Conflict issues matter: how conflict issues influence negotiation

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"The issue or issues in conflict between nations, groups, or individuals may be diffuse and generalized, as in ideological conflict, or specific and limited, as in the conflict over possession of a certain property; [...] it may permit compromise or require the submission of one side to the other." (Deutsch, 1973, p. 5)

Chapter 1

Negotiation and Conflict Issues:

An Introduction

Everybody encounters disagreements or conflicts in life. One way to solve these disagreements and conflicts is to negotiate. In this dissertation, it is argued that conflict issues — the topic of the disagreement — matter in negotiations because conflict issues affect the negotiation process. Negotiation research, however, has focused mainly on interests, and has largely ignored the impact of other conflict issues, such as ideologies, norms and values. This is unfortunate because negotiation parties do not only disagree about interests, but they may also have different views of the world or different ideologies. Negotiation is likely to deadlock unless these issues are adequately dealt with (Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy & Syna, 1992).

Little is known about the influence of different conflict issues on the subsequent negotiation process. This dissertation attempts to fill this void. The goal is to increase the knowledge about the effects of conflict issues on the negotiation process. A new experimental paradigm has been developed in which the effects of different conflict issues were studied. In the following chapters, experimental studies and field research show how conflict issues
chapters, experimental studies and field research show how conflict issues affect negotiation communication, negotiation perceptions, negotiation behaviors and negotiation outcomes. This dissertation adds to prior knowledge by integrating traditional negotiation research and decision-making research. Before turning to the specific studies, an outline of traditional negotiation research is given, and a typology of conflict issues is presented.

Negotiation Research

Negotiation is a procedure to resolve opposing preferences between parties. It involves discussion between the parties with the goal of reaching agreement (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). Negotiation is closely linked to the concept of conflict. Conflict exists when one party perceives that the other party is negatively affecting something that he or she cares about (Thomas, 1992). Negotiation is a way to deal with conflict, and to reach agreement when two or more parties have opposing preferences.

Disagreements and negotiation are widespread phenomena in human life. Therefore it is not surprising that negotiations are studied by scientists from a broad range of scientific disciplines such as industrial relations, organizational behavior, economics, sociology, politics, psychology, and even mathematics. As a consequence, the methods to study negotiations, the negotiation research paradigms, vary widely. Negotiation studies range from sociological descriptions of labor-union negotiations to highly mathematical, game-theoretic experiments. In the following section, an outline of three mainstream negotiation paradigms is given, followed by a description of the basic negotiation characteristics.

Negotiation Paradigms

There are three mainstream paradigms (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). The first paradigm is the qualitative, prescriptive approach by scientists from
organizational behavior and industrial relations. The second paradigm is the mathematical approach by game theorists and economists. The third paradigm is the negotiation game approach, which is often used by behavioral decision researchers.

Organizational Behavior

Researchers in the fields of sociology, industrial relations and organizational behavior use qualitative, descriptive methods to study negotiations. The main focus of these studies is to provide a rich and detailed description of (mainly) management-union negotiations and the forces that influence these negotiations. Researchers who use this method aim at grasping the complete picture of a negotiation. They study negotiation parties in their social context. Examples of social context are the constituencies, third parties, the group dynamics between or within the negotiation parties or the historical context in which the negotiations take place. Researchers who use the qualitative method acknowledge that negotiation parties have a history and a future, and take into account that many 'real-life' negotiations do not develop in isolation, but are influenced by the social context. The methods that are used by these researchers are interviews, case studies, archival studies, and (participatory) observations. For example, the classic work 'A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations' by Walton and McKersie (1965) is based on "extensive field work and several dozen printed case studies" (Walton & McKersie, 1965, p.xvi). Nowadays, this paradigm can be found in the field of organizational behavior, for example in the work of Friedman (1994), Jehn (1995, 1997), Jehn, Northcraft and Neale (1999) and Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin (1999).

The problem of this paradigm is generalizability. A minute description of the negotiation process is very appropriate to understand why and how a particular negotiation developed. However, the insights that were gained by the detailed study of one particular negotiation depend heavily on the particularities of the social context and the parties in that negotiation, and those insights are often hard to generalize to other negotiations with different parties
and different social contexts. Thus, the advantages of the deep insight in a particular case may be offset by the limited generalizability of these insights.

