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DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-18118-5_9

Publication date
2019

Document Version
Final published version

Published in
Feminist History of Philosophy: The Recovery and Evaluation of Women's Philosophical Thought

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Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA):
Schliesser, E. (2019). Sophie de Grouchy, Adam Smith, and the Politics of Sympathy. In E. O'Neill, & M. P. Lascano (Eds.), *Feminist History of Philosophy: The Recovery and Evaluation of Women's Philosophical Thought* (pp. 193-219). (Feminist Philosophy Collection). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18118-5_9

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Download date:28 Sep 2023

Chapter 9
Sophie de Grouchy, Adam Smith, and the Politics of Sympathy

Eric Schliesser

Abstract This paper explains Sophie de Grouchy's philosophical debts to Adam Smith. I have three main reasons for this: first, it should explain why eighteenth-century philosophical feminists (De Grouchy, James Millar, and Mary Wollstonecraft) found Smith, who has—to put it mildly—not been a focus of much recent feminist admiration, a congenial starting point for their own thinking; second, it illuminates De Grouchy's considerable philosophical originality, especially her important, overlooked contributions to political theory; third, it is designed to remove some unfortunate misconceptions that have found their way into Karin Brown's 'Introduction' to the recent and much-to-be-welcomed translation of Sophie de Grouchy's *Lettres Sur La Sympathie* (*Letters on Sympathy*). While Brown claims that there are major 'differences' in their programs of 'social reform', I argue there are important commonalities between Smith and De Grouchy. In particular, I highlight how they share a common understanding of how human sensibilities are shaped by social institutions and I show that De Grouchy's path-breaking analysis of negative and positive liberty is grounded in her extension of Smith's political theory and moral psychology.

The main aim of this paper is to explain Sophie de Grouchy's philosophical debts to Adam Smith.[1] I have three main reasons for this: first, it should explain why eighteenth-century philosophical feminists (De Grouchy, James Millar, and Mary Wollstonecraft) found Smith, who has—to put it mildly—not been a focus of much

[1] This piece was written long before my more recent articicle, 'Sophie de Grouchy, The Tradition(s) of Two Liberties, and the Missing Mother(s) of Liberalism' in *Women and Liberty, 1600–1800: Philosophical Essays*, Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press, 2017. I have not revised this chapter in light of it and other, more recent scholarship.

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E. O'Neill, M. P. Lascano (eds.), *Feminist History of Philosophy: The Recovery and Evaluation of Women's Philosophical Thought*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18118-5_9

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recent feminist admiration,[2] a congenial starting point for their own thinking[3]; second, it illuminationes of De Grouchy's considerable philosophical originality, especially her important, overlooked contributions to political theory; third, it is designed to remove some unfortunate misconceptions that have found their way into Karin Brown's 'Introduction' to the recent and much-to-be-welcomed translation of Sophie de Grouchy's *Lettres Sur La Sympathie* (*Letters on Sympathy*).[4] While Brown claims that there are major 'differences' in their programs of 'social reform',[5] I argue there are important commonalities between Smith and De Grouchy. In particular, I highlight how they share a common understanding of how human sensibilities are shaped by social institutions. Unfortunately, I skim over much of the importance and originality in De Grouchy, including a lovely treatment of the problem of tragedy, an ambitious program of penal reform that is of enduring importance, and highly original views on the political role of love.[6] The main point is to show that De Grouchy's path-breaking analysis of negative and positive liberty is grounded in her extension of Smith's political theory and moral psychology.

The main argument of this paper is as follows. In Sect. 9.1, I offer an introduction to De Grouchy's *Letters on Sympathy* with an aim to introduce her conception of philosophy. I also illustrate it by showing how similarly Smith and De Grouchy react to Rousseau. In Sect. 9.2, I offer an interpretation of Adam Smith's thought that is both taken for granted in De Grouchy and the target of some of her most ambitious criticism. In the last section, I analyze De Grouchy's criticism of Smith's account of justice and her efforts to offer a unified account of private and public justice that underwrites her program of institutional reform.

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[2] For example, Kuiper and Brown are very critical of Smith; see Kuiper, 'Feminist Contemporaries', and the introduction to Brown, *Letters on Sympathy*.

[3] The brilliant book by Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment*, explores many important connections between Adam Smith and Condorcet, Turgot and other French thinkers, but pays relatively little attention to Condorcet's wife, Sophie de Grouchy.

[4] Sophie de Grouchy, *Letters on Sympathy (1798): A Critical Edition*, ed. Karin Brown and trans. James E. McClellan III, *Transactions* of the American Philosophical Society vol. 98, pt. 4 (Collingdale, Penn.: DIANE Publishing Company, 2008); hereinafter, LS, and cited by letter and page number. It is unclear why this edition merits being called 'critical.' I am very indebted to Brown and McClellan for sharing their translation with me while the manuscript was under review. The translation reads very nicely, but sometimes anachronistic concepts are introduced into De Grouchy's arguments. So sometimes I have made slight changes to the translation. I have consulted de Grouchy's *Théorie*. This work is available at: http://books.google.com/books?id=L3IPAAAAQAAJ&pg=PP9&dq=Th%C3%A9orie+des+sentimens+moraux,+ou,+Essai+analytique+sur+les+principes+des+jugemens+que+portent+naturellement+les+hommes,&lr.

[5] Karin Brown, "The Philosophy of Sophie de Grouchy," in *Letters on Sympathy*, 45.

[6] For an excellent introduction and summary of De Grouchy's views, see Forget 'Cultivating Sympathy.' I note a few minor differences below. For useful background to De Grouchy's treatment of sympathy see also Forget, 'Evocations of Sympathy.' Riskin's *Science in the Age of Sensibility*, while rich in detail, unaccountably ignores De Grouchy. Hesse's *The Other Enlightenment* makes more connections to Sophie de Grouchy.

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9.1 The Main Aims of De Grouchy's *Letters on Sympathy*

In this section I make two points. First, I clarify De Grouchy's conception of philosophy. Second, I explain some overlooked, significant details of the relationship between De Grouchy's *Letters on Sympathy* (LS) and Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (TMS).

9.1.1 De Grouchy's Philosophy

The first sentence of the first of eight letters in De Grouchy's LS claims that 'Man' is the most 'interesting object of meditation'; she goes on to claim that to be 'with oneself seems to me the most pleasant and wise life possible.' This affirmation of Socratic self-examination is presented as a blend between 'the pleasures of wisdom and philosophy with those afforded by strong and profound emotions.' This life is the 'disposition most favorable to virtue.' The main theme of De Grouchy's LS is to employ *cultivated* pleasure in the service of virtue. I argue that for De Grouchy the cultivation is made possible by the political ordering of institutions. De Grouchy confidently inverts the classical hierarchy of value: 'after works that treat the primary means of assuring human happiness in society, I rank first those that lead us back to ourselves and make us dwell within our souls' (LS, I, 107). For De Grouchy social improvement (or philosophic philanthropy) comes before the examined life. Later, in the context of a criticism of Adam Smith, she connects this to an intellectual egalitarianism about participation in the Republic of Letters: 'whilst agreeing that Smith is rightly regarded as one of Europe's most important philosophers, it seems to me that on matters pertaining less to profound knowledge than to observations of oneself, all those who reflect can claim a right to the discussion" (LS, IV, 133). The examined life is available to all that reflect. LS encourages self-understanding in order to promote social reform. In doing so, she echoes other famous French Letters: Pascal's *Provincial Letters* and Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*.

De Grouchy's LS provides philosophical foundations in human nature for a far-reaching program of social reform and moral education.[7] This is most obvious from the long-running argument, spanning the only three letters (out of eight)—five through seven—that receive a sub-title: 'On the Origin of Moral Ideas.' Establishing the origin of moral ideas is the theoretical enterprise that is crucial for De Grouchy's political aims. As she explains at the start of Letter Five, 'This inquiry is the only one that can lead us to understand just how intimate the relation is between these ideas and our conscience and between the sentiments we experience in following them and our happiness…. Moralists have not been sufficiently concerned with demonstrating that the principles of virtue and the internal pleasures they provide

[7] See Forget, 'Cultivating Sympathy.'

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are a necessary consequence of our moral constitution and that the need to be good is an almost irresistible inclination for men subject to wise laws and raised without prejudice'(LS, V, 147).

I return to the second half the quotation when I analyze De Grouchy's criticism of Smith. Here I focus on De Grouchy's claim that following the principles of virtue provides internal pleasure. De Grouchy's overriding thesis is: given the way humanity is constituted, if one were raised in the correct legal and educational institutions, being virtuous *just is* acting from the right kind of pleasure. 'From the satisfaction we naturally feel at the sight or even the idea of another's pleasure or well being, a pleasure to oneself necessarily follows when we bring these about in others. This latter pleasure is even more intense when we are not directly involved because it is savored with more reflection…. Another reason redoubles the pleasure one finds in doing good: that one owes this pleasure to oneself and that consequently one holds in one's hands the power to procure it for oneself and to reproduce it at will' (translation slightly modified; LS, V, 147–8).[8] If we are properly cultivated then when we provide others with pleasure we will feel pleasure. This is not to deny that other motives can guide our actions. While not far removed from Mandevillian (egoistic-hedonistic) principles, De Grouchy turns her description of doing good for others into a (general) self-affirmation of near limitless human agency. This is an attractive vision, even if it is silent on meta-ethical concerns about what accounts for the rightness in the right kind of pleasure.

