Small group negotiation and team performance

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Chapter 6

General Discussion and Conclusions

An Overview of the Main Goals and Research Findings

This dissertation examined the effects of prosocial versus egoistic social motives on group negotiation and its aftermath. Although many negotiations take place in a multiparty setting, prior research on social motives in negotiation largely ignored group negotiation and instead focused on dyads. However, as argued in Chapter 2, many important differences between dyadic and group negotiations have been noted in the literature, and the few studies examining the effects of social motive in group negotiations revealed only weak results (see Gillespie, Brett, & Weingart, 2000; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). Therefore, the first goal of this dissertation was to examine the robustness of the effect of social motive on negotiation outcomes in a group setting and to identify the processes responsible for this effect. Second, past studies largely ignored the possibility that the effects of social motives may be moderated by other variables present in a group context. The second goal of the current dissertation was to fill this void, and to investigate the interplay between motivational, structural and procedural variables in group negotiation.

The first two goals were both concerned with the processes and outcomes that occur during negotiation. As is true for all but one prior experimental negotiation study (see O’Connor & Arnold, 2001), they did not take into account that negotiation may have consequences that lie in the future, when the negotiation task is already finished. The third goal of the current dissertation was therefore to examine the effects of social motives during negotiation on subsequent group performance.
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The experiments reported in this dissertation all involved three-person groups that were either prosocially or egoistically motivated and engaged in a three-issue joint venture negotiation. The experiment reported in Chapter 3 was designed to further the first goal of this dissertation. Results replicated the effects of social motive found in dyadic research (see De Dreu et al., 2000) and in the group negotiation study by Weingart et al. (1993). Specifically, it was found that prosocially motivated groups achieved higher joint outcomes than egoistically motivated groups.

Thus, the first contribution that this dissertation makes to the existing theory and knowledge about group negotiations is that it shows that, despite the increased complexity of group negotiations that was pointed out in Chapter 2, social motives influenced joint negotiation outcomes in groups in a predictable way. Moreover, findings indicated that higher levels of trust and integrative behavior, and lower levels of distributive behavior explain the relationship between social motive and joint negotiation outcomes in groups. Thus, the second contribution of this dissertation is that it sheds light on the processes by which social motives influence joint outcomes in groups.

In Chapter 4, an experiment was reported that furthered the second goal of this dissertation. It examined how the effects of social motive would be moderated by two variables unique to a group context: The structure of the negotiation task (symmetrical versus asymmetrical) and the decision rule the group uses (unanimity versus majority). Results generally supported the prediction that an asymmetrical task structure (in which there was a majority with compatible interests and a minority whose interests were incompatible) would lead to more distributive and less integrative behavior, and lower joint outcomes than a symmetrical structure, especially when group members have an egoistic instead of a prosocial motive and unanimity rather than majority rule applies.

In addition, results indicated that group members rated their group climate least favorably when they negotiated within an asymmetrical task structure, were egoistically motivated and used unanimity rule. Accordingly, the third contribution of this dissertation is that it shows that specific variables relevant for negotiation in groups, which are absent in a dyadic context, have an
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important impact on negotiation behavior and outcomes. The fourth contribution lies in the observation that the combination of these variables does not only affect "hard" performance parameters like joint outcomes, but influences the group climate as well.

As mentioned in the above, the third goal of the current dissertation was to examine the effects of social motives during negotiation on subsequent group performance. In the first experiment reported in Chapter 5, three-person groups were either prosocially or egoistically motivated and engaged in a three-issue joint venture negotiation, after which they had to engage in a second task. In this task, groups had to design advertisement slogans. Results replicated the findings reported in Chapter 3 and 4 that prosocially motivated groups achieve higher joint outcomes in the negotiation.

However, although it was predicted that groups that were egoistically motivated during the negotiation would perform worse on the post-negotiation task than groups that were prosocially motivated, results indicated that groups that were egoistically motivated during the negotiation produced less useful, but slightly more original slogans. Thus, the fifth contribution that this dissertation makes is that it shows that the social motives that group members had during negotiation affect further performance. Specifically, although an egoistic motive during the negotiation seemed to decrease performance on convergent aspects of the task, it seemed to enhance performance on divergent aspects.

To further investigate this unexpected finding, the second experiment reported in Chapter 5 used a similar set-up but manipulated the type of task that had to be performed subsequent to the negotiation. That is, groups had to engage in either a creativity task, which requires divergence, or in a planning task, which requires convergence. Results showed that groups that were prosocially motivated during the negotiation outperformed groups that were egoistically motivated during the negotiation on the planning task, whereas groups that were egoistically motivated during the negotiation outperformed groups that were prosocially motivated during the negotiation on the creativity task.