**Game Theory**

Game theory takes a prescriptive and highly abstract approach to negotiations. Prescriptive theories state how people should behave in negotiations, if they want to achieve certain ends (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). The highly abstract approach is not surprising if one takes into account that game theory is grounded in mathematics, the most abstract of all scientific disciplines. A book by Neumann and Morgenstern ‘Theory of Games and Economic Behavior’ (1947) made the domain of game theory accessible to social scientists (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). At the same time, the Cold War alarmed early conflict researchers, and experimental games seemed a safe way to study (the resolution of) conflict without the risk of injury to people or to their relationships (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977).

Game-theoretical experiments focus on rational choice strategies in highly formalized mixed-motive situations (Rubin & Brown, 1975). In a typical experimental game, two parties are involved in a choice situation. Each party has to make a (series of) choice(s) between at least two clearly described alternatives. Those alternatives are mostly individual cooperation versus individual competition (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). The parties are interdependent; the choices that are made influence a party’s own outcomes, but also influence the other party’s outcomes. The choice for cooperation or non-cooperation has to be made without knowledge of the other party’s choice. For an example of such a social dilemma game, see Figure 1. Game theory assumes that negotiators are rational, consistent in their wants and desires, and they are assumed to pursue their goals in a utility-maximizing way (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Rubin & Brown, 1975). Moreover, each player is assumed to know the preference patterns of the other players (Luce & Raiffa, 1957).

The game-theoretical approach has been criticized for being unrealistic. Parties in real negotiations, for example, often lack information about each other’s preferences. Second, parties in real negotiations can influence each other
by strategic interaction, such as bluffing or giving information, but in social
dilemma games parties can only influence each other by their choice behavior
and there is no possibility for strategic interaction. Finally, negotiators are not
fully rational (Friedman, 1994; Raiffa, 1982; Young, 1975). There are many
instances in which negotiators deviate from rationality and choose for sub-
optimal outcomes, which challenges the assumptions of game-theoretical
research. Many of these problems are dealt with in behavioral decision
research, which uses negotiation games to investigate negotiation processes.

**Figure 1.** Example of a choice matrix in a social dilemma game

**Negotiation Games**
Negotiation games are related to the game-theoretic approach, but they are less
formal, and show more resemblance to real-life negotiations. The earliest
negotiation game is the Siegel and Fouraker' (1960) Bilateral Monopoly game.
This game, which is typical for many negotiation games, consists of two
players, a buyer and a seller “of imaginary merchandise, who attempt to
maximize their individual profits by negotiating the particular price and
quantity at which this merchandise will be bought or sold” (Rubin & Brown,
1975, p. 30). More recently, negotiation games contain four or five items, such
as price, quantity, delivery time, warranty and accessories for the imaginary
merchandise. Negotiations are conducted through a series of offers and
counteroffers and are based on a profit table that specifies the payoff levels for
each possible agreement between the two players (see Table 1 and 2). The
individual outcomes are negatively correlated; the higher the price, the greater
the seller’s outcomes and the less the buyer’s profit, and vice versa.

The individual outcomes are not perfectly negatively correlated; most
negotiation games have so-called integrative potential. Integrative potential
means that the negotiation game contains agreements that are beneficial for
both parties (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Those mutually beneficial agreements,
or win-win agreements, exist because some items are more important for one
party than for the other. Both parties can achieve higher outcomes by trading
off losses on items that are relatively unimportant for themselves, but
important for the other party, for gains on items that are relatively important
for themselves, but unimportant for the other party. This particular tradeoff
behavior is called ‘logrolling’ (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993) or ‘simultaneous
consideration of issues’ (Weingart, Bennett & Brett, 1993).

An integrative, win-win solution would occur if the buyer and seller in
Table 1 and 2 would agree on a quantity of 50, a delivery time of 6 weeks and a
warranty of 24 months. The individual outcomes for each player would be 1300
and the joint outcomes would be 2600. In the tradeoff solution, both players
reach the maximal payoff on the item that is most important to them (warranty
for the buyer and quantity for the seller) and reach the minimal payoff for the
item that is least important to them (quantity for the buyer and warranty for
the seller). A compromise solution, in which the players would split the middle
between their most preferred solutions would result in a quantity of 30, a
delivery time of 6 weeks and a warranty of 12 months. The individual
outcomes of this compromise solution would be 800 and the joint outcomes
would be 1600, which is below the integrative solution. Thus, joint outcomes are higher when the players in the negotiation game use the integrative potential by logrolling rather than splitting the middle and compromising, or settling on a win-lose agreement.

