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Brazil-Israel Relations and the Marketing of Urban Security Expertise

by

Erella Grassiani and Frank Müller

The transnational (re)making of contemporary urban pacification practices, discourses, and technologies between Brazil and Israel is underpinned by coercive entanglements. The Israeli experience with the occupation of the Palestinian territories has brought the Israel Defense Forces and the country’s private security industry international recognition for their urban warfare skills and related security technologies; Brazil has recently gained international recognition for urban pacification efforts that emphasize the country’s military’s ability to combine “hard” and “soft” skills, thereby foregrounding the nexus of military and humanitarian forms of engagement on urban battlefields. Empirical findings framed by critical scholarship on pacification demonstrate how recent shifts in the military and diplomatic relations between the two countries seek to symbolically capitalize on their own and each other’s urban warfare experiences to promote themselves as security experts capable of addressing a range of future urban threat scenarios—from urban warfare to antigang and antiriot policing and peacekeeping.

Keywords: Brazil, Israel, Urban pacification, Defense industry, Marketing

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Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was quick to congratulate the Brazilian president-elect, Jair Messias Bolsonaro, in October 2018. He was the first Israeli prime minister to visit Brazil at the turn of the year 2018–2019, to be present at the latter’s inauguration (O Globo, December 27, 2018). The two state leaders share a militant stand on “security” and military prowess. During the visit, the politicians repeatedly stated their common interest in deepening cooperation in the exchange of military/security high-tech equipment and knowledge (Landau, 2018). The relationship between the two countries is not, however, new. The late Israeli President Shimon Peres headed for Brazil in 2009 for a first visit of an Israeli president to the country in 40 years (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). During this trip he met with Brazil’s then-president Luís Inácio da Silva of the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party—PT) in order to “strengthen and deepen Israel’s strategic, diplomatic, and economic ties” with Brazil. Peres was accompanied by 40 “representatives of the top Israeli companies in water technology, agriculture, communications, energy, medical equipment, and defense.” The visit was returned by a Brazilian delegation (including high-ranking politicians and 70 business leaders) to Israel a few months later with the aim of deepening the refreshed ties (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).

The inclusion of actors from the security industry in the tour was not coincidental. While their security concerns differ (with Israel’s stemming mostly from the occupation of Palestinian territory and Brazil’s being related to drug trafficking), the two countries have a great deal in common regarding a “need” expressed by their leaders to emphasize these “threats” to their countries’ well-being. Underlining this commonality, the delegation’s visit coincided with the Brazilian leftist government’s new interest in internationally staging Brazil’s “visible leadership of peacekeeping operations in order to increase its international status” (Sánchez Nieto, 2012: 161) and advocating “new forms of globalization” (Amar, 2012: 10). This shift toward a stronger position on international humanitarian and military interventions became most clearly grounded in the country’s leading military role in the United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH, for its French title Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti 2004–2017). At the same time, coining a positive, “humanitarian” term for security interventions in domestic (urban) areas as well, Brazil’s new role gained international recognition through the re-import of the urban pacification skills that informed the installation of unidades de polícia pacificadora (pacification police units—UPP) in many marginalized areas of Rio de Janeiro from 2008 to 2015 (Amar and Carvalho, 2016; Harig, 2015; M.-M. Müller, 2016; M.-M. Müller and Steinke, 2018). MINUSTAH was depicted as advancing Brazil’s particular way of peacemaking, employing humanitarian peace building as a corrective to more militarized peacekeeping strategies (Call and Abdenur, 2017).

While Brazil focuses on humanitarianism as a leading principle for sustaining an image of positive and legitimate pacification efforts through its security politics, Israel’s practices of securitization are more explicitly violent (Graham, 2010; Halper, 2015; Lambert, 2016; Turner, 2014). Israel uses harsh measures to control the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories through checkpoints, nightly raids, and surveillance and actively and violently attempts to
quell Palestinian protests, especially in the Gaza Strip. All these actions are explained to the Israeli people under the heading of “security” and legitimate defense.

While these efforts differ, Brazil’s and Israel’s pacification/securitization discourses are correlated on a representation level and deeply entangled in material terms. Both countries are engaged in the global promotion of particular images of their security politics, expertise, and country-specific urban warfare skills (domestic pacification in the case of Brazil and securitization in the case of Israel) while at the same time deepening their related engagements in the commercial defense and security sectors. In unpacking these connections and processes and comparing the discourses used by the two countries, we seek to highlight a frequently neglected aspect of Brazil-Israel relations and thereby to provide insight into the way symbolism and materialism shape interconnections within the global security industry.

