Nation-building in post-Soviet Ukraine: educational policy and the response of the Russian-speaking population
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1 INTRODUCTION

The disintegration of the multinational Soviet Union into a large number of ethnically heterogeneous successor states sparked a plethora of violent ethnic conflicts that took many scholars by surprise. Thus, the Trans-Dniestrian Russians in Moldova, the Abkhazians in Georgia, the Armenians in Azerbaijan and, recently, the Chechens in the Russian Federation, not happy with their minority status in the new successor states, all rose up in arms against their new masters. These examples show that, despite modernization and the Soviet Union’s attempts to create a ‘Homo Sovieticus,’ the phenomenon of multinationality is still alive in the post-Soviet world, continuing its destabilizing role in the new successor states.

However, problems of multinationality have not been confined to the (post-) Soviet world. Many Western European countries have, over the past thirty years, also had to cope with regionally concentrated populations who, claiming an incompatible “ethnos” and language, have challenged the existing state structure. Although not embarking on a course of open warfare and by generally opting for peaceful means of reaching their goals, these challenging national groups have had a significant impact on the states they were part of. A number of states, for instance, have granted considerable political-territorial autonomy to the nationalities’ homelands to accommodate ethnic demands: in Spain, the Basque country, Galicia and Catalonia now enjoy considerable autonomy; in Italy, the region of South Tirol has a number of special powers; and only recently, in the United Kingdom, the new Labour government granted Scotland a significant extension of its autonomy. In Belgium, ethnic demands have even resulted in the transformation of a unitary state into a federal one. There, the so-called language battle between the overwhelmingly Dutch-speaking north and homogeneously French-speaking south resulted in a complex transfer of power from the central level to newly created regional bodies of administration (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia) and community organs of administration (for Dutch, French, and German speakers).

The Mediterranean and the Balkans have recently also had their share of ethnic conflicts. The breakdown of Yugoslavia led to open warfare in the successor states of Croatia and Bosnia, with the Serbs in both states rejecting their new status as minorities. In rump Yugoslavia, a traumatized Albanian minority sees the UN administration of Kosovo as the first step to casting off the perceived Serbian yoke completely and attaining full independence. Further east in the Mediterranean, the bitter conflict between the Greeks and the Turks on the island of Cyprus still rages. Finally, there are numerous cases of violent ethnic conflict in other parts of the world, leading in their most extreme forms to thousands of refugees, genocide and a complete collapse of the economy and of central state authority. The following short list of cases can serve as a vivid and ominous reminder: the bloody war in Sri Lanka between the Tamils and the central government; the guerrilla war fought by the Kurds against the Turkish army; the collapse of central state authority in Somalia due to warring clans; and mutual mass killings by Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda.

All these examples demonstrate that multinational states still have problems similar to those they had fifty or hundred years ago. They also show that whatever the challenge an ethnic group poses, it invariably has a great impact on the central state, if not
in terms of its political structure (unitary with autonomous regions/federal/breakup), then in terms of its economic resources or political stability in cases of open warfare. Given the far-reaching consequences that this so-called political mobilization of ethnic groups can have, a whole body of academic literature has developed on the concept. Observers who seek to explain the rise of ethno-national movements have generally been classified into those arguing from a primordialist perspective and those embracing a mobilizationist or instrumentalist view on ethnic phenomena (e.g. McKay, 1982; Amersfoort, 1991). Primordialists see ethnic groups as static givens and contend that ethnic awareness is heightened, with the risk of becoming politicized, when ethnic groups come into close contact. Mobilizationists, on the other hand, argue that ethnic attachments are variable and contingent on political and economic interests. In their view, ethnic identities are generated and mobilized when groups compete with each other over scarce resources.¹

To muster the support of an ethnic group for some ambitious program, political entrepreneurs either appeal to existing national consciousness or try to construct an entirely new identity. Again a difference of opinion surfaces between primordialists and mobilizationists. The former would argue that a random collection of people cannot be ethnically mobilized if they do not possess a separate identity based on cultural markers that distinguish them from other groups. Smith (1988), for instance, contends that modern European nations, though being constructed entities, have distinct cultural origins. For instrumentalists, in contrast, cultural differences are not important for the creation and politicization of group identities (Amersfoort, 1991). However, the proponents of both perspectives would agree with the statement that national identity is vital for an elite seeking to mobilize a group on an ethnic platform, whether it is a necessary condition for group action (primordialists) or something that has to be created in the process of mobilization (instrumentalists). Given the centrality of national identity for the political manifestation of ethnic groups, it is surprising to find relatively few scholarly works addressing this issue, although there is now growing academic consensus on the changeable nature of identities to the detriment of the primordialist perspective. If national identities are indeed open to flux, then how do they change and how do new ones emerge? What are the components of this change and what factors trigger it? What is the role of the state in this? Is it not likely that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the nationalizing programs of the post-Soviet successor states have had an impact on the national outlook of ethnic minorities? The answers to these questions have remained far from complete. This study hopes to contribute to the understanding of the problem of national identity by focusing on the identity issue in post-Soviet Ukraine. It examines the nation-building policies of the central state and analyzes the response of the Russian-speaking population. The term ‘Russian-speaking population’ in this respect refers to Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Ukraine captures our attention for a number of reasons. First of all, this large successor state, the second most populous after the Russian Federation, is home to more than eleven million Russians. These Russians form, in absolute terms, the biggest non-

¹ Chapter Two gives an overview of the authors associated with the two perspectives and elaborates on the differences between the two approaches.
titular national group in all the successor states, the Russian Federation included.\(^2\) The size of the non-titular Russian population is, moreover, in a way compounded by the large group of titular Ukrainians who prefer to communicate in Russian and thus speak the corresponding titular language, Ukrainian, only as a second language. According to a recent survey referred to by Arel (1996, pp. 76,77) even more than 50 percent of Ukraine's population uses Russian "as a language of convenience" (20% Russians and 33% Russian-speaking Ukrainians).\(^3\) This brings us to a third interesting feature: the linguistic similarity of Ukrainian and Russian. With a little effort, Ukrainians and Russians can understand each other's languages even if they have never heard the other language before. It is this fact that made it possible for large numbers of Ukrainians to change to speaking Russian during the long period of Russian/Soviet rule when Russian was the dominant language and Ukrainian was regarded as a simple peasant dialect of Russian. According to Arel (1995a), this linguistic closeness produces two opposite predictions. On the one hand, just as it took Ukrainians little effort to learn Russian in the past, so Russian speakers should not have difficulty in learning Ukrainian now, if language policies oblige them to do so. Yet, "on the other hand, the fact that so many Ukrainians are linguistically russified means that language politics is, first and foremost, an intra-group phenomenon in Ukraine, and we know from the study of religious and ideological factionalism that internecine conflicts can be the most intense" (ibid, p. 598). Thus, it will be interesting to see how not only the Russians but also the Russian-speaking Ukrainians relate to the new Ukraine.

