Emotion in social conflict: the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations

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Negotiation is a ubiquitous feature of social life. It is one of the most common and constructive ways of resolving conflicts and conducting social and economic exchange. Because conflict and negotiation are inherently emotional phenomena, emotions are of paramount importance to understanding how individuals behave during negotiation encounters (Barry, 1999; Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999). The crucial role of emotions in negotiations is increasingly being acknowledged by scientists, and as a result the last fifteen years have witnessed a growing interest in affective influences on negotiation behavior. However, Chapter 1 revealed a striking gap in our knowledge regarding the effects of emotions in negotiation and other competitive decision making settings. Previous research has almost exclusively focused on the intrapersonal effects of emotions, that is, the effects of a negotiator's emotional state on his or her own cognitions and behavior during the negotiation. This one-sided attention has been at the expense of research on the interpersonal effects of emotions, the effects one negotiator's emotions may have on the other negotiator. The present dissertation was devoted to filling this void.

The current chapter is structured as follows. First, the main findings of the empirical studies reported in the preceding chapters will be summarized. On the basis of these findings an integrative framework will be proposed to account for the effects that have been observed in the current work and to guide future research on the role of emotion in social decision making. Subsequently, the major contributions and implications of this research will be highlighted. Finally, the strengths and limitations of the present approach will be discussed and directions for future research will be outlined.

Summary of the Main Findings

The central theme of this dissertation has been the way in which negotiators may be influenced by their opponent’s emotions. In order to address this question, I adopted a computer-mediated negotiation task in which participants negotiate with a computer-simulated, preprogrammed opponent (see De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Hilty & Carnevale, 1993). For the present purpose, this
task was modified in order to be able to manipulate the supposed emotional state of the simulated opponent in a dynamic and credible way. This computer-mediated negotiation task was used in all the experiments reported in this dissertation, except in Experiment 3.3, which was a scenario study. Below I summarize the core ideas and findings of the present work.

Chapter 2 set out to study the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. Based on the existing literature, two competing hypotheses were advanced. On the basis of a social contagion perspective and previous findings regarding the intrapersonal effects of emotions in negotiation, it was predicted that negotiators with an angry opponent would themselves become angry and behave competitively, placing high demands and making small concessions. Conversely, negotiators with a happy opponent were predicted to become happy and behave more cooperatively, placing low demands and making large concessions. A competing hypothesis was derived from the mixed-motive nature of negotiations and the social functions of emotions. According to this strategic-choice perspective, an angry negotiator cannot be expected to make substantial concessions. The only way to prevent the negotiation from ending in impasse, then, is by making concessions oneself. By contrast, a happy opponent does not constitute a threat to agreement, and is therefore unlikely to elicit large concessions. Following this line of argument, it was hypothesized that participants with an angry opponent would become more conciliatory, making lower demands and large concessions than would participants with a happy opponent.

Consistent with the strategic-choice perspective (and inconsistent with the social contagion perspective), Experiment 2.1 revealed that participants with an angry opponent placed lower demands and made larger concessions than did participants with a non-emotional opponent, whereas participants with a happy opponent placed higher demands and made smaller concessions. Lending further support to the strategic-choice account, Experiment 2.2 showed that these effects resulted from tracking (see Pruitt, 1981). Negotiators used their opponent's emotions to identify his or her limits, and subsequently used this information to make a counter-offer. Negotiators who were confronted with an angry opponent estimated the opponent's limit to be high, and to avoid costly impasse they placed relatively low demands and made relatively large concessions. Conversely, negotiators with a happy opponent judged the opponent's limit to be low, felt no need to concede to avoid impasse, and accordingly placed relatively high demands and made relatively small concessions. Furthermore, Experiment 2.2 revealed that the effects of anger and happiness are mitigated when the opponent makes large concessions and thereby undermines the focal negotiator's motivation to take the other's emotion into
account. Finally, Experiment 2.3 demonstrated that the effects of anger and happiness are removed when the opponent sends angry rather than happy messages, because angry messages induce fear in the receiver and distract the receiver's attention from the opponent's experienced emotion. These experiments further revealed strong effects of the opponent's emotion on interpersonal liking. Participants who were faced with a happy opponent developed a considerably more favorable impression of the opponent than did those who dealt with an angry counterpart.

