Emotion in social conflict: the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations

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Many of the decisions people make in everyday life influence not only their own but also other people's lives. Often such decisions are reached by means of negotiation, which Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) define as "a discussion between two or more parties with the apparent aim of resolving a divergence of interests" (p. 2). In many cases, the divergent interests that lie at the heart of social conflict and negotiation give rise to intense emotions, which may strongly influence the course of the negotiation (Barry, 1999; Barry & Oliver, 1996). Despite the fact that emotions are inherent to conflict and negotiation (Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999), surprisingly little research has investigated their effects in the negotiation arena. The central objective of the work reported in this dissertation is to increase the understanding of the role of emotion in negotiation, and, more specifically, of the ways in which one negotiator's emotions may influence the other's emotions, cognitions, and behavior. Are negotiators influenced by their opponent's emotional state? And if so, what is the nature of the mechanisms underlying this influence? These and other questions will be addressed in what follows.

The purpose of the current chapter is threefold. The first aim is to consider the role of emotion within the broader context of social decision making, and to provide an organizing framework that will serve to guide our thinking about the effects of emotions in various social decision making settings, including negotiation. The second objective is to review existing theoretical perspectives and empirical findings pertaining to emotion in social decision making. The third goal is to identify the lacunae in our knowledge of the effects of emotion on social decision making, which will then set the stage for the empirical studies reported in this dissertation. The chapter is organized as follows. First, a working definition of emotion will be proposed and different levels of analysis will be distinguished, with special attention to the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. I then provide a brief overview of the nature and scope of social decision making situations. Most of the rest of the chapter will then be devoted to a review of previous studies on the intra- and interpersonal effects of emotions in various social decision making situations, with special
attention to negotiation. The chapter will conclude with a critical discussion of the existing research and with an outline of the chapters to follow.

**Conceptualizing Emotion**

"What is an emotion?" When William James posed this famous question in 1884, he implied that the answer is not obvious. Indeed, Fehr and Russell (1984) observed that "everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition" (p. 464). The question of what constitutes an emotion has occupied philosophers, psychologists, and other social scientists since the dawn of recorded thought, and continues to do so. More than 150 theories and countless definitions of emotion have been advanced (see Strongman, 1996), attesting to the difficulty of formulating a satisfactory definition. The present dissertation is not concerned with the fundamental question of what constitutes an emotion. Instead, its purpose is to investigate the consequences of emotions in social decision making, especially negotiation. Therefore, instead of entering into a fundamental debate regarding the nature of emotion, or adding yet another definition to the already long list, I will adopt a working definition that incorporates the basic features of emotion about which there is considerable consensus among emotion researchers.

Most theories of emotion hold that emotions arise as a result of an individual's conscious or unconscious evaluation (appraisal) of some event as positively or negatively relevant to a particular concern or goal (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). In this sense, emotions can be seen as communications to oneself (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and to one's social environment (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). As communications to the self, emotions signal the importance of events to relevant concerns, and they serve to prioritize one's goals. In this way, emotions change the individual's readiness to act (Frijda, 1986). As communications to others, emotions provide information about how one feels about things (Ekman, 1993; Scherer, 1986), about one's orientation toward others (Knutson, 1996), and about one's social intentions (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Fridlund, 1994). Furthermore, emotions are typically characterized by distinct subjective experiences (Scherer, Wallbott, & Summerfield, 1986), physiological reactions (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990), and expressions (Ekman, 1993).

Emotion is a term that is sometimes used interchangeably with affect or mood. However, these various terms carry distinct meanings in emotion research. According to Frijda (1994) affect is a subjective feeling state that can range from diffuse moods (e.g., cheerfulness or depression) to specific and acute emotions (e.g., anger or fear). Among other things, emotion and mood are differentiated by the degree to which they are *intentional*, that is, directed toward a specific stimulus – be
it a person, an object, or an event (Frijda, 1994; Parrott, 2001). As Parrott (2001) puts it, "emotions are about, or directed toward, something in the world ... In contrast, moods lack this quality of object directedness; a person in an irritable mood is not necessarily angry about anything in particular – he or she is just generally grumpy" (p. 3). Emotions are also typically more differentiated and of shorter duration, whereas moods tend to be more enduring and pervasive, if generally of lower intensity (Frijda, 1994). Finally, compared to moods emotions have a stronger potential to change the flow of actions (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). In the present dissertation affect will be treated as a superordinate concept that encompasses diffuse and nonspecific moods as well as discrete and acute emotions (cf. Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004).

In their social-functional approach to emotion, Keltner and Haidt (1999) distinguish four different levels of analysis: the individual, dyadic, group, and cultural levels. At the individual level, emotions are proposed to serve two broad social functions (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). First, emotions may inform the individual about specific events or conditions that have to be acted upon (Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989). Second, along the lines of Frijda's (1986) idea of action readiness, it has been argued that the physiological and cognitive processes that occur during an emotion episode prepare the individual to respond to problems or opportunities that arise in social interactions (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996).

At the dyadic level, emotions are assumed to organize social interactions by providing important information to others (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). For instance, emotions convey information to observers about the sender's current feelings (Ekman, 1993; Scherer, 1986), social intentions (Fridlund, 1992), and orientation toward the relationship (Knutson, 1996). Further, emotional expressions may evoke reciprocal or complementary emotions in others that may in turn help individuals respond adaptively to social events (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). For example, expressions of anger have been demonstrated to elicit fear in observers (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996), and displays of distress have been shown to elicit sympathy (Eisenberg et al., 1989). Finally, emotions have been argued to serve as positive or negative reinforcers for other individuals' behavior (Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1983). More specifically, positive emotions may encourage others to continue their course of action, whereas negative emotions may serve as a call for behavioral adjustment (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999).

At the group level of analysis, emotions are believed to help individuals define group boundaries and identify group members (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). For example, theorists have argued that emotions such as fear, hatred, and disgust may function to sharpen group boundaries (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Heise & O'Brien,
1993). Some support for this idea is provided by research in the area of terror management, where it has been found that the experimental induction of fear of death (i.e., mortality salience) increases ingroup solidarity and outgroup derogation (Greenberg et al., 1990). Further, the differential experience and expression of emotion may help group members define and negotiate their respective roles and statuses within the group (Clark, 1990; Collins, 1990). Consistent with this idea, research has revealed associations between status and the expression of discrete emotions such as anger, sadness, embarrassment, contempt, and fear (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998; Tiedens, 2001). Lastly, it has been suggested that collective emotional behavior may help group members deal with group-related problems. Some suggestive evidence for this claim can be found in the results of a study on chimpanzee groups (de Waal, 1996). The chimpanzees in this study were observed to engage in exuberant affiliation immediately prior to the allocation of scarce resources, thereby presumably strengthening social bonds that might be threatened by conflict over the distribution of the resources.