Moreover, groups with an egoistic motive during negotiation had greater task dedication, were less derogative and had lower levels of distracting social activity when they engaged in a creativity task rather than a planning task.
Groups with a prosocial motive during negotiation, in contrast, had lower task dedication, were more derogative and had higher levels of social activity when they engaged in a creativity task rather than a planning task.

The results reported in Chapter 5 point to the final contribution made by this dissertation, namely that it shows that a good "fit" between a group's "history" in terms of motivational orientation during negotiation and its subsequent tasks is an important determinant of group effectiveness. Specifically, a negotiation led by prosocial motives leads to high joint outcomes and is beneficial for performance on subsequent convergent tasks, whereas a negotiation led by egoistic motives seems beneficial for performance on subsequent divergent tasks.

In the next sections, the contributions of the studies reported in this dissertation will be discussed in more detail. Strengths, limitations and some questions for future research will be pointed out. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the practical implications of this research.

The Effects of Social Motives in Group Negotiation

Based on the research findings reported herein, it can be concluded that social motives are an important determinant of negotiation outcomes in groups. Past work in this area was far from convincing.

First, the majority of studies that had examined the effects of social motives had focused on dyads, and dyads and groups differ on a number of important dimensions (see Chapter 2; Levine & Moreland, 1990, Moreland, Hogg, & Hains, 1994).

Second, the few studies that did investigate social motives in group negotiations reported weak and inconclusive results (Gillespie et al., 2000; Weingart et al., 1993; Weingart & Brett, 1998). In all four experiments reported in this dissertation, prosocially motivated groups achieved higher joint outcomes
than egoistically motivated groups, suggesting this is a robust effect that not only occurs in dyads, but can be extended to small groups.\footnote{In the experiment reported in Chapter 4, social motive had a main effect on joint outcomes, indicating that prosocially motivated groups had achieved higher outcomes than egoistically motivated groups. Although simple effects analysis failed to show a significant effect of social motive in the symmetrical task structure condition, a simple t-test showed that within this condition, the difference between the means for prosocially motivated groups and egoistically motivated groups was significant.}

In addition to establishing the effects of social motives on group outcomes, this dissertation also unfolds the underlying processes that explain these effects. Past work by Weingart et al. (1993) indicated that prosocially motivated groups engaged in less substantiation and made marginally fewer single issue-offers than egoistically motivated groups, and also showed that prosocially motivated group members trusted each other more than egoistically motivated group members. Based on these findings, they concluded that prosocially motivated groups achieved higher joint outcomes than egoistically motivated groups because in the former groups, members trusted one another to a greater extent, rather than because they engaged in more integrative and less distributive behavior. Unfortunately, however, the behavioral data were obtained from only one group per condition, and observed processes may have been unique to these groups, rather than attributable to the manipulations. Second, although ratings of trust and perceptions of insight of members within one group were not independent, Weingart et al. based their analyses on individual level data, thus potentially violating the assumption of independence of data necessary for analysis of variance. Third, they reported no formal mediation tests.

The experiment reported in Chapter 3 does not suffer from these limitations. Trust, integrative behavior and distributive behavior were measured in all groups with a well-established and validated questionnaire (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001), and the group was used as the unit of analysis. Also, formal tests for mediation were reported. Consistent with the conclusions of Weingart et al., trust was found to mediate the relationship
between social motive and joint outcomes. However, integrative and distributive behavior also played a very important role in explaining this relationship. Even after common source variance was removed from the data by using the "split groups" approach (Amason, 1996), high correlations were found between trust and integrative behavior \( r = .72 \) and distributive behavior \( r = -.48 \), indicating that negotiator cognition and behavior are related in an important way.

Because trust, integrative behavior and distributive behavior were measured within one questionnaire, I was unable to examine how trust and negotiation behavior influence each other. Thus, it remains unclear whether trust increases integrative behavior, whether distributive behavior reduces trust, whether integrative behavior increases trust while reducing distributive behavior, and so on. Answering these questions would require a detailed micro-level analysis of the sequences within negotiation processes (Weingart, 1997). Some researchers have already attempted to do this. For example, Olekalns and Smith (1999) analyzed the sequencing of negotiation strategies and found that social motives affect patterns of information search in dyads. Furthering these attempts to analyze sequences of negotiation behavior could enable researchers to gain knowledge as to which behaviors evoke others.

