1. Preliminary remarks: Concepts and domains

Concepts are our main tools for dealing with the world surrounding us, in daily life as well as in scientific investigation. During the last decades, philosophers and historians of science have observed that concepts often fulfil this function not as homogeneous building-blocks, but as heterogeneous entities, functioning within various contexts (cf., e.g., Toulmin 1972, chap. 2). In Elffers (1991) such contexts are labelled ‘domains’. Various domains may develop more or less independently from each other. In case of great independency, a concept may become internally ambiguous or incoherent, which may result in incompatibility between the various domains of the concept in question.

Domain incompatibility can often be explained by factors belonging to the sociology of scientific investigation. In many disciplines there is an actual ‘division of labour’ between, for example, more theoretically and more practically involved researchers (see Putnam [1979: 238] for the conceptual “division of labour”). Attention becomes restricted to those domains (theoretical or practical) that are most relevant to the researchers’ specific tasks. Developments in other domains are overlooked, so that a mutual tuning-in is lacking.

But domain incompatibility may also arise in undivided disciplines, even within the work of one investigator, for example when concepts obtain a central position in very broad and multifarious types of research. Suitable candidates are concepts (or clusters of related concepts) radiating a great intuitive explanatory appeal and equipped with a considerable potency of metaphor. In these concepts, a combination of a high confidence in their explanatory power

* The author would like to thank several anonymous commentators of previous versions of this paper. All remaining shortcomings are her responsibility.
and an inclination to a not too critical exploration of their pliable content may result in an unnoticed proliferation of mutually incompatible applications in various domains.

In such a case, domain incompatibility can be explained as an overgeneralization, caused by the promising appeal of the concept(s) in question. This appeal is, in turn, corroborated by every new domain in which the concepts appear to be applicable. Therefore, this type of domain incompatibility may be stubborn. The more central the position of the concept(s), due to an ever-expanding area of application, the more immune to criticism. Critical minds are required to break the spell of such concepts.

In 1934 the philosopher-psychologist-linguist Karl Bühler (1879–1963) presented his famous Organon Modell of language in his book Sprachtheorie. The model relates the linguistic sign to a “sender” (Sender), a “receiver” (Empfänger), and “objects and states of affairs” (Gegenstände und Sachverhalte). The sign is labelled a ‘symbol’ by its relationship to objects and states of affairs, a ‘symptom’ by its relationship to the sender (the speaker), and a ‘signal’ by its relationship to the receiver (the listener). Corresponding to these three relationships, Bühler distinguished three functions of language: “representation” (Darstellung), “expression” (Ausdruck) and “appeal” (Appell). The Organon Model can thus be considered as a cluster of concepts with some well-defined relationships between them.

This article deals with two early critical minds who discussed the same domain incompatibility in Bühler’s Organon Model. Their critical attitude sprung from very different sources, however.

2. **Domain incompatibility in Bühler’s Organon Model: The Dutch criticism**

Karl Bühler was a great scholar. His main subject was psychology, but he knew a great deal about contemporary developments in philosophy, biology and linguistics as well (see Vonk 1992, for Bühler’s career and scholarship). He had, moreover, the intellectual capacity and courage to observe and elaborate relationships between these disciplines.

On the other hand, Bühler’s attempts to unify and synthesize were not always successful. In the words of Hermann Ammann (1885–1956): ‘His light

1. The Organon Model was gradually developed in Bühler’s earlier works, however. The model was an original conception of Bühler, but, in his time, comparable models and views were put forward (cf. Vonk 1992: 206–214).

2. The English equivalents of Bühler’s terms and all other quotations from Bühler’s Sprachtheorie have been taken from D.F. Goodwin’s 1990 translation.
hand was not too capable to construe a solid system. 3 The Organon Model is a clear example of a ‘Lehrgebäude’ that runs the risk of instability, by precisely the type of domain-transgressing overgeneralizations referred to above.

Bühler’s work was well known by Dutch linguists and psychologists who were his contemporaries. Before the Second World War, the Dutch human sciences were intellectually oriented towards the German-speaking countries rather than towards America, especially in metatheoretical issues. As is shown in Vonk (1989) on the basis of the work of six prominent Dutch scholars, Bühler’s ideas were often discussed and referred to.

This article will deal with the evaluation of Bühler’s Organon Model by two Dutch general linguists, Anton Reichling (1898–1986) and Albert Willem de Groot (1892–1963), professors at the Universities of Amsterdam and Utrecht, respectively. Reichling’s criticism of Bühler is included in his opus magnum Het woord (“The word”) of 1935; De Groot’s critical remarks can be found in his Structurele syntaxis (“Structural syntax”) of 1949. Independently of each other, both scholars observed the same ambiguity in the model with respect to the notion of ‘Signal’ and the function of ‘Appell’. 4 The content of both criticisms can be characterized in terms of incompatibility between the roles of these concepts in the domains of, respectively, meaning and reference.

However, the relevance of the criticism for the linguistic theories of Reichling and De Groot, and the conclusions they draw from it, differ widely. These differences are indicative of the general linguistic position of both linguists. Whereas De Groot’s main concern was description and theory development according to his structuralistic methodology, Reichling was primarily involved in methodology itself, trying to found linguistics on the basis of phenomenological philosophy and psychology.

When comparing De Groot’s and Reichling’s similar criticisms of Bühler, this difference shows up clearly. While De Groot’s discussion of the Organon Model constitutes a rather isolated element in a chapter of his Structurele syntaxis devoted to the classification of linguistic signs, Reichling’s criticism is a part of a his extensive ‘conversation with Bühler’, running through Het woord like a continuous thread.

3. “Seine leichte Hand (war) nicht gerade geeignet, ein festes Lehrgebäude zu zimmern” (quoted in Vonk 1992:198). (My English translations, as all those that follow, except those of Sprachtheorie, see note 2.)

4. Although De Groot knew Reichling’s book and incidentally referred to it in Structurele syntaxis, his criticism of the Organon Model is unrelated to Reichling’s criticism of it.
Section 3 offers a brief introduction to both Reichling and De Groot; Section 4 will expound the gist of their criticism of the Organon Model. In Sections 5 and 6, I will enter into their respective positions vis-à-vis Bühler’s concepts. In Section 7, Reichling’s as well as De Groot’s approach will, in spite of differences, be shown to fit into a general climate of linguistic thought of European, and especially Dutch, structuralism. Finally, in Section 8, I will discuss some alternative historical interpretations of the two Dutchmen’s reactions to Bühler.

3. Reichling and De Groot: A brief introduction

The present paper belongs to the category of ‘micro-historiographical research’: its focus is on small portions of intellectual content. My object of analysis consists of Reichling’s and De Groot’s reactions to the Organon Model as it was presented to them in Bühler’s *Sprachtheorie*. This restriction implies that I do not describe the views of either of the three scholars in developmental terms. It also implies that I do not pay attention to their total intellectual and other surroundings. Nevertheless, I will provide a bit of information about Reichling and De Groot in order to supply some background information about these relatively unknown linguists. For my third *dramatis personae*, Karl Bühler, who does not need such an introduction, I refer to the huge literature available, especially to Vonk (1992).

Neither Reichling nor De Groot began his career as a general linguist. Reichling was trained as a Jesuit theologian and philosopher before studying Dutch linguistics and literature (see Elffers 1999b, for Reichling’s biography). His first publications were on literature and theology, but from about 1930 onwards he turned to linguistics. In 1935 he published his doctoral thesis *Het woord: Een studie omtrent de grondslag van taal en taalgebruik* (*The Word: A study of the foundation of language and language use*).