We proceed as follows: First, we will develop our understanding of “pacification” and “security” as discourses used by Brazil and Israel respectively. Second, we will explore how the two countries stress their individual efforts by promoting their domestic pacification or security expertise globally while deepening their cooperation in the defense and security sector. Finally we will summarize our main findings and stress their implications for our understanding of the interconnections within the global security industry. This work is based on our extensive fieldwork in Brazil and Israel respectively.

**PACIFICATION AND SECURITY: A DISCURSIVE APPROACH**

Brazil and Israel deploy very similar discourses while using different concepts to symbolically valorize their respective securitization practices. As part of these discourses and practices, “pacification” and “security” have become politically contested terms that are used by the two states separately but also convergently. To support this claim, we adopt a translation of Foucault’s discourse theory for an empirical analysis of the way orders of knowledge generate discursive practices (Diaz-Bone, 2006). We look at Brazilian and Israeli security practices to identify their relation to discursive practices, established formations of what is “sayable” in a given thematic field and an institutional arrangement of actors, listeners, and speakers. These practices provide an entrance point for reproducing a deeper order of knowledge, in the present case, that of pacification, including its historical legacy in Brazil’s and Israel’s cultural contexts. The “deeper structure of the discursive formation” (Diaz-Bone, 2006: 244) of interest in this paper—pacification—is now framing it as a laboratory for developing, exploiting, and selling practical military knowledge. Constructing, through discursive practices, its actions as morally righteous (either as humanitarian pacification or as defending the people against terror) legitimizes the increasingly capitalized private security-military complex.1

The dominant approach to pacification, as counterinsurgency, has been divided by the U.S. Army into three (not necessarily consecutive) steps—“clear, hold, build”—aimed at (1) establishing a physically and psychologically safe environment with the state, (2) providing stable control of a defined
territory and population, and (3) winning the “hearts and minds” of the population (U.S. Army, 2007: A-26). However, the term “pacification” as related to counterinsurgency, which features prominently in scholarly and practitioners’ debates on contemporary Brazilian and Israeli security practices, has a long, inherently colonial history (Fremont-Barnes, 2015; Khalili, 2010; McCoy, 2016; Neocleous, 2011).

Pacification, from a historical perspective, has been central to colonial, imperial projects of fighting insurgents as part of a market-liberal doctrine in different parts of the globe (Kienscherf, 2011), predominantly the South (J.-F. Klein, 2016). During colonial times and in subsequent phases of fixing territorial boundaries, pacification in Latin America was first and foremost a military strategy in rural areas (Kruijt, 2017), securing coastal spaces, harbors, and trade routes (Langfur, 2014a). Brazil, for instance, has long experience with internal, or domestic, pacification (Harris and Espelt-Bombin, 2018) under the strategy for territorial expansion into frontier regions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Bieber, 2014) and the subsequent violent oppression of indigenous communities (Langfur, 2014b). However, pacification also included a spatial strategy of ordering and urbanizing settlements in the colonized territories (Bieber, 2014: 167). The replacement of the more martial term “conquest” with “pacification” under Philip II of Spain in the late sixteenth century laid the discursive ground for an imperial “hearts-and-minds” (or “suavity and gentleness” [Karasch, 2014: 202]) strategy of appealing to local elites’ interests and securing investments in the local early extractive economy (Bieber, 2014: 173).

In Latin America today, pacification is more related to urban security politics in cities, predominantly in Colombia and Brazil. It has come to signify the (re-)installation of state-centered territorial sovereignty in marginalized urban areas under the control of various nonstate armed actors. In Brazil, pacification is related to both security provision and human rights guarantees and is frequently and explicitly linked to the above-outlined approach to counterinsurgency (Muggah and Mulli, 2012). The pacification-as-counterinsurgency strategy consists of fostering bonds with the local population in relatively secure areas rather than directly attacking the enemies’ strongholds by a concerted military occupation of the marginalized areas of the city and ends with the installation of community police units (the UPP). These units pursue direct personal contact with the inhabitants of marginalized communities in order to increase confidence, organize information flow regarding local security problems (Arias and Ungar, 2009), and secure the provision of urban infrastructures (e.g., social services and electricity) (Morange, Pilo’, and Spire, 2018: 49; F. Müller and Müller, 2016).