Finally, at the cultural level of analysis researchers have focused on how emotions are shaped by historical and economic factors, on how emotions are embedded in cultural institutions and practices, and on the cultural norms and scripts for the proper expression and experience of emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). At this level, emotions are thought to play a role in the processes by which individuals assume cultural identities (e.g., Thoits, 1985), in socialization practices that help children learn the norms and values of their culture (e.g., Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987), and in perpetuating cultural ideologies and power structures (e.g., Hochschild, 1990).

The main focus of the present review is on the individual and dyadic levels of analysis, and to some degree the group level, as these are especially relevant to our understanding of the consequences of emotional experience and expression in social decision making situations. Indeed, as will become clear in a moment, a considerable amount of research speaks to the question of how affective states impact on social decision making at these levels of analysis. Before turning to a review of this literature, it is important to specify more precisely what is meant by social decision making, and to define the scope of social decision making settings.

**Conceptualizing Social Decision Making**

The defining characteristic of social decision making is the notion that the decisions and choices of the parties involved influence not only their own but also the other party's outcomes (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). In other words: the individuals involved in the decision making situation are mutually interdependent. The nature
of this interdependence is of crucial importance for cognitive, motivational, and behavioral processes (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In this respect, a distinction has been made between positive and negative interdependence (e.g., Deutsch, 1949, 1962; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Positive interdependence exists when individuals share a common goal or when personal goal achievements are positively correlated. In situations of positive social interdependence individuals perceive that they can attain their goals only if the interdependent other also attains his or her goals. In other words, the parties' goals are cooperatively linked. Negative interdependence, on the other hand, exists when the parties' goals are opposed. In this case, there is a negative correlation between their respective goal attainments, and parties are likely to perceive that they can only accomplish their objectives at the expense of the other's success. Put differently, the parties' goals are competitively linked (Johnson, 2003; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).

Positive versus negative goal interdependence represent the two extremes of a single continuum, which ranges from perfectly cooperative situations to situations with perfectly conflicting outcomes. All situations in between are characterized by mixed motives; they are neither completely cooperative nor completely competitive, but contain incentives for both cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 2000; Walton & McKersie, 1966). Although most real-life decision making situations are of a mixed motive nature (Deutsch, 2000), it is useful to conceive of situations as being predominantly cooperative or predominantly competitive (e.g., Tjosvold, 1998). Examples of settings that may be considered as comprising more cooperative than competitive elements include parent-child interactions, intimate partners planning their wedding, colleagues helping each other with a difficult task, doubles-partners playing tennis, and work groups solving a problem collaboratively. Examples of settings that may be conceived as predominantly competitive include used car negotiations, police officers trying to get a confession from a suspect, drivers dodging road taxes, and students leaving their dirty dishes in the common kitchen of their students' house.

Whether a situation is predominantly cooperative or competitive, all social decision making situations provide ample opportunity for emotions to come into play and to influence the behavior of the parties involved. Social relations and interactions are the most commonly reported antecedents of a variety of emotions, such as happiness, joy, love, anger, disgust, sadness, and fear (e.g., Kemper, 1978; Oatley & Duncan, 1992; Scherer, Wallbott, Matsumoto, & Kudoh, 1988; Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992). In general, there is abundant evidence that emotion flourishes in social situations (Anderson & Guerrero, 1998; Planalp, 1999), and, more specifically,
it has been argued that emotions are especially likely to arise in the context of interdependent relationships (Berscheid & Ammazzalorso, 2001).

Of course, social interactions do not only elicit emotions — they are also influenced by emotions. People are emotional beings, and emotion has strong potential to shape behavior (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998). Social decision making and conflict in particular are phenomena that tend to give rise to emotion, and emotions underlie the need to resolve disputes through negotiation and other forms of interdependent decision making (Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999). In the next section I survey research on the effects of mood and emotion in a variety of social decision making situations and identify the major limitations in the understanding of the role of emotion in negotiation, which will serve as the rationale for the empirical studies reported in the ensuing chapters.

Affect in Social Decision Making

As noted earlier, the effects of emotions have been investigated at different levels of analysis (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Most relevant in the context of social decision making are the individual and dyadic levels, and, to some degree, the group level. To organize the existing literature I will dichotomously classify studies of affect in social decision making as focusing on intrapersonal or interpersonal effects (cf. Morris & Keltner, 2000). Intrapersonal effects refer to the influence of an individual's affective state on his or her own cognitions, strategies, perceptions, and behaviors (cf. Keltner & Haidt's individual level of analysis). Interpersonal effects, on the other hand, refer to the influence of one individual's affective state on one or more other individuals in the social context (cf. the dyadic and group levels of analysis).

In addition to distinguishing between intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of moods and emotions, I draw a distinction between predominantly cooperative and predominantly competitive social decision making settings. Some researchers have addressed the effects of moods and emotions in cooperative settings, such as intimate relationships or collaborative work groups. Other research has focused on affective influences in more competitively structured situations, such as ultimatum bargaining or negotiation. Thus, the following literature review is organized along two dimensions: (1) intrapersonal versus interpersonal effects and (2) predominantly cooperative versus predominantly competitive settings. This classification is not intended to serve as the basis for a theory or model, but simply as a heuristic framework that guides our thinking about the role of affect in social decision making, and generates hypotheses regarding the effects of moods and emotions in various situations of interdependent decision making.
Intrapersonal Effects

My discussion of the intrapersonal effects of moods and emotions will be largely confined to empirical research relating to the influence of feeling states on social decisions, that is, decisions that directly influence one or more interdependent others. Reviews of the effects of moods and emotions on individual cognition, attitudes, perception, and decision making, as well as of theoretical models accounting for these effects, are available elsewhere (see e.g., Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995, 2001; Isen, 1999; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Mellers, 2000), so I will not dwell on this work in any great detail here. For present purposes it will suffice to provide a brief discussion of two of the more influential models, because the predictions that can be derived from these models tend to be generally supported by research on the intrapersonal effects of affect on social decision making. One is the affect-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). According to this model, people may use their affect as information when inferring how to respond to social situations. The model posits that when evaluating objects or belief statements, people often act as though they ask themselves, "How do I feel about it?" and then use their feelings directly as input to their judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). For example, an ill-tempered negotiator may attribute his or her bad mood to the opponent or to the opponent's offer, resulting in a negative impression of the other and a bad feeling about his or her proposal. Conversely, a negotiator who is in a good mood may infer that he or she is satisfied with the counterpart's offer.