However, the most important reason to choose Ukraine is that its constituting regions, each having had their own particular historical background, have never before formed an entity as an independent state. It is these different historical backgrounds of the regions that have left Ukraine with a widely varying share of Russophones in the regional population as one crosses the country. The diverging historical backgrounds, in addition, have shaped the national consciousness and political outlook of the Ukrainians as the titular nationality. Thus, Ukrainians in western Ukraine tend to be more nationalist in outlook than Ukrainians in the rest of Ukraine (see next section). Wilson (1997, p. 1) sums it up well in the first line of his new book: "Modern Ukraine is a deeply divided society with a pronounced pattern of regional diversity." The social cultural characteristics of a certain region can be expected to frame the responses of the Russian speakers to the changed political circumstances. For this reason, I consider the concept of regional diversity to be of pivotal importance, using it as a basis for the structure of this research (see the last section of Chapter Two). Because of the centrality of regional differentiation, I turn to it in further detail in the next section, showing how it came about and what its consequences are for political life in contemporary Ukraine.

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\(^2\) Titular refers to the name-giving quality of a national group. Thus, a titular nationality is a nationality after which the corresponding Union Republic was named. For instance, the Ukrainian SSR was named after the Ukrainians, the Estonian SSR after the Estonians, and so on.

\(^3\) The category of Ukrainian-speaking Russians is virtually non-existent, as very few Russians adopted Ukrainian as their first language in Soviet times.
1.1 Ukraine's Regional Disparities: Historical Background and Political Consequences

The key player responsible for Ukraine's pronounced regional diversity is Russia. In general, there is a correlation between the time of the incorporation of Ukrainian lands into the Russian and later Soviet Empire, and the proportion of Russian speakers in the regional population: the earlier the time of incorporation, the larger the proportion of Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The following four regions can be discerned in a descending order of Russian influence on the region: eastern Ukraine, southern Ukraine, central Ukraine and western Ukraine (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1. Ukraine: Territorial Administrative Structure](image)

The lands of eastern Ukraine were finally conquered by the Russian Empire after a period of conflict lasting three centuries, from the end of the 15th to the end of the 18th century, when the last tracts of land along the Azov Sea were wrested from Ottoman control. For some parts of this region, notably for the heavily industrialized Donbas, comprising the oblasts of Donets’k and Luhansk, there is considerable debate among historians as to who settled there first. Ukrainian historians claim that because the area was under the control of Kyiv Rus’ in the early Middle Ages and later, in the 16th century, under the influence of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks, it should be considered as native Ukrainian

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4 The division of regions is based on that proposed by Arel and Wilson (1994). They define western Ukraine as the oblasts of L'viv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Volyn, Rivne, Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia. Central Ukraine comprises the oblasts of Khmel'nyts'kyi, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy, Kyiv Oblast, Kyiv City, Kirovohrad, Sumy, Poltava and Chernihiv. Eastern Ukraine comprises Donets’k, Luhans’k, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs’k and Zaporizhzhia. Southern Ukraine is made up of Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Crimea.
territory. Russian historiography, however, argues that the Donbas was never in the sphere of influence of either Kyivan Rus' or the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks, that the area was largely an empty no-man's land between Slav and Tatar areas of control and that Russians together with Ukrainians started settling the area from as early as the 16th century onwards (Wilson, 1995). Be that as it may, there is consensus about the fact that industrialization both from the 1860s onwards and after World War II attracted huge numbers of Russian migrants, giving the whole region a distinctly Russian urbanized character.

The conquest of the Ottoman-ruled Crimean Khanate in 1775 and its subsequent absorption into the Russian Empire in 1783 meant that all the lands of southern Ukraine fell into Russian hands. From then on, southern Ukraine, in many ways, followed the same path of development as eastern Ukraine. Here also, industrialization and the growth of commerce and harbour activities resulted in many Russians and other nationalities flocking to the rapidly developing cities of hitherto empty lands (Subtelny, 1988). As in eastern Ukraine, the cities became focal points of Russian culture and language. The difference was that, while in the east the Russian language could to a certain extent be considered indigenous, it functioned more as a lingua franca in the cities of the south due to the many foreign nationalities already residing there or pouring in, such as Germans, Moldovans, Serbs, Bulgarians, Jews, Armenians and Greeks. Also many Ukrainians migrated to the newly conquered lands, which came to be known as Novorossiya (New Russia). Most settled in the countryside as peasant serfs, attracted by favorable labor conditions. The ones that did go to the cities soon lost their Ukrainian language and quickly assimilated into the Russian culture.

The vast lands of central Ukraine were incorporated into the Russian Empire in a piecemeal fashion from the 15th to the 18th centuries. Using their northeast strongholds (the modern-day oblasts of Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv) as a springboard, the Russians managed to wrest the whole of Left Bank Ukraine from the Poles in the treaty of Anrusovo in 1667. Finally, after the third partition of Poland in 1795, the entire Right-bank fell into their hands (Subtelny, 1988). Although the lands of central, eastern and southern Ukraine were more or less simultaneously conquered by the Russian Empire, the former were much more Ukrainian in outlook than the latter two. Unlike the territories in much of the east and south, the whole of the central region had always been inhabited by Ukrainian peasant masses, toiling under the yoke of either a Polish, Russian or indigenous Cossack nobility. central Ukraine remained relatively rural in character due to a lack of minerals and a poor infrastructure on which industrial and commercial activities could be based. The cities remained small, Russian-speaking islands with a mixed Russian-Jewish-Ukrainian population in a sea of Ukrainian-speaking village communities.