Some might quibble with De Grouchy's claim that we are constituted such that we feel pleased by the sight or thought of another's pleasure. But she need not be committed to the claim that this is always so. In fact, she can discount most empirical evidence against the claim because bad laws and various injustices corrupt our sensibilities and undermine our conscience. This raises interesting, methodological issues about how De Grouchy establishes the (counter-factual) 'origin' of the idea she is investigating. I return to this in the final section. First, I turn to De Grouchy's complicated relationship with Rousseau and Adam Smith.

9.1.2 De Grouchy Between Rousseau and Smith

The only 'moralist' that De Grouchy exempts from criticism is Rousseau. He is the only 'preacher of virtue' that comes in for theoretical praise (see the first sentence of LS, V, 147). This is no surprise because she is clearly influenced by him in claiming that the whole point of her theoretical inquiry is that: 'If one could prove that the immorality of man is less the work of nature than of social institutions and if the failure to abstain from injustice was almost entirely the result of these institutions, one would then have to seek to reform them and cease slandering human nature' (LS, VI, 164). Rousseau's influence is apparent; for example, compare the

[8] The McClelland translation renders '*un plaisir pour nous-memes*' as 'a selfish pleasure,' but this is to attribute to De Grouchy a too Mandevillian position.

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following remark of hers with the famous first sentence of *The Social Contract*[9]: 'In hindering the exercise of natural rights for entire centuries, these institutions have led man from simple misfortune to the trusting and idiotic blindness that makes one accept as a law of necessity the chains one has become incapable of judging and breaking' (LS, VIII, 175).

The explicit praise for Rousseau is not restricted to his willingness to investigate the 'origins of moral ideas.' In an extraordinary passage near the end of Letter IV (thus halfway through LS), while comparing Rousseau favorably to Voltaire, she writes: 'Rousseau spoke more to conscience, Voltaire to reason. Rousseau established his views on the strength of his sensibility and his logic…. The former [Rousseau], in taking a few of his principles too far, spread a taste for the exaggerated and the singular; Rousseau's morality is appealing, though severe and carries the heart along even while berating it. Rousseau spoke of virtue with as much charm as Fénelon and with the empire of virtue itself on his side…[He] will renew enthusiasm for freedom and virtue from ages to come' (LS, IV, 144–5).

De Grouchy's assessment of Rousseau's rhetorical 'charm' echoes Adam Smith's rhetorically charged summary of Rousseau's achievement: 'It is by the help of this style, together with a little philosophic chemistry, that the principles and ideas of the profligate Mandeville seem to have the purity and sublimity of the morals of Plato, and to be only the true spirit of a republican carried a little too far' (*Edinburgh Review* 2 (March, 1756) in EPS, 251).[10] This anonymously published piece first appeared under Smith's name in the 1797 French edition of Smith's posthumous *Essays on Philosophical Subjects* (*Essais Philosophiques*). It is not impossible that De Grouchy was familiar with it and consulted it while she was preparing her translation of TMS. In the *Edinburgh Review* letter after quoting three translated, extensive passages from Rousseau's second *Discourse* Smith charges that Rousseau is somewhat of an extremist in his political convictions (notice that 'little too far'!). Smith claims that despite contrary appearances ('seem'), Rousseau is at bottom in the same boat as the 'profligate' and scandalous Mandeville—an *ad personam* attempt to convict Rousseau through guilt by association! Yet, in an ironic twist, Smith attacks Rousseau's *false* appearances.[11] What is the false appearance? According to Smith it is Rousseau who may appear to us as a modern Plato. Smith contests this appearance. (In the passage, Smith is not criticizing Plato or Platonism;

[9] See also: 'Laws should supplement the citizen's conscience, yet all too often they are nothing more than oppressive chains or at most sometimes the last restraint on iniquity' (LSBM, VII, 169–170).

[10] For more on this letter, see Lomonaco, 'Adam Smith's "Letter".' There is a xerox-copy of this piece lightly annotated in David Hume's hand in the British library. This has led David Raynor to speculate privately that the piece may be by Hume.

[11] It is ironic because for Rousseau 'unmasking' was an important activity (See Starobinski, *Jean Jacques Rousseau*; see also the second passage that Smith translates from the *Second Discourse* in his *Letter to the Edinburgh Review* (1756) EPS, 253. During the fallout over the Rousseau-Hume controversy, Smith urged Hume not to attempt to 'unmask' Rousseau 'before the Public,' suggesting that Hume ran the risk 'of disturbing the tranquility of [his] whole life' (CAS, Letter No. 93, 113).

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the criticism of Rousseau is done by means of a praise of Plato's 'morals,' which are said to be pure and sublime.) De Grouchy sides against Smith (and Voltaire's appeal to reason) in defending Rousseau's rhetoric as helping the cause of virtue in the long run. Yet, despite her high praise for Rousseau, she agrees with Smith that Rousseau takes his principles 'too far.' No doubt the aftermath of the French Revolution and its Terror, in which her husband, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet (17 September 1743–28 March 1794), lost his life, instilled in her an appreciation of Smithian moderation.

As is well known, De Grouchy's LS were appended to her translation of what is advertised as the seventh edition of TMS.[12] Yet, it has been entirely overlooked that her edition included as an appendix a work Smith sometimes called, 'The Dissertation upon the Origin of Languages' (hereinafter, Languages) (*Dissertation sur l'Origine des Langues*); Smith had attached it to the third edition of TMS (1767).[13] In Smith's lifetime TMS and Languages could be seen as mutually enlightening. In current editions, TMS ends with a historical survey of moral theories (part VII).[14] This obscures Smith's final intent; Languages is a response to Rousseau's treatment on the origin of language—a topic heavily debated in the eighteenth century. Removing Languages from its place at the end of TMS obscures Smith's design of placing his treatment of the moral sentiments in a natural historical context.[15] As we know from the 'Letter to the Edinburgh Review,' Smith read widely in eighteenth-century literature, especially French, natural history, botany, and zoology. Smith's posthumously published essay, 'Of the External Senses,' also shows evidence that in researching the Molyneux problem Smith valued careful empirical comparisons among man and other animals.[16] De Grouchy's edition of her translation

[12] Smith only published six editions in his lifetime, and this has elicited claims about late notes finding their way into De Grouchy translation (see LSBM, xi). I am dubious of this; the heavily revised, sixth edition of TMS was published shortly before his death, and it seems unlikely he would have prepared notes for a further edition.

[13] See: Adam Smith, *Lectures On Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, ed. J. C. Bryce, vol. IV of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985). Chapter: *3.: Considerations concerning the First Formation of Languages*

Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/202/55505 on 2012-03-04, July 16, 2009.

[14] 'The Dissertation upon the Origin of Languages,' was included in TMS, beginning with the third edition (1767). Inexplicably, the modern editors of the Glasgow edition of Smith's collected works, published by Oxford University Press and Liberty Classics, have moved Languages into a volume with student notes of Smith's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*.

[15] Berry's pioneering 'Adam Smith's Considerations on Language' is still the best piece on Smith's essay. For other interesting treatments see Levy, 'Rational Choice Linguistics'; Otteson, 'First Market,' 65–8 or Otteson, *Market Place of Life*, ch. 7; Dascal, 'Theory of Languages,' ignores the previous literature; cf. Schliesser, 'Review of *The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith*.'

[16] Molyneux asked Locke "whether a man who has been born blind and who has learnt to distinguish and name a globe and a cube by touch, would be able to distinguish and name these objects simply by sight, once he had been enabled to see," quoted from Degenaar, 'Molyneux's Problem.' Smith's insight was to recognize that there are developmental constraints in which the capacity of vision can be developed; for discussion, see Glenney, "Molyneux's Question Answered!"

Spencer Pack has long argued that, by reading Buffon, Smith was almost certainly aware of the extinction of the dodo. In WN there is a tantalizing passage that comes very close to acknowledg-

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of TMS and her own LS also includes her translation of Languages, namely *Dissertation sur l'Origine des Langues*.[17] Her knowledge of this piece helps explain why her (historically often more accurate) Smith often reads very differently from the one imagined by less informed commentators. Both TMS and the Languages essay presuppose a Smithian debate with Rousseau.

9.2 Adam Smith

In this section I offer a reading of Adam Smith. It is constructed from works presumably known to Sophie de Grouchy. In the following section I offer evidence that my reading of Smith shares important commonalities with De Grouchy's reading of Smith and some commitments crucial to her analysis.

9.2.1 Human Nature and the Wealth of Nations[18]

Right near the start of the 1776 publication of the *Wealth of Nations* (WN),[19] just after Smith introduces his crucial concept, the division of labor,[20] he adds the following remark:

> THIS division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human nature of which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts (WN, 1.2.1, 25).

ing the possibility of extinction (IV.vii.a.11). See Pack, *Aristotle, Adam Smith, Karl Marx*, ch. VII, section II entitled 'Smith on Change,' particularly the section on 'Aristotelian Residues and the Temporality of Species.' See also Schabas, *Origins of Economics* for more on these themes; cf. Eric Schliesser, 'Review of *Natural Origins*.'

[17] See the picture in LSBM, xii.

[18] The material of this section has been used in Schliesser, Eric. *Adam Smith: Systematic philosopher and public thinker*. Oxford University Press, 2017.

[19] Translations of parts of it appeared quickly in French; many editions followed soon after. See Lai, *Adam Smith Across Nations*, Part 3. De Grouchy's economics is more indebted to the Physiocrats than to Adam Smith because she believes agriculture is, for states, 'the unique source of real and lasting wealth' (LSBM, VII, 168–9).

