Regionalism after regionalisation : Spain, France and the United Kingdom
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Galicia is located in the North-Western part of Spain, and is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean on two sides, Portugal to the South, and has mountain ranges on its Eastern border with the rest of Spain. Galicia is one of the poorest regions of Spain, isolated and characterised by emigration. With Santiago de Compostela as its capital, famous for being the final destination of the pilgrimage route, and Cabo Fisterra as its Western edge, the region has been mythically perceived and eagerly promoted by Galicia's tourism sector as the end of the world. Its extraordinarily wet climate, (umbrellas are standard equipment for everyone who lives or visits) the green hills and the stereotypically inaccessible and headstrong character of its inhabitants make Galicia an exception to the better-known images of Spain and the Spanish.

Map 5.1 Galicia, the provincias

Galicia has, however, also produced a number of politicians who have made their mark on Spanish politics and society. Francisco Franco was born in the Galician port city Ferrol, during his reign officially known as El Ferrol del Caudillo, and Manuel Fraga, founder of the present Partido Popular.
and author of the Spanish Constitution, is also Galician. Both were among the staunchest defenders of the unity of the Spanish state and nation. Nevertheless, Galicia also has a history of regionalist resistance, although not to the same degree as the other two ‘historical nationalities’ of Spain, that is the Basque Country and Catalonia. This history of regionalism is described in the first section of this chapter, followed by a section on the development of Galicia’s regional administration. The emergence of Galician institutions after regionalisation is discussed in section 5.3, followed by an evaluation of Galicia as a distinct regional political arena. The chapter finishes with an analysis of the development of regionalism in the discourses of Galicia’s regionalist and other regional parties.

5.1 Galeguismo before 1981

As in other parts of Spain, in Galicia the movements which were formed to defend the identity and territorial interests of the region are all grouped under a term which refers to the region, ‘galeguismo’ (‘galicianism’) (cf. catalanismo, asturianismo, etc. or indeed with reference to Spanish nationalism, españolismo). The term regionalism is reserved for rather moderate movements, in contrast to nationalism. Most of those parties call themselves nationalist, which does not necessarily mean their aim is the formation of an independent nation state. The history of galeguismo has been described as a development from provincialismo to nacionalismo, via regionalismo. Whether or not this is seen as ‘the movement that incarnates the long and complex process of political postulation of Galicia as differentiated national entity and the parallel genesis of a body of ideas that justify that claim’ (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996, p.17), or as a mythified moment of origin of nationalist mobilisation situated as such retrospectively by the latter nationalist movements themselves (Máiz, 1994, pp.177-178), the 1840s saw the birth of a Galician ‘provincialist’ movement based on a discourse which underlined Galician collective identity and common history. Rather than constituting a political movement on its own, provincials were part of the progressive liberalism present in the whole of Spain. In Galicia provincialismo was characterised by a dedication to finding a historical justification of its ideology, an organic perception of Galicia, a glorification of its past and periods of ‘independence’, a concept of the Spanish nation as a union of Hispanic peoples, and a number of proposals for political decentralisation and socio-economic development (De la Granja et al, 2001, pp.44-45). Although there are similarities with the ideas of later nationalists, galeguismo played a marginal role within the progressive liberal movement. This period also saw the emergence of a cultural and literary revival, the Rexurdimento (Revival), similar to the Catalan Renaixença, although later and on a smaller scale. Xogos Florais (Floral Games) were held, like the Catalan Jocs Florals, and poets such as Rosalía de Castro promoted the Galician language. However, this remained a strictly intellectual exercise, with
hardly any immediate social effect; Galician remained a predominantly rural language with low social status (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996, pp.29-30).

Beramendi and Núñez Seixas (1996) identify a phase of ‘regionalism’ between the phases of ‘provincialism’ and ‘nationalism’ from 1885 to 1915. It was in this period that the first specifically regionalist political organisations emerged, the Asociación Regionalista Gallega de Santiago (1890), the Liga Gallega (1897), and Solidaridad Gallega (1907). This was also the period during which Manuel Murguía, one of the leaders of a liberal current of regionalism, formulated the founding myths of Galician regionalism. This predominant combination of progressive liberalism and regionalism is in contrast with regionalist movements and their founding fathers in the Basque Country and Catalonia, Sabino Arana and Enric Prat de la Riba, where regionalism was mainly conservative. Murguía particularly stressed the Celtic myth of origins of the Galicians, and concentrated on race, language and history in his discursive construction of Galicia as a nation. He created a division between the Celtic, Aryan, modern and European Galicians and an inferior ‘other’, namely the Semitic central and southern Spaniards (Máiz, 1996, pp.42-43). Although this articulation of a shared Galician disposition and a common myth of origin became very influential, it did not have an – organisational and electoral – political impact. According to Ramón Máiz (1996) it was not only ideological and organisational divisions that caused the political failure of regionalism in Galicia, especially when compared with Catalonia and the Basque Country. The slow modernisation of Galician society, with very little industrialisation and the persistence of late-feudal production relationships facilitated clientelism and caciquismo and an absolute electoral control by the main liberal and conservative parties in the rural zones. Moreover, the regionalists themselves, who were mainly from the small urban bourgeois section of Galician society, continued to maintain an elitist political stance which was out of touch with the interests and values of the majority of Galicians. De la Granja et al. (2001) add to these factors the absence of any Galician institutions of self-government – like the Basque fueros and the Catalan Generalitat - in recent history, the huge influence of the Catholic Church, whose hierarchy was highly integrated in Spain, and an ambivalence towards the values of Galician identity in a relatively poor Galicia. Contrary to the Basque Country and Catalonia, Galicia was an area of mass emigration, mainly to Castilian speaking parts of Spain and South America.

Another turning point was the founding of the Irmandades de Fala (‘Language Brotherhoods’) in 1916 in different Galician cities. Contrary to their name, these quickly developed into political, not merely cultural, organisations with a strict nationalist view (Máiz, 1996, pp.47-48). While earlier Galicianist movements had described themselves and their ideology as regionalista and regionalismo, the Irmandades de Fala used the terms nación, nacionalista and nacionalismo (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996). Their main theorist, Vicente Risco, combined the Catholic traditionalist ideas of earlier regional-
ists such as Alfredo Brañas with reactionary European thoughts of the time with the Celtic underpinnings of Murguía (Máiz, 1996, pp.49-50). The Primo de Rivera dictatorship made organisational developments difficult and electoral advances impossible. However, similarly to in the Basque country and Catalonia, this caused the regionalists in Galicia to rethink their strategy and organisation, and led to a widening of their social base (Núñez Seixas, 1999, p.96).

After the fall of Primo de Rivera, the Irmandades de Fala of the major Galician cities developed rapidly into political organisations. At the first general elections for the Second Republic in 1931 regionalist candidates gained 35.61% of the votes in Galicia (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996, p.148), and for the first time four seats at the Cortes in Madrid for galeguistas, one of them held by the writer and leader of the regionalists in Vigo, Alfonso Castelao. The fragmentation of nationalist deputados into different political groups, and the unsuccessful attempt – together with Basque and Catalan nationalists – to get the Second Republic organised as a federation, stimulated the unification of forces and the foundation of a single political party, the Partido Galeguista. The party combined a largely leftish republican orientation with some Catholic-traditionalist sections, but the main break with the past was an abandoning of elitism and the formation of a modern party with a larger and steadily increasing membership base (Máiz, 1996, p.52). Its main preoccupation was the pursuit of an Estatuto de Autonomía for Galicia, which Catalonia and the Basque Country had received in 1932 and 1933 respectively. Finally, in 1936, when the Partido Galeguista had received 26% of the Galician votes, which was still more than twice as many in absolute numbers as in 1931, a referendum was held to vote on an Estatuto de Autonomía. The result approved the introduction of autonomy, but before Parliament could affirm Galicia’s status as such, the Civil War started. Under pressure of Castelao, the Parliament in exile affirmed the Estatuto in its last session in 1938, a symbolic act in the short-term, but one which would have greater consequences much later on.

During the first years of Franco’s reign, regionalist groups were persecuted throughout the whole of Spain. In Galicia this applied especially to the large progressive sections of the Partido Galeguista. As a result, organised galeguismo quickly disappeared in Spain. There were some Galician activities abroad, especially in Buenos Aires, and Castelao became a minister in the Spanish Republican Government in exile. However, galeguismo in exile became isolated from Galicia and lost touch with the situation in Spain. In Galicia, political action was abandoned although Galaixa was founded in 1950 under the leadership of Ramón Piñeiro the publisher. In the face of censorship, a movement was started known as ‘piñeirismo’, that attempted to preserve the Galician language, culture and history, and aimed to ‘galeguizar’ (‘Galicianise’) Galician society and politics without having any ambition as
regards political autonomy, nor with any reference to ‘nationalism’ (Máiz, 1996, pp.54-55).

It was the 1960s before (clandestine) nationalist organisations with political ambitions re-emerged. In 1963, a heterogeneous group Consello da Mocedade (Youth Council) was founded, but almost immediately fell apart because of conflicts among three clearly differentiated currents: a radical leftist and regionalist, a socialist, and a Christian democrat. In 1964, the former faction founded the Unión do Povo Galego (‘Union of the Galician People’), based on a nationalist and Marxist-Leninist ideology and dedicated towards clandestine resistance against Franco. Many similarities can be found with other organisations in Spain, such as the Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional in Catalonia and ETA in the Basque Country, and others abroad, all founded in the same period and inspired by theories of internal colonialism, Marxism-Leninism and liberation movements in the Third World (Núñez Seixas, 1999, pp.122-123). The Unión do Povo Galego (UPG) had a very small but active membership. In the early 1970s, it dedicated itself increasingly to mass action and tried to position itself as a political party, with autonomy goals which tended to focus on full independence, although there was room for federalism or confederalism and ambiguous terms such as ‘self-determination’ (Barreiro Rivas, 2003, Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996). The Partido Socialista Galego (PSG) was also founded in 1963. Initially, the PSG’s ideology was less radical than the UPG in its nationalist and its leftist principles, but later in the 1960s and 1970s it radicalised its regionalist stance under the activist hegemony of the UPG (Máiz, 1996, p.56, De la Granja et al., 2001, p.191). Of the ideological currents visible within galeguismo in the early 1960s only the centre-right catholic-traditionalist part failed to develop its own political party or movement. The Galaixa editorial group was not interested in developing into a political party, and aimed to maintain an independent position. Piñeirismo opted for the regionalisation of the existing parties and sections of society, instead of founding a Christian democratic regionalist party. A second reason was the weak potential social base of such a movement, a Galician regionalist bourgeoisie, and the disapproving attitude of the Catholic Church in Galicia towards Galician regionalism. In Galicia this prevented the development of a major Christian-democratic regionalist movement, like the Christian-democratic Pujolismo of Jordi Pujol in Catalonia or the PNV in the Basque Country (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996).

The result was that, during the fall of Franco’s regime and the subsequent transition towards democracy, Galicia had only relatively radical left-wing regionalist parties. The UPG, which was the best organised and most active, established the Asamblea Nacional-Popular Galega (ANPG) in 1975 to act as a mass organisation open to various organisations, albeit with the same views on self-determination and anti-colonialism. It had ambitions to be an interclass umbrella organisation to form a provisory Galician government, modelled on Third World liberation movements (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996).
Seixas, 1996). In 1977, in order to participate in the first post-Franco elections, it developed a more concrete political programme and adopted the name Bloque Nacional-Popular Galego (BNPG), although it remained a multi-party organisation dominated by the UPG. A number of militants did not agree with this democratic transformation of the BNPG and formed an even more radical organisation, the UPG-Liña Proletaria, with its own umbrella organisation Galicia Ceibe, and a section dedicated to the ‘armed struggle’, known as Loita Armada Revolucionaria. This organisation was responsible for a number of bombings in Galicia between 1978 and 1980. However, when some key members were arrested, the others fled to Portugal or resumed their involvement in lawful organisations. Attempts to establish a large, moderately regionalist party failed. In 1978, the Partido Galeguista was re-established, with the ambition to revive the electoral success of the same party in the 1930s. As a moderate centre-left regionalist party it formed an electoral coalition with the PSG and the new Partido Obrero Galego, under the name of Unidade Galega. However, this coalition was very unstable and did not receive a lot of votes. In general, the years of the democratic transition were characterised more by fragmentation of galeguismo, which particularly affected the radical leftist fringe, rather than electoral success.

5.2 Regionalisation, the introduction of the Estatuto de Autonomía

The road to regional autonomy

Unlike Catalonia and the Basque Country, Galicia had no elected regionalist representatives in Madrid during the process of transition to democracy after Franco. It also lacked an important politicised regionalist movement among its population. It was Catalan and Basque pressure that pushed for the accommodation of regionalist demands in the making of the Constitution and the Estado de las Autonomías. Nevertheless, to a large degree thanks to the influence of the Catalan and Basque regionalists, Galicia was included in the group of regions which are commonly recognised as nacionalidades históricas (‘historical nationalities’), as specified in the 1978 Constitution, together with Catalonia and the Basque Country. This status was given to those regions that had approved an Estatuto de Autonomía by plebiscite during the Second Republic, even though Galicia’s Estatuto had never been implemented. It allowed Galicia to implement regional autonomy much faster than the other regions, that is directly after affirmation by referendum.

Galician regionalists had had little influence in achieving this goal. In fact, opportunities for direct influence were turned down by the UPG and PSG. When the Partido Comunista de Galicia (PCG) and the PSOE joined forces in a Táboa Democrática de Galicia to progress towards restoration of the
1936 Estatuto de Autonomía, the UPG responded with its own alternative council and plans for self-determination (Domínguez Castro & Quintana Garrido, 1995, Fernández Baz, 2003). Galician regionalists were also absent from the Asamblea de Parlamentarios de Galicia, formed in 1977, in which the aim of the PSOE and PCG in particular was to achieve the same level of autonomy for Galicia as Catalonia and the Basque Country. The reluctance of the central government to go that far inspired all political parties to join together to organise a mass manifestation to stress the Galician demand to be treated the same as Catalonia and the Basque Country. Two parties did not participate in this initiative and mobilised large numbers of demonstrators. They were the AP, because it opposed high levels of regional autonomy, and the BNPG, because it aimed at much higher levels of autonomy.

