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Immigration absorption and anti-immigrant attitudes in European welfare states

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THE DIVISIVE EFFECT
OF DIVERSITY

Abstract

Many studies on the recent anti-immigrant backlash in Europe show that education level is a strong predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment. Lower educated natives are on average more anti-immigration than their higher educated counterparts. However, it is as yet unclear what role different kinds of immigrant integration, or lack thereof, play in the increase or decrease of the education gap. This chapter uses ESS and LFS data to study the effects of different characteristics of immigrant integration on the immigration attitudes of low and highly educated natives in 25 European countries between 2002 and 2017. The empirical results indicate that better integration of immigrants decreases the education gap, but there are interesting differences in natives' opinion on immigration, depending on their level of education and the type of integration. Besides education, the unemployment gap between natives and migrants also has a negative effect on the anti-immigrant attitudes of higher educated natives. Further analyses show that high employment numbers of natives increase the employment gap between natives and migrants and decreases anti-immigrant sentiment among higher educated natives. Lower educated natives are more negative about immigration if the cultural divide between migrants and natives is big. This supports the notion that lower and higher educated natives view immigrant integration from different perspectives.

Introduction

Immigration has become one of the most divisive issues between societal groups in Europe. A large and increasing body of literature has tried to explain immigration attitudes. This research looks both at individual predictors such as education, class, and political leaning (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Semyonov et al. 2008) and at macro-level variables such as immigration, GDP, and (un)employment (Mayda 2006). The most consistent predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment is education level. All other things being equal, lower educated natives are found to be more negative about immigration than their higher educated counterparts (Bauer et al. 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007).

One of the intellectual battlegrounds in this debate is what motivates lower educated people to be more anti-immigration than higher educated people. Possible explanations fall roughly into two groups: economic and cultural reasons. First, lower educated citizens are perceived to be in more direct competition with immigrants, both on the labor market and when it comes to social assistance (Citrin et al. 1997; Finseraas et al. 2016). The fight over similar jobs and the presumed lowering of wages leads them to blame the newcomers to the country and the labor market. The second school of thought claims that people with a lower education level have a bigger concern over potential dilution of their culture due to immigration. Their higher educated counterparts have a more cosmopolitan worldview and believe different cultures can enrich the culture of the country, rather than erode it

(Igarashi and Saito 2014). Many of these studies differentiate between economic interest theories and more cultural explanations, either by incorporating one of the two in their empirical analysis or by explicitly comparing the two rival explanations (Dustmann and Preston 2007; Harell et al. 2012; Kehrberg 2007; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Rustenbach 2010). Although the economic explanation of the education gap has recently lost some of its relevance (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), measures of economic downturn (e.g. economic growth, unemployment) are still seen as important moderators that increase the divide between lower and higher educated natives.

One variable that so far has been overlooked in the debate is the economic and cultural integration of migrant groups (Givens 2007, 80). This is remarkable, because whether or not natives experience immigration as more or less problematic is likely to be dependent on the extent to and ways in which immigrants are absorbed in society. If migrants are less successful than natives on the labor market, or very different in terms of cultural values, natives might respond in a more hostile manner to them even if the group is relatively small. In this study I examine how differences in employment and cultural values between natives and immigrants affect anti-immigrant sentiment. It might be overly simplistic to assume that immigrants' better integration in society will lead to a demise of anti-immigrant sentiment among natives across the board. Since we know that natives with a high education level think differently and have a different interest when it comes to immigration, compared to natives with a low education level, it is likely that the effects of different aspects and levels of integration on anti-immigrant attitudes differ between these two groups.

Using eight waves of the ESS, complemented with European Union LFS data, I demonstrate that if differences between the native population and migrant groups increase, in terms of unemployment and cultural values, the gap between immigration attitudes of lower and higher educated natives expands. More interestingly, lower and higher educated natives show different priorities when it comes to immigrant integration. Higher educated natives seem to be more concerned about the general labor market and not so much the underperformance of migrants, whereas lower educated natives seem to be more concerned about differences in cultural values of migrants than about labor market competition. I demonstrate that employment and cultural integration are not merely an artifact of the time migrants spend in the host country or whether or not they come from western countries. The results of the analyses are robust when it comes to different specifications and statistical models.

This chapter increases the understanding of the diverging opinions of lower and higher educated natives concerning immigration. It shows another layer of complexity of the debate on anti-immigrant sentiment and, moreover, it provides insight into what lower

and higher educated natives find important when it comes to immigrant integration. These findings give more credibility to theories that see the education gap of immigration attitudes not merely through an economic competition lens. If policies are intended to close the immigration attitudes gap and create a more inclusive society, fostering cultural integration could be a valuable avenue. Taking into consideration the cultural distance and integration opportunities in the selection of migrants or the resettlement of refugees in Europe, the EU and its member states could ease anti-immigrant sentiment among lower educated natives.