**Interactions between Motivational, Structural and Procedural Variables**

This dissertation shows that structural and procedural variables interact with the negotiators' social motives to affect negotiation outcomes in a group setting. As noted in Chapter 2, some of the most striking differences between groups and dyads are that in groups, the structure of the negotiation task can be more complex because some group members may have compatible preferences, whereas others' preferences may be diametrically opposed. Consequently, in groups, but not dyads, coalition formation is possible, and a decision rule is needed to determine when an agreement becomes final.

The results reported in Chapter 4 showed that task structure (symmetrical versus asymmetrical) and decision rule (unanimity versus majority)
moderated the effects of social motives, such that negotiation behavior was least constructive and joint outcomes were lowest when groups had an egoistic motivation, and negotiated within an asymmetrical task structure under unanimity rule. This findings indicates that moving beyond testing main effects can enrich our knowledge of negotiating groups, especially so when variables are taken into account that are present in a group context but absent in dyadic negotiations. This opens up interesting avenues for future research, some of which I will discuss here below.

The experiment reported in Chapter 4 compared two different task structures and two different decision rules. In reality, an infinite number of different task structures are possible. Rather than being completely symmetrical or completely asymmetrical (i.e., when a stable majority exists with perfect interest alignment between the majority parties, as opposed to a minority whose interests are completely opposed to the majority’s), some parties may agree on most of the issues, but disagree on the remaining issues. It would be interesting to investigate whether minority parties are better able to get what they want under circumstances such as these.

Just as for task structure, different decision rules than the ones that were investigated in Chapter 4 are also possible. For example, it may be decided that a two-thirds majority is needed for an agreement to become final. This may especially be the case in larger groups. Another decision rule might be to have a lottery, in which the group member who holds the “winning ticket” decides what the final agreement will be. Future research should look at the implications that these different "decisions regarding how to decide" have for the groups’ negotiation processes and outcomes, especially in conjunction with group members’ social motives.

The experiment reported in Chapter 4 not only included a measure of joint outcomes, which is the "traditional" dependent variable in the dominant paradigm guiding negotiation research, but also included a measure of the group climate. According to Hackman (1990), the extent to which the group experience contributes to group members’ well-being and their capability to work together in the future is just as important as their quantitative output. However, these "soft" performance parameters have, until now, been ignored in negotiation research.
By showing that integrative behavior and joint outcomes are related to the group climate, the experiment reported in Chapter 4 corroborated Rubin et al.’s (1994) assertion that integrative negotiation relates to satisfaction, feelings of self-efficacy, positive interpersonal relations and reduced likelihood of future conflict. Moreover, the finding that the group climate is affected by variables present during the negotiation begs the question of how subsequent group functioning and performance will be affected by negotiation. This critical question was addressed in Chapter 5, and will be addressed in the next section.

**The Aftermath of Group Negotiation: Social Motives and Distal Group Functioning**

The two experiments reported in Chapter 5 are the first to address the question of how subsequent group functioning and performance will be affected by negotiation, and in particular by the social motives group members have while negotiating. Prior negotiation studies had failed to examine the aftermath of group negotiation, leaving researchers ignorant as to how negotiation affects further group processes and group effectiveness. The first experiment in Chapter 5 provided a first step towards an increased understanding by showing that social motives during negotiation affect post-negotiation group performance. Specifically, groups that were prosocially motivated during negotiation performed better than groups that were egoistically motivated during negotiation on convergent aspects of a group task, whereas egoistic groups outperformed prosocial groups on divergent aspects of that task.

Consistent with these findings, the second experiment reported in Chapter 5 showed that groups with an egoistic motive during negotiation had greater task dedication, were less derogative and had lower levels of distracting social activity when they engaged in a divergent task rather than a convergent task. Groups with a prosocial motive during negotiation, in contrast, had lower task dedication, were more derogative and had higher levels of social activity when they engaged in a divergent task rather than a convergent task. Moreover, groups with an egoistic motive performed better in a divergent task than in a
convergent task, whereas prosocial groups performed better in a convergent task than in a divergent task.