The Constitution was approved in December 1978, but by March of that same year Galicia had already been assigned a provisional ‘pre-autonomy’ government, named Xunta de Galicia (‘Council of Galicia’) with reference to medieval Galician Xuntas. All parties were invited to participate in the writing of an Estatuto de Autonomía, but still the regionalist PSG and BNPG refused, sticking to their own plans for federalisation or self-determination. While Catalonia and the Basque Country moved swiftly towards acquiring autonomy statutes, Spanish President Adolfo Suárez preferred a more modest arrangement for Galicia, fearing an escalation of demands from other regions (De la Granja et al., 2001, p.241). This minimal offer for Galicia unleashed widespread and unexpected protest in the region, supported by nearly all political forces, with the government proposals being described as an insult to the dignity of Galicia (Domínguez Castro & Quintana Garrido, 1995, p.470). In the 1960s and 70s, Galicia had not generated the large anti-Franco regionalist feelings of Catalonia and the Basque Country. Now, however, this prospect of losing the recently obtained status as equal to those two historical nationalities inspired a series of mass demonstrations to demand a substantial level of regional autonomy. It was the regionalisation debate itself that sparked regionalist activism on a much larger scale than ever before in Galicia.

Finally, the Spanish government gave in and an agreement was made to give Galicia a level of autonomy comparable to Catalonia. This could come into effect only after a referendum had been held, in December 1980. The campaign for this referendum was another opportunity for the regionalist parties to show their opposition to anything less than federalism or independence. In their fierce ‘no’ campaign the BNPG contrasted “la soberanía nacional de nuestro país” (‘the national sovereignty of our country’) with “el autonomismo, como modelo de descentralización y regionalización administrativa del Estado” (‘autonomism, as model of administrative decentralisation and regionalisation of the state’) (Rodriguez, 1980, p.24). The BNPG and PSG defended the ‘no’ vote while the POG called for people to submit blank votes. This meant that, paradoxically, the ‘Spanish’ state-wide parties were cam-
ampaigning to gain support for the transfer of a substantial level of autonomy to Galicia, while the Galician regionalists were trying to block this. A huge majority of the voters at the referendum (73.35%) agreed with the proposal, although only 28.27% of those eligible to vote actually bothered to turn up. This high abstention rate was not only the result of a fierce campaign by the radical regionalists to vote ‘no’ or abstain, but also of the uninspired campaigning of all other political forces, that had already agreed to back the proposal. It was also in line with generally high abstention rates at other elections in Galicia.

This meant that, in October 1981, the inhabitants could vote for the first time for a Galician parliament and the creation of a regional government, the Xunta, with considerable powers on a par with those of the Catalan Generalitat and the Basque Jaurlaritza. This was despite the fact that Galician regionalism lacked the mobilising force that had set its Catalan and Basque counterparts apart in Spain during the Franco period and the subsequent transition. Widespread, popular and cross-party support for regional autonomy was only apparent during the negotiations on the Galician autonomy statute. Even this broadly carried regionalist demand offered no support for the UPG and PSG. The resulting autonomy for Galicia had come about not only without support from Galician regionalists, but despite their explicit opposition to any compromise.

**Galicia’s autonomy**

After regionalisation, all the Spanish regions became subject to the Constitution and to their own Estatutos de Autonomía. Because each is the result of negotiations, both internal and with ‘Madrid’, they all have individual features with different levels of autonomy in different fields of government. Although the Estatutos specify the subject that can, in the future, become the responsibility of the regional authorities, the actual transfer of competencies is carried out by means of negotiation with the central government. As a result, the transfer of competencies is an evolutionary process. Galicia’s Estatuto de Autonomía which, like those of other regions, is very much like a constitution in tone and format, specified the fields in which the Xunta could obtain exclusive competencies, such as regional planning, regional railways, promotion and education in the Galician language, a regional police force, inland fishing and casinos. It also states that the development of legislature and administration within the limits of basic state legislature in important policy areas such as health, education at all levels, agriculture, and internal commerce should be the Xunta’s responsibilities. Furthermore, the setting up of a regional public television and radio broadcasting station, and the defence and promotion of ‘Galician cultural values’, are specifically mentioned as being some of the regional competencies (Estatuto de Autonomía de Galicia, 1981). Some of the powers were transferred quickly, while others
took more time. For instance, while the Basque Country had already created its own policy force in 1980 right after regionalisation, it took Galicia until 1991 to achieve the same in its Estatuto.

With the adoption of competencies, the level of public expenditure by the evolved steadily, also in comparison to the central government’s expenditures in the region. In 1985, the regional government’s expenditures were less than a third of those of the state. By 1994, the expenditure was nearly level 81% (Máiz & Losada, 2000, p.73). In the same year, the regional authorities had 59,132 employees, as opposed to 15,551 people employed by the regional administration of the state government (Subirats, 1995, p.8). In more recent years, the regional budget has continued to grow and, in 2003, it was nearly double that of 1994, namely 7.7 billion euro in total (Xunta de Galicia, 2003, pp.93-94). A lot of financial resources are spent in particular on education, public health, agriculture and territorial planning.

As prescribed by the Constitution, the Estatuto de Autonomía of Galicia specifies three organs that exercise the region’s powers, namely a legislative assembly (the Parlamento), a governing council (the Xunta), and a president of that council, elected by and from the members of the assembly. The Parliament mainly fulfils the role of legislator and controller of the Xunta, while the latter is the executive organ of the Galician government. Formally the President has a role in both institutions, on the one hand as a member of the Parliament and on the other as coordinator of the Xunta. The President also plays a role, at a level higher than the parties, as representative of the Galician regional authorities in contacts with other authorities in Spain and abroad, and has the power to dissolve Parliament. In practice, the role of the President as leader of the Xunta and representative outside the region have remained key (Vilas Nogueira et al., 1994).

5.3 Progressive institutionalisation of the Comunidad Autónoma Galicia

Confirmation of the territorial extent of Galicia

As is the case with all Spanish Comunidades Autónomas, the territory of the region of Galicia was determined by the provinces which chose to cooperate. On the one hand this put the issue of territorial division of the state into the hand of actors at sub-state level instead of them being dictated to by central government. On the other hand it did not allow for more detailed adjustments of the boundaries, as the provincial boundaries had to remain intact. Galicia already existed as an administrative entity of Spain before Napoleon divided Spain into 38 prefectures in 1810. Within the then existing boundaries, Galicia was divided into its present four provinces. The idea persisted that the territorial boundaries of Galicia coincided with the combined territory of
the provinces of A Coruña, Pontevedra, Lugo and Ourense. These provinces continued to be administrative entities during the 19th and 20th centuries without significant adjustments to their boundaries. Their combined territory kept being referred to as Galicia, and was also the region to receive autonomy in the Second Republic (García Docampo, 2003). There was, therefore, little debate about which provinces were going to form the Comunidad Autónoma Galicia or who the ‘Galician’ members of Parliament were who occupied seats in the Asamblea de Parlamentarios de Galicia in preparation of Galician autonomy in 1977. Because the historical region and contemporary grouping of provinces referred to as Galicia coincide spatially, the idea of where the political entity begins and ends is limited and fixed relatively clearly.

This relatively undisputed territorial area of Galicia was even underlined and presented as an asset in the electoral programme of the AP de Galicia in 1981:


This was despite the fact that there are areas located outside this region which could potentially be claimed to be part of Galicia on cultural and linguistic grounds. An example is the area of El Bierzo, a small northwestern part of the province of Léon, where Galician is spoken by a considerable proportion of the population. There is little enthusiasm to join Galicia there (Fernández de Rota e Monter, 1990), and no attention whatsoever is being paid to making this a political issue among Galician regionalists (interviews, BNG, 2003, 2004). The boundaries of Galicia were not a political issue during the regionalisation debate nor are they challenged in the present discourse of regionalist movements. Cultural and economical ties with Northern Portugal are an even more important topic than relations with areas in neighbouring areas in Spain that could be seen as cultural Galician, such as El Bierzo.

The history of the boundaries of Galicia is thus very stable, with continuous usage of the same boundaries in one administrative region or a group of provinces. Nowadays, the idea that these four provinces constitute the Galician territory is widely accepted. This is illustrated by the description

27 ‘Galicia is the only Autonomous Community that has a defined territorial configuration, without problems or debates about the integration of other territories or neighbouring provinces. It is not, therefore, in principle, a controversial Autonomy, but a stable one, a Community identified within its boundaries’ (translation FS).
of Argentina as *la Quinta Provincia* (‘the fifth province’), referring to its many Galician immigrants (Lugilde, 2003). The (re-)introduction of Galicia as one political and administrative entity in 1981 determined the territorial shape of the region even more specifically. The many initiatives of the Galician authorities to reach the population extend to the present boundaries and not, for instance, to El Bierzo. The *Comunidad Autónoma* of Castile-Léon has no legal status as regards the Galician language, let alone promotional campaigns to stimulate its usage, as in Galicia. This idea of the territorial shape of Galicia is now increasingly reproduced by the usage of maps of Galicia by the large number of new specifically Galician institutions.

This stable idea of the territorial extent of Galicia is reflected by the remarkably even geographical spread of the identification with Galicia (Rivera Otero et al., 1999), and the votes for the *Bloque Nacionalista Galego* (BNG) (in all four provinces between 20.51% and 24.54 % at the 2001 regional elections). At the European elections, the inhabitants of El Bierzo have the opportunity to vote for the BNG because of the uniform lists of candidates in the whole of Spain available at those elections. In the main municipalities of El Bierzo less than 0.5 % of the voters voted for the BNG at the 1999 European elections – considerably less than the results of the Unión del Pueblo Leonés. In the municipalities just across the border in Galicia the BNG received at least 13.5 % of the votes in 1999. It is possible to distinguish spatial concentrations of Galician speakers and BNG voters within Galicia but, unlike many regions with political or cultural regionalism, it is hard to speak of a core-area of regionalism. Regionalism is present in all four provinces, which themselves are relatively unimportant entities. Most institutions are organised regionally, with the provinces functioning at most as sub-divisions. Galicia can be divided into territories based on, for instance, rural and urban areas, or on the rivalry between Vigo and A Coruña, but those do not really challenge the institutional prominence of Galicia.

*The symbolic shape of Galicia*

One of the most important symbols of a region is its name. Even names that have been relatively recently adopted are then often put to use to describe periods during which this name did not yet exist, or was not universally used. In the case of Galicia, the present or a very similar name has been used for a relatively long time. The Roman emperor Augustus created the province Gallaecia in the northwestern part of Hispania, which included the territory of present-day Galicia as well as the entire north of Portugal and Asturias. The name Gallaecia is said to have devolved from the name used by the Greco-Roman geographer Strabo for inhabitants of these parts of the Roman Empire, that is Kallaikoi which means ‘those who live between rocks’ (García Docampo, 2003, p.82, Bermejo et al., 1981, pp.44-45). Galicia, spelled in various ways, was used during the Middle Ages to designate the
kingdom with a territory similar to that of the present region. The names therefore offer plenty of reasons to claim that Galicia has existed as a territory for a long period of time. Doing so not only establishes a link between people and place, but also to a common past of people and place. Such claims have, for example, been made in Historia de Galicia (1838) by Verea y Aguilar, Manuel Murguía’s Historia de Galicia (1865), and A memoria da nación. O reino de Gallaecia (2001) by Camilo Nogueira. Nowadays, the name of Galicia as a territorial symbol is frequently used to define the region as a territorial frame of reference in a variety of dimensions. In 2002, 4.8% of the businesses in the region, had names which included references to Galicia, as opposed to 0.6 with references to Spain (Ardan, 2002). There is some controversy about the region’s name, as there are two alternative ways of spelling the name in Galician: ‘Galicia’ or ‘Galiza’. This difference is related to discussions on Galician spelling in general, but ‘Galiza’ is preferred by most regionalists, while ‘Galicia’ has remained the official name, including in Galician language texts and speeches. Because of the consistent usage of ‘Galicia’ by the regional administrations, that name has remained the most prevalent since regionalisation. By contrast, the usage of ‘Galiza’ has connotations of Galician regionalism or cultural activism.

Landscapes can be significant symbols in relation to a region’s iconography (Paasi, 1997, p.45). Although its forests of eucalyptus trees and rainy climate are fairly typical, the landscape which is focused on predominantly in Galician literature in relation to Galicia is the coast and the sea, often in connection with fishery. This generates an image of Galicia as a maritime region or fishing territory which is then reinforced by the inclusion of ‘maritime’ sections in regional newspapers, providing information on maritime meteorology and fishing ports for all the inhabitants of Galicia. It is in this respect not surprising that the 2002 tragedy with the oil-tanker Prestige, which led to coastal pollution and affected fishing, was regarded in Galicia in particular as a regional disaster and as an attack on the region as a whole. The protest movement Nunca Más (‘never again’ in Galician) made use of the Galician flag with a black instead of a white background.

This type of rugged green coastal landscape is sometimes linked with the landscape found in other regions which is also regarded as ‘Celtic’ (Diaz-Fierros Viqueira, 2004). Celtic myths and legends do figure in Galician iconography, and the folkloristic gaita, Galician bagpipes, stress this link. How-

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29 Similar data in a study by Van Langevelde and Pellenberg (2001) on the usage of business names with references to provinces in the Netherlands showed considerably lower scores, with Zeeland (2.0%), Friesland (1.8%) and Flevoland (1.8%) coming out on top.
ever, compared to Ireland, Wales and Brittany, Galicia is on the periphery of an international Celtic community. Although claims of Celtic roots are sometimes made, this has no political resonance. Moreover, what sets Galicia apart from other ‘Celtic’ regions is that its regional language has no Celtic origins. In itself, Galician, which linguistically is closely related to Portuguese and Spanish, is an important element in the Galician symbolism. A regional language is a regional symbol used intensively by regionalists, and Galicia is no exception. Regionalisation provided an opportunity to raise the status of Galician, and the Estatuto de Autonomía of Galicia gave official status to the language. However, something that was more important was that the text, in Galician, of the Estatuto stresses the symbolic role of Galician as Galicia’s ‘own language’:

1. A língua propia de Galicia é o galego.
2. Os idiomas galego e castelán son oficiais en Galicia e todos teñen o dereito de os coñecer e de os usar. (Estatuto de autonomía de Galicia, 1981).

