”
defined the described populations in a negative way; it tells what the
populations have not or are not. Their diversity across other characteristics
was not considered relevant.¹

It would not be worthwhile to dwell on the Roman ways of looking
at the peripheral populations of their time if this situation, a central
government considering itself superior in cultural attainments and
struggling to maintain order in the periphery, had not become such
an enduring feature of the North African countries and of Morocco in particular. The classical presentation by the Arab sociologist Ibn Khaldun of North African Muslim society as divided in the Bled El Makhzen (land of government) and the Bled El Siba (land of dissent), Arab invaders had succeeded in establishing their regime in the plains is still convincing.\(^2\)

The relationships between the Arabs and the indigenous populations gave rise to a complicated mosaic of dynamic relationships. In the literature one finds a constant reference to bipolar relationships between: orderly government and feuding tribes, tax paying and tax consuming, towns with market economies and rural subsistence economies, sedentary agriculturalists and pastoral nomads or semi-nomads, scholarly Islamic orthodoxy and maraboutism rife with saints and other pre-Islamic superstitions.\(^3\)

For our purpose two broad processes that have their starting point in the Arab conquest of the western part of North Africa, the Maghreb, are essential: Islamisation and Arabisation.\(^4\) Gradually, the new religion brought by the invaders successfully penetrated the isolated mountains and deserts. No matter which divisions remained between the Arabs and the indigenous populations, Islam became a unifying force transforming the Maghreb into a Muslim society, admittedly with various grades of orthodoxy and the persistence of old beliefs and customs among the converted tribes. The penetration of the Arab language was far less successful.\(^5\) Whereas Islam became a unifying cultural element, language remained a characteristic of differentiation. In line with the tradition inherited from Roman times and continuing during colonial rule, Berbers were again defined in terms of what they were not: not Arabic speaking, not fully Islamised and/or not fully under the control of a central authority.

When the European powers established rule over Morocco, they inherited this legacy of a Muslim society united by religion and divided by language and effective national power structures. The Berber population of the Riff led by Abdelkaderkrim El Khatabbi resisted the Spanish colonisation forcefully and initially with great success. This conflict was not resolved until 1926. The French were also met with resistance, especially in the mountainous regions of the Atlas. When this resistance had been overcome, a form of colonial rule (protectorate) was established which combined the sultanate with a colonial administration in a somewhat awkward marriage of convenience. While the sultan remained “The commander of the Faithful” and a potential centre of power, French, and to a lesser extent Spanish, administrators took over. The French system of rule is especially interesting because of its great impact on the postcolonial situation in Morocco. Confronted with the divisions inside the sultanate, the French devised a system where the Bled El Makhzen and
the tribal areas were at the same time united and divided. It resulted in the controversial *Dahir Berbère* in 1930. The basic idea of this administrative system was a dualistic system where a French administrator was supplemented at each level by a local officer. This system would allow the local traditions and customs to remain intact as long as they did not interfere with colonial interests. In short, the Berbers were allowed to follow their own customary laws and regulations, while for the Arab population the Sharia would be valid.

The *Dahir Berbère* sparked a furious protest among the young nationalist movement. Moroccan nationalists saw the way the French treated the Berber issue as a device to divide the Moroccan population into separate segments as a coercive instrument. There is certainly much truth in this interpretation. The French could use this process to strengthen their grip on the country by finding loyal allies among the Berbers, of whom the Glaoui dynasty based in Marrakesh has become especially well known. However, Machiavellian reasoning was not the only root of the Berber policy. There was also a positive approach towards the authentic cultures of the mountains and the desert, a romantic admiration for the independent martial men who were their own masters. The romanticised picture of the Berbers as an ancient race full of remarkable qualities and possessing highly interesting cultural attributes was certainly part of the ideology of the colonial power (the simple but authentic Berber versus the cunning Arab!). But the Berber policy was not only a political device. It defined the Berber population not as what it was *not* (Arab speaking) or had *not* (an orderly administrative system), but instead created an image of its own. In this way the French Berber policy did two things simultaneously. It awakened the Moroccan nationalism, spurring it to unite behind the Sultan to restore the status of an independent Morocco. And, it made Berber intellectuals (of whom there was a growing number) to question what the place of their communities would be in postcolonial Morocco.

**Present-Day Morocco**

The decolonisation wave that put an end to the European colonial empires was articulated everywhere according to specific historical circumstances. In Morocco it gained momentum when Mohammed V succeeded in transforming the traditional sultanate authority into a new conception of nationalistic royalty. But once the independent kingdom was established and the colonial powers had withdrawn, the new Morocco faced old challenges. Regional differentiation and the conflicting interests of central and peripheral regions proved to be a sensitive problem, as for almost all
postcolonial regimes. In Morocco this tension manifested itself almost inevitably in the form of tribal opposition to the new central state administration and organisation. Especially in the Riff, with its tradition of resistance to the Spanish colonisation, discontent took the form of rebellion, a rebellion that was ferociously suppressed.\(^7\) As both Hart and Gellner note, the rebels formulated tribal grievances as a criticism of the regional policy of the national government and not as a policy striving for separatism. Rebellions in peripheral Berber regions fuelled fears in King Hassan II and his government of disloyalty, if not outright separatism, that had to be oppressed. The answer was royal despotism and acceleration of the Arabisation of the Berber-speaking areas, particularly in the unruly Riff.

However, Morocco had become a very different country in the last decades of the twentieth century than the Old World divided into the Bled El Makhzen and the dissenting Bled El Siba. In 1912, the population of Morocco had been around five million of whom 90% lived in rural areas; in 1998, the population had grown to over 28 million people, of whom more than 50% lived in towns and cities. Of this population, 40–50% are assumed to be Berbers. With the increasing mobility and the increase of market-oriented modes of production, a substantial part of the urban population, especially in Casablanca, now consists of first- and second-generation immigrants from Berber areas and dividing lines between Berbers and Arabs became more blurred than they already were.\(^8\) It became apparent that the regime had to respond differently to the old Berber issue than through pure oppression. The Moroccan government has become aware of this necessity during the past decades and has sought means to incorporate the cultural heritage of the Berber population into the national culture.