[20] Condorcet (and Turgot) also embraced the importance of the concept of 'the division of labor'; see the 'third stage' of the former's *Sketch.* For discussion of Smith's connections to Turgot's and Condorcet's political economy, see Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*.

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For present purposes, there are six important claims in this passage. First, Smith appears to view human nature as a collection of human propensities. Second, these propensities can either be bedrock parts of human nature (e.g., reason, speech) or the (necessary) consequence of such bedrock human nature. I call the former "original propensities" and the latter "derived propensities." This language tracks Smith's treatment. For example, he writes that.

> [nature] has constantly… not only endowed mankind with an appetite for the end which she proposes, but likewise with an appetite for the means by which alone this end can be brought about, for their own sakes, and independent of their tendency to produce it. Thus self-preservation, and the propagation of the species, are the great ends which nature seems to have proposed in the formation of all animals. Mankind are endowed with a desire of those ends, and an aversion to the contrary…. But though we are… endowed with a very strong desire of those ends, it has not been entrusted to the slow and uncertain determinations of our reason, to find out the proper means of bringing them about. Nature has directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate instincts. Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, the love of pleasure, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them (TMS, 2.1.5.10, 77–8).[21]

On Smith's view there are a great many 'original and immediate' instincts that guide our behavior. Presumably these original and immediate instincts can combine in various ways to produce stable original propensities.[22]

Third, Smith thinks it highly probable that the propensity to barter and truck is a derived propensity. Fourth, social phenomena (e.g., division of labor), which have social utility, can be explained by the unforeseen (and unintended) necessary workings of human propensities over time. Fifth, such changes in the social order take place over very long periods of time. Smith, thus, embeds his treatment of political economy within an elongated account of time. Sixth, Smith makes clear that, from the point of view of WN, certain original propensities are *epistemic* bedrock. This sixth point is reinforced by the observation that despite the presence of a stages-theory of economic development in WN (V.1.a, 689–708)—we can discern in it hunting, shepherding, agricultural, and commercial stages—,[23] Smith *seems* to presuppose that social institutions do not materially impact human nature. This absence is surprising because we know that in 'Letter to *Edinburgh Review*,' Smith was very impressed by the arguments of Rousseau's second Discourse, which did famously seem to think that human nature was changed (and made worse) by civilization. In Sect. 9.2.4 below, I show that WN obscures Smith's views on this.

It is tempting to see in the passage quoted from WN 1.2.1 an analogy between the (slow, gradual, and unforeseen) development of social institutions and derived

[21] According to Coase, 'This comes very close to a modern attitude.' See Coase, 'View of Man.'

[22] For the importance of instincts in Smith, see Wight 'Instincts, Affection, and Informal Learning.'

[23] See Meek, *Smith, Marx and After*, or Skinner, *System of Social Science*. Condorcet, in *Sketch*, also has these stages of development, but offers a more fine-grained set of distinctions within them. Condorcet and Smith are an extension of Hume's sketch of a three-stage model in "Of Commerce," (EMPL, 256).

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propensities. But in WN Smith leaves entirely open how original propensities play a role in producing derived propensities.[24]

9.2.2 Utility and Social Institutions

Recall from WN 1.2.1 that for Smith social phenomena (e.g., division of labor), which have social utility, can be explained by the unforeseen (and unintended) necessary workings of human propensities over time. These social phenomena are made possible by a set of background customs that ensure the existence of a modicum of justice, which, while useful, is itself the result of intricate workings of resentment.[25] Smith explicitly and repeatedly argues the claim that for a proper explanation of the origin of justice we cannot point to its utility (as Hume had done). As Smith writes, 'it is seldom this consideration which first animates us' against 'licentious practices.' All men, 'even the most stupid and unthinking, abhor fraud, perfidy, and injustice, and delight to see them punished. But few men have reflected upon the necessity of justice to the existence of society, how obvious soever that necessity may appear to be' (TMS, 2.2.3.9, 89). In fact, Smith devotes the whole of Part 4 of TMS to a respectful criticism of Hume's views, which he thinks more suitable to 'men of reflection and speculation' (TMS, 4.2.12, 192)—note the irony in Smith taking Hume's explanation to task for relying on speculative reason and being

[24] As an aside, if one reads Smith's phrase 'Director of Nature' sincerely then one thinks God is (in some way) responsible for the original constitution of human nature. (See Evensky, *Moral Philosophy*). Even if one is disinclined to read Smith metaphorically, it is worth noting that in the just quoted TMS (2.1.5.10) passage (a) human nature is assimilated to animal nature, and (b) the two ends (self-preservation and propagation of the species) of human nature are no different than those of all other animals. It provides little comfort to recently popular Christianizing and (to lesser degree) Stoicizing readings of Smith that our *natural* ends are *reduced* to such material ones. Christian and even Stoic providential values are surprisingly absent when, in the famous deception of nature passage in TMS (4.1.9–10, 183–4), Smith speaks of the activities ('arts and sciences') 'which ennoble and embellish human life.' Smith's nature has a role to play in making the ennobling activities possible, but strictly speaking their value is not given by or derived from nature or from (Christian) natural religion. (For De Grouchy's interest in ennoblement and proper glory, see LS, VII, 170.) This is not to deny that for Smith Christian 'religion' can reinforce 'the natural sense of duty' (TMS, 3.5.13, 170), but for Smith morality trumps religion and theology. De Grouchy thinks that 'reason and public utility' (not revelation or religion) are the 'natural and immutable judges of social institutions'; she attacks 'cruel laws associated with supernatural thinking' for failed attempts to 'prevent crime. Do countries exist where a more felicitous and more common use of supernatural reasons make it unnecessary to establish a penal code? Let their defenders thus content themselves to offer heavenly rewards as a great hope and a sometimes useful and gentle consolation to the unfortunate individual for whom the sentiments of courage and virtue cannot suffice' (LSBM, VII, 178; this echoes TMS). On ennobling activities in Smith, see Schliesser, 'Conception of Philosophy'; and Wight, 'Ethics and the "Noble Arts"'; Hanley, *Character of Virtue*, traces out the theme of nobility in TMS; Schliesser, 'Review of DD Raphael (2007).'

[25] For the full argument, see Pack, '"Humean" Criticism.' See also the argument in Schliesser, 'Articulating Practices as Reasons.'

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too reflective! Smith's main complaint is that the perception of utility is a secondary consideration that may enhance and enliven the sentiment that gives rise to the moral sentiment, but is not the 'first or principal source.' It is indeed a contingent fact of nature that the useful and the virtuous can coincide (TMS, 4.2.3, 188).[26] Acknowledging this, Smith maintains that the 'sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility' (TMS, 4.2.5, 188). In contradistinction to Hume, Smith writes: 'It seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well-contrived building; or that we should have no other reason for praising a man than that for which we commend a chest of drawers' (TMS, 4.2.4, 188).

Smith certainly does not want to deny any role for utility; it can enliven the sentiment of justice. Moreover, it plays a more fundamental role in his theory; he writes, 'the man of humanity' will, despite misgivings, go along with the fate of *'A centinel [sic]…who falls asleep upon his watch, [who] suffers death by the laws of war, because such carelessness might endanger the whole army. This severity may, upon many occasions, appear necessary, and, for that reason, just and proper. When the preservation of an individual is inconsistent with the safety of a multitude, nothing can be more just than that the many should be preferred to the one' (*TMS, 2.2.3.11, 90–91). Smith clearly thinks that regardless of individual judgments of propriety the *legislator* can uphold institutions with an appeal to social utility when society's survival is at stake.[27] Nevertheless, Smith does not want to claim that all evolved social institutions that persist must, therefore, be useful. As he writes, for example, '[L]aws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances which first gave occasion to them, and which could alone render them reasonable, are no more' (WN, 3.2.4, 383).

Thus, for Smith social institutions can arise from considerations that have little to do with utility. They are (trailing) responses to society's needs, and they can persist or be entrenched for all kinds of reasons that have nothing to do with their current utility. Of course, institutions that have some utility can reinforce their own and society's persistence over time. So, in Smith we find a sharp distinction between (a) the *origin of our moral ideas*, founded as they are in individual judgments of propriety, and (b) the *social evaluation of institutions* that are founded on these individual judgments. I return to these feature of Smith's thought twice below, first, when I investigate the impact of institutions on the cultivation of the norms of propriety behind our moral sentiments in Smith (Sect. 9.2.4), and, second, when I discuss Sophie De Grouchy's criticisms of Smith (Sect. 9.4).

[26] This is controversial because in recent years, a number of commentators have been revisiting and reviving Jacob Viner's more Deistic interpretation of Smith (See Viner, *The Role of Providence*.) For a recent defense, see Herzog, 'Visions of the Modern Society.'

[27] See Levy, 'The Partial Spectator'; see also Witztum, 'Utilitarianism.'

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9.2.3 Mind and Language

In this section, I argue for the significance of Smith's essay on Languages in order to understand what we may call the anthropological (or, less anachronistic, natural historical) assumptions behind TMS and WN, and De Grouchy's response. The Languages essay, which De Grouchy included in her translation of TMS, explains how considerable mental and linguistic development, if not evolution, of human nature is embedded in social interaction. Before I turn to the Languages essay, let me briefly gloss a famous passage from TMS in order to remove some misconception:

> Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no *mirror* which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the *mirror* which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and *when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind*. To a man who from his birth was a stranger to society, the objects of his passions, the external bodies which either pleased or hurt him, would occupy his whole attention. The passions themselves, the desires or aversions, the joys or sorrows, which those objects excited, though of all things the most immediately present to him, could scarce ever be the objects of his thoughts. The idea of them could never interest him so much as to call upon his attentive consideration. The consideration of his joy could in him excite no new joy, nor that of his sorrow any new sorrow, though the consideration of the causes of those passions might often excite both. Bring him into society, and all his own passions will immediately become the causes of new passions. He will observe that mankind approve of some of them, and are disgusted by others. He will be elevated in the one case, and cast down in the other; his desires and aversions, his joys and sorrows, will now often become the causes of new desires and new aversions, new joys and new sorrows: they will now, therefore, interest him deeply, and often call upon his most attentive consideration (TMS, 3.1.3, 110–11).