All three experiments also yielded evidence of social contagion – participants with an angry opponent became angrier whereas participants with a happy opponent became happier. These effects could not be attributed to self-perception of participants' own negotiation behavior. That is, participants with an angry opponent did not become angry as a result of their own relatively large concessions (which moved them away from their goal), while those with a happy opponent did not become happy as a result of their own small concessions (which brought them closer to their goal). It thus appears that social contagion may affect self-reported emotions in computer-mediated negotiation settings but that this does not translate into behavior. Instead, it appears that two distinct processes emerge when negotiators receive information about their adversaries' emotions: The information influences their own emotional state through contagion-like processes, while at the same time, they strategically use the information to track the opponent's limit and to make demands.

These findings seemed to suggest that the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness are the result of a process of strategic decision-making on the part of the emotion-perceiving negotiator. Apparently, negotiators use the information about the other's emotion to design their own negotiation strategy. Given that negotiating is a complex and cognitively taxing venture – negotiators need to keep in mind their own preferences and limits, monitor the opponent's behavior, try to locate his or her limits, and combine all this information to develop an optimal strategy – the question arose whether the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness on negotiation behavior would be moderated by negotiators' motivation to consider the strategic information that is provided by the opponent's emotions. This question was addressed in Chapter 3.

Building on the results reported in Chapter 2 and on the motivated information processing model of negotiation (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; see also Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), it was hypothesized in Chapter 3 that the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness on negotiation behavior would be moderated by the focal negotiator's epistemic motivation – his or her desire to
develop and maintain a rich and accurate understanding of the world (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983). Consistent with this idea, Experiment 3.1 revealed that negotiators' tendency to concede more to an angry opponent than to a happy one was moderated by individual differences in epistemic motivation: Negotiators with a low dispositional need for cognitive closure (i.e., high epistemic motivation) were strongly affected by the opponent's emotion, whereas those with a high dispositional need for cognitive closure (i.e., low epistemic motivation) were unaffected. Experiment 3.2 revealed a similar pattern for a situational manipulation of epistemic motivation. Participants who negotiated under low time pressure (i.e., high epistemic motivation) were strongly influenced by the other's emotion, whereas those under high time pressure (i.e., low epistemic motivation) were not. Furthermore, this moderating effect of time pressure was demonstrated to be mediated by information processing. Participants who negotiated under high time pressure engaged in less thorough information processing, which rendered them impervious to the information about their counterpart's emotional state. This experiment also revealed that participants who had negotiated with an angry opponent were less satisfied with the negotiation afterwards and were less willing to engage in future interactions with the other than were those who had dealt with a happy opponent.

In Experiment 3.3 managers of various Dutch companies were presented with a negotiation scenario in which the number of alternatives to a negotiated agreement was varied in order to manipulate their sense of power. In keeping with previous research showing that power reduces epistemic motivation (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987), low-power negotiators conceded more to an angry counterpart than to a happy one, whereas high-power negotiators were unaffected by the other's emotion. All in all, the results of the three studies reported in Chapter 3 provide good support for the proposition that a negotiator's epistemic motivation determines the extent to which he or she will be influenced by the opponent's emotion. Furthermore, the moderating effect of power has recently been replicated in a series of five studies (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2004) using different samples (undergraduate students, general population, managers), research methods (laboratory experiment, field simulation, scenarios), and power bases (number of alternatives, quality of best alternative, managerial support, and legitimate power). The results of these five studies confirm the generalizability of the findings reported in Chapter 3.

The objective of Chapter 4 was to broaden the empirical horizon by investigating the interpersonal effects of emotions that may arise as a result of the appraisal that one has taken too much or received too little from one's opponent.
Specifically, the chapter focused on the interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret on demands and concessions in negotiations. Extending previous work on supplication and appeasement, the results of Experiment 4.1 revealed that participants whose opponents appeared to experience emotions of appeasement (i.e., guilt or regret) developed a positive impression of their opponents but were non-conciliatory in the level of their demands. By contrast, participants whose opponents experienced emotions of supplication (i.e., disappointment or worry) rated their opponents less positively, but they made larger concessions in the course of the negotiation.

