Conflict issues matter: how conflict issues influence negotiation
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Chapter 4

Indecent Proposals and Temporary Impasses: Effects of Interests and Values
on Distributive and Integrative Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes

In daily life, we often encounter situations in which our own preferences differ from other people's preferences. For example, two partners may have different preferences concerning the division of household duties, labor and union may have different preferences concerning salary raises and governments may have different preferences concerning export regulations. Negotiation is a way to solve (perceived) differences (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Those differences can involve different conflict issues such as incompatible interests or opposing values (Coombs, 1987; De Dreu, Harinck, & Van Vianen, 1999; Druckman & Zechmeister, 1970; Kelley & Thibaut, 1969; Levine & Thompson, 1996). A negotiation about interests arises when interdependent individuals or groups hold incompatible positions that are based on different personal interests such as the attainment of money, time, personal benefits or other scarce resources. A

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6 This chapter is adapted from Harinck & De Dreu (2001).
negotiation about evaluative issues arises when interdependent individuals or groups hold incompatible positions that are based on different ideas about a issue that has no single demonstrably correct answer, such as norms and values. Negotiations about evaluative issues are sometimes referred to as ‘value conflicts’ (Druckman, Rozelle & Zechmeister, 1977).

Although many negotiations involve both interests and evaluative issues, negotiation research has largely ignored the basic question of how conflict issue affects negotiation processes, and the few studies that have examined the role of conflict issue can be criticized on methodological grounds. The current research was designed to gain a better understanding of the influence of conflict issues on negotiation behavior and outcomes. Specifically, we compared negotiations about interests versus evaluative issues, and we examined how and why interests and evaluative issues influence distributive and integrative behavior as well as the agreements negotiators reach.

**Conflict Issues and Negotiation Behavior**

Negotiation research typically distinguishes between distributive behavior and integrative behavior (Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Distributive behavior involves competitive claiming such as making positional commitments, using threats and power and trying to persuade the other party to give in. Parties who use distributive behavior often reach low joint outcomes because they tend to overlook win-win solutions and end up with a victory-for-one solution, a compromise or stalemate. Integrative behavior, in contrast, involves the exchange of information about preferences and priorities, clarifying underlying principles, and trading off less important items for more important ones (logrolling) (Lewicki, et al., 1994; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Parties who use integrative rather than distributive behavior reach higher joint outcomes because they are more likely to detect possibilities for tradeoffs and integrative, win-win agreements (De Dreu, Weingart & Kwon, 2000b; Kelley & Schenitzki, 1972; Pruitt, 1981; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993).
There is reason to believe that conflict issues influence negotiation processes and outcomes. For instance, Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley (2000, p. 292-293) argued: “When issues are tied to sacred values, compromise or trade becomes exceedingly difficult. [...] Not only will people resist trades or compromises on sacred issues, but even the consideration of such trades may be seen as reprehensible”. Logrolling is acceptable for interests such as money or personal benefits because losses on one item can be compensated by gains on another item. Theoretical work, however, suggests that tradeoffs are unacceptable when issues involve “sacred values” such as the truth, life, liberty or justice. Individuals do not like tradeoffs about values because losses on one sacred item cannot be compensated for by gains on another sacred item (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996; Thompson & Gonzalez, 1996; Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy & Syna, 1992).

Several studies are consistent with the idea that conflict issue influences negotiation behavior. Druckman and colleagues investigated the interplay between interests and evaluative issues (Druckman, Broome, & Korper, 1988; Druckman, et al. 1977; Druckman & Zechmeister, 1970, 1973; Druckman, Rozelle, Krause, & Mahoney, 1974). Participants in their studies negotiated the allocation of money to different projects, for example projects for racial issues or programs for prison services. Preferences for the allocation of the money depended on the negotiators’ beliefs or ideologies. Individuals with a ‘system-maintenance’ ideology, who believe that social change is dangerous and unnecessary, preferred prison services such as religious services and a counselor-training program. Individuals with a ‘system-change’ ideology, who believe that social systems should be changed when they do not meet society’s needs, preferred prison services such as a criminal justice action group and a reform of the prison system. The results of these studies repeatedly showed that conflict of interests was harder to solve when the interests were linked to evaluative issues. Moreover, agreements were more often characterized by dominance of one party over the other, rather than by mutual concessions or compromise, in conflicts where interests were strongly related to values. These
findings thus corroborate the idea that logrolling becomes less likely when evaluative issues are at stake.

Two problems characterize this past research. First, none of these studies distinguished between integrative and distributive negotiation behavior and none of these studies had a clear-cut measure of the extent to which parties reached mutually beneficial, integrative agreements. Second, differences in positions with regard to evaluative issues were based on measurement rather than experimental manipulation. As such, the causal effects remain unknown — it cannot be excluded that some unknown third variable accounts for different conflict perceptions and values and, independently, induces different negotiation behaviors. These problems were addressed by Harinck, De Dreu and Van Vianen (2000). In their study, participants in the role of district attorney or lawyer negotiated in dyads about the penalties for several offenders. The district attorney aimed for jail penalties and the lawyer aimed for monetary fines. The conflict issue was manipulated by altering the reason why the district attorney and lawyer had different preferences concerning the penalties. In the negotiation about interests, the district attorney and lawyer aimed for certain penalties because these penalties were supposed to influence their individual careers and chances to get promoted. In the negotiation about an evaluative issue, the district attorney and lawyer aimed for certain penalties because these penalties were supposed to be most just. Thus, participants had different preferences for the penalties and those preferences were linked to a personal interest or a personal held value.