Theory

Natives with a high and a low education level differ in numerous ways, but arguably the most politicized one is immigration attitudes. On average, lower educated natives are more anti-immigration than their higher educated counterparts. One explanation that dominated the debate in the 1990s and early 2000s was personal level economic nature (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). In this line of thought low-skilled migration increases the supply side on the labor market, which leads to the crowding-out of natives with a low education level and puts pressure on their wages. Natives with a high education level, on the other hand, profit from international mobility on the labor market, since it decreases the costs of low-skilled labor and provides more opportunities for them to work abroad. This idea should explain the education gap in immigration attitudes.

The explanation of economic self-interest of the education gap has been nuanced, if not refuted, by studies showing that the concerns of lower educated natives are not merely of personal economic nature. For instance, research by Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox (2007) shows that lower educated natives do not differentiate between high and low-skilled migration in their anti-immigrant stance. The opposite goes for the pro-immigration opinion of higher educated natives. They do not oppose migration, even if the migrants are highly skilled and potentially compete for the same jobs. In a more recent literature review, Jens Hainmueller and Daniel Hopkins (2014, 227) even go as far as to conclude that "there is little accumulated evidence that citizens primarily form attitudes about immigration based on its effects on their personal economic situation." This implies it is not about direct economic competition; something else must be related to the education divide.

The literature on social identity theory pays attention to immaterial origins of anti-immigrant sentiment and argues that people can feel a strong connection to what they consider their in-group and can feel threatened by outsiders that are racially, ethnically, or culturally different (Capozza and Brown 2000; Connor 1994; Ivarsflaten 2005; Kinder and Kam 2010; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Economic concerns can work as a catalyzer, but

they do not spur culturally motivated anti-immigrant sentiment. Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (2005) shows that the main way social identity is linked to anti-immigrant sentiment is through a fear for losing national community through the dilution of language, religion and traditions (ibid., 42). According to this strand of literature, differences between natives with different education levels are apparent: It is mainly the lower educated natives who are more anti-immigration when levels of immigration and diversity increase (Schneider 2008). In addition, natives with a low education level express more prejudice towards people of a different race or ethnicity (Quillian 1995).

Surprisingly, this literature mainly focuses on the inflow of migrants or migrants' share of the overall population to measure diversity in a society and only to lesser extent on the actual ways in which immigrants are different from natives (Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2008; Schneider 2008). Although studies find that views on the impact of immigration mostly concern cultural, linguistic, and ethnic homogeneity (Card et al. 2012; Ivarsflaten 2005), articles on immigration attitudes do not problematize or measure the differences or similarities between the in-group and the out-group; the level of immigrant integration. Integration is a multi-faceted concept and scholars are in disagreement about what integration consists of (see Bleich 2008 for a helpful overview; Brubaker 2001 for a discussion about the terms 'integration' and 'assimilation'; Favell 2010; Joppke 2007; Waters and Jiménez 2005). Immigrant integration concerns the ways and levels that migrant groups are different from natives and the ways and levels that migrants participate in society, for instance economically, culturally, politically and socially. These differences and similarities occur at the individual level, but aggregated to group level they elucidate the general state of integration on the societal level. Because differences can be bridged from both the side of natives and the side of migrants, I speak of integration rather than assimilation (Algan et al. 2012, 8).

Of all the different conceptualization of (aspects of) integration, I focus on two forms of immigrant integration that relate to the main debates about determining anti-immigrant sentiment, namely economic and cultural integration (Sides and Citrin 2007). This excludes other interesting aspects of integration, such as political participation. To conceptualize economic integration, labor is an obvious choice. Employment more than just earning a wage, it is also a way of contributing to society and not being dependent on government assistance. How is employment integration related to anti-immigrant sentiment? In general, natives with a low education level tend to be more anti-immigration than natives with a high education level. This would imply that the greater the diversity (e.g. less integration), the more lower educated natives experience and problematize immigration, leading to more anti-immigration sentiment. This leads to my first hypothesis:

H1: An increasing unemployment gap between natives and migrants increases the gap between anti-immigrant attitudes of lower and higher educated natives.

A decrease of the unemployment gap between natives and migrants can be caused by an increase of migrants' employment, but also by a decrease of natives' employment. Also, the increasing gap of anti-immigrant sentiment between higher and lower educated natives can be influenced from both ends. This has far-reaching implications for H1. Further analysis into the driving forces behind both gaps is necessary to make sense of the results of the interaction effect. On the one hand, an increasing unemployment gap between natives and migrants might be caused by more migrants being unemployed. This means they become a bigger a burden on the welfare state and put more pressure on lower tier wages. In general, it is mostly the lower educated natives whose immigration opinion would be more negative as a result of this, because they are in more direct competition with migrants in terms of the labor market and the welfare state (Citrin et al. 1997). This might increase the education gap of anti-immigrant sentiment. I therefore hypothesize:

H1a: Increasing unemployment rates of migrants increases the gap between anti-immigrant attitudes of lower and higher educated natives.