The founding of the *Royal Institute of Amazigh culture* (IRCAM) in 2001 is the most concrete expression of this awareness. It is a step to institutional plurality as an answer to the ethnic diversity. But the Institute’s mission is a delicate one. It faces two fundamental problems, one is external and the other internal.\(^9\) The former is relatively simple to picture. In its quest for recognition it must keep the confidence of the government that whatever form of institutional plurality it advocates and enhances, it gives no support to separatist tendencies. This is not an easy task because distrust of the loyalty of the Berbers (or part of the Berbers) has certainly not vanished. Concerns are kept alive by political upheavals elsewhere in the Maghreb, especially in the Kabylla region in Algeria. A too cautious approach with regard to political claims readily fuelled disappointment among the people who had high expectations when the Institute was founded.\(^10\) The internal problem is directly connected with the negative
definition of the term Berber we have come across already, Berbers as not
having certain characteristics. Such a negative definition is totally at odds
with a movement searching for self-respect and demanding a recognised
place in society. However, finding a positive definition that is not merely
symbolic in such a situation is a hazardous task. How can people in dissent
reach consensus among each other? Some issues are relatively easy.
The word Berber, with its derogatory connotation, is changed to Amazigh
(plural Imazighen) and is widely acceptable; however, unfortunately it is
not suitable for general communication because it is unknown in the wider
world. Moreover, it is much more difficult to find a general acceptable
denominator with regard to the languages and dialects actually spoken, in
order to give them a function in national life (for instance, in education).
Without going into endless debate about where the linguistic divides lay
between languages and dialects, it is clear that there is no unified Amazigh
language. Generally three languages are distinguished: Tarifit (spoken in
the Riff area), Tamazight (spoken in the Middle Atlas region) and Tashilhit
(spoken in the High Atlas, the Sousse valley and Anti-Atlas region). Within
these languages several dialects can be distinguished that are not
always mutually understandable. Though the three languages belong to a
single linguistic family, it will not be easy to develop a common
standardised language, for which (a form of) Tamazight seems the most
appropriate candidate. IRCAM has started to compile dictionaries,
grammar and school books as necessary steps on the way to
standardisation. However, these activities have provoked immediate
protest, for instance on the point of the most suitable alphabet, from some
of the Amazigh organisations. The Institute advocates a revitalisation of
the ancient Tifinagh script that was already in (limited) use before the
Roman and Arab invasions. But some organisations prefer the Latin
alphabet, because it is more practical and prevents that children need to
master three alphabets in their early school years. How much controversy
there is among the various sections of the Berber population can be
illustrated by the reaction of the Confédération des Associations
Amazighes du Maroc (TADA) to the founding of IRCAM. TADA regards
IRCAM as an apparatus of the Makhzen, created in order to neutralise the
mobilisation of the Imazighen.

Leaving aside questions of how representative the organisations united
in TADA are, this reaction illustrates the difficulty in converting a
heterogeneous population, which was for centuries defined as a negative
unit by successive ruling elites, into a united movement with generally
accepted and feasible goals. There is an inherent tension in all such
movements because the quest for identity induces them to place a high
value on unique, local traditions and cultural attainments. Yet, stressing these elements leads to fragmentation. At the same time, the emancipation movement wants to emphasise what is communal and of general interest to pursue.

These issues already pose complicated questions regarding the identity of the Berber populations inside Morocco and their attitudes towards the Moroccan society. But it is even more complicated for the migrants who have since left Morocco and settled in Western countries. As the Moroccan migrants came mainly from peripheral regions, where the population pressure was the most severe, a large number of the migrants are Berbers.13

In The Netherlands, for instance, about 65% of the Moroccans are Rifians; many of them speaking no other language than (a form of) Tarifit. Furthermore, the migration to Western Europe has now been underway long enough that not only a first but also a second generation is present and reaching adulthood.

**Transnationalism as a Theoretical Framework**

As we already remarked, immigrants always try to maintain contacts with their homelands for at least one generation. It is even common for the first-generation immigrants to consider returning to the homeland. However, experiences of the past have shown that instead of following this path, the immigrants shift their orientation in the course of generations from their home countries to their new environments and become new Americans, Frenchmen and so forth. The development of modern means of transport and communication during the last century makes maintaining contacts with their home countries much easier for the immigrants. Moreover, the maintenance of contacts and the exchange of ideas and money across borders with fellow migrant countrymen in other states have also become much easier. These circumstances have made the question relevant whether or not these developments have also changed the relationship between immigrants and their receiving countries, in the sense that the modern immigrants are incorporated in their new society in a different way than migrants in the industrial era. The immigrants of the second and further generations are now supposed to become “transnationalists”. They are viewed as people at home abroad, often in the possession of two, occasionally even more, passports, integrated in the society of settlement, but at the same time part of a wider national or cultural community.

The idea that modern international migrants become “transnationalists” in the course of generations was first put forward by American anthropologists in a rather apodictic way.14 Perhaps because they did not
pose the emergence of transnationalism as a possibility, as a valuable hypothesis about coming developments, but rather as an established fact, their work gained much attention and the term transnationalism became in vogue. However, a very similar approach can be found among other studies of communities with a history of migration. For instance, Sheffer uses the term “modern diasporas” for communities that have their origin in international migration movements and remain in some sense aloof of their country of settlement.15 The ideas put forward by these authors have been received with some reservations. Questions have been raised about the underlying assumptions and also the sometimes far-fetched conclusions that characterise such work.16 The great merit of the transnationalist approach, however, is that it has led to new research questions in the field of migration studies.17 We will elucidate some points from the theoretical discussions that have direct bearing on the questions that have guided our research.

Transnational studies are about sustained contacts between immigrants and their home country and/or fellow communities in other countries. Because these contacts are more or less ubiquitous among first-generation immigrants, the more interesting aspects of these contacts come to the fore among later generations, among the descendants of the immigrants. To analyse the nature of these contacts, attention to the measure of institutionalisation is essential. Because, after all, a certain measure of institutionalisation is necessary in order to have sustainable activities.18 And in order to understand the functioning of immigrant institutions, it is important to pay attention to their source. Are they grass roots organisations, founded and maintained by the immigrants themselves or does the source lie outside the immigrant communities, for instance with the government of the sending society, political parties of the homeland or international religious organisations? Among the first generation, the activities are often organised by informal leaders using personal networks of family members and friends. These activities require only a low level of institutionalisation and though they can be very important for the individuals involved (for instance, remittances to family members left behind), they remain primarily a private affair. But these personal networks become looser in the course of generations, and for the bond with the homeland to become long lasting, it is necessary for more formal organisations and professional roles to develop.