In the first experiment, Harinck et al. (2000) found that individuals in negotiations about interests, compared to those in negotiations about evaluative issues, had lower cooperative motivation and stronger fixed-pie perceptions. While this would suggest more competitive, distributive behavior in negotiations about interests rather than evaluative issues, the second and third experiment showed that individuals in negotiations about interests, compared to those in negotiations about evaluative issues, displayed higher levels of integrative behavior and reached higher joint outcomes. The latter finding is consistent with the results obtained by Druckman and colleagues, as
well as with the general argument that individuals resist tradeoffs when sacred values are at stake (e.g., Bazerman et al., 2000).

**Differentiation-before-Integration**

To explain the fact that individuals in a negotiation about interests have stronger fixed-pie perceptions and lower cooperative motivation yet reach more integrative agreements, Harinck et al. (2000) suggested that individuals in negotiations about interests are more likely to follow a differentiation-before-integration pattern than individuals in negotiations about evaluative issues. A differentiation-before-integration pattern means that individuals start with competitive distributive behavior but after a while, when costly impasse looms, they switch to integrative behavior and seek mutual, rather than personal benefit (Walton & McKersie, 1965, see also Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993).

Critical in the differentiation-before-integration phase are temporary impasses—those moments in a negotiation in which parties postpone their negotiation without having reached an agreement and during which parties may realize that they run the risk of a permanent impasse if they continue their competitive, distributive behavior. As a consequence, they may consider alternative strategies including problem solving which, if chosen, will result in mutually beneficial integrative agreements. This reasoning subscribes to Pruitt and Carnevale’s (1993, p. 114) postulate that in negotiations “joint-concern and integrative behavior often develop as a result of insight into the fact that one is in a hurting stalemate.” Indeed, Brett, Shapiro and Lytle (1998) showed that procedural remarks --statements that refer to the process of the negotiation itself -- were able to change negotiators’ focus from contentious, distributive communication to more constructive, integrative communication. Thus, stepping back from and reflecting upon the negotiation during a temporary impasse may facilitate a switch from competitive, distributive behavior to more cooperative integrative behavior.

The shift from distributive to integrative behavior requires not only a temporary impasse but also the willingness to engage in behaviors that require tradeoffs among items and differential concessions on more or less valuable
items. As mentioned, such willingness is hypothesized to be much lower when the negotiation is about evaluative issues rather than about interests. Therefore, the switch to integrative behavior after a temporary impasse is less likely to occur in negotiation about evaluative issues than in negotiations about interests.

Present Study
Although the differentiation-before-integration explanation explains the experimental results obtained by Harinck et al (2000), no empirical evidence was provided. The current research was designed to fill this void and, as such, to further increase our understanding of the interplay between conflict issues, temporary impasse, and distributive and integrative negotiation behavior. In Experiment 1, we tested the hypothesis that tradeoffs are considered more acceptable in negotiations about interests than in negotiations about evaluative issues (Hypothesis 1). In Experiment 2, we tested the general hypothesis that negotiators start with competitive distributive behavior and, after temporary impasse, switch to integrative behavior to a greater extent in negotiations about interests than in negotiations about evaluative issues. We develop specific hypotheses when we introduce Experiment 2 in more detail.

Experiment 1

Method

Design and Participants. The design was a 2 x 2 factorial, involving conflict issue (interests vs. evaluative issue) and proposal (tradeoff vs. compromise) as between-participant factors. Main dependent variables were acceptability and morality of the proposals. Participants were 240 undergraduate students at the University of Amsterdam who participated for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions.

Procedure. The study was conducted in a large classroom. Participants received written instructions containing the manipulation of the conflict issue (interests vs. evaluative issue). Participants, in the role of district attorney, read
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that they were going to discuss several court cases with a lawyer\(^7\). Subsequently, participants received a memo allegedly written by the lawyer that contained the manipulation of the proposal (tradeoff vs. compromise). Upon reading these materials, participants were given a questionnaire. Upon completion, they were told that the experiment was over, they were debriefed and thanked for participation.

**Task and Manipulation of Independent Variables.** The task was adapted from the negotiation task used by Harinck et al. (2000; see also Experiment 2). Participants were asked to adopt the role of district attorney who was going to meet with a lawyer in order to discuss possible penalties for two offenders\(^1\). The district attorney and lawyer could choose five different penalties: (1) long jail penalty of six months, (2) short jail penalty of two weeks, (3) community service, (4) a high monetary fine (Dfl 1500,- equivalent to $625) or (5) a low monetary fine (Dfl 600,- equivalent to $250). The participants, in their role of district attorney, were instructed to aim for jail penalties for the offenders. They were also informed that the lawyer wanted monetary fines.

We manipulated the *conflict issue* by manipulating the reason why participants had to aim for jail penalties. In negotiations about interests, participants were instructed to aim for jail penalties because obtaining jail penalties would help their career and chances to get promoted. Thus, the participants' preferences for a particular sentence were related to their self-interest of getting promoted. In negotiations about evaluative issues participants were instructed to aim for a jail penalty because this kind of sentence is most just. Justness is an evaluative issue, as there is no objective universal measure of justness (Gergen & Gergen, 1986; Levine & Thompson, 1996; Maier, 1963; Raiffa, 1982). Participants read that the lawyer aimed for monetary fines for the same reason as themselves. Thus, in the negotiation about interests, the penalties were linked to self-interest in terms of promotion.