On the other hand, if increases in the unemployment gap are driven by an increase of the employment of natives, instead of increasing unemployment of migrants, this may lead to a decrease of anti-immigrant sentiment among natives, because native workers are less negatively affected. It is unclear whether to expect this more from lower or higher educated natives. Lower educated natives could be more receptive to general unemployment and be more anti-immigrant, but higher educated natives might tend to be more pro-immigration until they fear for the implications when jobs become scarce. Therefore, my third hypothesis has two sides:

H1b: Increasing unemployment rate of natives increases/decreases the gap between anti-immigrant attitudes of lower and higher educated natives.

In sum, economic integration measured by the unemployment gap between natives and migrants can have both offsetting and dampening implications for the education gap in anti-immigrant sentiment, as summarized in Figure 2.1. This means that different mechanisms can be at play at the same time, canceling each other out in the analysis of H1. Thus, it is necessary to unpack unemployment differences between natives and migrants and determine 1) if the effect of labor market integration on the education gap is driven by the (un)employment of migrants or natives and 2) if the effect of labor market integration on the education gap is driven by the opinions of lower or higher educated natives.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework of the hypotheses

Cultural values are more difficult to conceptualize, because what culture is and what it is not is an extremely complicated question, also in the realm of integration (Archer 1985). For this study, I consider three cultural values that are relevant for immigration debates in Western Europe over the past decades and can function as proxies for progressivism, religion, personal freedom and LGBT rights (Algan et al. 2012, 1). I do not pretend to cover the concept of cultural (value) integration in its entirety (similar to Burgoon 2014).

When it comes to cultural integration, it can be expected that tolerance increases and anti-immigrant sentiment decreases when migrants and natives hold similar views on important personal and societal issues. However, there are reasons to expect that lower and higher educated natives respond differently to differences in cultural values between natives and migrants. In general, lower educated natives support a more homogenous society and feel that their native culture is under threat by others, whereas higher educated natives hold a more cosmopolitan worldview and see cultural pluralism as virtuous (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; McLaren 2001). I expect these different opinions on diversity to translate into how natives respond to the extent to which migrant groups are different from native cultural values. Given the more nationalist opinion of lower educated natives, I expect this group to be more anti-immigrant if differences in cultural values increase. The response of higher educated natives is more ambiguous, because one might expect that while cosmopolitan natives would prefer a society containing different cultures, they would still prefer it to be based on the same values. Still, I expect this group

to respond less negatively and potentially positively to increasing diversity between natives and migrants on cultural values. This leads to my final hypothesis:

H2: An increasing gap between cultural values of natives and immigrants increases the gap between anti-immigrant attitudes of lower and higher educated natives.

The jury is still out on the causal mechanism of this education gap. One common theory states that education teaches people values that correlate strongly with pro-immigration attitudes and more education thus correlates with positive immigration attitudes (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Igarashi and Saito 2014). This socialization theory assumes that the education system is at the root of the difference in immigration attitude. However, Lancee and Sarrasin (2015) tested attitude changes over time and did not find that people become more pro-immigration as they move through the education system. They claim that political notions are formed at an earlier stage in life and people do not become more cosmopolitan from going to school. In this view, education is not the cause of immigration attitudes, but a proxy of other, maybe more latent, gaps in society, such as a broad notion of social class. Highly educated people are raised in families where both a cosmopolitan worldview and the belief that a good education is something to strive for is central. Although this is an interesting and important debate, it lies outside the scope of this dissertation. In this chapter I do not discuss the root causes of the education gap, but merely study if this gap increases or decreases with different levels and different forms of immigrant integration.

Method

Before discussing the economic and cultural differences between natives and migrants which form the basis the integration measures, it is important to establish when someone is considered a migrant in this study. For the definition of a migrant I rely on whether a respondent is foreign born. Both the ESS and the LFS include a coding question on country of origin and I consider any other country than the country in which the survey has been carried out foreign. In the robustness analyses I apply the same models as in the baseline using a slightly more lenient definition of a migrant, namely if both parents were born abroad. The sample includes Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Anti-immigrant sentiment, my dependent variable, is measured on a scale from 0-10 and is comprised of three indicators measuring different aspects of immigration attitude. The three questions measure economic aspects of migration ("Immigration is good/bad for the economy of this country"), cultural aspects of migration ("This country's cultural life is enriched/undermined by immigration"), and more general immigration attitude

("Immigrants make this country a better/worse place to live"). Across the waves and countries of the ESS (Round 1-8), these survey questions form a strong scale (alpha = .85) of anti-immigrant sentiment. Before scaling the values, the responses are recoded in such a way that higher scores resemble more negative attitudes.[3]

The main moderating variable, education, is measured by the standard ISCED five-point scale of achieved education level. In the regression models it is treated as a continuous variable. For the clarity of the figures, the group with the lowest education level (primary education) is compared to the highest education level (tertiary education) in the graphic visualizations.