These results speak to the importance of "fit" between a group's history of negotiation and motivational orientation and the task that the group has to perform. Findings increase our understanding of the consequences of group negotiations because they show that being prosocially or egoistically motivated during a negotiation cannot simply be said to be "good" or "bad" for group performance. Rather, taking the task context into account shows that what helps or hinders performance depends on the type of task groups have to perform. Extending the "fit-approach" to research investigating the aftermath of negotiation provides an important impulse for new studies, and I will return to this in the section on future research. For now, it suffices to say that, from a more general viewpoint, Chapter 5 shows that it is worthwhile for group researchers to look at their subject of study from a more dynamic perspective. Groups are not static entities. Rather, they move to different (task) contexts from time to time, and their experiences within one context may influence their cognitions, behavior and performance in another. Investigating these changes that occur during groups' "lives" can lead to a new and richer understanding of group dynamics (McGrath, 1997; McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl, 2000)

**Strengths and Limitations**

When discussing the contributions of this dissertation in the above, I already noted and discussed some specific assets and shortcomings of the current research. In this section, I will address some more general strengths and limitations. One thing that stands out when reading this dissertation is that it is entirely based on experimental research, which has been conducted in the laboratory with undergraduate students. This raises concerns about external validity, that is, the extent to which the findings reported herein can be generalized to different settings.

These concerns are legitimate, in that in most negotiations parties do not carry a profit schedule with them to the negotiating table. Moreover, "real"
negotiations are often not stopped after 20 minutes. However, there are good reasons to believe that "experimental realism" (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982) was achieved in the studies reported here. For one, to the participants in the studies, the tasks were psychologically engaging, and their performance in the negotiation had real consequences for them in three out of four studies that were reported here, in that they could win a monetary bonus or a prize when they performed well. Also, observing participants during the tasks showed that they often took the tasks very seriously. Therefore, it can be assumed that "psychological realism" was achieved in the studies reported here (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982; Hollenbeck et al., in press).

Notwithstanding the above, I have to acknowledge that all studies used the same negotiation task, and that in all studies, roughly the same manipulation of social motive was used. That all four studies employed the same joint-venture negotiation task raises questions as to whether our results are unique to this type of negotiations. However, a meta-analysis on the effects of social motives on negotiation behavior and outcomes revealed no differences in effect size for different types of negotiation scenario’s (De Dreu et al., 2000). This suggests that the results reported in this dissertation would not have been different had different tasks been used.

In all four experiments we used instructions to manipulate social motives. These instructions were combined with incentives in the studies reported in Chapter 3, 4, and in the first experiment reported in Chapter 5. A critical reader might argue that by manipulating social motives in the same way across studies, we introduced mono-operation bias. This may well be the case and future research is needed to replicate current findings using other operationalizations of social motives. It is reassuring, however, that the meta-analysis by De Dreu et al (2000) showed that effect sizes for social motives on negotiation behavior and outcomes were not moderated by the way social motives were operationalized. Thus, incentives, instructions, individual differences, implicit cues like expected cooperative future interaction, cues about the other party’s social motive, or mood via a gift all resulted in the same effects on negotiation behavior and outcomes.
A further limitation is that negotiation behavior was not coded from transcripts from the interaction (as is often done in negotiation research). Instead, insight in behavioral processes was obtained by analyzing behavior as rated by group members on scales for integrative and distributive behavior adapted from the Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (Van de Vliert, 1997) that were administered to participants after the negotiation. Therefore, results may have been influenced by self-serving and social desirability biases. Also, mediational tests reported in Chapter 3, and evidence suggesting that a prosocial motive leads to more integrative and less distributive behavior, and thereby to higher joint outcomes (as argued in Chapter 4 and 5), is correlational rather than experimental.

Several arguments can be raised against the problems associated with the use of questionnaire items. First, past research revealed little evidence for social desirability and self-serving biases in self- and peer-reports of negotiation behavior (De Dreu et al., 2001; Rahim & Magner, 1995). Specifically, the DUTCH has been shown to have high convergent validity between self- and peer assessments and observed behavior (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer & Nauta, 2001). Correlations between observer ratings of integrative and distributive negotiation behavior and self-reports of these behaviors on the DUTCH ranged from .41 to .72. Also, the DUTCH was shown to have high divergent validity: Self-reported distributive behavior was significantly negatively related to integrative behavior as rated by observers (correlations range from -.38 to -.55), and self-reported integrative behavior was significantly negatively related to distributive behavior as rated by observers (correlations range from -.18 to -.45). Finally, confirmatory factor analyses have revealed good to excellent psychometric qualities for the DUTCH. Specifically, LISREL analyses showed that the items fit well into their respective scales and no unwanted overlap between items within a scale was detected (RMSEA residuals were 0.00 for integrative behavior and 0.07 for distributive behavior, AGFI-values were 0.99 and 0.96, respectively). For a more elaborate overview of the psychometric qualities of the DUTCH, I refer the reader to De Dreu et al. (2001).

