Disconnected innovations: new urbanity in large-scale development projects: Zuidas Amsterdam, Ørestad Copenhagen and Forum Barcelona

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS: THE DISCONNECTED INNOVATION OF NEW URBANITY

In this study we analyzed three projects which all had an initial ambition to generate new urbanity. In the three previous chapters we analyzed the individual paths of development taken by Zuidas, Ørestad and Forum. In this concluding chapter the emphasis is on the comparison between the three cases. In Chapter two we explained that our study never intended to conclude with a quantitative or qualitative measurement of the ‘new urbanity’ in projects. This would also be quite difficult to achieve due to the general terms we used to define this concept. This study was not intended to be a forum for a contest between projects to find out which one scored best. Neither does it add to the debate on the possible virtues or disadvantages of new urbanity. However, given that new urbanity was a policy aimed for in these three (and other projects), it is interesting to compare the various conditions that have been created for its realisation, as well as to identify learning opportunities offered by the projects.

A literature study before the start of our empirical fieldwork resulted in the observation that ambitions for new urbanity are often present in large-scale development projects but that these generate hardly any satisfactory results. We studied this phenomenon in three representatives of the latest generation of projects to investigate to what extent successful conditions for new urbanity had been created. We expected the most important answers to be connected to the way projects were symbolic-cognitively and organisationally framed, how their operational domains were structured and to the extent to which the ambition for new urbanity had developed as an ‘ought’ dimension of agency.

As mentioned above, this concluding chapter focuses on the comparison between the three cases. We want to emphasize that a variety of factors make it difficult to make a comparison in a very strict meaning of the term. As far as possible in the context of a complex international qualitative case study, we tried to keep certain aspects stable since this gave us an opportunity to study their causal implications on other factors. The factors that we tried to keep relatively stable were the general initial ambitions of these projects to create a new central area for economic activities and its location outside the traditional urban area. These economic ambitions were complemented with initial ambitions to create a mixed-use urban place. Such goals had already been laid down in initial policy documents. All three projects were initiated in the early-mid 1990s and were located in medium-sized cities (1-3 million inhabitants) in Western European metropolitan regions.
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Our study focused primarily on the governance aspects of the realization of new urbanity. This does not mean that our investigation is totally detached from the urban ‘reality’. On the contrary, we maintain that there is a clear connection between forms of process-oriented data and the (eventual) spatial results of the built environment in these projects.

In our framework, this connection is made in the form of a study of the social norms that influenced the ‘ought character’ of action. The peculiarity of social norms is that they are mainly visible through action. In action situations they are shaped, validated or disconfirmed. This encouraged us to carry out a close investigation of the first building projects in the three cases as well, to understand the extent to which there was a normative reflection on this initial spatial concept. This does not mean that we believe in a straight relationship between social norms and action. Actors can also ignore social norms on new urbanity, or could invest in projects of new urbanity for a reason which was completely other than normative. However, we maintain that the concept of social norms is a subtle yet powerful tool that can shed light on the behaviour of actors, especially in situations in which coordination is required between a multitude of actors and in which there is a lack of capacity to hierarchical implement planning principles. We explained before, that we expected these two conditions to be characteristic of contemporary large-scale development projects.

Our investigation is not a test of the ‘success’ of the urbanity in a large-scale development project, purely on the basis of physical or other criteria. Instead, we try to reconstruct the relationship between the actual spatial results in these (early stages of) projects and the underlying processes of framing, decision-making and normative reflection on action.

Although these projects have certain common aspects, there is an almost unlimited range of institutional, legal, economic and geographic differences between the contexts in which these three projects were developed. However, we have decided that, instead of making a comprehensive analysis of these factors in advance, which would take up all our research time, we would investigate relevant context factors through an in-depth case study of our specific spatial project.

One of the most important differences between the projects which we took into account beforehand, however, was their variation in strategic organisational framing in the initial phase. Ørestad was primarily framed in an a local-national-international government domain, Zuidas started out by being framed as a local government-business sector undertaking, while Forum started on the basis of a frame that included different layers of government and the social, civic and cultural domain. Taking into account the constraints of our small sample of only three cases, this difference made it possible to explore some ideas on the relationship between strategic framing and the ambition for new urbanity.

In this concluding chapter we first compare our empirical results with the three main aspects of the conceptual framework we introduced in the second chapter, namely the strategic framing in the metropolitan action space, the operational domain and the social norms. After that we analyse our overall findings by answering our two main research questions. The last part of the conclusions deals with methodological and theoretical reflections and suggestions for practice and further research.
6.1 Comparing strategic framing between cases

We started our analysis of the three projects by identifying their strategic framing and its development over the course of time. It is important to remember that, in this part of the research, we study our research objects from a certain distance and make generalizations. This is useful for the sake of comparison and to acquire an initial understanding of the difference between the projects and their development over the course of time. The following stages of the research, in the operational domains and the social norms, offer opportunities for more in-depth and detailed analyses.

We made a distinction between two, closely-related aspects of framing. On the one hand we investigated the content of the strategic frames related to our three projects. We interpreted framing in this sense as the practice among a group of actors that conveys ideas, visions and concepts on the project’s common direction, including its ambition of ‘new urbanity’. On the other hand, we studied the organisational framing as a practice conveying the connectedness of the project to the metropolitan action space.

As regards strategic framing we studied two subquestions:

- To what extent has the ambition to realize new urbanity been reflected in the way projects are strategically framed and how does this framing developed (symbolic-cognitive framing)
- What dynamic in time is observable in the case studies in the way projects are organizationally framed in the four distinguished domains of the metropolitan action space? (organisational framing)

We presented the following hypothesis in Chapter two regarding the organisational framing:

Concepts of new urbanity are likely to be more successfully implemented if a project is positioned in all four domains of the metropolitan action space. We therefore expect projects that were first embedded in a limited fashion in certain domains of action to seek connections with other domains during their development in order to ‘repair’ this situation, if they want to fulfil their ambition of becoming a truly integrated location.

6.1.1 Symbolic-cognitive framing

A general observation is that the way these three projects are symbolic-cognitively framed exhibits great stability in the first planning and development period. In all the projects we identified overarching frames on (1) economic development, (2) new urbanity and (3) infrastructure development. However, we also found differences, especially in the changing importance of certain frames over time. We first compare the frames that were present in all three projects:

1. Economic development

All three projects are strongly framed as new internationally-oriented business locations. However, there are differences as regards the exact meaning of this frame as well as the success of the individual projects in becoming such business locations. To begin with the first, the ambition in Barcelona for a new business location in the Forum area is more a strategic than a material one. For example, no ambitions for a large office program were formulated for the Forum area and the immediate surroundings. How-
ever, the area was expected to accommodate some important supporting institutions for the realization of this ambition in a geographically wider area. The new conference centre is the most notable example of such a strategic investment. The real private economic impact is expected to affect a much wider area outside the Forum on the east side of Barcelona, via a number of other projects (22@, Sagrera, Glories).