These findings were replicated and extended in Experiment 4.2, which considered the role of interpersonal trust. The data revealed that individuals with low trust were more suspicious about the trustworthiness of the other's emotions and were more likely to discount them rather than take them into account when forming their negotiation strategy. Accordingly, negotiators high in dispositional trust responded with high demands to an opponent who appeared to experience guilt and with low demands to an opponent who appeared to experience disappointment, whereas negotiators low in trust did not respond differentially to their opponent's emotions. Experiment 4.2 also shed light on the processes underlying the interpersonal effects of guilt and disappointment on demands. Results pertaining to participants' interpretation of their counterpart's emotions indicated that guilt is interpreted to mean that the other has claimed too much, whereas disappointment is taken as a signal that the other has received too little. A mediation analysis further revealed that negotiators with high levels of trust made smaller demands to a disappointed opponent than to a guilty one because the other's disappointment led them to lower their goals, whereas the other's guilt led them to raise their goals.

In Experiment 4.3 interpersonal trust was manipulated by varying participants' expectations regarding the opponent's cooperative versus competitive orientation, and the effect found in Experiment 4.2 was replicated. Participants who expected a cooperative opponent had high trust and made larger concessions to a disappointed opponent and smaller concessions to a guilty opponent. By contrast, subjects who were led to believe that the opponent had a competitive orientation had low trust and did not respond differentially to the opponent's disappointment versus guilt in terms of their demands and concessions. To recapitulate, the results of the three experiments reported in Chapter 4 provide strong support for the idea that emotions of appeasement and supplication have the potential to influence negotiation behavior on the interpersonal level, provided that the emotion-perceiving negotiator perceives the other's emotions as trustworthy.
In brief, the nine experiments reported in the preceding chapters demonstrate (1) that discrete emotions can have strong interpersonal effects on negotiation behavior; (2) that emotions can influence the relationship between negotiators by influencing their impressions of the other, their satisfaction with the negotiation, and their desire to engage in future interaction; and (3) that the interpersonal effects of emotions on demands and concessions are moderated by a number of personality traits and situational variables. In the following section, I point to the similarities among these moderators and propose an integrative framework that can parsimoniously account for all the behavioral effects reported in this dissertation.

**Toward an Integrative Framework: The Role of Motivation**

One of the main building blocks of the present research is the notion that emotions provide important information to observers. As I discussed in detail in Chapter 1, emotions convey information about how one feels about things (Ekman, 1993; Scherer, 1986), about one's social intentions (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Fridlund, 1994), and about one's orientation toward other people (Knutson, 1996). In the context of a negotiation, emotions may signal what value one attaches to the different issues and provide critical feedback about one's mood and willingness to agree (Putnam, 1994). Furthermore, emotions can serve as incentives or deterrents for other people's social behavior (Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1983). Negative emotions may serve as a call for mental or behavioral adjustment, whereas positive emotions may serve as a cue to stay the course (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). In short, emotions provide important information that negotiators may use as input in their strategic decision making. An obvious yet critical question is whether negotiators actually *use* the information that the other's emotion conveys to modify their negotiation behavior. The present dissertation has identified a number of moderator variables that affect the likelihood that negotiators will be influenced by their opponent's emotion when developing their negotiation strategy. I argue that these moderators, however diverse, all influence one crucial variable that ultimately determines whether a negotiator will adapt his or her demands to the other's emotion – *the motivation to consider information about the other.*