\(^7\) All participants were assigned the role of district attorney because the previous studies using this paradigm revealed no effect of role (Harinck et al. 2000).
In the negotiation about evaluative issues the penalties were linked to justness; justness is an evaluative issue because it is a matter of personal taste.

After the manipulation of the conflict issue, participants read a memo allegedly written by the lawyer with a proposal for the penalties for the two offenders. In the tradeoff condition, the memo contained an explicit tradeoff proposal: “I propose we make a tradeoff. You have you will for the first offender, this offender will have a long jail penalty. I will have my will for the second offender, this offender will get a low monetary fine”. In the compromise condition, the memo contained an explicit compromise proposal: “I propose we compromise. We will split the difference between our actual preferences and give both offenders civil service”.

Dependent Variables. The acceptability of the proposal was measured with one question “Would you, as a district attorney, accept the lawyer’s proposal?”. Answers were given on a five-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, to 5 = definitely). The extent to which the proposal elicited moral indignation was measured by one scale with eight items. The items were: I think the proposal is a) good (reverse-scored), b) just (reverse-scored), c) serious (reverse-scored), d) reasonable (reverse-scored), e) ridiculous, f) ethical (reverse-scored), g) honest (reverse-scored) and h) annoying (always 1 = not at all, to 5 = very much). Ratings were averaged into one index (α = .91).

The extent to which losses on one case could be compensated for by gains on another case was measured by two items. The items were ‘Gains in one case compensate for losses in the other case’ and ‘Gains in one case offset losses in another case’, (1 = I definitely disagree, to 5 = I definitely agree). Ratings were averaged into an index (r = .60, p < .001).

Results and Discussion

Acceptability. Results showed an effect of proposal, F(1, 236) = 32.70, p < .001, and an interaction between proposal and conflict issue, F(1, 236) = 7.88, p < .005. Tradeoffs (M = 1.75) were considered less acceptable than compromises (M = 2.45). The interaction between proposal and conflict issue showed that tradeoffs were less acceptable in the evaluative condition (M = 1.52) than in the
interest condition \((M = 1.96)\), \(F(1, 237) = 5.00, p < .026\). Compromises were equally acceptable in the evaluative condition \((M = 2.57)\) and in the interest condition \((M = 2.32)\), \(F(1, 237) = 1.92, ns\).

**Moral indignation.** Results showed an effect of proposal, \(F(1, 227) = 91.65, p < .001\), and an interaction between proposal and conflict issue, \(F(1, 227) = 4.16, p < .042\). Tradeoffs \((M = 3.39)\) elicited more moral indignation than compromises \((M = 2.65)\). The interaction showed that this was more pronounced in the evaluative condition than in the interest condition (see Figure 5).

![Figure 5](image.png)

**Figure 5.** The amount of moral indignation as a function of the conflict issue and proposal.

**Compensation.** Compensation showed an effect of conflict issue, \(F(1, 235) = 5.29, p < .022\), and an effect of proposal, \(F(1, 235) = 6.31, p < .013\). Gains on one case could compensate losses on another case to a greater extent when the conflict issue was interests \((M = 2.37)\) rather than an evaluative issue \((M = 2.08)\). Gains on one case could also compensate losses on another case to a higher extent when the proposal was a compromise \((M = 2.36)\) rather than a tradeoff \((M = 2.05)\). This unexpected finding may reflect the fact that losses are more
painful than gains are pleasant (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), making the complete loss on one item in the tradeoff proposal loom relatively large.

**Introduction to Experiment 2**

The results of Experiment 1 supported the idea that tradeoffs are generally considered as 'indecent proposals' in negotiations about evaluative issues. Results showed that tradeoffs were less acceptable and raised more moral indignation than compromises, especially in negotiations about evaluative issues. Moreover, in negotiations about interests losses on one item could to a greater extent be compensated by gains on another item than in negotiations about evaluative issues. These results are consistent with theoretical work suggesting that individuals do not like tradeoffs about values (e.g., Bazerman et al., 2000; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Tetlock et al., 1996; Thompson & Gonzalez, 1996; Zubek, et al., 1992). Moreover, they provide an important building block in our understanding of how and why conflict issue affects negotiation processes and outcomes.

In the Introduction we argued that because making tradeoffs would be seen as inappropriate in the case of evaluative issues, a differentiation-before-integration pattern would be less likely in negotiations about evaluative issues than in negotiation about interests. Specifically, we argued that negotiators start with competitive distributive behavior, but after a while, when costly impasses are looming, negotiators tend to switch to integrative behavior, but only in negotiations about interests and not in negotiations about evaluative issues (*Hypothesis 2a*). It was also argued that temporary impasses lead to higher levels of integrative behavior in negotiations about interests but not in negotiations about evaluative issues (*Hypothesis 2b*).

In both hypotheses temporary impasses play a critical role. Research suggests that temporary impasses are more likely when parties have a high rather than low resistance to yielding—someone's intransigence about concession making (Druckman, 1994). Parties with high resistance to yielding care a lot about their own position or outcomes and are unwilling to concede to
the other party. As a result, they concede slowly and engage in integrative behaviors that promote the discovery and developments of integrative solutions (De Dreu et al., 2000b). Parties with low resistance to yielding care less about their own position or outcomes, they are more willing to concede to the other party and to accept 50-50 compromises.