Reichling’s academic career began with an unsalaried lectureship in philosophy and psychology of language at the University of Amsterdam. In 1946 he was appointed professor in general linguistics at the same university. He retired from this position in 1968.

Throughout his career, Reichling was mainly involved in philosophical and metatheoretical subjects, rather than in empirical linguistic research, although he developed some general principles of structuralistic syntax together with his Leiden colleague Eugenius M. Uhlenbeck (1913–2003), the so-called ‘linear method’. He also discussed principles of lexical semantics and of (proto)-pragmatics. His international reputation remained limited, mainly because
he hardly published in other languages than Dutch. Nevertheless, Reichling’s name became widely known because, together with De Groot, he initiated and for many years edited the international journal *Lingua: International review of general linguistics*, founded in 1948 (which originally bore a French subtitle too: *Revue internationale de linguistique générale*).

De Groot began his career as a classicist; he worked as a professor in classical linguistics and literature at the University of Amsterdam from 1921 until 1951. During these years De Groot became more and more involved in general linguistics. After holding a professorship at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada (1951–1956), he became professor in general and comparative linguistics in Utrecht, a position held until his retirement in 1962 (cf. Verburg 1964).

For De Groot’s gradual development as a general linguist, his participation in the first International Congress of Linguists in The Hague in 1928 was of crucial importance. He can be numbered among the first European structuralists, collaborating with the Prague as well as with the Geneva structuralists. Although De Groot did not eschew discussions about the foundations of linguistics, his focus was on empirical linguistic description. It is therefore hardly surprising that De Groot initially did not approve of the proposed appointment of Reichling as a lecturer in general linguistics at the University of Amsterdam, because of Reichling’s lack of empirical studies. He did, however, value Reichling’s *Het woord*, and eventually he supported Reichling’s professorship in general linguistics in 1946 (cf. Noordegraaf 1994).

De Groot operated more internationally than Reichling, and was, therefore, in his time better-known, although his most important books appeared in Dutch; *Structuurele syntaxis* (*Structural syntax*, 1949) and *Inleiding tot de algemene taalwetenschap* (*Introduction to general linguistics*, 1962). *Structuurele syntaxis*, however, received some international attention (cf., e.g., Collinson 1952).

Nowadays, both scholars still play a modest role in linguistic debate. De Groot’s *Structurele syntaxis* was partially translated into German in 1978 (De Groot 1978), and thoroughly discussed in Block (1996). Graffi’s recent overview *200 Years of Syntax*, pays due attention to De Groot’s variety of structuralism (Graffi 2001: 280–282). Interest in Reichling’s ideas was revived when semantically-oriented approaches began to challenge the syntax-oriented hegemony of generativism (cf. Geeraerts 1983). The renewed appreciation of Reichling’s work is also due to the fact that parts of it can be regarded as “proto-
pragmatic” (cf. Nerlich & Clarke 1996: 205–206). In 1994, a Reichling Colloquium was organized in Amsterdam.  

4. On Appell and Zeigwörter

What was wrong with the Organon Model, according to Reichling and De Groot? Let us begin by looking at the model as Bühler presents it in his *Sprachtheorie* (1934: 28).

![Figure 1. Bühler's 'Organon Modell' (1934:28)](image)

Without going into details, I mention two important clues as to how the relationships represented in the figure must be interpreted. First, the linguistic sign (the middle triangle) is, in its function of ‘Darstellung’, as a *symbol*, related to objects and states of affairs by a relationship of *coordination* (Zuordnung). In its function of ‘Ausdruck’, as a *symptom*, it *expresses* the inner states of the speaker (Anzeichen, Indicium). In its function of ‘Appell’, as a *signal*, it *guides* the behaviour of the listener (Steuerung). Secondly, words may have more than one function, but in general, one function is dominant. Imperatives, for example, are typically signal-words. One type of words, classified by Bühler as signal-words, is dealt with at length in *Sprachtheorie*: the deictic words (“Zeigwörter”), for example personal and demonstrative pronouns, and deictic adverbs like “here” and “yesterday”.

Essentially, the criticism of Reichling and De Groot boils down to the observation: if signal-words are characterized by their ‘Appell’ function, ‘Zeigwörter’ cannot be signal-words; their function is ‘Darstellung’.

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5. This colloquium was organized by the Werkverband Geschiedenis van de Taalkunde ("Association for the History of Linguistics"). Its proceedings were published in *Voortgang* 14, 1994.
4.1 Reichling: A lack of balance in the Organon Model?

As was pointed out earlier, Bühler was Reichling’s most constant ‘interlocutor’ in his huge volume *Het woord*. His criticism of Bühler’s view of ‘Zeigwörter’ appears twice in the book. First, at the very beginning, in the introductory Chapter 1, “Methoden en termen” (Methods and terms), secondly in Chapter 7, “De zakelijkheid der betekenis” (The object-character of meaning). In both places, Reichling’s central thesis is that ‘Darstellung’ is inherent to language as such, ‘Ausdruck’ and ‘Appell’ are secondary phenomena, accompanying language use as well as other communicative acts.

The alleged incoherence in Bühler’s concept ‘Zeigwörter’ is interpreted as a corollary of the failure of the Organon Model to recognize this inequality between the three functions. In Chapter 1, the criticism fulfils a function in Reichling’s attempt to a preliminary demarcation of what is essential to language. In Chapter 7, its function is preventing a reduction of the class of words to elements with a clear referential meaning. I will discuss the passages separately.

4.1.1 Reinterpreting ‘Appell’

Reichling wrote the first chapters of *Het woord* before the appearance of Bühler’s *Sprachtheorie*. But as soon as this work was published, Reichling read it and incorporated his comments upon it into the book he was working on. Where these comments concerned its first — already finished — chapters, they took the form of extra footnotes, marked with an asterisk.

As the Organon Model had been partially presented in earlier works of Bühler (see note 1), Reichling could deal with Bühler’s three-functional view of language from the beginning. Bühler’s view of ‘Zeigwörter’ being introduced only in the *Sprachtheorie*, their incorporation into the class of signals could, however, be criticized only in these extra footnotes. In note 61* Reichling observes.

> In his “Sprachtheorie” […] Bühler attributes an entirely new interpretation to his “Appell”-function. “Appellieren” becomes “zeigen”. “Zeigwörter”, however, no longer exclusively fulfil the function of “das praktische Verhalten steuern” […]; on the contrary, they now also “guide” theoretical thought. Not only words like *here* and *now* and *I*, that have a “deixis-function”, but also conjunctions and relative pronouns […] become “Zeigwörter”. […] Bühler thus subjected his “Appell”-notion to such a metamorphosis that it no longer

6. Quotations from *Het woord* are based upon the second edition (1967). This edition is a reprint of the 1935 edition, the only difference is that printing errors have been corrected.
fits into his Organon Model of language. The opposition “Sender-Empfänger” disappears, or is applied in such a “metaphorical” way that it becomes scientifically useless. (Reichling 1967 [1935]:30)\(^7\)

In note 65* Reichling refers to this note, claiming that

[...] Bühler tries in vain to maintain the “Zeig”-phenomenon as a linguistic sign phenomenon, opposed to “Darstellung”. What he calls “zeigen” now is at the same time a type of “darstellen”, which his earlier “appellieren” was not. He now merely proves that “zeigen” can occur in the course of “darstellen”. (Reichling 1967[1935]: 34)\(^8\)

We observe that Reichling regards the notion ‘zeigen’ as the source of the problem. Bühler makes two mistakes, according to Reichling. First, he equates ‘appellieren’ with ‘zeigen’, thereby destroying its function of guiding the behaviour of the receiver (‘Empfänger’). Secondly, if one accepts this equation, the position of these words in the Organon Model becomes unclear, because the main function of ‘Zeigwörter’ is ‘darstellen’.

