Nation-building in post-Soviet Ukraine: educational policy and the response of the Russian-speaking population

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Citation for published version (APA):

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6 THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Fieldwork in the four cities of this study enabled the author to examine to what extent local state bodies shape the implementation of centrally announced policies. This chapter will show that the local impact on school education matters has indeed been substantial. The next four sections discuss the cities individually while the fifth is dedicated to differing practices in higher education. The subsequent section reports on the state of education in Simferopol, the capital of The Crimea, in order to examine to what extent the central state has managed to implement its policies in this monolith of Russian language and culture. The chapter ends with a short conclusion in which the local policies of the four cities are compared.

6.1 The City of L’viv

In L’viv, the center of nationalist western Ukraine, the turnaround of local policy came in March 1990, when Rukh captured the majority of the votes in the city soviet elections (Hentosh, 1998, interview). Until then, the number of Russian schools had grown to 24, and thereafter it declined year by year until in 1997-98 only five were left out of a total of 108 schools. At the same time the number of mixed schools, where instruction is in both Russian and Ukrainian, increased from seven in 1989-90 to twenty-one in 1993-94, after which the number declined again to seventeen in 1997-98.84 Taken together, these figures indicate that many of the former Russian schools are now in the transitional stage of becoming fully Ukrainian.

According to leaders of the Russian community, this sharp reduction in Russian-language education is a consequence of the power politics of the nationalist city authorities. Local school administrations reportedly pressurized directors of Russian schools into opening only Ukrainian-language first-grade classes.85 It is asserted that directors who refused to give in to this pressure were fired.86 A local educational periodical, for instance, tells the story of Alla Pozdniakova, the Director of School no. 17 and chairman of the Association Russkaia Shkola, who was fired by the local authorities for offering alcohol at a school meeting of vice-directors of the schools of the city district. This particular attempt to change the director failed as a district court overturned the dismissal and reinstated Mrs. Pozdniakova (Pedagogicheskii Kaleidoskop, 1996, No. 41). However, a personal check by the author found that in at least six of the seventeen former Russian and now (1997-98) mixed schools lasting personnel changes had occurred.

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84 Vidomosti pro movy navchannia ta vyvchennia movy iak predmeta u serednikh zahal’noosvitiakh navchal’novo-vykhovnykh zakladakh (1997-98), (statistical data on a standard form which was provided by the L’viv Department of Education. All regional and local bodies of the state executive use this form to keep track of the Ukrainianization process), hereafter Vidomosti + city + school year; private notes of Vladimir Kravchenko, Director of school no. 45 in L’viv.

85 Due to the sensitivity of the topic, these leaders asked not to be named (interviews in May and November 1997).

86 Here it must be remembered that Article 84 the March 1996 Law on Education gave local authorities the power to appoint and dismiss school directors (VVRU, 1996, No. 21).
6.2 The City of Kyiv

As noted before, Kyiv witnessed a spectacular growth of the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils: from an all-time low of 21.7% in 1989-90 to 82.2% in 1997-98. As there was no instruction in languages other than Ukrainian and Russian, the percentage of Russian-taught schoolchildren, conversely, declined from 78.3% in 1989-90 to 17.8% in 1997-98. Even more astounding is the decrease in the number of Russian schools: from 151 out of a total of 299 schools in 1989-90 to a mere 16 schools out of a total of 376 in 1997-98. In fact, the decline has been so dramatic that by 1997-98 Kyiv had proportionally fewer Russian schools (4.25%) than L’viv (4.63%). The decrease is reflected in the percentage of first graders taught in Russian: whereas Kyiv has a Russian population of 20.9%, the latter figure stood at a meager 6.4% in 1997-98. This means that many Russian children must have been enrolled in Ukrainian first-grade classes in that year.