For Smith, without others we cannot even think of our 'own' character; without others 'we' are utterly outer-directed by our passions; without others we would not have psychic depth—no thoughts on 'our' feelings. For Smith, the self and its dispositions have a social origin. I emphasize this because by selective quotation, Karin Brown presents Smith as offering a view of sympathy 'as a disposition that arises within the individual prior to social interaction' (LS, 37; see also 36).[28] Smith

[28] Brown quotes the following passage as evidence: 'Every Man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and principally recommended to his own care; and every man is certainly, in every respect, fitter and abler to take care of himself than of any other person. Every man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of other people. The former are the original sensations; the latter reflected or sympathetic images of those sensations. The former may be said to be the substance; the latter the shadow' (TMS, 6.2.1.1, 219). She then claims: 'If sympathy arises within the individual, as Smith argues and not out of a relation to another person, then one's primary concern would be towards oneself' (LSBM, 36). Out of context, I understand why the phrase about 'the

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is far removed from the 'individualism' (LS, 42, 46, 80) attributed to him. In fact, Smith is quite clear that the protection of interests of social *groups* is far more important to social harmony: 'The man whose public spirit is prompted altogether by humanity and benevolence, will respect the established powers and privileges even of individuals, and *still more those* of the great orders and societies, into which the state is divided' (TMS, 6.2.2.16, 233; emphasis added). The context makes quite clear that Smith is concerned with social harmony. For, 'Upon the ability of each particular order or society to maintain its own powers, privileges, and immunities, against the encroachments of every other, depends the stability of that particular constitution' (TMS, 6.2.2.9, 230–31). In Hegel's hands, positions such as this become the touchstone for Corporatism.

Let me now turn to the essay on Languages. It is an extended engagement with Rousseau's views. Smith starts this essay with a thought experiment:

> The assignation of particular names, to denote particular objects, that is, the institution of nouns substantive, would probably, be one of the first steps towards the formation of language. Two savages, who had never been taught to speak, but had been bred up remote from the societies of men, would naturally begin to form that language by which they would endeavour to make their mutual wants intelligible to each other, by uttering certain sounds, whenever they meant to denote certain objects. Those objects only which were most familiar to them, and which they had most frequent occasion to mention, would have particular names assigned to them (Languages, 1, 203–4).

Against Rousseau's speculations that language has its origin in a poetic and emotive language, Smith sees the origin of language in our desire to 'denote certain objects.'[29] (Rousseau and Smith agree that language has its origin in need.)[30] The significance of the thought-experiment is that for Smith language is not fully formed in human nature. This means that *even* the 'faculties of reason and speech,' which in WN are presented as a possible bedrock original propensity, can be derived from social interactions and need not be an original instinct or original propensity in human nature. They are themselves founded on our desire to make *mutual* wants intelligible to each other. (Smith presents the origin in language not in a Robinson Crusoe-like setting, but in a social setting!) Smith's emphasis on the importance of the familiarity of the objects probably reflects (despite important differences between

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original sensations' might be thought to support Brown's claim. Yet Smith's point is here simply that we feel our feelings more intensely than that of others. Sympathy is a mechanism by which we feel others' feelings. The passage makes no claim about the origin of the sympathetic disposition itself.

[29] Condorcet seems to be inclined to a more Rousseauian position when he claims that 'in the infancy of language nearly every word is a metaphor and every phrase an allegory' (third sketch, *Sketch*, 37); this is also Quine's position in *Word and Object*

[30] For more on the Rousseau-Smith relationship, see, for example, Pack, 'Rousseau Smith Connection'; Force, *Self-Interest*; Hurtado, 'Bernard Mandeville's Heir'; Schliesser, 'Conception of Philosophy'; Hanley, 'Commerce and Corruption'; Rasmussen, *Problems and Promises*; Hanley, '*Encyclopédie,*' is also very useful because it engages the significance of Diderot's entries on language and Rousseau's political economy essay to Smith's thought.

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Hume and Smith) a very Humean focus on the habituation that drives mental association.

In the essay on Languages, Smith goes on to develop an account in which language and mind co-develop. The argument unfolds slowly in Smith's hands. A few paragraphs after the initial thought experiment Smith informs the reader,

> The man who first distinguished a particular object by the epithet of *green*, must have observed other objects that were not *green,* from which he meant to separate it by this appellation. The institution of this name, therefore, supposes comparison. It likewise supposes some degree of abstraction. The person who first invented this appellation must have distinguished the quality from the object to which it belonged, and must have conceived the object as capable of subsisting without the quality. The invention, therefore, even of the simplest nouns adjective, must have required more metaphysics than we are apt to be aware of. The different mental operations, of arrangement or classing, of comparison, and of abstraction, must all have been employed, before even the names of the different colours, the least metaphysical of all nouns adjective, could be instituted (Languages, 7, 207).

Nouns get applied to familiar objects. The very possibility of applying what Smith calls a 'noun adjective' presupposes having a certain class of contrastive experiences and certain mental capacity for classification of and abstraction from these experiences. On Smith's view, objects must be conceived to be bearers of properties before adjectives can be applied to features of these objects. Moreover, in the quotation, Smith clearly conceives of nouns adjectives with different degrees of 'metaphysical-ness'—presumably here meant in terms of abstraction from the appearances. Abstraction turns out to be the key variable when Smith turns to prepositions/relations: 'The invention of such a word, therefore, must have required a considerable degree of abstraction,' (Languages, 12, 210).

Smith conceives the development of more abstract components of a language as a barrier in the development of language(s).[31] Smith's thought experiment is meant to capture the reality that the full metaphysical nature of language develops only slowly. Through the essay on Languages we, thus, learn that 'reason and speech' (WN, 1.2.2, 25), itself, builds on various instincts and is really composed of various propensities; different aspects of speech develop long before humanity first developed the full capacity of reason. This, in turn, implies that the capacity to 'truck and barter' is itself a late development in the life of the species. Smith's main point in all of this is that different parts of language presuppose different mental developments. So for Smith mental capacities that facilitate abstraction must be developed slowly before classes of (more abstract) words can be invented.

[31] I offer two examples from the essay: (1) 'Though the different formation of nouns substantive, therefore, might, for some time, forestall the necessity of inventing nouns adjective, it was impossible that this necessity could be forestalled altogether,' (Languages 10, 208); and (2) 'Number considered in general, without relation to any particular set of objects numbered, is one of the most abstract and metaphysical ideas, which the mind of man is capable of forming; and, consequently, is not an idea, which would readily occur to rude mortals, who were just beginning to form a language…In the rude beginnings of society, *one, two, and more,* might possibly be all the numeral distinctions which mankind would have any' (Languages 22–3, 214).

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The Languages essay sheds some light on, and is in turn illuminated by, a passage from the better known (among Smith scholars), posthumously published, 'History of Astronomy' (hereinafter, Astronomy)[32]:

> It is evident that the mind takes pleasure in observing the resemblances that are discoverable betwixt different objects. It is by means of such observations that it endeavours to arrange and methodise all its ideas, and to reduce them into proper classes and assortments. Where it can observe but one single quality, that is common to a great variety of otherwise widely different objects, that single circumstance will be sufficient for it to connect them all together, to reduce them to one common class, and to call them by one general name. It is thus that all things endowed with a power of self–motion, beasts, birds, fishes, insects, are classed under the general name of Animal; and that these again, along with those which want that power, are arranged under the still more general word Substance: and this is the origin of those assortments of objects and ideas which in the schools are called Genera and Species, and of those abstract and general names, which in all languages are made use of to express them (Astronomy, 2.1, 37–8).

The treatment of ever increasing abstraction in the essay on Astronomy compresses a process that gets decomposed analytically and 'historically' (in the manner of a conjectural history) in the Languages essay. Yet, Astronomy also teaches us that it is not merely need that drives the process; Smith also describes the mental pleasure that comes from classification. As we have seen in the TMS (2.1.5.10, 77–8) passage on self-preservation and the propagation of the species, nature's ends are brought about by (sometimes) pleasing instincts. So, in Smith we have a careful, proposed analysis of the (possible) mechanisms by which our needs get transformed into stable derived propensities.[33]

Yet, Smith may have also discerned the possibility that mind and language can influence each other's development. I offer an elaborate account to correct Karin Brown's claim that 'Smith manifests the traditional mind-body dualism, whereas de Grouchy does not' (LSBM, 10). She argues for her claim about Smith by two erroneous steps. Before I criticize these, I quote the paragraph leading up to her claim: 'Smith emphasizes that we sympathize through our imagination, not through our bodies: "The frame of my body can be but little affected by the alterations which are brought about upon that of my companion.… The person who has lost his whole fortune, if he is in health, feels nothing in his body…our imagination can more readily mould themselves upon his imagination, than our bodies can mould themselves upon his body." (TMS, 1.2.6, 29), For Smith then, physical pain and emotional pain are two separate, unrelated phenomena' (LSBM, 10).