The second perspective that merits attention takes a different approach. According to the affect priming perspective, moods and emotions influence social thinking and behavior by selectively priming related ideas and memories that are part of an associative network, thereby facilitating their use when planning and executing social behaviors (Bower, 1981; Bower & Forgas, 2001; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). In other words, the model assumes that mood effects on judgment are indirect, being mediated by changes in one's representation of the object of judgment. A good mood is hypothesized to function as a cue that temporarily increases the likelihood that positive cognitions will be generated in response to subsequent stimuli. Conversely, a bad mood is assumed to increase the accessibility of negative cognitions. To return to the negotiation example, a negotiator in a positive mood may see his or her opponent's offer through rose-colored glasses, whereas a negotiator with a bad mood may pay more attention to the unfavorable aspects of the opponent's proposal.

Although different in their outlook – especially with regard to the underlying processes – the predictions that can be derived from these and other models (e.g., Forgas, 1995) are quite similar, and, as we will see below, they are largely supported
by research on the intrapersonal effects of affect in the social decision making domain. I now turn to empirical research into the effects of moods and emotions in predominantly cooperative social decision making settings. I will then consider research that deals with the role of affect in mainly competitive settings.

**Cooperative Settings**

Research in both laboratory and organizational settings indicates that positive affect promotes helpful, prosocial behavior (Isen, 1987; Isen & Baron, 1991). For example, Isen (1970) found that people who had ostensibly performed well on some inconsequential task were more likely to donate money to charity than were people in a control condition or those who had supposedly performed poorly. Similarly, shoppers in a mall who had just found a coin in the return-slot of a public telephone were more likely to help a stranger who dropped a sheaf of papers as they passed by than were those who had not found a coin (Isen & Levin, 1972). Likewise, Baron (1997) demonstrated that passers-by in a shopping mall who experienced positive affect because of pleasant ambient odors (e.g., baking cookies, roasting coffee) were more likely to help an accomplice who needed assistance (by retrieving a dropped pen or providing change for a dollar) than were those who were not exposed to pleasant fragrances. Other types of positive mood experiences that have been shown to increase helpfulness include listening to soothing music (Fried & Berkowitz, 1979), being given a free packet of stationary (Isen, Clark, & Schwartz, 1976), imagining oneself to be enjoying a vacation in Hawaii (Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981), being on the winning team when participating in a football game (Berg, 1978), and being labeled a charitable person (Kraut, 1973; for reviews, see Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988; Isen, 1999).

Conceptualizing the role of positive affect in organizational behavior, George and Brief (1992) argued that positive affect may stimulate the occurrence of so-called *organizational spontaneity* (Katz, 1964), a construct that is conceptually related to organizational citizenship behavior (Organ, 1988) and prosocial organizational behavior (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). Specifically, George and Brief (1992) hypothesized that positive affect promotes helping co-workers, protecting the organization, making constructive suggestions, developing oneself, and spreading goodwill. In keeping with this proposition, George (1991) showed that positive mood at work was positively associated with the performance of both extrarole and role-prescribed pro-social organizational behaviors. Other research indicates that workers experiencing positive affect tend to be more creative and innovative (e.g., Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; but see George & Zhou, 2002), make better decisions and exhibit strong leadership (Staw & Barsade, 1993), and in general
perform better on their jobs (Baron & Bronfen, 1994; Cropanzano, James, & Konovsky, 1993; Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994; for recent overviews of the literature on affect in organizations, see Forgas & George, 2001, and Brief & Weiss, 2002). It can be concluded, then, that positive affect generally fosters friendly, helpful, socially responsible, and productive behavior.

In contrast to the empirical record concerning the effects of positive affect on prosocial behavior, findings pertaining to the effects of negative affect are less consistent. Some studies have found that negative affect increases helpfulness. For example, feelings of guilt have been demonstrated to increase prosocial behavior in both laboratory (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969) and field (Konecni, 1972) settings. Further, research by Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent (1973) indicates that distress and sadness increase helping, presumably because helping another person makes one feel good and hence improves one's mood (i.e., negative state relief; Cialdini et al., 1973; Cialdini & Fultz, 1990; cf. Carlson & Miller, 1987). However, other studies have found the opposite effect of negative affect (e.g., George, 1990; Moore, Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1973; Underwood et al., 1977). For instance, George (1990) found that the negative affective tone of a group, which she defines as "consistent or homogeneous affective reactions within a group" (p. 36), is inversely related to group prosocial behavior. Other research has linked workplace anger to a number of anti-social behaviors, including violence and hostility (Folger & Baron, 1996), theft (Chen & Spector, 1992), and organizational retaliatory behaviors, or revenge (Bies & Tripp, 1998; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Still other studies found no evidence of negative affect influencing prosocial behavior (e.g., Harris & Siebel, 1975; Holloway, Tucker, & Hornstein, 1977). These inconclusive findings have been interpreted as indicating that the association between negative mood and helpfulness is moderated by one or more other variables (Carlson & Miller, 1987).

A first example of such a moderator is the degree to which one believes that one's negative mood can be relieved by helping another person. In an ingenious experiment, Manucia, Baumann, and Cialdini (1984) experimentally induced happiness, sadness, or no emotion in participants, and subsequently used a placebo drug manipulation to lead half the subjects to believe that their induced moods were temporally fixed (i.e., resistant to change from normal events), whereas the other half was led to believe that their moods would remain manageable. Manucia et al. (1984) found that saddened participants showed enhanced helping only when they believed their mood to be changeable, whereas elated subjects showed increases in helping regardless of whether they believed their mood to be manageable or fixed. Second, research has identified the perceived costs and benefits of helping as moderators of the effects of negative affect on helpfulness (Weyant, 1978).
Participants who were put in a negative mood showed more prosocial behavior in the case of favorable rather than unfavorable costs and benefits of helping, whereas those in a positive mood displayed increased helpfulness regardless of the perceived costs and benefits. Other research has identified a third possible moderator: personal responsibility. Individuals in a negative mood appear to be willing to help another to the degree that they make an internal attribution of responsibility for their depressed mood (Rogers, Miller, Mayer, & Duval, 1982). Fourthly, level of socialization has been demonstrated to moderate the relationship between negative mood and helping. Cialdini and Kenrick (1976) showed that the youngest, least socialized participants in their study (6-8 years old) were somewhat less generous in a negative mood condition than in a neutral mood condition, whereas this pattern progressively reversed itself up to the oldest, most socialized group (15-18 years old).