Both Zuidas and Ørestad differ from Forum in that these projects do have a strong ambition to create an important economic concentration of office buildings and other economic activities within their project boundaries. It is true that these two projects cannot be understood either without studying their link to other areas. In the case of Amsterdam this means Schiphol airport and the rapidly-developing corridor from the airport to south-east Amsterdam. In Copenhagen the project is strongly linked to the road and rail bridge to Malmö and to the nearby airport. However, in the case of all three projects it applies that an important part of their framing as economic development area is their ambition to become a distinguishable entity within this wider collection of developments.

Although they have been framed as projects of economic development there are differences in the content of the economic frame between the three cases. Zuidas is framed as an internationally-competitive location for the headquarters and other large offices of businesses in the financial and legal services sector. The focus in Ørestad is on knowledge-related services and the project is trying to take economic advantage of the development of the bi-national Oresund region. From a narrow perspective, Forum and Diagonal Mar were framed to accommodate the ‘conference economy’ (conference centre, hotels) and the tourist and shopping economy, combined with some smaller investments in research and development. We can conclude that they collectively embody the changing predominant location of the planned locations for higher end economic activities, from the historic city to the periphery. However, there are major differences between the projects as regards their actual success in accommodating these economic investments in their respective quickly-evolving complex polycentric metropolitan areas in which opportunities for projects seem to be constantly changing.

On the basis of our sample we can conclude that Zuidas is definitely the most successfully developed as a business location. In a relatively short time span the area has developed into the most prestigious office location in the Netherlands. There are doubts, however, about its capacity to attract bigger international firms while the area is also still struggling to diversify from its main basis in finance to make it less vulnerable in the ongoing global restructuring in this sector, which seems to focus on clustering in bigger metropolitan areas in the long term. Nevertheless, its position is still far stronger than that of Ørestad. This project has not succeeded in acquiring a major position for economic development even within the Copenhagen area, in which the downtown (Østerbro) and the newly developing Sydhavnen area, together with the northern harbour areas of Hellerup are strong competitors. In Forum the results are more difficult to assess due to its more strategic interpretation of the economic ambition. After five years of development, the material results in the area are becoming visible with the conference centre, the hotels and the shopping mall all finished. It is very difficult, however, to assess their economic success at this moment in time.
2. New urbanity
We selected these three projects for our research since they had initial urban ambitions. However, our study shows that there are certainly differences between the symbolic-cognitive framing as new urbanity projects. In this respect Zuidas and Ørestad are the most alike since both projects are intended to create a high-density urban area with an almost equal proportion of offices and housing and with a quite traditional urban design layout of streets. The innovative aspects of these projects is therefore not to be found in their urban imagery as such, but in the idea of implementing this vision in a very high density location outside the traditional urban centre, an area normally dominated by scattered, low-density mono-functional use of space. Obviously there are differences as well between Copenhagen and Amsterdam regarding the specific spatial interpretation of this frame. We deal with this when we discuss the differences in activated social norms on new urbanity in section 6.3. At a quite abstract level, we can conclude that the ambition of new urbanity in Barcelona is – just like the economic ambition – framed at a much more strategic level compared to the other projects. The clearest example is the Forum event area. The ambition here was to make a previously industrial area accessible to a large public by creating new public spaces. In this sense Forum was not framed as a new traditional urban place, but more as a place for large-scale urban events and festivities. Based on an overall assessment of the frames on urban development in the three cases we conclude that they were developed and supported most vigorously (as we will see later) in the Amsterdam case. Here, the frame of the development of new urban area became dominant, while in Ørestad and Forum it was more of a secondary frame.

3. Infrastructure
A corresponding fact is that all three projects are also framed as important road and rail infrastructure projects. In the case of Forum (tram, subway station, new roads, tunnel for the ring road) and Ørestad (especially the new metro, but also a new train station and new roads), major new infrastructures were constructed specifically for the project to enhance the centrality of these locations. They were actually the first visible markers of these projects, before most ‘urban’ investments had started. Zuidas had a much stronger initial central position in infrastructure networks due to various infrastructure investments that took place before the project started, or were taking place independently of the project. In all three cases the framing as an infrastructure project was an integral part of the ambition since new infrastructure ambitions were developed during the development of the Zuidas project as well. Interestingly enough this symbolic-cognitive frame also caused difficulties in all three projects since it demanded organizational connectivity between different governance domains of the metropolitan action space.
All three projects were framed as infrastructure projects with metropolitan, national and international dimensions, although the latter was less well-developed in Barcelona. On a metropolitan scale, Forum increased its connectedness through a series of new roads, a new subway station next to the area and the new tram system. From an interregional and international dimension, the project tried to capitalize on the future HST stop in Sagrera, but this is quite a long way from the project area and is not yet operational. The location of Forum is not close to the airport either and neither is there a public transportation connection to it in the vicinity.
The connectivity with the airport is a major factor in the development of Ørestad and Zuidas. In Ørestad, the expanded airport, new airport connections and the new bridge have seriously enhanced the project’s centrality. The Ørestad centre area has a station with a direct link to the airport and Malmö and a junction on the new highway to Sweden. The metropolitan connection has been improved by the new metro system, the backbone of the whole development. In Amsterdam an improved subway connection is expected to have been implemented in 2013 when the new north-south line will provide an additional connection to the city centre. However, the extension of the central bundle of infrastructure and the building of a new multi-modal station, by far the biggest onsite infrastructure investment in the area, had still not started in mid 2007. Nevertheless, Zuidas had the most infrastructures available at the beginning compared to the other projects. Different infrastructure investments (in train, light rail, metro and highway infrastructure) improved the centrality of the place during the Eighties and Nineties already. The result was that this area easily developed into the second most central area of the metropolitan area after Schiphol airport. This will be further enhanced when the High Speed Train Amsterdam stop is created in the project area, sometime in the future.

As regards the results of the infrastructure frame we can conclude that Amsterdam has the best connectivity of the three projects, followed closely by Ørestad. The latter had the advantage that most new infrastructures were available at an early stage of the project. In Amsterdam, major new infrastructures still have to be completed and these might result in large disruptive activities in the area in the future.

Although there are differences between the cities, we can conclude that frames on economic development, urban development and infrastructure development were present in all three projects. However, the project in Barcelona included two additional symbolic-cognitive frames – as collective ambitions that unite a group of actors – that give this project a more innovative character compared to the other two. First, it is additionally framed as a project of environmental excellence and secondly as a cultural event. As regards the environmental framing, it is clear that Zuidas and Ørestad include environmental aspects as well but they were never as central to the development as they were in Barcelona where they were one of the original features of the project. Before the idea of a Forum cultural event or even an urbanization of the area was born, plans existed to deal with the different (polluting) facilities in the mouth of the river Besòs, namely the incinerator, the power plant and the sewage treatment plant. The heavily polluted Besòs river itself was also targeted. These environmental ambitions have been integrated into the ambition to urbanize the area which was formulated later. At first, this looked like an impossible combination. However, eventually the urbanization plan was the reason why (additional) funds could be made available for the necessary investments to improve the environmental performance of these three facilities. In the case of Zuidas and Ørestad, the framing of the ecological dimension was less well-developed. In Ørestad the project initiators were eventually forced to change their original plans and saved some of the most precious wetlands. Although there are ambitions for environmentally-conscious development – and the metro is tangible evidence of this – the fact that the project was built in a previously protected green location made framing the development as an environmentally conscious project hard – and also quite ironic. In the case of Zuidas, the environmental dimension has also been more secondary up to now. Some factors, like the favourable eco-friendly modal split
the area already possesses, and some advanced investments made in the cooling of buildings, support the idea of a possible environmental symbolic-cognitive frame for the area in the future. However, to date it has been a more secondary concern, reflected particularly in the lack of attention for the environmental performance of most of the individual buildings in the area.