To illustrate this point, I will briefly recapitulate the variables that were demonstrated to moderate the interpersonal effects of emotions on demands and concessions, and show how they are related to a negotiator's motivation to consider social information about the opponent. Experiment 2.2 revealed that negotiators only adapt their demands to their counterpart's emotion when it is in their strategic interest to do so; if the opponent makes sufficiently large concessions that there is no need to consider his or her emotions, negotiators do not modify their strategy in
response to the other's emotional state. Apparently, the other's large concessions reduce the motivation to consider his or her emotions. Experiment 2.3 indicated that negotiators are not affected by their opponent's emotion if the other's communications make them feel afraid, presumably because these fear-arousing communications attract their attention and reduce the motivation to think about the implications of the other's emotional state. Experiment 3.1 demonstrated that the interpersonal effects of emotions are dependent upon the focal negotiator's dispositional need for cognitive closure—an individual differences variable that is closely related to the motivation to search for, attend to, and think about (new pieces of) information. Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 further showed that two situational factors that are known to decrease the motivation to consider (social) information, time pressure and power, also moderated the interpersonal effects of emotions on negotiation behavior. Finally, Experiments 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrated that both dispositional and experimentally induced variations in interpersonal trust moderate the effects of emotions on demands and concessions. As is evidenced by the tendency of participants with low trust to discount the information about their counterpart's emotional state, lack of trust undermines the motivation to consider the other's emotion, and therefore low trusters are not influenced by their counterpart's emotions.

This brief overview reveals that all the moderators that have been identified in the present work are either distal or proximal determinants of the negotiator's motivation to pay attention to and think about the information that is provided by the opponent's emotions and to take this information into account in their strategic decision making process. If the motivation to consider this information is high—it because of a dispositional tendency to do so or as a result of situational factors—negotiators tend to modify their negotiation behavior in accordance with the opponent's emotions. If the motivation to consider this information is low, on the other hand, negotiators do not adapt their demands and concessions in response to the other's emotional state. Thus the conclusion seems warranted that motivation is the ultimate moderator of the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiation.

Implications and Contributions

The present dissertation reports the first systematic empirical investigations of the interpersonal effects of discrete emotions in negotiations. The synthesis of various previously separated lines of research that has resulted from this endeavor increases our understanding of the dynamics of negotiation and conflict resolution, the social effects of emotions, and the role of motivation in social interaction. Below I
address the implications of the present work for these domains, as well as discussing some of the main conclusions and contributions of this dissertation.

**Interpersonal Versus Intrapersonal Effects**

As pointed out in Chapter 1, prior research on the role of affect in negotiation has focused almost exclusively on the *intrapersonal* effects of moods and emotions in negotiation, demonstrating that negotiators who experience positive affect tend to be more cooperative, whereas those who experience negative affect tend to be more competitive. In recognition of the fact that negotiation is essentially a social phenomenon — and that negotiators' emotions are therefore likely to not only influence themselves, but also their counterparts — several scholars have emphasized the importance of the *interpersonal* effects of emotions in negotiation (e.g., Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998; Barry, 1999; Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999).

The work reported in the present dissertation has addressed the interpersonal effects of anger, happiness, disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret in negotiations. The findings constitute a first step toward an understanding of the ways in which emotions may influence behavior at the interpersonal level of analysis. I have demonstrated, for example, that in a negotiation anger is interpreted as signalling high limits, whereas happiness is seen as a signal of low limits, and that these appraisals in turn influence negotiation behavior. Further, the results of this dissertation go beyond the intrapersonal effects of guilt and regret by showing that interaction partners anticipate compensation from guilty or regretful others by making high demands and small concessions. Finally, the present results increase our understanding of the interpersonal effects of worry and disappointment. Most previous research on these emotions has also adopted an intrapersonal approach. This dissertation shows that disappointment and worry can also influence behavior at the interpersonal level: In negotiations, disappointment and worry appear to be quite effective in eliciting concessions.

The current findings also add to what is known about the interpersonal effects of emotions in general. Although the past decade has witnessed an increasing interest in the interpersonal effects of emotions (e.g., Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992), relatively little is known about potential moderators of these effects. The present research shows that the interpersonal effects of emotions are contingent upon the perceiver's motivation to consider (social) information about the other. This finding has interesting implications for the tactical use of emotions (cf. Barry, 1999), because it suggests that the effectiveness of the use of emotional deception as a strategic ploy
depends at least in part on whether the target of the influence attempt is motivated to think about the implications of the other's emotions for his or her own goal attainment.