Further, recent research has revealed that distinct negative emotions have differential effects on a number of dependent variables such as judgment and choice, risk perception, and information processing. For example, Lerner and Keltner (2000) showed that fearful people made pessimistic judgments of future events, whereas angry people made optimistic judgments. In another set of studies, Lerner and Keltner (2001) demonstrated that fear and anger have opposite effects on risk taking, with fearful participants being risk-averse and angry participants risk-seeking. In similar vein, research has found differential effects of discrete negative emotions on social perception, judgments, and information processing (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Tiedens & Linton, 2001), indicating that it is potentially more fruitful to conceptualize emotions in terms of their unique appraisal patterns than in terms of their valence (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Thus, the mixed findings pertaining to the impact of negative affect on helping may in part be due to the heterogeneous collection of negative feeling states that have been investigated, and that have been shown in other research to have distinct effects on cognitions and beliefs. As we shall see below, research on the role of negative moods and emotions in competitive social decision making settings has yielded more straightforward results.

Competitive Settings

The lion’s share of research on the intrapersonal effects of mood and emotion in competitive social decision making settings has examined the influence of positive or negative affect in the context of dyadic negotiation. The first study on the intrapersonal effects of positive mood on negotiation behavior was conducted by Carnevale and Isen (1986). They manipulated negotiators' moods by means of
humorous cartoons and a small gift, and found that participants with a positive mood used fewer contentious tactics and obtained higher joint outcomes than did negotiators in a neutral mood. Similar findings have been obtained in subsequent research using a variety of affect manipulations. For example, Kramer, Newton, and Pommerenke (1993) manipulated positive mood by showing subjects either a humorous or an affect-neutral videotape before the negotiation, and they replicated the finding that positive affect leads to enhanced joint outcomes.

Using a different procedure, Baron (1990) found that participants who were exposed to pleasant scents (i.e., environmentally induced positive affect) made more concessions during face-to-face negotiations than did participants who were exposed to a neutral scent. Likewise, socially induced positive affect (e.g., through mild flattery or a small gift) has been found to increase participants' preference for resolving conflict through collaboration, and to reduce their preference for resolving conflict through competition (Baron, Fortin, Frei, Hauver, & Shack, 1990). Finally, Forgas (1998) used a false-feedback technique to manipulate participants' moods. He found that subjects who were led to believe that they had performed well on a verbal abilities test (i.e., good mood) planned and reported more cooperative and fewer competitive bargaining strategies than did those who did not receive feedback on their performance (i.e., neutral mood).

The intrapersonal effects of negative moods and emotions have received somewhat less research attention. However, the studies that have been conducted seem to paint a rather consistent picture of the effects of negative affect on negotiation processes and outcomes. Baron et al. (1990) had subjects negotiate with an accomplice who disagreed with their point of view on a particular topic, manipulating the manner in which this disagreement was expressed. In half the conditions the accomplice expressed disagreement in a calm, reasonable, and unprovocative manner (e.g., "I can see why you feel that way, but I guess I disagree..."). In the other conditions disagreement was expressed in an arrogant, condescending, and provoking fashion (e.g., "Oh come on, you've got to be kidding!"). Previous research (Baron, 1984) had shown that this procedure effectively induces negative emotions such as annoyance or anger. The results of the experiment revealed that male (but not female) participants who had been provoked prior to the negotiation made significantly lower initial offers to the accomplice than did those who had not been provoked (Baron et al., 1990). Compatible results were obtained by Forgas (1998), using the previously described false-feedback manipulation: Participants who were led to believe that they had performed poorly (and who were presumably in a bad mood) planned and reported more competitive
bargaining strategies than did those who received no feedback (who were presumably in a neutral mood).

The research discussed so far examined the effects of positive and/or negative mood on negotiation behavior and outcomes. Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, and Raia (1997) were the first to investigate the role of discrete, other-directed emotions (as opposed to moods) in negotiation. In a simulated negotiation experiment they manipulated anger and compassion and found that negotiators with high levels of anger and low levels of compassion had less concern for the other's interests, achieved lower joint gains, and had less desire to work with the other in the future than did negotiators who had more positive emotional regard for the other party. Interestingly, Allred et al. also demonstrated that discrete emotions (in this case anger and compassion) exerted a stronger influence on negotiation behavior than did diffuse moods.

These studies quite consistently show that negotiators experiencing positive affect tend to be more cooperative and conciliatory, whereas negotiators who are in a negative affective state tend to be more competitive and reluctant to make concessions. The sparse research on the role of affect in other predominantly competitive social decision making settings has generally yielded compatible results. For example, Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) investigated the role of perceived fairness and emotion in an ultimatum bargaining situation. Participants in their experiment received a "take it or leave it" offer in the form of a proposed division of money between themselves and another person. They manipulated the extent to which participants could evaluate the fairness of the offer by providing either complete or incomplete information about the amount of money that was to be divided. The results showed that participants were more likely to reject an offer if they were able to evaluate its fairness, and, more important for present purposes, that the anger resulting from perceived injustice was a better predictor of rejections than was unfairness per se. Compatible findings were reported by Bosman, Sonnemans, and Zeelenberg (2001), who showed that the probability of rejection of an ultimatum offer was positively related to the intensity of experienced anger, irritation, contempt, sadness, and envy.

Knapp and Clark (1991) examined the effects of positive and negative affect in a resource dilemma, in which individual interests are at odds with collective interests. In a laboratory simulation, participants harvested fish from a common and depletable resource pool that was only partially replenished at fixed time intervals. In this situation, the dilemma consists in the fact that although it is profitable for individual fishers to maximize their selfish interests by harvesting all they can, if all fishers were to do so the resource would be depleted and everyone would be
collectively worse off (for overviews of research on these and other social dilemmas, see Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983). Before playing this fishing dilemma game, participants were experimentally induced to feel happy, angry, or sad (or neutral in a control condition). Across two experiments, Knapp and Clark found that angry and sad participants were both more competitive (i.e., they took more fish) than were participants in a happy or neutral mood.

Extending this line of research, Sanna, Parks, and Chang (2003) investigated the influence of positive versus negative moods in interaction with cooperative and competitive goals in a resource dilemma (as described above) and a prisoner's dilemma, in which choosing an individually favorable option prevents the players from reaching a collectively favorable outcome (Rapoport & Guyer, 1966). In four studies Sanna et al. (2003) demonstrated that mood effects were moderated by the individual's social goal. When participants had a competitive goal, negative moods led to more competition and positive moods led to more cooperation. However, a reverse pattern was found for participants with a cooperative motive, with competition being increased by positive mood and cooperation increased by negative mood. Sanna et al. (2003) interpreted these findings as indicating that people use their positive affect as a cue that they have reached their goal and their negative affect as a cue that they have not (yet) reached their goal. When one has a cooperative goal, they argue, negative affect is interpreted as a signal that more cooperation is needed because the cooperative goal has not yet been reached, whereas positive affect is taken to indicate that one's goal has been attained and that there is therefore no need for further cooperation.