The second distinguishing method of symbolic-cognitive framing in the Barcelona case, in contrast to Amsterdam and Copenhagen, was its framing as a cultural event. The International Forum of Cultures was used as a vehicle to create political priority from different layers of government, as well as additional investments and public awareness and support for the transformation. This way of framing, namely an attempt to reuse the Olympic formula for 1992, was successful in safeguarding the huge investments in public space and infrastructure in the area. Political consensus was quickly reached and the work was then carried out rapidly to meet the deadline of the spring of 2004, when the cultural event was to open. However, in contrast to the Olympic era, this way of framing was, on this occasion, quite unsuccessful in creating societal support and an identification with the urban transformation process.

6.1.2 Development of symbolic-cognitive frames

By nature, processes of framing develop over time. The most significant development in the symbolic-cognitive frames we found in our sample was that the relative emphasis of a certain way of framing changed in two of the three projects. In the Barcelona and Copenhagen cases there was a more short-term frame which was quite dominant in an early stage of these projects, namely the Barcelona Forum cultural event and the Copenhagen metro respectively. However, after these frames had led to material outcomes, the emphasis in the strategic framing shifted, self-evidently, towards the project’s more long-term economic and urban goals.

Nevertheless, in both cases, this short-term framing is very much part of the project’s ‘legacy’. This has had a quite negative effect in both Barcelona and Copenhagen. The Forum cultural event generated quite disappointing results – especially with regard to the involvement of, and identification with, the local population. This has also influenced the appreciation and support for the urban interventions in the rest of the area. The metro in Copenhagen started unfavourably due to time delays and huge budget problems. The difference is that the metro budget overflow in Ørestad is still having a directly negative influence on the urban transformation, due to the high debt incurred by the development corporation. In the case of Forum, there is no material link, only a symbolic one.

In the case of Amsterdam there was no frame related to a relatively (contested or not) short-term outcome. This was also one of the reasons this project started rather quietly, without much public debate. However, of the three projects studied, the symbolic-cognitive frames in Zuidas experienced the largest number of dynamics over time.

Here we identified a process of integration. The quite local framing as an economic competitive location for Amsterdam, which led to a power struggle for national infrastructure priorities, evolved eventually into a more common frame as a new competitive mixed use location with national importance. This seems to lead to more receptive conditions for new urbanity at a strategic level since it improved the probability of the realization of the dock model to cover all the infrastructure in the area. However, final decisions on this topic had still not been made at the time of writing.
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6.1.3 Conclusion on symbolic-cognitive frames
Although the ambition to include new urbanity was a feature of the frames in Zuidas, Ørestad and Forum, there were also differences. Of these three projects, the strategic framing of Forum is the most complex. Here, frames on the economic, urban and infrastructure aspects of the initiative are supplemented with frames on environmental excellence and cultural activities. Especially the latter frame had the potential capacity to supplement the ambition for new urbanity with a programmatic aspect.

Zuidas and Ørestad are framed as an urban extension outside the traditional urban core. Both projects use the new urbanity frame to substantiate a primarily business-oriented development. The weakness of this approach is that, due to this way of framing, new urbanity is only defined as a mixture in the proposed real estate program. The innovative aspect of Forum is that this ambition is also – even predominantly – related to a programmatic strategy for the area. However, we have noticed that this way of strategic framing has not only had positive effects in the case of Forum, and more particularly with regard to the relationship with the social, civic and cultural domain it created difficulties. This is examined in more detail in the next subsection. Nevertheless it seems an interesting way to explore further.

6.1.4 Organisational framing
In our introduction we mentioned that the difference in initial organisational framing in domains of the metropolitan action space was one of the main factors for the selection of these three projects. Our empirical chapters included a more detailed investigation of the connectedness of these initiatives to society. How were these initiatives connected to the metropolitan action space? We roughly identified four domains that are relevant for these projects: (1) a private domain, (2) an inner regional government domain, (3) an interregional and international government domain and (4) a social, civic and cultural domain. We hypothesized that, over the course of time, the project initiators would seek to create (a more) connective way of framing, linked to all four domains.

A general conclusion based on our comparison is that all three projects have difficulties creating an organisational framing that connects them to all these four domains. The connection to the social, civic and cultural domain was, in particular, an ongoing weakness in all three projects. Forum in Barcelona was initially framed in the most connective way, due primarily to its initial connection to the social domain. However, as we have already pointed out, this link was weakened during the course of time. Ørestad was primarily a government-oriented project, strongly framed as a partnership between the local and the national government, but missing a regional government dimension. Zuidas in Amsterdam experienced the most development in its organisational framing in the metropolitan action space. It started out as a relatively introverted business-local authority initiative, but was eventually successful in becoming attached to the interregional and national government domain. However, in this case as well, the connection with the social, civic and cultural domain remained weak.

Private sector economic domain
Critical observers of large-scale urban investment projects often emphasize the strong link with private capital (Moulaert, Rodríguez and Swyngedouw 2003). However, in the three projects we investigated, only Zuidas is a convincing example of a project where the project was supported by significant private investments. In Ørestad and Fo-
rum, public investments dominated the initial stages, not only in infrastructure, but also in buildings (the exception is the Diagonal Mar area in Barcelona). However, the initiators of these two projects expect that these initial public investments would be matched by even larger private investments: in the Ørestad in the form of office and housing development in the direct project area, in Barcelona in the ring of projects directly adjacent to Forum and in a much wider development area on the east side of the city. In both cases this expectancy had not yet been fulfilled at the time we studied these projects.

The significant private sector interest in the development of Zuidas resulted in more than a steady demand for available parcels, especially for office development. It is the only project of the three in which some private sector actors clearly developed project-wide interests, beyond their individual investment projects and tried to influence the operational domain of the project. Recently, a group of several private actors have even been planning to participate financially in the development of major infrastructures in the area. In Forum and Ørestad the private sector generally took a more reticent position (again with the exception of the Diagonal Mar project in Barcelona). This also reflects the clear difference in economic status between the three projects. Zuidas is the only project in which private investors acknowledged the strategic national importance. For some of these actors this has resulted in a somewhat ‘patriotic’ framing and involvement in which the (future) success of the Zuidas is seen as a matter of national pride, resulting in more committed participation. This is certainly not the case (yet) as far as Ørestad and Forum are concerned.