There are numerous ways to conceptualize and measure immigrant integration. This chapter makes use of the LFS and the ESS to measure differences between immigrants and natives on two important social issues: unemployment (gap) and cultural values (gap). Although in the public debate immigrant integration is often viewed as a one-dimensional concept, it is much more nuanced. Although it would make intuitive sense that the longer a person is in the host country, the better their chances are for work and a good education and the more they will take on some of the values of that country, this is not the case. There are differences between different indicators of immigrant integration and they do not all correlate with time spent in the host country. To illustrate this, I correlated my measures of labor and cultural values integration with time spent in the country and a rough measure of origin of migrant (western vs. non-western), across countries and years from the ESS, in Table 2.1. The table shows only weak correlations. The strongest correlation is between a dummy for time spent in the host country (1 = over 20 years) and unemployment (-.11). Although the indicators are rather rough estimates, the correlations clearly show that it is necessary to look at more specific aspects of immigrant integration than the most obvious one, time spent in the country, and that there are differences in the level of economic and cultural integration on the individual level.

Table 2.1: Correlation coefficients of different measures of immigrant integration

	20 years in host country	Western	Unemployed	Cultural values gap
20 years in host country	1			
Western	.06	1		
Unemployed	-.11	-.02	1	
Cultural values gap	.02	-.09	.02	1

Note: N = 12,553

Source: ESS

[3] A descriptive overview of this variable is available in Appendix 1.

To gauge the extent of labor market integration per country-year, I aggregated the average employment of foreign-born population and natives per country per year of the LFS. I divided the country-year unemployment averages of the foreign-born people by the averages of natives to obtain the country-year ratio. If the ratio of a certain country-year is 1 for unemployment, this means that the average unemployment rate between natives and migrants is the same. Scores below 1 mean there is less unemployment among immigrants than among natives. A score of 2 means that the unemployment of migrants is twice as high than that of natives in that country-year. I also aggregated the average unemployment statistics of natives and migrants separately for the additional analyses of H1a and H1b.

The descriptive statistics of the unemployment gap are presented in Figure 2.2. From this figure it becomes clear that differences between natives and migrants are very diverse between countries. In Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, migrants are more than twice as often unemployed than natives. This difference is to a great extent due to the high employment figures of natives, but it also shows that migrants do not profit equally from well-functioning labor markets. In Eastern and Southern-European countries the differences are smaller and in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland migrants are even more often employed than natives.

Figure 2.2: Average unemployment difference between natives and migrants per country 2002-2017

Source: LFS 2018

The concept of cultural values differences between natives and migrants is more difficult to measure. I broadly follow Brian Burgoon's (2014) operationalization of cultural values integration. To get some sense of the differences in how natives and migrants feel about important sociocultural issues, I use average difference scores to the answers to the following questions and statements the ESS consistently asks its respondents across the eight waves: 1) "Gay men

and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish," 2) "Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?," and 3) "It is important to make your own decisions, be free and not depend on others."[4] I aggregated the average answers per question, societal group, and country-year. The scores of migrants are subtracted by the scores of natives and squared, because I am interested in the size of the difference and less in the direction of the difference. Finally, I added up the differences scores of the three questions pre country-year to obtain the average country-year difference of the cultural values between natives and migrants.[5,6] To obtain a sense of the differences, and in case of the cultural values also the direction, Figure 2.3 shows these scores per country over the full period.

Figure 2.3: Average cultural values gap per country 2002-2017

Source: ESS round 1-8.

Some caution is required with the measures of cultural values differences. The measure is based on the ESS and with the comparison between migrants and natives on country-year level, the samples become rather small, which potentially violates the reliability of the data.[7] To avoid that few respondents have too big an impact on the country-year averages,

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[4] These survey questions do not form a proper scale (alpha = 0.31). I do not pretend these three survey questions together measure one particular concept. I merely try to measure an average difference between natives and migrants on three important and different social issues. I also analyze the specific survey questions in the models separately.

[5] Cultural values gap = (country-year mean gay rights migrants – country-year mean gay rights natives)^2 + (country-year mean religiousness migrants – country-year mean religiousness natives)^2 + (country-year mean individual freedom migrants – country-year mean individual freedom natives)^2.

[6] Although it is possible to compare the average cultural values of migrants on an aggregate level with natives' individual level cultural values, this is not the focus of my study. Natives' individual level cultural values are endogenous to their immigration attitude, and, moreover, I am interested in the integration of migrants on a societal level.

[7] Unfortunately, this makes it impossible to disaggregate the data further on a regional level.

I coded the country-years where the amount of foreign born respondents is lower than 20 as missing values, which reduces the number of country-years from 228 to 117.

As a robustness test for the cultural values gap, I use two additional measures that are arguably related to issues of culture or identity: language adaptation of immigrants and the proportion of migrants that consider themselves Muslim (Fasel et al. 2013; Koster 2013). The language adaptation indicator is the percentage of migrants that speaks the language of the host country, included as a survey question in the ESS and measured in a way similar to Alberto Alesina et al. (2003) and Ferry Koster (2013). I recoded this question for foreign born respondents into a dummy variable which captures whether or not the respondent speaks the language of the host country (or regional languages of that country) at home, after which I aggregated these answers to an average per country-year. I also correlated the country-year averages of my own estimations with similar survey questions the OECD (2015a) and Eurostat (2014) have asked a large sample of immigrants and found strong correlations between my ESS estimates and the OECD's (0.76) and Eurostat's (0.8). This gives me the confidence that the reliability of my measures is not affected too much by the low numbers of the sub-samples, which is also important for the cultural values gap indicator. Still, some caution should be exercised when interpreting regression models based on these numbers. For the proportion of Muslim migrants, I aggregated the scores of the migrants that reported to believe in Islam on a country-year basis.