Discrete Emotions Versus General Affect

Another important contribution of this dissertation lies in its focus on discrete emotions instead of general affect. Most prior research in this domain has focused on the influence of positive or negative mood in negotiation, rather than on specific emotions. As argued by Weiner (1986), however, discrete emotions have a more focused and specific influence on behavior than does undifferentiated mood. In this respect, Allred (1999) and Davidson and Greenhalgh (1999) made a strong case for a closer examination of the role of anger in negotiation, because this emotion is especially likely to arise in conflict-laden encounters. Furthermore, as revealed by recent research by Keltner and his associates (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) and Tiedens and Linton (2001), emotions of the same valence can have markedly different effects on cognitive processes and behavior (see Chapter 1 for a discussion). Through its unique focus on the interpersonal effects of discrete emotions in negotiation, the present dissertation enhances our understanding of the distinct effects of emotions in negotiations.

The current research indicates that the role of emotion in negotiation cannot be understood merely by classifying emotions as positive or negative, as is often done. Chapters 2 and 3 dealt with the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations and showed that negotiators tend to concede more to an angry opponent than to a happy one. Although it is tempting to explain this finding in terms of a positivity-negativity dimension, the results reported in Chapter 4 suggest that it would be unwise to do so. The emotions that were investigated in that chapter – guilt, regret, worry, and disappointment – are all negative in valence, yet they had quite different effects on behavior: The effects of guilt and regret were opposite to those of worry and disappointment, which were in turn similar to those of anger. A more fruitful approach, then, is to adopt a social-functional perspective on emotion, which assumes that emotions have distinct social functions (e.g., Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000). Guilt and interpersonal regret, for instance, may motivate a person to repair his or her transgression, whereas anger may motivate others to remedy their transgressions, and worry and disappointment may function as a call for help. I believe that conceptualizing the interpersonal effects of emotions in terms of their unique appraisal patterns and social functions may go a long way toward bolstering our understanding of these effects.
Incidental Versus Integral Emotions

Another contribution of the present research concerns the origin of the emotions that were studied. Researchers have made a useful distinction between affect that has its origin outside the negotiation context (exogenous or incidental affect) and affect that results from the negotiation itself (endogenous or integral affect) (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Thompson et al., 1999; see also Perrott & Bodenhausen, 2002). So far research has almost exclusively focused on the effects of moods and emotions that are unrelated to the negotiation. For example, affect has often been manipulated by showing participants happy or sad films, giving them a small present or not, or providing them with bogus success or failure feedback. As a result of this tendency to focus on incidental affect, researchers have been relatively blind to the effects of feelings that arise as a result of the negotiation encounter itself. The present dissertation focused on the influence of such integral emotions, and demonstrated that they have theoretically meaningful effects. A focus on emotions that are relevant to a given interaction – as opposed to emotions that have been induced in a way that is unrelated to the interaction – has great potential to further our understanding of the role of emotions in social interactions.

Motivation in Social Interaction

There is a great deal of research on the role of motivation in social interaction. Among other things, this research has focused on the role of motivation in related areas such as person perception (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996), impression formation (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987), expectancy (dis)confirmation (e.g., Snyder & Stukas, 1999), and social information processing (Wyer & Gruenfeld, 1995). The results of the present dissertation extend this line of inquiry to the emotion domain by pointing to the important role of motivation in determining individuals’ responses to other’s emotions. To my knowledge, this research is the first empirical investigation of the ways in which motivation influences people’s reactions to other individuals’ emotions. The conclusion that negotiators only act on their opponent’s emotions if they are motivated to consider the information that they convey thus constitutes an important contribution to the literature on motivational influences in social interaction. Motivation not only influences how people perceive others and form impressions about them, it also determines whether they take the others’ emotions into account in (competitive) social decision making situations.