A deeper cause of this incoherence is, according to Reichling, a lack of balance inherent in the Organon Model. Bühler’s three functions cannot be symmetrically presented as three ‘dimensions’ of one general entity, the linguistic sign. Only ‘Darstellung’ is an essentially and inherently linguistic phenomenon. ‘Ausdruck’ and ‘Appell’ are aspects of communication in general. Reichling thus regards Bühler’s implicit metamorphosis of the ‘Appell’-notion as a consequence of the model’s imbalance: in order to present clear examples of signals, one needs an implicit metamorphosis of the notion of ‘Appell’, in such a way that ‘Darstellung’ is stealthily admitted. Only in this way does ‘Ap-
pell’ seem to become a suitable element of a model of language. For Reichling, the apparent necessity of this move in Sprachtheorie confirms his earlier analysis and evaluation of the Organon Model. Note 61* concludes with the rather triumphant statement:

When working on this chapter, the author could not suspect that, at the publication of the “Sprachtheorie”, his criticism of Bühler’s point of departure would receive such a confirmation. (Reichling 1967[1935]: 30)¹⁰

In Section 5 I will examine in more detail Reichling’s objections to putting ‘Ausdruck’ and ‘Appell’ on a par with ‘Darstellung’. For this moment my main conclusion is that Reichling observes that Bühler mistakenly regards ‘Zeigwörter’ as signal-words. We can rephrase his observations in terms of domains of concepts. According to Reichling, Bühler elaborates the concepts ‘signal’ and ‘Appell’ in incompatible ways in, respectively, the domain of meaning (indicating the main semantic function of utterances, in this case ‘darstellen’) and the domain of reference (indicating the ways in which referents are identified, in this case through a kind of ‘zeigen’ which occurs in the course of ‘darstellen’).

Reichling’s view of deixis is elaborated on the relevant pages of Chapter 7, which I will discuss now. I will show that Reichling here completes his criticism of Bühler by substantiating further his claim that ‘zeigen’ cannot be opposed to ‘darstellen’ in the manner suggested by Bühler.

4.1.2 ‘Zeigen’ and ‘darstellen’

The central problem dealt with in Reichling’s Chapter 7 is: how to conceive of “meaning” if we are to apply this notion to the members of word-classes like

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9. In various passages, Reichling suggests that Bühler was, at least partially, aware of the problem of the doubtful status of the signal as a subcategory of the linguistic sign. Cf. Reichling’s remark on p.295: ‘It [this problem: E.E.] is not to be found in his “Sprachtheorie” explicitly, but it shows all the time’. He subsequently describes how Bühler brings about the metamorphosis from ‘Appellieren’ to ‘Zeigen’, by distinguishing ‘Aktionssignale’ (“action signals”, e.g., imperatives) and ‘Rezeptionssignale’ (“reception signals”, e.g., “Zeigwörter”). Reichling also mentions an announcement, made by Bühler in his Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften (1933), of a solution of the same problem in his Sprachtheorie. He explicitly regards Bühler’s metamorphosis of ‘Appell’ as an attempt to such a solution, as he remarks in note 50* (p.25): ‘Bühler kept his promise; “Sprachtheorie” tries to offer a solution. See note 61* below.’

10. “De schrijver kon bij het bewerken van dit hoofdstuk niet bevroeden dat zijn critiek op Bühlers uitgangspunt bij het verschijnen der ‘Sprachtheorie’ een dergelijke bevestiging zou krijgen.”
particles and conjunctions? The notion ‘Darstellung’, argued to be essential to meaning in earlier chapters, seems not to apply to these linguistic elements. By discussing and criticizing other scholars’ solutions to this problem, Reichling eventually arrives at his own view: ‘Darstellung’ is only seemingly absent in these words. Therefore, even these ‘difficult’ words are symbols like others. For example, a word like “because” symbolizes the causal relationship between the sentences it connects. The particular character of this type of conjunction does not consist of absence of ‘Darstellung’, but of the way of symbolization, namely as a technical tool for language: the causal relationship is not mentioned independently, it only becomes ‘actual’ by the use of the conjunction between the sentences to which it applies. Language itself is a tool, so these words are ‘like the handle of a hammer, or the string of a bow’ (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 291).

Reichling’s analysis implies a ‘rehabilitation’ of particles, conjunctions, etc.: they are full-fledged words, on a par with substantives and verbs. Ammunition is thus supplied for the battle against the views of linguists like Joseph Vendryes (1875–1960), who refuse them the status of ‘word’ because they are not the expression of ‘ideas’, but only of ‘relations between ideas’.

Bühler’s view is less radical, but, from Reichling’s point of view, it too has to be opposed:

For, although we do agree with Bühler that these linguistic elements are fully-fledged words, our explanation is fundamentally different from Bühler’s. There is no reason to assume that for him these “words” too are words because they have the character of “symbols”, because they have an element of “Darstellung”. He thinks that they fulfil the function of “zeigen”, and that their existence as “words” is determined by this function: for him, the “Nenn”-function, the “Darstellungsfunktion” is only “aufgemalt”. It is this view that we cannot accept. (Reichling 1967[1935]: 293–294)¹¹

Reichling’s arguments in this chapter elaborate the ideas presented in Chapter 1. He briefly appeals to his earlier description of the “metamorphosis” of Bühler’s concept ‘Appellieren’ into ‘Zeigen’ (pp. 294–295). But his main attention is now directed to a more detailed discussion with Bühler about the char-

acter of deixis: not a main semantic function of language elements, but a particular manner in which the main function, namely ‘Darstellung’, is realized.

The issue becomes more subtle than in Chapter 1, because Reichling now takes into account the fact that Bühler also attributes a symbol function to deictic words. However, for Bühler, this function is additional to their *Urfunktion* (‘primal function’), which is “rein zeigen” (‘pure pointing’), illustrated by Bühler by a signpost consisting of a plain arrow without a name on it. Originally, deictic elements were like such signposts, according to Bühler. During their further development, they acquired a *Nennfunktion* (‘naming function’), in addition to the *Zeigfunktion*, which remains the primary one: “The arrow function of the signpost is not cancelled by painting a place-name on it.” (Bühler 1990[1934]: 144).12

Reichling quotes the latter sentence, partially approvingly: of course, there is no loss of functions during development (p.301). But he does not agree with the sentence’s main intention. The word “aufgemalt” (‘painted on’) in the quotation above anticipates the signpost comparison and reveals Reichling’s disagreement with this alleged secondary status of the ‘Darstellungsfunktion’ of deictic words.

Reichling also argues against Bühler’s view of the way in which deictic words acquired this function, in addition to their deictic ‘Urfunktion’. For Bühler, this development is closely related to the gradual development of systematic semantic oppositions between deictic words. Reichling’s doubts are twofold: there must have been ‘Darstellung’, also in the alleged undifferentiated earlier state of deictic words, and moreover, this undifferentiated state never existed; words participated in oppositional relations from the very beginning (p.300).