Second, and related to the first argument, results obtained with the questionnaire items closely map onto results obtained in past studies using observational data, which showed that a prosocial motive led to more integrative

Third, in the studies reported herein, we did not use self-reports in the sense that participants were asked to rate their own behavior. Rather, they were asked to rate the behavior of their group members, and we computed the eta-square statistic to establish whether the two group members in a group were in agreement when rating the third group member. Although this procedure does not guarantee that ratings were not biased, at least intersubjectivity between group members’ ratings was achieved.

Fourth, and finally, it has been argued that recall of behavior and the judgments based on it are as "real" to a person as ongoing behavior (Pearson, Ross, & Dawes, 1991). The most important consequences of behavior lie in the future, such that recall of behavior and judgments based on it may provide a better predictor of future group functioning and effectiveness (which was the focus of the studies presented in Chapter 5) than actual behaviors and outcomes.

Suggestions for Future Research

Effects of Culture
The findings reported in this dissertation were based on studies using participants raised in Western Europe, typically characterized by individualistic values (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995). Individuals brought up in such a society tend to define themselves as an autonomous and independent entity, give priority to personal goals over group goals, emphasize their own beliefs, values and attitudes rather than social norms, and are generally more oriented towards task achievement than towards the maintenance of harmonious relationships. Individuals brought up in a collectivist society, on the other hand, tend to define themselves as connected to others, give priority to group goals over individual goals, emphasize social norms, and find it very important to maintain harmonious relationships (Triandis, 1995).

It is possible that culture in terms of individualism-collectivism may have a direct effect on group members’ behavior in a negotiation task. There is some
evidence that individualism-collectivism affects conflict management. Specifically, research showed that individuals from a collectivist culture tend to choose conflict management styles that aim to maintain a harmonious relationship, whereas individuals from an individualistic culture tend to choose more confronting and aggressive styles (Bond, Wan, Leung, & Giacalone, 1985; Gabrielidis, Stephan, Ybarra, Dos Santos Pearson, & Villareal 1997; Leung, 1987). Therefore, individualism-collectivism may be viewed as one of the possible "operationalizations" of social motive, with individualistic individuals holding a generally more egoistic motive, and collectivist individuals holding a generally more prosocial motive.

However, it is also possible that culture might interact with manipulations of social motive. Chen, Chen and Meindl (1998) argue that goal interdependence may need to be framed differently in individualistic and collectivistic cultures to have the same effects on motivation and behavior. Specifically, cooperation can be induced in an individualistic culture by appealing to the instrumentality of cooperation for self-interest, whereas in a collectivist culture, cooperation can be induced by appealing to self-sacrificial contribution for the collective good. In the manipulations used in the studies reported here, neither of these appeals were made, and interpreting the rather simple instructions was left to the participants. Because participants came from an individualistic culture, it is possible that they interpreted the manipulation of a prosocial motive as an appeal to the instrumentality of cooperation for their self-interest, and that is why the manipulation worked. When the studies would be replicated in a collectivist culture, according to Chen et al. (1998), the manipulation would only work if participants would interpret it as an appeal to make a sacrifice in favor of the group. When this would happen, results may be expected to be the same as in individualistic cultures, only the underlying processes by which the manipulations affect behavior may be different. To my knowledge, no studies have investigated the possible interaction of individualism-collectivism and the different factors that can induce social motives. Therefore, testing the above proposition would be an interesting avenue for future research.
Homogeneous versus Heterogeneous Groups

In all studies reported in this dissertation, groups were homogeneous regarding their social motives, whereas in real-life groups, some members may have a prosocial and others an egoistic motive. Important questions are, therefore, how heterogeneity of social motives would affect negotiation processes and outcomes, how different task structures and decision rules would affect groups with different ratios of egoistic and prosocial members, and how the aftermath of negotiation would be affected by heterogeneity in social motives.

There are some, as yet unpublished, studies that have investigated groups in which members have different social motives, but results are inconclusive. For example, Weingart and Brett (1998) found that mixed-orientation groups tend to shift toward cooperation, and that a shift towards cooperation decreased the chance of impasse. Schei and Rognes (2001) found that group composition did not affect joint negotiation outcomes. Interestingly, however, Schei (2001) found that egoistically motivated groups outperformed mixed groups and prosocially motivated groups when group members knew each other’s motive. These interesting findings indicate that future research should pay more attention to groups that are heterogeneous regarding social motives.