Practical Implications

Professional negotiators, researchers, and laypersons alike tend to have divergent beliefs about whether and how emotions should be managed in
negotiations. As discussed in Chapter 1, some believe that negotiators should capitalize on their positive emotions to make optimal use of integrative potential (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986), whereas others argue that irrational outbursts of anger will be effective in helping them to get others to comply with their wishes (e.g., Frank, 1988; Schelling, 1960). Still others contend that emotional expressions should be avoided altogether (e.g., Nierenberg, 1968; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). Although the focus of the present dissertation has been on deriving and testing new theory-driven hypotheses regarding the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations, rather than developing practical advice or designing optimal negotiation strategies, the present findings have obvious practical implications. They suggest that anger, disappointment, and worry are conducive to favorable outcomes for the self, whereas happiness, guilt, and regret do not serve the negotiator's strategic interests. However, the use of anger, disappointment, or worry may not be effective or even appropriate in all situations, and happiness, guilt, and regret may not always lead to poor individual outcomes. In the next section I consider the potential moderating influence of a number of structural variables when I discuss avenues for future research.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The primary focus of this research was on generating and testing new hypotheses. The data that I reported have been collected in the context of a research paradigm that was explicitly designed to retain as much experimental control as possible while still allowing to investigate the interpersonal effects of emotions in a relatively dynamic and involving setting. Although the present findings generalize across settings, operations, and populations, some of them may be limited by particular methodological choices that were made. Below I consider some possible limitations and discuss future research that may shed more light on these as well as other lingering issues.

Computer-Mediated Versus Face-to-Face Interaction

The findings reported in this dissertation may be limited by the fact that there was no face-to-face interaction in the present experiments. In this respect it is useful to briefly consider research on the impact of communication media on social interaction. Researchers in this area often conceptualize the various communication media along a continuum of "social presence" (Fulk, Schmitz, & Steinfeld, 1990; Rutter & Robinson, 1981). That is, face-to-face communication has the richest level of social presence, followed by audio/visual, audio, and written or computer-mediated
communication. Thus, according to this conceptualization, computer-mediated negotiations are characterized by (relatively) low levels of social presence.

However, as Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, and Valley (2000) point out, there exists no such thing as a universally superior communication medium. Rather, the choice of a particular communication medium should be contingent upon the nature of the negotiation and the objectives of the parties involved. For example, based on a review of empirical findings, Bazerman et al. (2000) argue that when there is rapport between the negotiating parties and/or the negotiation encounter is characterized by strong tensions, audio-only communication has clear advantages over face-to-face communication because it may reduce the use of pressure tactics that might result in domination or hostility. They also propose that when conflicts involve low levels of arousal and meeting by phone or in person is not feasible, computer-mediated negotiations may be preferable because they allow for more egalitarian participation (Sproul & Kiesler, 1991).

At the very least, the current findings pertain to computer-mediated negotiations. In light of the above, the question of how individuals respond to each other’s emotions in computer-mediated negotiations is itself of great theoretical and practical importance (McGrath & Hollingshead, 1994; McKersie & Fonstad, 1997; Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999). Moreover, considering the fact that the current paradigm has yielded results that have been replicated in face-to-face negotiations (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2004), there is no apparent reason why the present findings should be limited to situations that lack face-to-face contact. However, future research is needed to settle this issue more definitively. For example, researchers may investigate whether the influence of motivation is as potent in face-to-face settings as it is in computer-mediated settings, or examine the degree to which the interpersonal effects of supplication and appeasement emotions generalize across settings with different levels of social presence.

**Distributive Versus Integrative Negotiation**

I have examined the interpersonal effects of emotions on distributive negotiation behaviors (i.e., value claiming and concession making). In distributive negotiations, anger, worry, and disappointment apparently elicit large concessions, whereas happiness, guilt, and regret tend to elicit small concessions. At first glance these findings may seem to contradict evidence that positive emotions (e.g., happiness) improve negotiator effectiveness whereas negative emotions (e.g., anger) decrease effectiveness (see Chapter 1 for an overview). However, this apparent contradiction is easily reconciled if we distinguish between distributive and integrative negotiation. In integrative negotiation, it is more important to create value
than it is to claim value. This can be done, for example, by engaging in problem solving – exchanging information regarding the two parties' priorities and trying to find a mutually satisfying solution (see e.g., De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). Given that positive affect stimulates creativity and problem solving (see Chapter 1), it makes perfect sense that positive affect has the effect of increasing joint outcomes in integrative negotiations, as has been demonstrated in previous studies (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986).