Galician, as an officially recognised regional language, affirms the status of Galicia alongside the Basque Country and Catalonia in the constitution, being described not just as region but as a ‘nationality’. Moreover, unlike the situation in some of the regions where a regional language is claimed as to be a characteristic distinction, Galician is indeed widely used in the region. However, the use of the language as a symbol or aspect of group identity and of the idea of Galicia as an imagined community are, in reality, no longer necessary preconditions. Research by Tracy Henderson (1996) and Rivera Otero et al. (1999) shows that Galician is regarded as a key element of Galician identity. According to Henderson it is qualified as such by academics, writers and politicians, while Rivera Otero’s survey reveals that the language is referred to most frequently as a fundamental characteristic of Galicia as a region or nation. On signs and advertisements the Galician language is a visible element of the urban landscape, but more as a practical tool of communication rather than an element to which attention is drawn in a systematic flag-waving, intentionally symbolic fashion.

As regards the image of Galicia as a poor region, emigration is perceived as a historical phenomenon characteristic of Galicia and if a principal focus of historical accounts. Many of Galicia’s inhabitants left the poor region for Madrid, Catalonia, Switzerland, Argentina and other destinations. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were more inhabitants from Galicia in Buenos Aires than in any city in Galicia itself (Lugilde, 2003, p.38). The image of Galicia as a region of continuous emigration persists even now that Galicia has experienced a positive migration balance for over a decade. Nev-

30 ‘1. Galician is Galicia’s own language. 2. Galician and Castilian are the official languages of Galician and everyone has the right to learn and use them’ (translation FS).
ertheless, emigration is a constant feature of people’s memories and of practical transcontinental contacts within families. As a key characteristic of Galician history and identity regional authorities have, since the 1980s, shown increasing interest in reviving the memories of emigration in order to bind together a larger ‘supraterritorial’ imagined Galician community. This is demonstrated, for example, by the prominent regional councillor for emigration in the Xunta, and the establishment by the regional government of aid programs for the Galician community in Latin America (Núñez Seixas, 2002). This element has a political side as far as the Galician ‘diaspora’ are concerned since Galicians living abroad are entitled to vote. In fact emigrants make up more than 12% of the electorate and are therefore a force to be reckoned with, especially because many do keep in touch with Galicia and do exercise their right to vote. In fact, 36% of Galicians outside Spain voted in the 2004 Spanish parliamentary elections. Remarkably enough, an even higher percentage (40%) did the same at the 2005 Galician regional elections. The percentage in Argentina alone was 50%. Because of this, party leaders always include trips to places like Argentina and Venezuela in their election campaign schedules.

Galician leaders, especially the President of the Xunta, have made more general trips abroad, especially to South America. As a result, the President himself has become a symbol of Galicia among Galician emigrants, as well as at home, through media attention. Official visits by President Manuel Fraga and audiences with the heads of state of Cuba or Argentina not only boost the stature of the President himself, but also promote Galicia as a state-like entity. For example, during visits to Cuba and the Galician community there in 1991 and 1998, Fraga negotiated the liberation of a number of political prisoners directly with Fidel Castro, who is himself of Galician ancestry, and welcomed him to Castro’s ‘native’ Galicia in 1992. Although Santiago de Compostela, as a pilgrims’ destination and religious centre, was known a symbol of Galicia as well as of Spain, regionalisation provided the city with a new role of regional capital. Previously, Galicia did not have a capital and there was some competition between A Coruña and Santiago de Compostela. In the end, Santiago de Compostela was chosen as the administrative and political centre of the region. Another, more obvious symbol used by the regional administration is the Galician flag which flies on regional government buildings and whose white and light-blue colours are used in the omnipresent logo of the Xunta. As is the case with the region’s name, an alternative is used by leftist regionalists, namely the same flag but then with an additional red five-pointed star as a reference to the communist influence of the movement.
Figure 5.1 Galician flags: At a PSdeG-PSOE meeting; the regionalist version with five-pointed star; and the version used in the ‘Nunca Más’ campaign after the Prestige oil tanker tragedy.

**Galician institutionalisation**

**Galician language**

As mentioned above, in order to serve as a tool for regionalist movements and regional identity builders, a regional symbol such as a regional language does not need to be spoken as an everyday language by the whole, or even a large part of the regional population. However, the regional language is relatively widespread in Galicia. As a language that is linguistically relatively close to Spanish, Galician is easily understood, but is also spoken by almost the entire population (table 5.1). In 1998, 99% of the inhabitants of Galicia understood Galician, and 89% were also able to speak the language. Those skills have remained fairly stable since 1984, just after the moment of regionalisation. On the other hand, writing and reading skills have developed spectacularly between 1984 and 1998. Galician is the ‘habitual’ language of almost 70% of the population (O’Rourke, 2003), and still has a relatively strong position in Galician society, with a considerable production of literature and even scientific publications in Galician.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1 Knowledge of Galician, %</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding, speaking and writing or reading</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding and speaking</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding but not speaking</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not understanding</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Siguán Soler, 1999, author’s elaboration.

Regionalisation meant that Galician was adopted as an official language for Galicia in the *Estatuto de Autonomía*, with an officially bilingual regional authority implementing so-called ‘normalisation’ policies aimed at promoting
the usage of Galician at all levels of society. The ‘Lei de normalización lingüística’, passed by the Parlamento de Galicia in 1983, serves as a foundation for this policy. Although it was adopted by a Parliament in which only four of the 71 seats were occupied by regionalists, its goal of promoting the Galician language was very clear. In Galician, the preamble clearly stresses the importance of Galician for a Galician collective identity:

A Constitución de 1978, ó reconece-los nosos dereitos autonómicos como nacionalidade histórica, fíxoo posible a posta en marcha dun esforzo constructivo encamiñado á plena recuperación da nosa personalidade colectiva e da súa potencialidade creadora. Un dos factores fundamentais desa recuperación é a língua, por se-lo núcleo vital da nosa identidade. A língua é a maior e máis orixinal creación colectiva dos galegos, é a verdadeira forza spiritual que lle dá unidade interna á nosa comunidade. Úmenos co pasado do noso pobo, porque del a recibimos como patrimonio vivo, e uniramos co seu futuro, porque a recibirá de nós como legado da identidade común. E na Galicia do presente serve de vínculo esencial entre os galegos afincados na terra native e os galegos emigrados polo mundo31. (Cited in Monteagudo & Bouzada Fernández, 2002a, p.51).

This law was the start of a continuous presence of ‘linguistic policy’ aimed at ‘normalisation of Galician’ within the Xunta. According to Monteagudo and Bouzada Fernández (2002a, pp.55-56) this was part of the democratisation process and a break with Francoism. In this sense, Galicia underwent the same developments as in other regions, most notably Catalonia. This context facilitated widespread support for the Galician language. Indeed, in their political programmes32 for the 1981 regional elections, all major political parties stressed their dedication not just to a legal official status for Galician, but also to its active stimulation, especially through education. In fact, the only opposition to the ‘Lei de normalización lingüística’ came from the BNPG-PSG, which considered the proposal too modest—as had been the case in the referendum on Galician autonomy. However, because its three members of the Parliament of Galicia were expelled after refusing to take the oath of respect

31 ‘The Constitution of 1978, that recognises our autonomous rights as historical nationality, makes it possible to start a constructive effort leading to the full recovery of our collective personality and its creative potential. One of the fundamental factors of this recovery is the language, because it is the vital core of our identity. The language is the greatest and most original collective creation of the Galicians, it is the true spiritual force that gives internal unity to our community. It unites us with the past of our people, because of that we receive it as living heritage, and will unite us with its future, because it will receive it of us as legacy of a common identity. And in the present Galicia it serves as essential link between the Galicians bound to the native land and the Galicians emigrated over the world’ (translation FS).
to the Constitution, the law was passed unanimously. This unanimity as regards the objectives of linguistic policy in its most general terms, that is the ‘normalisation’ of Galician, does not rule out political conflicts and differences as regards implicit objectives. Whereas the AP and PP dominate regional governments whose aim is to avoid social conflicts and ‘harmonious bilingualism’ (Monteagudo & Bouzada Fernández, 2002a), the socialist and regionalist opposition, in the first place the BNG, is in favour of positive discrimination policies in favour of Galician in some instances (interview, Xunta de Galicia, 2003).

However, the participants in this debate are actors other than parliamentarians, government and political parties. A large number of organisations concerned with the Galician language have emerged, in addition to those that existed before 1981. These range from the Asociación Gallega para la Libertad del Idoma (1988) which defends the position of Castilian in Galicia via the moderate Real Academia Galega (1906), the Instituto da Língua Galega (1971), the Consello da Cultura Galega (1983), and Coordinadora de Traballadores da Normalización da Língua (1996), to A Mesa pola Normalización Lingüística (1986), Nova Escola Galega (1988), and Asociación Galega da Língua (1981) which defends and promotes the Galician language. Some of these are closely linked to the Xunta and are involved in implementing its language policies, while others came about due to the dissatisfaction with the regional government’s policies and have links with the regionalist opposition.

The regional government distinguishes three main fields of action for the stimulation of the Galician language, namely administration, education and the media. The regional government authorities themselves now primarily use Galician in communication with citizens through publications, forms, documents, etc. This practice has clearly become more common during the last two decades. Galician has become the dominant language used within the Xunta especially as regards written communication, while there has been less of an increase in its informal oral usage (interview, Xunta de Galicia, 2003). Galician language abilities are a criterion for the selection of civil servants, and citizens have the right to use Galician when dealing with regional authorities. Galician has become the most commonly used language in administrative circles and in Galician politics. Generally, public speeches, debates in the Parliament of Galicia, and announcements by public authorities are made mostly in Galician (Monteagudo & Bouzada Fernández, 2002a). Taking this as norm, the BNG’s leader Xosé Manuel Beiras even spoke in French during a session of the Galician Parliament, as a reaction to the use of Spanish by Mariano Rajoy of the PP, which Beiras interpreted as implying the right to use a ‘foreign language’ (Lugilde, 2001, pp.190-191).

In Galicia the regional government’s office of language policy is part of the department of education, and not of that of culture, as in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Legally the usage of Galician in education has been promoted using three steps. In 1983, the Galician Parliament passed a law
making Galician a primary and secondary education subject, although with the same status as foreign languages. In 1988, it became possible to use Galician as the vernacular language in some subjects, and from 1995 on, primary teachers were expected to use the predominant maternal language in class, that is either Galician or Spanish, while in secondary education the subject of social sciences and natural sciences were to be taught in Galician. Since 1993, Galician or Spanish can be used at universities. All the universities in Galicia have bureaus for the ‘normalisation’ of Galician, and the Xunta promotes the usage of Galician at universities with campaigns, for instance using posters which encourage students to write their thesis in Galician. According to a study by Monteagudo and Bouzada Fernández (2002b), the position of Galician in education has changed significantly in the past twenty years, with the primary cause being the introduction of a legal framework stimulating the use of Galician in education. Galician is usually used in around 30% of primary schools, as opposed to 40% at which Spanish is used, although there are variations between the school years (Monteagudo & Bouzada Fernández, 2002b, p.118). However, as an official of the Xunta confirms, the actual situation is still ‘quite far off’ the goal of parity as regards the use of Galician and Spanish (interview, Xunta de Galicia, 2003).

Table 5.2 Knowledge of Galician language, per age group, 1998, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-44</th>
<th>45-54</th>
<th>55-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understand, speak, read and write</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand, speak and write</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand and speak</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only understand</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Understanding</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The effect of the presence of the regional language in education is shown by an analysis of the language skills per age group (table 5.2). The cross-table clearly shows that knowledge of the Galician language is highest amongst the younger generations. This applies especially to reading and writing skills, aspects of a language particularly learned at school. According to Monteagudo and Núñez Seixas (2001) this hides the fact that the number of people with Galicia as their first or maternal language is steadily decreasing. In rural areas many still learn Galician from their parents, and rely on other sources, like school and television, to learn Spanish. However, in urban areas in particular, parents choose to teach their children Spanish first, motivated by the perception of Spanish as being a more useful language. This development is certainly not related to the moment of regionalisation, nor does it date from thereafter. Although figures of language abilities do not reveal their actual usage in everyday life and the environment in which the language
was learned, Galician education will have played a role in countering a decline in the use of the language in urban areas.

The third pillar of the linguistic policy of the Xunta, the mass media, shows different developments in different sectors. The diffusion of Galician through newspapers has remained at an extremely low level. The only daily newspaper in Galicia is Galicia Hoxe ("Galicia Today"), named O Correo Galego until 2003. This is the sister daily of the Spanish language El Correo Gallego, whose Galician version was founded in 1994 and has maintained a low circulation. In fact, it can only survive because of subsidies from the Xunta (interview, 2003) as part of their linguistic policy. All other regional and local newspapers in Galicia have kept to Spanish, although the largest regional newspaper, the Voz de Galicia, does not translate quotes by people speaking in Galician. The Xunta also initiated the establishment of audiovisual media, but with more success. In 1985 it founded the public Televisión de Galicia (TVG) and Radio Galega, which broadcasted in Galician. Unlike Galicia Hoxe, TVG reaches the general public, with an audience share in 2002 of 20.2%, making it the second most viewed station in Galicia after the state-wide TVE-1 (El País, 2003, p.253). In general, the usage of Galician in mass media relies, to a large extent, on public rather than private initiatives. One sign that this might be changing is the large increase in Galician language commercials instead of Spanish ones since the late 1990s (Ledo Andión, 2000).