Table 1. Example of buyer’s payoff charts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Delivery Time</th>
<th>Warranty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payoff</td>
<td>Weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Example of seller’s payoff charts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Delivery Time</th>
<th>Warranty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payoff</td>
<td>Weeks</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>750</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In the 60's and 70's, negotiation researchers studied the influence of individual characteristics and the influence of situational or structural variables on negotiation processes and outcomes. Examples of individual characteristics are motivational orientation (Messick & McClintock, 1986), risk-taking propensity
and perceived locus of control, or demographic variables such as age, nationality, and gender (for an overview, see Rubin & Brown, 1975). The interest in studying individual differences has declined because individual differences tend to explain little variance in negotiation behavior or outcomes (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, 2000). Secondly, individual differences are of little use to negotiators because a) individual characteristics are hard to assess, and hence it is hard to choose a correct opposing negotiation strategy, and b) individual characteristics can hardly be manipulated (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, 2000). Examples of structural variables are the absence of presence of audiences or third parties, the availability of communication channels or the absence or presence of time limits (for an overview, see Rubin & Brown, 1975). These structural variables however, are usually unchangeable by the negotiating parties. Therefore, recent research tends to focus on how negotiators perceive and construct the negotiation structure.

In the 80’s and 90’s, behavioral decision research started to investigate how negotiators systematically deviated from rationality instead of assuming that negotiators were fully rational. Raiffa (1982) initiated this change by his book ‘The art and science of negotiation’ in which he pointed at negotiator’s irrational behavior. He noted that ‘Often, disputants fail to reach an agreement, when, in fact a compromise exists that could be to the advantage of all concerned. And the agreements they do make are frequently inefficient...’ (Raiffa, 1982, p. 358). In the years that followed, Neale, Bazerman, Thompson and their colleagues showed that negotiators are prone to biases and use negotiation heuristics, which both lead to sub-optimal negotiation outcomes (Bazerman & Neale, 1983, Neale & Bazermen, 1991; Thompson, 1990, 1998). For example, negotiators often have a fixed-pie perception; they erroneously believe that their preferences a in negotiation situation are diametrically opposed to those of the other party, (Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). Negotiators also tend to be overconfident that their positions will prevail if they remain firm during the negotiation (for an overview, see Bazerman & Neale, 1983).
Negotiation Process and Characteristics

Although the negotiation research paradigms vary widely, most negotiation researchers agree upon the general negotiation process and negotiation characteristics (Rubin & Brown, 1975).

Negotiation Process
As mentioned earlier, negotiation is a procedure to resolve opposing preferences between parties. As soon as one party perceives opposed preferences, the negotiation process starts. In general, four elements can be distinguished in the negotiation process (De Dreu, Harinck & Van Vianen, 1999) (see Figure 2). The first element is the conflict issue, the substantive issue about which the parties have different preferences. The different preferences produce the second element: negotiation cognitions and emotions; ideas, feelings, and motivations that are associated with the conflict issue and the other party. Those negotiation cognitions and emotions lead to negotiation behaviors intended to solve or intensify the differing preferences. Finally, the fourth element is the negotiation outcome; the extent to which agreement is reached and the quality of the agreement. The process is not a one-way street, different elements of the negotiation process may influence each other. For example, dishonest negotiation behavior may introduce the conflict issue of honesty into the negotiation, and may result in perceptions of a dishonest negotiation opponent.
Figure 2. Model of the negotiation process.

Negotiation Characteristics
The first general negotiation characteristic is that at least two *interdependent parties* are involved in a negotiation. Those parties may be individuals, as in negotiations between family members, or groups, as in labor-union negotiations or international negotiations. The parties are assumed to be interdependent, which means that behaviors or decisions by one party affect the other party and vice versa.