[32] It is in the French edition, *Essais Philosophiques*, but I have no evidence of De Grouchy's familiarity with it. See, for discussion of it, Schliesser, 'Scientific Revolutions.'

[33] Darwin describes much the same process in *The Descent of Man*, but he adds one crucial element that is consistent with, but, perhaps, not appreciated by Smith's view: 'The mental powers in some early progenitor of man must have been more highly developed than in any existing ape, before even the most imperfect form of speech could have come into use; but we may confidently believe that the continued use and advancement of this power would have reacted on the mind itself, by enabling and encouraging it to carry on long trains of thought.' *Descent of Man*, eds. Adrian Desmond and James Moore (London: Penguin, 2004), 110. Darwin sees clearly that the possession of rudimentary language also facilitates mental development.

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In Smith, there is indeed a distinction between imagination and body. But for Smith the imagination is an entirely *physical* entity. (Incidentally, this is already true for a genuine dualist, such as Descartes, or his opponents, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, etc). Smith's claim is simply that sympathy (understood as a mechanism) is largely the product of the imagination (one of the body's faculties). I write 'largely' because in the quote Smith does allow for *some* sympathy between two bodies without the contribution of imagination. Incidentally, Brown and McClellan also mislead in identifying 'reflection' with 'reason' in De Grouchy. In the philosophic tradition, 'reflection' is a distinct faculty, where impressions and ideas are re-directed (reflected). Here is Smith's account: 'That faculty, which Mr. Locke calls *reflection*, and from which he derived the simple ideas of the different passions and emotions of the human mind' (TMS, 7.3.3.6, 322). Sadly, even Forget conflates 'reflection' with 'reason.' But this is not how it is used; here is an illustrative example from Smith (which also provides further evidence against the claim that De Grouchy's use of reflection sets her apart from Smith): 'Those general rules of conduct, when they have been fixed in our mind by habitual *reflection*, are of great use in correcting the misrepresentations of self–love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our particular situation' (TMS, 3.4.12, 160).

In a passage that I suspect was written as a response to Hume's infamous claim that there is no constant impression of the self to be found in him, Smith argues:

> But in this early period of the language, which we are now endeavouring to describe, it is extremely improbable that any such words would be known. Though custom has now rendered them familiar to us, they, both of them, express ideas extremely metaphysical and abstract. The word *I,* for example, is a word of a very particular species. Whatever speaks may denote itself by this personal pronoun. The word *I*, therefore, is a general word, capable of being predicated, as the logicians say, of an infinite variety of objects. It differs, however, from all other general words in this respect; that the objects of which it may be predicated, do not form any particular species of objects distinguished from all others. The word *I*, does not, like the word *man*, denote a particular class of objects, separated from all others by peculiar qualities of their own. It is far from being the name of a species, but, on the contrary, whenever it is made use of, it always denotes a precise individual, the particular person who then speaks. It may be said to be, at once, both what the logicians call, a singular, and what they call, a common term; and to join in its signification the seemingly opposite qualities of the most precise individuality, and the most extensive generalization. This word, therefore, expressing so very abstract and metaphysical an idea, would not easily or readily occur to the first formers of language. What are called the personal pronouns, it may be observed, are among the last words of which children learn to make use. A child, speaking of itself, says, *Billy walks, Billy sits*, instead of *I walk, I sit*. As in the beginnings of language, therefore, mankind seems to have evaded the invention of at least the more abstract prepositions (Languages, 32, 219).[34]

If we leave aside the possible error-theory provided to Hume's account (where we are asked to look for a simple impression of what is—by Smith's lights—an

[34] In the last lines of the quoted passage Smith expresses what has become known as (the largely discredited) Haeckel's Biogenetic Law: (a child's) individual development recaptures species development. I thank David Haig for setting me straight on the difference between Von Baer's and Haeckel's law!

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extremely metaphysical idea), in the last few lines of the passage, Smith uses evidence from child-development to capture the nature of minds of early humanoids. This is very much in line with Lockean anthropology, where the savage mind is likened to the child mind.[35] However, unlike many of his contemporaries (e.g. Ferguson and even Condorcet), who liken then-contemporary savages to children (the source of imperial ideology in which conquered nations require Western political/military guidance), Smith clearly has 'early' savages in mind here. This passage suggests an important addition to Smith's famous treatment of how the self is socially constructed in TMS III (quoted at the start of this sub-section): these *social* achievements of self-hood presuppose considerable mental and linguistic development (facilitated by social interactions over time) before they can be put into words.[36]

9.2.4 Natural vs. Cultivated Sentiments

In this section, I connect the various strands of my treatment of Smith with important themes in Smith's moral theory as illustrated by his account of property. In particular, I show that Smith has a distinction between natural and cultivated sentiments.

First, I argue that there is a very important, unappreciated distinction in Smith's TMS. It is crucial for understanding De Grouchy's debt to Smith. It is a distinction between natural and moral sentiments.[37] Smith does not alert the reader to the distinction. In fact, the first explicit mention of the 'natural sentiments' is only in TMS, part two (in a heavily reworked passage throughout the editions): 'All our natural sentiments [of untaught nature but [not] of an artificial refinement of reason and philosophy. Our untaught, natural sentiments, all] prompt us to believe, that as perfect virtue is supposed necessarily to appear to the Deity, as it does to us, for its own sake, and without any further view, the natural and proper object of love and reward, so must vice, of hatred and punishment' (TMS, 2.2.3, 91).[38] In context Smith is making a claim about the opposition between what reason teaches us about how to

[35] Christopher Berry, 'Smith and Science,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith*, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 128.

[36] Brown is correct to note that motherhood and care play a very important role in De Grouchy (LSBM, 68–70), but Smith is not blind to developmental needs of children.

[37] Carrasco, 'Reconstruction of Practical Reason,' is the first to note the distinction. I use it for very different ends than she does. Of course, my treatment resembles Charles L. Griswold's focus on the importance of what he labels (in Aristotelian fashion) "second nature" in Adam Smith; see Griswold, *The Virtues of Enlightenment*, 131. This is not the place to explore our differences.

[38] The part between brackets was included in the third through fifth editions. The paragraph was removed from the sixth edition. Almost certainly Smith's reasons for removing it have to do with changes in his public presentation of God and the afterlife; these need not concern us here. I am using the paragraph as evidence for a technical, conceptual distinction, not Smith's views on religion.

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think of the deity and how we naturally feel about it. In the third, fourth, and fifth editions of TMS, Smith helpfully explained that natural sentiments are untaught, that is to say, our uncultivated passions/feelings. In Smith there is a distinction between the uncultivated feelings humans 'naturally' possess ('natural' sentiments) and the cultivated feelings humans acquire from the local social institutions that acculturate them (the so-called 'moral sentiments').

The distinction between natural and moral sentiments is crucial for Smith's response to Hume's account of the approval of justice. Above, I already noted that Smith criticizes Hume's claim that it is originally derived from our appreciation of the social institution's utility. This is the wrong kind of sensation. The crucial passage in favor of Smith's alternative source is this:

> [S]o when a single man is injured, or destroyed, we demand the punishment of the wrong that has been done to him, not so much from a concern for the general interest of society, as from a concern for that very individual who has been injured. It is to be observed, however, that this concern does not necessarily include in it any degree of those exquisite sentiments which are commonly called love, esteem, and affection, and by which we distinguish our particular friends and acquaintance. The concern which is requisite for this, is no more than the general fellow–feeling which we have with every man merely because he is our fellow–creature. We enter into the resentment even of an odious person, when he is injured by those to whom he has given no provocation. Our disapprobation of his ordinary character and conduct does not in this case altogether prevent our fellow–feeling with his *natural* indignation; though with those who are not either extremely candid, or who have not been accustomed to correct and regulate their natural sentiments by general rules, it is very apt to damp it (TMS, 2.2.3.10, 89–90; emphasis added).

Smith claims that we *even* naturally sympathize (from common humanity) with the 'natural' indignation of (an unfairly) injured odious character. This sympathetic resentment is the right kind of sentiment to do the explanatory job Smith has set himself. He avoids offering (i) too abstract a sentiment (e.g., Humean 'utility;' 'general interest of society'); (ii) too moralized a sentiment (e.g., love of virtue); or (iii) too 'exquisite' a sentiment (love, esteem, and affection). The first cannot ground an institution whose fruits can only be discerned after its establishment; the second presupposes (justice) which it is trying to explain; the third sentiment ties us to particular people but does not provide us the right sort of social institution.

So, in Smith's system 'natural' sentiments must do some important work to ground the social institutions that allow for enlarged societies.[39] To use language

[39] Smith does not use the language of 'natural sentiments' very often, but this is a particularly striking passage:

But though man is thus employed to alter that distribution of things which natural events would make, if left to themselves; though, like the gods of the poets, he is perpetually interposing, by extraordinary means, in favour of virtue, and in opposition to vice, and, like them, endeavours to turn away the arrow that is aimed at the head of the righteous, but to accelerate the sword of destruction that is lifted up against the wicked; yet he is by no means able to render the fortune of either quite suitable to his own sentiments and wishes. The natural course of things cannot be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavours of man: the current is too rapid and too strong for him to stop it; and though the rules which direct it appear to have been established for the wisest and best purposes, they sometimes produce effects which shock all his natural sentiments. That a great combination of men should prevail over a small one; that those who engage in an enterprise

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from my treatment above, in Smith we find 'original' propensities in human nature (e.g., the natural sentiments) that help ground derived propensities (e.g., moral sentiments, which are regulated, in part, by 'general rules'). This is not only crucial in Smith's explanation of the origin of morality, some such distinction also plays a crucial role in his moral theory.