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5 Left Bank Ukraine refers to all Ukrainian lands east of the Dnipro river, Right Bank Ukraine to Ukrainian lands west of this river.
In theory, the sharp social contrast in central Ukraine between the poor Ukrainian peasant masses on the one hand and the rich Russian or russified Polish and Ukrainian gentry on the other was an ideal breeding ground for a Ukrainian-nationalist liberation movement. However, the nationalist appeal had only a limited audience for several reasons. First of all, widespread illiteracy among the peasants hindered the few nationalist activists in propagating the Ukrainian national idea and turning the peasants into nationally conscious Ukrainians. According to Krawchenko (1985, p. 23), Czarist policy in particular was to blame: "The social and national policies of czarism had led to a situation, probably unique in Europe, where Ukrainians had higher rates of literacy in the mid-eighteenth century than at the turn of the twentieth". Secondly, the official Czarist dogma which considered Ukrainians as part of the true Russian nation was translated into a 'carrot and stick' policy that undermined the development of a Ukrainian-nationalist intelligentsia and bourgeoisie who could 'guide the nation' (ibid, p. 31). On the one hand, Ukrainians wanting to move up in society were not discriminated against as long as they gave up their Ukrainian background and assimilated into Russian culture (the carrot). In the cities, where everybody was expected to speak Russian in the public sphere, this, indeed, led to many Ukrainians switching to Russian. On the other hand, those propagating the idea of Ukrainian singularity were subject to persecution (the stick). The latter policy was embodied in several Czarist decrees banning firstly the Ukrainian language both as a subject and as language of instruction in schools in 1804, and secondly books and other publications in the Ukrainian language in 1863 and 1876. The social predicament of the peasant masses, the minuscule Ukrainian intelligentsia and bourgeoisie and the Czarist policies thus combined to prevent a Ukrainian nationalist movement from entering the scene and to keep Ukrainian in its stigmatized confinement of a 'Malo-Russian' (small-Russian) peasant dialect.

The three chaotic years of Ukraine's independence from 1917 to 1920, the ensuing period of relatively liberal Bolshevik rule, and Stalin's backlash in the 1930s did little to change the pattern of differences between central, eastern and southern Ukraine that had been laid down in the Czarist era. The only thing that did leave its mark was the urbanization drive of Ukrainians all over Soviet Ukraine, which turned the Russian/Jewish majorities into minorities in most of the cities despite the continuing influx of large numbers of Russians into the rapidly developing industrial centres of the east and south.

Western Ukraine took no part in any of the aforementioned events. Its biggest, and from the point of view of the rise of national consciousness, most important part, eastern Galicia, comprising the modern-day oblasts of L'viv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk, was successively part of Poland until its partition at the end of the 18th century, Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of World War I, and again Poland until the Soviet invasion of 1939. By the mid-19th century, the Galician Ukrainians were in more or less the same situation as their eastern compatriots. The overwhelming majority

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6 For a discussion on the 1920s policy of Ukrainianization and Stalin's backlash, see Arel (1994) and Shevelov (1989).
7 This is not entirely true. The two northern oblasts of Rivne and Volyn become part of Czarist Russia after the partition of Poland.
(over 95%) were poor illiterate peasants caught in an economic stranglehold by Polish estate-owners. Yet, unlike their eastern brothers, the west Ukrainians lived “in a constitutional monarchy that allowed much greater freedom of association and expression than was possible in the Russian Empire” (Subtelny, 1988, p. 323). Moreover, the better organized Czechs and Poles, who were at least one stage ahead of Ukrainians in their social-national advancement, proved fine examples for the Galician Ukrainians. Mobilization of the peasantry by the small Ukrainian intelligentsia principally occurred as a reaction to Polish attempts to monopolize the political and educational institutions of eastern Galicia. Hence, west-Ukrainian intellectuals managed to accomplish what their eastern colleagues had failed to achieve. By means of an extensive network of cultural organizations, sports clubs, societies and cooperatives in the countryside, they raised the social and national consciousness of a peasantry whose sense of separateness had already been encouraged by its affiliation with the Greek Catholic church. What is more, the bitter competition with the Poles for political, cultural and economic resources only reinforced the depth of nationalist sentiment, making Galicia the centre of the Ukrainian national movement and posing many problems for future rulers, like the Poles in the interbellum, in the decades to come.

World War II, the Holocaust and its aftermath of Ukrainian-Polish population exchanges made west Ukraine’s previously mixed Ukrainian-Polish-Jewish-German population almost homogeneously Ukrainian. Newcomers were Russian experts, sent by Moscow to administer the newly acquired territories and rebuild the infrastructure destroyed during the war. However, unlike their eastern compatriots in eastern and southern Ukraine, who proved quite vulnerable to being russified, the nationally conscious western Ukrainians retained their language in the decades after World War II. They sharply distinguished themselves from the recently arrived Russian immigrant, who formed only a tiny minority of the local population, compared to Russians elsewhere in Ukraine. As before the war, Russians continued to immigrate to the industrial areas of the east and south, strengthening the already pronounced Russian character of these regions (Arel, 1994). Thus, with the population in the west turning more Ukrainian, and the population in the east and south becoming more Russian, the historically inherited regional differences did not level off, but actually became more acute in the decades after World War II.

In short, diverging historical experiences set the regions apart on two dimensions: a rural, predominantly Ukrainian-speaking - urban, predominantly Russian-speaking dimension on the one hand and a weak Ukrainian national consciousness - strong Ukrainian national consciousness dimension on the other (see Figure 2).

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8 A person is considered ‘Russified’ if he or she claims Russian as his/her mother tongue.
Regional differences in the relative numbers of Ukrainian and Russian inhabitants are presented by Table 1.1. The percentage of Russians in the regional population ranges from 5.1% in the seven oblasts of western Ukraine to 36.1% in the five oblasts of eastern Ukraine, with central Ukraine (8.6% - excluding Kyiv city as a special case) and southern Ukraine (23.6% - excluding The Crimea as a special case) falling in the middle. Thus, the proportion of Russians in eastern Ukraine is more than seven times that of Russians in western Ukraine. This regional concentration of Russians is compounded by the fact that the southern and eastern oblasts are the most populous, leading to a situation in which 80% of all Ukrainian Russians live in eastern and southern Ukraine (Arel, 1994). The table further shows that, as there are only three oblasts with sizeable non-Ukrainian, non-Russian minorities (Odesa - 18.0%; Zakarpattia - 17.6% and Chernivtsi - 17.6%), Ukraine can essentially be regarded as a bi-national state, made up of Ukrainians and Russians. The last column, which presents the percentage of Russians in the population of oblast capitals, confirms the observation that, besides being regionally skewed, the Russian presence in Ukraine is indeed an urban phenomenon: Without exception the proportion of Russians living in the oblast capitals exceeds that in the surrounding oblasts.