This does not imply that Reichling rejects Bühler’s general developmental ideas about ‘Zeigwörter’, on the contrary. He accepts their deictic ‘Urfunktion’ but does not equate ‘Urfunktion’ with *Ausgangsbedeutung* (‘initial meaning’), as Bühler does. For Reichling, the ‘Urfunktion’ state is prelinguistic; also in child language, speech sounds begin purely situational and deictic, but they are not really words in this state. In order to become words, an ‘act of word-making’ is necessary. This brings about knowledge of the word as a unity of sound and meaning, which *implies* ‘Darstellung’.

Reichling’s ends this exposition about “Zeigwörter” in Chapter 7 of his book as follows: ‘Conclusion: “Zeigwörter” do not exist; there are, however,

12. “Man löscht die Pfeilfunktion am Wegweiser nicht, wenn man einen Ortsnamen aufmalt.”
“Wörter” which also perform the function of “zeigen” (Reichling 1967[1935]: 302; Reichling’s italics).\(^{13}\)

In Section 5, I will return to the last-mentioned views of Reichling. The above discussion can be summarized: although Reichling shares Bühler’s developmental ideas about deictic words, and also his idea that they combine the functions of ‘zeigen’ and ‘darstellen’, their views about the primacy of functions differ. For Bühler, the deictic function is primary, as appears from the very distinction of ‘Zeigwörter’ and ‘Nennwörter’ as separate word-classes. For Reichling, all words have the primary function of ‘Darstellung’.\(^{14}\)

At the very end of his discussion of Bühler’s view in Chapter 7, Reichling returns to the Organon Model for a while, claiming to have only now fully revealed its defects (p.305). Reichling had to travel a long way to reach this point. As I will show now, De Groot’s way is both shorter and smoother.

4.2 De Groot: ‘reality signs’ and ‘position signs’

De Groot’s discussion of Bühler’s Organon Model follows his exposition about various types of meaning:

> There is one distinction […] that is essential to language and speech, which can be found at all levels of a language system, and which has indeed been found in many language systems […]. This is the fundamental distinction between objective and subjective meanings, or between “position” meanings and “reality” meanings. (De Groot 1949: 202)\(^{15}\)

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13. “Conclusie: ‘Zeigwörter’ bestaan niet; er bestaan wel ‘Wörter’ die tevens ‘zeigen’.”

14. Reichling’s ideas about deixis did not remain entirely unchanged; during his later development as a lexical semanticist he distinguished several types of meaning, ‘deixis’ being one of them. In Reichling (1963:11), he pays tribute to Bühler’s distinction of deixis as a separate semantic category in the following way: “Karl Bühler hat das schon in den dreissiger Jahren betont. Leider habe ich diese Ansicht damals bestritten, irregeführt durch seine psychologische Betrachtungsweise und wegen seiner Ausführungen über Deixis, denen ich auch jetzt nicht beistimmen kann” (“Karl Bühler stressed that in the thirties already. Unfortunately, I argued against this idea at that time, led astray by his psychological view and because of his expositions about deixis that I still today cannot agree with”). I interpret the latter remark as referring to Bühler’s conception of ‘zeigen’ as the main semantic function of deictic words, a view Reichling never adopted.

15. ‘Er is één onderscheiding […] die in het wezen van taal en spreken gefundeerd is, die in alle lagen van het taalsysteem kan voorkomen en bij vele taalsystemen inderdaad voorkomt […]. Dit is de fundamentele onderscheiding tussen objectieve en subjectieve, of tussen positie — en werkelijkheidsbetekenenis.’
Speaking implies two activities: referring to something that exists in reality (as it is supposed by the speaker) and taking a position towards that something. Linguistic signs can thus be divided into two main classes: “reality signs” (werkelijkheidstekens) and “position signs” (positietekens).

Sentences have to express both types of meaning. Put in general terms, this is brought about for ‘reality meaning’ through words, and for ‘position meaning’ through intonation. But some words and phrases have position meaning as well: many interjections, expressing the speaker’s emotion; imperatives and vocatives, expressing the speaker’s will; and constructions consisting of substantive + finite verb (and elements like “yes” and “no”), expressing the speaker’s judgment. So the fundamental distinction between reality signs and position signs shows up in the sentence as such (words vs. intonation) as well as in the system of word classes (interjections vs. non-interjections) and in the morphological and grammatical system of words.

After observing that linguists have neglected these distinction thus far, De Groot remarks that psychologists of language did make more or less similar distinctions. As an example, he mentions Bühler’s Organon Model and compares it to his own classification in the following way (De Groot 1949: 212):

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De Groot stresses, again, that his classification ’[…] corresponds to the most fundamental oppositions to be found in various, and sometimes even all languages, as oppositions in the language system itself; as oppositions not only of meaning, but at the same time of form […]’ (De Groot 1949: 213).

From this point of view, the fact that Bühler’s classification is at variance with De Groot’s itself counts against Bühler. This is actually what De Groot says. But he takes pains to discuss Bühler’s model in more detail.

De Groot suggests that, at first sight, Bühler’s symbols might seem to be equivalent to reality signs and symptoms and signals to position signs. But, he continues, this equivalence does not exist:

Apparently he [Bühler: E. E.] does not count as signals those typical categories, found in many languages, that are used by the speaker to get the listener to perform some action; vocatives and imperatives; pronouns — which he refers to as ‘pointing words’ — on the other hand, he does regard as signals. Those pointing words (I/you/he; my/your/his/; these/those) are, however -and this is one of our fundamental objections to Bühler’s classification- not a means to get the listener to do something: perform an action, achieve a state or the like, but a means to indicate something to him, to refer to something in reality that the speaker is talking about. This is why the term ‘pointing words’ is misleading; ‘localization words’ would be a better term. In our opinion, Bühler was led astray by his comparison with an arrow or some other sign that indicates a direction for pedestrians or motorists to move in. But pronouns in a language do not have the function of getting the listener to perform an action or the like, but rather to explain something to him, namely what the speaker is talking about. What is remarkable about pronouns is, however, that they bring this about by making use of some division — which may be an obvious division, but one that is in any case conventionally distinguished in the language in question- within some ‘field’ in or in relation to which the speaker and the listener are situated at the moment of speech. […] This distinguishes them from “naming words” like horse, walk, good, two etc. (De Groot 1949: 213–214)

16. “[…] correspondeert met de meest fundamentele tegenstellingen die in verschillende, soms in alle talen als tegenstellingen in het taalsysteem zelf voorkomen. Dus als tegenstellingen niet alléén van betekenis, maar gelijktijdig van de vorm […]”.

17. “Onder de signalen rekent hij [Bühler: E. E.] blijkbaar niet de in vele talen voorkomende typische categorieën waarmee de spreker de hoorder tot iets tracht te bewegen: vocatie en imperatief, maar wel de pronomina, die hij ‘wijswoorden’ noemt. Die wijswoorden (ik/jij/hij; mijn/jouw/zijn/; deze/die) zijn echter — en dit is één van onze principiële bezwaren tegen Bühlers indeling — niet een middel om de hoorder tot iets te brengen: een handeling, een toestand o.i.d., maar een middel om hem iets aan te geven, om naar iets te verwijzen in de werkelijkheid waarover de spreker het heeft. Daarom is de term ‘wijswoorden’ misleidend;
De Groot’s comment on Bühler is not flawless: Bühler does regard imperatives as signals, as was observed above; for the rest, his main tenet is similar to Reichling’s. By considering deictic elements, ‘localization words’,18 as signals, the category of signals can no longer be opposed to the category of symbols: both are ‘reality signs’. The pronouns in question are thus used to refer to reality; their difference with other reality signs concerns their way of referring: they appeal to the situation of speech as a means for the determination of their reference.