Following this reasoning, we need to pay attention to three points in our study of the Moroccan associations: the measure of institutionalisation, the source of institutionalisation and the generation of differences over time. The nature of these institutions’ activities, and what they generate or maintain also needs to be discussed. It is customary to analytically separate
economic, cultural and political activities. This distinction is easier to achieve analytically than it is in the observation of daily practices, but even so it is virtually impossible to study all kinds of contacts and consequences in one project. For instance, the topic of the volume of remittances and their direct and indirect consequences for Morocco, not only on the level of households, but also on regional developments and national economy is so important and far reaching that it merits a study in itself.\textsuperscript{19} We decided to focus on the cultural and political orientation of the Berber immigrants in The Netherlands, on how they define themselves (as Moroccan and/or Berber), and on the identity they use to navigate out of their special position in the surrounding society and their home country (or the country of their parents). Given the historical contradictions in the Moroccan society that we have already described, it is also of interest to study to the extent that they take part in the discussions around the recognition of a specific place for the Amazigh population in the Moroccan society. Finally, we have to address the question if and to what extent they have contacts with Berber communities in other countries (Western Europe, Africa and America) and examine whether it is possible to identify the birth of a “transnationalist” Berber community, or in the terminology of Sheffer, a Berber diaspora.

**Research Questions and Design**

In the previous paragraphs we described the historical scene and the theoretical framework that guided our research. To investigate the meaning of the Berber inheritance for Berber immigrants we address the following questions:

a. How has the process of institutionalisation been influenced by the development of migration from Morocco to The Netherlands? Has the character of the organisations changed (for instance, in the goals pursued, their source of organisation or the role of professional involvement)?

b. What is the relationship between general Moroccan organisations in The Netherlands and specific Amazigh organisations? Are there Amazigh organisations that address specific types of Berbers (Riffians or Soussis) or do they all have a general Amazigh character and ideology?

c. What kinds of activities do the specific Amazigh organisations pursue? Are these activities aimed at the political and cultural situation in Morocco or are they more involved in the problems confronting the
immigrants in The Netherlands? Are there important differences between the activities of the Amazigh organisations and general Moroccan groups?

d. Does the involvement in Berber issues differ among generations of Moroccans in The Netherlands, or are other variables (such as regional differentiation, level of education) more evident?

e. Are there relationships with Amazigh organisations in other countries in Western Europe, Africa and America? Can we say that the organisations in The Netherlands are part of a much wider Amazigh movement among immigrants in several countries?

The literature on the Moroccans in The Netherlands has been scrutinised with regard to our research questions and these sources enable us to describe the recent development of the Moroccan organisations in The Netherlands. Much of the information came from van Heelsum’s study of migrant organisations in The Netherlands.20 These works provide a comprehensive overview of the Moroccan associations and their networks. Furthermore, 40 associations were studied in detail. Their documents and annual reports were gathered; the researcher visited their meetings, interviewed board members and investigated their contacts. We then consulted the websites of the Amazigh associations. The Internet is a medium that generates contacts and the expression of viewpoints among a wide and often international audience. It is an especially popular podium for discussion among youth and is free to access in Dutch libraries.21 Interlinking websites show organisational ties between the various organisations, both nationally and internationally.

Immigrants and Immigrant Organisations

From Workers to Immigrants

When the Dutch economy recovered much more rapidly than expected from the Second World War and the ensuing years of poverty, the resulting economic growth caused a labour shortage, especially in classical industries that demanded a relatively small investment of capital and a high input of unskilled or lowly skilled labour. The employers in these sectors started to recruit labour in the Mediterranean region. At first this process was quite informal. Sometimes the workers came by themselves, because they had heard one way or the other that jobs were available. In this way migration flows from Mediterranean countries towards Western Europe came into being. Moroccans migrated primarily to France and Belgium and to a lesser extent to The Netherlands.22
In the course of time, the governments involved – both from the sending and the receiving countries – felt the need to intervene, because all sorts of negative side effects became visible (for instance, in the field of healthcare). This situation led to recruitment agreements, such as those between The Netherlands and Morocco in 1969. In fact, the Moroccan migration towards The Netherlands was already well under way. Immigrants had already found a route in many cases via France or Belgium and often guided by contacts by earlier migrants from the same village or region. This chain migration often caused striking localised settlements of the Moroccans from certain villages in specific towns in The Netherlands. Nearly all of these immigrants were married men who had left their families behind with the expectation that their stay abroad would only be temporary. They regarded their migration to Europe as an extension of the experience that they (or their fathers) had with systems of circular migration, which had already existed for generations in peasant areas, especially in the Riff. All the parties involved, not only the governments but certainly also the migrants themselves, expected this labour migration to be a temporary affair. The first studies of the Moroccans in The Netherlands point this out clearly. The men intended to return to Morocco after a few years of hard work and frugal living and to invest their savings in the family farm or a small business. These first immigrants had not much contact within Dutch society except from their participation in the labour market. It is interesting that in the studies of the Moroccan labourers in The Netherlands, issues of identity or the relationships of Berbers within the Moroccan society did not play a role. The interest was focused on the living conditions in The Netherlands, the stability of migration patterns and on the consequences of the labour migration for the development of the areas that were strongly involved in these migration flows. Still, it became clear from these investigations that the migration to The Netherlands largely consisted of Berbers from the Riff and to a lesser degree from the southern regions around Ouarzazate and Agadir.

