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**Price Stability and Volatility in Markets with  
Positive and Negative Expectations Feedback:  
An Experimental Investigation**

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**Abstract:** The evolution of many economic variables is affected by expectations that economic agents have with respect to the future development of these variables. We show, by means of laboratory experiments, that market behaviour depends to a large extent on whether realized market prices respond positively or negatively to average price expectations. In the case of negative expectations feedback, as in commodity markets, prices converge quickly to their equilibrium value, confirming the rational expectations hypothesis. In the case of positive expectations feedback, as is typical for speculative asset markets, large fluctuations in realized prices and persistent deviations from the benchmark fundamental price are likely. We estimate individual forecasting rules and investigate how these explain the differences in aggregate market outcomes.

**Keywords:** market behaviour, coordination, expectations feedback, experimental economics

**JEL -codes:** D02, G12, C92

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A key difference between natural and social sciences is that in social systems individual expectations or beliefs can affect the aggregate outcome. An investor buys a stock that she expects to go up in the future, a chip-manufacturer builds a new production facility because she expects that demand and therefore prices will be high after goods have been produced. Expectations determine individual behaviour of economic agents and the actual market outcome, i.e., prices and traded quantities, are determined as an aggregation of individual behaviour. Simultaneously, economic agents form their expectations on the basis of market history. Therefore, a market, like other social environments, may be viewed as an *expectations feedback system*: past market behaviour determines individual expectations which, in turn, determine current market behaviour and so on. We distinguish two important types of feedback, positive and negative. We say that a market has positive (negative) expectations feedback, when a higher average price forecast yields a higher (lower) realized market price. This paper may be viewed as *an experimental testing of how expectations feedback affects aggregate market outcome and individual forecasting behaviour*.

In most markets both types of feedback may play a role. Positive feedback however, seems to be particularly relevant for speculative asset markets. If many agents expect the price of an asset to rise and therefore start buying the asset, aggregate demand will increase, and so, by the law of supply and demand, will the asset price. High price expectations thus become self-confirming and lead to high realized asset prices. Similarly, when a majority of investors expects markets to go down, this belief will be self-fulfilling and the market will go down. In markets where the role of speculative demand is less important, e.g. in markets for non-storable commodities, negative feedback may play a more prominent role. Consider e.g. a supply-driven commodity market. If many producers expect future prices to be high they will increase production which, according to the law of supply and demand, will lead to a low

realized market price. In contrast, if firms expect a low price, they will produce little and, as a consequence, the realized market price will be high.

To investigate how the expectations feedback structure affects aggregate market outcomes and individual forecasting behaviour we designed experimental market environments that only differ in the *sign* of the expectations feedback, but are equivalent along all other dimensions. We compare these markets with respect to the coordination of individual expectations and (speed of) convergence to the fundamental market equilibrium price.

### **1. Related Work**

It is useful at this point, to discuss some closely related literature. The distinction between positive and negative expectation feedback is related to the concept of, respectively, strategic complements and strategic substitutes, as introduced by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985). When actions are strategic complements, agents have an incentive to imitate other agents. This is the case in an asset market, where predicting a price close to the predictions of the other participants turns out to be most profitable. Coordination of predictions enhances the impact of the irrational participants upon the realized prices and convergence to the rational equilibrium price becomes unlikely. When actions are strategic substitutes, agents have an incentive to deviate from what other agents are doing. This is the case in negative feedback markets, where agents have an incentive to predict high (low) prices when the majority predicts prices below (above) the equilibrium price. The impact of irrational individuals will be limited and convergence to the equilibrium price is more likely. Coordination of predictions will only take place after convergence.

Fehr and Tyran (2002, 2005) report on a related experiment in which they study the adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated money shock in a price setting game with positively (complements) or negatively sloped (substitutes) reaction curves. They find much

faster convergence in the substitute condition, in line with our results.<sup>1</sup> They argue that differences in the “stickiness of price expectations” are key for understanding these results. Our experiments shed more light on this important issue, since they provide detailed information about the relation between individual expectations and aggregate outcomes in markets with strategic complements (positive feedback) and strategic substitutes (negative feedback).

Since the seminal work of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972), rational expectations became the dominating expectations hypothesis in the seventies and eighties. More recently models of bounded rationality and adaptive learning have become popular in macroeconomics, as discussed e.g. in Sargent (1993) and Evans and Honkapohja (1998,2001), and in finance in Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Hommes (2006). The state of the art on adaptive learning has recently been nicely formulated in an overview by Bullard (2006, p.205): “*The state of affairs is thus that some rational expectations equilibria are learnable while others are not. Furthermore, convergence will in general depend on all the economic parameters of a given system, [...] (that is, it depends on the entire economic structure)*”.

Laboratory experiments on expectations and forecasting have e.g. been performed by Schmalensee (1976), Hey et al. (1994), Dwyer et al. (1993) and Kelley and Friedman (2002). In particular, several experiments in environments with *expectations feedback* between individual forecasts and aggregate market outcomes have been performed in Marimon and Sunder (1993), Marimon et al. (1993), Peterson (1993), Gerber et al. (2002), Hommes et al. (2005, 2007), Sutan and Willinger (2005) and Adam (2007). The current paper is motivated

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<sup>1</sup> Another related study concerning strategic substitutes versus strategic complements is Potters and Suetens (2005). Their focus, however, is more on social behaviour than on convergence and coordination. Cournot games and Bertrand games are both social dilemma situations (the Nash equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient), but in Cournot games actions are strategic substitutes while in Bertrand games they are strategic complements. Potters and Suetens design two games with the same Nash equilibrium, the same social optimum and the same absolute (but opposite) slope of the reaction curve. They find more cooperation in the case of strategic complements than when actions are strategic substitutes.

by striking differences in earlier experiments on expectation formation in an asset pricing framework in Hommes et al. (2005) and a cobweb framework in Hommes et al. (2007). In the asset pricing framework coordination on trend following strategies caused oscillatory price movements with persistent deviations from fundamentals, whereas in the cobweb framework prices were relatively stable, often moving close towards the equilibrium level. We conjecture that these striking differences can be attributed to the sign of the expectations feedback structure. Unfortunately however, the experimental designs are also different in a number of other ways. For example, the temporary equilibrium asset pricing framework required two period ahead forecasts, whereas in the cobweb framework subjects had to make one-period ahead forecasts. Another important difference is the presence of fundamental ‘‘robot traders’’ in the asset pricing framework of Hommes et al. (2005). The main goal of the current paper is to investigate whether a different expectations feedback structure (positive versus negative) *alone*, leads to differences in individual forecasting and aggregate market behaviour.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the positive and negative feedback systems and set out the experimental design. Section 3 describes aggregate market behaviour, Section 4 investigates individual forecasting strategies, and Section 5 concludes. The appendices finally contain a more detailed description of the models underlying the positive and negative expectations feedback systems, a description of the experimental instructions and detailed estimation results of the individual prediction strategies.

## 2. Expectations Feedback and Experimental Design

In both treatments of the experiments the price adjustment rule will be of the simple form

$$p_t = f(\overline{p_t^e}), \quad (1)$$

where  $\overline{p_t^e}$  is the *average price forecast* of all subjects in the market. Appendix A describes how this simple pricing rule can be derived from ‘‘the law of supply and demand’’ for a

cobweb model (negative feedback) and an asset pricing model (positive feedback). In fact, since we assume demand and supply to be linear, in the experiments the map  $f$  in (1) will be linear, with negative respectively positive slope. As discussed above, positive versus negative feedback is related to the concepts of strategic complements versus strategic substitutes. We use positive/ negative feedback to stress the fact that the difference is entirely due to the sign of the derivative of the expectations feedback map in (1).