Because even perceptive scholars have been blind to the importance of this distinction between natural and moral sentiments in Smith, they have considered De Grouchy's LS 'of limited value' as an interpretation 'of Smith's intention and achievement.'[40] This is connected to a related mistake. For example, in treating of De Grouchy, Karen Brown writes: 'Smith stays loyal to the sentimentalist tradition, explaining the entire scope of morality through sentiments, and this becomes a source of criticism by de Grouchy' (LS, 22). I understand why such a claim is tempting: Smith rarely discusses reason's role in morality. Yet, Brown's statement is only true if we restrict the scope of 'morality' so as not to include either the evaluation of social institutions or the source of moral rules. Smith writes: 'reason is *undoubtedly the source* of the *general rules* of morality, and of *all* the moral judgments which we form by means of them' (TMS, 7.3.4.7, 320; emphasis added). It is true that Smith goes on to deny that reason plays a role in the *origin* of our moral judgments, but this does not deny the importance that Smith gave to reason in the practice of our judgments. Clearly, Brown is not reporting De Grouchy's own (correct) understanding of Smith. The general rules regulate the *moral* sentiments in Smith's, and, thus, reason plays quite a large role in moral practice in Smith's theory.

Elsewhere I have explained that Smith has a two-tier moral theory: the first tier is a thin conception of universal morality governed by our common humanity founded in our natural sentiments; the second tier is the morality as cultivated by our local institutions governed by our judgments of propriety in our moral sentiments.[41] If these institutions can withstand the scrutiny of reason informed by humanity and equity (not guaranteed—Smith devotes considerable attention to corruption of moral sentiments), we can see in them, as the philosopher Maria Carrasco rightly argued, a form of practical reason.[42]

I illustrate the two-tier conception by focusing on a well known passage (which also illustrates the tight link between justice and property) from WN; this will be useful in considering De Grouchy's thought: 'The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most

with forethought and all necessary preparation, should prevail over such as oppose them without any; and that every end should be acquired by those means only which Nature has established for acquiring it, seems to be a rule not only necessary and unavoidable in itself, but even useful and proper for rousing the industry and attention of mankind. Yet, when, in consequence of this rule, violence and artifice prevail over sincerity and justice, what indignation does it not excite in the breast of every human spectator? (TMS, 3.5.10, 168–169)

[40] Forget, 'Cultivating Sympathy,' 322.

[41] See Eric Schliesser, 'Articulating Practices as Reasons: Adam Smith on the Conditions of Possibility of Property,' *Adam Smith Review* 2 (2006): 69–97.

[42] See M.A. Carrasco, 'Reconstruction.'

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sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbour, is a plain violation of this most sacred property' (WN, I.x.c.12, 138).

There are four crucial points in this passage. First, the original foundation of property is the most sacred and inviolable; it is derived from every man's labor. As we have seen in TMS, this is supported by the natural sentiments. Second, the claim to being 'original' is, thus, not wholly a temporal claim, but also a conceptual claim. It is original because it is rooted in our natural sentiment of sympathetic resentment when confronted with 'injury.' This focus on injury/society is why I link it to the TMS passage quoted before. Third, it points to Smith's moral egalitarianism and universalism: the normative authority for appeal is available to us all ('poor man') and to this day (repeated 'is'). Fourth, our injuries come in degrees. This last point suggests that in different societies derived property rights might be protected by different institutions/customs. Our moral sentiments are cultivated by institutions that embody local norms of rationality, many of which may remain sub-optimal. From the point of view of our natural sentiments this is sometimes a good thing.

In summary, Smith has one story to tell for the origin of justice; this account does some work in his thin universal morality. Here our natural sentiments do most of the work. Smith has another story for the evaluation of social institutions; here moral sentiments regulated by reason do a lot of work. In this chapter, I have not even touched upon all the various strands that make up evaluation of actions and characters.[43] The complexity of Smith's account, which is underwritten by a very rich moral phenomenology, has made it difficult to classify Smith's moral theory.

Now we can return to De Grouchy. First, I explain her debts to Smith. Then I analyze some of her criticisms of Smith.

9.3 De Grouchy's Debt to Smith

First, there can be no doubt that De Grouchy understands Smith as having observed 'without prejudice both the natural man and man in society' (LS, IV, 136; especially noteworthy because this is offered in the context of Smith's failure to appreciate the importance of 'love's passion'). So, De Grouchy's Smith has a view of both natural and cultivated man.

[43] Here is Smith on the diverging (and justified) sources of moral approval:

When we approve of any character or action, the sentiments which we feel, are, according to the foregoing system, derived from four sources, which are in some respects different from one another. First, we sympathize with the motives of the agent; secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions; thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules by which those two sympathies generally act; and, last of all, when we consider such actions as making a part of a system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe to any well contrived machine (TMS, 7.3.3.16).

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Second, DeGrouchy accepts something akin to the Smithian distinction between natural and cultivated sentiments; she makes it central to her political reform-program that is based on the claim that 'the immorality of man is less the work of nature than of social institutions' (LS, VI, 164; see also VIII, especially, 180–1). For De Grouchy, 'Man receives from society incomplete and false moral ideas and passions more dangerous than his natural passion, and on that account he has lost the rectitude and original vigor of his conscience' (LS, VII, 174). De Grouchy and Smith agree on the crucial role of conscience, and they agree that it is frequently corrupted by customs and social institutions. This is why it is so important for De Grouchy that in educating children we 'cultivate' the proper 'natural sensitivity to the pleasures of others and especially to the satisfaction of contributing such pleasures' (LS, III, 128).[44] Smith, too, gives an ambitious project for institutional reform. This is most clear in WN.[45] But there is a striking passage in TMS that has not attracted much attention:

> A superior may, indeed, sometimes, with universal approbation, oblige those under his jurisdiction to behave, in this respect, with a certain degree of propriety to one another. The laws of all civilized nations oblige parents to maintain their children, and children to maintain their parents, and impose upon men many other duties of beneficence. The civil magistrate is entrusted with the power not only of preserving the public peace by restraining injustice, but of promoting the prosperity of the commonwealth, by establishing good discipline, and by discouraging every sort of vice and impropriety; he may prescribe rules, therefore, which not only prohibit mutual injuries among fellow-citizens, but command mutual good offices to a certain degree (TMS, 2.1.8, 81).

The executive should not only enforce the laws to prevent mutual harm (a classic Liberal position) but he can also demand, by commanding 'mutual good offices' (see also TMS, 2.3.1, 85ff.), that people help each other. This is important in that he does not rule out state intervention to ensure that citizens support each other. While he does not go as far as Condorcet's mandatory, mathematically sophisticated, welfare programs (see the tenth stage in his *Sketch for a Historical Picture of The Progress of the Human Mind*), it is misleading to say that Smith has no resources to deal with global justice issues (cf. Brown's Introduction in LS, 42, 84–5). This is reinforced by Smith's (curiously ignored) claim that the 'laws of all civilized nations … impose upon men many other duties of beneficence.'

Third, De Grouchy agrees with Smith that 'the origin of our moral sentiments had to be shown to lie in our *natural* and unreflective sympathy for the physical pains of others' (LS, VI, 162; emphasis added). This is not De Grouchy's whole story, of course, but before we can analyze her criticisms of Smith, it is important to recognize the core commonality.[46] Moreover, she recognizes that Smith 'recognized that reason is indisputably the source of general rules of morality, and yet he found

[44] Forget 'Cultivating Sympathy'.

[45] The *locus classicus* is Rosenberg, 'Institutional Aspects'; the political reform program is outlined in Muller, *His Time and Ours*; see also Schliesser, 'Measure of Real Price,' for more references.

[46] This is one instance where I cannot agree with De Grouchy's reading of Smith. On my reading of Smith we naturally and instantaneously sympathize with pains and pleasures (TMS 1.1.1.4). I thank Maria Carrasco for pressing this point on me.

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it impossible to deduce from reason the first ideas of the just and unjust' (LS, VI, 162; recall TMS 7.3.2.7).[47]

The point of departure of De Grouchy's criticism of Smith is her claim that 'Smith limited himself to noting [sympathy's] existence and showing its principal effects. I regretted that he did not dare go further, to penetrate its first cause, and ultimately to show sympathy must belong to every sensible being capable of reflection' (LS, I, 108). De Grouchy's point is that Smith takes the existence of sympathy for granted in his analysis. She is correct that nowhere in his published writing does Smith explain sympathy's origin analogous to, say, the conjectural manner of explaining the development of language and mind in the Languages essay; nor does Smith ever acknowledge the question-begging claim that sympathy is a universal trait. Smith may be forgiven for not offering an account of sympathy as a derived propensity.[48] Yet, De Grouchy, who had just translated Languages, is surely within her rights for wanting to offer one. If one were to grant that sympathy exists universally, Smith's arguments against Hume and his positive account of the origin of justice can follow, so De Grouchy is correcting what would otherwise be question-begging within Smith.