Resistance to yielding is higher when negotiators have high rather than low aspirations, are held accountable by constituents, or when time pressure is mild rather than acute (De Dreu et al. 2000b; Druckman, 1994; Pruitt, 1981). Time pressure, for instance, is assumed to speed up mutual concession making and to reduce the likelihood of temporary impasse. When time pressure is mild or absent, temporary impasses are more likely and more integrative agreements will be reached (cf., Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; Druckman, 1994). The increase in integrative behavior after temporary impasse is, as argued, more likely in the case of negotiations about interests rather than evaluative issues. Therefore, we expected that individuals in negotiations about interests reach higher joint outcomes than individuals in negotiations about evaluative issues, especially when there is high resistance to yielding (Hypothesis 3).

Method

Design and Participants. The design was a 2 x 2 factorial, involving conflict issue (interests vs. evaluative issue) and time pressure (high vs. low) as between-dyads factors. Main dependent variables were integrative behavior, distributive behavior and joint outcomes. We measured temporary impasses to examine their relevance for the differentiation-before-integration pattern.

Participants were 96 undergraduate students at the University of Amsterdam. Part of the sample participated for course credit, the other part participated for money (Dfl 15.00; equivalent to $6.25). The study was run in dyads (N = 48). There were 3 male-male couples, 18 male-female couples and 27 female-female couples, randomly distributed over the experimental conditions.

Negotiation Task and Manipulation of Independent Variables. The negotiation task was similar to the negotiation task in Harinck et al. (2000).
Participants worked in dyads, one of the members was (randomly) assigned the role of a lawyer, and the other one was assigned the role of a district attorney. Their task was to reach agreement on penalties for five different criminal cases. Each participant received the same information about the penalties and the criminal cases.

The possible penalties were: (1) long jail penalty of six months, (2) short jail penalty of two weeks, (3) community service, (4) a Dfl 1500 fine (equivalent to $625) or (5) a Dfl 600 fine (equivalent to $250). Three cases were about theft (CD player, clothes, bag), one case was about the disturbance of domestic peace, and one case was about an illegal immigrant. Each case was described in five sentences on average, containing background information about the offender and information about the criminal case itself. Cases were real-life, although they were slightly altered and stripped from all information that could endanger the anonymity of the offenders. We used masculine names to refer to the offender in all cases. Lawyers were instructed to aim for monetary fines for their clients, while district attorneys were instructed to aim for jail penalties.

The conflict issue was manipulated as in Experiment 1. In the negotiation about interests, the penalties were linked to one's self-interest in terms of promotion. In the negotiation about evaluative issues the penalties were linked to justness; justness is an evaluative issue because it is a matter of personal taste.

After reading these instructions, the participants were presented a chart in which their preferences for the penalties per criminal case were printed. Participants only saw their own preferences, and were not informed about the other party's preferences. In the interests condition, the verbal labels that were used to match preferences for the penalties were based upon the usefulness of the sentences for the lawyer's and district attorney's own career: very good, good, rather good, good nor bad, rather bad, bad and very bad. In the evaluative condition preferences for the sentences were based on the assumed justness, using the labels: very just, just, rather just, just nor unjust, rather unjust, unjust, and very unjust.
The preferences for the penalties were manipulated in such a way that the negotiation task contained one fixed-sum case, one win-lose case, two integrative cases and a congruent case. In the fixed-sum case, the preferences of the party were completely opposed in such a way that gains for one party equaled loss for the other party. In the win-lose case the preferences of the parties were completely opposed, and there was no possibility for a compromise. In the two integrative cases the parties had opposed preferences but the cases differed in importance to the lawyer and the district attorney. In the congruent case, the preferences of the parties were identical. Thus, the task had integrative potential, i.e. participants could earn higher joint outcomes if they traded off losses on their less important case for gains on their most important case (see Harinck et al. (2000) for full instructions and pay-off charts). Research (Ritov, 1996) suggests that negotiation parties in these tasks anchor on the issue that is listed most to the left in the case chart. Therefore, we manipulated the order of the cases according to a Latin Square design. Participants were not informed about the integrative nature of the task. Participants were allowed to talk about their charts and pay-off structures but they were not allowed to show their charts to each other. The different pay-off structures had to be discovered by communication.

Resistance to yielding was manipulated by the absence or presence of time pressure. Time pressure is caused by the negotiators' nearness to a deadline or the total amount of time available to negotiate (Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; p. 637). High time pressure is related to low resistance to yielding, because the nearness to a deadline makes an agreement more urgent. Low time pressure is related to high resistance to yielding, because there is no immediate threat of a costly impasse. In the study by Harinck, et al. (2000), dyads needed 10 to 30 minutes to complete the task. Based upon this experience, we expected most dyads would experience time pressure when they have 10 minutes to complete the task, but will not experience time pressure when they have 30 minutes to complete the task. Accordingly, we gave dyads 10 minutes to negotiate in the high time-pressure condition and 30 minutes to negotiate in the low time-pressure condition.
**Procedure.** When the participants entered the laboratory, they were welcomed by the experimenter and divided in dyads. Each dyad was assigned a cubicle. The experimenter told the dyads that they were participating in an experiment about ‘decision making in court’. The experimenter also told that they were to discuss some criminal cases, and that their conversation would be recorded. The participants were given a folder containing instructions about their role and the task, the negotiation issue manipulation and their own preference chart. The participants had to answer two questions about the preference chart, to ensure that they understood the chart correctly. The answers were checked by the experimenter, and corrected when necessary. Subsequently, the participants were given ten minutes to think about and write down arguments for their own position. The lawyer had to write down arguments favoring monetary fines and the district attorney had to write down arguments favoring jail penalties.