For the *negative feedback treatment* the price adjustment rule is given by

$$p_t = \frac{20}{21} \left( 123 - \bar{p}_t^e \right) + \mathbf{e}_t, \quad (2)$$

while for the *positive feedback treatment* it is given by

$$p_t = \frac{20}{21} \left( \bar{p}_t^e + 3 \right) + \mathbf{e}_t. \quad (3)$$

In both cases,  $\bar{p}_t^e = \frac{1}{6} \sum_{h=1}^6 p_{h,t}^e$  is the average prediction of the six participants in the experimental market, and  $\mathbf{e}_t \sim N(0, 1/4)$  is a random term, representing e.g. small random fluctuations in the supply of the risky asset. The two treatments are perfect symmetric opposites. One can easily check that the rational expectations equilibrium price of both (2) and (3) is  $p^* = 60$ , and that if all participants would forecast  $p_{h,t}^e = 60$ , then realized market price becomes  $p_t = 60 + \mathbf{e}_t$ . Both price series (2) and (3) are generated as a linear function of the average predictions of six participants, the realization of the random shocks is exactly the same and the absolute value of the slope of the relation between  $p_t$  and  $\bar{p}_t^e$  is equal to  $20/21$  for both treatments<sup>2</sup>. The only difference between the treatments is the *sign* of this slope. Note also that  $p^* = 60$  is a stable steady state under naïve expectations,  $p_{h,t}^e = p_{t-1}$ , since the absolute value of the slope of (2) and (3) is given by  $20/21$  and is smaller than one.

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<sup>2</sup>In a dynamic asset pricing model this slope is typically  $1/(1+r)$ , where  $r$  is the risk free interest rate. This slope is close to +1, and for an interest rate of 5%, i.e.  $r = 0.05$ , the slope becomes  $20/21$ .

### *Experimental Design*

Thirteen experimental markets of 50 periods were created, six with negative and seven with positive feedback. In each market six students participated, who earned more money if they predicted market prices more successfully. The computerized experiments were conducted in the CREED laboratory. Figure 1 shows the main experimental computer screen. Subjects have information about past realized market prices and past own predictions, but have no information about other individual predictions. Subjects were not explicitly informed about the price generating mechanisms ((2) or (3)), but did obtain qualitative information about the market, in particular that the market price was determined by the “law of demand and supply”, that is, the market price will increase (decrease) when there is excess demand (supply). This is in line with the real markets where participants know the direction of price changes caused by market expectations, but not the magnitude of these changes. Appendix B contains a detailed description of the experimental instructions.

The computer screen in Figure 1 shows the actual development of one of the experimental markets, in this case an asset pricing market, from the perspective of one of the participants. The participant observes both a graphical and a numerical representation of the realized market prices and his previous price predictions, in the upper left and right panel respectively. In the middle left panel information is displayed regarding the total earnings so far of the participant, his earnings in the last period and the present time period of the experiment. The participant submits his price prediction for the next period in the lower middle panel. The individual earnings  $E$  per period are based on the quadratic error of the prediction:

$$E = \text{Max}\left\{1300 - \frac{1300}{49}(p_t - p_{h,t}^e)^2, 0\right\}, \quad (4)$$



and 1300 points corresponds to 0.5 Euro. Earnings were on average about 22 Euro in approximately 90 minutes.

### 3. Aggregate Market Behaviour

Results of the experiments are shown in Figure 2 (6 markets with negative feedback) and Figure 3 (7 markets with positive feedback). Each individual panel shows, for one experimental market, the realized prices and the six time series of individual predictions. Two characteristics of the data catch the eye immediately. First, in the negative feedback market prices tend to go through an initial phase of high volatility, neatly converging afterwards to the equilibrium price 60, only to be disturbed occasionally by the impact of a mistake by one of the group members. Allowing for a short initial learning phase, for all six negative feedback markets average prices are statistically not significantly different at a 5% level from what the rational expectations hypothesis (i.e. when *all* agents are rational) predicts. Volatility is not significantly different at a 5% level from the volatility under rational expectations for the first (N1) and fourth (N4) market.

In contrast, the results for the positive feedback markets are strikingly different. Although the heterogeneity of predictions decreases in a much shorter period, a quick convergence to the equilibrium price does *not* occur. Rather, most groups show a slow oscillatory movement around the equilibrium price of 60, and come close to it only in the very long run. Average prices and volatility in all positive feedback groups are significantly different at a 5% level from the price and volatility under rational expectations. Second, in both treatments there is little dispersion between individual predictions within experimental markets, which is particularly remarkable for the non-converging positive feedback treatment. Participants in the positive feedback treatment *quickly coordinate* on a common non-equilibrium prediction rule.

Convergence of prices and coordination of expectations is demonstrated in more detail in Figure 4. The upper panel shows the median over 6 or 7 markets of the absolute difference between the market price and the equilibrium price of 60 for both treatments. We find a much higher degree of convergence to the equilibrium price in the negative feedback treatment, already after period two (statistically significant at 5% in 44 of the 48 periods, Wilcoxon test). Coordination of expectations is measured by the standard deviation of the individual expectations of the market participants. The lower panel shows the median over 6 or 7 markets of these standard deviations for each period. A low standard deviation implies a high level of consensus among the participants about the future price. We find that the standard deviation is higher (and therefore coordination is less) for the negative feedback treatment in the early periods 2-7 (statistically significant at 5%, Wilcoxon test). After period 7, coordination is very high in both treatments. Note that, outside of equilibrium, it pays off for participants in the negative feedback treatment to 'disagree' with the majority: if the average prediction is high, the realized price will be low. This drives the heterogeneity in predictions in the early periods and the fast convergence to the equilibrium price. In the positive feedback treatment, on the other hand, 'agreeing' with the majority pays off since the market price will be close to the average price prediction. This quick coordination of price predictions in the positive feedback treatment is surprising, since participants were not able to observe each others predictions during the experiment, making the coordination itself "blind". Individual price predictions and aggregate market prices can concisely be summarized as exhibiting "slow coordination and fast convergence" in the negative feedback treatment, and "fast coordination and slow convergence" in the positive feedback treatment.

#### 4. Expectations Rules

Before investigating individual forecasting strategies in the experiment, we consider two benchmarks of expectations, naïve and average price expectations.

##### *Two simple benchmark rules*

*Naïve expectations* means that all subjects use the last observation as their forecast, i.e.

$$p_{ht}^e = p_{t-1}, \quad (5)$$

and *average price expectations* refers to the case when all subjects take the average price as forecast (see e.g. Carlson (1968), Manning (1971) and Auster (1971)), i.e.

$$p_{ht}^e = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} p_j. \quad (6)$$

Figure 5 shows the realized market prices under naïve and average price expectations for both treatments. This figure suggests that naïve and average price expectations are *not* consistent with the laboratory experiments in Figures 2 and 3. For the cobweb treatment with naïve expectations (top left panel) convergence to the equilibrium price is much slower than in the experiments, and the persistent up and down price oscillations are much more regular than what has been observed in the experiments. Moreover, in contrast to the experiments the naïve forecast is systematically wrong as it is high (low) when realized prices turn out to be low (high). Average price expectations in the cobweb treatment (top right panel) leads to an extremely quick convergence to the equilibrium price, in fact already after two periods, which is faster than in the experiment. For the asset pricing treatment with naïve expectations (bottom left panel) slow monotonic convergence to the equilibrium price occurs. The key difference with the experiments is the absence of (slow) oscillatory movements under naïve expectations. The asset pricing treatment with average expectations (bottom right panel) shows an extremely slow movement in the direction of the fundamental equilibrium, and, in

contrast to the experiments, the market price stays far below 60 for all 50 time periods. From these simple simulations we conclude that naïve and average expectations lead to quite different results for both treatments. None of these benchmark forecasting rules gives a good description of individual forecasting in the experiments.