The experience of Brazil’s urban military police in fighting criminal gangs dates back to the initial years of the formation of urban police forces in the nineteenth century in the context of disciplining and repressing slaves—a continuity that is literally expressed in Brazil’s “Pacification Manual” (Exército Brasileiro, 2015, our translation): “The term ‘pacification’ is part of a military terrestrial history of the country, from the legalist and reconciliatory actions conducted by the Duque de Caxias, Patron of the Brazilian Army, via the revolts and internal insurrections to situations that made it necessary to reinstate
public order and social peace menaced by grave and imminent institutional instability.” This quotation underlines the historical continuity of the discursive strategy employed by Brazil’s armed forces in the international community of peace building. Urban pacification thus makes use of the image of a territorial frontier against the “uncivilized Other” known from the territorial expansion of colonial times. Highlighting the ability to draw upon armed confrontations in the domestic realm and a close correlation of military control, humanitarianism, and economic development “constitutes a distinct comparative advantage for the country” (Kenkel, 2010: 656) and, more specifically, the military and the police. Urban pacification has turned into a showcase for the reinstallation of territorial power and sovereignty before an international audience (Oliveira, 2014), countering the stability-oriented, state-institution-fostering top-down model of Northern peace builders. Brazil’s “comparative advantage” was manifested in its “pronounced [and mainly rhetorical] ability to harness economic development and socioeconomic policies such as poverty reduction to tackle the root causes of development” (Kenkel, 2014: 23).

The concept of pacification can serve to highlight Brazil’s and Israel’s attempts, both separately and through their economic and political relations, to accumulate international recognition for their security actors’ urban warfare expertise. We understand pacification as a form of warfare that aims at “the fabrication of a social order” (Neocleous, 2011: 193). Calling attention to the intrinsic correlation of urbanization and capitalist accumulation, pacification underlies the global installation of a bourgeois order based on wage labor exploitation, dispossession, and the commodification of nature and social relations (Rigakos, 2016: 5). Sustaining this capitalist order, the production of security as pacification builds on a close concentration of police and military work: “In other words, ‘pacification’ is intended to grasp a nexus of ideas—war-police-accumulation—in the security of bourgeois order. All of which is to say that from the perspective of the critique of security, it is impossible to understand the history of bourgeois society without grasping it as a process of pacification in the name of security and accumulation” (Neocleous, 2013: 9; see also Wall, Saberi, and Jackson, 2016). However, pacification cannot be reduced to the capitalist form of fabricating social order. Rather, pacification in the case of Israel may help create a “laboratory” (Graham and Baker, 2016) or “showroom” (N. Klein, 2007; Stockmarr, 2016) that allows the Israeli military and the country’s private security industry to test, advertise, and sell new security practices and technologies—a point that, in our view, can also be made for the case of Brazil.

In the Israeli case “pacification” is used not by the state itself but by critics of its occupation and military actions against the Palestinians. The methods and tools that are used to uphold this occupation and to suppress resistance, for example, are called “pacification” (e.g., Gordon, 2008; Graham, 2010; Halper, 2015; Khalili, 2010; Stockmarr, 2016). The parallel phrase in the Israeli case for what in Brazil is thought of as “pacification” is “security.” While of course this is a very general term, it is of great symbolic importance for Israeli policy makers, the military, and the public. Although Israel is fighting a clear, external (imagined) enemy and seeking security and safety foremost for its own (Jewish) population, the strategies it deploys to accomplish this are similar to those of
Brazil. In order to flesh out this convergence, we will examine Brazilian pacification discourse and Israeli security discourse for similarities in the way they describe and sell similar ideas.

In addressing the cases of Brazil and Israel, we extend the above-mentioned theorization of pacification as security of bourgeois order in two related moves. First, we argue that pacification is also a war for accumulation of symbolic capital understood as the showcasing of one’s possession of superior pacification skills and related technologies. Second, we argue that this symbolism serves the material, and in this sense capitalist, politico-economic interest in selling one’s country’s and industry’s pacification and security skills and technologies, underlying the growing engagement between Brazil’s and Israel’s security and defense industries.