Inner regional government domain
All three projects are strongly connected to the inner regional government domain. In all three cases the local municipality is one of the leading actors, aiming to use the project to (re-)position the city within a competitive landscape. The difference is that in Amsterdam the project was established in an attempt to guide existing market interest via an official urban planning formula, while in Copenhagen and Barcelona the projects were clear attempts by the local government to create market interests in areas that were previously unattractive or unavailable for market investments. The framing within the region reflects major differences however. In Copenhagen and Amsterdam there are not only quite weak regional governments, in both cases the project was hardly framed in this part of the domain. It was only at a later stage that Amsterdam was successful in linking the region (province and metropolitan government) to its ambitions for the Zuidas. One of the problematic aspects in Copenhagen was that the abolishment of most of the regional planning in the Nineties had caused a lack of any regional strategy regarding office development. The resulting inner-regional competition was one of the reasons why Ørestad was not successful in claiming a prominent spot in the private sector domain. In Barcelona the regional dimension was more strongly developed, both at the level of the province and the autonomous region (Catalonia) who both contributed funds to the Forum project.

Interregional and international government domain
The framing in this domain was developed most strongly in the Copenhagen case. Ørestad was clearly linked, materially and symbolically, to the EU-supported Oresund integration project. It was one of the most eminent physical outcomes of this policy.
This meant national and European prestige and support. It was the only project that was immediately framed successfully at the level of national government.

In Barcelona and Amsterdam the originally locally constituted projects tried to connect to the interregional and international government domain. Eventually, Forum was much more successful. Its framing as a cultural event with a tight deadline worked out to be very efficient. It helped to gain ‘clout’ at other levels of government and even helped to acquire European subsidies. This in sharp contrast to Amsterdam where the project initiators were unsuccessful in linking their proposal to the national and European government domains. It is important to emphasize, however, that this cannot only be attributed to the less successful execution of a strategy to establish these connections. In Amsterdam, the local strategic framing between the municipality and the (Amsterdam-oriented) business interests for a long time underestimated the importance of this domain for the success of the project. It was only at a later stage that the importance of this connection was understood, both for hard investments (in infrastructure) as for softer aspects such as prestige and supporting regional policies. This was actually a two-sided development, since the national government started to frame the development of the Zuidas as a crucial part of its own spatial-economic development agenda as well after 2003. This slow development was in stark contrast to Forum and Ørestad. The initiators in these projects had a better understanding of the crucial importance of these domains and safeguarded framing accordingly at an early stage.

Social, civic and cultural domain.

Our empirical research shows that the framing in this domain is often weakly developed. Just like the other four domains, this domain contains a lot of internal variety, so very bold statements about ‘well’ or ‘poorly’ connected are an unjust simplification. However, it might be considered a surprise that, generally speaking, this connection is underdeveloped in projects that strive to become not only a new economic location but also a new urban place. Barcelona was an initial exception in this respect due to its attempt to link to this domain via the Forum cultural event. However, our empirical research showed that this framing was quite unsuccessful. In Copenhagen and Amsterdam, the projects were framed quite defensively and non-ambitiously as regards their link to this domain. In both cases the framing meant informing the nearby residents about the proposals. More positive framing strategies, like attempts to include residents or social, civic or cultural groups into innovative communicative approaches or other opportunities for involvement or identification from this domain to express themselves are rarely found. Our empirical research shows that the eventual result is a rather strong disinterest in the developments on the part of actors in this domain.

6.1.5 Conclusion on organizational framing

Figure 6.1 (next page) shows the different graphic representations of the strategic framing of the three projects in the metropolitan action space. We can conclude that there are significant differences in organisational framing, and more importantly, that the expected development of projects in the direction of a more connective framing has not been proven by our empirical data. Every project seems to have its own weakness in this respect. In Amsterdam, the ambition to create a new urban area has been set without framing in the social, civic and cultural domains. However, the connection to the interregional government domain was improved over the course of the time, al-
though still on the basis of a very underdeveloped link with international government. In Ørestad, on the other hand, the higher government involvement was secured from the beginning via the Ørestad Act and Ørestad Development Corporation in which the national government participated. It is the clearest example in our sample of a project which is well-connected to different domains of government. However, it largely failed to connect to the private sector economic domain and the social, civic and cultural domain. The latter was one of the most innovative aspects of the Barcelona framing. Via the Forum cultural event the urban transformation would also include a social and cultural dimension. However, this did not turn out to be very successful. Although the project was successfully framed in a local, regional, national and international domain, its connection to the private sector economic domain was not self evident after the first ten years of plan making and development.

Figure 6.1: Development of organisational connectivity of Zuidas, Ørestad and Forum
6.2 Comparing the operational domains

The next step in our empirical studies was the investigation of the complex operational domains in these projects. Following an actor-centred institutional approach we made a distinction between an analysis of actors and modes of interaction on the one hand and strategies and scopes on the other hand. We defined two subquestions for the investigation in the operational domain in Chapter two:

- What are the rules that affect the participants and modes of interaction in a project and what development is observable in these rules?
- What are the rules that affect the scope and strategy of the participants, and what development is observable in these rules?

6.2.1 Participants and modes of interaction

Overall the impression arises of relatively introverted, project-oriented forms of governance, which are specifically geared to function in these particular places. An attempt to redefine modes of interaction and responsibilities between different actors is an important aspect in all three projects. This has resulted in governance innovations in all three cities. However, this does not mean that these projects are realized in a way which is totally detached from existing practices. In all three projects a combination of general and project-specific rules affects who participates and what modes of interaction are used.

Ørestad is the clearest example in our study of a project in which a specific governance structure was created for the project that was also strongly institutionalized. The Ørestad Act allowed a public-public development corporation to be set up that manages the whole development. The Act ensured financial participation of the State in the project and provided guidelines for the development of the area. In Ørestad, there is a clear division of tasks between public and private actors. The Ørestad Development Corporation, which is based on a 55% stake by the Municipality of Copenhagen and a 45% stake by the national government, manages the development and private actors can solicit for plots. In the case of concrete building projects, the existing planning regulations of the Copenhagen municipality apply. This creates an interesting double role for this actor, with a potential conflict of interests since it is both a participant in the Ørestad Development Corporation (whose main economic aim is to increase the return for the shareholders) and controlling and regulating urban planning (with the aim being to maintain certain planning standards).

Zuidas is a project in which we expect this tension to be an important factor in the future as well. However, during the early stages of the project, there was a clear distinction between public and private tasks in the operational domain. The operational domain in Zuidas can be characterized as quite dynamic. It represented an ongoing search for new rules to structure the operational domain more effectively, both between public parties and between public and private parties. In this project the cooperation between the municipality and private partners is intense, although the early stages of the project did not include specific public-private partnerships. The fact that the municipality owned most of the parcels and its strong legal position in combination with a receptive market made interactions on developments quite straightforward. However, new rules of operation were introduced to streamline tasks and coordination within the organization of the Amsterdam municipality, especially through the initiation of a special pro-
ject office. This small organization was relatively detached from the municipal’s structure of departments so as to facilitate market interest more effectively and to more efficiently work with a focus on the area, instead of a focus on (partial) interests of departments.

In the future stages of the development of the Zuidas, most probably a Zuidas Company will be set up consisting of 60% private shareholders and 40% public shareholders (the latter split evenly between the Amsterdam municipality and the national government). In this case the municipality will play both public and private oriented roles in the operational domain. In contrast to the situation in Ørestad, in the case of Zuidas the municipality will only have a minority stake. This may lead to conflicts of interest within the municipality between its position as shareholder (financial return on investment) and its public urban planning role.