### *Individual Prediction Strategies*

Linear prediction rules, with 3 lags in prices and expected prices, of the form

$$p_{h,t}^e = c + \sum_{i=1}^3 o_i p_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^3 s_i p_{h,t-i}^e + \mathbf{n}_t, \quad (7)$$

have been estimated for each individual participant. Surprisingly, predictions of 71 out of 78 participants could be described successfully (i.e. without autocorrelation in the residuals) this way (see Appendix C, Tables 1 and 2<sup>3</sup>). Moreover, the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of the estimated linear forecasting rules is small for both treatments, with mean 1.15 for the cobweb treatment and mean 0.66 for the asset pricing treatment, which would correspond to high earnings of 1282 points for the cobweb treatment and 1269 points for the asset pricing treatment, both close to the maximum of 1300 points (=0.5 Euro) per time period. These results suggest that participants use simple linear forecasting rules based on recent information to form predictions. The time series of individual forecasts already suggested that individual forecasts are close to the equilibrium price level for the cobweb treatment (see Figure 2) and fluctuate slowly around the equilibrium level for the asset pricing treatment (see

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<sup>3</sup> In the estimations we have excluded a short initial learning phase. The learning phase ends when the majority of individual forecasts (i.e. at least 4 subjects in each group) is within 5% of the realized market price. In the asset pricing treatment the initial learning phase lasts only 3 periods, whereas in the cobweb treatment it lasts 7 periods. We have also excluded a few exceptional time periods from the estimations, with outliers in individual forecasts. These excluded periods are as follows. For the six Cobweb groups: {44}, {8, ..., 12}, {36, 45, ..., 50},  $\emptyset$ , {21, 41} and {8, ..., 15, 22} respectively. For the seven Asset Pricing groups:  $\emptyset$ ,  $\emptyset$ ,  $\emptyset$ , {39}, {7, ..., 16, 28, 34, 45}, {15, 25, 35} and  $\emptyset$  respectively. The time series of individual forecasts in Figures 1 and 2 show that these periods indeed show individual outliers in forecasting, probably due to typing errors or individual experimentation.

Figure 3). For the estimated individual linear forecasting rules (7) this can be checked, by looking at the corresponding long run equilibrium price level

$$p^* = \frac{c}{1 - \sum_{i=1}^3 o_i - \sum_{i=1}^3 s_i}. \quad (8)$$

Figure 6 shows frequency distributions of the long run equilibrium price level  $p^*$  in (8), corresponding to the estimated individual forecasting rules for the cobweb treatment (top panel) and the asset pricing treatment (bottom panel). For the cobweb treatment 34 forecasting rules from Table 1 (excluding the 2 rules with residual autocorrelations) have been used, and more than 60% of these have an equilibrium level  $p^*$  very close (within distance 0.5) to the fundamental equilibrium price 60. The mean equilibrium level is 56.90, with standard deviation 9.79; the null hypothesis that the equilibrium level  $p^* = 60$  can not be rejected (p-value 0.078). For the asset pricing treatment 37 forecasting rules from Table 2 (excluding the 5 rules with residual autocorrelations) have been used, and most rules have an equilibrium level fairly close to the fundamental equilibrium price 60. The mean equilibrium level is 64.97, with a much higher standard deviation of 30.34. Also for the asset pricing treatment; the null hypothesis that the equilibrium level is  $p^* = 60$  can not be rejected (p-value 0.332).

Apparently, in both treatments individuals are able to learn the fundamental, long run equilibrium level  $p^* = 60$ , for example by observing that the average price is close to 60. This motivates an even simpler linear individual forecasting rule

$$p_{h,t}^e = \mathbf{a}_1 p_{t-1} + \mathbf{a}_2 p_{h,t-1}^e + (1 - \mathbf{a}_1 - \mathbf{a}_2)60 + \mathbf{b}(p_{t-1} - p_{t-2}) + \mathbf{n}_t. \quad (9)$$

This rule has a simple *behavioural* explanation, as the forecast is simply a weighted average of the last observed price  $p_{t-1}$ , the last individual forecast  $p_{h,t-1}^e$  and the long run equilibrium level 60, together with a trend term  $\mathbf{b}(p_{t-1} - p_{t-2})$ , measuring how participants respond to the

last price change. Since the rule (9) is based upon one lag in price, forecast and price change, we refer to it as the “*first order heuristic*”. Surprisingly, for 40 of the 78 participants the first order heuristic can be successfully estimated, and the estimated parameters are given in Table 3 in Appendix C and represented graphically in Figure 7.

Concerning individual prediction strategies, there are two important differences between the positive and negative feedback treatments. In the case of positive feedback (21 prediction rules, black dots in Figure 7), the trend parameter  $\beta$  is typically highly significant (15 rules) and strongly positive ( $>0.5$ , for 11 rules). In the negative feedback case, only 3 rules have a significant  $\beta$ , one slightly positive (0.06) and two negative values (-0.44 and -0.38, thus acting as contrarians). Trend following strategies are thus more important in the case of positive feedback, while some individuals behave as contrarians in the negative feedback case. The second difference between the treatments is that, in the case of positive feedback, the sum  $\mathbf{a}_1 + \mathbf{a}_2$  is typically close to 1 ( $>0.9$  for 19 rules), implying that the equilibrium level  $p^* = 60$  gets little weight in individual forecasting. In contrast, for the negative feedback treatment, only for 3 rules  $\mathbf{a}_1 + \mathbf{a}_2 > 0.9$ , and typically it is much smaller, implying that the equilibrium price level 60 gets high weight in individual forecasting<sup>4</sup>.

Summarizing one can say that, in the positive feedback environment participants tend to base their prediction on a weighted average of the last price and the last prediction, and extrapolate trends in past prices from there ( $\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2 > 0$ ,  $\mathbf{a}_1 + \mathbf{a}_2$  close to 1 and  $\mathbf{b} > 0$ ), without taking the equilibrium price into account. Individual forecasting in the positive feedback treatment may thus be described as *naïve and adaptive trend following*. On the other hand, most of the estimated prediction rules from the negative feedback treatment (19 prediction

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<sup>4</sup>From Table 3 it can be seen that for 8 individual rules in the negative feedback treatment, all estimated coefficients  $\mathbf{a}_1$ ,  $\mathbf{a}_2$  and  $\beta$  are 0, so that the individual forecasts in (9) reduce to a constant forecast 60. Comparing these results to Table 1, it can be seen that for 7 of these individuals the corresponding estimated linear rules in (10) reduce to a constant close to 60.

rules, yellow dots in Figure 7) lie along the positive  $\mathbf{a}_1$ -axis ( $\mathbf{a}_2$  and  $\mathbf{b}$  close to 0), implying that typically predictions in that treatment are a weighted average between the last observed price and the equilibrium price level. Individual forecasting in the negative feedback treatment may thus be described as *adaptive-average price expectations*.