My baseline model is a multilevel random intercept model with robust standard errors. The country level independent variables are lagged by a year. Individual level control variables include age, gender, social class, subjective income, social welfare benefit dependency, religiosity, and whether the respondent lives in a rural or urban area. On the country-year level I control for the percentage of immigration per capita (Eurostat 2018a) and the total percentage of unemployment (Eurostat 2018b), both of which are lagged by a year. To estimate anti-immigrant sentiment of natives only, foreign-born respondents are left out of the analyses. The number of respondents and countries and ESS rounds varies between models, because of data availability issues of some of the variables, but the baseline results have between 73,773 and 210,337 observations in 101 to 158 countries and eight ESS rounds.

Results

Before reporting on the interaction effects between education level and the integration measures on anti-immigrant sentiment, it is important to note that there is a negative and significant ($p < .001$) direct effect of the employment gap on anti-immigrant attitudes (see Appendix 2.2). However, this result is highly dependent on the models and specifications used and hence not considered robust. It seems unlikely that an increase of employment integration would lead to an increase or decrease of anti-immigration attitudes among natives in general. But as the theory implies, integration might mean something different

for lower and higher educated natives, because of their economic interest or belief system. The results in Table 2.2 show that this seems to be the case regarding employment integration. Model 1 presents a direct negative effect of education level on anti-immigrant attitudes, corroborating the education gap of anti-immigrant sentiment itself. Model 2 contains the interactions with the unemployment gap, and model 3 and 4 contain the unemployment rate of migrants and the unemployment rate of natives, respectively.

Table 2.2: Results of interaction effects between education level and different measures of employment integration on anti-immigrant attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Education level	-.27***	-.15***	-.27***	-.32***
	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)
Unemployment gap ratio (lagged)		.03		
		(.10)		
Unemployment gap ratio (lagged) X Education		-.07***		
		(.02)		
Unemployment rate migrants (lagged)			-1.11	
			(1.61)	
Unemployment rate migrants (lagged) X Education			-.02	
			(.19)	
Unemployment rate natives (lagged)				6.20
				(6.66)
Unemployment rate natives (lagged) X Education				.88*
				(.35)
Age	.01***	.01***	.01***	.01***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Income (subjective)	-.27***	-.27***	-.27***	-.27***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Social benefit receiver (dummy)				
	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Class	-.08***	-.08***	-.08***	-.08***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Religiosity	-.02***	-.02***	-.02***	-.02***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Female (dummy)	.09***	.09***	.09***	.09***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Rural (dummy)	.16***	.15***	.16***	.16***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Country level immigration (perc., lagged)	-.12†	-.11	-.12†	-.09
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Unemployment rate (perc., lagged)	-.01	-.02	.0.	-.07
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.05)
Constant	6.95***	6.96***	6.97***	7.05***
	(.14)	(.23)	(.15)	(.15)
Total N (Observations)	210,337	205,523	210,337	205,523
Group N (Number of groups)	158	154	158	154

Note: † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

The interaction effect of the unemployment gap and education on anti-immigrant sentiment is statistically significant at the .001 level. When migrants have less employment than natives, lower educated natives are more anti-immigration and/or higher educated natives are more pro-immigration, all other things being equal. In other words, an increasing unemployment gap tends to make higher educated natives more positive about immigration. As mentioned earlier, to interpret this result, it is important to analyze the effects of the employment of migrants and natives separately, because an increasing unemployment gap can be driven by migrants being more often unemployed, but also by natives being more often employed. The interaction between the unemployment rate of migrants and the education level of the respondents is not statistically significant (model 3), but the interaction between the unemployment rate of natives and education level is, at the .05 level (model 4). This means that when the unemployment of natives increases, lower educated natives are less anti-immigration and/or higher educated natives are more anti-immigration, which is in line with H1b. For an assessment of the levels of change of anti-immigrant sentiment and among which groups of natives, it is necessary examine the marginal effect of models 2 and 4, presented in panel A and B of Figure 2.4. The black line with the dots represents the effects for lower educated natives (cat. 1), and the blue line with the squares represents the effects for higher educated natives (cat. 5).