Governance innovations are also visible in the Barcelona case. However, Forum represents a way of organizing operational domains that has become quite common in post-Olympic Barcelona, through the use of publicly-owned consortia that operate in a private manner. In this case the difficulty was that the project area was situated in two municipalities: little Sant Adrià del Besòs and its big brother Barcelona. The Consorci del Besòs was set up especially for the Forum project and the surrounding area. This consortium of two municipalities has planning authority. Besides this consortium there were two important players, namely the Forum Consortium for the organization of the Forum cultural event (and dissolved thereafter) and Infrastructures del Llevant, a public company responsible for the infrastructure planning and investments. Barcelona Regional, the city’s private planning agency was in charge of the spatial planning of the whole area. Private actors involved in project development or finance are not part of these companies. The exception is the Diagonal Mar area developed by an American project developer. This development was completely private and felt outside the rationale of the framework sketched above.

Given the complexity of the projects, it is not surprising that new forms of governance were set up to manage these complicated decision-making processes. However, the closed characters of the operational domains are remarkable, especially in the light of the urban ambitions of these projects, as we mentioned before. In all three cases, the basis of the operational domain is a form of cooperation between the government and private investors. Only in Barcelona – via the Forum Consortium – was an attempt made to involve a wider group of societal actors in the process. In all three cases, citizens have had almost no direct say in the plans. This does not mean that these projects are undemocratic in the literal meaning of the term since all projects received majority support from elected levels of government. However, no project makes a special effort to include other groups in the decision-making processes. The result is that, in all three cases, the project goals are defined in an introverted setting. As is the case with regard to the strategic framing, this is a quite stable situation that hardly evolves.

6.2.2 Rules that affect the scope and strategy of the participants

The empirical study of this aspect was limited to the scope and strategy of participants with regard to the project’s future urban ambition. This was defined, however, to include more than just physical interventions.

Seen from the perspective we have been focusing on in this study, spatial concepts and
investment schemes to create a new area of economic significance with a strong urban dimension play an important role in all three cases. Nevertheless, the development of this dimension and the strategies that were used by major actors in these projects to achieve this vision varied considerably. We identified strong links with the way projects were strategically framed. This strategic framing (and its development) not only influences which actors participate in the operational domain and how the modes of interaction are organized, but also affect the scope and strategy of the participants. It makes sense to compare Ørestad and Zuidas first, because they have interesting resemblances in their spatial ambitions, though we have identified serious differences in the scope and strategy of the participants.

In Ørestad the concept of creating a new economic competitive location with a strong urban character was developed by the one dominant development actor, namely the Ørestad Development Corporation. The limited framing in the strategic domains of the private sector and the social, civic and cultural sector resulted in an operational domain in which spatial ambitions were defined in a mainly unilateral manner. The Ørestad Development Corporation expected a strong position vis-à-vis potential buyers of plots to be realized due to the strategic location of the project close to the airport, the new bridge and the city centre. Its connections to these places would even be improved by new road and metro infrastructure. The strategy of the Ørestad Development Corporation was to use this position to implement its spatial concept in a rather top-down manner vis-à-vis potential buyers of plots. It also meant that the scope of the strategy was also defined in quite a top-down way. During the first five years, the few private investors that were interested in development did not seem to play a very active role in developing the overall strategy of new urbanity to create actual building projects, as we will see in the next section.

The strategy of the Ørestad Development Corporation had to be changed for two major reasons: (1) the lack of private sector interest, especially for the office parcels in the project, resulting in low sales and lower land prices, and (2) the metro finances – both cost overruns in the construction and lack of ticket sales after the operation started. This resulted in a balance sheet with less income on plot sales and ticketing and a lot more expenses on debt payments. The revised strategy focused on treating housing development as more of a priority than in the original plans, additional direct investments (subsidies) by the national government to relocate some public buildings to Ørestad and the acceptance of a proposal to build a huge indoor shopping mall on the most prominent location in the project area.

Although the scope of the city government in Amsterdam regarding the urban ambition corresponded with that of the municipality of Copenhagen, there was less of a top-down strategy by the initiators to implement it. The concept was further developed in a process in which the scope and strategy of both public and private actors was slowly integrated to form a common vision on new urbanity. This has also influenced the content of the vision on new urbanity. Over the course of time, the municipality of Amsterdam was stimulated by private parties to radicalize its initially quite moderate ambitions for new urbanity. Major business interests – especially ABN/AMRO and ING – advocated a more intensive use of the area and supported the city government. In the recent process of the development of a Zuidas Corporation they made a strong case for a future retail area around the Zuid/WTC station. However, this process has
also highlighted some important differences in interpretation as regards the precise meaning of the concept of new urbanity, both in the group of private participants and between this group and the municipality. One of the aspects is that most of the private investors questioned the city’s (expensive) ambition to realize social housing in the area, especially in a situation in which it still seemed difficult to make the Zuidas Corporation financially feasible in the long run. This has already resulted in this ambition being withdrawn in the latest plans by the municipality.

Nevertheless, even with those difficulties and others yet to come which will be played out in the Zuidas area in the near future, the serious attempt to develop a common strategy by different public and private actors is one of the biggest positive factors in the operational domain compared to Ørestad.

It is quite difficult to compare these two projects with the Forum project in Barcelona on this issue. Here the most important promoter of new urbanity was the Barcelona city government. However this ambition was not translated into a strategy to create a ‘traditional’ urban district. New urbanity was understood rather as an attempt to – quite radically – create a new centrality, with a quite open mind on how this could develop further into a new urbanity. The strategy of the public initiators was twofold. On the one hand it was totally focused on the development of the infrastructures, that is the roads and metro, as well as on improving the environmental installations in the area (incinerator, power plant and wastewater treatment plant). On the other hand it was geared to organizing the Forum public event as a strategy to create urban ‘content’, identification and support for the transition of the area. As in the case of Ørestad, the role of private investors was quite secondary in these two processes, although the private sector was an important sponsor of the Forum of Cultures 2004. The only exception is the Diagonal Mar area which was completely developed under private governance.

Based on an overall analysis of the rules that influenced the scope and strategy of the actors in the operational domain regarding new urbanity, we can conclude that there were considerable differences as regards how the major actors translated a quite general ambition into an initiative to create new urbanity. In Amsterdam this took the form of a co-promotion of the municipality of Amsterdam with private actors. Although the understanding between these actors was dynamic and improved in time, there was only limited support from parties outside this small network. By contrast, the Ørestad project had a much more national and international orientation. There was less of a strategy to involve private parties in the development of a shared understanding and ambition for new urbanity. The link between public planners and private investors was mainly played out within the boundaries of individual plots. Finally, in the case of the Forum initiative, the strategy to realize new urbanity in the first place did not focus on a building program in the traditional sense. Instead, the emphasis was on enhancing the strategic centrality of the area and on identification with a broader public via infrastructure works and an international cultural event. In all three cases the ambition for new urbanity can be interpreted as a sort of rule that guided the behaviour of some of the public actors. In the next section on social norms, we draw conclusions regarding the extent to which this rule has developed to acquire an ‘ought character’: to what extent did actors felt social pressure to comply with such a rule?
6.3 Social norms on new urbanity

As we explained in our theoretical framework, social norms give an ‘ought character’ to action. In our framework this concept helps us to make the link between the process-oriented analysis on strategic framing and the rules in the operational domain on the one hand, and the ambitions to realize an urban space in the three projects. We investigated to what extent the ambition for new urbanity is normatively reflected upon in concrete action. Social norms are defined as social rules of action. Although they can sometimes lead to written codification – in the form of schemes or plans in this case – they primarily have an ‘invisible’ nature. In practices of interaction they help to define acceptable courses of action, but they also leave room for individual actors to ignore them.