The same disturbance in the ‘right-hand side’ of the Organon Model is assumed by Reichling and De Groot. The semantic ‘signal’ function of appeal to listener in the domain of meaning is conflated with the merely instrumental ‘signal’ function in the domain of reference. Both scholars attribute this conflation, at least partially, to Bühler’s comparison of the function of linguistic signs with the function of a signpost.

But differences are also evident. Reichling, for example, adopts the view that all linguistic signs are primarily symbols. De Groot recognizes in particular signal-like signs: his ’position signs’.19 In the next sections the differences between Reichling and De Groot will be discussed in more detail.

18. De Groot applies the term deictic in a related, but different sense. It refers to a type of adjunct within noun phrases, not a type of sign.

19. Reichling does not present a detailed view of imperatives and vocatives, but the final sentence of note 65* runs as follows: ‘We keep in memory that he [Bühler: E. E.] used to teach us — and rightly so — that there is, moreover, a functional aspect “Appell” [namely, next to the phenomenon of ‘zeigen’ in the course of ‘darstellen’, E. E.] (“Wij blijven onthouden dat hij [Bühler: E. E.] ons vroeger terecht leerde dat er bovendien een functioneel aspect ‘Appell’ is”). This suggests that Reichling is referring here to these categories. Reichling's general word theory implies that, unlike De Groot, he attributes a primary 'Darstellung' function to these words as well.
5. **Reichling’s project: Reconstructing the notion of ‘word’**

Reichling’s book *Het woord* can be conceived as an exercise in linguistic metatheory. His primary aim is an epistemological reconstruction of the concept of ‘word’. Throughout the book, he “rebuilds” this notion step by step. Chapters about word-form are followed by chapters about word-meaning. A chapter about the word as ‘syntagm’, as element in larger units, concludes the book. At the end of most chapters a new description of the notion is given, adding the new characteristics just elaborated.

Why was such a project thought necessary? Reichling belongs to those European structuralists of his time, who adopted a psychological basis for linguistics, affiliating themselves with what Reichling called ‘the more recent psychology’: the school of Würzburg, Gestalt-psychology and phenomenological psychology. 19th-century associationist psychology had been rejected before, although rearguard actions were still fought, also by Reichling. More vehement was the opposition against behaviouristic psychology that was gaining ground in America.

Reichling also belongs to the small group of linguists who took the psychological basis so seriously that a new and explicit foundation of linguistic notions was considered of primary importance. His colleagues in this metatheoretical enterprise were not only linguists, but also philosophers and psychologists. In the Netherlands, Reichling’s points of reference were the works of the psychologist-linguist Jacobus van Ginneken (1877–1935), the philosopher-linguist Hendrik Pos (1989–1955) and the psychologist Martinus Langeveld (1905–1989); internationally, Reichling leaned heavily upon Bühler’s work, and to a lesser degree on the works of, among others, Gustaf Stern (1882–1948), Sir Alan Gardiner (1879–1963) and Charles Kay Ogden (1889–1957) and Ivor Armstrong Richards (1893–1979).

Reichling’s choice in favour of the notion ‘word’ as his main object of reconstruction is motivated by his conviction that all linguistic events necessarily presuppose the word (cf. Reichling 1967[1935]:i). His book is not only a reconstruction of a central linguistic notion, but also a vehement defence of the notion’s ‘primacy’, against the current view of the “primacy of the sentence” (cf. Daalder 1994).

Reichling’s choice is also motivated by his psychological viewpoint. In earlier associationism, word-meanings had been equated with ‘representations’ in

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20. See for this change in the psychological orientation of linguistics Elffers (1999). In Elffers (1994) Reichling’s psychological-linguistic view is discussed in more detail.
the mind of the speaker. This mental imagery was assumed to be ‘associated’ with word-form and was considered to be very variable. Words were thus deprived of a constant semantic identity. The thesis that the sentence has primacy over the word seemed plausible in this metatheoretical constellation, because semantic variation was seen as depending on contextual and situational factors. So there was a reason to reconsider the word and its relationship to the sentence as a consequence of adopting a new psychological metatheory.

On the other hand, this new metatheory itself did not immediately reinforce such a reconsideration. As inhabitants of the human mind, the earlier associationists’ ‘representations’ and their machinery of mutual associative relationships, were now replaced by several kinds of ‘intentional acts’. From this conceptual change a new reconstruction of the sentence followed more naturally than concentration on the word. The idea of intentionality stimulated a view of sentences as purposive acts, instead of sentences as outward symptoms of associative processes.

Attention to the word did not arise naturally in this context. Its alleged ‘secondary’ position may have strengthened this neglect. Until the appearance of Reichling’s book, the view of the word remained essentially unchanged.\(^{21}\) It was to Reichling’s merit that he attempted a serious new reconstruction of the notion ‘word’, derived from the ‘more recent psychology’. In the course of this project, Reichling developed and elaborated the view that ‘Darstellung’ is the essence of word-meaning. All words are therefore symbols in Bühler’s sense. The criticism of Bühler’s notion ‘Appell’ can be understood as a supporting element in the substantiation of this central claim.\(^{22}\)

What was the motivation of Reichling’s idea that all words are symbols? Two factors seem to be relevant:

\(^{21}\) In fact, there were a few reconstructions of the notion ‘word’ in terms of the “more recent psychology”. Bühler’s reconstruction, discussed in Section 4.1.2, was one of them; another one, as thoroughly criticized by Reichling, was Gustaf Stern’s (1882–1948) of 1931 (cf. Elffers 1994).

\(^{22}\) Earlier criticisms of the Organon Model are discussed by Reichling. Hellmuth Dempe’s (1904–1990) book Was ist Sprache? (1930) is the most important among them. Dempe’s conclusion is similar to Reichling’s: ‘Darstellung’ is the sole function of language as such. But most of Dempe’s arguments and the way he elaborates his point of view are at variance with Reichling’s, although there are similarities too. Besides the simple statement (p.34) ‘As to that, I believe, he is right’ (“Hij heeft daarin, geloof ik, gelijk”) and a few minor critical remarks, Reichling does not pay attention to Dempe’s work. He seems to have constructed his arguments independently of Dempe.
The first concerns conclusions, drawn by Reichling but not by Bühler himself, from features of the Organon Model. Reichling observes a large asymmetry between the elements of the Organon Model (cf. chap.1 of Het woord). When discussing the linguistic sign in general, Bühler often appeals to properties that are in fact present only in symbols. For example, signs are described by Bühler in terms of the old scholastic phrase “aliquid stat pro aliquo”. But this property applies only to ‘Zuordnung’ (“ordo rerum”), not to ‘Anzeichen’ (“connexio rerum”). Symptoms and signals relate the speech sound to the speaker and the listener by a causal relationship; only symbols are related in a non-causal but a representational way to objects and states of affairs. Symptoms and signals convey information that can also be conveyed by non-linguistic means; for symbols this is impossible. Animals make use of signals and symptoms; symbols are restricted to human beings. Reichling’s conclusion is that symptoms and signals are phenomena that belong to communication in general, rather than to language as such. Elements of language are always symbols.23

The second factor is Reichling’s own metatheory, which is rooted in his specific variety of phenomenological psychology. This psychology regards intentional acts as the main psychical occurrences in the human mind. Persons observe intentional acts as direct self-experiences. The objects towards which the acts are directed are observed as not belonging to the self. Applied to the particular “act of knowing” upon which linguistic signs as unities of form and meaning are based, this view implies that linguistic signs relate to entities not belonging to the self, but to the ‘Gegenstände und Sachverhalte’ that are experienced as outside the self. In order to relate linguistic signs to such objects, meaning has to be of the ‘Darstellung’ type. Reichling appeals to phenomena of primary language acquisition throughout his book, in order to make the assumed transition from speech signals to ‘real’ words by means of the ‘act of word-making’ as clear as possible. Again and again, the symbol function appears to be the essential feature in terms of which this transition is described (Reichling 1967[1935]: chaps. 1 and 6 passim).24

23. Reichling remarks on p. 4 of Het woord that Bühler explicitly claimed that the experience of language can only be understood in terms of ‘Darstellung’, but that he did not render this insight methodologically fruitful. On p. 25, he refers to Bühler’s honest concession that “aliquid stat pro aliquo” applies to signals “nur grob-logisch”, as an indication that the signal-function is not a linguistic sign phenomenon at all.