Fourth, while De Grouchy's treatment of property rights is, in its return to 'a state of nature' (LS,VI, 157) argument, in certain important respects more Lockean than Smithian, it shares with Smith four important features: First, De Grouchy embraces our 'natural equality' (LS, VI, 158). Second, property rights are derived from 'labor,' not because there has been a metaphysical mixing of labor and matter (as in Locke), but because work generates reasonable expectations. As De Grouchy explains: 'in robbing him of what he had long hoped for and the possession of which deserved, one does him greater harm than denying him a similar harvest that might be simply at hand,' (LS, VI, 157). This is very close to the account we find in the student notes to Smith's lectures on jurisprudence, but it can only be inferred from his published writings; recall the passage about the need to 'respect the established powers and privileges' (TMS 6.2.2.16, 233).[49] So, here DeGrouchy is Smithian without, perhaps, realizing it. I return to De Grouchy's treatment of property because it goes beyond Smith in a significant fashion. Third, for De Grouchy property rights and crimes against them come in degrees. (See her treatment of 'lesser' and 'bigger' crimes.) It is one half of the core principle behind her reform of the penal code. She attacks the failure of European criminal codes to match penalties to crimes (LS, VIII,176–7). This failure has had unintended consequence of *licensing* 'lesser crimes, and one can also regard these laws as the cause of bigger crimes, since the impunity of the former alone inspires the confidence to commit the latter.' (Lesser

[47] Cf. LS, 22, quoted above.

[48] It is a bit odd that Karin Brown would claim that 'the difference between [De Grouchy's and Smith's] moral and political views are rooted in their conceptions of the origin of sympathy' (LS, 4); De Grouchy is correct that Smith has *no* account of the origin and, thus, this cannot be the root-source for his political views. De Grouchy's account is compatible with Smith's theory.

[49] See, especially, Fleischacker, *Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations*, 158, 187 and 191; reasonable expectations do figure in TMS 6.1.13, but not in any foundational passages.

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crimes go unpunished because ‘humanity almost always keeps one from reporting minor thefts’ if the penalty is severe (e.g., death penalty for theft; LS, VIII, 176). Fourth, De Grouchy and Smith agree that ‘in the case of absolute necessity’ the right to property is not absolute (cf. LS, VI, 158; WN, IV.v.b.40, 539).[50]

Fifth, De Grouchy and Smith agree that social utility and reason (informed by humanity and utility) are proper standards when we design and evaluate our social and political institutions. (See De Grouchy, LS, LVIII, 178; II, 166; in Smith, ‘equity,’ WN, I.viii.36, 96; V.ii.k.45, 888–89 and V.ii.k.55, 893; ‘humanity,’ recall TMS, 6.2.2.16, 233; ‘reasonableness,’ e.g., WN, V.ii.e.6, 842; V.ii.e.19; 846; I. viii.36, 96; I.viii.44, 100, etc.; cf. Smith’s outrage at the ‘folly and injustice’ of European Colonists at WN, IV.vii,.b.59, 588).

Sixth, like Smith, she recognizes that mankind has a ‘greater or lesser ability to entertain abstract and general ideas’ (LS, V, 155). In De Grouchy this is the basis for her account why it is so hard ‘to enlighten people, even with respect to their genuine interests.’ Smith agrees, but locates the problem in the division of labor in modern commercial societies, which causes common laborers to lack basic education and to be so overworked as to make them suffer ‘the torpor of mind’ (WN, V.i.f.50, 781). De Grouchy follows Smith in thinking that ‘the primary goals of education should thus be to provide the ability to acquire general ideas and to experience these abstract and general sentiments’ (LS, V, 155). Smith believed that the ‘study of science and philosophy’ can have a social utility in suppressing ‘enthusiasm and superstition’; this is why he advocates mandatory exams in them for anybody who wants to practice a profession (WN, V.i.9.14, 796; V.i.f.50–56, 781–6). Smith thought that an educated populace was necessary to maintain freedom, public accountability and order in a modern society (WN, V.i.f.61, 788).[51]

9.4 Four Differences Between De Grouchy and Smith

I call attention to four important differences between De Grouchy and Smith. These account for much of the subtle differences between their political projects.

First, as noted before, De Grouchy takes on the following challenge: ‘to explain our sympathy with respect to moral suffering shared by all beings of our species, one must go back to the causes of our particular sympathies that form the basis of such sympathy’ (LS, II, 117). Without doing justice here to her full analysis, let me simply note that De Grouchy concludes:

[50] I am ignoring interesting, even salient differences: De Grouchy thinks that morality sanctions the violation of property right to satisfy pressing individual need; Smith thinks the government can suspend private property in order to maintain social peace.

[51] While Smith hoped that education would lend genuine stability to government (WN, V.f.61, 788), he also recommended public ‘diversions’ (e.g., ‘painting, poetry, musick, dancing’ and ‘all sorts of dramatic representations and exhibitions’) to ‘amuse’ people’s minds and make (political and religious) fanatics the objects of ‘ridicule’ (WN, V.i.g.15, 796–797).

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> I have shown how moral pains and pleasures are born in us solely from physical sympathy transmuted by particular sympathy, after various circumstances strengthen it, and after enthusiasm makes it more active and energetic. But this sympathy with another being has an origin independent of the nature of his pains and pleasures. We suffer in watching him suffer. And, the idea of his pains likewise becomes troublesome for us because a similar pain would make us suffer, too. It is therefore evident that what we said of physical pain is also true of moral pains, as soon as we are capable of experiencing them. The sight or recollection of the moral pains of another affects us the same way as does the sight or recollection of his physical pains.
>
> Here, then, are the new bonds of sympathy that unite us with other men and that broaden our connections to them.
>
> Not only are the sight or memory of the moral or physical pains or pleasures of others accompanied by pain and pleasure in us, but also, as we already explained, this sensitivity, once awaked and excited in our soul, renews itself solely at the abstract idea of good or evil. As a result, we have an internal and personal incentive to do good and to avoid doing evil. This incentive is an extension of our natures as both sensory and rational beings. In delicate souls it is capable of both monitoring our conscience and driving us towards virtue (LS, III, 132).

This is indeed a level of detail that is entirely absent in Smith on why sympathy is shared by all the members of the species. As I hinted at the start of this paper, it is a remarkably egocentric model[52]: our moral ideas are derived from *our* suffering at the sight at others suffering and the mental abstractions from our impressions of it. For De Grouchy moral sentiments presuppose considerable social and psychological development. In order to avoid confusion, we need to distinguish between De Grouchy's explanation of the *origin* of our moral sentiments, which is social in character and presupposes considerable interaction between many contextual factors over time, and DeGrouchy's account of the *nature* of our moral sentiment, which, even in its focus on duties to others, is strikingly self-regarding. This makes her treatment of sympathy akin to Rousseau's use of 'pity'.[53]

De Grouchy does not merely fill a conjectural gap in Smith's analysis. She can offer a streamlined account in which our pleasures and pains are linked to social utility. For her 'the idea of virtue, that is to say, *actions that give others a pleasure approved by reason*' (LS, V, 151, emphasis in original) just is the choice for giving ourselves 'the most lasting satisfaction' (V, 151). To put this starkly: by tacitly bypassing Smith's criticism of Hume's account of the origin of justice, she can streamline the Smithian moral apparatus into a coherent, hedonistic consequentialism. Recall that Smith has a two-tiered analysis in which the principles that underwrite our judgments of institutions are distinct from our judgments of character. It is not so much the absence of the 'objective' impartial spectator that distinguishes Smith's theory from De Grouchy's, but her willingness to forego judgments of propriety as an authoritative source of approval. Some will see in this a loss of

[52] Smith pointed out that Rousseau's views are really derived from Mandeville's but dressed up rhetorically. The same can be said of De Grouchy (and, perhaps, Smith).

[53] Ryan Hanley pressed this point on me. By Smith's lights Rousseau-ian pithy is inspired by Mandeville. It is unclear if De Grouchy is tracking the Mandeville-Rousseau-Smith connection. Perhaps Mandeville has dropped off the radar-screen post French Revolution.

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appreciation for moral particularity, but others will welcome it as a move toward the very possibility of social reform especially if respect for particularity is used to stifle the very possibility of progressive reform. This is because for Smith judgments of propriety are always judgments of local situations.[54] I do not wish to imply that De Grouchy could not consistently recover an analysis of propriety or find other ways to do justice to moral particularity, but it does not seem to be of major interest to her.

Second, above I have emphasized the similarities between Smith and De Grouchy in their treatment of property rights. But there are two important differences between them. One is a matter of style; Smith rarely uses the languages of "rights." One suspects he shares Hume's distaste for them. De Grouchy's rhetoric on this matter (as in other things) is far closer to Rousseau's.[55]

A third difference is substantial and turns on De Grouchy's original analysis of her definition of a right. De Grouchy defines a right as a 'preference commanded by reason itself in favor of a particular individual' (LS, VI, 157). Above I have already offered De Grouchy's arguments in favor of property as a right. I should add that there is a general consequentialist flavor in her arguments because she argues 'the good resulting from their infringement cannot be compared to the advantages provided by the generality and certainty of these laws [of property]' (LS, VI, 158). De Grouchy then confronts an objection. Her argument is worth quoting in full because I am unfamiliar with any sustained discussion of it.

> The definition of *right* I have given will perhaps appear incomplete to you because the word *preference* seems contrary *to natural equality* and because a part of real human rights is founded on this equality. But this contradiction is only apparent, for when equality is upset, the preference owed to someone who suffers thereby is merely a preference granted for the restoration of equality over a higher claim not acknowledged by reason. In this way, the right one thus attains over everything necessary to reenter a state of equality is an act of justice and not a favor.
>
> A right such as the right of property is a positive right. It consists in a preference founded on reason concerning the possession of something. In some ways a right like liberty is a negative right, since it exists only on the supposition that someone wants to attack my free-

[54] "Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it." (TMS 1.1.1.12).