The distribution of Russian-speaking Ukrainians is strikingly similar to that of the Russians (compare Tables 1.1 and 1.2). Thus, in the regions where Russians record the highest percentages, so do the Russophone Ukrainians, and in the regions where Russians record the lowest percentages, so do the Russophone Ukrainians. Moreover, Russian-speaking Ukrainians show the same tendency as the Russians to form a higher percentage.

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9 The data in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 are based on the 1989 census, which, although old, is the only source of reliable, large-scale, demographic data. One may safely assume that since 1989 the number of Russians has declined relative to the number of Ukrainians because of the large-scale emigration of Ukrainian Russians to the Russian Federation from 1994 onwards when the differences in living conditions between Ukraine and Russia began to be felt. A new census was planned for 1999.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Other nationalities</th>
<th>Russians in oblast capitals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Ukraine</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhans'k</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>43.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total in Eastern Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>42.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Ukraine</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>71.6</td>
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<td>Mykolaiv</td>
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<td>19.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Odesa</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Kherson</td>
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<td>20.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>29.2</td>
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<td><strong>Total in Southern Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>40.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>(excluding The Crimea)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv City</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Central Ukraine</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirovograd</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
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<td>91.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sumy</td>
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<td>13.3</td>
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<td>Kyiv Oblast</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Poltava</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
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<td>Cherkasy</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>20.5</td>
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<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
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<td>Vinnytsia</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmel'nytskyi</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total in Central Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Ukraine</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volyn</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'viv</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakarpattia</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total in Western Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total for all Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Zastavnyi (1993) and Arel (1994)
of the population of the oblast capitals than that of the corresponding oblasts. In summary, one can safely speak of a perfect positive correlation between the percentage of Russians and the percentage of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the regional/local population, leading to the obvious conclusion that the more Russian the environment, the more likely Ukrainians are to have or to adopt Russian as their first language.10

Table 1.2 Russophone Ukrainians by Region in 1989 (in percentage of total population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Capitals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East and South*</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyiv city</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ukraine</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arel (1994)

* Unfortunately the data for the east and south could not be shown separately since they were quoted together in the original source.

Ukraine’s regional diversity has had a profound impact on its post-independence political landscape, as many authors have noticed (Bojcun, 1995; Holdar, 1995; Arel and Khmelko, 1996; Birch, 1998; Craumer and Clem, 1999). In general the people of western Ukraine consistently vote for nationalist candidates, while the population of the east and south back leftist and center-left forces. Nationalists are opposed to closer ties with Russia, favor Ukraine’s present unitary status and single state language (Ukrainian) and generally back the idea of economic reform. The leftist bloc (to which communists, socialists and agrarians are usually allied), on the other hand, favors strong ties with Russia, advocates the adoption of Russian as a second state language and opposes economic reform.

The 1994 parliamentary elections witnessed particularly dramatic regional differences (Holdar, 1995). The people in the west sent 39 nationalist candidates to parliament as opposed to 27 independent candidates and only one candidate from the bloc of leftist parties. By contrast, the people in the five eastern oblasts, expressing their dissatisfaction with the deepening economic crisis and the nation-building project, voted overwhelmingly left-wing, electing 68 candidates from the communist-socialist bloc, 45 independent candidates and not a single nationalist candidate to the new parliament. In central and southern Ukraine, independent candidates captured most of the votes (71 seats in the new parliament), but the communist-socialist bloc came in as a good second (46 seats), leaving the nationalists in third place (20 seats). Because the communists and socialists emerged victorious in demographically important eastern Ukraine and performed well in the south and the center, the new 1994 parliament leaned decidedly

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10 Dostal and Knippenberg (1979) noted the same patterns for the Soviet Union in 1959 and 1970: the higher the percentage of Russians and the higher the percentage of urbanites in an oblast population, the larger the proportion of members of an ethnic minority who have Russian as their first language.
towards the left (even though independent candidates made up the largest group in parliament).

The regional pattern of the 1994 elections resurfaced to a great extent in the 1998 parliamentary elections (Craumer and Clem, 1999). Nationalist parties again principally relied on support from the seven western oblasts, and notably from L'viv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil, the three oblasts constituting the Galician heartland. Communists, socialists and agrarians, however, succeeded in significantly strengthening their base of support in the southern and central oblasts. As a result, regional differences in voting patterns between the east, the center and the south became less pronounced. The left-wing victories in all but the western oblasts and Kyiv city produced a parliament in which the political left predominated.

The regional divide was also evident in the presidential elections of 1991 and 1994. In 1991 Chornovil, Kravchuk's nationalistic contender, only obtained a majority of the vote in the western oblasts of L'viv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil (Kuzio and Wilson, 1994). In the 1994 elections, incumbent president Kravchuk, who in his term of office had focused on issues of Ukrainian state- and nation-building, rather than on economic reforms, noticed that his support base had shifted to the west: six of the seven western oblasts delivered overwhelming majorities and all of the Right Bank central oblasts, except for Kirovohrad, voted for him as well, albeit with small majorities. Kuchma, Kravchuk's opponent and the eventual winner, who called for closer ties with Russia, was victorious in all the other oblasts (Holdar, 1995). Thus, the presidential elections of 1994 effectively split Ukraine in two, with the western half of the country supporting Kravchuk and the eastern half backing Kuchma, the river Dnipro being the dividing line.

The similarity between the territorial distribution of votes and the territorial distribution of Russians and Russian speakers leads one to assume that ethnic variables (nationality and native language) are the principle determinants of electoral behavior. Combining the results of the 1994 presidential elections with survey data, Arel and Khmelko (1996, p. 81) argue that there is indeed a strong correlation between voting patterns and the "language of convenience," i.e. the language people use with a survey interviewer at home when they are asked to choose the language they feel more comfortable in - Ukrainian or Russian. Recently, however, it has been claimed that there are other variables at least as, if not more, important influencing voting conduct. Focusing on the 1994 parliamentary elections, Birch (1998) found that the percentage of retirement-age voters in a constituency had the largest effect on support for the left, with an interaction effect between ethnicity and education coming in second. Moreover, ethnic variables were not significantly correlated with votes for the nationalist camp overall, although being weakly significant in explaining votes for Rukh and the Ukrainian Republican Party individually. The preliminary results of the November 1999 second round of the presidential elections only add to the impression that ethnic variables may indeed not be the main determinant of the electoral process, as the east-west split has by and large disappeared in comparison to that seen in earlier elections.\textsuperscript{11} Incumbent

\textsuperscript{11} See UKL # 65 of 23 November 1999, in which Taras Kuzio (1999c) presents and discusses the election results broken down by oblast. This mailing list is maintained and distributed by Dominique Arel.
president Leonid Kuchma, who presented himself as a reform-minded defender of Ukrainian independence (much as Kravchuk did in the 1994 elections), received more votes than his communist challenger, Petro Symonenko, in all of the western oblasts and in Kharkiv, Donetsk’s, Dnipropetrovsk’s and Odesa, heavily urbanized (and Russian-speaking!) oblasts of the east and south. Symonenko emerged victorious in most of the rural oblasts of the center and the south. The rural/urban split thus seems to have become the dominant dividing factor.