24. For Reichling, it was only a small step from this view to his general thesis of the primacy of the word. The symbol-character of the word constitutes a main argument for this thesis: meaning is an entity, a constant and inalienable aspect (‘moment’) of the word, inherent
6. *De Groot’s project: Structuralistic syntax*

In contrast to Reichling’s book, De Groot’s *Structurele syntaxis* does not contain extensive philosophical considerations concerning the epistemological foundations of linguistic notions. Still, the book is not a purely descriptive work. On the contrary, it aims at a principled “rebuilding” of syntax. As in Reichling’s work, the notion ‘word’ is analyzed and reconstructed. ‘Sentence’, ‘phrase’ and many traditional syntactic notions are redefined as well. Like Reichling, De Groot aims at a contribution to a new and ‘methodologically sound’ foundation of linguistics, one that should replace earlier approaches that are assumed to have precluded a fruitful development of linguistics as a science.

As noted earlier, De Groot also refers to Bühler’s *Sprachtheorie* throughout his *Structurele syntaxis*, although less extensively than Reichling. In his annotated list of literature about syntax at the end of the book, Bühler’s *Sprachtheorie* is positively characterized in the following way: ‘Important work by a psychologist about language. It is definitely not psychology, but really linguistics.’

The great difference between Reichling’s and De Groot’s projects lies in the character of the supposed new foundation. Whereas Reichling’s central problem concerns the ultimate psychical events that give rise to linguistic knowledge, De Groot hardly addresses this type of question. He implicitly presupposes the possibility to attain valid knowledge about elements of language, their form as well as their meaning, without bothering too much about the basis of such knowledge.

De Groot regarded as his task the consistent application to syntax of the structuralistic research programme as developed by its “founding fathers” Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) and Nicolaj Trubetzkoy (1890–1938). Like the other linguistic levels of phonology and morphology, syntax was supposed to consist of *elements* and their *possibilities to combine into higher level elements*. The structuralistic programme implied that lower level elements should be established *before* the study of higher level elements could start. This caused a long delay in beginning a thorough attack of the problems of structuralistic syntax, in Europe as well as in America.

De Groot, like many of his structuralistic colleagues, began by applying the new principles to phonology, but he took the task of extrapolating them in its existence as a word. Therefore, word meanings do not ‘result from’ sentence comprehension, but sentence comprehension proceeds from word meanings. See further Daalder (1994).

25. “Belangrijk werk van een psycholoog over taal. Het is bepaaldelijk niet psychologie maar werkelijk taalkunde.”
to other areas very seriously. In the Netherlands, De Groot’s syntactic work, and especially his *Structurele syntaxis* fulfilled a pioneer function and became very influential. In this work De Groot develops general syntactic principles and definitions of syntactic categories. He continuously stresses linguistic variability, and the danger of unjustified claims of universality. De Groot illustrates the principles by giving many examples, mainly taken from Dutch. The book thereby functioned as a guide for Dutch structuralists’ syntactic description as well. De Groot himself regarded the book as a mere introduction to a larger descriptive work on Dutch syntax, a real ‘Dutch grammar’, that should definitively replace outdated traditional grammars. This book never appeared, however.

What was wrong, according to De Groot, with the older approaches to syntax? And complementarily, what was the wholesome effect, expected from a structuralistic ‘rebuilding’ of this branch of linguistics? By answering these questions we will be able to establish the relevant context of De Groot’s criticism of Bühler.

De Groot’s main starting point for linguistic analysis is the Saussurean sign as a unit of form and meaning, both aspects being *mutually dependent*. Sounds constitute linguistic forms, only if they are semantically relevant. Potential semantic elements constitute linguistic meanings only if constant and distinctive forms are attached to them. Neither forms nor meanings can be established without taking the ‘other side’ into consideration. According to De Groot, traditional grammarians did not respect this principle. By a priori postulating meanings, they created “reversed grammar” ("omgekeerde grammatica"):

By “reversed grammar” we mean the method of *not* asking which semantic categories a language has (categories that can be distinguished by features […], and which together with other categories constitute a system of oppositions), but of asking: in which way — by means of categories or (and) otherwise — is a certain element of thought (we cannot even speak of meaning or meaning elements in this case) expressed in a certain language? A typical example is the question: how is the relationship to a substance expressed? This is, however, formulated as follows: ‘which cases has the language at issue’? What is meant, however, is not cases in the grammatical sense (certain formal features of words with certain meanings or moments of meaning), but concepts of certain relationships in the supposed reality or those relationships themselves. In certain languages, all kinds of elements, besides the grammatical or linguistic cases, […] are taken into account, e.g. prepositions. […] There is no reasonable objection to occasionally putting this type of question. It can be useful, for example for foreign language learning. […] But the answer to such a question is not linguistic description. […]
After all, incorporation of pieces of reversed grammar into the grammar easily results in confusion. The writer as well as the reader are inclined to regard extra-linguistic distinctions and categories as linguistic categories, as elements of the system of the language at issue. It makes no difference whether the extra-linguistic categories are taken from logic, or ontology, or that they are linguistic categories, but of another language than the language that is studied or described. One can project all kinds of categories and systems of categories onto, i.e. assume them for, a given language in which they do not exist. (De Groot 1949: 128–130)26

In the light of these passages, De Groot’s central objection to Bühler will be clear: He accuses Bühler of practising ‘reversed grammar’, by assuming the universal relevance of his tripartition of signs into symptoms, signals and symbols. Although he does not explicitly apply the term to Bühler’s distinctions in the relevant passage, he does so indirectly by defending his own rival view as supported by formal-linguistic data. Immediately before his organon-criticism, De Groot remarks that the classifications assumed by him correspond to

26. “Onder ‘omgekeerde grammatica’ verstaan we de methode waarbij men niet vraagt welke betekenis kategorieën een taal heeft (kategorieën die door kenmerken […] onderscheidbaar zijn, en die met andere kategorieën een systeem van tegenstellingen vormen), maar waarbij men vraagt: op welke wijze — door middel van welke kategorieën of (en) op welke andere wijze — wordt een bepaald gedachte-element (van betekenis of betekenis-element mag men dan zelfs niet spreken) in een bepaalde taal uitgedrukt? Een typisch voorbeeld is de vraag: hoe wordt de betrekking tot een substantie uitgedrukt? Men formuleert dit dan wel zo: ‘welke naamvallen heeft de gegeven taal?’ Men bedoelt dan niet naamvallen in grammaticale zin (d.w.z. bepaalde formele kenmerken van woorden met bepaalde betekenissen of betekenis-momenten), maar men bedoelt begrippen van bepaalde betrekkingen in de veronderstelde werkelijkheid, of die betrekkingen zelf. Men haalt daar dan in bepaalde talen behalve de grammaticale of linguistische naamvallen wel allerlei geheel ander elementen bij, b.v. voorzetsels […].