BRAZIL: FRAMING THE GLOBAL IMAGE OF HUMANITARIAN PACIFICATION

In contrast to the situation in Israel, Brazil’s enemy is not “terrorism” or “political insurgency” but a depoliticized “criminality”: its pacification is allegedly aimed at diminishing crime and violence in some of Rio de Janeiro’s low-income settlements, the favelas. Brazil’s “internal enemies” are the drug traffickers, with changing leaders, territorial influence, and internal hierarchies, who control the production and sale of illicit substances in urban Brazil (Arias, 2013). The stated goal is to reduce drug trafficking and thereby gain state control of domestic territories (World Bank, 2012). Brazil’s pacification approach involves the military, the military police, with its Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Special Police Operations Batallion—BOPE) and UPP, trained in proximity policing, and, in connection with the MINUSTAH, institutionalized collaboration with the Brazilian nongovernmental organization (NGO) Viva Rio, suggesting that the mission might be called “armed social work” (González, 2008; Kilcullen, 2010). Police, military, and NGO workers combined hard and soft skills (including the organization of sports events, household visits, and personal communication with residents). The combination of social work and cultural and sports initiatives aiming to “convince” the local population of the legitimacy of the military interventions in urban environments took shape in the promotion of the positive connotations of “pacification.” The strong focus on serious efforts to overcome security actors’ gendered and racialized violence came to be viewed as a mediation approach to conflict resolution and considered as offering “a promising break from past practice” (Muggah and Mulli, 2012: 65).

Throughout the past 10 years, under the Guarantee of Law and Order, the military has been deployed on several domestic missions to support the military police. Among these were the occupation of the Providência favelas, those in the Complexo do Alemão and the Complexo da Maré, directed toward “demobilizing” the drug-traffic-related criminal gangs, and international events ranging from the Rio+20 to the visit of the pope in 2012 and 2013 respectively. While these last events can be considered “extraordinary” in that they demanded intensified security measures, the favela occupations were publicly justified in terms of the need to integrate the crime-driven areas into the
formally administered city. After the military occupations, the soldiers were replaced by a regular police force—in many cases UPP (Saborio, 2014)—and by social programs and urban upgrading (Magalhães and Villarosa, 2012) and thereby facilitated and secured private investment in real estate and urban services (Atuesta and Soares, 2018; Freeman, 2012). Thus, the pacification process in Rio’s favelas can be described as a productive effort to control local power structures, settle conflicts, and increase investors’ confidence in the political stability of these hitherto marginalized areas. In addition, more symbolically (but no less economically productively) it provided a showcase for Brazil’s proper approach to peacemaking on a global stage.

The inner-city “peace operations” from 2007 to 2017 followed the explicit aim of reproducing the peace building mission in Haiti, with its leadership in the hands of the army. In Brazil’s transnational laboratory, expertise in achieving recipient populations’ support was expanded. Leading military personnel frequently said that learning by the police and military abroad (in Haiti) and at home (in Rio) and “cultural affinity and close contact with the host country population” (Kenkel, 2010: 656) helped in the deployment of the UN mandate (F. Müller and Steinke, 2018). In all of the Rio occupations, personnel who had served in MINUSTAH were prominent and, according to the doctrine leader at Brazil’s military training center for UN missions, “well prepared and experienced” because of their prior engagement abroad (interview, May 28, 2016). In terms of both the military’s territorial strategy (interview, April 26, 2016) and its population-centric approach, the knowledge flow between the two sites was fertile.

These two sites of engagement with pacification have reinforced the image of military operations as successful ways to peace, since in both of them the claim to reducing criminal activity (predominantly by armed force) converged with a “humanitarian” approach. The military’s motto “Braço Forte–Mão Amiga” (Strong Arm–Friendly Hand) describes this hard-and-soft-skill combination. It is based on Brazil’s particular experience in dealing with “internal” enemies: in gathering information and reducing support for criminal leaders, not only must “collateral damage” be avoided but also emphasis should be placed on engaging in confidence-building events such as organizing football tournaments, offering health care, and providing support in accessing the formal job market (Muggah, 2010: 454; Pinheiro, 2015).