As is clear from the studies discussed so far, most research on the intrapersonal effects of affect in social decision making has focused on diffuse positive versus negative moods, and, in some cases, discrete emotions such as happiness, anger, and sadness. A rare exception is the recent research by Ketelaar and Au (2003), who examined the effects of guilt in repeated social bargaining games. In one experiment they showed that participants who had been experimentally induced to feel guilty about their previous (uncooperative) behavior in a prisoner's dilemma game displayed higher levels of cooperation in the subsequent round of the game than did those who had not been induced to feel guilty. In a second experiment they demonstrated that self-reported feelings of guilt were also related to increased cooperation in an ultimatum game. These findings are consistent with theorizing by Frank (1988), who emphasized the important role that emotions serve in solving problems of commitment. The idea is that the experience of certain emotions (such as guilt) promotes the adoption of behavioral strategies that fare well in repeated social bargaining games. More specifically, Frank's
commitment model proposes that emotion helps to solve the problem of overcoming the attraction of immediate rewards, leading individuals to make binding commitments to forego their short-term self-interests in order to pursue a more effective long-term strategy (see also Hirshleifer, 1987).

**Conclusion**

Three decades of research have greatly illuminated the intrapersonal effects of moods and emotions in various social decision making situations. In predominantly cooperative situations, positive moods and emotions have generally been shown to promote pro-social behavior. Negative moods and emotions, in contrast, have sometimes been found to increase helpfulness and sometimes to decrease helpfulness. The conclusion that positive affect is more reliably linked to social decision making behavior than negative affect is in accordance with Clark and Williamson's (1989) observation that the effects of mood on judgments of self, others, and objects are found more consistently with positive than with negative moods. It appears that at least five factors may be (partially) responsible for the mixed findings concerning the intrapersonal effects of negative affect in cooperative settings: (1) whether or not one believes that helping may relieve one's negative affect; (2) relatedly, how one perceives the relative costs and benefits of helping; (3) whether one believes oneself to be personally responsible for one's negative mood; (4) one's age and concomitant level of socialization; and (5) which specific negative emotion one experiences.

As is clear from the foregoing discussion, empirical findings regarding the role of affect in predominantly competitive settings are more straightforward. Research in various competitive social decision making settings has revealed that positive moods and emotions tend to promote cooperation, whereas negative moods and emotions tend to elicit competition. Notwithstanding the fact that recent developments suggest that the relationship between affect and cooperation may be somewhat more complex than has long been assumed (e.g., the effects may depend in part on whether one has a cooperative or a competitive goal; Sanna et al., 2003; see also Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2000), there is now a considerable body of literature painting a consistent overall picture of the intrapersonal effects of mood and emotion in competitive social decision making situations.

**Interpersonal Effects**

In 1996, Parkinson published a theoretical article with the bold title, "Emotions are social," in which he argued that emotions are best viewed as social rather than individual phenomena. Indeed, inspired by the early writings of Darwin
(1872), researchers have identified a number of important social functions of emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1994; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). As discussed above, at the interpersonal level emotions convey information to others about an individual's feelings, social intentions, and orientation toward the relationship (Ekman, 1993; Fridlund, 1992; Knutson, 1996). Further, emotions may evoke reciprocal or complementary emotions in others that may in turn help individuals to respond to significant social events (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). And lastly, emotions may serve as incentives or deterrents for other individuals' social behavior (Klinnert et al., 1983).

The idea that emotions can influence the flow of actions at the interpersonal level is of course highly relevant to the study of affect in social decision making. In situations where people depend on each other for their outcomes, the question of how their respective emotions mutually influence their decisions is of the utmost importance for a complete and thorough understanding of behavior in social decision making situations. Below I give an overview of the empirical literature regarding the interpersonal effects of moods and emotions on social decision making, starting with the role of affect in predominantly cooperative settings.

Cooperative Settings

Much of the research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in cooperative settings has departed from the general notion that emotions communicate intentions and needs and have the potential to transform relationships and change patterns of joint action (de Rivera & Grinkis, 1986; Fernald, 1989; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). A widely shared belief is that emotions may alert others to our needs and prompt them to address those needs (e.g., Buck, 1984, 1989; Clark, Fitness, & Brissette, 2001; Clark & Watson, 1994; Scott, 1980). Research in this area of inquiry has mostly focused on the supplication function of emotions such as sadness, disappointment, fear, and worry, which it has been argued communicate a need for support and thereby evoke empathy and helping behavior (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Eisenberg, 2000; Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 2001). Sadness, for instance, has been demonstrated to increase perceptions of neediness and dependency (Clark & Taraban, 1991) and to evoke helping behavior in both children (Barnett, Howard, Melton, & Dino, 1982) and adults (Clark, Ouellette, Powell, & Milberg, 1987; Yee & Greenberg, 1998). In similar vein, crying has been found to serve a help-seeking function (Labott, Martin, Eason, & Berkey, 1991). For example, Cornelius (1984) demonstrated that (involuntary) crying can be an effective means of eliciting a positive and desired change in other people's behavior.

Similar effects on helping behavior have been observed for expressions of
worry and fear. Like sadness, worry and fear communicate a need for assistance, and they elicit sympathetic and supportive responses in others (Eisenberg, 2000; Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 2001). For example, a study of reactions to crime victims by Yee and Greenberg (1998) revealed that fear on the part of the victims influences observers' appraisals of need and increases the inclination to help, especially if the observer and the victim are in a communal rather than an exchange relationship. By the same token, employees who display fear are likely to elicit helpful, supportive responses from co-workers (Côté, in press).

Other research indicates that the expression of emotions of appeasement is associated with improved relationship outcomes (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; M. Lewis, 2000). The appeasement account has its roots in studies of human apologies (e.g., Tavuchis, 1991) and reconciliation in other species, such as nonhuman primates (e.g., de Waal, 1986, 1988). Emotions that may be thought of as fulfilling an appeasement function are guilt, embarrassment, and interpersonal regret. For example, Baumeister et al. (1994) explain why a victim of a transgression should feel better when the transgressor feels guilty: "First, the transgressor's guilt affirms a commitment to the relationship, which is thus a potentially powerful indication of affection, caring, and intimacy that may be pleasing and reassuring to an intimate partner: Feeling guilty is a way of showing that one cares. Second, if the transgressor acknowledges guilt, the victim may see this as an implicit commitment not to repeat the offense, as a promise to rectify that transgression by making amends, or as an acknowledgement of a nonspecific debt toward the victim. Thus, despite the victim's misfortune or distress, he or she may be pleased to regard the partner's acknowledgement of guilt as an implicit promise of better treatment in the future" (p. 247). This would suggest that appeasement emotions such as guilt play a role in regulating social interactions in situations of interdependent decision making.