In distributive negotiations, by contrast, individual outcomes are not so much determined by value creation but by successful value claiming. In such negotiations the beneficial (intrapersonal) effects of positive emotions on value creation are eliminated, and the interpersonal effects of emotions that are conducive to successful value claiming (e.g., anger) become more important. Future research could focus on exploring the interplay between the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotions on distributive versus integrative negotiation behavior. For example, do the positive effects of happiness at the intrapersonal level of analysis (e.g., more creative problem solving) outweigh the negative effects at the interpersonal level of analysis (e.g., risk of exploitation by one's opponent)? And vice versa, can the strategic advantages of anger at the interpersonal level (e.g., successful value claiming) be offset by the disadvantages of anger on the intrapersonal level (e.g., reduced likelihood of successful value creation)?

**Single-Shot Versus Repeated Interaction**

Another avenue for future research concerns the long-term consequences of emotions. The present findings indicate that the emotions that are conducive to successful value claiming (i.e., anger, disappointment, and worry) may also contribute to a negative interpersonal climate, and that the emotions that would improve the interpersonal relation between the negotiators (i.e., happiness, guilt, and regret) tend to produce suboptimal individual outcomes. I have demonstrated that anger elicits large concessions, whereas happiness elicits small concessions. However, negotiators with an angry opponent tend to develop an unfavorable impression of the other (Chapter 2), and they tend to be less satisfied with the negotiation and less willing to engage in future interaction with the same opponent (Chapter 3) than negotiators paired with a happy counterpart. Similarly, participants concede more to disappointed and worried opponents than to guilty or regretful ones, but they also rate the former less favorably than the latter (Chapter 4).

These findings point to an interesting dilemma facing negotiators who anticipate future interactions with the same negotiation partner. On the one hand, negotiators may be motivated to strategically present emotions such as happiness in
order to make a good impression and to induce or maintain a positive interpersonal relationship. On the other hand, they may choose to employ anger or disappointment in order to get their opponents to go along with their preferences. Future research could investigate which of these strategies is more beneficial when there is an ongoing relationship between the negotiators. Do the effects of anger and disappointment persist over time, or do they diminish or even backfire in the long run? Do people respond differently to their opponent's emotions if they anticipate future interaction?

Conflict of Interest Versus Value Conflict

The interpersonal effects of emotions may also depend on the type of conflict the negotiation is supposed to solve. Conflict may be rooted in divergent interests (e.g., competition over scarce resources such as money or time), disagreement about an intellectual problem (e.g., discussing the right solution to an objectively solvable task), or a difference of opinion regarding an evaluative issue (e.g., debating what is good and what is bad; see Coombs, 1987; Harinck, De Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000; Kaplan & Miller, 1987). The latter type of conflict has been referred to as a "value conflict" (e.g., Druckman & Zechmeister, 1973). Research has documented that negotiation behavior may differ substantially as a function of conflict issue (e.g., Harinck et al., 2000). Druckman and Zechmeister's (1973) argued that "the mode of resolution for value conflicts is not joint compromise or concessions . . . [instead] altered understanding of the situation by one or both parties is necessary" (p. 450). Accordingly, it has been shown that negotiators are more reluctant to make compromises and trade-offs in value conflicts than in conflicts of interest (Druckman, 1994; Harinck et al., 2000). In this light, it is conceivable that emotions such as anger, disappointment, and worry will not have beneficial effects in value conflicts (as opposed to conflicts of interest). Instead of eliciting concessions these emotions may contribute to conflict escalation and hostility because parties are unwilling to yield on issues that have significant emotional value for them. In value conflicts it may therefore prove more beneficial to display emotions such as happiness, because these may ameliorate the interpersonal climate and reduce the risk of hurtful impasse and escalation. This idea could be pursued in future investigations.