## 5. Discussion

Neo-classical economic theory assumes that individuals form expectations rationally (Muth (1961), Lucas (1972)). This implies that on average market participants make correct price forecasts, and that prices quickly converge to their market clearing equilibrium values, thereby leading to an efficient allocation of resources (Fama (1970, 1991)). However, large fluctuations of prices on financial markets have fueled the debate whether this is indeed a good description of economic behaviour (Shiller (1981), DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and Garber (1990)). Our findings show that whether rational expectations (i.e. when *all* agents have rational expectations) gives a good description of aggregate market behaviour depends upon the underlying expectations feedback structure. In fact, commonly observed differences between experimental commodity and financial markets (Smith (1962), Smith et al. (1988), Gode and Sunder (1993), Noussair et al. (2002) and Hommes et al. (2005)) may be attributed to a large extent to this feedback structure. Prices in commodity markets where speculative demand only plays a limited role will be much more stable and closer to the equilibrium value when the product (and production technology) has been around for a while, and commodity prices can fluctuate wildly only for relatively new products (e.g. computer chips, see The Economist, 1996a,b, 2001). The fact that some established commodity markets regularly exhibit fluctuations is consistent with our conclusions, since these fluctuations may be attributed to the presence of demand-driven speculators (Cashin et al. (2002), and Canoles et al. (1998)). In contrast, due to the positive feedback structure driven by speculative demand,

financial markets can easily diverge from the equilibrium price and be relatively unstable and excessively volatile.

What causes these differences in aggregate outcome? Two important differences between the treatments have been observed: (i) in the positive feedback treatment market prices are characterized by *slow oscillatory movements*, while in the negative feedback treatment market prices converge to the steady state  $p^* = 60$ , within about 10 periods, and (ii) in the positive feedback treatment *coordination of individual forecasting rules* is extremely *quick*, in fact within 3 periods, while in the negative feedback treatment heterogeneity in forecasts persist for about 10 periods, and coordination only occurs after the market price has converged to its steady state. Our estimation results of individual forecasting rules clearly provides an explanation for the oscillatory price movements in the positive feedback treatment. In a market with positive feedback, *trend following behaviour* is much more prominent than in a market with negative feedback. In markets dominated by positive feedback, when a majority of individuals uses a trend following strategy, other individuals have an incentive to use such a strategy too, thus reinforcing trends in prices. In contrast, in markets dominated by negative feedback when many individuals adopt trend following strategies, it becomes more profitable for other agents to go against the trend. As a consequence, trend following strategies do *not* survive in a market dominated by negative feedback, but play an important role in markets dominated by positive feedback, such as speculative asset markets. In particular, the survival of trend following strategies contributes to oscillatory price movements, persistent deviations from the fundamental benchmark and excess volatility.

Explaining the differences observed in the first ten periods of the experiments is more difficult, but the realized market prices in Figures 2 and 3 suggest the following tentative explanation. In the first period of an experiment, subjects make heterogeneous forecasts,



leading to some average forecast, say around 50. In the positive feedback treatment, the realized market price will then be fairly close to, but slightly above the average forecast, i.e. slightly above 50. In the second period, if most subjects put large weight to the observed market price (i.e. their forecasts are close to naïve expectations), this simple but plausible forecasting behaviour will lead to relatively small forecasting errors and coordination of forecasts, say close to 50, and a second realized market price close to, but slightly above the first observation. After this quick coordination of forecasts, realized market prices move slowly and, as our estimation of individual forecasting rules has shown, trend following behavior may reinforce slow oscillatory price movements. The initial stage of an experiment in the negative feedback treatment is quite different. Assuming heterogeneous forecasts in the first period with an average forecast of say 50, due to the negative feedback, market price will be pushed to the other side of the steady state price 60, leading to a realized market price close to 70. In the second period, when most subjects put large weight to the observed market price (i.e. their forecasts are close to naïve expectations), once more due to the negative feedback the next realized market price will be on the other side, that is, below the steady state price 60, with a value of say somewhat above 50. Quick coordination of individual forecasts therefore is unlikely in the case of negative feedback and subjects make large forecasting errors. Due to the negative feedback, prices fluctuate considerably in the initial phase of the experiments and, as shown in Figure 2, individual forecasts remain *heterogeneous* for a while. Naïve expectations and trend following rules perform bad in these circumstances, and it is more likely that subjects adopt some average or adaptive expectations rule. Fig. 2 shows that individual forecasts become less extreme and move in the direction of the average price, thus stabilizing price fluctuations and enforcing convergence to the steady state after about 10 periods.

Our results are in line with different, but related experiments in Fehr and Tyran (2002, 2005) in markets with strategic complements (positive feedback) and strategic substitutes

(negative feedback). See also Camerer and Fehr (2006) for an extensive recent discussion. Our results are also consistent with noise trader models (DeLong et al. (1990ab)) and herding models in finance (Kirman (1993), Lux (1995), Brock and Hommes (1998)), showing that simple trend following strategies may explain investor's behaviour in financial markets. Estimation of individual forecasting rules suggests an explanation for the differences between the treatments. We conjecture that models with *heterogeneous expectations* rules and *evolutionary* and *reinforcement* learning, e.g. as in Brock and Hommes (1997) and Branch (2004), may explain these different outcomes in markets with positive and negative feedback. Only in an environment where positive feedback is sufficiently strong, trend following strategies have a chance of surviving evolutionary competition. We leave this conjecture for future work.

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
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
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


**Figure 1:** The main experimental computer screen for one of the markets in the asset pricing treatment, as seen by one of the subjects. Subjects have information, both graphically and in a table, about previous realized market prices and previous own predictions. The Dutch labels of the computer screen translate as follows: “prijs” = price; “voorspelling” = prediction; “werkelijke prijs” = market price; “ronde” = round; “totale verdiensten” = total earnings; “verdiensten deze periode” = earnings this period; “Wat is uw voorspelling voor de volgende periode?” = What is your prediction for the next period?; “Een nieuwe ronde is begonnen” = A new round has started.






**Figure 2:** Prices and predictions in the negative feedback treatment. Each panel contains, for one experimental market, time series for the realized price (in red) and the time series of individual prediction of the six participants.




**Figure 3:** Prices and predictions in the positive feedback treatment. Each panel contains, for one experimental market, time series for the realized price (in red) and the time series of individual prediction of the six participants.




**Figure 4:** Upper panel gives the median, over the different groups, of the absolute difference between the market price and the equilibrium price; the lower panel gives the median, over the different groups, of the standard deviations of individual predictions. Solid lines correspond to the negative feedback treatment, broken lines correspond to the positive feedback treatment.


(a) cobweb, naive expectations




(b) cobweb, average expectations




(c) asset pricing, naive expectations




(d) asset pricing, average expectations



**Figure 5:** Realized market prices (blue) and predictions (red) for both treatments in the benchmark cases when all agents have naïve expectations (left panels) and average price expectations (right panels).