The question is how these trends can be explained. Part of the answer may lie in the fact that the Kyivyan population, though using Russian as the language of conversation in the street and at work, has consistently shown support for nationalist parties and candidates both in national (parliamentary and presidential) and in local elections. Nonetheless, the initiative to ukrainianize the school system in Kyiv may well have come from the national authorities instead, as in May 1992 Kravchuk-appointed Mayor Ivan Salyi appears to have simply ordered the vast majority of Russian school directors to change the status of their schools (Tchaikovs’ka, 1996, interview). One of these directors recalled how he and his colleagues were summoned to a meeting at the Mins’ka city-district office, where the educational authorities told them to start opening Ukrainian classes (Hlushchenko, 1996, interview). But, whereas the authorities claim that this order was based on the results of a survey which allegedly indicated that a large majority of both Russian and Ukrainian parents wanted Ukrainian-language education for their children (Tchaikovs’ka, 1996, interview), others argue that no such survey was ever carried out, characterizing the order of the mayor as a *Ukaze* from above and as coming in response to actual parental requests (Gratchev; Shurov, 1997, interviews). Thus, it is doubtful whether the current proportions of Ukrainian and Russian-instructed pupils are an accurate reflection of parental preferences. Furthermore, in contrast to L’viv, the local educational authorities in Kyiv do not allow the parallel opening of Russian classes alongside Ukrainian ones. As a result, a great number of former Russian schools started

91 For the 1989-90 Kyiv data, see: *Vidomosti pro ... RSR* (unpublished document); for the 1997-98 Kyiv data, see: *Statystychnyi zbiryk ... Ukrainy* (1998).
92 The percentage of first graders instructed in Russian is calculated from statistics that can be found in *Vidomosti, Kyiv* (1997-98). As in L’viv, this document was provided by the local education office.
93 In the 1990 parliamentary elections, the Democratic Bloc gained a majority of the votes in Kyiv at the expense of the communist anti-reform Group of 239; in the 1994 parliamentary elections Kyiv elected four *Rukh* representatives and no left-wing; in the 1994 presidential elections Leonid Kravchuk, the nationalist incumbent president and losing candidate, gained 60% of the Kyiv vote (Arel, 1990; Holdar, 1995). In the 1994 city soviet elections, the communists captured only four seats and the socialists a meagre two out of a total of seventy seats (Grachev, 1996, interview).
94 The mayors of Kyiv and Sevastopol are appointed by the president.
95 Interview with Hlushchenko (1996) and personal observations. See also Arel (1995a).
the process of becoming fully Ukrainian. (In 1992-93, when the mayor’s order was implemented on a large scale, as many as 238 schools out of a total of 330 were in the process of changing; by 1997-98, this number had declined to 156 out of 376 schools, since many of the schools previously in transition had become Ukrainian.)

A closer look at the spectacular pace of ukrainianization in Kyïv reveals that the year-to-year change in the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils was so dramatic - 13 percentage points alone between the 1992-93 and 1993-94 school years: from 41.7% to 54.7% (Statystychni dani pro ..., unpublished document) - that it is doubtful whether this was caused solely by the replacement of old Russian-instructed batches by new Ukrainian-instructed cohorts. Indeed, personal observations revealed that classes had actually switched the language of instruction in at least three of the Ukrainian and mixed schools that were visited. It could not be determined whether this was the result of pressure from the local authorities or whether overzealous directors or parents had brought this about. However, it is known for certain that the practice of switching the language of instruction was not just confined to Kyïv. Elsewhere, however, the change of language of instruction does not seem to have happened on the same scale and at the same speed as it did in Kyïv.

In Kyïv the state of the Russian language as a subject appears to be better than in L’viv. As many as 27% of the Ukrainian-instructed pupils were still taught Russian as a compulsory state or school component subject in 1997-98, and another 3% of these pupils (or 8,111 in absolute numbers) chose it as a facultative subject (Vidomosti, Kyïv, 1997-98). The Ukrainian schools in Kyïv thus seem to appreciate the subject much more than in L’viv.