Brazil’s military has been cultivating the image of being a culturally sensitive sympathizer of the local population, but at least in the official version it has been deaf to critiques from that population (F. Müller and Steinke, 2018). While it is not the purpose of this article to assess the pacification process in Rio, we can nevertheless state that with regard to the legitimacy of the occupation, the local perception diverges somewhat from the military’s alleged expectation. Although the Maré is known as Brazil’s “Gaza Strip,” residents of parts of it that are violently contested by rival gangs did not support the military occupation, since it did not effectively reduce the killing of either residents or police (E. S. Silva, 2017).

However, if it was to become a permanent security strategy, the improvement of the local security and violence situation depended on a steady and legitimate police presence, and this in turn depended on a decrease in proven cases of police violence; only a radically transformed perception of state’s executive power would lead to a broad acceptance of the police, a hope that became
institutionalized in the UPP. The UPP project began with smaller communities in the South of the city and close to the upper-middle-class neighborhoods of Copacabana, Ipanema, and Leblon. By 2015, 38 UPP units were spread all over Rio de Janeiro (Steinbrink et al., 2015). Besides the stated goal of improving police-citizen relations, the strategy of improving the image of the police also backed Brazil’s claim for deploying proximity-policing practices informed by visits to Israel of leading military police officers (Wood, 2013: 197).

According to members of the military police, the UPP should suffice to legitimize the presence of the police in areas where they have long been absent by improving their public image among the residents (Saborio, 2014: 417). Yet, as the UPP’s doctrinarism founder Robson Rodrigues da Silva (2016) explains, pacification cannot be successful as a teleological process coterminous with “occupation” and easily quantifiable in terms of numbers of favelas pacified and increased numbers of police. As has become apparent through almost 10 years of international academic debate, security experts (practitioners and academics) have considered the UPP as a model for reforming the police of the whole region through training in human rights and proximity policing (Leeds, 2016; Muggah, 2017), the only feature that distinguishes UPP personnel from regular military police (Felbab-Brown, 2011).

Symbolically, countering police violence and reducing the number of killings were thought to contribute to a globally sellable model of humanitarian pacification (Leeds, 2016). In conceiving pacification as a “tool for grasping the destruction and reconstruction of social order,” Neocles (2011: 193) also reminds us of its productive dialectics. Pacification, a process that is not teleological but emergent and dynamic, produces an insecure or uncertain spatial context that calls for continuous military intervention: since the occupations of favelas in 2007, 2010, and 2014 and ongoing at the time of writing of this article, we can observe a statewide military intervention. As a condition for presidential authorization of that intervention, the governor, Luiz Fernando Pezão, had to announce the incapacity of the state’s security force to guarantee public safety in the metropolis. In a context of persistent economic crisis (the state’s bankruptcy and subsequent cuts in the security budget), urban militarization by temporary decrees was politically and economically productive. Political approaches to the military have seen a strong revival since Brazil’s and particularly Rio de Janeiro’s post-Olympics increase in police violence and killings of police. The conservative Michel Temer of the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party—PMDB) became interim president in September 2016 after a strongly disputed impeachment vote against then-president Dilma Rousseff of the PT. Facing broad distrust of the legitimacy of both the manner and the fact of his power takeover, Temer ordered military forces against protesters in a number of Brazilian cities by turning over security provision to the military and declaring a state of exception. The ongoing and increasing political and economic instability in urban Brazil suffices to support Temer’s strong-arm approach and association with the military, and its domestic deployment has provided the military with budgetary inflow and yet another urban live-training stage.

After the mega-events that have been considered primary contexts for Rio de Janeiro’s securitization (Belton, 2016), what critics of pacification feared has happened: the city continues to be immersed in violent gang-gang and
police-gang confrontations with numerous “collateral” killings of (mostly) favela residents. Nevertheless, its pre-Olympics military-police assemblage has become an internationally recognized model for theorizing and learning (Bertetto, 2012; Burgoyne, 2011; Gaffney, 2016). The balance between enemy-centric and population-centric strategies that is at the heart of Rio de Janeiro’s counterinsurgency-like approach to pacification shows strong similarities to Israel’s approach in Palestine.