**Figure 6:** Frequency distribution of long run equilibrium price level  $p^*$  in (8), corresponding to estimated individual forecasting rules for cobweb treatment (top panel) and asset pricing treatment (bottom level). For the cobweb treatment 34 forecasting rules of Table 1 (excluding 2 rules with residual autocorrelations) have been used, and more than 60% has an equilibrium level very close to the true equilibrium price 60. For the asset pricing treatment 37 forecasting rules of Table 2 (excluding 5 rules with residual autocorrelations) have been used, and most rules have an equilibrium level fairly close to the true equilibrium price 60.



**Figure 7:** Prism of First-Order Heuristics containing the parameter vectors of the prediction rules of the form  $p_{h,t}^e = \mathbf{a}_1 p_{t-1} + \mathbf{a}_2 p_{h,t-1}^e + (1 - \mathbf{a}_1 - \mathbf{a}_2)60 + \mathbf{b}(p_{t-1} - p_{t-2}) + \mathbf{n}_t$ . The smaller graph on the right is a top-down view of the prism. Yellow dots depict prediction rules from participants in the negative feedback treatment and black dots depict rules from participants in the positive feedback treatment. Positive (negative) values of  $\mathbf{b}$  correspond to a trend following (trend reversing) prediction rule. The special cases “naivety”, “fundamentalism” and “obstinacy” correspond to  $p_{h,t}^e = p_{t-1}$ ,  $p_{h,t}^e = 60$  and  $p_{h,t}^e = p_{h,t-1}^e$ , respectively. Finally, “adaptation” refers to a prediction rule of the form  $p_{h,t}^e = \mathbf{a} p_{t-1} + (1 - \mathbf{a}) p_{h,t-1}^e$ , with  $0 < \mathbf{a} < 1$ .

## Appendix A: Expectations Feedback Models

This appendix describes the cobweb and asset pricing model underlying the negative and positive feedback systems. In both treatments, the price adjustment rule is of the general form

$$p_t = p_{t-1} + \Gamma \sum_{h=1}^H ED(p_{t-1}, p_{h,t}^e), \quad (\text{A1})$$

where the excess demand function  $ED$  depends upon the market price  $p_{t-1}$  and individual forecasts  $p_{h,t}^e$  and  $\Gamma$  is the speed of adjustment. In real markets, the price adjustment rule (1) depends upon lagged market price  $p_{t-1}$  and individual forecasts  $p_{h,t}^e$ . In the experiments however, parameters have been fixed in such a way that the dependence of  $p_t$  on  $p_{t-1}$  cancels out, in order to keep the setting as simple as possible and to isolate the effect of the expectations feedback. In the experiments therefore, (A1) is of the simpler form

$$p_t = f(\overline{p_t^e}), \quad (\text{A2})$$

where  $\overline{p_t^e}$  is the *average price forecast* of all subjects in the market. Since we assume demand and supply to be linear, in the experiments the map  $f$  in (A2) is linear, with positive respectively negative slope.

### *Negative feedback: the cobweb framework.*

The market with negative expectations feedback used in the experiment is based on the classical cobweb or hog cycle model. The cobweb model has served as a benchmark framework to study various expectations schemes, e.g. naïve expectations (Ezekiel (1938)), adaptive expectations (Nerlove (1958)), rational expectations (Muth (1961)), OLS learning (Bray and Savin (1986)), genetic algorithm learning (Arifovic (1994)) and heterogeneous expectations (Brock and Hommes (1997)). Originally the model was mainly applied to

agricultural commodities such a corn or hogs, but later on it has e.g. also been used as a model for the demand for lawyers, engineers (Freeman (1975), (1976)) and public school teachers (Zarkin (1985)) and the demand for oil (Krugman (2001)). The key feature of the model is a fixed production lag, so production decisions by price-taking firms are based on a forecast of the market price in the next time period. Let  $D(p_t)$  be a nonnegative and monotonically decreasing demand function and let  $S(p_{h,t}^e)$  be the nonnegative supply function of firm  $h$ , derived from expected profit maximization. Supply of firm  $h$  in the next period depends upon the expected price,  $p_{h,t}^e$ , for that period by that firm. The second order condition for profit maximization implies that  $S$  is a non-decreasing function. Moreover, we assume that all firms have the same supply function. In the model equality between demand and supply in each period is not required, but in each period the market price is adjusted in the direction of the excess demand, the trade gap itself being absorbed by a hypothetical market maker. An increase of the price forecast leads to increasing production, a decreasing excess demand and therefore a lower market price. The following price-adjustment formula was used:

$$p_t = p_{t-1} + \mathbf{I} \left( D(p_{t-1}) - \sum_{h=1}^H S(p_{h,t}^e) \right) + \mathbf{e}_t. \quad (\text{A3})$$

The expression between brackets represents excess demand, where the market maker uses demand in period  $t-1$  as a proxy for demand in period  $t$ . We assume there are  $H$  suppliers, only differing in the way they form expectations. In the laboratory experiment we take  $H=6$ . The market maker adjusts the market price proportionally to the excess demand, with a positive price adjustment coefficient  $\alpha$ . The term  $\mathbf{e}_t$  is a random term, representing e.g. small uncertainties in demand; in the laboratory experiment  $\mathbf{e}_t \sim N(0, 1/4)$ . In the cobweb treatment in the experiment, the participants act as advisors to the producers in the market, so their individual price expectations  $p_{h,t}^e$  determine aggregate supply. The demand function is taken



to be linearly decreasing,  $D(p_t) = a - bp_t$ , and the supply function is linearly increasing,  $S(p_{h,t}^e) = sp_{h,t}^e$ .

For the laboratory experiments we chose parameter values  $s=1/6$  and  $b=21/20$ ,  $I=1/b=20/21$  and, for the intercept of the demand function,  $a=123$ . The (unknown) price adjustment rule then becomes:<sup>5</sup>

$$p_t = \frac{20}{21} \left( 123 - \bar{p}_t^e \right) + e_t, \quad (\text{A4})$$

where  $\bar{p}_t^e = \frac{1}{6} \sum_{h=1}^6 p_{h,t}^e$  is the average prediction of the six participants in the experimental market.

***Positive feedback: an asset pricing framework.***

The second market in our laboratory experiment consists of a standard asset-pricing model (see Cuthbertson (1996), Campbell et al. (1997), and Brock and Hommes (1998)). Demand of speculators for a risky asset depends positively upon the asset's expected price increase. Investors can either invest in a risk-free asset (e.g. a government bond) with a fixed gross return  $1+r$ , or invest in a risky asset (e.g. a stock) paying an uncertain dividend  $y_t$  in each period. In this model, excess demand for the risky asset leads to an increase in the asset price, and excess supply to a decrease (see Beja and Goldman (1980)). Since in the experiment demand was taken to be an increasing function of the price predictions, as would be natural in the case of a stock or some other financial asset, our asset pricing treatment was driven by positive expectations feedback, which, to a certain extent, confirmed any tendency in the

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<sup>5</sup>For this choice of the parameters, the lagged price  $p_{t-1}$  drops from the price adjustment rule (A3), and (A4) is equivalent to the classical cobweb model with the market price  $p_t$  determined by market clearing.

participants' beliefs about future prices. As in the cobweb model above, a market maker adapts prices in proportion to excess demand and the actual development of prices is given by

$$p_t = p_{t-1} + \mathbf{I} \left( \sum_{h=1}^H \frac{E_{h,t}(p_t + y_t - (1+r)p_{t-1})}{a\mathbf{s}^2} - z^s \right) + \mathbf{e}_t. \quad (\text{A5})$$

Excess demand is given by aggregate demand, which consists of the sum of individual demand functions of the traders in the market, minus the supply  $z^s$  of shares of the risky asset, assumed to be constant. The expression for the demand function is standard in finance and obtained from mean-variance maximization of next period's expected wealth, where  $a$  equals the coefficient of risk aversion,  $E_{h,t}(p_t + y_t - (1+r)p_{t-1})$  is the belief of trader  $h$  about excess return, and  $\mathbf{s}^2$  is the belief about the conditional variance of excess returns, here assumed to be constant for all periods and all traders. Each participant in the experiment acts as an advisor to a trader (say a large pension fund) informing them of their price prediction  $p_{h,t}^e = E_{h,t}(p_t)$ , which the trader then uses to calculate her demand function. Six participants form a market in the experiment, i.e.  $H = 6$ .