6.3 The City of Odesa

Despite its multinational, thoroughly Russian-speaking population and the politically neutral color of its city soviet, Odesa, the famous seaport of the south, has witnessed a strong ukrainianization campaign in education since independence. This campaign has proceeded in a stop-go manner. From 1991-92 to 1993-94 the number of Ukrainian schools by status (i.e. including mixed schools) jumped from four to twenty out of a total of 124 schools, from 1993-94 to 1995-96 it declined to 16, and after that it once more rocketed to 51 schools out of a total of 133 schools in 1997-98 (Dynamika rozvytku ... Odesy, unpublished document). The two periods of rapid ukrainianization coincide with the terms of office of one man: Serhii Kozyts’kyi, a physicist and strong supporter of

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96 For the 1992-93 data, see: Statystychni dani pro ... (unpublished document); for the 1997-98 data, see: Statystychnyi zbirnyk ...Ukrainy (1998).
97 This had occurred in school no. 20, school no. 170 and school no. 240, which were all located in the Mins’ka district.
98 I discovered that in some of the schools in Donets’k and Odesa classes had switched from Russian to Ukrainian as well.
99 Neither nationalists nor communists had seats in the 1994-98 city soviet. All but five of the 62 seats were in the hands of independent deputies (Yakupov, 1997, interview).
100 The number of 51 includes so-called beginner schools (only grades one, two and three), which serve as preparatory schools for gymnasiums and lyceums.
From 1991 to 1994 he was head of the Department of Education of the Odesa Oblast Administration, and in 1995 the independent-minded anti-communist mayor, Eduard Hurvitz, appointed him Head of the Education Office of the Odesa City Administration.

Intending to ‘bring the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils into concordance with the Ukrainian element in the population,’ Kozyts’kyi proudly told me how he had managed to raise the proportion of Ukrainian-taught first-graders from 8% in 1991-92 to 39% in 1997-98, just ten percentage points short of the Ukrainian element in the population (Kozyts’kyi, 1997, interview). According to an inspector working in the same department, the procedure of ukrainianization had been as follows (Maskaleva, 1997, interview). First, their department determined how many schools would have to become Ukrainian in each city district in order for the network of schools to correspond to the national composition of the population. Next, the material base of schools (i.e. the availability of Ukrainian teaching materials and teachers with a sufficient command of Ukrainian) was checked and the school directors and parent committees were consulted. Upon receiving the assent of the latter, the local authorities then proceeded to change the status of a school. Thus, it was claimed that ukrainianization had been implemented in a democratic way, in accordance with the preferences of parents and school directors.

In a similar vein, it was denied that any pressure was used on the side of the authorities to ‘persuade’ schools to switch status. However, a year later, when the author visited Odesa again and the new mayor, Ruslan Bodelan, had replaced Kozyts’kyi, the same inspector disclosed that those schools that had refused to become Ukrainian during Kozyts’kyi’s first term of office “regretted their decision” when Kozyts’kyi became Head of the City Education Office.

Other aspects of local policy only confirm the impression that the ukrainianization campaign was not so liberal and considerate after all. As in Kyïv, for instance, it was forbidden for Russian schools that had changed status to open Russian first-grade classes alongside Ukrainian ones, no matter how many parents with school-aged children applied for Russian-language instruction at these schools. These parents who often began to take an interest in school matters at a very late stage, were thus, to their surprise, confronted with a fait accompli, namely a predetermined network of schools. For many, the ensuing choice was to send their child either to the closest school, which had suddenly become Ukrainian and only had Ukrainian classes first-grade classes, or to a Russian school further away. Another, equally strict measure obliged all schools (i.e. including Russian ones) to only use Ukrainian in internal documentation and at school meetings from 1 September 1997. In addition, all schools were ordered to teach humanitarian

101 The figure of 39% can also be calculated from data found in Kontynhenty uchniv... roku (unpublished document).
102 A document given to me called Prohrama rozvytku merezhi navchal’no-vykhovnykh zakladiv z derzhavnoi movoiu navchannia do 2000 roku specified, year by year, which schools would change status and open Ukrainian first-grade classes.
103 This version of events was confirmed by several school directors.
104 According to Kozyts’kyi, a parallel opening of Russian language classes would have a negative impact on the ‘language regime’, leading to an impaired acquisition of Ukrainian by the child.
105 In October 1998, I noticed how all the signs and inscriptions in Russian school no. 8 were in Ukrainian.
subjects (history, geography and law) in Ukrainian in the 1998-99 school year. Moreover, by the 1 September 1999 all new and existing gymnasiums and lyceums would have to function in or switch to Ukrainian as the language of instruction.  