Dyadic Versus Multi-Party Negotiation

Another issue that could be addressed in future research concerns the potential difference between dyadic negotiation and multi-party negotiation with regard to the interpersonal effects of emotions. In the present dissertation I have
focused on the effects of emotions in dyadic negotiations. Interestingly, Experiment 3.3 revealed that negotiators remain unaffected by their opponent's emotions if they have abundant alternatives. The most likely explanation for this finding is in terms of power: Negotiators who have plenty of alternatives in the event that they do not reach a consensus with their current partner are less dependent on their counterpart, and therefore have less need to consider his or her emotions. Consistent with this line of reasoning, Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, et al. (2004) showed that negotiators with low power are strongly influenced by their opponent's emotions, whereas those with high power are unaffected. It is likely that negotiators will also experience an increased sense of power and independence in multi-party negotiations where multiple coalitions are possible. In such settings, not being able to reach an agreement with one party is far less costly than in a dyadic negotiation, because the possibility of alternative coalitions is highly salient. It can therefore be predicted that partners to a multi-party negotiation will be less susceptible to each other's emotions than parties in a dyadic negotiation. Future research could explore the interpersonal effects of emotions in multi-party negotiation settings such as coalition formation.

**Individualism Versus Collectivism**

A final avenue for future research that I would like to mention concerns the role of culture. Thus far the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations have been investigated in the Netherlands (this dissertation), the United States (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2004), and Italy (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, et al., 2004). These countries all (to variable extents) endorse Western, individualistic values. This raises the question to what extent the effects that have been observed in these individualistic cultures generalize to more collectivistic cultures such as Japan or China. Although a considerable body of research has investigated cultural variations in antecedents, appraisal, regulation, expression, and perception of emotion (e.g., Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Russell, 1994), very little is known about possible cultural differences in the ways people respond behaviorally to others' emotions. Recent research suggests that there may be cultural differences in the ways in which individuals respond to emotional expressions. For example, Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, and Fischer (2000) reported evidence suggesting that expressions of shame may be more appropriate in honor cultures than in individualistic cultures, whereas expressions of pride may be more positively received in individualistic cultures than in honor cultures. It would be interesting to see how cultural differences influence the ways in which negotiators respond to their opponent's emotions. Do people in collectivistic cultures respond more empathically to another's worry or disappointment, or do they find these emotions inappropriate
because they communicate a preoccupation with the self rather than the collective? Will collectivists exploit others’ expressions of guilt or regret to the same extent as individualists, or will they be more lenient because guilt and regret signal interpersonal concern? Future research could address these and other questions regarding possible cultural influences on reactions to other people’s emotional experiences and expressions.

**Conclusion**

The present dissertation has addressed the interpersonal effects of discrete emotions in negotiations. The nine experiments that I have reported further our understanding of the interpersonal effects of anger, happiness, disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret in negotiations. The results show that negotiators make larger concessions to angry, disappointed, or worried opponents than to non-emotional ones, whereas they tend to make smaller concessions to happy, guilty, or regretful counterparts. Furthermore, the results indicate that these effects are moderated by the focal negotiator’s motivation to consider the other’s emotion. When negotiators are motivated to consider the information that is conveyed by their counterpart’s emotions, they tend to modify their demands and concessions according to the other’s emotional state. In contrast, when negotiators are not motivated to consider their opponent’s emotions – be it because of their personality (e.g., high need for closure, low dispositional trust), because of the opponent’s behavior or personality (e.g., large concessions, a competitive orientation) or because of situational factors (e.g., high time pressure, good alternatives) – they tend not to adapt their negotiation strategy to the other’s emotion. These findings point to the pervasive interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations and to the important moderating role of motivation. As such this research constitutes an important step toward a more thorough understanding of the negotiation process, the social functions and consequences of emotions in competitive social decision making, and the role of motivation in social interaction. Although many questions have been answered, many more remain to be addressed. Future investigations are needed to advance our understanding of the interpersonal effects of emotions in social decision making. I hope, therefore, that the present research will prove to be a beginning rather than an end.