A similar case has been made for displays of embarrassment (Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990; Goffman, 1967; Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Anderson, 2000; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Keltner, Young, & Buswell, 1997; Leary, Britt, Cutlip, & Templeton, 1992; Semin & Manstead, 1982). More specifically, it has been argued that "an individual who violates a social norm threatens the validity of the norm and potentially incurs the anger and unfavorable evaluation of others. Individuals who show embarrassment after violating a norm, however, appease others by displaying their submissive apology for the transgression and their knowledge of the violated norm" (Keltner, 1995, p. 441). Put differently, displays of embarrassment signal that one feels bad about the fact and imply that one may live up to the social norm in the
future (Goffman, 1967). In this way, embarrassment contributes to the restoration of social relationships.

In an interpersonal context, social transgressions can also cause feelings of regret (Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, & Manstead, 1998). When the regret is interpersonal in nature, that is, when one regrets a behavior that has inflicted harm on another person (rather than on oneself), it shares a number of characteristics with guilt (Berndsen, van der Pligt, Doosje, & Manstead, 2004; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Because regret is an aversive state, people are motivated to avoid it, and, once they experience it, to take action to undo it (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000). Gilovich and Medvec (1994, 1995) refer to this undoing as "behavioral repair work" or "ameliorative behavior." In the case of interpersonal regret, this repair work typically takes the form of apologizing to the person who has been affected by the transgression (Steiner, 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 1998). In this way, interpersonal regret also contributes to the regulation of social interactions.

Positive emotions, too, may serve important social functions. Research has shown that expressions of happiness are associated with increased liking (Clark & Taraban, 1991; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987). This finding led Clark et al. (1996) to argue that people may strategically present displays of happiness (e.g., smiles) for purposes of ingratiation or flattery. Indeed, research on smiling suggests that smiles are not merely reflections of an underlying mental state but may often be intended as communicative acts (Fridlund, 1991; Hess, Banse, & Kappas, 1995; Kraut & Johnston, 1979). For example, Jakobs, Manstead, and Fischer (1999a, b) demonstrated that smiling is determined by both emotional feelings and social context (e.g., whether a friend is physically present or not), indicating that smiles function at least in part as social communications. Relatedly, other evidence suggests that people sometimes knowingly smile in order to get others to like them (Godfrey, Jones, & Lord, 1986; Rosenfeld, 1966). It is therefore conceivable that individuals involved in a social decision making situation may enact happiness as part of an impression management strategy. Consistent with this idea, Duck (1986) observed that people may exaggerate their expressions of positive feelings toward their boss in order to make him or her feel more positively about them, presumably with the ultimate goal of enhancing their chances of obtaining favorable outcomes. Similarly, Staw et al. (1994) found that positive affect has favorable outcomes at work in terms of supervisor evaluation and co-worker support.

In a complementary fashion, people may also strategically suppress negative emotions. There is some evidence that expressions of sadness and anger decrease liking (Clark & Taraban, 1991; Shaver et al., 1987; Sommers, 1984). Taking this notion
one step further, Fitness and Fletcher (1993) showed that married couples frequently report controlling and inhibiting the display of strong negative emotions. In similar vein, Jakobs, Manstead, and Fischer (2001) investigated whether facial displays of sadness are influenced by the implicit or explicit presence of another person. They found that participants exhibited fewer displays of sadness when others were present (even only implicitly) than when they were by themselves. Likewise, other research attests to the importance of controlling displays of anger in the maintenance of personal (e.g., Fehr & Baldwin, 1996; Fehr, Baldwin, Collins, Patterson, & Benditt, 1999; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991) and organizational (Fitness, 2000; Ostell, Baverstock, & Wright, 1999) relationships.

The research discussed so far has focused on the effects of moods and emotions at the dyadic level of analysis. There is also a considerable amount of work speaking to the role of affect at the group level. A line of research that is relevant in this respect concerns work on what is referred to as group emotion (e.g., Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, in press), which may be defined as the group's affective state arising from the combination of its "bottom-up" affective compositional effects and its "top-down" affective context (Barsade & Gibson, 1998). Research in this area has found that members of social groups tend to exhibit mood or emotion convergence, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as group emotional contagion. This may be regarded as the group-level manifestation of so-called primitive emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992, 1994), which is defined as "the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements, with those of another person and, consequently, to converge emotionally" (Hatfield et al., 1992, pp. 153-154). A variety of mechanisms have been claimed to be responsible for the spreading of emotion among people, including facial mimicry, postural mirroring, motor mimicry, physiological synchrony, and vocal mimicry (e.g., Friedman & Riggio, 1981; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Hietanen, Surakka, & Linnankoski, 1998; Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995; Neumann & Strack, 2000; Wild, Erb, & Bartels, 2001).

In their research on mood linkage within teams, Totterdell and his associates departed from an emotional-contagion perspective. For example, Totterdell, Kellett, Teuchmann, and Briner (1998) investigated whether people's moods are influenced by the collective mood of their teammates over time. In a first study they investigated mood linkage within teams of community nurses and found a significant association between the nurses' moods and the collective moods of their teammates, which did not depend on shared hassles. Interestingly, the association was stronger for nurses who were older, were more committed to their team, perceived a better team climate, or experienced fewer hassles with teammates. In a
second study Totterdell et al. (1998) found similar evidence for mood linkage within a team of accountants. In a similar vein, Totterdell (2000) had players from two professional cricket teams provide ratings of their moods during a competitive match between the teams. The results showed that the players' moods were more strongly correlated with the current aggregate mood of their own team than with the aggregate mood of the other team or with the aggregate mood of their own team at other times. Further, mood linkage was not affected by the state of the game between the two teams, and was greater for players who were older, more committed to the team, and more susceptible to emotional contagion.

Compatible findings were reported by Bartel and Saavedra (2000), who argued that members of work groups are likely to experience "group moods" to the extent that they can detect and display mood information through observable expressions. To test this idea they compared observers' reports of group mood with the work-group members' own mood ratings in 70 work groups. As predicted, groups converged for eight distinct mood categories, and observers' ratings of work group mood were positively correlated with the groups' aggregated self-report scores. The study also revealed that moods characterized by high arousal (e.g., cheerful enthusiasm, hostile irritability) yielded more accurate observer assessments and were more likely to spread among the group members than moods characterized by low levels of arousal (e.g., serene warmth, depressed sluggishness).

As a final example, Anderson, Keltner, and John (2003) examined emotional convergence in personal relationships. Using laboratory procedures to induce and assess emotional responses, they found that both dating partners and college roommates became more similar in their emotional responses over the course of a year. Interestingly, Anderson et al. (2003) also found that relationship partners with less power made more of the change necessary for convergence to occur, and that relationships whose partners were more emotionally similar were less likely to dissolve.