Effects of Group Size

In the studies reported here, three-person groups were investigated. Although Weingart et al. (1993) have shown that a prosocial motive also increases joint negotiation outcomes in four-person negotiations, we cannot rule out the possibility that social motives influence negotiation processes and outcomes differently in even larger groups. Adding negotiators to the group increases the complexity of the negotiation, which may result in cognitive overload. This cognitive overload might undermine the effectiveness of integrative behavior and, therefore, the effects of social motive might be reduced. Some indirect evidence for the idea that cognitive load reduces the effects of social motives was reported by De Dreu et al. (2000), who showed that as the negotiation task became more complex due to the number of issues being negotiated, effect sizes for social motives were reduced. However, the cognitive load logic assumes that
effects are due primarily to increased information exchange whereas, as evidenced in Chapter 3, trust is at least as important a mediator. Trust may be less susceptible to the influence of group size. Thus, the moderating influence of group size constitutes an interesting question for future research.

Group size may also affect negotiation processes and outcomes by its implications for structural and procedural variables in groups. The effects of decision rule reported in Chapter 4 may be even more pronounced in larger groups, as using unanimity rule in a large group may be even harder than in a three-person group. Moreover, group size can influence the structural aspects of negotiation by affecting the size of the different factions within a group. In the study reported in Chapter 4, the "minority" consisted of only one party. Because research has shown that minorities are able to exert more influence as soon as they grow from one to two members (Asch, 1956), it is interesting to examine how the size of the minority faction would influence the group process. It is possible that the minority position would be incorporated in the final decision to a stronger extent when it is represented by more parties, but it is also possible that, especially when groups are egoistically motivated, a stronger minority only leads to more distributive behavior by the majority.

Effects of the Topic of Disagreement
All studies reported herein investigated negotiations about divergent interests. However, apart from interests, negotiations can also be about different ideologies, norms and values. Specifically, De Dreu, Harinck and Van Vianen (1999) distinguished between interests, facts and values. Conflicts of interests concern the distribution of scarce resources like time, space, and money. Factual, or intellectual conflicts concern disagreements about questions to which an objectively verifiable answer exists. Value conflicts concern disagreements in which there is no objective truth (Rapoport, 1960).

Research shows that these different conflict issues affect the negotiation process and outcomes in important ways (Druckman, 1994; Harinck, 2001; Harinck, De Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000). This raises questions regarding the effects of social motives in negotiations based on different conflict issues. Perhaps the effects of social motive would not be as pervasive in negotiations about norms
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and values as in negotiations about interests, since prior research has shown that in value-driven negotiation integrative behavior and making trade-offs is often considered inappropriate (Harinck et al., 2000). Future research should therefore address the effects of social motives in intellective and evaluative negotiations.

Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate if different negotiation issues affect the "aftermath" of negotiation differently. Although the results regarding this aftermath reported here pertain to negotiations about interests, some prior field studies have studied negotiations about intellective issues (actual issues that have correct solutions according to commonly accepted standards), and found that group negotiation and conflict on the one hand and performance on the other were positively related when when the conflict took place within a cooperative context (see Tjosvold, 1998, for an overview). Since these studies are cross-sectional in nature, experimentally investigating the effects of different types of negotiation on post-negotiation performance would be worthwhile.

Future Research Concerning the Aftermath of Group Negotiation

One of the most interesting contributions of this dissertation it that it looks beyond the negotiation process to investigate the consequences of negotiation that lie in the future. However, many questions concerning this topic still remain unanswered. In the above, I already suggested that the aftermath of negotiation may look differently when the negotiation is about intellective or evaluative issues rather than about interests. The aftermath of (social motives during) negotiation may also look differently when we extend its investigation to different post-negotiation tasks. In Chapter 5, three tasks were investigated (i.e., the advertisement task in experiment 1, and a creativity task and a planning task in experiment 2). These specific tasks were chosen because of their differences in the extent to which they required divergence versus convergence.

Of course, many more group tasks exist. For example, apart from the creativity and planning tasks that were investigated here, McGrath (1984) also distinguishes "problem solving tasks" (which have a correct answer), "executing performance tasks" (psychomotor tasks), "cognitive conflict tasks" (resolving conflicts of viewpoint), etc. Research in which participants engaged in an
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interdependent command and control simulation task (the Distributed Dynamic Decision-making Task, for more information see Humphrey, Hollenbeck, Ilgen and Moon, 2000), has shown that a prosocial motive helped group members' accuracy, but reduced their speed. In contrast, an egoistic motive increased speed but reduced accuracy (Beersma, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Moon, Conlon, & Ilgen, 2002). This finding seems to be consistent with the findings reported in this dissertation since in the task used in the aforementioned study, accuracy required convergent processes (e.g., collaboration in identifying whether targets were friends or foes), whereas speed required moving towards a target as fast as one can, which involves a very solitary effort. It would be interesting to gain more knowledge about the aftermath of negotiation by for example investigating how social motives during group negotiation affect subsequent performance on motor-tasks, or on a second negotiation-type task.