Besides the stimulation of the knowledge and usage of Galician, the image of the regional language has changed since regionalisation. As mentioned above, Galician was, until the 1980s, mainly a rural language with low social status and hardly any application in formal situations. Although Galician is still predominantly used outside the main cities, its image has changed significantly. The adoption of Galician as an official language in Galicia, its new role as a language of education, administration and the media, and its dominant position within the Galician political arena have hugely improved the prestige of Galician (Beswick, 2002, Iglesias Álvarez, 2002). One illustrative is that Xunta officials normally use Spanish when speaking informally, but resort to Galician when writing or for formal use (interview, Xunta de Galicia, 2003).

Regional media
The continuous confirmation of a particular language is obviously not the only important role of mass media. However, the media do focus on events taking place somewhere and are in this way vehicles for the spread of a territory as a spatial frame of reference and the institutionalisation of a region. A large number of regional, local and state-wide newspapers are available in Galicia.

The Faro de Vigo is the oldest existing newspaper in Spain. This is an urban newspaper aimed at readers in Vigo and the province of Pontevedra.
The newspaper with by far the highest circulation in Galicia is the *Voz de Galicia*, read in all provinces, as is the *Correo Gallego*. In Galicia regional and local newspapers are read much more than state-wide ones. The circulation of newspapers in general has increased between 1976 and 1999. However, when divided into categories of regional, local (urban and provincial) and state-wide newspapers, it appears that the growth of the regional newspapers is the strongest, especially after 1982 (figure 5.2). Proportionally, the growth of the state-wide newspapers is larger than that of local newspapers, but this is largely because of the rise in circulation of one particular newspaper, namely *El País*, that was founded in 1976 and whose circulation has grown strongly in the whole of Spain since then.

Figure 5.2 Development of daily newspaper circulation in Galicia, 1976-1999

![Circulation Graph](image)


The content of regional newspapers has changed as well according to an analysis of a sample of editions of the two largest newspapers in Galicia, the *Voz de Galicia* and *Faro de Vigo*, with a combined portion of the daily newspaper readership (not counting sports dailies) of 61% in 1996. All editions of those newspapers issued in the first week of May between 1975 and 2000 were analysed, on the basis of five year intervals (see Annex D). Picking the same period for all years allows a comparison without any season-specific aspects affecting the outcome. The selected week in May avoids any election campaigns in those years, which would arguably have serious consequences for the amount of attention in the news for a particular area. In general, both newspapers showed increased attention for news in Galicia during this period, and relatively less for foreign news and news from other
part s of Spain. During the 1980s, in particular, the number of pages dedicated to Spain dropped, with a huge growth in Galician news. This continued into the 1990s, although in that period the amount of local news, at the level of the provinces, comarcas or municipalities, grew as well. This division, and the territory under which an article is labelled in the newspaper is, of course, a choice made by the editors of the newspaper themselves. An examination of content showed that, in 1975 and 1980, a lot of articles in the ‘Galicia’ section covered events or news from various places within the region, but without any regional scope. By contrast, many of the articles in the ‘local’ sections in later years focused more broadly on Galicia, from the political, social and cultural point of view. In this respect, the establishment of the Galician Parliament and government meant a huge shift from reports on events just happening somewhere in the region to (political) news affecting the region as a whole. One illustration of the increased adoption of Galicia as a territorial frame of reference in those newspapers is the territories used for the weather maps. Until 1990, both newspapers only showed Spain or Western Europe and the Atlantic on their weather maps while, in 1995 and 2000, the most prominent map showed the weather forecasts for Galicia, with Spain and the Atlantic Ocean on smaller maps.

The Estatuto de Autonomía of Galicia explicitly mentions the possibility for the government of the Comunidad Autónoma to create a specifically Galician television and radio station. TVG was indeed created as a public broadcasting station by the Galician authorities in 1985. According to Ledo Andión, the decision-making capacity of the regional government was a key element in the creation of a regional television station (1998, p.361), with it acquiring an increasing role as an instrument by which to defend the Galician identity and ‘cultural and linguistic normalisation’ (Ledo Andión, 2001). In brief, prominent regional newspapers and a television station reproduce a sense of regional consciousness, and inform the regional population about regional politics. Both types of regional media do indeed pay substantial amounts of attention to the regional political arena, and present national or more general news and politics in a regional perspective.

Regional identity in Galicia

The changes in the institutionalisation of Galicia as described above are not matched by equal changes in the identification of the inhabitants of Galicia with their region relative to their identification with Spain (see table 5.3). According to these survey results from the CIS and the University of Santiago’s Barómetro Galego only a fraction of the Galician population does not identify themselves as Galician at all. On the other hand, those that do not see themselves as Spanish at all, but as Galician instead, also make up just 10% or less of the population. This means that more than 85% of the inhabitants of Galicia regard a Galician and Spanish identity as complementary. Within that
large group, most also do not prioritise their Galicianness or Spanishness either. However, of those that do so, the percentage that put their Galician identity first is much larger than the small group that considers themselves Spanish in the first place. In other words, for most people Galician and Spanish identities are not mutually exclusive, with more emphasis being placed on one’s Galician identity than on one’s Spanish identity. By and large, this has been the case during the whole period since regionalisation, with only minor deviations. There has been a slight decrease in the number of people identifying with Spain alone or primarily, and a similar small increase in those who consider themselves equally Galician and Spanish. These changes were considerable between 1980 and 1984, although this might be partly due to different categories included in the questionnaire. However, on the whole, Spanish and Galician identifications have remained rather stable.

Table 5.3 Spanish and Galician identities, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish not Galician</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish than Galician</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Spanish and Galician</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Galician than Spanish</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galician not Spanish</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 469, 2,671, 2,125, 2,147, 3,213, 590


Question asked: “¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases se identifica Ud. en mayor medida? Me siento...español que gallego.”

Table 5.4 Preference for using the term ‘nation’ or ‘region’ when describing Galicia, 2002, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>69.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of those</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 606

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2002, author’s elaboration.

Question asked: “¿Qué término prefiere utilizar Vd. para referirse a su Comunidad Autónoma? ¿Es una región o una nación?”

Although most people in Galicia feel equally Galician and Spanish, or Galician in the first place, the percentage of people that prefer to describe Galicia as a nation rather than a region is small (Table 5.4). Galicia is seen by most of its inhabitants as a region and less as a nation. This is despite the fact that the BNG calls Galicia (or ‘Galiza’ in their words) a nation, are themselves generally called nationalists, and have obtained nearly 25% of the votes in Galicia at regional elections. Apparently, the fact that most people in Galicia do not agree with them on this basic issue does not prevent a num-
ber of them from voting for a ‘nationalist’ party. It should be noted that this question does impose a dichotomy where it might not exist, since the concepts of region and nation might well overlap. The significant difference between both preferences is clear enough, however, to conclude that some do not accept the claims that Galicia is a nation based on the subjective criteria of its population, most of whom consider themselves to be Galician.

5.4 A Galician political arena

**Turnout at elections**

The adoption of an administrative and political role of a region after regionalisation does not automatically make it a political space, a territorial framework for political debate and legitimate decision-making. The emergence of a region as a separate political arena implies an appreciation of the impact of the regional political debate and the decisions taken by its authorities compared with political arenas at other spatial levels. It involves the regionalisation of politics in the actions and minds of political actors, professional onlookers and the *demos*.

Figure 5.3 Turnout at regional and national elections

![Turnout at elections graph](image)

Source: Ministerio del Interior, Argos.

In a democracy, elections are usually the cyclically returning moments of political climax. The turnout at political elections is a standard indicator of how the population views the importance and legitimacy of the elections and the level of government concerned. Traditionally, Galicia has very
high abstention rates. Indeed, at the first post-Franco general elections, Galicia had by far the lowest turnout of all Spanish regions. Contrary to trends in most West-European countries, the turnout figures for the general, regional and municipal elections have increased consistently since the first post-Franco elections (figure 5.3). Although there is no great difference, the increase in the turnout at regional elections is sharper than that at general elections. According to Rivera Otero (2003) there are a number of reasons for this, all of which are related to the introduction of a regional government; the enlarging autonomy and extension of public policies of the Xunta, and the own dynamic of regional institutions, including the fact that political party competition increased together with the turnout figures. If the abstention rates are a measure of the degree to which a level of government is taken seriously by the population of voting age, then the legitimacy of the Galician political arena can be regarded as nearly as high as that of the Spanish one.

Media attention for regional politics

Apart from the turnout figures, the focus of election campaigns tells us a lot about the presence of a separate political arena. In that respect the regional elections in Galicia can be said to be to a large extended events with their own agenda and stakes, especially since the emergence of a three party system. Because of the important position of the President of the Xunta, the regional elections have effectively become presidential elections. During their campaigns, most parties put forward their leader as a ‘candidate for the presidency’ no matter whether they have a realistic chance or not. As a result, the election campaigns are dominated by regional political figures, and not so much by political leaders from Madrid. At least within Galicia the impact of the regional elections is not restricted to an opinion poll on the popularity of the state-wide government, as is often the case at local and regional elections. This impact is heightened by the existence of regional media with a wide audience, which devote a lot of time and space to the regional elections. The dominant newspaper in the region, La Voz de Galicia, and others as well, fill special sections on regional election campaigns weeks in advance. However, national newspapers like El País and El Mundo also treat regional elections as important political events in their own right, especially those in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia which decide their own election dates, unlike the regional elections in the rest of the regions which are held at the same day and are therefore more likely opportunities for an interim assessment of the national government. During the 1990s, the repeated victorious comebacks of Manuel Fraga, branded the ‘electoral magician’, gave the Galician elections a profile of their own as well (Lugilde, 2001).
Whereas the indicators above examine the region as an arena of political debate, party political debate is just one side of the coin. Apart from being an arena of political debate, a political region is a decision-making arena as well. This means that, policy impact is also important. Because we are interested in the perception of the region as an important political arena, a subjective notion of policy impact is most relevant. In 1980, before the establishment of a regional level of government in Galicia, a considerable number of the region’s inhabitants were sceptical of the impact on them of the policies made at both the most important levels of government at the time, namely the state and the local level. Of the two, the state government was seen as affecting the respondents the most. Now the state has lost that position, having been superseded not only by government at local level but at regional level as well. On the whole, the assessment of the impact of governing authorities at all levels has increased. In relative terms the state has lagged behind in the perception of the Galicians, making ‘Madrid’ not only distant in a physical sense, but also with regard to the effect of the political decision made there. This does not necessarily mean that the state government is regarded as unimportant, but rather that most concrete decisions affecting peoples’ lives are now perceived to be taken by the Xunta de Galicia and the municipal council.

Table 5.5 Impact of Spanish regional and local government on respondent’s well-being, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
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<td>92</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td>712</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Question asked: “¿Hasta qué punto: mucho, bastante, poco o nada, cree Ud. que las decisiones del Gobierno Central afectan a su bienestar y al de su familia?”

Regionalisation of political parties

The party system is an important factor in the construction of the region as a political arena, separate from the political arena of the state as a whole. The existence of specifically regional parties, and the degree of regionalisation of state-wide parties within the region are influential for the emergence and indicative of the existence of a distinct regional political arena. At present,
Galicia effectively has a three party system, with a regionalist (BNG), social-democratic Partido Socialista de Galicia-PSOE (PSdeG-PSOE), and a conservative party Partido Popular de Galicia (PPdeG). Generally speaking, this three party system has been around since the introduction of the regional Parliament in 1981, although smaller fourth, fifth and sixth parties also had one or a couple of seats until 1993. More importantly, the position of third major party alongside the PSdeG-PSOE and PPdeG was taken up successively by the state-wide UCD (1981-1985), the regionalist Coalición Galega (1985-1989), and the BNG (1989-present). None of the regionalist parties in Galicia ever came close to actually winning the regional elections, as the CiU in Catalonia and the PNV in the Basque Country have done consistently. The Galician sections of the PSOE and PP are part of a larger structure, the state-wide parties with headquarters in Madrid. An examination of those parties and their regional sections in the whole of Spain shows that the PSOE certainly started much earlier with the regionalisation of its party structure and with the assigning of more organisational leeway to its regional sections than the PP.

In Galicia the situation is somewhat different, mainly because of the unique position of the PPdeG. From the first years of post-Franco democracy onwards, Galicia has been an electoral and personal base of the Spanish Alianza Popular and its founder Manual Fraga came from the region. The victory at the regional elections in 1981 gave the party its first taste of what it is like to govern. This position in government was an incentive to adopt a relatively emancipated position as regards the directive bodies in Madrid in order to formulate and execute specifically Galician policies. It also provided the expertise and organisational power to enforce this (Lagares Díez, 1999, p.283). The almost continuous coalescence with the governing power of the AP and later PP in Galicia facilitated the evolution of a strongly regionally organised PPdeG which was relatively autonomous from the Spanish PP. Sometimes, specific proposals, such as that of an Administración Única (‘Single Administration’) based on a principle of subsidiarity, went against the directives and ideas of the PP in Madrid (Lagares Díez, 2003, p.74). This considerable degree of latitude was also supported by the fact that the Spanish PP was in opposition for a long time. Thus, the PPdeG had room to manoeuvre as regards formulating policies from a specifically Galician perspective and, by doing so, it opposed the PSOE government of Felipe González in Madrid. This changed when Aznar became President in 1993. An evolution towards a stronger grip on the party by Aznar, with the aim being to standardise the organisation of regional sections of the PP, and a more and more centralist orientation towards the Spanish state, became increasingly paradoxical with a more and more autonomist tendency in Galicia (Lagares Díez, 2003, p.96).