Social norms are of particular relevance since it is only via actual physical projects, in buildings, infrastructures and public spaces, that a general planning ambition can be transformed into an urban space. In Chapter one we stated that the stage of transition from general (master) plan to concrete development ‘object’ seems to be the crucial phase wherein ambitions for new urbanity disappear.

Our investigation into social norms on new urbanity was guided by two subquestions introduced in the second chapter:

- As regards the ambition for new urbanity: To what extent is this ambition normatively reflected upon and validated in the operational domain of these projects?
- Are processes of change in dominant social norms perceivable as regards this issue being hinted at in the literature? Is there a change in group composition, an increase in power of actors holding the norm for new urbanity, a charismatic norm entrepreneur, or a change in the positive externalities for new urbanity as perceived by the participants?

We studied these subquestions by analyzing the first building projects in the three areas, and by means of a qualitative investigation of the opinions of key participants in these projects on the goal of new urbanity. This study underlines the importance of social norms as a relevant theoretical tool. In all three projects our empirical study shows a discrepancy between the original intentions regarding new urbanity and the first series of concrete spatial interventions. Neither project has succeeded till now to deliver an urban shape and usage which lives up to its own expectations in this regard, even if we take into account the early stage of development of these three projects.

In Chapter one (p.38) we provided the following general description of ‘new urbanity’:

‘(…) a considerable program of spatial functions alongside a program of office construction, plus a certain ambition to spatially integrate and/or connect different uses, either by locating them close to each other, or by proposing the shared use of buildings. (…) The following three dimensions of ‘urbanity’ can work as a guide to understand what we mean by new urbanity: (1) specialisation and exchange (a combination of a plurality of activities and trades), (2) differentiation and opportunities of choice (a variation of activities and uses), and (3) civic expression (symbolic values and identities of places) (Salet 1996; Lynch 1980).’

It is important to emphasize once again that all three projects are essentially long-term development projects. Assessing them in a quite early stage can be difficult, especially
with regard to the complex goal of creating new urbanity. However, all three projects have been the focus of extensive building activities during the last decade and this has made an initial investigation possible.

In all three projects we have identified numerous development projects (mostly buildings) that do not enhance the ambition of creating a new urban space. For example, in Amsterdam, most office buildings are realized with hardly any attractive ground floor areas. The public spaces in Mahler 4 and the WTC area are large, mostly empty and windy. In Ørestad the centre of the project is dominated by a big box indoor shopping mall that is completely non-conducive to a street life atmosphere. In Barcelona an immense square is being realized which is unused for most of the time. The real estate program in Barcelona consists of free-standing offices, hotels and condominiums and again a large-scale indoor shopping centre.

Nevertheless, we also observed physical developments that (possibly) enhance the new urbanity in the projects. In Ørestad this is most obvious in the Ørestad Nord area, due mainly to the presence of some public buildings such as the university and student housing that generates a considerable feeling of liveliness. In Amsterdam, there seems to be more potential for new urbanity once the first predominately housing-oriented project, referred to as Gershwin, has been completed in a couple of years times. In Barcelona, the results are less tangible. Forum at least succeeded in making an area accessible to visitors. It has also been used for festivities and concerts which have taken place since the original major cultural event for which it was created.

Overall we can conclude that the results achieved by the first building projects as regards the new urbanity goal are quite disappointing. Should we then simply conclude that this is because of a failure to reflect on an effective social norm for creating new urbanity? It would seem that this is a justified conclusion based on the first building period.

In Ørestad and Zuidas, in particular, major parts of the urban development still have to be completed. We therefore feel it is sensible to look beyond the current built program and investigate future possibilities, although this is fraught with risk. It is certainly not our intention to engage in opportunistic speculation. However, neither can we assume that the urban intentions that are being voiced in general plans – as is the case in Zuidas and Ørestad – will automatically lead to the successful implementation of new urbanity in the remaining parts of these projects in the future. Our empirical study into the first ten years of the development of these projects revealed that there is a considerable discrepancy between general intentions and concrete conditions that support the implementation of these intentions. To what extent have social norms regarding new urbanity evolved in the last decade in our three case studies?
Chapter 6: Conclusions

6.3.1 Change in social norms?

Social norms do often not change in a revolutionary manner. Rather than trying to indicate what the social norm at a given moment in space and time is, and how they are reflected upon (this is almost impossible in a complex real-life situation), it makes more sense to investigate processes of development and change. The literature on social norms refers to a number of possible conditions that could influence processes of norm change and development (see Chapter 2). We studied three of them, namely (1) a change in strategic framing and the composition of the actors in the operational domain, (2) an increase in the powers within the operational domain of the actors holding the norm for a (more) urban development and (3) the existence of a charismatic norm entrepreneur, capable of aligning different norms.

With regard to point 1: A change in strategic framing and the composition of the actors in the operational domain.

This is a condition that particularly caught our attention in the Zuidas case. New actors have been included in the operational domains, in particular in the current discussions on the Zuidas Development Corporation which is a public-private body whose aim is to develop the dock model and the rest of the Zuidas parcels. Although this might be a condition for a change in strategic framing, it obviously depends largely on how the composition of actors is changing. It seems that, in the case of the Zuidas project, this could work as a positive condition, although actual results still have to materialise. However, with additional private and public actors ‘on board’ the chances for a successful implementation of the dock model seem greater than before. This might be a physical prerequisite for a stronger urban development of the Zuidas in the future. Nevertheless it remains very uncertain at the moment as to whether this expanded composition of the operational domain will facilitate the goal of new urbanity, even after a dock model has been realised. It could be that the risks (both for the construction costs of the dock and the possible incomes from project developing activities) are so high that the new financial actors in the domain concentrate more on legally sound contracts rather than on the content of the operation any more. The strategic weakness of the project continues to be the lack of organisational framing into the social, civic and cultural domain and the inclusion of actors representing this frame into the operational domain. The new situation has not changed this weakness.

In Ørestad and Forum there is less development in both symbolic-cognitive and organisational framing and the composition of actors in the operational domain. Especially in Ørestad, the rigid institutionalized operational domain leaves hardly any room for innovation. The strict financial constraints of the operations make it difficult for the Ørestad Development Corporation to accept land uses that do not contribute maximally to the corporation’s income. This current condition hampers a more bottom up organic style of development for the area to happen and is expected to be a negatively influencing condition in the future.

In the Forum project the strategic framing was especially focused on creating consensus between public parties regarding the infrastructure investments. Eventually the project was also being hampered by the problems concerning the cultural event. Instead of new actors being introduced in the operational domain, the operational domains became more introverted over the course of time.
With regard to point 2: An increase of powers within the operational domain of the actors holding the norm for a (more) urban development.