**ISRAEL: FRAMING THE GLOBAL SECURITY EXPERT**

In contrast to the Brazilian case, Israel does not occupy domestic spaces, although the status of the spaces involved may be debated. For our purposes, and according to international law, the West Bank is an (external) occupied territory. However, to the Israeli settlers who receive the backing of the current administration, the West Bank is “Judea and Samaria,” invoking the idea of an ancient Jewish land that is today Israel. This distinction is important, because the pacification that is being carried out by Israel is not only geared toward subduing the local Palestinian population but being carried out on the pretext of bringing security and safety to a very clearly cordoned-off group, the Jewish population of Israel, including the settlers living in the Occupied Territories. The distinction made between these populations, even though some (the settlers and the Palestinians) live in the same space, on a judicial level and even on the level of infrastructure (some roads are for Jews only) has often been compared to a state of apartheid (Bakan and Abu-Laban, 2010; Yiftachel, 2009). In the Israeli case there is thus a very clear “enemy” (the Palestinian) and a very clear “insider” (the Israeli Jew, no matter where he or she lives). The military actions of recent years are geared toward violently suppressing the Palestinians while framing this as necessary for the security “of all,” by which is meant the Israeli, Jewish population.

While Israel has controlled Palestinians since the 1940s, it occupied the West Bank, Gaza (and the Sinai Peninsula, which was later returned to Egypt), and the Golan Heights during the 1967 Six-Day War. The Golan Heights and East Jerusalem were annexed and are seen as a legitimate part of Israel by the state itself (though not by the international community), but the rest of the West Bank and Gaza have been under Israel’s military control ever since. And even though Israel “pulled out” of the Gaza Strip in 2005, it still strongly controls its borders on land and sea and even in the air above and the ground beneath (Weizman, 2012). As Gordon (2008) has shown, the occupation by Israel of these territories has shifted over the years from strategies of colonization aimed at normalizing the occupation to strategies of separation. The colonization strategies, he writes, were characterized by control mechanisms targeting the Palestinian population under Israeli control through “institutions, legal devices, bureaucratic apparatuses, social practices, and physical edifices that operate both on the individual and the population in order to produce new modes of behavior, habits, interests, tastes, and aspirations” (2008: 3). The idea behind this approach was to control the population and curb any resistance while at the same time using the land and other natural resources to the fullest. The aim was to be an occupier but for the occupation to be “nonexistent” (7).
These first decades of the occupation can therefore be characterized as a more “classic” form of pacification in which in fact the population was kept quiet and subdued. Israel controlled all the important institutions and resources, including the educational systems in the Occupied Territories (Gordon, 2008). This occupation was characterized by the use of disciplinary power (to confine individuals to a “pacified” mode of living and thinking) and biopower (to supervise and control the population as a whole through collection of data on health, births, deaths, and the like). With the military occupation of today, however, the situation has changed dramatically. Instead of any attempt to normalize the occupation, it is being maintained with substantial violence. As Gordon (2008: 13) argues, the aim of the occupation is to separate the two peoples through an emphasis on forms of sovereign power that perceive all Palestinian resistance as “terrorism” and use military and police force, in addition to the judicial apparatus, to suppress it. After the first serious uprising of the Palestinians in 1987, Israel began to separate Israelis from Palestinians with violence and checkpoints, and the population was no longer of interest to the occupying forces (e.g., Cleveland and Bunton, 2016; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2009).

Here we want to show how the strategies, technologies, and materials that were developed to accomplish this form of control have been sold globally because of Israel’s self-framing as a world leader in security issues. In general, this framing is based on a David-and-Goliath narrative—the idea that because of its historical experience with its enemies (the many wars it has been faced with) Israel has had no choice but to defend itself. As a result of its past it has become a specialist through well-funded R&D efforts (mostly with the cooperation of international scientists through programs such as the European Research Council Horizon 2020) and (inter)national investments. Israel thus aims to portray itself as a “homeland security” champion (Gordon, 2011) and defense specialist through its experience in fighting “terror” in the Occupied Territories and Gaza (Grassiani, 2017; 2018). Halper (2015: 68) argues that Israel has “forged for itself a uniquely pivotal position” in global defense and identifies three main “niches” in this respect: weapons for use in so-called hybrid warfare and appeals to foreign militaries and militias or police forces, the “matrix of control” characterized by tight control of the Palestinian population, and “framing and ‘lawfare’” (84), by which he means the way Israel describes itself as a “small country surrounded by many enemies” that is in dire need of self-defense by any means. Through a very strong system of public relations (hasbara in Hebrew) this message is exported in multiple ways to the international world. “Lawfare” is used to delegitimize those who use international law to criticize conflict and the use of weapons by certain parties. Underlying these niches is a strategy of framing nationalist Palestinian resistance in terms of an Islamic threat. The methods for suppressing this “threat” are easily transferable to other places in the world that are facing “Muslim terror.” This becomes clear, for example, at security fairs where Israel showcases its security produce and explicitly tries to connect itself to the rest of the “Western” world. High-ranking politicians, for example, come to speak to an international crowd about the “good” versus the “bad” and refer to “us in the West” who stand in stark opposition to the supposedly “dark, bad” terrorist nations (Grassiani, n.d.).
THE ISRAELI-BRAZILIAN SECURITY INDUSTRY COMPLEX