Yet, it would be a serious mistake to dismiss language and nationality as irrelevant factors. The results of the last presidential election also showed that the western oblasts, where support for Kuchma was overwhelming (in the three oblasts of Galicia as high as 92% in each), sharply contrasted with other oblasts, where the contest between the two contenders was much closer. Hence, the regional divide is still there, suggesting that the ethnic factor is of continued importance. In their analysis of the 1998 parliamentary elections, Craumer and Clem (1999) found that language and sex ratio could explain as much as 74% of the variation in the total left-wing vote. In addition, language correlated significantly with support for the nationalists, accounting for 28% of the variation in this variable.

Given that language and ethnicity continue to operate as regionally manifested divisions in politics, visible in conflicts over issues of national sovereignty and state/nation-building, doubts can be raised about Kyiv’s chances of establishing a strong unitary Ukraine. Indeed, Wilson (1993) shows how dissatisfaction with Kyiv’s “anti-Russian” foreign policy and fear of Ukrainianization prompted the Donetsk’s and Luhans’ Oblast Councils to vote for regional autonomy during the mass miners’ strike of June 1993. By far the strongest calls for self-governance or even outright secession came from The Crimea, however, where the regional parliament provoked the national authorities from the very onset of Ukraine’s independence (Solchanyk, 1994). The Crimea’s extraordinary resistance to Kyiv can be explained by its peculiar history. Although the area was already incorporated into the Russian Empire in the 18th century, it only became part of (Soviet) Ukraine in 1954 when Khrushchev ordered the transfer by decree to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the ‘reunification’ of Ukraine with Russia. This, and the fact that 67% of its present population is Russian (making it the sole region in Ukraine in which Russians constitute a majority) gave rise to a sense of belonging to Russia, rather than Ukraine.

In sum up, Ukraine’s ethno-linguistic regional diversity, as expressed in the national parliament and in secessionist movements, make Ukraine a highly interesting case for the student of state- and nation-building. Two compelling questions can be raised: (1) Given the fact that Ukraine’s regional diversity complicates the development of a strong stable state, what strategies does the central state follow in its attempts to reduce this regional diversity? (2) What is the response of the regional population, in particular that of the Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, to these attempts?
1.2 State-Minority Relations in Ukraine: The Role of the State

The centrality of the above-mentioned questions is enhanced by the fact that many scholars have come to realize the autonomous role of the state in either diluting or triggering (and sustaining) ethnic identities (e.g. Rothschild, 1981; Breuilly, 1982; Rudolph and Thompson, 1985; Gurr, 1993; Roessingh, 1996). Some authors have argued that this so-called institutionalist approach is of special relevance to the post-Soviet world, in a sense that the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union is thought to have unintentionally contributed to the rise of ethno-national movements in the late 1980s (e.g. Brubaker, 1994; Kaiser, 1994; Knippenberg, 1996). As Brubaker (1994, p. 53) argues:

"The significance of the republics as institutional crystallizations of nationhood [in the 1920s the most populous Soviet nationalities were granted 'their own' so-called Union Republics, de jure the most far-reaching form of political-territorial autonomy] lay...in the durable institutional frame the republics provided for the long-term cultivation and consolidation of national administrative cadres and national intelligentsias...and for the long-term protection and cultivation of national languages and cultures." More specifically in the same article, Brubaker proposes that the Soviet policy of granting nationalities both a political-territorial form of autonomy and a strictly non-territorial ethnocultural kind of autonomy - in which individuals were assigned a certain nationality that was stamped in their internal passports - led to a mismatch between the two that ultimately gave rise to considerable ethnic tension both in the Soviet Union and in its successor states. This mismatch became particularly evident after World War II when large numbers of Russians, according to their passport nationality, emigrated to the non-Russian Union Republics. In the late 1980s and certainly after independence, the titular nationalities of the Union Republics came to view the republics as 'their own', utilizing institutions to further their political goals, a move the non-titular Russians took as an encroachment on their ethnocultural autonomy.

The institutional approach elaborated by Brubaker to account for the nationality problems in the post-Soviet world is, of course, most relevant for Ukraine, being the second largest post-Soviet state with, as we have seen, both a large titular Ukrainian majority and a huge non-titular Russian minority that is disproportionately living in the south and the east of the country. Thus, whatever policy the Ukrainian central state pursues vis-à-vis its Russians, this policy most certainly provokes some reaction, the nature of which is being difficult to assess beforehand. This once more underlines the importance of the two questions posed at the end of the previous section. Obviously, the state's cultural policies are also relevant for Russian-speaking Ukrainians. A program of ukrainianization, for instance, would force them to choose sides, just as it would also force the Russians to do so.

States can choose from a whole range of strategies to deal with ethnic pluralism within their boundaries. Mikesell and Murphy (1991) provide a short but useful overview of these strategies. However, to my knowledge, neither Mikesell and Murphy nor other scholars studying central-state responses to national groups have yet come up with a comprehensive theory accounting for the differences between states in their dealings with these groups. This is surprising given the growing acknowledgement that central state policy has a profound impact on the ethno-national sentiment of minority groups. Such a
theory is all the more necessary given that central state policy can change the very concepts that scholars employ to describe state-minority relations. Thus, in the case of Ukraine, scholars can no longer rely on an official categorization of Russians as a nationality since the law on citizenship of November 1991 removed the nationality stamp from internal passports and declared all those resident in the territory of Ukraine to be state citizens. Since other ethnic markers, such as religion, language and family names cannot be used to objectively distinguish Russians from Ukrainians (both groups share these attributes), it is only through old Soviet passports or by current national self-identification that we can still consider Russians and Ukrainians as separate nationalities. This is, therefore, something for the reader to keep in mind whenever Russians in Ukraine are categorized as such.