The changes in Odesa seem not to have affected the teaching of the Russian language as a subject in Ukrainian schools. Although precise data were not collected, the author found that in all four Ukrainian schools that were visited the Russian language was still taught.

6.4 The City of Donets’k

Left-wing political forces have dominated both the Donets’k city council and the Donets’k oblast council since independence. In contrast to Odesa, there have not been personnel changes in the department of education of the city administration. These features of local politics have caused local educational policy to markedly differ from that in the other three cities. Whereas in L’viv, Kyïv and Odesa local policy strives to make the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils correspond to the Ukrainian element in the population (or make it even larger), in Donets’k it only aims at bestowing the status of Ukrainian school on at least one school in each of the nine city districts (Kamennova, 1997, interview). Naturally, this was not a difficult task to fulfill: in 1997-98 Donets’k had 15 schools which were Ukrainian by status and each city district had at least one. Yet, given that there were 163 schools in total, it is clear that the network of schools did not correspond to the share of Ukrainians in the local population (39.4%). Asked whether this did not contradict national policy, a local official answered:

The decree(s) stipulating that the percentage of Ukrainian-instructed first-grade pupils should be brought into line with the percentage of Ukrainians in the population only has the character of a recommendation. Until we receive orders from Kyïv obliging us to do something, we proceed from the Language Law. Since the first clause of the Article on school education states that parents have the right to choose the language of instruction for their children, this is what we follow (Demura, 1997, interview).

Local policy in Donets’k further completely deviated from that in Kyïv and Odesa in that it allowed schools which were Ukrainian by status to open parallel Russian classes, because, as the same official told the author: “It does not say anywhere in the Language Law that parallel classes should not be opened.”

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106 These last three measures can be found in Nakaz (order) No. 481 of 28-8-1997 of the education office.
107 Although independent candidates captured the majority of the seats in both councils in the 1994 elections, most of these candidates allied with the Left, i.e. the Communist Party, the Labor Party, and the Socialist Party, which occupied the remainder of the seats (Rybakov, 1997, interview). Data on the composition of both councils was obtained from the local authorities.
108 According to Kamennova, her boss Valentin Lukianov, Head of the City Education Office, had until that moment managed to resist pressure from Kyïv, the oblast authorities and various nationalist parties to speed up Ukrainianization.
109 The Department of Education of the Donets’k Oblast Administration provided me with a list of Ukrainian schools.
Law that Ukrainian schools cannot open Russian classes. What is more, the whole concept or status of *Ukrainian school* does not have any legal basis.” Moreover, unlike the authorities in Odesa, the local powers in Donets’k did not require schools to use Ukrainian as the language of internal documentation and meetings. Schools’ correspondence and communication with the district and city administrations was still mostly in Russian as well (Kamennova, 1998, interview). The oblast administration, however, issued and accepted only documentation in Ukrainian.