Another question regarding the aftermath of negotiation that has remained unanswered is through what exactly which processes the effects of social motives during group negotiation on subsequent performance occur. There are two general possibilities. First, the effects of social motives during group negotiation on post-negotiation performance may be mediated by negotiation behavior or outcomes. Groups which' members are egoistically motivated during negotiation engage in forceful distributive behavior, as a consequence of which the group may lack cohesion and a good interpersonal climate when starting the post-negotiation task. This could have detrimental effects for group consensus and convergent performance. But at the same time, having been confronted with distributive negotiation behavior may stimulate group members to "do their own thing" without looking after each other too much, which helps their creativity and divergent performance. Groups which' members are prosocially motivated during negotiation engage in integrative behavior, build interpersonal trust and create a positive interpersonal climate (see Chapter 4). When the group has become very cohesive when starting the post-negotiation task, this may help consensus and convergent performance, which is functional in some tasks. However, it may at the same time be detrimental for tasks in which dissent and creativity are needed (Janis, 1972; see also De Dreu & Beersma, 2001).
Likewise, the effects of social motives on post-negotiation performance may be mediated by negotiation outcomes. Thus, egoistic groups may become more creative because of their lower outcomes in the negotiation. Low negotiation outcomes, or even no outcomes at all in the case of an impasse, may communicate to participants that "something has gone wrong". This may stimulate them to try new, divergent courses of behavior in a second task instead of walking the old "beaten tracks". This is consistent with many studies showing that individuals often base their behavior on the simple "win-stay, lose-change" heuristic: when negative feedback is received, this is used as a signal that some new course of behavior is needed (Messick & Liebrand, 1997). In contrast, prosocial groups were generally shown to achieve high outcomes in the negotiation tasks. Those high outcomes may communicate to these groups that they are doing all right. In this case, a stimulus to engage in some innovation and divergent thinking in the post-negotiation task is absent, as a consequence of which prosocial groups just work on the task convergently.

A second possibility is that the effects of social motives on post-negotiation performance are not mediated by the negotiation process and outcomes, but rather transfer from the negotiation task to the post-negotiation task directly. Different motives may trigger in participants different "mindsets", or "mental models", that is: an egoistic motive may cause individuals to define the task situation differently than a prosocial motive (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000). These different mindsets may affect group members' behavior. Specifically, an egoistic mindset may make group members less able to think convergently, but better able to think divergently, whereas a prosocial mindset may have the opposite effect. According to this "transfer of motivation" explanation, a negotiation involving processes and outcomes is not even necessary to bring about the effects demonstrated in the two studies reported here; the mere inducement of a social motive is enough, because this motive "transfers" from the negotiation task to a following group task.

In an attempt to gain more insight into what caused the effects found in the studies reported in Chapter 5 and to test the validity of the explanations discussed in the above, I statistically analyzed whether in our datasets, the effects of social motives on post-negotiation performance were mediated by negotiation
outcomes and/or performance. These analyses showed that neither negotiation behavior (integrative and distributive) nor negotiation outcomes statistically mediated the relationship between social motives during negotiation and post-negotiation performance.

Failure to find evidence for mediation by negotiation behavior may reflect measurement problems (e.g., using reports by participants instead of observational data). Failure to find evidence for mediation by negotiation outcomes may be due to the fact that groups neither received feedback as to how well they performed in the negotiation compared with other groups, nor did individual group members learn about each others’ outcomes prior to performing the post-negotiation task and to completing the questionnaire. Although one study (O’Connor & Arnold, 2001) showed that low negotiation outcomes (i.e., reaching an impasse) have a negative effect on the aftermath of negotiation, the design of that study precludes inferences as to whether these effects were due to the negotiation outcomes or the negotiation process. Therefore, future research should examine how (feedback about) negotiation outcomes affects further team performance.

Another reason for not finding mediating effects of negotiation behavior and outcomes may be that these effects are just not there, and the impact of social motives on post-negotiation performance is instead caused by transfer of motivation from one task to the other. Whether this possibility holds up should be tested by manipulating social motives by giving participants either prosocial or egoistic negotiation instructions, and then letting them perform a group task right away, without a negotiation preceding this task. In that way, it can be examined whether the effects of social motive on group performance in creativity and planning tasks still occur when groups did not go through the negotiation process. When they do, this attests to the plausibility of the "transfer of motivation" explanation of the effects reported herein.
Practical Implications

As noted in Chapter 1, teamwork enjoys a still increasing popularity. Since negotiation lies at the core of teamwork, group negotiations are becoming more and more prevalent. However, these group negotiations do not only occur between work team members experiencing conflicting preferences, but, for example also between house owners in a large apartment building, between countries in multilateral political conferences, and between unions, management, and interests groups during collective bargaining. What implications do the research results reported in this dissertation have for those involved in these group negotiations and for those trying to make these negotiations result in collectively beneficial outcomes?