Going back to the options the Ukrainian central authorities have in combating regional diversity, it is important at this point to stress that every multinational state practices some degree of nation-building. In other words, every multinational state tries in some way to integrate regionally-based national groups to strengthen the state's unity. To my knowledge, no state has so far willingly and voluntarily ceded parts of its territory. In this respect, territorial integrity in conjunction with legitimacy is considered an inviolable attribute by every state (Unwin, 1982; Mikesell and Murphy, 1991). Only when states are forced, either by violent means or by other pressures, will they permit a more flexible territorial structure ranging from some form of political-territorial autonomy to secession of a part of its territory. Given the fact that state nation-building is universal, it is worth taking a closer look at what its elements are and exactly how it is being practised.12

One of the most important aspects of nation-building is state policy aimed at promoting the use of one standardized language in the public domain. This official state language may be a lingua franca that is not spoken as a first language by any of the state's inhabitants. Such a situation can typically be found in former colonial multinational states comprising more than two ethnic groups. In such cases it is usually the language of the former colonizing state that is chosen as the new state language. Yet, it is far more common for states to adopt the language of the dominant or titular nationality as the sole official language. Linguistic homogenisation is believed to promote a single national identity that will strengthen the state's cohesion. To reach this aim, the promotion of the language of the dominant nationality usually goes hand in hand with the neglect or suppression of languages spoken by members of non-titular minorities. This in turn often leads to these minorities protesting against what they see as a deliberate attempt by the state to eradicate their language and culture. In many cases they also resent the fact that

12 At this point it is important to stress that in the literature generally, a broader conception of nation-building can be found than presented here. In addition to embracing a nationalizing element, nation-building is usually said to have a modernizing component (see, for instance Deutsch, 1963; Knippenberg and de Pater, 1988; Zwaan, 1989). In other words, for these authors nation-building does not only involve homogenizing the population in terms of language and national identity but also integrating it in society in a social-economic way by providing education for all, by stimulating farmers to produce for the market, and by persuading redundant farm workers to work in industry. In this study, this latter part of the definition is disregarded because Ukraine is a state with an already modernized population. Also, nation-building is usually considered to be a partially autonomous process independent of state action. Here it shares an element of definition with modernization. This 'autonomous' element of the definition is also ignored. I define nation-building here as state policy intended to nationally homogenize the population.
state promotion of the language of the titular nationality gives this nationality an unfair advantage over the non-titular minorities in the competition for scarce resources.

From the point of view of the state, another essential ingredient of the nation-building process is the remodeling of its history and geography in a fashion that legitimizes the present independent state. This remodeling usually involves portraying state inhabitants and their ancestors as always having felt as ‘one’ together, as a nation that has eternally and courageously fought to obtain independence for its territorial homeland, the dimensions of which are often depicted in as broad a manner as possible. Often, the state will not rest until the last inhabitant is made to believe the desired version of its history and geography.

Finally, nation-building always involves creating central political institutions and national symbols that serve as focal points of identification for state inhabitants. Attention is directed to a national parliament, government and/or presidency that claims to represent the whole population and all of its interests. Gathered at special ceremonies, schoolchildren and military recruits swear allegiance to the fatherland, whilst looking at the national flag and singing the national anthem.

The state has a number of ‘tools’ at its disposal to enhance the use of the state language, impose its desired version of history and geography on the population and strengthen identification with central institutions and national symbols. One of these tools is the central media. By means of state television, radio, newspapers and magazines, the state can profoundly influence the information flow to its citizens and hence contribute to the nationalization of its population. In some cases, states are so ‘enthusiastic’ in their nation-building that they infringe upon the freedom of the press, which prompts non-titular minorities to accuse the state of violating human rights. Another tool used by the state is military service. Drafted for a considerable period of time, young men from all over the country are forced to use the state language to communicate with each other. In this respect, the army provides the state with an ideal setting to convey its ideology to still pliable young men as it is a highly disciplined organization that does not leave much room for individual freedom of thought.

However, by far the most effective instrument the state employs to nationalize its population is education. After all, in most states, every citizen without exception has to follow at least 10 years of school education at an age when a person’s character and social and professional skills are being formed and he or she is particularly susceptible to state propaganda. Many authors stress education’s pivotal role in the nation-building process (e.g. Bourdieu, 1967; Bock, 1971; Gellner, 1983; Knippenberg and De Pater, 1988; Simon, 1991). Thus, Knippenberg and De Pater (1988, pp. 135,136), describing the modernization and integration process in the Netherlands after 1800, argue that “Subjects like history and geography raise school pupils’ national consciousness. Moreover, when pupils, regardless of their regional background, learn the standardised state language at school, they are automatically socialised into the national culture.” Also Bock (1971, p. 18), specifically studying the role of education in the nation-building process of developing Malaysia, underlines its centrality: “In these nations where the family and other primary groups tend to socialize the child toward competing subgroup loyalties and transmit a message which is incongruent with the emergent goals of the national government, the political elite often feels compelled to undertake the resocialization of
large masses of its citizens in order to reorient them to cope with the emergent patterns of society. It is largely due to this set of circumstances that the secondary agencies of socialization, particularly the schools, assume such critical importance in the new nations.” The issue of developing countries using education as a means to construct national identities has also been identified by Makulu (1971) for the African context. Finally, Simon (1991), addressing the role of education in the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union, shows how greatly education contributed to the success of the 1920s policy of korenizatsia (stimulating the national consciousness and social-economic development of the non-Russian peoples constituting the early Soviet Union). In addition, the author discusses in detail how education was used by the Soviet authorities in the 1970s as a principal tool in reaching the goal of slyianie (merging) of the Soviet nationalities into a single Soviet Narod (people).

Not only for the nationalizing state, but also for its opponent, namely the non-titular nationality, education is of crucial importance as it represents the prime institution for the nationality to pass on its language and culture to the next generation. Not surprisingly, there are many examples of national groups accusing states of alleged attacks on non-titular language education and of forced assimilation into the dominant nationality by providing education only in the titular language. Thus, Schöpfli (1978) argues that the significant reduction in Hungarian language instruction in both secondary and university education in Romania in the 1960s and 1970s was one of the most important grievances felt by the Hungarian minority. Similarly, Poulton (1993) holds that the decision by the Serb authorities in 1976 to reduce the amount of Hungarian language teaching in the Vojvodina because of a supposed lack of qualified teachers greatly disturbed the Yugoslav Hungarian minority. Moreover, when the Serb government amended the Law on Education in 1992 to make Serbian the sole language of instruction (Hungarian language instruction could only be maintained if specifically requested by individual school authorities), the Hungarians responded immediately by setting up their own cultural organizations to provide their children with native language instruction (ibid.). The conflict in Belgium in 1969 between the two language communities about the language of instruction in Leuven/Louvain University proved to be particularly volatile, causing the university to actually split up into a Dutch-speaking section, which remained in the old town, and a French-speaking counterpart, which had to move across the language border to build its own university complex (Roessingh, 1996). In Finland between the two world wars, the bilingual Finnish-Swedish status of Helsinki University led to much antagonism between the small Swedish-speaking community and the Finnish-speaking majority. Roessingh (1996) recalls how the issue was solved peacefully by a compromise that guaranteed continued Swedish language instruction despite a petition against it signed by 300,000 Finns. These latter two examples in Belgium and Finland show how explosive the language issue can be in higher education. It does not come as a surprise, however, since higher education is of equal importance for the dominant and the non-titular nationality in producing an intelligentsia able to raise the status of a language and culture threatened with being marginalised.