As is typically the case with this kind of migration and despite the original intentions of the migrants, the return journey was postponed, the duration of stay became longer and longer and finally the migration changed in character. Instead of the men going back, the wives and children followed their husbands and fathers. After 1973 the number of Moroccans in The Netherlands increased rapidly and the demographic structure changed completely. In 1965 there were only 4500 Moroccans in The Netherlands; in 1998 there were already more than 163,000. By 2007,
This number had increased to 329,493, of whom 137,071 were under the age of 20.24

This development inevitably made the type of contacts with Dutch society increase enormously: the families had different housing needs than the single men, children had to go to Dutch schools, wives had to visit maternity wards and so forth. The development of a settled Moroccan community comprising men and women of different age cohorts increased the need for more structured and permanent forms of organisation. The first immigrants had, because of their low level of participation in Dutch society, only a limited need for institutions. The first organisations focused their efforts on lobbying to improve the legal position of labourers in The Netherlands. The first prominent organisation was the Committee for Moroccan Labourers in The Netherlands (Komittee Marokkaanse Arbeiders Nederland, KMAN) established in 1975 and its sister Association for Moroccan Women in The Netherlands (Marokkaanse Vrouwen Verening Nederland, MVVN).25 KMAN was founded by leftist intellectuals, and supported by left-wing Dutch organisations, who tried to incorporate the Moroccan labourers in a modern labour movement. It was very active in the social and political field for several years, while the focus of MVVN lies on the emancipation of women.
Political opponents of the regime of King Hassan II had also become active among the immigrant workers. The Moroccan government reacted by trying to tighten its grip on the immigrant communities by founding a Dutch branch of the Amicales as an attempt to institutionalise the ties the Moroccan migrants had with their home country. The Amicales were viewed by political adversaries as an instrument to extend political control over left wing and Berber activists.

A second organisational development was of religious nature. The need for a place to perform the religious duties led to the formation of mosque committees, but most of them were initially strictly local, grass roots organisations without wider aims and contacts. However, the growing number of permanently settled Moroccan immigrants brought in its wake several changes with regard to the institutionalisation of Islam among the Moroccans in The Netherlands. A large number of local organisations with diverse interests developed and Landman states that by 1992 the Unie van Marokkaanse Moslim Organisaties in Nederland had succeeded in bringing together 79 of the 100 Moroccan mosque committees in The Netherlands. In the same period, institutionalisation from other sources took place, which reflected the wider Islamic world. Specific denominations of Islam, which were mostly of a more strict, if not fundamentalist interpretation, began to establish mosques and sent imams to recruit followers among the Moroccan immigrants.

It is interesting to note again that in the first studies of the Moroccan immigrant organisations, the specific problems of the Berbers did not receive much attention. Until 1990, it seems to have been a topic that was regarded as less relevant than, for instance, the social position of the immigrants (KMAN), the attitude towards the Moroccan government (the Amicales) or the institutionalisation of Islam in The Netherlands.

Organisations After 1990

The increase in the number of Moroccan immigrants and change in their demographic composition have both given rise to growth in the number of associations and a broadening of their range of activities. We now find theatre and sport clubs and music, language and literature groups. The first generation of immigrant workers was not confronted with questions about their identity because they remained rooted in their villages and family backgrounds. However, the younger generation do not possess this automatic frame of reference. They are confronted with a different school system, with the questions about religion, with differences between the languages at school versus at home and so forth. Young Moroccans in The Netherlands are
confronted with at least four worlds: a Dutch one, an official Arab-speaking Moroccan one, a Berber one and last but not least, an Islamic one. These worlds are not isolated from one another, and overlap to a large extent. But to some extent they are also in conflict, posing difficult dilemmas for young Moroccans. The increasing number of organisations can be interpreted as a response to this psychologically and socially challenging situation.

Our research concerning the number and activities of the Moroccan organisations and the ties between them has shown a wide network of loosely structured groups with a great variety of activities. A substantial number are religiously based, but many focus only on a specific problem (such as helping children with their homework) or a particular group (for instance, elderly/young persons). As already emphasised, the specific position of the Rifians or Soussi did not arise in the early years of the Moroccan settlement in The Netherlands. One of the reasons the Berber issue received more attention was that children, who spoke a Berber language at home, encountered problems in Dutch schools. Moreover, the recognition in Morocco of the Berber population as a valuable segment of the total population made it possible to address questions that were previously too politically sensitive. At present, there are about 720 more or less important Moroccan organisations in The Netherlands. Although all Moroccan associations consist mainly of members with a Rifian background, for the purpose of studying the Berber issue we have concentrated on those bodies that label themselves explicitly as Amazigh organisations, and not on, say, religious associations, women’s associations and sport clubs.

The first Amazigh organisations were Izaouran (Amsterdam), Syphax (Utrecht) and Adrar (Tilburg). Their founders had arrived as refugees in The Netherlands. Some of them had been political prisoners because of their struggle to improve Berber rights in Morocco during the reign of Hassan II. The first Amazigh organisations emphasised that human rights had been violated in the Berber areas in Morocco. They supported a conference on the consequences of the toxic gases that had been used during the Rif war. They were politically active and associated themselves with the Unrepresented Nations’ and Peoples’ Organisation. Their activities were initially aimed at the situation in Morocco. But they soon turned their attention to the situation of the Berber immigrants as well, because the Berbers in The Netherlands felt that they were looked down upon. A member of the board of one of the Amazigh organisations has said:

Berbers are not in a position of high esteem in Morocco. They are seen as backward peasants and not as real Muslims. Within the Moroccan community in the Netherlands similar notions exist about Berbers. Berbers in the Netherlands are not proud of their culture, but try
to behave as Arabic as possible, although the Arabic culture was actually imported to that region. The second generation has even more problems, since the children speak a Berber language at home and Dutch is the standard in the school and neighbourhood. A foundation like ours, which wants to spread Berber language and culture, becomes an issue of discussion. Left wing Moroccans accuse us of being “regionalist” and royalists accuse us of being anti-Moroccan. Because we try to promote a local language, we are called anti-Arab and against the King. In conservative circles around the mosques, they call us anti-Islamic. The Arab language is the language of Islam, so it is reasoned that a person who finds Berber languages important is against Islam.31

This spokesman articulates the distrust of the Berbers among leftist groups, the Moroccan government and some sections of the Muslim community. The political debate that we noticed earlier within Morocco between people who regard the Amazigh movement as a separatist movement and those who think that certain cultural and language rights should become a recognised part of the Moroccan society and do not threaten the integrity of the Moroccan state, is echoed in The Netherlands. The derogatory opinion about the non-Arabic speaking Muslims among some Islamic organisations reflects the old contrast between the “civilised” Arab townsmen and the “uncivilised” rural population.