Er kan geen enkel redelijk bezwaar tegen worden gemaakt dat dergelijke vragen bij geleendheid worden gesteld. Ze kunnen b.v. nuttig zijn om iemand een vreemde taal te leren hanteren […] Maar het antwoord op een dergelijke vraag is geen taalbeschrijving.[…]

En tenslotte leidt het opnemen van beschouwingen der omgekeerde grammatica in de grammatica zelf gemakkelijk tot het stichten van verwarring. Schrijver en lezer krijgen dan maar al te spoedig de neiging extra-linguistische onderscheidingen en kategorieën voor linguistische kategorieën, voor elementen van het systeem van de gegeven taal te beschouwen. Of die extra-linguistische kategorieën aan de logica ontleend zijn, of aan de ontologie, of dat het wel linguistische kategorieën zijn, maar in een andere taal dan die men onderzocht of beschrijft, maakt geen verschil. Men kan allerlei kategorieën en systemen van kategorieën projecteren op, d.w.z. aannemen voor, een gegeven taal, waarin ze niet bestaan.”
fundamental linguistic oppositions, which implies that these oppositions are not only semantic, but also formal.

We observed earlier that both Reichling and De Groot suggest that Bühler’s ambiguous application of ‘signal’ has something to do with, in my terminology, the application of ‘Appell’ and ‘signal’ in various domains. Hearer-oriented semantic function is conflated with hearer-oriented instrumental function in the determination of reference. The intellectual settings of the criticism are very different, however. For Reichling there are, for principled reasons, no primarily signal-like signs. De Groot rejects, for purely empirical-linguistic reasons, Bühler’s trichotomy. He does not share Reichling’s assumption of the general primacy of ‘Darstellung’. As far as they are words, his ‘position signs’ are primarily signals (or symptoms). But Bühler’s ‘Zeigwörter’ are purely ‘reality signs’.

7. Reichling and De Groot as ‘Dutch structuralists’

Both De Groot and Reichling are usually regarded as leading scholars of the Dutch variety of European structuralism as it developed between 1930 and 1960. Descriptions of this variety stress the eclectic character of Dutch structuralism: there was not a “Dutch school” as there were ‘schools’ of Geneva, Prague and Copenhagen or a ‘Bloomfieldian school’. Dutch structuralism was based upon principles developed in these foreign schools. The principles chosen by individual linguists differed considerably, so that Dutch structuralism is not a homogeneous ‘school’.

But Dutch structuralists also appear to have shared a climate of thought that can be characterized in terms of a few prominent metatheoretical principles: first, the idea that linguistic facts should be re-founded on the basis of firm psychological evidence; and second, the idea that linguistics should be autonomous, independent of other sciences.

I will not scrutinize here the appearance of contradiction between these two principles. For the moment, it may be sufficient to point out that the idea of autonomous linguistics seldom implied a rejection of a general psychological basis. On the other hand, intrusions from “wrong” types of psychology (like associationism or behaviourism) were rejected as a threat to autonomy (cf. Jakobson [1973:16] and Elffers 1997).

By recognizing that the intellectual climate was determined by these principles, one can understand the fact that Reichling was a man of influence.

despite his lack of descriptive work and despite the much-complained “difficulty” of *Het woord*. Central viewpoints developed in *Het woord* were, nevertheless, widely discussed and taken over, though in a less elaborated form than Reichling had presented them. This could occur only if there was a general acceptance of the necessity of a new and thorough re-foundation of basic linguistic notions, along the lines exemplified in Reichling’s work.

We also observe that De Groot’s and Reichling’s Bühler critique has more in common than their respective works would suggest. This can be related to the general climate of the period. Both attribute Bühler’s mistake to his being a psychologist, not a linguist. De Groot motivates his attention to the Organon Model in the following way:

> In order to avoid misunderstanding, we deem it correct to go somewhat further into this theory, which is important for the psychology of language. In this way we also hope to avoid that linguistics, just as it was formerly dominated by Wundt, will now follow Bühler’s track, and thus project non-linguistic categories to languages for the hundredth time. (De Groot 1949: 212)\(^{28,29}\)

Reichling explains almost all Bühler’s mistakes in terms of the non-linguistic approach of the latter. Bühler’s inclusion in the Organon Model of elements that are argued to be not really linguistic, is never discussed without paying attention to his general a-linguistic point-of-view. Reichling’s standpoint has to be somewhat ambivalent, because the type of psychology Bühler adopts is largely shared by him. He admired many of Bühler’s psychologically-based views. This ambivalence is clearly illustrated in the following statement in the first chapter of *Het woord*:

> He [Bühler: E.E.] is a psychologist. Therein lies his strength and his weakness.[…] No linguist can afford not to read him, but no linguist should follow him entirely. (Reichling 1967 [1935]: 8–9)\(^{30}\)

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28. “Ter voorkoming van misverstanden achten wij het goed deze theorie, die voor de taalpsychologie belangrijk is, iets nader te bespreken. Dit ook om te voorkomen dat de linguistiek, zoals ze destijd aan de leiband van *Wundt* heeft gelopen, thans de sporen van *Bühler* zal volgen, en daarmee voor de zoveelste maal niet-linguistische kategorieën op talen projecteren.”

29. We observed above that De Groot deems the content of Bühlers’ *Sprachtheorie* “not psychology but really linguistics”. I interpret this remark as referring to Bühlers’ thorough discussion of linguistic phenomena, not to all of his metatheoretical principles.

There are large differences between the non-linguistic points of view attributed to Bühler by De Groot and by Reichling. For De Groot, Bühler suffers from the psychologism of the ‘reversed grammarian’ who derives his grammatical categories from psychologically-based semantic notions, without previously testing their linguistic relevance. For Reichling, Bühler’s psychologism consists of a lacking distinction between purely linguistic elements and general communicative elements within the speech event.

However, Reichling’s and De Groot’s diagnoses of Bühler’s mistake as ‘psychologism’ mirror a common aim: the protection of linguistic methodology from intrusions from other sciences, in order to render linguistics ‘truly linguistic’ and ‘autonomous’. Both Reichling and De Groot conceive of linguistics as a subject that for centuries has been unjustifiably mixed up with other subjects, and that has been ‘liberated’ only so recently, that a struggle against a-linguistic influences is still urgent. As a corollary of this conception, which they shared with many European, and especially many Dutch linguists, there was a widespread and strong inclination to interpret deviant viewpoints in terms of an alleged a-linguistic approach of language by the opponent. If the opponent happened to be a non-linguist by profession, like Bühler, this diagnosis becomes even more predictable. The fact that Bühler himself forcefully defended Saussure’s view “[…] that linguistic facts, and nothing else, not physics nor physiology nor psychology, but only linguistic facts are to be found in the initial data of linguistics” (Bühler 1990[1934]: 9), could not prevent this.31

8. **Looking backward**

When we look at the history of linguistics as a centuries-long game with myriads of possible moves (and of course with changing rules), how would we assess the moves of Reichling and De Groot discussed in this article? Three possibilities may have to be considered:

1. These were ‘blind alley’ moves. Bühler’s views were influenced by his psychological point of view (which was suggested by both Dutch linguists, as

31. “[…] dass schon in den Ausgangsdaten der Linguistik nicht Physik, Physiologie, Psychologie, sondern *linguistische Fakta* und gar nichts anderes vorliegen”

32. The term ‘psychologism’, once applied in a negative sense, could adopt more meanings than the two described here. Reichling and De Groot both apply the terms ‘psychologistic’ and ‘a-linguistic’ in other, sometimes more dubious senses. An example is Reichling’s qualification of Bühler as a-linguistic by an incorrect presentation of the Organon Model, thus suggesting ‘behaviourism’ (see Lukkenaer 1974).
we have seen), but Reichling’s and De Groot’s ideas, in turn, were determined by their own linguistic point of view. So there was an unbridgeable gap.