After these ten minutes, the experimenter told the dyad they had 30 or 10 (depending on the condition) minutes to discuss their positions and to reach agreements. Besides, the experimenter set an alarm clock on which participants could see how much time they had left to complete the task. The members of each dyad were allowed to interact freely and to ask each other whatever they wanted, but they were not allowed to show their preference charts to each other. The dyad had a sheet of paper on which it could report the agreements. The dyad had to stop the negotiation when the alarm clock went off or when all cases were settled upon. Then, the experimenter handed out a questionnaire. Upon completion of this last questionnaire participants were paid and debriefed.

**Dependent Variables.** The questionnaire contained two questions to check the issue manipulation. The general question was ‘Why did you want monetary (in the case of a lawyer) or jail (in the case of a district attorney) penalties’. Answers had to be given on two sub-questions: (a) because monetary/jail penalties are good for my career, and (b) because monetary/jail penalties are most just (always 1 = not at all, to 5 = very much).
The questionnaire contained two measures of resistance to yielding. Own resistance to yielding was measured with three items ($\alpha = .87$), including the item "During the discussion it was very important for me to serve my own interests" (always $1 = \text{disagree}$, to $5 = \text{agree}$). Other's resistance to yielding was measured with one item "During the discussion it was hard to persuade the other party to give in".

The negotiations were recorded and transcribed. Each individual speaking turn was coded using a coding scheme based on research by Pruitt and Lewis (1975; see also De Dreu, Giebels & Van de Vliert (1998)). We divided the discussion in a first and second half by a split after 50% of the speaking turns (Gersick, 1989) to investigate whether negotiation behavior changed over time. We coded four instances of distributive behavior: single-issue proposals, persuasive arguments, positional commitments and threats. A speaking turn was coded 'single-issue proposal' when it contained a proposal for one single case. An example is: "I want a long jail penalty for the illegal immigrant". A speaking turn was coded 'persuasive argument' when it contained a social or economic argument aimed at making the other party concede to oneself. An example is: "The illegal immigrant has fled his country because he was haunted for religious reasons, you cannot put him in jail for that!". A speaking turn was coded 'positional commitment' when it contained a strong statement that the speaker was unwilling to change his or her proposal. An example is "I really cannot agree with anything but a monetary fine for the illegal immigrant". A speaking turn was coded 'threat' when it contained the suggestion of doing harm to the other party if the other party did not agree. An example is: "I will get very nasty on the next case if you do not give in...".

We coded four instances of integrative behavior: giving information about preferences and priorities, showing insight, multi-item offers and cooperative statements. A speaking turn was coded 'giving truthful information' when it contained truthful information about the preference chart. An example is when the lawyer says: "I want a low monetary fine for the clothes theft". A speaking turn was coded 'insight' when it showed that one party had correct insight into the preferences and priorities of the other party. An example is a district
attorney who says: "I see, you do not want a jail penalty for the clothes theft but you want a low monetary fine". A speaking turn was coded 'multi-item offer' when it contained a proposal that concerned two or more cases. An example is: "Shall we give a jail penalty to the clothes theft, and a monetary fine to the illegal immigrant?". A speaking turn was coded 'cooperative statement' when it expressed optimism about finding a mutual satisfactory solution or the acknowledgement of the importance of serving both parties' interests. An example is: "I think we can find a penalty that we both agree upon for the clothes theft".

We also coded the number of temporary impasses. A statement was coded 'temporary impasse' when a speaker proposed to discuss a next court case because they could not reach agreement on the case that they were currently discussing. An example is "I do not think we can sort this case out now, shall we discuss the next case and come back to this one later?".

Any speaking turn could have multiple codes. All transcript were coded by one individual and 30% of the transcripts were coded also by a second individual to check interrater reliability. Cohen's Kappa was .63, which is substantial (Landis & Koch, 1977). Analyses of the negotiation behavior are based on all transcripts' codes.

Joint Outcomes. The participants individually received points for every agreement that they reached. These points were related to the labels in the case chart that corresponded with the penalty the dyad agreed upon. The participants in the interest condition received 7 points for every agreement that had the corresponding label 'very good' in their case chart. They received 6 points when the corresponding label was 'good', 5 points when the label was 'rather good', 4 points when the label was 'good nor bad', 3 points when it was 'rather bad', 2 points when the label was 'bad' and 1 point when the label was 'very bad'.

The participants in the evaluative condition received 7 points for every agreement that had the corresponding label 'very just' in their case chart. They received 6 points when the corresponding label was 'just', 5 points when the label was 'rather just', 4 points when the label was 'just nor unjust', 3 points
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when it was 'rather unjust', 2 points when the label was 'unjust' and 1 point when the label was 'very unjust'.

Thus, the lawyer and district attorney could receive different amounts of points for the same agreement, depending on the labels that corresponded with the penalty in their individual case charts. To calculate the joint outcomes, the individual outcomes (points) of the lawyer and the district attorney of each couple were summed. The maximum joint outcomes a dyad could earn was 46, the minimum was 0 (in case of impasse on all criminal cases).