Activists, often male, for whom the political situation in Morocco was of prime interest founded the first Berber organisations. But with the development of the second generation the Amazigh groups became more oriented to the practical problems of the Berber immigrants in Dutch society. It is interesting to note that in these new associations of youngsters both boys and girls are active members.

Activities of the Amazigh Organisations

Amazigh organisations are currently active in a range of fields, and language is of the essence in their activities. However, language should not be viewed as an isolated item, as they are interested in promoting the culture of the Berbers on the whole. For the younger generation in The Netherlands, the questions of identity are directly linked with their social position in Dutch society. Therefore, providing information not only about Morocco but also about The Netherlands is another main task.

Language

Most of the young Moroccans in The Netherlands speak a Riffian dialect at home and need to learn Dutch in primary school. In 1970, the Dutch
government implemented a special programme for immigrant children, *Onderwijs in EigenTaal en Cultuur* (OETC, education in own language and culture), to make return to the home countries easier. Immigrant children followed extra lessons regarding the national culture and language of their home countries. Because the OETC programme was developed in consultation with the governments of the various sending societies, OETC instruction for the Moroccan children meant having lessons in Arabic. The OETC programme was popular with the Moroccan parents because of the high status of Arabic as the language of the Koran and the national language of Morocco. When it became clear that very few Moroccans returned, however, the philosophy behind the OETC programme changed. Pedagogues argued that the (partial) use of the home language in education was necessary for the healthy intellectual development of children. The focus on the home language is reflected in the new name, *Onderwijs in allochtone levende talen* (OALT, education in living foreign languages). In line with this reasoning, instruction in one of the Berber languages was advocated. 32

Without discussing the arguments about the pros and cons of this view, it is clear that the philosophy of the OALT posed both an opportunity and a challenge for the Amazigh bodies in The Netherlands that were already working on Berber languages. It provided them with the opportunity to achieve one of their main ideals, education in the home language. As in Morocco, the main challenge was to develop a standard form of Tamazight that would be understandable for as wide a circle of Berber speakers as possible. The need to develop a standardised spelling and useful teaching materials were viewed with at least as much urgency in The Netherlands as in Morocco.

Amazigh associations had already worked on publications focussing on the Tamazight alphabet, grammar, teaching materials, stories and literature. Publications first appeared in France and The Netherlands, and were not allowed in Morocco during the reign of King Hassan II. In the context of the different approach to OALT, the Amazigh associations put pressure on the Dutch authorities to introduce Tamazight lessons and have developed instructional materials with the help of the educational authorities.

The Internet also increased the information flow among the Amazigh organisations. Websites came to offer language and writing courses and began to circulate a standardised form of Tamazight. These electronic sources carry information on new books and language methods are reviewed and discussed. And in line with such developments in 2001, Said Essanoussi developed electronic dictionaries for translation between the Riffian Tarifit and Dutch, Spanish, English and French as well as fonts for typing in Tifinagh, the ancient Tamazight alphabet. 33 The present-day
diversity in languages and dialects spoken by the Berber population makes the use of the home language in the school education an intricate affair. Even the introduction of the Riffian Berber language Tarifit at school would not ensure that the majority of the Moroccan children in The Netherlands would benefit from it.

After the establishment of the Royal Institute in Morocco, standardisation is more likely to occur in the future. This could make it more feasible to include a standardised Berber language in the school curriculum both in Morocco and in other countries.

Culture

Dutch Amazigh associations have organised a range of cultural activities. Moroccans in The Netherlands are remarkably active in literature and since most Dutch Moroccans are Berbers, there are several authors of Berber origin writing in Dutch. Evenings and festivals are organised, where Berber stories are told and poems are recited. Recently, the Dutch publisher Bulaaq presented a book plus CD containing Berber fairy tales. Mohammed El Ayoubi publishes Berber stories, based on the oral literature from the surroundings of Ayt Waryaghel, an area of the Riff. He explains his motive for gathering these stories as follows:

My generation is the last one that is acquainted with the oral literature of the Riff. One day this oral tradition will come to an end.34

Large numbers, especially of young Moroccans attend music and literature festivals organised by the Amazigh associations. When Tarzzut (a Berber organisation from Rotterdam) arranged one of the first large cultural events in the Amsterdam in 2001, the tickets were sold out within a few hours. The organisers took great pain to point out that it was a cultural, not a political event, as this interview fragment shows:

Berbers have inhabited North Africa for ages and have a very rich culture and a long history. We want to show as much of this as possible (. . .) A language expert will give a lecture and some known Moroccan writers in The Netherlands – Abdelkader Benali, Said el Haji, Mimoun Essahraouhi, Ehmmed Essadki and Najib Elyandouzi – will read from their work and explain how their work is influenced by Dutch and Berber culture. There is also a lot of music. The legendary Berber protest singer Walid Mimoun will perform and also Ayned and Choukri.

In the period after 2001, Amazigh cultural events featuring writers and music have taken place more regularly, for instance in popular venues such as Argan and Paradiso in Amsterdam. Most young visitors are interested mainly in finding out about their roots. However, politics is difficult
to avoid completely. It comes to the surface in the texts of the singers, for instance when protesting against the oppression of Berbers in Algeria. These singers do not only come from Morocco and usually travel from country to country. In this way they are able to build connections between the Amazigh organisations and put political emancipation on the agenda in the various North African countries.

**Information**

Many Moroccan associations provide information to help immigrants cope with practical problems like immigration law, other legal affairs, political participation and health care. More specific for the Amazigh associations is the organisation of all kind of meetings and discussion groups about the history of the Berber population, about their music, literature and other cultural subjects. However, some associations that do not explicitly present themselves as Amazigh organisations are also active in this sphere. For instance, the Moroccan Cultural Union Bades, the Association of Moroccan Migrants in Utrecht and the Moroccan Association for Cultural Action Rotterdam in cooperation with the Leiden University organised a conference in November 2001 on the Riffian hero, Abdelkarim El Khattabi. During this two-day congress, researchers of international standing from France, Egypt, Spain and Morocco expounded on the history of the Riff. Bades organised two more events in 2001 on subjects that were (indirectly) connected with Amazigh culture: a congress on developmental aid in the Riff and a discussion evening on the booklet, “Riff between palace, Istiqlal and the freedom movement”, by Mustafa Arab. A spokesperson from BADES explained:

> Culture is more than language and literature. Attention to history is also important for our activities; it’s part of our identity ... and that consists of Amazigh-elements, Arab elements, Islamic elements, and also Jewish elements, although these last elements nowadays do not get much attention anymore. One needs to be realistic: 80% of Dutch Moroccans are Berbers, so we pay attention to that. But we are not fanatic.