[55] Rousseau had no such distaste. See this surprising (given that Rousseau is the hero of the Left) claim about sanctity of property rights in *Discourse on Political Economy*: '[I]t is certain that the right of property is the most sacred of all the rights of citizens, and more important in some respects than freedom itself; either because it bears more directly on the preservation of life; or because, goods, being easier to usurp and more difficult to defend than persons, greater respect ought to be accorded to what can more easily be seized; or finally, because property is the true foundation of civil society, and the true guarantee of the citizens' commitments: for if goods were not in accord with persons nothing would be so easy as to elude one's duties and scoff at the laws.' (DPE, 42; I have consulted and slightly modified Victor Gourevitch's 1997 translation.) ['Il est certain que le droit de propriété est le plus sacré de tous les droits des citoyens, et plus important à certains égards que la liberté même; soit parce qu'il tient de plus près à la conservation de la vie; soit parce que les biens étant plus faciles à usurper et plus pénibles à défendre que la personne, on doit plus respecter ce qui se peut ravir plus aisément; soit enfin parce que la propriété est le vrai fondement de la société civile, et le vrai garant des engagements des citoyens: car si les biens ne répondaient pas des personnes, rien ne serait si facile que d'éluder ses devoirs et de se moquer des lois' (OC, III, 264).]

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> dom because there is no reason why this someone should have a hold over me that I do not have over him. The same applies to equality…. This, because abject submission to another's will is a greater evil than dominating someone's will and being superior to him. In evaluating the just and unjust, we submit the sentiment to reason, itself guided by general rules, notably a preference founded on general and logical grounds that aim for the greatest good, that is to say, directed by the rule of *right*.
>
> Given this exact definition of *right*, do you not see…how the monstrous edifice of the pretended rights of the despot, the noble, the priest, and all holders of non-delegated power falls to pieces and instantly vanishes. (LS, VI, 158-9)

A lot is going in this passage: (a) De Grouchy rejects the idea that property rights are infringements on our natural equality because it is a preference in the service of our natural equality (and, as we saw before, clearly has beneficial, long-term consequences). (b) She distinguishes between such a preference, which is rooted in natural equality, and special group 'prerogatives' (LS, VI, 159), which are rooted in infringements against natural equality. (c) So, she would reject Smith's council for 'respect for the established powers and privileges even of…the great orders and societies' (TMS, 6.2.2.16, 233). De Grouchy is employing Smith's conceptual apparatus to argue for a more radical position than Smith. But this is because, in context, Smith is clearly willing to balance natural equality with considerations of social stability: 'The man whose public spirit is prompted altogether by *humanity* and *benevolence,* …[w]hen he cannot establish the right, …will not disdain to *ameliorate* the wrong; but like Solon, when he cannot establish the best system of laws, he will endeavour to establish the best that the people can bear' (TMS, 6.2.2.16, 233; emphasis added). Smith frequently worries about the political 'disorder' that a too rapid introduction of the system of natural liberty 'would occasion' (WN, IV.ii.40, 496; see also IV.vii.c.44, 606). 'Humanity' demands 'reserve and circumspection.' Even though De Grouchy is writing in a post-revolutionary state (not to mention the Terror), yet she is frustratingly silent which considerations could constrain the implementation of her program.

(d) Most crucially, by conceiving property right as a preference De Grouchy sees it as both a positive right (namely the right to dispose with the property whatever way one wishes) as well as a negative right (protection from harms) at once. In light of Isaiah Berlin's famous analysis, in 'Two Concepts of Liberty,' we can say that De Grouchy straddles the two traditions that Berlin struggles to keeps separate conceptually and historically.[56] Interestingly, De Grouchy claims the same argument applies to equality: it is both a source of positive rights (of, say, entry to the professions, rights to inheritance of property, free movement, etc.) as well as a source of the right to protection from submission to others.[57] Again, she radicalizes Smith (who is an avowed enemy of slavery; see, especially, WN, IV.vii.b.53–62, 586–589

[56] See Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[57] Karin Brown spends a lot of effort to put De Grouchy in the feminist ethics-of-care-camp; this despite the fact that De Grouchy's utilitarian program has little room for a virtue ethic; it seems to me that De Grouchy can be more usefully compared to Catherine McKinnon, who never loses sight of how power leads to dominance and subjection. (Of course, McKinnon is shaped by Foucault and Marx, but Hobbes' shadow hangs over her project.)

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and III.ii.10, 388; see also, TMS, 7.2.1.28, 282) and recognizes that there is in man *'love of domination and tyrannizing'*.[58]

Fourth, De Grouchy believes there is a 'sentiment of natural equality that leads us to regard everything above us with jealousy or at least harshly' (LS, IV, 134). Smith, by contrast, thinks we are likely to sympathize with our superiors. He has what we may call a principle of authority, and it underwrites his political theory that social stability requires some inequalities of fortune.[59] While Smith may have underestimated resentment towards superiors (although fully allowing that in times of crises social bonds may be loosened), De Grouchy is silent about the sources of social order *in transitions*.[60] This is surprising because she is very articulate on the dangers and mechanisms of faction and demagoguery (See, especially, LS, VII, 170ff, but also II, 125).

There is also a more profound issue lurking here. Some of the 'significant' differences 'when it comes to the issues of social reform' (Brown in LS, 45) between Smith and De Grouchy are, I suspect, the result of different perspectives: Smith is self-consciously (a teacher of) the adviser(s) of princes. There is no evidence that in 1798 De Grouchy had any hope she could influence the development of Napoleonic France. Rather, by systematizing and radicalizing Smithian principles, De Grouchy is offering us a model to aspire to. She can afford to be more radical because she is writing after the abolishment of feudal and clerical privileges and in no sense has to take into account the interests of established powers.

9.5 Conclusion

This paper offered an interpretation of Adam Smith that makes sense of why De Grouchy would have found his thought an attractive means to develop her own highly original views. My argument provides unity to Smith's thought; it explains that if one reads the works available to De Grouchy in light of each other they tend to focus attention on the significance of institutional reform and the real possibility that this will lead to much improved political, moral, and economic outcomes for all

[58] For a useful discussion, with extensive references to student notes on Smith's 'Lectures on Jurisprudence,' see Haakonssen, *Science of the Legislator*, 140–141.

[59] 'Upon this disposition of mankind, to go along with all the passions of the rich and the powerful, is founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society. Our obsequiousness to our superiors more frequently arises from our admiration for the advantages of their situation, than from any private *expectations* of benefit from their good–will. Their benefits can extend but to a few; but their fortunes interest almost everybody. We are eager to assist them in completing a system of happiness that approaches so near to perfection; and we desire to serve them for their own sake, without any other recompense but the vanity or the honour of obliging them' (TMS 1.3.2.3). For discussion of the principle of authority, see Khalil, 'Anatomy of Authority.' For an important interpretation of this issue, see Tegos, 'Problem of Authority.'

[60] De Grouchy is clear that a just social order 'in preserving man his natural rights, would put men in the optimal position to lead them to mutually respect these rights, and then these rights would be guaranteed by the interest in each individual's happiness and tranquility even more than by the laws' (LS, VIII, 177).

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human beings. This was always the natural reading of WN, but I hope I have made clear that TMS and Languages provide the groundwork for it. This explains the attraction of Smith's early Feminist readers.

De Grouchy's focus on outcomes also makes clear how Smith's thought unintentionally paved the way for nineteenth century consequentialism. De Grouchy offers us, what we may label, 'sympathetic Consequentialism,' and, thus, anticipates much of nineteenth century political theory (without the narrow focus on utility we find in early Utilitarians like Bentham and James Mill).[61] Until the rise of Eugenics in the late nineteenth century this reform program was extremely influential.[62] The significance of De Grouchy's thought is, of course, not exhausted by how it helps us explain the relationship between 18th and nineteenth century thinkers.

De Grouchy offers an attractive understanding of the complex social, moral- psychological basis of the reform of political institutions that does justice to our rich longings. Moreover, by adapting the Smithian framework to the language of rights, De Grouchy provides a path-breaking analysis of positive and negative rights that offers a synthesis between the radical impulse behind much egalitarian thought while providing a framework in which the fruits of the division of labor can be securely reaped. Especially in a time where markets are viewed with only suspicion by many well-meaning progressive theorists and would be reformers De Grouchy's critical embrace of the Smithian project deserves reconsideration.

None of this is to deny the importance of De Grouchy for the history of feminism; my paper tacitly aims to prepare the way for an analysis of the thought of, for example, Wollstonecraft in light of the discussion here. But that must await another occasion.[63]

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[61] Maria Carrasco points out to me that in many respects De Grouchy's views end up being closer to Smith's teacher, Hutcheson, than Smith. There is no evidence that De Grouchy was familiar with Hutcheson.

[62] See Levy, *Vanity of the Philosopher*.

[63] I thank Karin Brown and James E. McClellan III for much help and encouragement in the long gestation of this paper. I am also grateful to Evelyn Forget for her helpful feedback on an earlier version of this chapter. Ryan Hanley and Lisa Herzog provided me with excellent criticism on a penultimate draft. Some of the material in this paper was presented at a conference at Richmond University, and I received helpful feedback from Elias Khalil, Johnathan Wight, and David Haig there. Finally, I hope I have lived up to the high standards of the editors of this volume, Marcy Lascano and the late Eileen O'Neill, especially—I am very grateful for the opportunity to contribute to it.

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