Results

Treatment of the Data. Participants' individual data in each dyad were averaged and analyzed at the dyadic level because participants negotiated in dyads, and their individual data are interdependent within each dyad (Kenny & LaVoie, 1985). As in past research (e.g., Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; Weingart et al., 1993), we corrected the amount of each negotiation behavior for the number of speaking turns.

Manipulation Checks. The two questions that checked the manipulation of the conflict issue were analyzed by ANOVA with conflict issue (interests vs. evaluative) and time pressure (low vs. high) as between-dyad factors and the sub-questions (reason to aim for penalty is career vs. reason to aim for penalty is justness) as a within-dyad factor. Results showed a main effect of reason, $F(1, 42) = 8.05, p < .007$, and an interaction effect of Conflict Issue and Reason, $F(1, 42) = 127.66, p < .001$. In the interest condition, dyads wanted to give the penalties because it favored their career ($M = 4.73$), rather than because they thought it most just ($M = 2.04$), $t(22) = 13.78, p < .001$. Dyads in the evaluative condition wanted to give the penalties because of the justness of the penalties ($M = 4.34$) rather than because it would favor their career ($M = 2.73$), $t(21) = 4.86, p < .001$. We conclude that the manipulation of conflict issue was successful.

The manipulation checks for own and other's resistance to yielding were analyzed by ANOVA with conflict issue (interests vs. evaluative) and time pressure (low vs. high) as between-dyad factors. Results showed an effect of
time pressure on own resistance to yielding, \( F(1, 42) = 5.96, p < .019 \). Dyads under low time pressure showed more resistance to yielding (\( M = 3.95 \)) than dyads under high time pressure (\( M = 3.61 \)). Results also showed an effect of time pressure on other's resistance to yielding, \( F(1, 43) = 8.24, p < .006 \). Dyads under low time pressure reported that the other party had higher resistance to yielding (\( M = 3.41 \)) than dyads under high time pressure (\( M = 2.70 \)). We conclude that the time pressure manipulation had the desired effects on resistance to yielding.

**Descriptive Statistics.** Table 10 provides the zero-order correlations for all dependent variables.

**Table 10.** Means, standard deviations and correlations between negotiation behaviors and outcomes in first and second half of the negotiation (\( N = 48 \) dyads)

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<td>1. Joint outcomes( ^a )</td>
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<td>2. Integrative behavior ( ^b )</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1(^{st} ) half</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Integrative behavior( ^b )</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.35*</td>
<td>.43*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2(^{nd} ) half</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Distributive behavior( ^b )</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- 1(^{st} ) half</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Distributive behavior( ^b )</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2(^{nd} ) half</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Temporary impasses( ^c )</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- 1(^{st} ) half</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Temporary impasses( ^c )</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.28+</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2(^{nd} ) half</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** \( ^a n = 47 \) dyads. \( ^b \) Calculations based on percentages. \( ^c \) Calculations based on frequencies, due to low absolute level of temporary impasses.

\( ** = p < .01, * = p < .05, + = p < .10. \)
Integrative behavior in the second, but not in the first, half of the negotiation was significantly related to mean joint outcomes per agreement, $r = .35, p < .015$. This suggests that integrative behavior in the beginning of a negotiation is less important for joint outcomes than integrative behavior in later stages of the negotiation.

**Joint Outcomes.** We predicted that dyads in the negotiation about interest would obtain higher joint outcomes than dyads in the negotiation about evaluative issues, but only under high resistance to yielding (Hypothesis 3). We measured the quality of the joint outcomes - the extent to which participants used the integrative potential in the task- in two ways. We had to account for impasses because impasses reduce the opportunities for mutually beneficial logrolling\(^8\). One way was to analyze the joint outcomes with the non-agreement dyads excluded from the analysis (Carnevale & Lawler, 1987; Harinck et al. 2000; see also Tripp & Sondak, 1992). The other way was to divide the total joint outcomes by the number of agreements, resulting in a score for mean joint outcomes per agreement. We analyzed the joint outcomes in both ways, and reached identical conclusions.

There were 28 dyads that reached agreements on all five cases. The results of the analysis of the joint outcomes of these 28 dyads showed an interaction of conflict issue and time pressure, $F(1, 27) = 5.74, p < .025$. Cell means are given in Table 11. Simple main effects showed that dyads in the interest condition reached higher joint outcomes than dyads in the evaluative condition when there was low time pressure, $F(1, 27) = 6.71, p < .016$. There was no difference between the joint outcomes of the dyads in the interest condition or dyads in the evaluative condition when the parties had high time pressure, $F(1.27) = .32, ns$. The mean joint outcomes per agreement showed similar results. One dyad reached no agreement at all and therefore this dyad had no score on the mean joint outcomes per agreement (one cannot divide by zero). Results showed an interaction between conflict issue and time pressure, $F(1, 43) = 5.56, p < .023$.

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\(^8\) Impasse rates were unaffected by conflict issue or time pressure.
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Cell means are given in Table 11. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, simple main effects showed that dyads in the interest condition reached higher joint outcomes than dyads in the evaluative condition when there was low time pressure, $F(1, 44) = 4.42, p < .041$. There was no difference between the joint outcomes of the dyads in the interest condition or dyads in the evaluative condition when the parties had high time pressure, $F(1, 44) = 1.46, ns$.