Figure 2.4: Predicted scores of anti-immigrant sentiment by unemployment gap and unemployment natives interacted with education level

A

B

The marginal effects plot of panel A shows that the higher educated natives do mostly respond to an increase in the unemployment gap between natives and migrants: their anti-immigrant sentiment decreases. They are more positive about immigration when the employment gap increases with 1.1 point on the 0-10 scale across the full distribution of the employment gap. Panel B indicates that this is mostly because they are more anti-immigration when the unemployment of natives goes up. All other things being equal, increases in the unemployment of natives across the full sample leads to a 1.7 out of 10 increase of the anti-immigrant sentiment of higher educated natives. However, although

the interaction between the unemployment of natives and education level is statistically significant, the effect of the higher educated group is not. Lower educated natives are also more anti-immigration if the unemployment of natives increases, but this effect is weaker than that of higher educated natives. The combination of the two results indicates that higher educated natives find the employment of natives important and are in favor of immigration if the labor market for natives is in good shape, even if this means that migrants lag behind when it comes to employment.

Models 5-8 measure the effects of the interaction between difference of cultural values between migrants and natives and education of the respondents on their anti-immigrant sentiment. Model 5 presents the effect of the constructed average of the three questions on different cultural values and models 6-8 consider the survey questions separately. The interaction between average cultural values differences and respondents' education level is statistically significant at the .05 level, which supports H2. Models 6-8 show that this is mainly driven by the coding question on religiousness, which also shows a statistically significant result at the .05 level.

Table 2.3: Results of interaction effects between education level and different measures of cultural integration on anti-immigrant attitudes

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Education level	-.26***	-.27***	-.27***	-.29***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)
Cultural values gap (lagged)	.06*			
	(.03)			
Cultural values gap (lagged) X Education	-.01*			
	(.01)			
LGBT rights opinion gap (lagged)		.61		
		(.38)		
LGBT rights opinion gap (lagged) X Education		-.16		
		(.12)		
Religiosity gap (lagged)			.07*	
			(.03)	
Religiosity gap (lagged) X Education			-.02*	
			(.01)	
Personal freedom opinion gap (lagged)				.16
				(.67)
Personal freedom opinion gap (lagged) X Education				-.12
				(.14)
Age	.01***	.01***	.01***	.01***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Income (subjective)	-.31***	-.31***	-.31***	-.31***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Social benefit receiver (dummy)	-.00	-.02	-.02	-.02
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Class	-.08***	-.08***	-.08***	-.08***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Religiosity	-.03***	-.03***	-.03***	-.03***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Female (dummy)	.12***	.12***	.12***	.12***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Rural (dummy)	.18***	.18***	.18***	.18***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Country level immigration (perc., lagged)	-.16	-.16	-.15	-.16
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)
Unemployment rate (perc., lagged)	.01	.02	.02	.02
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Constant	6.92***	6.91***	6.90***	6.99***
	(.24)	(.23)	(.23)	(.21)
Total N (Observations)	73773	78224	78224	77452
Group N (Number of groups)	101	103	103	103

Note: † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

To determine whether this effect is more due to natives with a low education level becoming increasingly negative about immigration when migrants differ more in their opinion on the three survey questions, or to higher educated natives celebrating this diversity, I turn to the marginal effects plot in Figure 2.5. The figure shows that lower educated natives are more anti-immigration when the gap of cultural values between natives and migrants increases, whereas higher educated natives' immigration opinion does not seem to change across different levels of the cultural values gap. The increase of anti-immigrant sentiment of lower educated natives is .45 on the 10-point scale of anti-immigrant sentiment, over the full spectrum of the cultural values gap and statistically significant at the .05 level. This corresponds with the effect size of the specific religiousness indicator for lower educated natives.

Figure 2.5: Predicted levels of anti-immigrant sentiment by cultural values gap interacted with education level


Table 2.4 shows an overview of the regression coefficients for lower and higher educated natives interacted with the different indicators of diversity that were statistically significant in the baseline models. It is important to study the significance and regression coefficients per group, as the general interaction terms and the predicted outcomes of Figure 2.5 do not show at what levels of education the effects of the integration measures are significant. The overall pattern is that higher educated natives seem to respond more strongly to economic integration, or, more specifically, to natives' employment, which they might view as an indicator of how many migrants the labor market is able to absorb. The immigration opinion of natives with a low education level only changes based on the more cultural side of immigration. Lower educated natives are more anti-immigrant if migrants are more different from natives in terms of cultural values. This seems to be a less important factor for higher educated natives.

Table 2.4: Regression results for low and high education level per integration estimate

DV: Anti-immigrant attitudes	Low education level		High education level	
	B	Std. error	B	Std. error
Unemployment gap	-.04	(.10)	-.23***	(.09)
Unemployment natives	7.08	(6.61)	10.60	(6.61)
Cultural values gap	.05*	(.02)	.01	(.02)
Religiousness gap	.05*	(.02)	-.01	(.02)

Note: † p < .1 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Robustness

I have made various choices in the data analysis with regards to the measurement of variables and the statistical model used. I have chosen the best specifications available, but I am well aware that these choices may not be evident to everyone. This concerns the measurement of the dependent variable and independent variable, as well as the interaction terms and the regression model itself. The results of the robustness tests with different estimations are displayed in Table 2.5 below.