A second negotiation characteristic is that the *parties have different preferences concerning one or more items*. In a labor-union negotiation, for example, union wants to raise the salaries with five percent and two extra holidays, and labor wants a salary raise of one percent and no extra holidays. People can have different preferences concerning the ultimate agreement on one item, but parties can also rate the importance of items differently. Thus, union and labor do not only disagree about the ultimate salary raise and number of holidays, but union may judge the extra holidays more important than the salary raise, whereas labor thinks that the salary raise is more important than the holidays.

The third negotiation characteristic is that the parties are in a *mixed-motive situation*. A mixed-motive situation means that parties experience motivations to cooperate and to compete. The cooperative motivations arise because the parties have similar preferences for certain outcomes. For example, they both prefer agreement to non-agreement, or prefer a win-win solution to a
compromise. Competitive motivations arise because the parties have different preferences concerning certain agreements.

A fourth negotiation characteristic is the activity between the parties, which concerns the division or exchange of one or more specific resources and/or the resolution of one or more intangible issues among the parties involved. As mentioned earlier, negotiation may concern many conflict issues, varying from the division of scarce resources, such as money, space or territory, to more abstract, intangible issues such as negotiations about the interpretation of information, or negotiations about norms and values.

**Conflict Issues**

Although most negotiation researchers would agree that negotiations concern the division or exchange of one or more specific resources and/or the resolution of one or more intangible issues, most negotiation research tends to focus on the division of scarce resources only and ignores other conflict issues such as information or values. Negotiations about scarce resources are generally called negotiations about interests (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) or goal conflicts (Thomas, 1993), and concern issues such as the division of money, power, personal benefits or other scarce resources. In the organizational-behavior paradigm, researchers study real (labor-union) negotiations about salary raises and other job-related scarce resources such as holidays or incentive systems. In game-theoretical research and behavioral decision research, parties negotiate about scarce resources such as points or money.

The problem is that in negotiation there may not only be disagreement about interests such as the distribution of or access to scarce resources, but there may also be disagreement about information, norms and values. Ignoring those conflict issues means ignoring important aspects of negotiations. For a better understanding of negotiation, it is important to know how different conflict issues influence the negotiation process and how these issues should be handled.
Below, a typology of conflict issues is proposed, based upon Thomas (1992). This typology is followed by a discussion of decision-making research and earlier research concerning the effect of conflict issues on negotiation. Finally, an overview of the current dissertation will be presented.

**Typology of Interests, Intellective and Evaluative Issues**

Negotiation is a discussion between two (or more parties) aimed at resolving opposing preferences (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Opposing preferences can be based on three different conflict issues; interests, intellective issues, or evaluative issues (Coombs, 1987; De Dreu et al., 1999; Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Kelley & Thibaut, 1969; Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986; Levine & Thompson, 1996). A negotiation about interests arises when interdependent individuals or groups have opposing preferences that are based on different personal interests such as the attainment of money, time, personal benefits or other scarce resources. Negotiations about interests are also called conflicts about interests (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), goal conflicts (Cosier & Rose, 1977; Thomas, 1993) outcome conflicts (Levine and Thompson, 1996) or non-correspondence of outcomes (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978).

A negotiation about an intellective issue arises when interdependent individuals or groups have opposing preferences that are based on different interpretations of an objectively verifiable issue. Negotiations about intellective issues are also called 'cognitive conflicts' (Brehmer & Garpebring, 1974; Brehmer, 1976; Hammond, Bonaiuto, Faucheux, Moscovici, Froehlich, Joyce et al. 1968; Reagan-Ciricione, 1994) or 'judgment conflicts' (Thomas, 1992).

A negotiation about an evaluative issue arises when interdependent individuals or groups have opposing preferences that are based on different ideas about an issue that has no single demonstrably correct answer, such as norms and values. Negotiations about evaluative issues are also called 'value conflict' or 'value dissensus' (Druckman, Broome & Korper, 1988) or normative
conflicts (Thomas, 1993). Evaluative issues are also called judgmental issues (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Laughlin, 1980).