Table 11. Joint outcome as a function of conflict issue and time pressure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Pressure</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.33$^a$</td>
<td>43.38$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.27$^a$)</td>
<td>(8.70$^b$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.25$^b$</td>
<td>43.71$^b$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|               | (8.73$^b$) | (9.02$^b$) |}

Note. Joint outcome corrected for the number of items settled are given in brackets ($N = 42$). Different superscripts are given to column means that differ significantly at $p < .05$.

Negotiation Behavior. It was expected that individuals start with competitive distributive behavior, but when costly impasses are looming, individuals in negotiations about interests are more likely to switch to integrative behavior than individuals in negotiations about evaluative issues (Hypothesis 2a).

Results for distributive behavior showed an effect of time pressure, $F(1,44) = 8.16, p < .007$, and discussion half, $F(1, 44) = 14.29, p < .001$. Dyads displayed less distributive behavior under low time pressure ($M = .63$) than under high time pressure ($M = .72$). This finding suggests that participants under low time pressure use less distributive behavior to impose their own most preferred agreement onto the other party. Under low time pressure, parties may be more relaxed and more willing to listen to the other party instead of trying to
convince the other party to give in. The effect of discussion half showed that participants displayed more distributive behavior in the first half of the discussion \((M = .72)\) than in the second half of the discussion \((M = .64)\).

Results for integrative behavior showed an interaction between conflict issue and discussion half, \(F(1, 44) = 10.71, p < .002\). Simple main effects showed that participants in negotiations about interests displayed more integrative behavior in the second half of the discussion \((M = .037)\) than in the first half of the discussion \((M = .015)\), \(F(1,46) = 8.96, p < .004\). There was no difference between the amount of integrative behavior in the first and the second half in the negotiation about evaluative issues \((M = .034 \text{ vs. } M = .023)\), \(F(1, 46) = 2.28, ns\).

These results support Hypothesis 2a and sustain the idea that the behavioral pattern of differentiation-before-integration is more likely to appear in negotiations about interests than in negotiations about evaluative issues. Participants in both negotiations started with competitive distributive behavior and decreased their distributive behavior in later stages of the negotiation. Participants in negotiations about interests however, combined the decrease in distributive behavior with an increase in integrative behavior, whereas the participants in negotiations about evaluative issues did not.

**Temporary Impasses.** We have argued that temporary impasses in negotiations about interests are key to the transition from distributive to integrative behavior in the differentiation-before-integration pattern (Hypothesis 2b). To test this possibility, we first analyzed the number of temporary impasses as a function of conflict issue, time pressure and negotiation half. Additionally, we calculated the intercorrelation between the number of temporary impasses in the first half and the amount of integrative behavior in the second half of the negotiation for each conflict issue.

Results showed an effect of time pressure, \(F(1, 44) = 6.21, p < .017\). Dyads under low time pressure and concomitant high resistance to yielding reached a higher number of temporary impasses \((M = 1.27)\) than dyads under high time pressure \((M = .42)\). Conflict issue had no effect on the number of temporary impasses. However, and consistent with our theory, in negotiations about
interests, there was a positive correlation between the number of temporary impasses in the first half of the negotiation and the amount of integrative behavior in the second half of the negotiation, $r = .40, p < .05$. Moreover, this correlation was stronger in the low time pressure condition, $r = .82, p < .01$, than in the high time pressure condition, $r = -.04, ns, z = 2.52, p < .01$. Thus, in negotiations about interests, temporary impasses were related to higher levels of integrative behavior, but only when parties had high resistance to yielding.

In the negotiation about an evaluative issue, there was no significant correlation between the number of temporary impasses in the first half and the amount of integrative behavior in the second half, $r = .07, ns$. This correlation was also non-significant when calculated for negotiations about evaluative issues under low time pressure, $r = .21, ns$, or high time pressure, $r = .15, ns$. Taken together, we conclude that Hypothesis 2b was supported; a higher level of temporary impasses in the first stage of a negotiation leads to higher levels of integrative behavior in later stages of a negotiation, but only when the negotiation concerns interests.

Conclusions and General Discussion

Prior negotiation research mainly focused on negotiations about interests and ignored the effects of evaluative issues on the negotiation process. The goal of the current research was to gain insight in the effects of interests and evaluative issues on patterns of distributive and integrative negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes. We hypothesized that parties in negotiations about interests would reach higher negotiation outcomes, especially under high resistance to yielding, because they are more likely to engage in mutually beneficial integrative behavior.

Results showed that conflict issues have specific and profound effects on subsequent negotiation behaviors and outcomes. The negotiation process as a function of conflict issue and resistance to yielding can be summarized as follows. Dyads in negotiations about interests reached higher joint outcomes than individuals in negotiations about evaluative issues, but only when they
Tradeoffs and Resistance to Yielding

had high resistance to yielding (cf. Hypothesis 3). Dyads started a negotiation with competitive, distributive behavior leading to temporary impasses, especially when resistance to yielding was high. Temporary impasses triggered a switch from distributive behavior to integrative behavior, but only when the negotiation concerned interests, and not when the negotiation concerned evaluative issues (cf. Hypothesis 2a and 2b). These integrative behaviors in the final stage of the negotiation were beneficial for the joint outcomes. The low joint outcome in negotiations about evaluative issues is consistent with our finding in Experiment 1 that tradeoffs are considered inappropriate when values are at stake (cf. Hypothesis 1).