Formally, the PSdeG-PSOE is more independent from the Spanish party than de PPdeG. In fact, the PSOE is formally a federation of regional
parties, each with their own presidency and congress. In Galicia the main bodies of the regional organisation are the Comisión Executiva Nacional Galega and Comité Nacional Galego, with 'national' referring to Galicia. In the organisational structure the provincial level is unimportant, regarded only as legally imposed constituencies (interview, PSdeG-PSOE, 2004). In contrast to de PPdeG, de PSdeG-PSOE had to establish a regional organisation to function as an opposition party, while the PSOE was the governing party in Madrid for most of the 1980s. According to Jiménez Sánchez an important obstacle for the formulation of a 'common project' for Galicia by the PSdeG was also the influence of the local power bases of the PSOE, the large cities, and the direct relationships of those local leaders with the Spanish government (2003, pp.294-295). As with federal states, federalisation can be regarded as a method to protect the autonomy of the smaller entities, but also as a unifying principle. According to one PSdeG-PSOE representative: “Sí, obviamente que el Partido Socialista de Galicia tiene autonomía para defender sus posiciones y no tienen que ser siempre coincidentes con las del PSOE. Pero si tienen que ser convergentes” (interview, PSdeG-PSOE, 2003). But according to another PSOE representative such debates are frequently held internally, but never publicly (interview, PSdeG-PSOE, 2004).

In Galicia, the party system has, in relative terms, become quite strongly regionalised. In the case of the PSOE this is shown by a relatively independent organisation from the formal point of view, while the PP has a differentiated regional discourse. Both parties also have Galician sections or informal factions of Galician deputados in the congress in Madrid, and regular meetings are held of Galician parliamentarians in the Galician and Spanish parliaments, to facilitate cooperation and ensure that Galician interests are made known in Madrid (interviews, PSdeG-PSOE, PPdeG, 2003, 2004). This is in line with the development in other aspects of a distinct Galician political arena, with its own political actors and media attention, and adapted political proposals and programmes.

5.5 Political regionalism in Galicia after regionalisation

Preferences for regional autonomy

The gradual emergence of Galicia as a distinct political space, through turnout at elections, media attention, political party organisation and public opinion, suggests a certain degree of legitimacy for Galicia as a level of government. This is confirmed by CIS surveys on preferences of Galicians for the territorial organisation of the Spanish state since 1979 (table 5.6). Since the

33 ‘Yes, obviously the Partido Socialista de Galicia has autonomy to defend its points of view that need not always coincide with those of the PSOE. However they have to be convergent' (translation FS).
introduction of regional government in Galicia and the rest of Spain, the preference for a centralised state has gradually decreased. An overwhelming majority of the population favours some form of regional autonomy, and only a small proportion of the population want to abolish the Xunta and Galician Parliament. At the other end of the spectrum, demands for Galician independence are even more marginal, having remained stable since regionalisation. At the same time, a considerable and growing percentage of the population prefers an arrangement with more powerful regions or a federal state. There appears to be considerable support for the Estado de las Autonomías in Galicia, that has grown since regionalisation. Moreover, there is a trend towards a preference for more powerful regions, although regionalisation has certainly not caused an increased demand for independence. Although this survey question focuses on the preferences for the organisation of the state in general, rather than Galicia’s level of autonomy in particular, almost exactly the same result was produced when the same question was posed in relation to the respondent’s own region in 1996. This suggests that people do have their own region in mind when answering the question. The main difference was that when asked about their direct preferences for Galicia, slightly more respondents preferred the categories of higher autonomy, increased autonomy or independence. However, this more specific question still confirms the low demand in Galicia for full independence, even if formulated invitingly as the ability to ‘exercise the right to self-determination’. It seems safe to say that regionalisation has not stimulated separatism in public opinion in Galicia.

Table 5.6 Preferences for the organisation of the state, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralised state</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Actual level of autonomy)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlarged autonomy/ Federalism</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to independence</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The demand for more or less autonomy for Galicia has been investigated using a different type of question which asks specifically about wishes for more or less regional autonomy (table 5.7) The formulation used in the 1980s leaves some room for interpretation in that it is unclear whether the question refers to the respondent’s recollection his or her thoughts at the moment of regionalisation, or his or her opinion at the moment of the interview. What the answers do show is that there was not much support in Galicia for the idea that regionalisation had gone too far. Most people thought the level of autonomy obtained was about right, or should have been higher. The second group is by far the larger one, expressing a demand
for increased regional autonomy. If the formulation of the question allows for the observation of a trend in this demand for more autonomy, this demand weakened during the period after regionalisation, while the group satisfied with the level of autonomy grew in size.

Table 5.7 Is regional autonomy obtained more or less than wished for?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1988</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>36.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>54.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>Missing</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Question asked: “Para Usted personalmente, ¿la autonomía conseguida por Galicia es mayor, igual o menor que la que Usted hubiera deseado?”

Table 5.8 Preferences for increase or decrease of regional autonomy, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td>3,213</td>
<td>1,204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Question: “¿Y a Usted, personalmente, le gustaría que el grado de autonomía de Galicia fuera mayor, menor o igual de lo que es?”

In the 1990s, the question was reformulated to focus directly and more clearly on the wish for more or less autonomy for Galicia (table 5.8). This produced another trend, with an increase in the support for more autonomy, by far the most popular option in all years, and a decrease to just 3 of those who thought Galicia’s autonomy should be reduced. Although the questions in tables 5.8 and 5.9 were formulated differently, there appears to have been a steady decline in the number of people who prefer a centralised state, as well as a more stable preference of a majority of the population for increased regional autonomy.

**Elections and regionalism**

If electoral results are taken as an indicator for the developments of regionalism in a region, attention is logically drawn to the performances of regionalist parties. In Galicia such parties are clearly distinguished from the other parties and usually refer to themselves as nationalists. Coalición Galega, Esquerda Galega and Bloque Nacionalista Galego have been the main parties over the past
few decades. The election results in Galicia of those regionalist parties, and of the state-wide parties PP, PSOE, UCD, Centro Democrático y Social, Izquierda Unida and the Partido Comunista de España are shown in table 5.9 and 5.10.

Table 5.9 Election results in Galicia, General elections, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>G77</th>
<th>G79</th>
<th>G82</th>
<th>G86</th>
<th>G89</th>
<th>G93</th>
<th>G96</th>
<th>G00</th>
<th>G04</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>48.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCD</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EG</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ministerio del Interior, Argos, own elaboration. Percentages of total valid votes cast.

- Until 1989 the AP, in 1979 running as Coalición Democrática and in '85 and '86 as Coalición Popular.
- Until 1989 the Partido Comunista. From 1993 to 1996 in coalition with EG.
- Until 1981 as BNPG, and in 1982 in coalition with PSG.
- In 1977 the PSG, in 1979 Unidade Galega, and from 1985 to 1989 as EG-PSG.
- In 1989 in coalition with PNG.

Table 5.10 Election results in Galicia, Regional elections, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R81</th>
<th>R85</th>
<th>R89</th>
<th>R93</th>
<th>R97</th>
<th>R01</th>
<th>R05</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>45.2</td>
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<td>PSOE</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCD</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNG</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
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<tr>
<td>EG</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ministerio del Interior, Argos, own elaboration. Percentages of total valid votes cast.

- Until 1989 the AP, and in 1985 as Coalición Popular.
- Until 1989 the Partido Comunista. From 1993 to 1996 in coalition with EG.
- In 1981 in coalition with PSG.
- From 1985 to 1989 as EG-PSG.
- In 1989 in coalition with PNG.
The hegemonic position of the PP has become stronger at nearly every election. Only in the first few years after the transition to democracy was this position held by the UCD in Galicia, as was the case in Spain as a whole. The PP has been counting on winning the elections in Galicia for some time now and, for the time being, there do not seem to be any serious challengers. At regional elections it has obtained absolute majorities since 1993. Paradoxically, this has also proven to be its main weakness. Because the PSOE and BNG have no real chance of governing Galicia by winning the elections on their own, they are forced to rely on each other. Because of that, the most they can hope for is for the PP to fail to win an absolute majority, and for the formation of a governing coalition, despite ideological differences. This is what happened at the regional elections of 2005, when the emigrant votes in the constituency Pontevedra tipped the balance, denying the PP an absolute majority, and giving Manuel Fraga a fifth presidency.

The PSdeG-PSOE has never had any prospects of winning the elections, although their firm position as the second largest party did gain them the presidency of the Xunta between 1987 and 1990. Given the gradual disappearance of the UCD, the PSdeG has been in a constant downwards spiral, especially at regional elections. The erosion of the PSOE’s position in the Spanish central government, the weak leadership in Galicia, and above all the continuous internal struggle, which become evident during electoral campaigns, were at the root of this trend (Máiz, 1994, Jiménez Sánchez, 2003). Rivera Otero (2003) adds to this the notorious problems the PSdeG-PSOE has formulating a common project for Galicia. At the last regional elections, in 2001, the party recovered slightly when, for the first time, they managed to present a coherent programme clearly aimed at Galicia (Rivera Otero, 2003, pp.394). This approach was maintained, yielding much better election results, and the regional presidency, in 2005.

Other state-wide parties have played minor roles in the recent history of Galicia. The UCD disappeared as suddenly from the Galician scene as it did in Spain after the departure of its leader Adolfo Suárez revealed the party’s ideological disunity. The Centro Democrático y Social founded by Suárez never became a true force in Spain or in Galicia. The Partido Comunista de España did play a significant role in the elections in Spain, as does its successor, Izquierda Unida. In Galicia, the Spanish radical left has never scored a good election result, only winning one seat at the 1981 regional elections.

BNG has clearly been the hegemonic force among the regionalist parties since the 1990s. In terms of ideological influence and number of militants it was an important party before then, but from the point of view of elections it remained a small party during the 1980s. If we apply this division into regionalist and state-wide parties and examine the trends of both categories, no spectacular development is visible. The state-wide parties have always won the major part of the votes. At both types of elections, the share of the regionalist parties in the vote is increasing slowly, with the largest in-
creases at general elections. During this period there was a distinct growth in the number of votes for the whole regionalist party family until the mid-1980s, followed by a period of consolidation and a slight decline until 1993, followed by another period of regionalist growth after that.

However, such a crude regionalist versus state-wide party dichotomy hides a number of developments. If we examine the electoral trends of the main parties of Galicia separately, combined with the programmatical differences and trends that will be discussed below, a somewhat different and more complex picture emerges. Within the family of regionalist parties different parties have provided the bulk of the votes in different periods. The growth in the 1980s can mainly be attributed to the Coalición Galega (CG) while, in the 1990s, the BNG adopted that role. As the BNG had a much stronger regionalist programme than the CG, despite its own discursive moderation, we can say that there has been a steady electoral strengthening of regionalism in Galicia. This has been not the electoral rise of one party during the whole period, but an evolution from weak election results for regionalists in the late 1970s and early 1980s, via the rise of the moderate regionalist CG, to the growth in the 1990s of the BNG.

As can be expected, regionalist parties have scored considerably better results at regional elections than at national elections. Regionalist parties can adapt to campaigns in which regional issues and interests dominate more readily than to state-wide election campaigns focused on national and international issues. In Galicia regional elections have certainly presented opportunities for regional debates. However, not only did the BNG perform better at regional elections in Galicia, the PP generally performed better at regional elections than at Spanish elections as well, as can be seen in table 5.10. In contrast, the PSOE obtained considerably better election results at national elections than at regional elections. Two explanations can be given for this difference between PP and PSOE performance at regional elections. In the first place the BNG, as a left-wing party, is a more natural competitor of the PSOE than of the PP. Moreover, a change based on strategy or something else in the number of people voting socialist at national level and regionalist at regional elections is more likely than between the BNG and the PP. Secondly, as will be discussed below, the PP invested much more in creating a Galician image of the party than the PSOE did in Galicia, certainly up till the mid-1990s. According to a CIS survey of 1992 (Rivera Otero, 2003) and a 1999 Barómetro Galego (Rivera Otero et al, 1999), the PP was indeed regarded as a more Galician 'nationalist' party than the PSOE.

Regionalism and political programmes

Regionalist parties
There are a large number of regionalist parties in Galicia. However, an even larger number has disappeared over time, especially if one includes the par-
ties and movements within umbrella organisations or ‘fronts’, such as the BNG and the Unidade Galega, and the fringe parties that do not always participate in elections. However, only one has been ever-present at elections during the entire period since regionalisation, namely the BNG. It has clearly been the most important regionalist party during the period since regionalisation. Two other regionalist parties also deserve some attention, namely the Coalición Galega and the Esquerda Galega (EG). The first because of the impact it had on Galician politics during a short period in the second half of the 1980s. The second because it has participated consistently at elections and in Parliament for over a decade, before being incorporated into the BNG.

**Bloque Nacionalista Galego**
The BNG – and the organisations it originated from – have formed the dominant regionalist party of Galicia during recent decades. In the first instance only in terms of membership, militancy and ideological influence. However, since 1989 it has also been dominant as regards electoral support. In this period, the BNG has clearly transformed itself ideologically. In its initial phase, the UPG’s aim was to construct a Communist Galician state (Barreiro Rivas, 2003, p.129). It based its nationalist ideology on the principle of national self-determination (‘autodeterminación’), with independence as, in principle, its ultimate goal (Beramendi & Nuñez Seixas, 1996, pp.225-228). In the years during which the first democratic elections were held, the ANP G and BNPG still focused on the Galician right to national self-determination and sovereignty, although without any direct mention of full independence (BNPG, 1979, Bloque (ANPG/UPG)-PSG, 1981). The BNPG rejected any plans for regionalisation and decentralisation of the existing state, and its aim was to cause a complete rupture before reformulating some type of association between different parts of the state, as in its Bases Constitucionais da Nación Galega – like all its programmes written in Galician:

1. Rotura da estructura unitaria do Estado Español, co establecemento dun Goberno Provisorio Galego. 2. Convocatoria por éste a unhas eleccións dunha Asamblea Constituínte de Galicia encargada de elaborar unha Constitución axustada a nosa realidade nacional. 3. Esta Constitución elaborada dacordo co proxecto das Bases Constitucionais parte do reconocemento de que a soberanía política de Galicia reside no Pobo Galego, e contempla a posibilidade de establecer relacións en pé de igualdade cos restantes nacións que boce forman o Estado Español e dentro dun pacto político supranacional 34 (Bloque Nacional Popular Galego, 1979).