The aforementioned Brazilian and Israeli representational efforts are embedded in a growing engagement between the two countries’ security and defense industries in the political context of Brazil-Israel relations. Our analysis of pacification calls for examination of the materiality of this convergence and in particular the way in which the independently determined economic and political goals of the two countries correlate with the binational ties of their security industries.

Amounting to what commentators label a “coup” (but without the literal taking over of governmental institutions by the military), Brazil’s recent political shift has strengthened right-wing groups, including the urban upper middle classes, the industrial, agricultural, and resource-extractive oligarchies, and, importantly, the military. With Temer assuming the presidency in 2016 following Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, diplomatic relations between the two countries have gained new momentum in what has been headlined as a rapprochement. During the 14 years of leftist presidency in Brazil, Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories had been taken as justification for a political freeze (although security sales continued to take place). Brazil is an important market for the Israeli security and defense industry, and many Israeli state and private companies have made important deals involving drones, weapons, and security technologies. There has been a corresponding change in Brazil’s political attitude toward Israel that has been reinforced by Bolsonaro’s announcement of the closing of the Palestinian embassy in Brasilia and the transfer of the Brazilian embassy from Tel Aviv to East Jerusalem. Not only does he not condemn Israel’s practices of occupation as former leaders did but he actively supports them. Temer’s interim government had modified its earlier radical pro-Palestine position toward Israel in international organizations such as the UN, proposing to support Israel’s politics toward Palestine on a case-by-case basis; the security-industry nexus entailed links between Brazilian companies and the occupation of Palestinian territories. The links between the two countries’ security industries are not new. Despite the difference between the PT government’s position toward Israel’s occupation and that of the right-wing presidencies, the material underpinnings of the two countries’ attempts to promote pacification expertise have existed for decades.

In 2010 an agreement was signed between Israel and Brazil for security cooperation. Israeli security and defense actors are well-known guests at security fairs in South America, and private and public Brazilian actors visit Israel for business regularly. Some examples of economic ties between the Israeli and Brazilian security and defense industries are as follows: The Israeli company Elbit, one of the biggest security/defense companies in Israel, invests heavily in Brazil and has bought AEL and other Brazilian companies as subsidiaries. One of these subsidiaries has contracted with the Brazilian armed forces for the supply of remote-controlled weapons systems, and another supplies the Brazilian air force with unmanned drones. Elbit also invests in the border monitoring system SISFRON and the Guarani project, a military project that, according to a leading Brazilian military official, is under modernization with technological support from Israel. Elbit has also provided unmanned turrets for armored vehicles and tanks.
A second example of such cooperation between the two countries is the presence in Brazil of International Security and Defense Systems (ISDS), an Israeli company that sells training, knowledge, weapons, tanks, and more. ISDS was already operating in South and Central America in the 1980s and is known to have trained death squads in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras. In the 1990s it came to Brazil, and since then it has trained the BOPE, sold security and defense systems, and served as an official sponsor of the 2016 Olympics. It has also sold multiple caveirões (armed vehicles) to the Rio police. In the film The Lab by Yotam Feldman we see Leo Glaser, the founder of ISDS, walking around a favela with BOPE agents and hear him talking about the warm relationship he has with Brazil, where he sells his knowledge and technologies. ISDS even has an office in Brazil. Importantly, Idan Landau, in his insightful blog, reminds us that this is not solely a private endeavor but one known to if not controlled by the Israeli government.

