Essays in financial economics

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This dissertation contains three essays in financial economics. The first essay investigates why firms become less dynamic in the subsequent years after going public. The second essay is inspired by the financial crisis of 2008. It shows that there is not enough information production about the underlying risks of innovative financial products in the run-up to financial crises, leading to overinvestment. The third essay is a survey about the emerging literature on safe assets, which play a crucial role in shaping credit expansion and risk taking in the financial sector.

Pascal Golec (1990) obtained a Bachelor in Economics and Business at the University of Zürich. After completing an MPhil in Finance at the Tinbergen Institute in 2014, he continued to pursue a PhD at the University of Amsterdam.
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UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM

Essays in Financial Economics

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aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
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prof. dr. ir. K.I.J. Maex
ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie,
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Prof. Dr. A.M. Pacces Universiteit van Amsterdam
Dr. R. Perez Ribas Universiteit van Amsterdam
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Samenvatting (summary in dutch)
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