34 ‘1. Break-up of the unitary structure of the Spanish State, with the establishment of a Provisional Galician Government. 2. Call by these of elections for a Constituent Assembly of Galicia entrusted with the elaboration of a Constitution fitting our national reality. 3. This Constitution developed in accordance with the project of the
An examination of the political programmes presented by the BNPG and the BNG at general and regional elections shows that there is a clear trend toward a moderation of claims and proposals. This did not happen suddenly after regionalisation, but was the result of a long process. The assertion that Galicia is a nation has persisted over the years but the consequences of this for concrete political proposals have changed. The emphasis on self-determination and national sovereignty disappeared slowly, together with the total rejection of the Spanish state, the Constitution and the Autonomy Statute. The 1989 programme for the general elections spoke of the need for reform of the Autonomy Statute of Galicia to facilitate a ‘higher level of competencies’ which would only be possible through a ‘constitutional reform’ (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 1989a). Although the 1993 general elections programme used the term self-determination, it did so in combination with the need for the organisation of a ‘plurinational’ Spanish state:

Impulsar a reforma da Constitución Española no sentido de posibilitar a estructuración dun Estado plurinacionalista, o que conleva a superación do actual marco autonómico e o reconocemento do dereito de autodeterminación das nacións que o component.35 (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 1993a).

More recent programmes put Galicia even more firmly within the framework of the Spanish state and its regional structure, concentrating on the construction of the ‘plurinational state’. Demands are still made that the Constitution be reformulated to do justice to the ‘plurinational character of the state’ and, at the same time, proposals are also made to increase the autonomy within the existing Autonomy Statute (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 2000). Such implicit recognitions of the Spanish state and the Autonomy Statute as a framework were not a feature of earlier programmes. References to self-determination and sovereignty are conspicuously absent from the more recent electoral programmes (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 1997, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 2000, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 2001). The implications of the idea that Galicia is a nation have thus shifted from the need for secession or a confederal arrangement of self-determination for Galicia to the need for institutional recognition of Galicia as a nation within the Spanish state, consistently expressed through the term plurinational:

Constitutional Foundations starting from the recognition that the political sovereignty of Galicia resides with the Galician People, considering the establishment of relations on the basis of equality with the other nations that today form the Spanish State in a supranational political pact’ (translation FS).

35 ‘Promote a reform of the Spanish Constitution to enable the organisation of a plurinational State, to lead to [the overcoming] of the actual autonomous framework and the recognition of the right of self-determination of the nations that it consist of’ (translation FS).
Partimos de que Galicia es una realidad nacional en el plano socio-político. Si distinguimos entre nación y Estado, podemos decir que el Estado español no es uninacional, a diferencia del Estado alemán, sino que es un Estado socio-políticamente plurinacional\(^\text{36}\) (entrevista, BNG, 2004).

Sin embargo, con un estado plurinacional como objetivo constitucional (cf. Aymeric Cano, 2002; Beiras, 2003) BNG no significa Galicia como una nación dentro de una mayor nación española, sino que es una nación dentro de un estado:

*Hay una nación gallega, el otro es un estado*\(^\text{37}\) (entrevista, BNG, 2004).

Within the framework of this view Galicia, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Spain ("the rest") are seen as four separate nations. Although terms like independence and sovereignty are not much used anymore in the BNG's texts, they have not been completely disregarded as possible autonomy goals:

*El autogobierno, modificación de la Constitución Española, que el Estado español sea un estado plurinacional, formalmente, que la soberanía sea compartida y que, por lo tanto, se vaya a una confederación de Estados naciones*\(^\text{38}\) (entrevista, BNG, 2004).

The differences between internal and external discourses were sometimes considerable, particularly in the case of umbrella organisations as the ANPG and the BNPG and they still are, to some extent, in the case of the BNG. The main constituent part of the BNG, namely the UPG, still has party statutes that describe it as "partido comunista e patriótico" ("communist and patriotic party") that "mobilice e organice ao noso povo na loita pola autodeterminación e o exercicio da soberanía nacional" ("mobilises and organises our people for the struggle for self-determination and the exercise of national sovereignty") and "A instauración dun Estado galego democrático e popular que articule as medidas que den fin á colonización que padece o país" ("the installation of a Galician state, democratic and of the people, that articulates the measures to make an end to the colonisation of which the country suffers") (UPG, 2005).

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\(^{36}\)We built on Galicia as a national reality in a socio-political sense. If we make a distinction between nation and state, we can say that the Spanish state is not uni-national, unlike the German state, but that it is a socio-politically plurinational state' (traducción FS).

\(^{37}\)"There is a Galician nation, the other is a state' (traducción FS).

\(^{38}\)"Self-government, modification of the Spanish constitution, so that the Spanish state would become a plurinational state, formally, so that the sovereignty would be shared that consequently would lead to a confederation of nation-states' (traducción FS).
However, this language is no longer used in election manifests, campaign publications and public texts and speeches. The main reason is that this is supported in Galicia by only a small section of the population. The promulgation of a more moderate view is regarded as a means of obtaining more votes in the regional political arena. As one prominent BNG member of the Galician Parliament states:

*Lo que paso es que nosotros, en el contexto gallego, lo que tenemos que hacer es modular los términos en que nosotros nos dirigimos a los ciudadanos* (interview, BNG, 2004).

While a shift towards demanding full independence for Galicia is not made

*Por razones electorales, por razones de confianza de los ciudadanos del país* (interview, BNG, 2004).

After regionalisation, the BNG thus made a clear choice to adapt at least part of its message to the Galician electorate so that, as shown in an earlier section, it was less enthusiastic about Galician independence.

Another element that changed in the regionalist discourse of BNG is the role of ‘Europe’ and the EU. Spain became member of the European Economic Community in 1986, and the BNG’s position towards Europe was very antagonistic. This was based mainly on an economic and ideological rationale, as the Common Market and its ‘capitalist’ character were regarded as threats to the Galician economy (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 1989b) and as highlighting the peripheral and colonial position of Galicia:

*No ultimo decénio da nosa histórra presente, a crise pola que atravessa a economía capitalista e máis a adhesión do Estado español á C.E.E., agravaron e metamorfosearon a un tempo e outra volta o feito e as consecucións da nosa condición periférica e colonial* (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 1989b, p.3).

In the 1990s, the perspective on the European Union shifted towards a level of governance ‘affecting the competencies for national self-government and the interests’ of Galicia, in which Galicia would be represented by ‘its own voice’ (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 1999). In the BNG’s

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39 ‘What happens is that we, in the Galician context, have to modulate the terms in which we speak to the citizens’ (translation FS).

40 ‘For electoral reasons, for reasons of the confidence of the citizens of the country’ (translation FS).

41 ‘In the latest decade of our present history, the crisis which the capitalist economy is going through and the adherence of the Spanish State to the EEC, aggravate and transform time and again the reality and the consequences of our peripheral and colonial position’ (translation FS).
discourse, ‘Europe’ has become a framework for the recognition of the status of Galicia as a nation, next to that of the ‘plurinational state’. In line with transformations of other regionalist parties, when expressed through the idea of a ‘Europe of the regions’ or of the ‘peoples’, ‘Europe’ became an instrument to attack the existing state level. Those institutional opportunities outweighed economic threats. As explained in the BNG’s 1999 European election manifesto:

[Translation of Galician text]

In this way, the BNG often presents its proposals for constitutional change on the basis of a focus on the state as well as on the European context (e.g. Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 2002).

Finally, the BNG also moderated its radical ideological position as a left-wing party of Marxist-Leninist signature. During the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, the BNG moved gradually towards the political centre in a shift from an anti-system to a catch-all party (Barreiro Rivas, 2003), although it was still clearly a left-wing party. Illustrative for this ideological transformation is the use of the description of Galicia as an exploited internal colony. This had been one of the main elements of the BNG (and UPG) ideology since the 1960s onwards (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996, pp.228-230), and was still clearly present in the political programme for the 1993 regional

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42 “The construction of the European Union affects the nations without a state that aspire to self-determination, like Galicia, in two ways. On the one hand, it transforms the scope of the central characteristics of traditional sovereignty, shifting political decision away from the level with institutions lacking direct democratic legitimation or even any popular legitimation. On the other hand, in the degree to which it withstands the handing over of competencies to suprastatal institutions, is the struggle for national liberation in a wider context situated, full of contradictions not always controllable by the Spanish state. Those circumstances demand a specific suprastatal action towards Galicia as nation, and consequently from BNG, considering the European Union as upcoming space of association and new political territory where the Galician nation exercises its wish for self-determination” (translation FS).
In more recent years, this formulation has been dropped almost completely, or replaced by other, weaker terms. This general moderation of both autonomy goals and ideology, and the evolution from a radical anti-system movement to an established regionalist political party is well illustrated by the signing of the Barcelona Declaration in 1998. In that Declaration the three main regionalist parties of the three ‘historical nationalities’, the BNG, the CiU, and the PNV, signed a pact to call for the recognition and constitutional construction of Spain as a ‘plurinational’ state, and to cooperate in order to achieve this. This led to, among other things, an electoral coalition with a united list of candidates at the 2004 European elections. In the light of the backgrounds of those parties, it is remarkable that the BNG chose to cooperate with CiU and PNV, two conservative, centre-right parties, and less radically regionalist than the other regionalist parties in their regions, the ERC, EA and HB. What bound them was that they are the dominant regionalist party within their region, with the largest electorate.

Thus, various aspects of the political discourse of BNG have changed. As argued by Barreiro Rivas (2003) this change has been largely the result of strategic choices. The main background to such choices has been the changed situation following the introduction of a regional level of government, and more specifically, of elections at regional level. The most drastic change of strategy was made at the BNG assembly of 1982 to abandon the idea to create an independent Galician state, and to form instead a valid instrument to compete electorally and politically in an autonomous Galicia (Barreiro Rivas, 2003, p.146). This meant a shift from a strategy based on the conversion of the electorate to the UPG’s original nationalist project, to one based on trying to find a balance between the ideological underpinnings of the party and the expectations of potential voters. The main motive for this change was the new reality of the need to compete at regional elections, and the new opportunities to gain representation through seats, something that was not possible before 1981, as the 1977 and 1979 elections had revealed. The role of the BNG’s charismatic political leader since 1985, Xosé Manuel Beiras, was also important. As the BNG’s only elected representative in the Parliament of Galicia in 1985, Beiras, who originally came from the relatively moderate PSG, had the opportunity to participate actively in Galicia’s parliamentary life, and steer the party towards a strategy aimed more at defending the interests of Galicia within the framework of an autonomous Galicia, than at the rejection of the Autonomy Statute and the Constitution (Bermendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996, p.278). Clearly, the fact that this strategy worked, with a steady growth of votes and seats since 1985, has also helped the

43 In the three page introduction to this programme, the term ‘colonial’ (‘colônia’ or ‘colonial’) is used seven times with respect to Galicia and ‘peripheral’ (‘periférica’ or ‘periferia’) fourteen times (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 1993b, pp.7-9).
continued moderation of the BNG. Worse results and a lack of representation in return for the sacrifice of radical principles by large factions such as the UPG would have made it much more difficult to keep such groups within the organisation. This umbrella or ‘front’-like organisational structure of the BNG was also a reason for moderation, as more and more moderate political parties and movements merged into the organisation (PSG, EG, CG). At the same time, more radical ones, which were more interested in extra-legal action than electoral success, left the organisation (Partido Galego do Proletariado, Frente Popular Galega) (Barreiro Rivas, 2003). In this way regionalisation facilitated the electoral growth of the BNG. On the one hand it inspired the programmatic moderation that enlarged the voter potential and the merger of regionalist parties that concentrated the regionalist vote in one party (Núñez Seixas, 2001). On the other hand, it created a favourable political opportunity structure and a Galician political arena with a focus on Galician interests and Galician identity, and more options for regionalist parties to mobilise support (Máiz, 2001, 2003b).

\textit{Coalición Galega}

Coalición Galega (CG) was formed after the regionalisation in 1984 and, ‘like a summer hit’ (Lugilde, 2001, p.197), slowly faded away after a few glorious years of electoral success and even governing responsibilities. It was intentionally formed to fill a gap in the electoral market, a party that was both conservative and regionalist, something like the CiU in Catalonia or the PNV in the Basque Country (De Juana López et al., 1995). The CiU even openly stimulated and assisted the formation of CG (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996, p.274). The party described itself as ‘authentically Galician, autonomist, democratic, progressive and reformist’, and as ‘a moderate nationalist political answer’ (Coalición Galega, 1985, pp.7-8). The latter can be interpreted in two ways: as a moderate regionalist alternative to the dominant state-wide centre-right parties, or as a response from the centre-right to the plethora of left-wing regionalist parties that existed in Galicia at the time. Based on relatively moderate regionalist beliefs, the CG did not use terms like self-determination, sovereignty, and even refrained from calling Galicia a nation. In its political programmes, the party is mostly described as ‘galleguista’, ‘autonomista’ or ‘regionalista’, and Galicia is called a ‘people’ or a ‘historical nationality’ (the formulation of the Spanish Constitution), with many references to ‘identity’, ‘sentiment’ and ‘history’ (Coalición Galega, 1985, 1986, 1989). Only the 1989 programme included a few indirect references to Galicia as a nation (‘identidade nacional’ or ‘o galego é língua nacional de cultura’) (Coalición Galega, 1989). There were no direct references to Galicia as a nation, nor inferences that this justifies a larger degree of autonomy or even independence of Galicia as well. The autonomy goal was restricted to making full use of the possibilities of the existing Autonomy Statute:
Proposals in the linguistic and cultural sphere were modest and permissive as well, calling for the ‘normalisation’ and stimulation of the Galician language, Galicia’s ‘own’ language, but with widespread tolerance of the use of Castilian:

_The normalisation of the Galician language should help the necessary coexistence with Castilian, also Galician heritage, as the sister languages that they are_ (Coalición Galega, 1985, p.72).