The first specification, arguably the most important one, contains different operationalizations of employment and cultural values integration. In specification A of Table 2.5, I included measures of differences in social benefit dependency between migrants and natives, rather than unemployment. This measure relates to the possible fear of natives that migrants receive disproportionally more government benefits. The result is similar to the employment gap measure of the baseline and corroborates the conclusions. For different measures of cultural integration, I included two different variables that are arguably related to cultural diversity: the percentage of migrants that consider themselves Muslim and the percentage of migrants that speak a different language than the host country's at home. The results confirm the baseline models and the coefficients are even a bit stronger. The greater the percentage of Muslims among migrants, the more anti-immigration mainly lower educated natives are ($p < .001$). The effect of the percentage of Muslim migrants on the anti-immigration sentiment of higher educated natives is positive and significant (at the .05 level), but clearly weaker than the effect on lower educated natives. When it comes to language adaptation, again, lower educated natives are more anti-immigration the more migrants speak a different language at home than the host country's ($p < .001$). Natives with a high education level are more pro-immigration when migrants' language adaptation decreases, but this result is weaker than the result for the lower educated natives and only statistically significant at the .05 level. Both alternative measures of cultural integration confirm the theory

that lower educated natives see cultural differences between natives and migrants as a problem, whereas higher educated natives might even consider it virtuous. With different but similar operationalization of both employment and cultural integration, the results confirm the findings of the baseline results.

Table 2.5: Robustness tests

DV: Anti-immigrant attitude	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
A: Other interaction terms					
Education	-.20*** (.03)	-.19*** (.02)	-.18*** (.04)		
Social benefit ratio	.20† (.12)				
Soc. ben. ratio X Educ.	-.05** (.02)				
Percentage migrants Muslim		2.46*** (.68)			
Perc. migrants Muslim X Educ.		-.73*** (.13)			
Perc. migrants w. different language			1.22** (.40)		
Perc. migrants w. different language X Educ.			-.36*** (.09)		
B: Specific DVs					
Education	-.23*** (.01)	-.16*** (.03)	-.31*** (.02)	-.28*** (.02)	-.29*** (.02)
Unemployment ratio		-.01 (.08)			
Unempl. ratio X Educ.		-.07*** (.01)			
Unemployment natives			9.28 (6.43)		
Unempl. nat. X Educ.			.59* (.29)		
Cultural values gap				.08* (.04)	
Cult. values gap X Educ.				-.02* (.01)	
Religiousness gap					.08* (.04)
Religiousness gap X Educ.					-.02* (.01)
C: Education in years					
Education	-.09*** (.00)	-.05*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.08*** (.01)	-.08*** (.01)
Unemployment ratio		.10 (.11)			
Unempl. ratio X Educ.		-.02*** (.01)			

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Unemployment natives			3.94 (6.39)		
Unempl. nat. X Educ.			.32*** (.09)		
Cultural values gap				.15*** (.04)	
Cult. values gap X Educ.				-.01*** (.00)	
Religiousness gap					.16*** (.04)
Religiousness gap X Educ.					-.01*** (.00)
D: Fixed effects					
Education	-.27*** (.01)	-.14*** (.03)	-.32*** (.02)	-.27*** (.02)	-.27*** (.02)
Unemployment ratio		.27** (.08)			
Unempl. ratio X Educ.		-.07*** (.02)			
Unemployment natives			-5.35 (3.49)		
Unempl. nat. X Educ.			.97** (.33)		
Cultural values gap				.05* (.03)	
Cult. values gap X Educ.				-.01* (.01)	
Religiousness gap					.04 (.02)
Religiousness gap X Educ.					-.01* (.01)
E: Parents foreign born					
Education	-.29*** (.01)	-.30*** (.02)	-.25*** (.01)	-.25*** (.01)	-.29*** (.01)
Unemployment ratio	.03*** (.01)				.03*** (.01)
Unempl. ratio X Educ.	-.00*** (.00)				-.00*** (.00)
Unemployment natives		-1.72 (1.83)			
Unempl. nat. X Educ.		.58 (.36)			
Cultural values gap			.06** (.02)		
Cult. values gap X Educ.			-.02** (.01)		
Religiousness gap				.06** (.02)	
Religiousness gap X Educ.				-.02** (.01)	

F: Weights					
Education	-.33*** (.02)	-.18* (.07)	-.38*** (.03)	-.33*** (.04)	-.33*** (.04)
Unemployment ratio		.41† (.23)			
Unempl. ratio X Educ.		-.10* (.04)			
Unemployment natives			-6.70 (17.80)		
Unempl. nat. X Educ.			.73* (.32)		
Cultural values gap				.04 (.04)	
Cult. values gap X Educ.				-.01 (.01)	
Religiousness gap					.04 (.04)
Religiousness gap X Educ.					-.01 (.01)

Note: † $p < .1$ *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

For specification B I did not use the anti-immigrant attitude scale as the dependent variable, but more specific questions related to economic and cultural aspects of the immigration issue. For the unemployment gap interaction, I used "Immigration is good/bad for the country's economy" and for the cultural values gap interaction I used "The cultural life of this country is enriched/undermined by immigration." The results confirm the baseline models. For estimation C I used a different measure of education level. Instead of the level of education, I used the number of years the respondents have been in education. Although this might be considered a less direct measure of education, it does avoid some of the comparability issues that come with scaling education levels between countries and over time. The results from the baseline models are corroborated by this estimation and show even stronger results.