This point is related to the first point since, theoretically, new actors in the operational domain can be powerful agents of change. However, even in a situation in which the strategic framing and the composition of actors was not developing in favour of a framing or composition more receptive to a social norm of new urbanity, the literature on norms suggests that social norms could also change due to the fact that individuals who hold a certain norm can become more powerful within a certain setting and thereby acquire the capacity to impose their norm on others (Horne 2001). In order to explore this condition, we have to investigate which actors were mostly trying to pursue a norm of new urbanity. In all three projects, this was initially the local municipality. We mentioned before that in Ørestad, the capacity of the Ørestad Development Corporation to implement its spatial strategy was hollowed out by a variety of circumstances. In terms of social norms we can conclude that its capacity to create a social norm to be imposed on others along with sanctions was also eroded. Given the first spatial results in Ørestad, such a social norm was necessary since it seems in hindsight that the spatial intentions for new urbanity were not naturally supported by the private actors. The box-shaped indoor-oriented Field’s shopping mall is the strongest example of the lack of an enforced social norm of new urbanity. Due to the weakness of the development corporation, the investor involved was able to realize its un-urban mega block.

In the Zuidas project, the municipality was also a strong promoter of the concept of new urbanity. If we examine its capacity to impose such a social norm and how this developed we see that the results were mixed. On the one hand, the municipality was quite powerful due to the fact that it owned land in large parts of the area. It did not use a lot of its legal powers to implement certain planning goals. Moreover it sought to negotiate on the basis of public leadership with private actors. However, the power of the municipality of Amsterdam to impose a social norm in a top-down way seemed to be quite limited. One example from the early stages of the project are the new headquarters buildings of ABN/AMRO and ING, the two most important private investors in the area. These two projects became non-integrated architectural icons with no mixture of uses and inaccessible ground levels. In the Mahler 4 project, which was developed some years later, the municipality still seemed to struggle to implement its quite radical ideas on new urbanity. It will be interesting to see in the future if, in a more privatized governance setting, some private actors will step up to express their support for a norm on new urbanity.

In Barcelona, the Diagonal Mar part of the larger Forum area is the clearest example of a situation in which the actor holding the norm for new urbanity was quite powerless to let the private investor – who had a quite different interpretation of the concept – conform to its spatial concepts. The very poor initial market position of this area, whose development started before the Forum, eventually resulted in a carte blanche for the developer as regards the building program. The result is a collection of free-standing condominiums in a landscaped park together with an indoor shopping mall and some office towers. In the Forum event area itself the municipality could validate its own norm on new urbanity. Due to different reasons it decided in quite abstract ‘post-modern’ interpretation of it, which was not commonly appreciated.
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As regards point 3: The existence of a charismatic norm entrepreneur.
Up to now we have not included individuals in our analysis and we have stayed at the analytical level of the composite actor. However, literature suggests that, within this field of actors, specific individuals can make a significant contribution to processes of norm change. A charismatic norm entrepreneur is a powerful individual capable of aligning different (diverging) interests by portraying an image of the future that unites actors. Such a person may have links with one of the participating actors, or may hold a relatively independent position. A norm entrepreneur may work internally but, in most cases, they also have an important external ‘face’, for example with links to the media.

An analysis of the empirical results from the three projects enables us to identify powerful personalities, especially leading figures in political and private domains that were instrumental in the origin of the project, for example Pasqual Maragall in Barcelona, Elco Brinkman in Amsterdam, or the lord-mayor of Copenhagen and the current director of the Ørestad Development Corporation, Jens Krammer-Mikkelsen. However, a peculiar observation – reflecting the quite introverted operational domains in all three projects – is that there is no clearly visible charismatic norm entrepreneur that identifies her or himself with the ambition for new urbanity. These three men played instrumental roles in different stages of the project. However, they did not actively publicly stood strong for a program of new urbanity. They were more capable and powerful ‘fixers’ of complex public-private negotiation situations.

Within the projects themselves there are influential individuals who strongly supported the goal of new urbanity, such as Amsterdam alderman Duco Stadig, or long-term municipal urban design supervisor of Zuidas, Pi de Bruijn and, in Barcelona, the director of Barcelona Regional, Josep Acebillo. However, during the translation of general aims into designs for specific buildings and public spaces it is hard to classify them as very powerful norm entrepreneurs. In Barcelona, the individual architects have traditionally been very powerful. In Copenhagen, there was no strong norm entrepreneur that could stop or divert the lack of new urbanity in the Ørestad centre area. In Amsterdam, the city assigned an urban design supervisor, architect Pi de Bruijn. He was strongly in favour of new urbanity and certainly played an important role in furthering the spatial concept of Zuidas in that direction in the subsequent master plans that were drawn up for the area. However, he was less successful in translating it beyond a physical representation of new urbanity. In addition, his position vis-à-vis the powerful private actors was eventually quite weak when the translation had to made from general concepts to concrete building designs.

6.3.2 Conclusion

If we interpret social norms as social rules of action, and we ask ourselves to what extent the ambition for new urbanity has developed in these projects as such a social rule, our answer has to be that the ambition has remained largely unfulfilled. We have not identified clear examples wherein actors, initially not aligned to such a norm, changed their behaviour. However, if we look into the fine details and developments we also see changes. It seems that, in the case of Zuidas, a broader range of actors is interested in this ambition being fulfilled in the project’s future phases. However their precise interpretation is still quite unclear, and could well be far removed from the municipality’s original intentions which quite closely resembled our definition. It is also still questionable to what extent social pressure will be generated amongst the parties to imple-
ment these general aims as actual individual development projects, especially in view of the potential financial difficulties the project is facing which might cause actors to opt instead for less innovative investments. However, the Zuidas is way ahead of the other two projects since it has, at least, a quite well-established community of interacting partners.

In the cases of Ørestad and Forum it has seemed up to now that only the original public initiators of the project support the social norm for new urbanity. However, they are quite powerless to implement this norm in a top-down fashion. In Ørestad this is due to the weak bargaining position of the Ørestad development corporation, while in Barcelona there seems to be a general lack of ideas and momentum as regards what should be done with the Forum area after the cultural event has taken place. If we examine the possibilities for change, these two projects offer almost no opportunities due to closed governance settings, a lack of power on the part of the actors holding the norm, and a lack of a charismatic norm entrepreneur that can overcome this situation. The latter is also a feature of Amsterdam, although the more dynamic operational domains offer a better chance of creating a situation in which a broader group of actors will indeed discuss the possibilities of new urbanity. This is important for the creation of normative reflection on the concept of new urbanity. Together with social group mechanisms of pressure, rewards and disapproval, this could lead to a situation which is more conducive to its implementation than before.

### 6.4 Conclusion

Our main scientific-oriented research question was:

*As regards the initial ambition for new urbanity, how can we understand the dynamics between the connectivity of a project in the metropolitan action space, the systems of rules that structure operational domains and social norms in Amsterdam Zuidas, Copenhagen Ørestad and Barcelona Forum?*

We first present our empirical conclusions on the case studies and then we analyse the relations between the three aspects of our conceptual framework. Two main aspects came to light during our empirical studies: (1) the different interpretations of new urbanity in our case studies and (2) the distinction between new urbanity and new centrality.