Contrary to other regionalist forces, the CG’s political programme was even published in two languages, Galician and Castilian. For the short period, during the second half of the 1980s, the CG was a significant force in the Galician political arena and succeeded in combining moderate regionalism with a centre-right ideology. Because its history was so brief there is not much use in looking for a programmatical development over time.

_Esquerda Galega_

_Esquerda Galega_ (EG) emerged from the remains of _Unidade Galega_ as a left-wing regionalist party with a slightly more moderate programme than the BNG. Unlike the BNG, EG had a clear autonomy goal and accepted the Spanish state as a framework. The solution for a combination of a social democratic and nationalist approach was found in the formula of “_Soberanía nacional Solidaria_” (‘national sovereignty with solidarity’), and the concrete goal of a ‘confederal’ state (Esquerda Galega, 1981, pp.259-264, Esquerda Galega, 1982, pp.5-6). Its political programme explicitly mentioned this as the party’s final goal, and not as a step towards full ‘self-determination’ or ‘national sovereignty’. An intermediate step would be the ‘democratic reform of the Statutes and the Constitution’. This pragmatic acceptance of the Autonomy Statute and the Constitution remained the main difference between the BNG and EG during the 1980s and early 1990s, when EG joined forces with the PSG (Núñez Seixas, 2003, p.168). EG was a very active producer of ideas and parliamentary action during the 1980s. In 1981, Manuel Fraga stated that there were only two ‘proper’ political programmes in Galicia, that of his own _Alianza Popular_, and that of EG (Lugilde, 2001, p.197). In the first legislative

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44 ‘[C]omplete, as soon as possible, the process of transfers to the Autonomous Communities, especially to Galicia’ (translation FS).

45 ‘The normalisation of the Galician language should help the necessary coexistence with Castilian, also Galician heritage, as the sister languages that they are’ (translation FS).
period of the Galician Parliament, between 1981 and 1985, the only EG deportado, Camilo Nogueira, individually generated 51 of all parliamentary activity (law proposals, motions, and other proposals) (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996, p.270). The PSG-EG combination definitively abandoned a maximalist nationalism, accepted the regional autonomy as a framework, and formulated a moderate regionalism which was social-democratic and was directed at the most dynamic and urban sectors of the Galician society (Máiz, 2001, p.304).

*State-wide parties*

Only two state-wide political parties have made an impact in Galicia, namely the PP and the PSOE, or their regional sections PPdeG and PSdeG-PSOE. In most other parts of Spain there are three state-wide parties. However, in Galicia the Spanish radical left – first the communists, more recently Izquierda Unida – have never made an impact. In Galicia most of the electorate of the radical left is attracted to the regionalist BNG.

*Partido Popular de Galicia*

As the party which has governed Galicia since 1981 – apart from a short interlude between 1987 and 1990 – and which has won all regional elections, the PPdeG has had a major influence on Galician administration and society. However, in order to retain this hegemonic position, it has had to adapt itself to Galicia as well and has shifted its vision away from that of the central party in Madrid, and from the earlier ideas of the Galician section of the party. Its leader (and founder and honorary president of the national PP) Manuel Fraga played an important role in this choice of direction of the PPdeG. Fraga, a former ambassador and minister of Information and Tourism in Franco's government, and minister of the Interior in the first post-Franco government, was the initiator of the AP in 1977. Since its formation in 1977, the party has been a markedly centralist and 'españolista' organisation. The founding manifesto propagated this stance by declaring Spain as 'the only valid point of departure for any political action', defending at all times 'the unity of the Patria', and stating the party's aim as being to 'strengthen the force and prestige of the Spanish state' (Fraga Irribarne, 1977, pp.13-14). However, from 1979 on, the discussion of an Autonomy Statute for Galicia inspired the adoption of a more regionally minded, even 'regionalist' view by the Galician section of the AP (Lagares Díez, 2003, pp.40-42). This was already reflected in the political programmes of the AP of Galicia for the first regional elections in 1981 and 1985, which were accompanied by statements such as 'the most Galician programme' (El programa más Gallego), claims for 'maximum possibilities of self-government' for Galicia and consequent references, in Galician, to 'nosa identidade' (our identity) and to 'ó pobo galego' (the Galician people) (Alianza Popular de Galicia, 1981, Coalición Popular de Galicia, 1985). The 'galeguización' of the Galician section was also boosted by the party becoming the governing party in Galicia (Lagares Díez, 2003). This stimula-
ted the development of a regional government in Santiago de Compostela to defend Galician interests in the face of a Spanish government lead by the PSOE in Madrid.

The political views of the PPdeG became even more openly autonomist after the resignation of Fraga as leader of the Spanish PP and after he had taken charge of the Galician section in 1989, coupled with the electoral threat posed by the CG in the second half of the 1980s (Lagares Diez, 2003, pp.70-75). The elimination of CG, which was also positioned on the centre-right and perceived as an electoral competitor after its great advance in 1985, called for a more regionalist approach to convincing those important sections of the electorate that were both conservative and Galicia-minded. Fraga, as founding president, had the stature within the PP to drive through ideas deviating from those of the Spanish party lines of thought. This step was visible in the 1989 electoral campaign. Its programme, in Galician, entitled “Un gran Futuro para un gran Pobo” (“A great Future for a great People”), used a more regionalist rhetoric:

Unba cultura galega que é patrimonio de todos e que a todos debe agrupar nun sentimento de identidade colectiva, se de verdade aspiramos a ser un país libre, emprendor, ilustrado e rico. Partimos do convencemente de que a través da cultura pretendemos, non tanto, a brillantez ou spectacularidade como a construcción día a día, da democracia e o desenvolvemento da Autonomía a través da más fonda identidade de sermos galegos46 (Partido Popular de Galicia, 1989, p.27).

This centrality of ‘galeugidade’ (‘Galicianness’) (see Vázquez Villanueva, 1996) was the basis for proposals and subsequent policies which actively promoted the Galician language and culture, although ideas for enlargement of the political autonomy of the region were relatively modest. The latter was based on Fraga’s idea of the ‘Administración única’ as “[E]l paso del Estado unitario y centralizado a un Estado compuesto y con comunidades dotadas de autonomía real y autogobierno” (Fraga Iribarne, 1993, p.9). The proposal was based on the principle of subsidiarity, and was based on an interpretation of the existing Constitution, and was not so much a proposal to reform the Constitution and the Autonomy Statutes (Fraga Iribarne, 1992). It did include proposals for reform of the Spanish senate into a chamber of representatives of the regions, and for

46 ‘A Galician culture that is the heritage of all and that should unite all in a sentiment of collective identity, if we really aspire to be a free, enterprising, erudite and wealthy country. We start from the conviction that through culture we strive not so much for brilliance or spectacularity, as to the everyday construction of democracy and the development of the Autonomy through the most profound identity of being Galician’ (translation FS).

47 ‘The step from the unitary and centralised State to a compound State with communities provided with real autonomy and self-government’ (translation FS).
direct participation of the Spanish regions in the European union, proposals that were maintained by Manuel Fraga (interview, 2004). It should be noted that Fraga launched this idea of *Administración única* 'from Galicia' – ‘Una propuesta desde Galicia’ ('a proposal from Galicia') – at a time at which the PSOE still led the Spanish government, and it was thus a means of opposing the PP as well.

This direction of the PPdeG was consolidated in subsequent years, and yielded three consecutive absolute majorities at regional elections. The party described itself as ‘autonomista’ ('autonomist') or 'galeguista' and its discourses were centred around concepts like ‘Administración única’, ‘autoidentificación’ ('self-identification'), 'autogobierno', and ‘galeguidade’ (Partido Popular de Galicia, 1993, 1997, 2001). It was on this basis that it sought to find a balance between the unity of Spain and the autonomy of Galicia. After all, the party reiterated the unity of Spain and expressed pronounced allegiances to Galician identity as well. It referred only to Spain as ‘nation’, and made no concrete proposals for more autonomy that would need revision of the Constitution or the Autonomy Statute, although the florid prose of the PPdeG sometimes corresponded with that of regionalist rhetorics:

*La construcción de una nueva Galicia, de una Galicia eterna, anclada en sus raíces, dueña de su historia, orgullosa de su ser como Pueblo, pero al mismo tiempo joven, ilusionada con su futuro, dispuesta a luchar sin complejos para ocupar sin miedo un puesto relevante entre los pueblos de Europa. ...Se dotó a nuestro Parlamento de una nueva sede digna y funcional, que facilitó su alta misión como institución fundamental del autogobierno y de la soberanía del pueblo gallego* (Partido Popular de Galicia, 1997, p.2).

In short, since the regionalisation debate at the end of the 1970s, the Galician section of the PP has evolved to become more and more ‘Galician’ and even has (mostly symbolic and cultural) characteristics of a regionalist party. Rhetorically, this ‘moderate regionalism’ was contrasted with other ‘nationalist’ and ‘centralist’ forces, as explained by Fraga: “*Hemos defendido siempre la autonomía frente visionas centralistas y frente visionas nacionalistas. ... El Partido Popular es claramente regionalista, claramente autonomista, y claramente anti-nationalista*”

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48 The construction of a new Galicia, of an eternal Galicia, anchored in its roots, owner of its history, proud of its being as People, but at the same time young, hopeful about its future, determined to fight without complexes to occupy without fear a relevant place among the peoples of Europe. ... Our Parliament made itself a worthy and functional seat, that facilitated its important mission as fundamental institution of self-government and of the sovereignty of the Galician people’ (translation FS).

49 ‘We have always defended the autonomy vis-à-vis centralist visions, and vis-à-vis nationalist visions. ... The Partido Popular is clearly regionalist, clearly autonomist, and clearly anti-nationalist’ (translation FS).
There were a number of reasons for this. First, there were the regionalisation and early responsibilities of a governing party, which called for a formulation of a specifically Galician programme. In the two other regions that were able to take the fast route to autonomy, Catalonia and the Basque Country, the regional governments were dominated from the start by regionalist parties, while in Galicia such powers were assigned to the regional section of a state-wide party. The fact that, for a long time, the Spanish government was in the hands of the PSOE which had a rather centralising policy, increased the value of a specifically Galician policy and profile for the PPdeG. Secondly, competition with regionalist political parties (first the CG, more recently a more moderate BNG) for sections of the electorate that were to different degrees attached to Galicia, demanded a more regionalist approach. This explains why the PPdeG openly characterised itself as ‘autonomista’, and ‘galeguista’. In other regions, these descriptions were used specifically for regionalist parties. However, the PP de Galicia still distanced itself from those that called themselves ‘nationalista’ and referred to Galicia as a nation. As explained by a PPdeG member of the Galician Parliament:

> Si aplicas una terapia, digamos, nosotros somos la vacuna. Para que no tenga la enfermedad, se vacuna la gente. ¿Y qué es la vacuna? Es la misma enfermedad, pero debilitada. Nosotros somos un poco la vacuna frente al nacionalismo. Y para que se pueda avanzar, lógicamente esta vacuna es del mismo nacionalismo, pero mucho más derivada. Y eso es nuestra aplicación, eso es la diferencia entre el galleguismo, entre los que defienden el regionalismo, y la teoría y pensamiento del nacionalismo radical, que es excluyente

The progressive regional institutionalisation described above, and the development of a separate political space, were the foundations for the electoral need of a mildly regionalist discourse. Thirdly, the strong and undisputed regional party leadership of Fraga facilitated a drastic change in the party’s political stance. This was especially the case as regards the pacts he made with provincial party ‘barons’ with a traditionally strong position in the party. Finally, there were several factors that made a relative independence of the PP de Galicia from ‘Madrid’ within the region possible, as described above.

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50 ‘If we would apply a therapy, let’s say we are a vaccine. To not become ill, people are vaccinated. And what is a vaccine? It is the same illness, only weakened. We are a bit like a vaccine against nationalism. And to make progress, logically that vaccine is of the same nationalism, of the same credentials, only much more a derivative. And that is our application, that is the difference between Galicianism, between those that defend regionalism, and the theory and considerations of radical nationalism, which is excluding’ (translation FS).
In the run-up to the introduction of regional autonomy in Galicia, the PSOE in Galicia was one of the advocates of the eventual Autonomy Statute. However, even before regionalisation, the issue of regional autonomy had caused considerable friction within the PsdeG-PSOE. Given that socio-economic equality was the main ideological point of departure, there was ideological tension between the aim of pursuing equality for the whole of Spain, and of regional autonomies facilitating the growth in regional differences. Socialists had much fewer problems with far-reaching regional autonomies than the Conservatives on the Spanish Right, certainly while the memories of centralist Francoism were still fresh in people’s minds. Large differences between regions, and therefore differences in equality between Spanish citizens, were more of an obstacle, in that a more uniform federal state was the preferred option (Seara Vazquez, 1980).

One important obstacle to the formation of a united Galician section of the PSOE with a common political project for Galicia took the form of the long-lasting feuds between local sections and leaders. At the 1982 regional congress in Lugo the most antiregionalist section had the upper hand and the aspirations of a PSdeG with an independent and strongly regional profile as in Catalonia were blocked (Jiménez Sánchez, 2003, pp.293-294). This is reflected in the party electoral programmes of the 1980s. These focused a great deal of attention on the economic development of the region and an efficient administration, but almost none on regionalist issues such as the extension of regional autonomy, the defence or recognition of a Galician regional identity, and linguistic policy (PSdeG-PSOE, 1981, González Laxe, 1985). Another significant fact in this respect was that the PSOE headed the Spanish government and this made a particularly Galician programme more difficult and the political advantage thereof smaller.