The next specification (D) considers fixed effects models. The results are almost identical to the random intercept models. For specification E I used a different definition of an immigrant. Instead of the person being foreign born, I used the definition of both parents being foreign born, which includes second generation migrants. Not surprisingly, the results of the regressions become slightly weaker and in case of the interaction effects between education level and the unemployment of natives, they become insignificant. These models include a group that is born in the country and has therefore a much higher level of integration than first-generation immigrants. Although the results are weaker, the direction is the same and most of the models remain statistically significant. For the final model (F) I used the design and population weights of the ESS. This weakens the significance of both the employment models and cultural values differences models. In

the latter case they even become insignificant. The coefficients, however, remain very similar. Although weighting survey responses is an important exercise for descriptive interpretation, because it aims to correct issues of over and under sampling and non-response, it is contested whether it is useful in regression models in general and cross-level interaction models specifically. This is why the non-weighted models are preferred.

These robustness tests show with a certain amount of confidence that integration is related to the education gap of anti-immigrant sentiment in the direction and proportion described in the interpretation of the baseline models. Although the results are dependent on the type of weights that are applied, the results are robust when using different measures of the key variables or fixed effects regression models.

Conclusion

As many studies have shown, natives with a low education level are more anti-immigration than their higher educated counterparts (Bauer et al. 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007). This chapter shows that the ways in and extent to which migrant groups are integrated in society is important for understanding anti-immigrant sentiment among lower and higher educated natives. Immigrant integration is an important aspect of how immigration is absorbed in host countries and how immigrants are perceived by natives. Immigration absorption forms a link between the size of immigration and the problematization of the issue. In this chapter, I argue that higher educated natives are more positive towards migration when the employment gap increases, mainly because they seem to react to increasing employment among natives. The employment of natives is an important aspect in the size of the employment gap, and seemingly, an important factor for higher skilled natives in assessing the desirability of more or less immigration in their country. Lower educated natives respond more strongly to the average cultural values differences between natives and migrants. When cultural values differences between natives and migrants increase, the anti-immigrant sentiment among lower educated natives also increases.

These two main conclusions support the notion that lower and higher educated natives have different priorities when it comes to immigrant integration. Higher educated natives seem to be more concerned about economic consequences of immigration and integration, whereas lower educated natives seem more concerned about their national identity, culture and traditions. In the immigration debates that are currently unfolding across Europe, this forms a wedge between lower educated, more nationalistic natives and more cosmopolitan, higher educated natives and adds a new perspective to the question of whether anti-immigrant sentiment is driven by economic interest or by the politics of culture and identity. According to some scholars, the different average position of lower and higher educated natives has been used as evidence that economic

interest explains anti-immigrant sentiment (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Later studies have argued that differences in immigration attitudes between lower and higher educated natives is mostly explained through stances on cultural aspects of immigration (Capozza and Brown 2000; Connor 1994; Ivarsflaten 2005; Kinder and Kam 2010; Tajfel and Turner 1979). This study argues that lower and higher educated natives perceive the immigration from different angles and that both economic and cultural explanations are relevant, but to different groups, in explaining the relationship between immigrant integration and the education gap of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Despite my efforts to compose quality measures and statistical models, this chapter does not come without its limitations. An important limitation is the possible endogenous relationship between the gap in cultural values and immigration attitudes. It cannot be ruled out that in contexts where there is a bigger gap in cultural values between natives and migrants, natives' cultural values that are very different from the migrants' are the same values that underlie their positive immigration attitudes. However, in these contexts there is still a decreased support for immigration among the lower educated natives. Other cultural differences (language adaptation, percentage of migrants that is Muslim) are also in line with the results for cultural values. Another limitation is that despite the control variable which measures whether the respondent lives in an urban or a rural area, it is not possible to know the diversity of the respondents' neighborhood. It would be very interesting to know how this relates to the effect of integration on someone's immigration attitude (Schneider 2008, 54).

This is not the only question this chapter leaves unsolved and it should therefore be viewed as an early attempt to bring the integration issue into the realm of anti-immigrant sentiment and education gap studies. Notwithstanding the limitations, the empirical analyses show that immigrant integration, or the lack thereof, is relevant for understanding the education gap of anti-immigrant sentiment. As this chapter shows, integration is a multi-faceted concept and different aspects of it play out differently for lower and higher educated natives' immigration opinion. Future research should focus on theorizing and empirically testing more fine-grained measures of cultural values differences between natives and migrants and explore the determinants of successful immigrant absorption, both relating to the composition of migrant groups, their characteristics in terms of country of origin, and integration related policies.