As could be expected from a thoroughly Russian-speaking city like Donets’k, the relative number of pupils studying the subject of Russian in Ukrainian schools was much higher than in the cities of Kyïv and L’viv. Data show that 78% of the Ukrainian-instructed pupils were taught Russian as either a state component or compulsory school component subject in the 1997-98 school year.110

Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that local policy in Donets’k completely ignored central regulations as it appeared from detailed statistics provided by the educational department that the ministerial decree obliging Russian schools to open Ukrainian classes when there were 8-10 parental requests was carefully followed. In fact, this particular policy can help explain why 10.1% of Donets’k’s first graders were taught in Ukrainian in 1997-98, compared to only 4.2% of the pupils of all grades (*Vidomosti*, Donets’k, 1997-98). Given that many schools which were Russian by status opened one or two parallel Ukrainian classes and some schools which were Ukrainian by status opened one or two parallel Russian classes, one could argue that, though different in status, ‘Russian’ and ‘Ukrainian’ schools can in practice be identical in Donets’k (with both of them opening Ukrainian and Russian classes simultaneously and thus qualifying as bilingual schools in our conception).

### 6.5 Higher Education

Although institutions of higher education are directly subordinate to the Ministry of Education, I found some differences between cities, between *vuzy* within a city, and between disciplines within one *vuz* regarding the implementation of language regulations. Thus, whereas the emphasis in Donets’k seemed to be on the creation of Ukrainian-instructed academic groups running parallel to Russian groups, in Odesa there appeared to be a preference for a gradual increase in the number of subjects taught in Ukrainian, resulting in a growing number of bilingually-instructed academic groups (Ivanitsyn, 1997, interview).111 Odesa also provides an example of differences between *vuzy* within one city: while some faculties of the State University of Odesa showed no real hurry in increasing the number of Ukrainian-instructed subjects or academic groups, the Odesa Economic Institute and the Polytechnical University seemed to aim for a complete ukrainianization of the *vuz* within five years, using the transition method known from

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110 *Vidomosti* of the city of Donets’k (1997-98).

111 Interviews with Ivanitsyn, the Vice Rector for Educational Matters of the State University of Odesa, and with the Vice Rector for Educational Matters of the Polytechnical University of Odesa (1997).

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school education (i.e., an annual phasing out of Russian-instructed cohorts). The State University of Donets'k offers an example of variations between disciplines within one university: an inspection report contrasts the Faculty of Chemistry, where 8 of the 21 academic groups received all their subjects in Ukrainian, with the Faculty of Accounting and Financing, where all academic groups were still exclusively instructed in Russian in the 1997-98 university year (Dovidka Universiteti, unpublished document).

However, despite these differences, the university officials in Odesa and Donets'k were unanimous in their opinion that the Ministry of Education did not exert strong pressure on vuzy and lecturers to cease the practice of allowing students to vote on the language of instruction. Hereby they implicitly acknowledged that this practice still occurred. Several students at the Donets'k State University and the Polytechnical University of Odesa confirmed that they had indeed been given the opportunity to determine the language of instruction. In fact, voting on the language of education in combination with the presence of lecturers with an impaired command of Ukrainian can account for the fact that many of the subjects that should already have been taught in Ukrainian (according to some internal university decree) were still given in Russian. At the same time, this is an indication that university statistics on the language of instruction may not be very reliable.

The difficulties with the introduction of Ukrainian as the language of instruction notwithstanding, it appeared that all vuzy visited by the author in Odesa and Donets'k (and in L'viv and Kyiv as well) fulfilled the obligation of administering a Ukrainian-language entrance exam to students wishing admission to a vuze. Thus, at least one important aspect of central policy, intended to encourage parents to send their children to Ukrainian-language schools, was followed up in the south and east.

6.6 Simferopol

Although The Crimea falls somewhat outside the scope of this research for the simple reason that Ukrainian-language education was and is virtually non-existent on the peninsula, it is interesting to see to what extent the central state has managed to

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112 Interviews with Khmarsky, Koval, Matveev and with the Vice Rector for Educational Matters of the Polytechnical University of Odesa (1997). The first two university officials asserted that a majority of the first-grade subjects in their faculties were still instructed in Russian and that there was no real pressure from the central administration of the university to increase the number of Ukrainian-instructed subjects.

113 According to Khmarsky (see above), the Ministry of Education understood that if vuzy imposed strict language regulations on their personnel, they would lose many qualified lecturers.