Apparently, then, moods and emotions may spread among group members, resulting in emotional convergence. But do the resulting group emotions actually influence behavior in social decision making situations? Recent research suggests that, at least sometimes, they do. Barsade, Ward, Turner, and Sonnenfeld (2000) investigated the effects of mean group trait affect and affective heterogeneity on group-level dynamics. In a study using a sample of top management teams, they obtained evidence suggesting that affectively diverse groups scoring low on mean group positive trait affect experienced the greatest task and emotional conflict and the least cooperation. Along similar lines, Barsade (2002) examined emotional contagion in laboratory groups which contained an accomplice of the experimenter
who had been instructed to act in either a happy and optimistic or an unhappy and pessimistic manner. Participants in groups that included a happy confederate reported more pleasant moods than did those in groups that included an unhappy confederate. Moreover, the extent to which group members caught the confederate’s mood was predictive of levels of cooperation and conflict, with dispersion of positive affect leading to greater cooperation and reduced conflict in the group, whereas the spreading of negative affect was associated with less cooperation and increased conflict.

Other evidence for interpersonal effects of affect on behavior is provided by a number of studies on the impact of leader mood on group processes and performance. For instance, K. M. Lewis (2000) found that expressions of sadness on the part of the leader reduced arousal in followers, while leader anger increased follower arousal, suggesting that leaders may influence their subordinates’ behavior via emotional contagion. George and Bettenhausen (1990) found that leader positive mood was positively related to the incidence of prosocial behavior in work groups and negatively related to voluntary turnover rates in a service context. In a later study, George (1995) found that leader positive mood was also positively associated with group performance in a customer service setting. A recent study by Sy, Côté, and Saavedra (in press) revealed a somewhat more complex pattern of effects. Leaders of groups constructed in the laboratory watched a movie that instilled either positive or negative mood, and subsequently rejoined their group to work on a tent-building exercise. The authors found that individual group members experienced more positive mood and less negative mood when their leader was in a positive rather than a negative mood, and that groups had a more positive affective tone when the leader was in a positive rather than a negative mood. Moreover, Sy et al. found that groups with a positive-mood leader exhibited more coordination, whereas groups with a negative-mood leader expended more effort. In this study and the study by George (1995) the relationship between leader mood and group performance remained significant after controlling for group affective tone, indicating that leader affect can directly influence follower behavior.

**Competitive Settings**

As we have seen above, there has been a great deal of research on affective influences in predominantly cooperative settings. In sharp contrast, surprisingly little is known about the role of emotion in more competitive settings. This is unfortunate because emotions are especially likely to arise in the context of competitive, conflict-laden interactions (Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999; Jones & Bodtker, 2001). In fact, Kurt Lewin already suggested that the ways in which
conflicts are resolved depends greatly on the opposing parties' emotions (Lewin, 1951). More recently, Thomas (1992) commented on the state of the art by noting that "it seems ironic that conflict, which is among the most emotion-arousing of phenomena, has been predominantly studied as though those emotions had no bearing on it" (p. 702). Despite the fact that our lack of understanding of the impact of affective phenomena in conflict and negotiation has often been noted and deplored (see also Barry, 1999; Neale & Northcraft, 1991; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999), we still know virtually nothing about the interpersonal effects of emotions in competitive settings such as conflict and negotiation.

This scientific ignorance is reflected in the disagreement among both scholars and lay people regarding the question of how emotions may or may not help one to gain the edge in a negotiation. In a recent overview of different prescriptive approaches to successful negotiation, Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, and Kopelman (2001) identified three distinct theoretical perspectives: the "rational negotiator," the "positive negotiator," and the "irrational negotiator." The rational negotiator perspective views emotion as a weakness. According to this view, which is commonly taught to professional students, the best negotiation strategy is to maintain an impassive "poker face" and not show one's true feelings at the negotiation table (e.g., Nierenberg, 1968; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987).

A different view is adopted by followers of the positive negotiator approach. This perspective builds on research on the intrapersonal effects of emotions in negotiations, which, as discussed earlier, has generally shown that positive emotions lead to increased joint outcomes (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Kumar, 1997). Proponents of this approach argue that positive emotions have beneficial effects on negotiation outcomes, whereas negative emotions lead to detrimental outcomes. According to Carnevale and Isen (1986), "the use of positive affect may be a very useful tactic that may help negotiators discover optimal solutions . . . The ability to integrate, to find creative ways of combining issues, and to develop novel solutions may be necessary for negotiators to achieve anything beyond obvious compromises" (p. 12).

Those who adhere to the irrational negotiator perspective adopt the opposite approach. According to this perspective, irrational outbursts of anger will be effective in getting others to comply with one's wishes (e.g., Daly, 1991; Frank, 1988; Schelling, 1960; Schoonmaker, 1989). In his insightful book Passions Within Reason, Frank (1988) argues that "for a signal between adversaries to be credible, it must be costly (or, more generally, difficult) to fake" (p. 99). He reasons that negotiators may feel pressured to concede in response to their adversary's anger out of fear that the negotiation might end in an impasse. In keeping with this idea, studies of people's
reasons for displaying anger have found that people sometimes deliberately display anger in order to intimidate others, to get others to comply with their wishes, or to extract a favor (Averill, 1982; Clark et al., 1996) and, more specifically, to induce a concession in negotiations (Adler et al., 1998).

Aside from the three broad perspectives identified by Thompson et al. (2001), a number of researchers have emphasized the importance of different aspects of the role of affect in negotiation. For instance, Barry (1999) emphasized the role of emotion as a tactical gambit in negotiation. He reports the results of a preliminary study suggesting that people are both more accepting of and more confident in their ability to use emotion management tactics (e.g., strategically expressing anger toward the other party when one is not really angry) than more cognitive forms of deception (e.g., misrepresenting information or making false promises). In a somewhat related vein, Rafaeli and Sutton (1991) investigated the use of emotion as a social influence strategy. The results indicated that criminal interrogators and bill collectors often use combinations of expressed positive and negative emotions to elicit compliance in others, a strategy that may be regarded as a variation of the infamous "good cop, bad cop" technique.

Thompson et al. (1999) draw attention to another aspect of emotion in negotiation, pointing to the potentially crucial role of emotional responsiveness and convergence. They contend that "negotiators who mimic emotions and experience emotional contagion are likely to be more accurate in judging the true emotions of the other person" (Thompson et al., 1999, p. 148). Conversely, they argue, negotiators who fail to engage in behavioral synchrony with the other party will tend to be less effective than negotiators who are emotionally responsive. Thompson et al. propose that effective negotiators engage in "emotional tuning," adapting their messages to the perceived emotional state and reactions of the other party. Finally, they argue that effective negotiators buffer or suppress emotion in situations where affect is undesirable.