Having confirmed the crucial role that central state policy and its most important element, education, play in the nationality question, it is surprising to find that scholars have paid almost no attention to issues of education in the post-Soviet successor states,
which all face difficulties with non-titular minority nationalities. For Ukraine this is all the more surprising since, contrary to most other Soviet republics, it saw a considerable number of its titular nationality (Ukrainians) send their children to non-titular (Russian) language schools in Soviet times. In fact, while the titular Ukrainians make up a solid majority of the population (72.7%), only a minority of Ukraine’s pupils were taught in Ukrainian in 1989 (47.5%) and a majority in Russian (51.6%).\textsuperscript{13} Arel (1995a), who is one of the few authors to concentrate on educational issues in the process of nation-building, notes that this situation was much resented by the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia of the late 1980s. Therefore, in an attempt to gain a better understanding of this almost virgin field of research, this study will explicitly focus on education as the central state’s main instrument of nation-building, although other aspects of nation-building will not be ignored when they are deemed of interest.

1.3 State-Minority Relations in Ukraine: The Response of the Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians

Much academic attention has focused on the political attitudes (surveys) and conduct (elections) of the Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in post-independence Ukraine. Using 1994 survey data, Arel and Khmelko (1996) found that Ukraine was deeply split along linguistic, national and regional lines regarding attitudes towards the issues of disarmament and Ukraine’s relations with Russia. Guboglo (1996, p. 100) also discovered significant differences between the nationalities in their evaluation of Ukraine’s independence (with 60.5% of Ukrainians displaying a positive attitude toward Ukraine’s independence as opposed to only 35.7% of Russians).\textsuperscript{14} Miller \textit{et al.} (1998) found pride in national symbols, identification with the Soviet Union, and support for communists to correlate strongly with region and ethnic identification (nationality). People from west Ukraine and people identifying themselves as Ukrainians showed much more of pride when seeing the national flag and expressed a substantially weaker Soviet identification than people from eastern Ukraine and people identifying themselves as non-titulars. While support for communists correlated with ethnic identification in western Ukraine, it was primarily governed by class identification in eastern Ukraine.\textsuperscript{15}

Bremmer (1994) also encountered both a regional and a national dimension to the political opinion process in his 1992 survey, carried out in the cities of L’viv, Kyiv and Simferopol. Attempting to classify the responses of Russians, he used the typology of \textit{Exit, Voice and Loyalty}, as developed by Hirschman (1970), with ‘exit’ referring to rejection of the new state and a demand for territorial autonomy or secession, ‘voice’ pertaining to participation in the new system with accompanying demands for ethnic recognition, and ‘integration’ (which Bremmer used instead of ‘loyalty’) meaning a

\textsuperscript{13} For the 1989 data on pupils, see: \textit{Rozpodil zahalnoosvitnykh ... rik} (unpublished document of the Ministry of Education).

\textsuperscript{14} Guboglo’s data are based on a survey administered in the cities of Kyiv and Donets’k in the summer of 1994. Therefore, his data are not representative of all Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine.

\textsuperscript{15} The data of Miller \textit{et al.} were based on nationwide representative surveys held in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania in 1992, 1995 and 1997.
justification of and full compliance with the new order. His main finding was that the Russians in Kyiv showed the highest propensity to integrate. This was a surprising result given that Bremmer’s *ethnic attachment* model expected the highest level of Russian integration to occur in places where their numbers were smallest and their residential history was shortest (i.e. in L’viv and not in Kyiv). The highest inter-ethnic difference was found in Simferopol with high rates of ‘exit’ among Russians contrasting sharply with the more moderate attitudes of Ukrainians.

As to political conduct, Section 1.1 has already discussed extensively the regional dimension in the voting patterns of the parliamentary and presidential elections. In addition, Arel and Wilson (1994) found a rural-urban cleavage (with the peasantry in all regions except the west supporting left-wing forces) to operating alongside an increasingly more pronounced regional division (east and south versus center and west).

As rich as the literature is on the political response of the Russians (and Russophone Ukrainians) as scant it is on their specific cultural response. Little is known about the linguistic attitudes and behavior of both groups in the various regions of Ukraine. To what extent do Russians and Russophone Ukrainians send their children to titular-language schools? Are they making a conscious effort to raise their children in Ukrainian? Do we already see a language shift occurring between two generations? The almost complete neglect of the cultural dimension is all the more remarkable in view of the likelihood of a strong link between linguistic behavior and identity formation. Thus, Kolstoe (1996, pp. 613, 617) asserts that “An identification with the dominant culture in the state of residence” is in most cases accompanied by assimilation. In his view, Russians who adopt the titular language as their mother tongue will “shed their identity as being ethnic Russians” and will at most have “a hazy memory of the distant origin of their forebears.” Conversely, language retention is most likely related to “an identification with the dominant culture in the external homeland,” or to “the development of a new but still basically Russian self-understanding.” Laitin (1998, p. 23) sees a similar close connection between language and identity:

One might argue that adopting a new language does not automatically mean one has adopted a new identity. Yet if Liuba Grigor’ev [a member of the Russian minority in Estonia, GJ] had felt like a traitor or fool for taking Estonian language lessons, her motivation would have been sapped. Her identity was becoming “a Russian who has accommodated to the realities of Estonian sovereignty.” This was the real “Liuba.” But these microadjustments in identity (...) alter the identity possibilities of a following age. In this sense, Liuba’s quest to keep her family intact lays the foundation for a constructed Estonian identity for her grandchildren.

Hence, the type of linguistic response is an important clue for the development of (new) identities. For this reason, the emphasis is on the particular linguistic response of the Russian speakers (Russians and Ukrainians) in the present study.
1.4 Research Questions

The two central questions at the end of Section 1.1 can now be reformulated into the following research questions, taking into account the considerations of the previous sections.