114 Matveev and the Vice Rector for Educational Matters of the Polytechnical University of Odesa (see above) claimed that first- and second-year students should receive all subjects in Ukrainian in the 1997-98 educational year. However, the teaching staff of both vuzy appeared not to be able to live up to this demand as a first-grade student at the Odesa Economic Institute conceded that still about 50% of subjects were taught in Russian while two first-grade students of the Polytechnical University told the author that as many as 5 out of 7 subjects were given in Russian in the first semester. Moreover, the two students of the Polytechnical University stated that several teachers had given the students a choice in language of instruction.

115 Khmarsky (see above) disclosed that if only one subject in a certain year is given in Ukrainian then all the students of that year are considered to be receiving instruction in Ukrainian.
implement its policies in this stronghold of Russian resistance. An analysis of the sphere of education is particularly worthwhile as the constitution does not grant the autonomous republic special powers in this domain (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). Thus, The Crimean authorities formally have to do what the Ministry of Education tells them to. Whether they in reality obey Kyïv is, of course, another matter and one worth investigating. For this reason, Simferopol, the capital of The Crimea, was paid a visit.

As it turned out, school education in The Crimea had its peculiarities. This starts with the imbalance between the offer of Ukrainian-language education and the proportion of Ukrainians in the population: whereas Ukrainians constitute 25.8% of The Crimean population, only 0.3% of all pupils were instructed in Ukrainian in 1997-98. In fact, there was only one full-fledged Ukrainian school on the whole of the peninsula in this year (Statystichnyi zbirnyk...Ukrainy, 1998). Obviously, this state of affairs flouts the central policy aim of bringing the proportion of Ukrainian-instructed pupils in line with the Ukrainian element in the population. Consequently, the national authorities have frequently accused The Crimean republic of sabotaging central instructions. Yet, the republic authorities could always mask their unwillingness to open Ukrainian classes - and therefore their defiance of central rule - by arguing that there simply were not enough parental requests for Ukrainian-language instruction. Nonetheless, the negative attitude of The Crimean administration towards ukrainianization was clearly reflected in a legal document dedicated to the development of minority (Ukrainian and Tatar) language schools. In its final version, two crucial clauses of the project paper, which would have foreseen a year-by-year ukrainianization of 150 of the 587 schools of the peninsula, were omitted, leaving the adopted document as a toothless piece of hollow rhetoric.

An aspect of local policy that plainly violated central legislation was the substitution of the compulsory history of Ukraine exam in the 11th grade by a self-prepared exam on world history. According to a local education official, The Crimean authorities refused to administer a central history of Ukraine exam “that was prepared by those nationalist maniacs from L’viv” (Yakovleva, 1997, interview). In addition to the world history exam, the local powers produced a Russian language exam and offered it as an alternative to the central Ukrainian language exam in the 11th grade. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of the 11th grade pupils chose the Russian exam. As a result of these practices, many 11th grade pupils took only one of the three prescribed central exams, namely mathematics. Hereby they sharply deviated from the program of the 11th graders in the remainder of Ukraine, who all had to take the three central exams. However, the aforementioned executive expected Kyïv to put an end to the independently prepared exams in the near future.

These particularities notwithstanding, the same official informed the author that from 1 September 1997 all Crimean schools had started to work with the Kyïv curricula,

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116 See Article 137 for matters on which the autonomous republic has special authority.
117 For an article denouncing this situation, see Zerkalo Nedeli, 7-8-1999.
118 The document was called Programma formirovania i razvitia sety obrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdenii, klassov s Ukrainskim, Krymskotatarskim iazykami obuchenia, shkol i klassov s dvumia iazykami obuchenia, and was given legal force by Decree no. 260 of 27 August 1997 of the Council of Ministers of The Crimean Republic. Unfortunately the author could not trace the periodical(s) that had published the text of the project paper.
programs and textbooks. A personal check in Schools 3, 21 and 25 in Simferopol revealed that this indeed seemed to be the case. The schools even used the new history of Ukraine textbooks, which, as we have seen, present an account of history that sharply contrasts with the Russian-Soviet version. The teaching staff conceded that they were actually glad to have received these textbooks—which were available in a Russian translation (!)—as until that time they had constantly been tormented by a lack of teaching materials. The introduction of Ukrainian language and literature as a school subject appeared to have been an equally successful campaign: whereas in Soviet days only a few schools offered Ukrainian language and literature, in 1997-98 as many as 99.7% of Crimean pupils studied the subject, according to the aforementioned state employee. Thus, under Kuchma the national authorities appear to have significantly strengthened their grip on this recalcitrant region in the sphere of school education.