The three issues – language, culture and information – are all discussed on Amazigh websites in The Netherlands. Websites such as www.amazigh.nl and www.rifnet.nl host “chat boxes”, where visitors discuss Amazigh issues. The subject matter is often related to current affairs and life in The Netherlands. Though the intention of the web organisation is “to raise awareness of Amazigh identity”, it is also used for heated discussions on current questions and issues, such as the war in Iraq. The organisations
behind the websites offer possibilities to young Berbers to acquire information, find out about meetings and cultural shows and discuss their opinions directly through chat boxes. Communication on websites can accelerate national and international contacts and make it easier to define oneself as part of a more general Berber movement.

The activities of these particular organisations are focused around the culture and history of the Riffian Berbers. This is understandable because they form the majority of the Moroccans in The Netherlands. However, Berber immigrants also come from other areas in Morocco. Although less visible, they have also founded organisations to maintain their specific cultural traditions. In Amsterdam for instance, the Stichting Tazanakhte has been founded. This Soussi organisation accuses other Amazigh organisations of paying attention only to the traditions and language of the Riff and neglecting the culture and language of the southern Berbers.

**Berber, Moroccan, Islamic**

The dividing line between specific Berber and more general Moroccan organisations is clearly fluid. Only a few organisations address Arabic speakers alone (for instance, the student union Eurabia and the publisher El Hizjra). Most Moroccan associations also pay attention in one way or the other to the Amazigh languages since the majority of their members are Berbers. The interest among the immigrants in the traditional and modern Amazigh cultures has increased during the past decades. This may partly be a reaction to the negative image about Moroccans that has become widespread during the past decade. The gap between the first and the second generation seems to affect the educational situation of the boys in particular. The resulting misbehaviour and high crime rates have contributed to the negative image many Dutch people have of the Moroccans. These interests in the culture and in a more or less romanticised history of the Amazigh offer the possibility to create a positive self-image in an otherwise unfriendly environment.

There is, however, another reason why the Dutch population perceives Moroccans negatively. Although there have always been anti-immigrant groups and anti-Islamic feelings, they never had a great impact in Dutch society until recently. None of the various racist or xenophobic parties had ever succeeded in making real inroads into the Dutch electorate. However, the terrorist attacks (11 September in New York; the bombing of commuter trains in Madrid) and their association with Muslims have changed this situation. In The Netherlands, the moviemaker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a young Muslim fundamentalist, which has led again to a rise in anti-Muslim feelings. This negative attitude towards Islam has increased
the awareness of religious identity, particularly among the Moroccan youth and many official and unofficial discussions focus on Islam and the place of Muslims in a non-Islamic society.

The Amazigh associations and the general Moroccan organisations are confronted with these discussions around Islam in the course of their daily activities. The organisations that do not regard themselves as religious prefer to leave this debate to groups linked in some way to the mosque. It is understandable that the Amazigh groups are reluctant to engage in theological discussions about the role of Islam in modern society and the correct interpretation of the teachings of the Prophet. But this is not realistic any longer, as all young Muslims educated and living in the West have to find a way to combine their faith with modern insights in science and technology, with ideals about marriage and relationships between men and women in general, the education of children and so forth. However, these issues are particularly complicated for young Berber men and women. Their parents are (mostly) pious Muslims, but their religious practices are in the eyes of more sophisticated orthodox Muslims full of superstitious practices. Orthodox forms of Islam – whatever be the internal differences – are attractive to some of the second generation because they at least give answers to the questions they are confronted with in daily life and provide the feeling of belonging to an important, global religious movement. A number of young Moroccan men and women are interested in more orthodox forms of Islam and a small number even in an extremist form. The gap between the generations brings a certain amount of tension to the fore in every population, but in this case it manifests itself around the topic of Islam in particular. Because traditional Islam with its maraboutism was such a characteristic part of the Berber cultures, it is difficult to see how the Amazigh organisations can continue to avoid the discussion about the contradictions between religious customs and practices in the traditional Berber cultures and official Islamic orthodoxy.

The Amazigh associations are primarily engaged in supporting a specific Moroccan Berber identity within The Netherlands, but that does not mean their activities are restricted to the Moroccan immigrants in The Netherlands alone. At least three of the Amazigh organisations in The Netherlands have contacts with the European network of the Amazigh movement centred in France, and in this way form part of the worldwide Amazigh community.

Berber Associations in Europe, Canada, the United States and Other Countries

Berbers live in all North African countries and consequently there are Berber organisations of differing levels of importance in all of these
countries, which are in one way or another committed to preserving their language and cultural traditions. In many cases these organisations take part in wider networks, forming what can be considered as an international Amazigh movement. When Berber immigrants began settling in Western countries this network became even more international. Some scholars say that an awareness of the Amazigh issue has become internationalised because of the virtual community. The contacts between Amazigh organisations in the homelands and in the countries of Western Europe, the USA and Canada provide successive generations of immigrants with the opportunity to gather information about their cultural background and the developments in their homelands. The Berber organisations in The Netherlands are all Moroccan, which is not the case in other countries. In France and Canada, for instance, a considerable number are Algerian Berbers, which is reflected in the Amazigh organisations in these countries and colours their interests and activities. To further examine the extent to which the Berbers in The Netherlands take part in the international Amazigh movement, we have examined the links on the websites of Berber associations on the Internet. Both Dutch Amazigh websites and those of the main international Amazigh movement were investigated.

The most influential Amazigh website is the French website “Mondeberbere”. Although most of the information is in French, some items are in English and in Tamazight (using the Latin alphabet). There are a great variety of people and groups connected with the site. We not only find Berber groups in several European countries on this site, but also villages in Morocco (like Azems in Boumale de Dades), the Moroccan federation TADA, Tuaregs, groups in Kabylia in Algeria, Libyan groups, as well as groups in the Canary Islands, the USA and Canada. Mondeberbere is based in France and seems to be the main connection point of the international Amazigh movement. Two of the older Dutch associations (Adrar and Syphax) are also members.