To achieve symmetry between the positive and negative feedback treatment, we choose parameters such that the treatments only differ in the sign of the expectations feedback. Fixing parameters  $r = 1/20$ ,  $a\mathbf{s}^2 = 6$ ,  $z^s = 1$ ,  $\mathbf{I} = 20/21$  and assuming  $E_{h,t}(y_t) = 4$  for all  $h$  and  $t$  we get, for the positive feedback treatment, the price adjustment rule:<sup>6</sup>

$$p_t = \frac{20}{21} \left( \overline{p}_t^e + 3 \right) + \mathbf{e}_t, \quad (\text{A6})$$

where, as before,  $\overline{p}_t^e$  defines average price expectations over all subjects, and  $\mathbf{e}_t \sim N(0, 1/4)$  is a random term, representing e.g. small random fluctuations in the supply of the risky asset.

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<sup>6</sup> As in the cobweb treatment, for this choice of the parameters, the lagged price  $p_{t-1}$  drops from the price adjustment rule (A5), so that for both treatments the  $p_t$  is determined by average market expectations.

## **Appendix B: Experimental Instructions**

During each of the four experimental sessions, a short welcoming message was read aloud from paper, after which the participants were randomly assigned to a cubicle in the computer lab. In each cubicle there was a computer, some experimental instructions on paper and some blank paper with a pen. The two treatments had similar instructions that differed only in their description of the market environment. When all the participants were seated, they were asked to read the instructions on their desks. After a few minutes, they were given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the instructions, after which the experiment started. When the 50 time periods were completed, the participants were asked to remain seated and fill in the questionnaire, which was subsequently handed out to them. After a reasonable amount of time, the participants were called to the ante -room one by one to hand in the questionnaire and receive their earnings, in cash. The participants left the computer lab after receiving their earnings.

The experimental instructions the participants read in their cubicles consisted of three parts, totalling five pages. The first part contained general information about the market the experiment was about to simulate, which was of course treatment-specific. The second part contained an explanation of the computer program used during the experiment. The third part displayed a table relating the absolute prediction error made in any single period to the amount of credits earned in that period. The conversion rate between credits and euros, being 2600 credits to 1 euro, was made public by announcement, since it was not listed with the table. The questionnaire after the experiment contained 19 questions, the first 10 of which could be answered only by the integers 1 through 5. The experimental instructions will be translated below.

## ***Translation of experimental instructions for negative feedback treatment***

### **Experimental instructions**

The shape of the artificial market used by the experiment, and the role you will have in it, will be explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the backside of this sheet of paper.

### **General information**

You are an advisor of an importer who is active on a market for a certain product. In each time period the importer needs a good prediction of the price of the product. Furthermore, the price should be predicted one period ahead, since importing the good takes some time. As the advisor of the importer you will predict the price  $P(t)$  of the product during 50 successive time periods. Your earnings during the experiment will depend on the accuracy of your predictions. The smaller your prediction errors, the greater your earnings.

### **About the market**

The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. The size of demand is dependent on the price. If the price goes up, demand will go down. The supply on the market is determined by the importers of the product. Higher price predictions make an importer import a higher quantity, increasing supply. There are several large importers active on this market and each of them is advised by a participant of this experiment. Total supply is largely determined by the sum of the individual supplies of these importers. Besides the large importers, a number of small importers is active on the market, creating small fluctuations in total supply.

### **About the price**

The price is determined as follows. If total demand is larger than total supply, the price will rise. Conversely, if total supply is larger than total demand, the price will fall.

### **About predicting the price**

The only task of the advisors in this experiment is to predict the market price  $P(t)$  in each time period as accurately as possible. The price (and your prediction) can never become negative and always lies between 0 and 100 euros in the first period. The price and the prediction in period 2 through 50 is only required to be positive. The price will be predicted one period ahead. At the beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction for period 1,  $V(1)$ . When all participants have submitted their predictions for the first period, the market price  $P(1)$  for this period will be made public. Based on the prediction error in period 1,  $P(1) - V(1)$ , your earnings in the first period will be calculated. Subsequently, you are asked to enter your prediction for period 2,  $V(2)$ . When all participants have submitted their prediction for the second period, the market price for that period,  $P(2)$ , will be made public and your earnings will be calculated, and so on, for 50 consecutive periods. The information you have to form a prediction at period  $t$  consists of: All market prices up to time period  $t-1$ :  $\{P(t-1), P(t-2), \dots, P(1)\}$ ; All your predictions up until time period  $t-1$ :  $\{V(t-1), V(t-2), \dots, V(1)\}$ ; Your total earnings at time period  $t-1$ .

### **About the earnings**

Your earnings depend only on the accuracy of your predictions. The better you predict the price in each period, the higher will be your total earnings. The attached table lists all possible earnings.

When you are done reading the experimental instructions, you may continue reading the computer instructions, which have been placed on your desk as well.

## ***Translation of experimental instructions for positive feedback treatment***

### **Experimental instructions**

The shape of the artificial market used by the experiment, and the role you will have in it, will be explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the backside of this sheet of paper.

### **General information**

You are an advisor of a trader who is active on a market for a certain product. In each time period the trader needs to decide how many units of the product he will buy, intending to sell them again the next period. To take an optimal decision, the trader requires a good prediction of the market price in the next time period. As the advisor of the trader you will predict the price  $P(t)$  of the product during 50 successive time periods. Your earnings during the experiment will depend on the accuracy of your predictions. The smaller your prediction errors, the greater your earnings.

### **About the market**

The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. Supply and demand on the market are determined by the traders of the product. Higher price predictions make a trader demand a higher quantity. A high price prediction makes the trader willing to buy the product, a low price prediction makes him willing to sell it. There are several large traders active on this market and each of them is advised by a participant of this experiment.

Total supply is largely determined by the sum of the individual supplies and demands of these traders. Besides the large traders, a number of small traders is active on the market, creating small fluctuations in total supply and demand.

### **About the price**

The price is determined as follows. If total demand is larger than total supply, the price will rise. Conversely, if total supply is larger than total demand, the price will fall.

### **About predicting the price**

The only task of the advisors in this experiment is to predict the market price  $P(t)$  in each time period as accurately as possible. The price (and your prediction) can never become negative and lies always between 0 and 100 euros in the first period. The price and the prediction in period 2 through 50 is only required to be positive. The price will be predicted one period ahead. At the beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction for period 1,  $V(1)$ . When all participants have submitted their predictions for the first period, the market price  $P(1)$  for this period will be made public. Based on the prediction error in period 1,  $P(1) - V(1)$ , your earnings in the first period will be calculated. Subsequently, you are asked to enter your prediction for period 2,  $V(2)$ . When all participants have submitted their prediction for the second period, the market price for that period,  $P(2)$ , will be made public and your earnings will be calculated, and so on, for 50 consecutive periods. The information you have to form a prediction at period  $t$  consists of: All market prices up to time period  $t-1$ :  $\{P(t-1), P(t-2), \dots, P(1)\}$ ; All your predictions up until time period  $t-1$ :  $\{V(t-1), V(t-2), \dots, V(1)\}$ ; Your total earnings at time period  $t-1$ .