Take as an example, Ann and Bernice who disagree about their holiday destination. Ann wants to go to a campsite near a big city and Bernice wants to go to a hotel in a seaside resort. Their opposing preferences might be based on interests; Ann is short of money and a campsite is cheaper than a hotel, whereas Bernice wants to go the the hotel because her boyfriend is staying there. Their opposing preferences might be based on an intellective issue; there are more museums, bars and restaurants in the big city according to Ann, whereas Bernice believes there are more museums, bars and restaurants in the seaside resort. One of them is right, because the number of museums, bars and restaurants can be objectively established, but they can disagree about the numbers, unless they actually count. Finally, their opposing preferences might be based on evaluative issues such as personal values; Ann loves architecture and loves to walk around in cities, whereas Bernice loves to sport and lie down at the beach. There is no objective right or wrong for such issues because there is no accounting for taste.

The typology that is used in this dissertation is related to a typology proposed by Thomas (1992). The negotiation about interests is similar to his goal conflict and the negotiation about an intellective issue is similar to his judgment conflict. The negotiation about evaluative issues however, expands his normative conflict. Normative conflict according to Thomas involves conflict about behavior. The negotiation about evaluative issues, however, expands normative conflict because it includes non-behavioral issues for which no objectively correct answer exists, such as personal opinions about art, ideologies or religion.

The typology that is used in this dissertation expands earlier typologies that distinguish between conflicts about interests and conflicts about information (Kelley & Thibaut, 1969, Levine & Thompson, 1996). The distinction between interests and information parallels Rapoport’s (1960) distinction between ‘games’ and ‘debates’. Conflicts about interests are similar to negotiations about interests. Games are similar to negotiations about
interests, debates are similar to conflict about information, which occurs when people have different information or when they disagree about the validity or relevance of certain facts (Levine & Thompson, 1996). Conflicts about information concern debates about facts and opinions and include both intellective and evaluative issues.

It is important to make a distinction between intellective and evaluative conflict issues rather than combining these issues within the concept ‘conflict about information’, because the negotiation process by which people reach agreement is likely to be different for these to categories of conflict issues. Below, research concerning these two types of issues is discussed and it is shown that these issues give rise to different interpersonal processes.

**Intellective and Evaluative Issues**

Allen and Levine (1968) were among the first researchers to study the difference between objective, intellective issues and subjective, evaluative issues in the field of social influence. They studied the effects of broken group consensus on conformity in so-called Asch experiments (Asch, 1952), in which individuals conform to the erroneous group judgment about intellective and evaluative issues (Allen & Levine, 1968, 1969). Allen and Levine used intellective information issues, such as the question “How far is it from San Francisco to New York” and evaluative opinion issues, such as the question “Most young people get too much education” (Allen & Levine, 1969). Results showed that the breaking of group conformity significantly reduced conformity on intellective items (as Asch (1952) found), but not on evaluative items. It seems likely that individuals expect a group to be unanimous in response to simple objective, intellective, stimuli. Lack of consensus would imply that the group is unreliable in judging physical reality and the group is rejected as social referent for reality. Lack of group consensus on opinion items however, would not endanger the group’s validity for social comparison, because there is no accounting for tastes.

Laughlin (1980) introduced the concept of intellective and evaluative (or ‘judgmental’) issues in the field of group decision making. He distinguished
two types of tasks. Intellective tasks involve "a definite objective criterion of success within the definition, rules operation and relationships of a particular conceptual system" (Laughlin, 1980, p.128). Examples of intellective problems are mathematical problems, map reading, and anagrams. Evaluative tasks involve "political, ethical, aesthetic, or behavior judgments for which there is no objective criterion or demonstrable solution" (Laughlin, 1980, p.128). Examples are many political problems such as the legalization of abortion or the legalization of soft drugs, or the question whether capital punishment is acceptable.

The distinction between intellective and evaluative tasks is not a strict dichotomy but rather a continuum with varying degrees of verifiability (Laughlin, 1980, Maass, Volpato & Mucchi-Faina, 1996). Intellective tasks, for which the answer can be easily and objectively verified, occupy one extreme of the continuum. Evaluative tasks, for which the correct answer cannot be verified, occupy the other end. Issues that can be verified theoretically, but for which it is hard to find the truth, occupy the middle. An example of such a task is the investigation of the cause of the hole in the ozone layer above the South Pole.