A second influential association in France is Le Congrès Mondial Amazigh (CMA), the Amazigh World Congress. Its website is only in French. CMA, based in Paris, is a federation and organises a yearly international congress, where its member associations meet. In 2002 this took place from 29 to 31 August in Roubaix. The CMA expresses its solidarity with the Amazigh brothers in Kabylia, the region in Algeria, where riots took place during 2001 and 2002. The CMA, although restricted to the Francophone world, is the second most important hinge in the international Amazigh movement. It has an enormous list of member organisations, including groups in Morocco, Algeria, France, Spain, The Netherlands and Norway. According to Boussetta and Martiniello there are also several Amazigh associations closely connected
with the CMA in Belgium. There are also many other Berber associations in France which are often clearly based locally, like L’association de Culture Berbère Paris (ACB), Afus degw fus (Roubaix), Awal (Lyon), ACBK (Montpellier), Argane (Sevran), Amazigh (Nantes) and Tiwizi (Paris).

Because of the great number of North African immigrants and the old political and cultural ties, the Amazigh organisations in France are the most numerous and influential. But Berber immigrants in other Western countries also take part in the international Amazigh movement. In Germany, there are at least seven Berber associations. Of these, the Moroccan Berber association in Frankfurt, the Marokkanischer Verein für die Tamazight-Kultur und Soziales, is connected to the CMA in France. The Swedish Amazigh association, Svensk-Berbiska Föreningen (Stockholm Sweden), is also a member of CMA. The Amazigh Voice in the United Kingdom was linked to Mondeberbere in 2004, but currently this website is down. The two other associations in the UK are The Amazigh Association and SWASWA, both based in London.

In Canada there are two Amazigh organisations that have international contacts through the Internet. These two groups are based in Francophone Canada; they do not seem to be members of the CMA and appear to be connected only loosely with the wider Amazigh movement. The first one is located in Montreal (Centre Amazigh de Montreal) and the second in Hull (the French part of Ottawa). The latter is oriented towards Algeria.

The Berber organisations in the USA are connected with American academia and primarily engage in spreading knowledge about the Berber cultures. The Amazigh Cultural Association in America (ACAA) is based in Bedminster, New Jersey. Since 1994, ACAA has maintained local centres in New Jersey, Massachusetts and California. ACAA has co-sponsored a series of public seminars on Amazigh culture and language held by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Tulane, Stanford, the University of California, Santa Cruz and New York. ACAA also organises exhibitions of Amazigh artists in San Francisco. This is not to say that the ACAA is completely apolitical. It condemned the way in which the uprising in Kabylia was suppressed by the Algerian government. An initiative of a different nature is the Tazzla Institute for Cultural Diversity in Los Angeles. It does not arise from the Berbers themselves, but was founded by an anthropologist. Its mission is to promote multicultural understanding through peaceful educational means, and to assist American Indian and Amazigh organisations through cultural and educational projects.

Looking at all the Amazigh associations on which we gathered data, we can detect common characteristics and differences. Language is an important issue on all the websites of the European and American Amazigh
associations. They often provide downloadable fonts, available for users to install on their own computer. Hence they offer the possibility to type in the Tamazigh alphabet on an ordinary computer. Another subject present on all the websites is information on the ancient, pre-colonial history of North Africa. The stories of Syphax, Jugurtha and the female warrior Dihya (or Damia or Kahina) can be found in Dutch, German, English and French, propagating a nostalgic, somewhat romantic historical image. Many websites offer also a bibliography of books about the Berbers.

The most obvious difference between the Amazigh associations in the countries that we have studied is the language in which they communicate. French versus other languages is an important dividing line. The difference is not only in the language of communication. French associations are also more politically involved and in particular with regard to the situation in Kabylia. They also seem to have more direct contacts with organisations in Morocco. The English, German, Dutch and Swedish associations are less connected to each other, though they have sometimes links to Mondeberbere or CMA. The extent to which the Amazigh organisations are linked with each other depends largely on the language they have in common. Although the CMA has a large network in France, Morocco, and Belgium, it is less pervasive in countries where French is not the dominant language. The website of the ACAA has links to the main French associations but the use of French limits the effective use of these contacts. In The Netherlands, the second-generation board members of the Amazigh organisations are more proficient in English than in French, and this seriously curbs their enthusiasm to communicate with their French counterparts.

Since we found most of the information outside The Netherlands by following links on websites, it is understandable that locally oriented associations and those without websites are likely to have been omitted. The local organisations, like many in The Netherlands may be primarily involved in solving practical problems. Though the Internet is an interesting source of information, we must be aware that it is also a biased source of information. We do not pretend that it gives a complete portrait of all the organisations and their activities among the Moroccan Berber immigrants in the various countries, since a complete survey in different countries was not possible. The information collected via the websites, however, does give us a picture of the worldwide interest in and viability of the Amazigh culture.

Conclusions

To conclude our paper we summarise our findings for the questions we have formulated in Research Questions and Design.
a. The process of institutionalisation of the transnational contacts among the Moroccan immigrants in The Netherlands has been strongly influenced by the overall development of their migration. In the first stage of migration, the level of institutionalisation was low and the organisations that came into being were grass roots bodies, aimed at recreating a trusted world and meeting the direct needs of the “guest-worker” population. These limited functions are characteristic for immigrant organisations in the first stage of settlement. When the settlement assumed a more permanent character, organisations that had their roots in Morocco or elsewhere in the Islamic world became active among the immigrants. The level of formalisation of the Moroccan organisations varies considerably to date; as there are more than 700 of them, this development was to be expected. However, a certain level of professional management has developed among the more influential ones.

b. The Amazigh organisations differ from their general Moroccan counterparts in their aims and activities. For instance, they are especially active in organising informational meetings on the history of the Riff. The development of teaching materials for lessons in Tamazigh has changed since IRCAM also produces materials in Morocco – Adrar now presents the official IRCAM fonts. But the dividing line between the general Moroccan and specific Amazigh organisations is in practice often thin. Within Amazigh associations, Riffians are the most numerous and therefore dominate the scene. However, most Amazigh organisations aim to include all Amazigh, though it is difficult to state to what extent this aim is realised. It is certainly not universally accepted, as we have also found some specific Soussi organisations.