An important initiator of the restraining from a regionalist project for the PSdeG has been Francisco Vazquez, the charismatic and outspoken mayor of A Coruña. He has won all six municipal elections since 1983 with an absolute majority, and has been influential in the PSdeG, promoting a view of Spanish unity and opposing linguistic ‘normalisation’. He even refrains from using the now official Galician name for his city, A Coruña, insisting on La Coruña (Hermida, 2003). Especially between 1994 and 1998, when he was regional party secretary, he moved the party towards strong anti-regionalism which supported stronger municipal administrations at the expense of the regional government (Núñez Seixas, 2003, p.175). Jiménez Sánchez (2003) speaks of Vazquez’s ideology as ‘coruñesismo’, in contrast to galeguismo.

However, this strategy was held largely responsible for the disastrous result of the PSdeG at the regional elections of 1997 when the BNG became the second largest party of Galicia, surpassing the social-democrats. This inspired a drastic change of policy which embraced the Galician identity and
linguistic and cultural policies. Part of this new party policy was the adoption by the PSOE of the new plans for the federalisation of Spain. The new leader of the PSdeG, Emilio Perez Touriño, even became one of the instigators of federalism within the PSOE, together with the Catalan Pasqual Maragall. This U-turn by the PSdeG is shown clearly in its electoral programmes. While those of the regional elections of 1993 and 1997 never mention Galician identity, and refrain from calling for development of regional autonomy (PSdeG-PSOE, 1993, 1997), that of 2001, in Galician, has plenty of regionalist elements:

Temos a vontade decidida de impulsar e exercer de xeoito efectivo o autogoberno de Galicia, mediante políticas que posibiliten a transformación do país. Por iso representamos un galeguismo mais dinámico, integrador, garante da nosa identidade colectiva, tolerante e aberto a outras culturas e espacios que habrán de ser factores de enriquecemento e convivencia. ... Dende a nosa vontade de contribuir e formar parte dun proxecto común cos demais pobos de España, os socialistas galegos queremos afondar no desenvolvemento do Estado das Autonomías ó traveso dun novo impulse federal ...51 (PSdeG, 2001, p.12).

This federalism is also expressed explicitly as part of a historical tradition of Galician regionalism:

O federalismo territorial entronca cunha longa e decisiva tradición do galeguismo histórico desde o século XIX, pois de Pereira a Castelao pasando por Vilar Ponte, federal foi a plasmación do galeguismo nos seus valedores mais progneristas52 (PSdeG, 2001, p.227).

To counter its long electoral decline, symbolically underlined in 1997 by the loss of its once firm position as runner-up to a regionalist party, the PSdeG opted for an openly federalist path which took in the cherishing of the Galician identity and calls for linguistic normalisation.

However, the dilemma of combining regionalism and pluralism with equality and solidarity remained, as formulated by Touriño:

51 ‘We have the determined intention to promote and put into practice effectively the self-government of Galicia, by means of policies that enable the transformation of the country. That is why we represent a more dynamic, integrating galeguismo, guardian of our collective identity, tolerant and open for other cultures and spaces that should be factors of enrichment and coexistence. ... From our will to contribute to and be part of a common project with other peoples of Spain, the Galician socialists want to deepen the development of the State of the Autonomies through a new federal impulse ...’ (translation FS).

52 ‘Territorial federalism is connected to a long and decisive tradition of historical galeguismo since the 19th Century, from Pereira to Castelao via Vilar Ponte, federal was the expression of galeguismo in its most progressive values’ (translation FS).
Como resolver la ecuación entre cohesión y diversidad, entre solidaridad y eficacia, que siempre es una gran cuestión, siempre. ... Tenemos una posición firme, en el sentido que Galicia es una comunidad histórica, con nuestra lengua, con nuestra cultura diferenciada, con nuestro patrimonio, nuestra identidad, nacional, como país, como comunidad, aspiramos a que se recoja, que se profundice el autogobierno, la autonomía, comunidad, pero siempre con dos límites, que son los avances de la autonomía, los avances del autogobierno: nunca defenderemos que ponga en riesgo para nada la solidaridad, para nada en riesgo la cohesión, para en riesgo la igualdad que tienen que tener todos los ciudadanos del Estado en derechos y el acceso a los servicios públicos básicos y sociales" (entrevista, PSdeG-PSOE, 2004).

As a result, all political parties in Galicia of any size now openly call themselves galeguista. As far as the PPdeG and the PSdeG are concerned, this has largely been a strategic choice, to keep regionalist parties from robbing them of any more of the regionally-minded voters. At the same time it indicates that at least a moderate regionalist discourse is demanded by a large part of the Galician electorate. This has led to a situation in which, according to Nuñez Seixas (2003, p.175), no party can win the regional elections in Galicia without appealing to the promotion of the regional identity. Simultaneously, the BNG has moderated its regionalist stance and has transformed itself from a radical party with a strong focus on strict regionalist issues to a party which appeals to large sections of the electorate.

A cross-table of political party preference and regional identification (table 5.11) shows that the PPdeG and PSdeG get votes from those who consider themselves Galician and not at all Spanish. In this respect, and especially in the case of the PP, the situation is very different to the one that exists in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where PP voters identify strongly with Spain. On the other hand, as could be expected, there are hardly any BNG voters that do not consider themselves Galician. This means that, in Galicia, the PPdeG and PSdeG have been rather successful in adapting themselves to the regional electorate, and also in attracting some of the votes of those with strong, and even exclusive, regional identities.

53 'How to resolve the equation between cohesion and diversity, between solidarity and efficiency, which always is a great question, always. ... We have a firm position, in the sense that Galicia is a historical community, with our language, with our distinct culture, with our heritage, our national identity. As country, as community, we aspire to reunite, to deepen the self-government, the autonomy, community, but always with two limits, that are the balances of the autonomy, the balances of self-government: we will never defend what could put the solidarity at risk, the cohesion at risk, the equality that all citizens of the state have in rights and access to basic and social public services at risk' (translation FS).
Table 5.11 Voting and identity in Galicia, 2001, %

<table>
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<th>PP</th>
<th>PSOE</th>
<th>BNG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish not Galician</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish than Galician</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Spanish and Galician</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Galician than Spanish</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galician not Spanish</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1017</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2001, author’s elaboration.

Organisation of regionalist parties

As described above in section 5.1, a large number of regionalist parties existed at the moment of regionalisation. In the six years after the death of Franco, they had formed various coalitions such as the UG and the BNPG. After 1981, the tendency to break up into new parties and movements disappeared somewhat. In its place came a clear trend towards amalgamation that would continue well into the 1990s.

In 1982 the BNPG, which was still a very loose umbrella organisation and successor to the ‘assembly’ of regionalist parties the ANPG, turned itself into the BNG, which was more of a political party rather than a temporary coalition. The electoral deception of the first regional elections of 1981 called for a change of strategy (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996, p.271), and the BNG was supposed to serve this role as a more stable organisation that could produce a more united message externally. Internally, it remained an ‘assembly’ organisation with a ‘front’-like character. In fact, the strategy for homogenisation involved fragmentation of the hegemonic section of the party, the UPG. This was done to break its dominant doctrinal power, and make the different groups within the organisation more accountable to the ‘minimal points’ that were guidelines for the BNG’s strategy and electoral programme (Barreiro Rivas, 2003, p.214). Since regionalisation, the BNG has developed more and more into a single party, although it still regards its internal plurality as an asset. The fiasco of the referendum on regional autonomy had shown that an abrupt rupture with Spain was impossible, and the new reality of the need to compete at regional elections called for more electoral efficiency for the enormously dispersed, fragmented and badly organised nationalist left. The introduction of regional elections and institutions created the opportunity for regional parties to compete for the presence and real influence in these organisations, and in this way was an incentive for reorganisation and putting an effort into maintaining unity (Barreiro Rivas, 2003, pp.147-148).

After the regionalisation referendum, the large number of left-wing regionalist parties not involved in the BNPG had joined forces to form a more stable organisation, named Esquerra Galega, for the same reasons.
Even before the first regional elections, at its founding congress in 1981, this new party explicitly confirmed the new regional autonomy as the arena in which to seek self-determination (Beramendi & Núñez Seixas, 1996, pp.266-267). In 1984, the remainders of the PSG – after a coalition in 1981 with the BNPG – merged with EG to form a stable coalition under the name of PSG-EG. Finally, in 1994, the core of this party merged into the BNG, after a period of steady electoral decline.

As mentioned above, the CG was founded a few years after the introduction of regional elections to fill an electoral gap. It was not based on a social movement or historical process, but was created primarily on the basis of the objective of obtaining power. It was a direct reaction to the opportunities for acquiring power that the creation of a new regional political arena offered, and an attempt to imitate what the CiU and PNV had achieved within their regions. However, after a short period in government, the lack of ideological and organisational coherence and leadership showed itself in opposition. In the early 1990s, the party broke up with some militants going to the PP and others to the BNG. The same happened to the small group which wanted stronger regionalism and which broke away from the Coalición Galega in 1987 to form the PNG. Although they joined forces with the Partido Galeguista, they merged into the BNG soon after the poor electoral results in 1989.

New regionalist parties steadily continued to emerge only among radical leftist and separatist groups. A whole current of separatist parties and movements persisted, but all remained marginal. Just as had been the case in the late 1970s, the ‘loita armada’ (‘armed struggle’) reappeared in the late 1980s, even leading to the murder of a member of the guardia civil in 1989 in the village of Irijoa (Martínez Orero, 2000). The organisation that was responsible, the Exército Guerrilheiro do Povo Galego Ceibe (‘Guerrilla Army of the Free Galician People’) was dismantled by the police soon afterwards. Until 1989, the many Galician separatist movements had ‘boycotted’ all political elections – or supported Herri Batasuna at the European elections where that was possible (Rios Bergantinhos & Morais, 2000). Since 1989, the Frente Popular Galega has participated in general and regional elections, with a strict separatist ideology:

*Só a radical ruptura da dependência colonial da Galiza a respeito do Estado Imperialista Español, concretada na Independência Nacional, pode procurar un futuro digno ás clases traballadoras galegas*54 (Frente Popular Galega, 1988).

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54 ‘Only the radical break from the colonial dependence of Galicia from the Imperialist Spanish State, realised in the National Independence, can achieve a future worthy to the Galician working classes’ (translation FS).
However, with just a few thousand votes – and a maximum of 0.28 of the votes – it made no electoral impact at all.

In short, regionalisation caused no fragmentation of the regionalist parties in Galicia. On the contrary, it brought about a gradual integration of the regionalist forces, with the result being the formation of one large regionalist movement by the mid-1990s. New parties emerged only on the centre-right, most notably the Coalición Galega. This was not the result of splits within existing regionalist movements, but a temporal political project with different ideological and organisational origins. Splits occurred only in the extreme leftist and separatist groups within the existing regionalist forces. However, the groups and the splinter parties they formed were so marginal that such splits could hardly be regarded as real schisms within the regionalist movement.

5.6 Conclusion

Regionalist pressure was the main rationale for regionalisation in Spain, and regionalist demands have had a considerable impact on the way the ‘State of the Autonomies’ was constructed. Conversely, after the introduction of regional governments in the early 1980s, regionalisation has had substantial effects on regionalism as well, in a number of ways. In the case of Galicia, it facilitated the emergence of a mature politicised regionalist movement, where there was no such thing before the moment of regionalisation. One thing that did not change much, or at least not as far as we can tell from the surveys used here, has been the regional identity and identification with Galicia and Spain. Even public opinion on preferred levels of autonomy for Galicia did not change spectacularly, apart from an increase in acceptance of the regionalised state. There is no sign of a general satisfaction with the autonomy obtained. On the contrary, the demand for increased autonomy has remained large, and has even increased. This has not gone as far as support for Galician independence. But because there never was substantial support for separatism, there is no reason to suggest that regional autonomy suppressed the advance of Galician separatism.

The most important impact of regionalisation has been in the emergence of a distinct Galician political arena, and in evolution of the role of regionalism in Galician politics (see also Schrijver, 2005). To some extent the political and administrative regionalisation contributed to the ‘Galicianisation’ of society. Developments on a number of key aspects confirm that a distinct Galician political space, as defined by Keating (1997), has emerged after regionalisation. Regional election campaigns are indeed strongly focused on regional issues and Galician politicians. There is a substantially regionalised political party system, with a very distinctive three party structure, and regional media do treat regional politics as a significant topic. The Galician dimension has become more important since regionalisation with regard to all these aspects. This has proven to be a fruitful arena for regional-
ists wishing to mobilise support and has, at the same time, encouraged other political actors to adopt a regionalist discourse.

Regionalisation has indeed been a watershed for Galician regionalism, and has confirmed the recursive nature of regionalist politics. The emergence of a Galician political space inspired the transformation of regionalist parties to put forward new demands for autonomy. As suggested by Bogdanor (1999), this involved the isolation of the most radical factions, but this can only be regarded as a strengthening of the position of regionalism in Galicia. Although the BNG adapted its discourse to suit the Galician electorate better, it remained a regionalist party with ambitious, as well as ambiguous, autonomy goals. Its discursive moderation was not so much an alteration of its final autonomy goal for Galicia, but more a strategy to get there and a strategy on how to defend the interests of Galicia in the meantime. At the same time, the Galician sections of the two main state-wide parties have incorporated regionalist elements into their political programmes and policy proposals. Above all, the PPdeG and PSdeG have increasingly presented themselves as the protectors of Galician interests, identity and autonomy, and have taken pride in branding themselves ‘Galicianist’, ‘regionalist’ and ‘autonomist’. This ‘Galicianisation’ of the Spanish parties in the region has been one of the clearest developments after regionalisation and is perhaps more complete in Galicia than in any other region of Spain.

Another main development has been the electoral advance of regionalism in Galicia. An examination of the changes in the votes for regionalism based on a distinction between Spanish and regionalist parties shows that there has been an increase in the votes for regionalist parties since regionalisation, although this increase has not been very spectacular. However, this hides the fact that the relatively moderate Coalición Galega acquired those votes at an earlier stage. Later the BNG did the same and grew to become the second party of Galicia by the late 1990s. Combined with the advance of regionalist discourses within the Galician sections of the Spanish parties, this is reason to conclude that regionalism has been strengthened within the Galician political arena during and since regionalisation.