The final approach that warrants mention here is Morris and Keltner's (2000) social-functional perspective, which highlights the functions of emotions in social interactions that were discussed earlier in this chapter. According to Morris and Keltner, these social functions are illuminated when one identifies how "emotion-related behavior helps the individual or the dyad respond to the problem in the interaction" (p. 14). Their four-stage model explores how relational problems trigger particular social emotions, which in turn give rise to interaction behaviors. During the first stage of the negotiation – the opening moves – negotiators face the relational problem of initiation, which is solved by openness and interest. In the positioning stage, they argue, negotiators face the problem of influence. The relevant emotions in
this stage are anger and contempt. In the third stage, which is dedicated to problem solving, negotiators face the problem of trust. This stage is accompanied by embarrassment and empathy. Finally, during the endgame, negotiators face the problem of binding, which is accompanied by pain and exasperation. Morris and Keltner thus strongly emphasize the social and communicative function of emotion in negotiation.

Conclusion

There is a considerable body of empirical work on the interpersonal effects of moods and emotions in predominantly cooperative social decision making settings. We have seen, for example, that people tend to exhibit prosocial behaviors in response to another's displays of distress; that people may strategically manage their emotional displays to regulate both personal and organizational relationships; that the affective state of one group member may be "caught" by other group members and influence levels of cooperation and conflict; and, finally, that leader affect may influence follower behavior. In striking contrast, there is a lack of empirical data pertaining to the interpersonal effects of emotions in more competitive social decision making situations. A number of descriptive and prescriptive approaches have been proposed, which are in some respects partially overlapping but in other respects are in apparent contradiction. What makes an effective negotiator? Should one suppress one's emotions and maintain a poker face? Should one cultivate positive affect in order to find a mutually satisfying agreement? Or is it more effective to display signs of anger to get the other party to comply? Are possible interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations better predicted by an emotional contagion account or by a strategic behavior perspective? Previous research is silent with respect to these and other questions concerning the role of emotion in negotiation. This striking lack of knowledge forms the starting-point for the empirical studies reported in the following chapters.

Overview of the Present Dissertation

Thirty years of research on the role of affect in social decision making have yielded a considerable amount of work concerning the influence of moods and emotions in a wide range of social decision making settings. In the preceding overview I organized these studies in terms of two dimensions: (1) intrapersonal versus interpersonal affective influences; and (2) predominantly cooperative versus predominantly competitive settings. Table 1.1 provides a schematic summary of the major areas of research with their respective classifications in the resulting 2 by 2 matrix. When reading this table, it is important to keep three things in mind. First,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Setting</th>
<th>Type of Effect</th>
<th>Areas of Research Included in Previous Investigations of the Role of Affect in Social Decision Making, Including Exemplary References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Interpersonal</td>
<td>Classifed according to the Type of Effect and the Nature of the Setting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.2**

- Social dilemmas (Kappp & Clark, 1991)
- Ultimatum bargaining (Phila & Emgin, 1996)
- Negotiation (Camerale & Lien, 1996; Fong, 1998)
- Leadership (George, 1997; K. Lewis, 2000)
- Cooperation (Barse, 2002; Barse & al., 2000)
- Intergroup conflict (Anderson & al., 2003; Torerdal, 2000)
- Impression management (Duck, 1986; Cody & al., 1996)
- Appearance (Buneirer & al., 1994; Kelter & Buswell, 1997)
- Supportive behavior (Clark & al., 1992; Erisenber, 2000)
- Anti-social work behavior (Folger & Baran, 1996)
- Job performance (Smith & Barse, 1999)
- Creativity and innovation (Lien & al., 1997)
- Organizational spontaneity (George, 1997)
- Pro-social behavior (Lien, 1997; Baran, 1997)
the table is not intended to be exhaustive; a comprehensive overview of prior research has already been provided in the preceding sections of this chapter. Rather, the purpose of the table is to provide a brief recapitulation of the research that has been discussed above, and to identify the empirical gaps in the study of affect in social decision making. Second, it is important to emphasize that the areas of research summarized in Table 1.1 are classified under the heading of intrapersonal or interpersonal effects on the basis of the nature of the effects that were studied. For instance, organizational spontaneity is in itself not necessarily an intrapersonal phenomenon, but research in this area has focused on the intrapersonal effects of affect on organizational spontaneity. Similarly, negotiation obviously occurs between people, but so far research has focused on the intrapersonal effects of moods and emotions on negotiation behavior. Finally, the table presents one or two exemplary references for each area of research. Although representative of the domain in question, the choice of references is inevitably quite arbitrary. Inclusion or exclusion of references in the table should therefore not be taken as a value judgment.

As can be seen from Table 1.1, prior research on the role of affect in social decision making has addressed both the intrapersonal and the interpersonal effects of moods and emotions in a wide array of predominantly cooperative settings. Less attention has been given to affective influences in predominantly competitive settings. In fact, as is evident from Table 1.1, empirical research concerning the interpersonal effects of emotion in competitive social decision making settings is altogether lacking. As revealed by the preceding literature review, there has been some theorizing regarding the interpersonal effects of moods and emotions in negotiations, and a number of distinct theoretical perspectives have been proposed. However, to date this theorizing has not stimulated any empirical findings. The primary objective of the work reported in this dissertation is to fill this gap by focusing on the interpersonal effects of discrete emotions in negotiations. The central question that constitutes the thread running through the dissertation is therefore the following: How are negotiators influenced by their opponent’s emotions?

In the chapters that follow I report nine empirical studies that were designed to address this question. In Chapter 2, two competing hypotheses regarding the effects of anger and happiness in negotiation are proposed and tested, one based on an emotional contagion account and the other on a strategic choice perspective. Chapter 3 extends the findings of Chapter 2 and reports three studies that were designed to examine the effects of anger and happiness in more detail. Specifically, attention is given to the moderating role of strategic considerations and information processing motivation. Chapter 4 broadens the empirical horizon by exploring the
interpersonal effects of four other emotions. Two of these emotions may be seen as serving an appeasement function (guilt and regret), and the other two may be seen as serving a supplication function (disappointment and worry). In addition, this chapter investigates the role of interpersonal trust in determining the effects of these emotions. Finally, Chapter 5 integrates the empirical results presented in Chapters 2 to 4 and advances an integrative framework that can account for these effects and that can be used to formulate specific hypotheses regarding the interpersonal effects of emotions in other settings of social decision making. Additionally, Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the contributions and limitations of the present dissertation, and outlines a number of avenues for future research.