As could be expected, there were peculiarities in higher education too. Thus, the author was surprised to find that vuzy in Simferopol appeared to grant future students a choice between a Ukrainian-language entrance exam, which is compulsory in the rest of Ukraine, and a Russian one. Obviously, in Russian-dominated Crimea, more than 90% of the students chose the Russian version. Moreover, the other entrance exams (in mathematics, physics or biology) had to be taken in Russian as the university staff could not prepare them in Ukrainian.

6.7 Conclusion

A brief overview of local educational policy reveals that ukrainianization practices in Donets’k were the least radical. There, local policy obviously acted as a break on and even contradicted central policy. It is difficult to determine in which of the other three cities local ukrainianization programs are more severe. Although L’viv had relatively liberal provisions compared to Kyiv and Odesa, there are indications that it has embarked on a policy of systematically purging directors of Russian schools, a radical element of local policy not found in Kyiv or Odesa.

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119 Until the introduction of the Kyiv curricula and programs, the schools in The Crimea had functioned on a Crimean curriculum, using programs prepared by the Ministry of Education of The Crimea. Iakovleva also disclosed that their department had stopped abiding by The Crimean Law on Education and had started following the Ukrainian Law on Education.

120 In an article in a local newspaper it is asserted that the introduction of the Kyiv programs and textbooks in the schools in Sevastopol presented the families of the personnel of the Russian part of the Black Sea Fleet with a huge problem. Given that these programs and textbooks strongly deviated from those of the Russian Federation, the school leavers from these families would face difficulties when entering vuzy in Russia. The article foresees a rush of pupils, not only from the families of Russian navy personnel but also from ordinary Crimean families, to attend the only official Russian school in Sevastopol (i.e., a school under the authority of the Russian Federation), which is currently being set up (Krymskoe Vremia, 12 November 1997).

121 Denis Shevchenko, a second-year student of journalism at the Tavrian Ecological University proudly told the author that he was one of the few who had taken a Ukrainian-language entrance exam. Roman Monasypov, a second-year student at the Institute of Environmental Protection and Health Resort Building, also spoke to the author on this subject (interviews in November 1997).
The differences between the cities in local policy, especially those between Odesa and Donets’k, appear to have mostly sprung from the persons in charge of the local education departments. It is remarkable that one official could leave his mark on the ukrainianization process in Odesa to such an extent especially since the local population, given its political preferences, is unlikely to have supported ukrainianization. In Kyïv the influence of the local population on local politics appeared to be marginal as well, since the order requiring the vast majority of Russian schools to only open Ukrainian classes was issued by a mayor who was appointed by the president. However, in contrast to the inhabitants of Odesa, Kyïvans, with their nationalist-leaning voting behavior, may well have welcomed the order.

From this account it is obvious that the degree to which the cities implemented elements of central policy varied widely. Yet, in addition to these variations, there were also similarities. For instance, in none of the four cities did the local authorities follow the central recommendation of paying teachers giving classes in Ukrainian higher salaries than teachers teaching in Russian. Similarly, examples have not been found of Ukrainian and mixed schools receiving more textbooks or receiving them sooner than Russian schools.\(^{122}\) Clearly, the distressing lack of financial means must have been as important as a possible unwillingness of local authorities to realize this policy objective.

\(^{122}\) School personnel in all four cities denied that this was the case.