1. What kind of nation-building policies did the national authorities introduce in the field of education in the post-Glasnost era?
   This question is subdivided into:
   a. How do the current policies compare to those in Soviet times?
   b. How can the current policies be explained?
   c. To what extent have these policies been implemented in the various regions?
   d. What has been the role of local state administrations in this implementation?
      (i.e. have these administrations accelerated or diluted the implementation of central policies and to what extent have they developed their own policies?)

2. How do the local Russians and Russophone Ukrainians react to the current nation-building policies in education?
   This question is subdivided into:
   a. How do the local Russians and Russophone Ukrainians respond linguistically?
      (i.e. in terms of school choice, language use and attitudes, and cultural self-organization)
   b. How can the pattern of responses be explained?

Chapters Three and Four examine question 1a. Chapter Three discusses the structure of the educational system as it determines the amount of freedom regional or city bodies of administration and schools have in following their own policies. Attention will focus in particular on language policies as these prove to be the source of much heated debate. Regulations are discussed concerning the language of instruction in schools and institutions of higher education and the number of hours in the curriculum devoted to Ukrainian and Russian as subjects. In the concluding section I seek to explain Ukraine’s nationalizing programme by comparing it to nation-building and education policies of other Soviet successor states (question 1b). This attempt at interpretation will have a largely exploratory character due to the scarcity of academic works developing a theoretical framework for the comparative study of post-Soviet nationalizing projects. Chapter Four is entirely devoted to history, geography and literature teaching because of the role these subjects play in instilling a form of national consciousness into the pupil’s mind. Chapter Five deals specifically with the implementation of central state policy in the regions (question 1c). It will present detailed low-aggregate statistical data on the language of instruction in schools and in institutions of higher education. Chapter Six addresses question 1d – the autonomous role of the local state. Attention will focus on the strategies local state administrations use to stimulate or attenuate the implementation of central policies.

Chapter Seven discusses the linguistic reaction of the local Russian-speaking population (question 2a), and how it can be explained and interpreted (2b). To measure this reaction, a survey was done among pupils of two batches at both Russian and
Ukrainian schools in four cities, one in each of Ukraine’s four regions. Pupils were asked to state the nationality of their parents and answer questions about their language behavior at home and at school, which enabled us to draw conclusions about the willingness of Russophone parents to send their children to Ukrainian-language schools and about the patterns of language use of parents and pupils both in public and private and settings. Interviews with state and school officials provided information about the degree of self-organization among Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians (to what extent they established their own private schools and cultural or political societies). The two cohorts of pupils allowed us to check the dynamics of school choice and language behavior. Finally, as research was done in Kyïv (central Ukraine), L’viv (western Ukraine), Odesa (southern Ukraine) and Donets’k (eastern Ukraine), the country’s regional diversity, which has left it with varying proportions of Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the local population, was maximally accounted for.

Comparing the same cultural groups in four places within one country is, in fact, unusual. Nearly all comparative studies involve cross-border comparisons of ethnic phenomena. However, Bremmer (1994) in his elucidating article on the political outlook of Russians in Ukraine also compared Russians and Ukrainians in three Ukrainian cities, the choice of which was motivated by a theoretical framework that has served as a guideline for this research as well. Chapter Two, which gives an overview of the theoretical approaches to ethnic pluralism, elaborates on this framework in further detail and shows how it shapes the methodology of this research.

1.5 The Role of Russia

This study has been couched in a two-actor model of a central state versus a non-titular nationality (Russians) and non-titular language-speaking group (Russian-speaking Ukrainians). Obviously a third actor, which Brubaker (1995, pp. 109,110) calls the “external national homeland”, may also exert a considerable influence over both actors. Thus, in the case of Ukraine, Russia, as the external national homeland of the Russian minority, can put pressure on the Ukrainian central state to ease ukrainianization policies. At the same time, Russia can support the Russian minority and thereby encourage it to raise its demands for some degree of cultural or political autonomy. The Ukrainian government may respond to pressure from Russia by making concessions to the Russian minority. In contrast, the central government could also be irritated by Russia’s attempts to “meddle in Ukraine’s internal affairs” and react by speeding up ukrainianization. Lastly, the Russian minority might respond in different ways to support from Russia. It could be encouraged to raise its demands, but it could ‘sit back and relax’ as well, reassured by the idea that ‘Mother’ Russia will always be there to help in case of emergency. Conversely, a lack of support from Russia might also stimulate Ukraine’s Russians to raise their demands, knowing that without external help they are forced to stand up for themselves.

Clearly, therefore, Russia is likely to influence Ukraine’s central policy making and the Russian minority’s demands. However, for a number of reasons this research does not pay attention to Russia as a factor of some influence. First, the specific field of
education is almost always a state’s internal affair. Cases in which one state is permitted to play a role in another state’s educational system are rare indeed and usually only surface in extreme circumstances.\textsuperscript{16} During the course of this research project I found no indication of Russia being in any way involved in Ukraine’s educational system. Second, if Russia were at all influential, it would be difficult to ascertain its precise role. At this point we have to make a distinction between any influence of the central government in Moscow and influence of local or regional actors operating along Ukraine’s borders. To get a clear overview of the influence of the latter, one would have to engage in measuring cross-border contacts, which, even if at all feasible, requires a separate research project in itself. To determine the influence of the Russian government one could concentrate on public statements and concrete policy steps of prominent Russian office-holders and on Ukraine’s response to these statements and/or actions. However, whether Russian pressure is indeed effective in influencing certain Ukrainian policies would still be a difficult question to answer since Ukrainian politicians will never openly admit to bowing to Russian pressure. Finally, the fact that nearly all Soviet successor states have Russian minorities, who naturally all consider Russia to be their external national homeland, makes comparisons between these states easier, as the influence of the ‘external national homeland’ factor can be controlled.\textsuperscript{17} To put it differently, because the Russian minorities in the successor states all share the same external national homeland, one can compare successor states on their \textit{central state - Russian minority relations independently of the influence of the external homeland factor}.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} For such an example, see Hin and Sigaloff (1996), who found that the national authorities in war-torn Georgia were not able to prevent Armenia from providing the Armenian minority in Georgia with Armenian schoolbooks.

\textsuperscript{17} We assume that Russia behaves in more or less the same way towards all successor states with Russian minorities.

\textsuperscript{18} Though admittedly, conclusions about \textit{central state - Russian minority relations} would then only be valid in the post-Soviet context.