c. The Amazigh organisations in The Netherlands originally had a political orientation towards the country of origin. Their founders were motivated by the political circumstances of suppression that existed at that time in Morocco. In the course of the years, when more Dutch-born Moroccans became interested in the Amazigh heritage, the associations became more oriented towards questions of identity and solving social problems in Dutch society (like helping young brothers and sisters in the Dutch educational system). Furthermore, as the political situation in Morocco improved, the tendencies to work as a political movement became less urgent. Nevertheless, at least 3 of the 16 associations have contacts with the European network of the Amazigh movement centred in France, which is engaged in political discussions, which are however not primarily centred on Morocco but on Algeria.
d. The first Amazigh organisations were led by first-generation (male) activists and refugees, who were strongly orientated to Morocco. But all sources and observations confirm that to date the Moroccan organisations are increasingly dominated by the generation that came to The Netherlands at a young age or was born there. The young generation, of both sexes, has become increasingly involved in all kinds of activities. There seems to be a certain cleavage between the generations with regard to participation in Moroccan organisations. The first labour migrants were involved in political groupings and later on in Islamic associations, whereas their descendants took part in all kinds of organisations.

e. The organisations in The Netherlands have limited contacts with the Amazigh groups in France, Belgium, Germany, the UK, Canada and the USA. Many of these share a common political aim: more rights and freedom for Berbers, though there are different ways in which they hope to realise these ideals. In nearly all cases, the official recognition of the Tamazigh language is the most important issue. In Morocco the mobilisation of the Berber population has been successful in the sense that the government is now trying to officially incorporate the languages and cultures of the Berbers in the Moroccan society.

Having concluded our research the question arises what our findings mean for the future position of the Moroccan Amazigh immigrants in The Netherlands. At present, a second and even a third-generation Moroccan is growing up and reaching adulthood in The Netherlands and for these youngsters the issues of recognition of their cultural heritage and Muslim identity are questions of everyday life. Their Dutch classmates, colleagues and neighbours regard them primarily as Muslims and question them about terrorism, their loyalty to democratic values and their ideas about gender relationships. At the same time, the contacts with Moroccan youth from other regions and representatives of the Moroccan state and general Moroccan culture have increased. And in these contacts the Berbers – in The Netherlands in the first place the Rifians – are also challenged to come to terms with their cultural background. As speakers of an unwritten language they are often looked down upon as a rural backward people practising an Islam full of tribal customs and pre-Islamic superstitions. The great interest of a substantial part of the young generation in the orally transmitted stories and characteristic music and dances of the Riff testify to their commitment to their cultural heritage. But being western educated and having far more (formal) educational attainments than their parents, they are also critical with regard to local
customs and traditions. It is therefore understandable that many youngsters are searching for ways to redefine themselves as Berbers, Moroccans and certainly also as Muslims in the modern world, and make use of modern means of communication. It is perhaps premature to speak of a “transnational Berber community”, but international developments will certainly have an impact on the relationship between Dutch society and its Moroccan immigrants. It remains to be seen therefore if the oncoming generation will succeed in finding a balance between respect for their religious beliefs and cultural heritage and participating in a secular welfare state.

Notes

[3] Gellner, Muslim Society; Hart, Qabila; Gellner and Michaud, Arabs and Berbers; Obdeijn et al., Geschiedenis van Marokko.
[10] In February 2005, seven members of the board of the institute resigned because they were disappointed in the progress made in improving the position of the Amazigh. In an interesting interview with the Berber organisation Tilelli in Rotterdam the former chairman of the IRCAM, Professor Chafik, agreed with much of the criticism on the functioning of the Institute. He pointed out that resistance among the Moroccan elite against the emancipation of the Berbers had certainly not vanished. However, he still had high hopes that in the end the struggle for recognition of the Berbers will be successful.
[11] We will use the words Berber and Amazigh as synonymous, for wider communication and for stylistic reasons throughout our text.
[12] The spelling of these languages is unfortunately not uniform in the different sources. Professor Chafik writes: Tachelit (western High Atlas, Sousse valley and the Anti atlas), Tamazight (Middle Atlas) and Riffian-Zenatic (in the Riff and part of the Middle Atlas); (Chafik, Imazighen, 12).
At present, at least 8% of Moroccans live abroad (2.4 million; this includes second generation and Moroccan Jews in Israel) and the remittances form about 8–10% of the gross national product. The estimates of experts on the official figure differ between 8 and 10%. The real transfer in money and valuables is undoubtedly higher than is documented in the official figures. The total value of the remittances may be twice as high as the official figure. de Haas and Plug, “Cherishing the Goose,” 603–34.

van Heelsum, Marokkaanse Organisaties in Nederland; van Heelsum, Marokkaanse Organisaties in Amsterdam; Kraal and van Heelsum, Dynamisch Mozaïek.

Brouwer “Virtuele identiteiten van Marokkaanse jongeren”; Mamadouh, “Constructing a Dutch Moroccan Identity.”


Van Amersfoort and van der Wusten, Les travailleurs Marocains aux Pays Bas; van Amersfoort, “Migrant Workers,” 17–26; Heinemeijer et al., Partir pour rester; Shadid, “Moroccan Workers in The Netherlands.”

See Figure 1, in Van Amersfoort, “From Workers to Immigrants” 308–12.

Van der Valk, Van migratie naar Burgerschap.

Landman, Van mat tot minaret, 163.

Ibid., 174–94.

van Heelsum, Marokkaanse Organisaties in Nederland; van Heelsum, Marokkaanse Organisaties in Amsterdam, Kraal and van Heelsum, Dynamisch mozaïek.

A full list of the Amazigh associations in the Netherlands with members of CMA and web addresses is available upon request to the authors.

Bouddouft, “Marokkaanse Migratiepolitiek,” 72–86.

Translated from page 18 in the appendix of Lindo et al., “Op eigen kracht vooruit.”

Lucassen and Köbben, Het partiële gelijk.


Ibid., 32.

Werdmölder, Een generatie op drift; Van Gemert, Ieder voor zich.

Buijs et al., Strijders van eigen bodem.


Boussetta and Martiniello, “L’immigration Marocaine en Belgique.”

Penninx and Schrover, Bastion of Bindmiddel?, 55.

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