Further, Israeli Military Industries and Israeli Aviation Industries are welcome guests in Brazil. Both these Israeli state companies have multiple subsidiaries that work with the Brazilian air forces, military, and police and provide drones, weapon systems, planes, and intelligence systems. Tanks developed by Israel Military Industries have been used in the pacification of favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Taurus, a Brazilian weapons company, produces an assault rifle developed by Israeli Military Industries. Many other Israeli companies are working in Brazil and were especially active in the preparations for the World Cup and the Olympics. Companies such as Verint Systems Inc., Nice Systems Inc. and Magal have sold fences and intelligence and communication systems to various parties in the country.

These examples, which represent only part of the extensive cooperation between Brazil and Israel, go beyond just commercial enterprises. All the Israeli companies mentioned are actively engaged in the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, and the products and knowledge they sell to Brazil are directly related to these pacification endeavors. Israel and Brazil increasingly share an interest in “selling” their pacification expertise on a global market; detailing the concrete ties established in public-private as well as private-private partnerships between the two countries showcases their shared interest in capitalizing on each country’s symbolic expertise.

CONCLUSION

Brazil and Israel are both working to sell their images as specialists in pacification and security, and these efforts converge symbolically and materially. What does the analysis of the growing engagement between Israel’s and Brazil’s security and defense industries tell us about the global dynamics of those industries?

First, their collaboration has important political consequences with regard to Latin American, mainly Brazilian, relations with Israel and Palestine. While Brazil under its center-left governments maintained a diplomatic dimension, a critical stance toward Israel’s offensive politics and military interventions in Palestine, with Brazil’s recent conservative shift its position has changed. Despite
the economic recession the country is suffering, which has had a noticeable effect on the country’s military budget, it is pursuing military ties with Israel and a seemingly win-win logic that involves both symbolic and material marketing. Cooperation in the defense and security sector seems to have intensified with the recent shifts in the political orientation of Brazil’s now right-wing government.

Second, while Brazil and Israel both have domestic experience of pacification/occupation/colonization, they have developed different kinds of expertise and associated images. Both, however, maintain their respective settings of violence as showcases for improvements in urban warfare strategies and tactics in both domestic missions and abroad.

The aspiration to maintain accessible showcases serves both countries’ military and private security industries by reinforcing their claims to expertise in global security. While in terms of technology and military equipment there seems to be a clear asymmetry between Brazil and Israel, in terms of strategy and tactics there is apparent consensus that each country contributes its specific bit to the global dynamic of urban warfare knowledge. Both countries can offer constantly accessible urban battlefields for testing and improving military technology, strategies, and tactics. As leading military theorists explain in a nearly consensual way, future insurgencies will be urban (Kilcullen, 2012); the increasing hybridization of war against criminal and/or insurgent enemies poses new “threats to militarily stronger countries, since non-state actors, mobile, not confined to a particular battlefield or locale and able to access a wide range of weapons, can reach their population centers far from the actual scenes of conflict” (Halper, 2015: 23). In other words, as enemies and war scenarios change, new strategic and tactical knowledge spreads and countries with long experience in urban pacification assume new importance.

Brazil’s and Israel’s interests in the sophistication of their specific holds on pacification thus converge, and this goes beyond their respective domestic battlefields. The battle space of pacification is—although located primarily in urban centers—global. Thus, our analysis contributes to the debate on the global security industry by spelling out how, beyond North-South relations, pacification and security are increasingly nuanced by powers that do not belong to the core hegemons. In the above-cited “war for accumulation,” the productive symbolic convergence and material-industrial entanglements of Israel and Brazil promote their specific urban warfare skills, and this sheds new light on the global making of social order through security politics. While peace and a stable social order are explicitly foregrounded as goals of both Israel’s occupation and Brazil’s involvement in transnational pacification (connecting Rio de Janeiro and Port-au-Prince), our analysis of the symbolic-material convergence of military and security interests suggests that maintaining the image of a threatening Other serves the industry’s hunger for ongoing investment. As both countries build their international recognition as urban warfare experts on their respective access to real-life showcases and laboratories for improving technologies, strategies, and tactics, pacification paves the way for accumulating symbolic and other capital beyond political shifts and economic downturns. Pacification, looked at from the perspective of its symbolic productivity, is the exact opposite of what its semantics promises—the continuation of violence and the promotion of new industrial alliances.
NOTE

1. Markus-Michael Müller unfortunately had to withdraw from coauthoring this paper. We are grateful for his intellectual input and authoring of an initial version of this theoretical section.

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