Theoretical Implications

Current findings have several implications for our thinking about negotiations. First, the current research suggests that whether a party’s preferences are rooted in interests or in values profoundly affect the negotiation process by which parties try to reach agreement. The conflict issues that were the basis of the opposing preferences affected the behavioral patterns during the negotiation, the type of proposals a party would accept or reject and eventually the quality of the agreements that were reached.

The findings that parties react differently to structurally equivalent negotiation situations, depending on the conflict issue, subscribe recent notions about the importance of mental models in negotiation. A mental model of a negotiation is “a cognitive representation of the expected negotiation, a representation that encompasses understanding of the self, negotiator relationships, attributions about the other and perceptions and knowledge of the bargaining structure and process” (Bazerman et al. 2000, p. 287). The concept of mental models can explain why the same negotiation situation is interpreted differently by different negotiation parties, and as a result they think, act and react differently to the same situation. Different conflict issues seem to trigger powerful and pervasive mental models of the negotiation, and explain why negotiation parties may react differently to the same situation.
Second, results suggest an important qualification of the previous work on conflict issues in integrative bargaining (Harinck et al., 2000). Harinck et al. (2000) found that dyads reached higher joint outcomes in negotiations about interests than in negotiations about evaluative issues. This effect was due to the fact that parties in negotiations about interests engaged in higher levels of integrative behavior. The current research showed that parties in negotiations about interest only reached higher joint outcomes when there was low time pressure and concomitant high resistance to yielding. We argued that the integrative behavior that leads to high joint outcomes, would only be displayed when there is high resistance to yielding because integration of each other’s preferences is the only way to reach agreement under these circumstances. When resistance to yielding is low, parties are more likely to engage in distributive behavior such as conceding or compromising (b et al., 2000b; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

Beyond the interaction of conflict issue and resistance to yielding, this study offers a more detailed picture of the effects of conflict issues on the negotiation process. We showed that dyads in negotiations about interests, compared to dyads in negotiations about evaluative issues, were more likely to follow a behavioral pattern of differentiation-before-integration. These results corroborate earlier speculation by Harinck et al (2000), who found that individuals in negotiations about interests, compared to individuals in negotiations about evaluative issues, had stronger fixed-pie perceptions and lower intentions to cooperate but reached higher joint outcomes. The differentiation-before-integration pattern explains how competitive intentions and behaviors in negotiations about interests can translate into mutually beneficial integrative behaviors and consequently higher joint outcomes.

This research is, as far as we know, one of the first quantitative studies to show that the switch from distributive to integrative behavior seems to be triggered by temporary impasses, moments in which negotiation parties temporarily postpone their negotiation without having reached an agreement. Temporary impasses are related to the idea of ‘going to the balcony’ (Ury, 1991), a ‘cooling off period’ (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), a hurtung stalemate
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(Pruitt & Rubin, 1993) or 'a ripe moment' (Zartman, 1991). Higher levels of temporary impasses in early stages of negotiations about interests, especially in combination with high resistance to yielding, were related to higher levels of integrative behavior later in the negotiation. This finding is consistent with Pruitt and Carnevale's (1993, p. 114) postulate that in negotiations 'joint-concern and integrative behavior often develop as a result of insight into the fact that one is in a hurting stalemate'. It is also consistent with the finding that negotiators engage in more integrative behavior and reach higher joint outcomes when they are strongly motivated to think deeply about their negotiation problem (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000a).

Strengths, Limitations and Avenues for Future Research

While we studied interests and evaluative issues separately, conflict issues rarely come alone, and if they do, they are quickly joined by others (De Dreu et al., 1999; Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994). In fact, negotiations often contain both types of issues, for example when preferences for a certain allocation of scarce resources are based on personal opinions about evaluative issues (Druckman et al., 1977; Druckman & Zechmeister, 1973). Real-life negotiations therefore may be classified along a continuum ranging from 'purely about interests' to 'purely about evaluative issues', depending on the focus of the negotiating parties. Future research could investigate what determines whether negotiators perceive their conflict to be about interests, or about values, that is what determines their dominant mental model.

We randomly allocated participants to conditions and roles. The advantage of this procedure is that particular features of the participants due to self-selection cannot explain the results, and the results should be attributed to the experimental manipulations. The problem of the random allocation to roles and conditions is that the role or the reasons why the participants had to aim for certain penalties may have been contrary to their personal ideas. For example, an individual who privately favors monetary fines because she thinks these are just will find it hard to role-play a district attorney in the negotiation about interests, who aims for jail penalties because these are best for her career. Note
however, that participants who were in a condition that ran counter to their private ideas probably argued less enthusiastically for their position, or tried less forcefully to reach the penalties they had to aim for according to their instructions. Thus, random allocation in this case represents a conservative approach and if all participants had been in a condition that was in accordance with their private ideas, the results should only be stronger.

Conclusions

Negotiation research has largely ignored the influence of evaluative issues on negotiation processes. The current findings, however, show that negotiation behavior and agreements depend heavily on whether preferences in the negotiation are based on interests, such as the allocation of scarce resources, or on evaluative issues, such as questions about what is right or wrong. High levels of resistance to yielding and temporary impasses seem to produce integrative behavior and agreements but this beneficial effect is limited to negotiations about interests and does not generalize to negotiations about evaluative issues.