2. These were only pseudo-moves, based upon conceptual confusions. Reichling and De Groot misinterpreted the Organon Model. They created too much out of a functional contrast between the various types of signs. For Bühler, signs could combine various functions, whereby ‘Darstellung’, like in Reichling’s views, was the most dominant one (Bühler 1934: 30).

3. These were real moves in the ‘semantic description’ part of the game, consisting of the type of clarification that aims at laying bare a domain incompatibility, and developing an alternative description.

As may be clear from the way in which I have discussed the issue, my own reconstruction is the ‘real move’ one. I feel that Reichling’s and De Groot’s analysis of deictic words is really different from Bühler’s analysis, and that their analysis laid bare a real domain incompatibility. Elaborating the concept of ‘signal’ in terms of a semantic function in the domain of meaning and in terms of an instrumental function in the domain of reference, puts deictic words in an impossible position. Both De Groot and Reichling took some steps towards a tentative solution of this problem. My ‘real move’ reconstruction implies that, I believe, if Bühler had reacted with a counter-move, a further common effort towards a satisfactory description of deictic words could have developed.

As to the first-mentioned ‘blind-alley’ possibility, although I acknowledge differences in point of view, I think that empirical phenomena of language constituted a common ground for discussion between Bühler and the two linguists. Their statements about deictic words, however different, bear witness of a common data-oriented attitude that characterizes their general approach. All three participants explicitly attach much importance to linguistic facts. Bühler’s statement quoted above (p. 110) bears witness to his agreement with the empirical-linguistic point of view of his structuralistic colleagues. Bühler was not a descriptive linguist professionally, but the multitude of detailed and

33. Nowadays the same domain incompatibility still contributes to notorious difficulties in the definition of the subject of pragmatics, and subsequent uncertainties about the “identity” of this discipline (cf. Dascal & Françozo 1988). A too general idea that everything that “has something to do” with the speaker, the listener and the speech situation belongs together results in a heterogeneous area, in which, for example, deixis as well as speech act theory should fit. De Groot’s and Reichling’s comments on the Organon Model could be helpful in untying this knot.
admirable linguistic observations throughout his *Sprachtheorie* show that his statement was not a dead letter.

De Groot’s empirical-linguistic point of view and practice have been amply discussed above. And also Reichling’s work contains many examples of sound linguistic observation. Despite his non-descriptive orientation, he always illustrated even the most abstract metatheoretical issues with many clear examples of the use of language in daily life; actually, for his students these examples were part of his fame (see Elffers 1999b). There does not, therefore, seem to exist any support for the ‘blind alley’ view.

As regards the issue of ‘pseudo-moves’, we have to admit that De Groot’s description of Bühler’s model is not entirely correct. But this does not invalidate his argument against Bühler’s classification of signs in terms of their main function. We observed that Reichling explicitly takes into account Bühler’s view that deictic words also fulfil the ‘Darstellung’ function. But he also took Bühler’s classification of words seriously: ‘Nennwörter’ are opposed to ‘Zeigwörter’, and this classification is based upon their different dominant functions of symbol and signal respectively. It is this dichotomy that Reichling as well as De Groot reject on empirical grounds: for deictic words as well as for naming words, ‘Darstellung’ is the main semantic function.

In one respect, Reichling may have misinterpreted Bühler, namely where he suggests that Bühler’s ideas about deictic words were developed in order to solve the problem of giving ‘Appell’ a clear position in his Organon Model. There are, as far as I can see, no indications that Bühler felt this problem. First, Bühler did not share Reichling’s idea, stronger than his own ‘Dominanz der Darstellungsfunktion’, that ‘Darstellen’ is the only inherent and essential function of language. So Reichling’s suggestion that Bühler continually felt doubts about the linguistic status of ‘Appell’ (p.295) appears to be a case of “hineininterpretieren”, i.e., to see things as you want to see them. Second, even if the dominant signal status of deictic words should be abandoned, the class of signal words would not be entirely empty: as inhabitants the ‘Aktionssignale’ (imperatives) would remain, as in De Groot’s classification. Third, and most importantly, for Bühler the Organon Model was far less vulnerable than Reichling suggests. A possible loss of support from the semantic domain would not cause a collapse, because there was also support from other domains, not discussed in this article (see for example Swiggers 1981 and Vonk 1992: 210–214).

The organon triangle was related to the *speech event*, the symbol mediating between the speaker and the listener; it was also related to various *linguistic products*: lyric (symptoms), epic (symbols), and rhetoric (signals), and also to
various psychological approaches: Erlebnispsychologie (‘experiential psychology’, i.e., symptoms), behaviourism (signals) and geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie (‘social science psychology’, i.e., symbols), the latter domain having been mainly elaborated in Bühler (1927).

Given this plurality of domains, the issue of ‘Zeigwörter’ seems less critical than Reichling suggests. Bühler’s extensive discussion of deixis in all its manifestations in his Sprachtheorie also supports the impression of a genuine interest in these phenomena, rather than a mere “functional” appeal to them, arising from the need to rescue his model. Bühler would not have needed them for this purpose, since other means were available. To what extent these other means entail their own domain incompatibilities is a question to be discussed elsewhere.

REFERENCES


**SUMMARY**

Dutch structuralism developed during the first half of the 20th century as a heterogeneous movement. Interest in the works of Karl Bühler (1879–1963), however, can be observed in the publications of Dutch linguists as different as Albert Willem de Groot (1892–1963) and Anton Reichling (1898–1986), professors of General Linguistics at the universities of, respectively, Utrecht and Amsterdam. Although the ways in which they discuss and make use of Bühler’s insights differ widely, in agreement with their very divergent theoretical orientations, there is one common element: both scholars discovered and criticized, independently of each other, the same ambiguity in the famous organon-model, presented by Bühler in his *Sprachtheorie* (1934).

**RÉSUMÉ**

Le structuralisme néerlandais, qui s’est développé au cours de la première moitié du vingtième siècle, était un mouvement dénué d’unité. On peut cependant retrouver un certain intérêt pour les travaux de Karl Bühler (1879–1963) dans les publications de linguistes néerlandais aussi dissemblables l’un de l’autre qu’Albert Willem de Groot (1892–1963) et Anton Reichling (1898–1986), professeurs de Linguistique Générale, le premier à l’Université d’Utrecht, le second à l’Université d’Amsterdam. Tout en différant grandement dans leurs façons de discuter et d’utiliser les idées de Bühler, ce qui ne saurait surprendre étant donné leurs orientations théoriques fort divergentes, il y a un élément commun dans leurs travaux: les deux savants ont découvert et critiqué, chacun sans être influencé par l’autre, la même ambiguïté dans le célèbre ‘modèle Organon’ que présente Karl Bühler dans sa *Sprachtheorie* (1934).
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