### **About the earnings**

Your earnings depend only on the accuracy of your predictions. The better you predict the price in each period, the higher will be your total earnings. The attached table lists all possible earnings.

When you are done reading the experimental instructions, you may continue reading the computer instructions, which have been placed on your desk as well.

## ***Translation of computer instructions***

### **Computer instructions**

The way the computer program works that will be used in the experiment, is explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the backside of this sheet of paper.

The mouse does not work in this program.

Your earnings in the experiment depend on the accuracy of your predictions. A smaller prediction error in each period will result in higher earnings.

To enter your prediction you can use the numbers, the decimal point and, if necessary, the backspace key on the keyboard.

Your prediction can have two decimal numbers, for example 30.75. Pay attention not to enter a comma instead of a point. Never use the comma. Press enter if you have made your choice.

The better your prediction, the more credits you will earn. On your desk is a table listing your earnings for all possible prediction errors.

For example, your prediction was 13.42. The true market price turned out to be 12.13. This means that the prediction error is:  $13.42 - 12.13 \approx 1.30$ . The table then says your earnings are 1255 credits (as listed in the third column [this is a typing error, it should be second column]).

The available information for predicting the price of the product in period  $t$  consists of: All product prices from the past up to period  $t-1$ ; Your predictions up to period  $t-1$ ; Your earnings until then.

[Figure of computerscreen]

### **The computer screen.**

The instructions below refer to this figure.

In the upper left corner a graph will be displayed consisting of your predictions and of the true



prices in each period. This graph will be updated at the end of each period.

In the rectangle in the middle left you will see information about the number of credits you have earned in the last period and the number you have earned in total. The time period is also displayed here, possibly along with other relevant information.

On the right hand side of the screen the experimental results will be displayed, that is, your predictions and the true prices for at most the last 20 periods.

At the moment of submitting your price prediction, the rectangle in the lower left side of the figure will appear. When all participants have subsequently submitted their predictions, the results for the next period will be calculated.

When everyone is ready reading the instructions, we will begin the experiment. If you have questions now or during the experiment, raise your hand. Someone will come to you for assistance.

### Appendix C: Estimation Results of Individual Forecasting Rules.

Part.	$c$	$p_{-1}$	$p_{-2}$	$p_{-3}$	$p_{-1}^e$	$p_{-2}^e$	$p_{-3}^e$	$R^2$	AC	Eq.	MSE
1	53.67	0.1080	0	0	0	0	0	0.2013	No	60.17	0.425
2	29.75	0.7002	0	0	0	-0.1957	0	0.8795	No	60.04	0.668
3	25.47	0	0.2431	0	0	0	0	0.0983	No	33.65	0.613
4	23.30*	0.4213	0	0	0	0	0	0.1385	No	43.72	0.667
5	32.90*	0.3919	-0.3136	0	0.3750	0	0	0.3077	No	60.18	0.925
6	39.48	0.3255	0.2009	0	-0.5089	0	0.3240	0.6504	No	59.95	0.593
7	87.60	0	0	0	0	-0.1772	-0.2876	0.3478	No	59.80	1.266
8	10.26*	0.0111	0	0	0.0306	0	0	0.1912	No	10.71	1.363
9	32.15	0.0953	0	0	0	0	0.3662	0.7756	Yes	—	0.709
10	29.38	0.2818	0.2317	0	0	0	0	0.2821	No	60.39	0.792
11	16.13	0.2697	0.1532	0	0	0.3088	0	0.4381	No	60.12	0.053
12	20.81	0.6534	0	0	0	0	0	0.5102	No	60.04	1.157
13	-0.489*	0.3003	0.4690	0	0	0.2218	0	0.7600	No	54.94	0.814
14	59.15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0000	No	59.15	1.126
15	7.433	0.8692	0	0	0	0	0	0.9412	No	56.83	1.100
16	31.26	0	0.4799	0	0	0	0	0.4220	No	60.10	1.232
17	-170.6	0	0	0	-1.356	1.538	3.671	0.9670	No	59.80	1.105
18	82.00	-0.7656	0.3995	0	0	0	0	0.7943	No	60.02	0.660
19	34.40	0.4264	0	0	0	0	0	0.5653	No	59.97	0.511
20	45.60	0.2423	0	0	0	0	0	0.3077	No	60.18	0.429
21	60.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0000	No	60.00	0.292
22	20.97	0.6489	0	0	0	0	0	0.7385	Yes	—	0.519
23	16.56	0.3326	0.3946	0	0	0	0	0.2316	No	60.70	0.543
24	60.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0000	No	60.00	0.292
25	44.31	0.2653	0	0	0	0	0	0.2074	No	60.31	2.867
26	23.03	-0.2041	0.4658	0	0.3586	0	0	0.6671	No	60.65	1.950
27	60.98	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0000	No	60.98	3.960
28	58.89	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0000	No	58.89	2.926
29	45.38	0	0	-0.0898	0	0	0	0.5408	No	59.85	0.805
30	5.533*	0.9115	0	0	0	0	0	0.7367	No	52.52	6.158
31	5.767*	0.5157	0	0	0	0.3906	0	0.7284	No	61.55	0.687
32	27.21	0.4251	0.1179	0	0	0	0	0.6324	No	59.54	0.588
33	90.46	0	0	0	0	0	-0.5047	0.2533	No	60.12	0.482
34	59.66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0000	No	59.66	0.469
35	45.71	0.2338	0	0	0	0	0	0.2004	No	59.66	0.656
36	60.48	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0000	No	60.48	0.910

**Table 1:** Estimation Individual Forecasting Rules (negative feedback).

Prediction rules for the 36 participants of the negative feedback treatment (least squares estimation of equation (7)). The first column shows participants' numbers, clustered according to group; the second through eighth column show estimates of the coefficients; the ninth and tenth columns show the R-squared statistic and report on autocorrelation in the residuals up to the 20<sup>th</sup> order (Ljung-Box Q-statistics, 5% level); the last two columns contain the long run equilibrium price and the mean squared error of the estimated rule. Insignificant variables were eliminated one by one, largest p value first, until all p values were below 5%. An asterisk in the second column indicates that the constant is insignificant.