The work of Laughlin stimulated many studies in the field of group decision making and social influence (Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Kaplan, Schaefer & Zinkiewicz, 1994; Kelly, Jackson & Hutson-Comeaux, 1997; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986; Maass, Volpato & Mucchi-Faina, 1996; Parks & Cowlin, 1996; Trafimow & Davis, 1993). Kaplan and Miller (1997), for example, showed that intellective issues are associated with influence to accept information from another as evidence about reality (informational influence), while evaluative issues are associated with the influence to conform to another's positive expectations (normative influence) (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Laughlin and Ellis (1986) showed that the number of group members that is necessary for a collective decision is higher when the correctness of the group decision is less demonstrable. Decisions about evaluative issues need more supporters in order to be accepted by a group than decisions about intellective issues because the 'correct answer' for evaluative issues is determined by the majority of the
group members, whereas the correct answer for intellective issues can be objectively demonstrated.

**Intellective Issues**

Intellective issues received much attention in decision-making research. Hammond, Brehmer and colleagues have studied purely intellective conflicts, defined as interpersonal conflict caused by cognitive differences (Brehmer, 1976; Brehmer & Garpebring, 1974; Brehmer & Hammond, 1977; Hammond, Bonaiuto, Faucheux, Moscovici, Fröhlich, Joyce, et al., 1968; Hammond, Todd, Wilkins, & Mitchell, 1966; Reagan-Ciricione, 1994). This line of research is based on Social Judgment Theory and the Brunswikian ‘lens model’. A typical social judgment theory paradigm consists of two participants who face a series of problems for which a correct answer exists. The participants are required to make a correct judgment from cues that provide uncertain information. For example, participants have to estimate teachers’ salaries based on demographic and economic data (Reagan-Cirincione, 1994) or participants have to predict which horse will win a race, based on cues such as the horses’ median speed, the positions at the start, the jockeys, and the winning records of last year (Harmon & Rohrbaugh, 1990). The participants, however, disagree in their judgments because each participant has a different prediction policy; each participant uses the cues differently (by training or by pre-experimental experiences). There are two possible sources of disagreement in this type of experiments. The first source is systematic differences between participants’ prediction policies; participants give different weights to the cues, or they have different ideas about the relation between the cues and the to be predicted criterion. The second source of disagreement is lack of consistency in the application of the prediction policy. In each trial of the experiment, participants are required to negotiate in order to find a common judgment. After the participants have reached an agreement, they receive feedback about their common judgment, are informed of the correct answer and proceed to the next trial.
Brehmer (1976) draws two major conclusions from this type of research about intellective conflict. First, parties find it hard to reach agreement in intellective conflict. Research suggests that parties in series of trials rapidly reduce the systematic differences between their prediction policies. At the same time, however, the consistency with which they apply their prediction policies decreases. Thus, the structure of the conflict changes from disagreement caused by different prediction policies to disagreement caused by inconsistency, but the amount of conflict remains the same.

Second, accuracy may be more important in intellective conflict than agreement. Especially participants with inaccurate prediction policies change, whereas participants with correct prediction policies stuck to their policy and did not change it in order to reach agreement with the incorrect participants. This aspect clearly distinguishes intellective conflict from conflict of interests. In conflict of interests, any agreement can solve the problem as long as both parties accept the agreement. In intellective conflict, the agreement has to be accepted by both parties, and the agreement has to be a correct solution to the problem.

Conflict Issues and Negotiation

In the following section, the results and limitations of three lines of research that give preliminary evidence for the effects of conflict issues on negotiation processes are discussed. The first two lines of research focus on individuals' perception and interpretation of the conflict issue. Research about conflict frames shows that people's interpretations of the conflict and the conflict issue influence negotiation outcomes. Research about the effects of task-related and relationship-related disagreement show how group performance is influenced by these disagreements. The third line of research focuses on the interaction of interests and values (evaluative issues) on negotiation processes.
Conflict Frames

The importance of how people experience and frame disagreements and conflict issues is shown by Pinkley (Pinkley, 1990; Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). Pinkley (1990) showed that individuals do not only interpret disagreements in terms of interests, but rather use different dimensions to describe or frame a conflict. Participants in her research judged the degree to which 40 conflict descriptions were similar or dissimilar and specified the characteristics that they felt distinguished the conflict descriptions. The results revealed that individuals use three dimensions to interpret a disagreement. Individuals frame disagreements in terms of a relationship disagreement versus a task-related disagreement, an emotional versus intellectual disagreement and a cooperate versus win disagreement. The relationship-task dimension refers to the extent to which individuals focus on the interpersonal relationship between the conflict parties versus the material aspects of the conflict. The emotional-intellectual dimension refers to the extent to which individuals focus on the feelings involved in the conflict versus the behaviors that occur in the conflict. The cooperate-win dimension refers to the extent to which individuals hold both parties responsible for the conflict and view the conflict as resolvable versus hold the other party responsible and view the conflict as a win-lose situation (Pinkley, 1990; Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994).

Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) furthermore showed that such conflict frames influence negotiation processes and outcomes. In a negotiation simulation, they found that individuals’ conflict frames mutually influenced each other and converged during the negotiation. Moreover, they found that conflict parties with a task, rather than relationship, orientation and cooperate, rather than win, orientation reach higher personal and joint outcomes (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994).

The research about conflict frames shows that disagreements are not about interests alone, but rather comprises intangible issues such as emotional, task-related and relationship-related issues as well. Pinkley and Northcraft (1994), however, did not investigate whether and how the perceived conflict issue influences the negotiation behavior. The assumed effect of conflict frames on
negotiation behavior therefore remains unknown. Moreover, the conflict dimensions seem to cover different aspects of conflict. The relationship-task dimension seems to cover conflict issues (what the conflict is about). The emotional-intellectual dimension seems to cover conflict experiences such as feelings and behavior. The cooperate-win dimension seems to cover conflict outcomes. Therefore, the research described above clearly shows that conflict issues influence negotiation processes, but the conflict typology and research is not conclusive.

**Task-related and Relationship-related Conflict**

A second line of research studies how task-related conflict and relationship-related conflict affects team performance (Amason, 1996; Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Friedman, Tidd, Currall & Tsai, 1998; Jehn, 1995, 1997, Jehn, et al., 1999; Pelled, et al., 1999). Task conflict is defined as disagreement about the content of the task being performed, including differences in viewpoints, ideas and opinions. Relationship conflict is defined as interpersonal incompatibilities among group members, including tension, animosity and personality clashes (Jehn, 1995). This line of research usually studies real work groups or management teams and their performance. The amount and type of conflict within a team is measured by a questionnaire (Jehn, 1995). Participants are asked to what extent they experience task-related or relationship-related disagreements and conflict. It is found that task conflict sometimes enhances team performance, whereas relationship conflict usually deteriorates team performance (De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1997; Jehn, 1995, 1997; Pelled, et al. 1999; Simons & Peterson, 2000).

Research concerning task-related versus relationship-related conflict shows that individuals are sensitive to differences in the experienced conflict issues and that these different experienced conflict issues affect subsequent team performance. This line of research, however, has two limitations. First, this distinction between task-related and relationship-related conflict confounds conflict issue (content of the task in task conflict) with conflict cognition and behavior (tension and personality clashes in relationship conflict). It may be
hard to distinguish different conflicts using this typology because a task conflict can also result in tension and personality clashes. However, the conflict cognitions and behaviors that are typical of relationship conflict according to this distinction, such as tension, animosity or personality clashes, are not limited to relationship conflicts, but can also occur in task conflicts. Consistent with this notion, research using this distinction typically shows a high correlation (mean $r = .47$, Simons & Peterson, 2000) between task and relationship conflict. This high correlation shows that task and relationship conflicts are highly interrelated and conflicts often show aspects of both types of conflicts. This correlation would suggest that task versus relationship might not be a clear-cut typology to characterize a conflict.

The second reason not to use this distinction is that the instrument to measure task-related and relationship-related conflict tends to confound the frequency and intensity of the conflict. Two items concerning task conflict refer to the frequency of task conflict "How often/frequently do members of your team disagree about...?". Items concerning relationship conflict refer to the intensity of the conflict "How much friction/tension is there among members in your work unit?" (Jehn, 1995; Pelled, Eisenhardt & Xin, 1999). As a result, the effects of task versus relationship conflict, as measured by the current instrument, can be the result of the type of conflict, or the result of the frequency versus intensity of the conflict.