A first piece of advice would be that managers should emphasize that the negotiation outcomes should be favorable for all parties, and that group members should strive for high outcomes as a group. Also, they should try to minimize egoistic motivation, by emphasizing that negotiating is not a game of win and loose, and by stimulating the search for integrative agreements. Based on the results of the experiment reported in Chapter 3, it can be argued that this approach will lead to advantages for negotiating groups, as well as for the larger context in which they function, because a prosocial motive enables groups to use the resources that are available in the negotiation more efficiently.

However, a critical reader may argue that in existing groups, social motives are often already present before the negotiation starts, and therefore, emphasizing high group outcomes may have little effect. I tend to disagree with this view, not because I do not think that most members of real groups already developed a social motive, but because evidence suggests that the possibility to form integrative agreements is often overlooked. This can be assumed to be especially the case in complex negotiations. In real life, parties do not have clear-cut profit schedules representing their interests, which makes it hard to realize the integrative potential in the situation. Therefore, I believe that stimulating a prosocial motivation should be accompanied by increasing group members' knowledge regarding tactics to form integrative agreements. The combination of
knowledge regarding integrative outcomes and a prosocial motive would, in my view, certainly increase the effectiveness of group negotiations.

Another, less "obvious" implication of the current research, is that the results reported in Chapter 4 show that it is worthwhile to take a critical look at the decision rule that is used in group negotiations. Since long, lay wisdom has supported unanimity rule as a positive and majority rule as a "lazy" way of reaching agreements. Unanimity rule is often thought to be more "fair", since it gives each group member an equal say in the decision making process. Results reported herein, however, suggest unanimity rule is not always beneficial. In fact, they show that in an asymmetrical negotiation, unanimity rule can have detrimental effects when group members are egoistically motivated. A general advice to practitioners is therefore that structural and motivational aspects of the situation should be taken into account when the procedures that will guide the negotiation are laid down.

A final implication of the current dissertation, which is mainly based on Chapter 5, is that conflict and negotiation in groups are not necessarily bad for subsequent performance. Although many researchers have argued otherwise (see, e.g., De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1997), conflict is still often seen as detrimental to performance, especially so when parties are egoistically motivated during the conflict (see, e.g., Tjosvold, 1998). The experiments reported in Chapter 5 showed that group negotiation about divergent interests does not necessarily have to be bad for subsequent group performance, not even when negotiators were egoistically motivated. Rather, when groups have to be convergent, managers and group leaders should foster prosocial motives and try to minimize egoistic motivation. On the other hand, when groups have to be divergent, managers should consider stimulating egoistic motives. Although the immediate consequences of such an action may be costly -- egoistic motivation decreases negotiation outcomes -- it may pay off in the long run as it can result in creative products.
Concluding Remarks

This dissertation shows that social motives have a pervasive effect on the processes in, and the outcomes of, group negotiations. Moreover, it shows that variables specific to the group context, such as the structure of the negotiation task and the decision rule that is used, interact with social motive to affect negotiation outcomes and the group climate. Finally, this dissertation shows that the social motives group members have during negotiation even affect group functioning and performance beyond the negotiation task, and that whether having a prosocial motive during negotiation is beneficial or detrimental for subsequent performance depends on the type of task groups have to perform.

These results add to our knowledge about group negotiations in many ways, and at the same time raise new and interesting questions for future research. However, no simple, clear-cut answers were provided. Accordingly, this final chapter has, apart from discussing the contributions of this dissertation, also emphasized new avenues for future research. With regard to the question "Should we be prosocially or egoistically motivated when we engage in a group negotiation?" the current dissertation has revealed that "it depends". It depends on what one wants to achieve during the negotiation, on what one wants to achieve during subsequent tasks, and on what these subsequent tasks are. One should be prosocially motivated when the negotiation task is asymmetrically structured and unanimity rule applies, and future teamwork requires convergent activity. But one may foster egoistic motivation when majority rule applies, and future teamwork requires individual speed, creative thought, and divergent activity. Under these circumstances, a little egoism may carry the team further than one would think.