Part.	$c$	$p_{-1}$	$p_{-2}$	$p_{-3}$	$p_{-1}^e$	$p_{-2}^e$	$p_{-3}^e$	$R^2$	AC	Eq.	MSE
1	-0.790*	1.675	0	-0.4329	-0.2324	0	0	0.9965	No	81.44	0.622
2	-0.682*	1.340	-0.5007	0	0.4642	-0.2914	0	0.9980	No	56.36	0.708
3	-1.176*	1.724	0	-0.3995	-0.3069	0	0	0.9932	No	66.82	0.738
4	-1.121	1.893	-0.8748	0	0	0	0	0.9971	No	61.59	0.518
5	0.417*	1.443	-0.8745	0	0.4264	0	0	0.9975	No	81.76	0.529
6	-0.817*	1.787	-0.7724	0	0	0	0	0.9982	No	55.96	0.538
7	0.742*	1.184	0	-0.1698	0	0	0	0.9964	Yes	—	0.550
8	-0.179*	1.463	-0.4552	0	0	0	0	0.9938	No	22.95	0.536
9	0.657*	1.220	-0.7315	0	0.5006	0	0	0.9969	No	60.28	0.477
10	0.339*	1.285	0	0	0	-0.2887	0	0.9969	No	91.62	0.381
11	0.693*	1.368	-0.8523	0	0.4743	0	0	0.9948	No	69.30	0.472
12	0.223*	1.851	0	0	-0.3270	-0.3533	-0.1723	0.9926	No	139.4	0.521
13	0.040*	1.450	-0.4504	0	0	0	0	0.9870	No	100.0	0.545
14	0.164*	1.069	-0.4708	0	0.4000	0	0	0.9943	No	91.11	0.460
15	-0.251*	1.275	-0.2989	-0.2706	0	0.2984	0	0.9981	No	64.36	0.649
16	2.170*	1.232	0	0	0	-0.2662	0	0.9780	No	63.45	1.136
17	-0.985*	1.251	0	-0.2345	0	0	0	0.9900	No	59.70	0.452
18	-0.1026	1.219	-0.5430	0	0.4372	0	0	0.9942	No	-0.07	0.417
19	2.411	1.084	0	0	0.2635	0	-0.3910	0.9940	No	55.43	0.880
20	1.956*	-0.9115	0	0	0	0	0	0.8975	No	1.02	0.875
21	1.382	1.641	-0.9729	0	0.3084	0	0	0.9978	No	58.81	0.515
22	2.687	1.6274	-0.4900	0	0	0	-0.1816	0.9934	No	60.79	0.683
23	1.475	1.441	0	-0.4659	0	0	0	0.9948	No	59.24	0.858
24	0.062*	1.943	-0.9439	0	0	0	0	0.9953	No	68.89	0.977
25	34.27	0	0.1203	0	0.3421	0.2670	-0.3179	0.9892	Yes	—	1.578
26	173.7*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0000	No	173.7	0.780
27	2.601	1.000	0	-0.1972	-0.0384	0.1215	0.0682	1.0000	Yes	—	1.000
28	4.160	1.005	0	0	0	-0.1025	0	0.9981	No	42.67	0.705
29	15.71	1.004	0	0.5544	-0.2446	-0.4973	-0.1217	0.9981	Yes	—	1.385
30	13.52	1.062	-0.5319	0.3410	0.2280	-0.0978	-0.2084	0.9995	No	65.28	0.860
31	2.295*	0.8857	0	-0.4284	0.5064	0	0	0.9866	No	63.22	1.336
32	0.7813*	1.117	-0.7796	0	0.6513	0	0	0.9927	No	69.14	0.823
33	-0.946*	1.767	-0.8572	0.1052	0	0	0	0.9937	No	63.07	1.665
34	8.501*	1.130	0	-0.4372	0	0	0	0.6584	No	27.67	0.905
35	1.851	1.182	0	-0.5068	0	0.2952	0	0.9931	Yes	—	1.385
36	14.01*	0.7478	0	0	0	0	0	0.2058	No	55.55	0.751
37	-3.020*	1.0498	0	0	0	0	0	0.9363	No	60.64	0.391
38	1.560	0.9728	0	0	0	0	0	0.9316	No	57.35	0.391
39	6.501	1.1315	-0.2359	0	0	0	0	0.9656	No	62.27	0.342
40	2.584*	1.043	0	0	0	-0.1619	0.0780	0.9719	No	63.18	0.298
41	1.739*	1.383	-0.4099	0	0	0	0	0.9443	No	64.65	0.360
42	1.113*	0.9327	-0.2968	0	0.3471	0	0	0.9569	No	65.47	0.445

**Table 2:** Estimation Individual Forecasting Rules (positive feedback).

Prediction rules for the 42 participants of the positive feedback treatment (least squares estimation of equation (7)). See the caption for Table 1 for more information.

PFOH Part.no.	$\alpha_1$	$\alpha_2$	$\beta$	Orig. part.no.	Orig. gr.no.	Label
1	0.7389	0	0	2	N1	Naive Fundamentalist
2	0	0	0	3	N1	None
3	0.9362	0	0	4	N1	Naive & Fundamentalist
4	0.1350	0.1923	0.0605	5	N1	Fundamentalist
5	0.5689	0.3480	0	8	N2	None
6	0.5553	0	0	12	N2	Naive Fundamentalist
7	0.7391	0	-0.4444	13	N3	None
8	0	0	0	14	N3	Naive & Fundamentalist
9	-0.3770	0	-0.3762	18	N3	Naive Fundamentalist
10	0.4016	0	0	19	N4	Naive Fundamentalist
11	0	0	0	21	N4	Fundamentalist
12	0	0	0	24	N4	Fundamentalist
13	0.2633	0	0	25	N5	Fundamentalist
14	0	0	0	27	N5	Naive & Fundamentalist
15	0	0	0	28	N5	Naive & Fundamentalist
16	0.9101	0	0	30	N5	Naive
17	0	0	0	34	N6	Fundamentalist
18	0.4321	0	0	35	N6	None
19	0	0	0	36	N6	None
20	1.5096	-0.5238	0	3	P1	Naive Trend Follower
21	1.0177	0	0.8591	4	P1	Naive Trend Follower
22	0.5227	0.4711	0.9118	5	P1	Adaptive Trend Follower
23	1.0142	0	0.7818	6	P1	None
24	0.4888	0.5000	0.7290	9	P2	Adaptive Trend Follower
25	0.4670	0.5269	0.9210	11	P2	Adaptive Trend Follower
26	0.9994	0	0.4609	13	P3	Naive Trend Follower
27	0.5369	0.4627	0.5587	14	P3	Adaptive Trend Follower
28	1.0090	0	0.2765	15	P3	Naive Trend Follower
29	0.9557	0	0	20	P4	Naive Trend Follower
30	0.6669	0.3089	0.9696	21	P4	None
31	0.9616	0	0.8678	22	P4	None
32	0.9989	0	0.9437	24	P4	Naive & Adaptive Tr.Foll.
33	0	0	0	26	P5	Naive & Adaptive Tr.Foll.
34	0.2831	0.7045	0.8266	32	P6	Adaptive Trend Follower
35	1.1366	-0.1226	0.6077	33	P6	Naive Trend Follower
36	0.7428	0	0	36	P6	Naive Trend Follower
37	1.0376	0	0	37	P7	None
38	0.9419	0	0	38	P7	None
39	1.0155	0	0.2907	41	P7	Naive Trend Follower
40	0.6370	0.3842	0.3182	42	P7	Adaptive Trend Follower

**Table 3:** *Estimation of Individual First Order Heuristics.*

Prediction rules for both treatments (least squares estimation of equation (9)) for the Prism of First-Order Heuristics. The first column is the number of relevant participants, clustered according to treatment; the second, third and fourth columns show estimates of the coefficients, estimated by eliminating the least significant variable until all p values were below 5%. This procedure was applied only to the linear prediction rules statistically equivalent to a rule in the Prism (Wald restriction test, 5% level). The fifth and sixth columns show the participant's original number and group (cf. Tables 1 and 2); the seventh checks for statistical equivalence with canonical rules (Wald restriction test, 5%).