**Interests and Values**

Druckman and colleagues developed a third line of research that shows that conflict issues influences negotiation behavior and outcomes (Druckman, Broome, & Korper, 1988; Druckman, Rozelle, & Zechmeister, 1977; Druckman & Zechmeister, 1970; Druckman & Zechmeister, 1973; Druckman, Rozelle, Krause, & Mahoney, 1974). Druckman and colleagues investigated the interplay between conflicts about interests and conflicts about values. Conflict of interest is defined as differences between parties in their preferred distributions of a scarce resource (Druckman & Zechmeister, 1970). Conflict about values is defined as differences between parties in values or beliefs
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concerning the same social object or objective (Druckman & Zechmeister, 1970) and is similar to the negotiation about an evaluative issue. Druckman and colleagues studied the effects of conflicts of interests and value dissensus in the area of political decision-making. In politics, different preferences for a certain allocation of money (conflict of interests) often stem directly from differences in values and norms (value dissensus). For example, pro-choice politicians will prefer to allocate more money to abortion clinics than pro-life politicians.

Druckman and colleagues used decision-making simulations to study the interplay of value dissensus and conflict of interest. Participants negotiated in dyads and had to allocate money to different projects, for example different solutions for racial problems or different programs for prison services. Preferences for the allocation of the money depended on the negotiators’ beliefs or ideologies. For example, negotiators with a ‘system-maintenance’ ideology, who believed that social change is dangerous and unnecessary, preferred prison services such as religious services and a counselor-training program. Negotiators with a ‘system-change’ ideology, who believed that social systems should be changed when they do not meet society’s needs, preferred prison services such as a criminal justice action group and a reform of the prison system.

The first conclusion that can be drawn from this line of research is that conflicts about interests are harder to solve when they are more linked to value dissensus. Dyads allocate less money and reach more impasses in conflicts in which interests are strongly, as compared to weakly, related to values (Druckman & Zechmeister, 1970; Druckman et al 1977; Druckman et al, 1988). The explanation is that people are more committed to their positions and less willing to give in when their interests more strongly related to their values. Second, agreements are more often characterized by dominance of one party over the other, rather than by mutual concessions or compromise, in conflicts in which interests are strongly, as opposed to weakly, related to values (Druckman & Zechmeister, 1970; Druckman et al, 1988). Probably, the commitment of participants to opposing ideologies made negotiation or compromise unlikely.
The problem of Druckman's research is first that participants in most (although not all) experiments were randomly allocated to experimental conditions but not randomly allocated to roles. Rather, participants' ideological beliefs were measured before the experiment, and participants were allocated to the role that fitted best with their private opinions. Although this procedure may enhance experimental realism and participants' motivation to comply, the drawback is that the participants' private opinions may have caused the experimental results. The allocation of the participants to roles prior to the experiment may have contaminated the results.

Second, Druckman's line of research does not include intellectual issues. As noted above, intellectual issues such as different interpretations of information are important causes of disagreement. Thus, distinguishing between interests and values is important but not conclusive, and the design of the research concerning the interplay of interests and values makes it hard to draw firm conclusions about the effects of the different conflict issues.
Conclusion and Overview of this Dissertation

The theory and research described above support the typology of interests, intellective and evaluative issues as distinct separate conflict issues. Each issue can cause disagreement, and each conflict issue is likely to stimulate different negotiation processes. Unfortunately however, there is no research that fully integrated and investigated these three conflict issues and their effects on subsequent negotiation processes. This dissertation attempts to fill this void. An experimental paradigm was developed to study the effects of interests, intellective issues and evaluative issues on several important aspects of negotiations, such as negotiation experience, negotiation behavior and communication and negotiation outcomes. The experiments and field research reported in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 all deal with the influence of conflict issues on negotiation processes and contain perceptual, motivational and behavioral data. Chapter 2 is focused on negotiation communication. Chapter 3 is focused on negotiation cognition and motivation, negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes. Chapter 4 builds on the findings reported in Chapter 3. Finally, in Chapter 5 conclusions are drawn, limitations of the current research program are discussed and suggestions for future research are given.

1 Chapter 2 and 3 concern negotiations about interests, intellective and evaluative issues. Negotiations about intellective issues were left out in Chapter 4 because the studies in Chapter 2 and 3 had shown that intellective issues took intermediate positions between interests and evaluative issues and it was decided to focus on the two most extreme conflict issues.