#### 6.4.1 Different definitions of ‘new urbanity’

Although the three projects studied share the ambition to become new central and urban places, the initial definition of what this ‘urbanity’ should be that major actors are striving for differed between the projects. These differences are partly an initial condition, based on cultural or context-specific interpretations of the preferred future character of the area. However, they are also related to the processes of strategic framing and the organization of the operational domains which mediate and shape these images. In Amsterdam the rather vague concept of new urbanity started to show a capacity to reconcile the different claims and interests from public and private parties. This has stimulated a more privatized interpretation of the term however. The municipality of Amsterdam initially emphasized the capacity of new urbanity to realize a new centre
area with a lively street culture, social life and a contribution to connect two separated
neighbourhoods. The private actors were less enthusiastic about the social housing, but
did embrace the spatial concept of extreme density and high quality public space. They
saw new urbanity both as a way to create a more prestigious area that would be re-
lected in higher rents for the offices and as a way to limit investment risks due to in-
clusion of a substantial housing program. As far as Amsterdam is concerned we can
therefore conclude that the concept was able to reconcile – to a certain extent since
there are many confronting issues – the needs of different parties in relation to the area
(this line of thought is developed in more detail in Gualini and Majoor 2007). The
situation is totally different in both Copenhagen and Barcelona. In the case of the Fo-
rum project the concept has been interpreted in a very ‘strategic’ way. The group of
actors in the operational domain never inten ded to urbanize that part of Barcelona in a
traditional sense (as was the case in the Olympic Village, another brown field area
which was urbanized a decade ago). In the Forum area itself, the ambition for new ur-
banity was materialized by implementing ‘hard’ infrastructures to make the area acces-
sible, complemented with two buildings that are quite colossal and introverted. Al-
though some claim that this has resulted in an intriguing ly open-ended (or
‘post-modern’) new urbanity (Cohn 2004), it has also generated a great deal of criti-
cism.

The initial spatial concepts in the master plan for Ørestad resemble the ambitions in
Zuidas for a quite traditional interpretation of the concept, in the form of a modern rep-
lica of the traditional downtown area, although the concept was never radicalized in
terms of density and small-scale mixing as was the case in the Zuidas plans.
What these observations teach us is that the meaning of new urbanity is con-
text-dependent. In order to achieve a better understanding of these differences, our em-
pirical data shows us that we have to make a distinction between new urbanity and new
centrality. These concepts are related but not similar.

6.4.2 New urbanity and new centrality

An examination of the results of our empirical study of the conditions for new urbanity
in large-scale development projects, we have to make an analytical distinction between
at least two (geographical) layers: a more strategic one at a metropolitan level and a
more concrete one at a project level. As regards the concept of social norms we eventu-
ally investigated the first building projects and examined to what extent a social norm
on new urbanity has been normatively reflected upon by the actors responsible for this
particular urban investment. This is a quite localized and morphological interpretation
of the (success of the) concept of new urbanity, which only partly addresses its mean-
ing. Although we explained the establishment of social norms via processes of strategic
framing and operational rules, it is necessary to emphasize that ‘new urbanity’ goes
further than the functioning of a particular set of buildings.
At a strategic metropolitan level, new urbanity is much more closely related to the ca-
pacity of these projects to create a new form of centrality. At local level the issue in-
deed relates to the functioning of a particular area. The two layers are related, but also
have independent dynamics.
Investigating the new centrality of our three projects means, in our case, a qualitative
examination of the question as to what extent these areas are perceived as new central
places within the metropolitan context. Zuidas is the clearest example in our sample of
a project with a strong metropolitan centrality for the higher-end office sector. It is clearly identified as the major location for this sector. However, it has not (yet) been identified as being a central area for a lot of other functions. In Ørestad, the infrastructural conditions have been realized for it to acquire a (more) central position, but the area has failed to develop into a focal point for any of the main spatial functions (offices, housing and facilities) it wishes to accommodate. At a strategic level we can conclude that the Forum and Diagonal Mar projects have been very successful till now in urbanizing areas that, for a long time, were hardly used for urban purposes. The impressive improvements in the environmental facilities are complemented with new road and tram infrastructure. Together with the scheme of strategic urban development projects on the eastern side of Barcelona (22@, Sagrera) the physical conditions are being realized for a reinvention of urbanity in this part of Barcelona that was known for its industrial functions.

In all three cases, therefore, the material (physical) conditions for new centrality have been improved or enhanced to varying degrees. However, this has not automatically resulted in supportive conditions for new urbanity in these local projects. Although the place-node model of Bertolini (Bertolini 1996; 1999) suggests a quite linear positive relationship between centrality and urban potential, reality is much more complex. This is quite understandable since the planning and realization of infrastructure is often a more straightforward endeavour than the realization of a complex planning goal like new urbanity. To understand this we have to investigate thoroughly the relationships between strategic framing, the functioning of the operational domains and the social norms.

6.4.3 Analyzing the connections between the different domains of the conceptual framework

Our empirical study of three projects in which we identified an initial ambition for new urbanity has shown that the transfer from intentions to a physical urban project which fulfils this ambition is very complex. In this study we focused on the institutional aspects of this discrepancy. The first part of this concluding chapter introduced our comparative conclusions relating to the three domains we researched, namely (1) strategic framing in the metropolitan action space, (2) the operational domain and (3) the social norms regarding new urbanity. Figure 6.2 (next page) reintroduces the conceptual framework from the second chapter to reveal the relationships between these three domains. In this part of the conclusions it makes sense to investigate the meaning of these two-way arrows between the domains in more detail.

As was anticipated in our conceptual framework, our empirical results show that a positive condition for new urbanity to be successfully implemented is that it should acquire a certain ‘ought character’, i.e. it should develop as a ‘social norm’ which influences micro-level situations. This is not a surprising conclusion. It is more interesting to understand the dynamics between social norms, rules that structure operational norms.

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1 A related aspect is that Bertolini’s model underestimates the mechanism that strong centrality can also lead to extreme pressure on land prices, which will eventual hamper urban variety (and thus new urbanity). This is a possible situation which could particularly jeopardize the new urbanity ambitions of the Zuidas project.
domains and the strategic domains in the metropolitan action space. If we investigate the relationship between strategic framing and the operational domain first, it becomes clear that both were quite introverted in these three projects. In Chapter two, we hypothesized that a connective organisational framing that relates the project to all the four domains of the metropolitan action space creates positive conditions for the realization of new urbanity in these projects. Our empirical studies provide some evidence to confirm this hypothesis. However, there is generally no simple linear relationship and neither is there one project in our sample which was completely connected to these four domains and which could thereby serve as a ‘best practice’. It is important to understand new urbanity not as a fixed (idealistic) physical ‘end result’ of governance processes but as a metaphor for the introduction of urban complexities in large-scale development projects. As such it is necessary that the different societal domains that represent this complexity are present in its governance settings. However, none of the three projects was able, over the course of time, to realize a successful connection to all of the four subdomains we identified in the second chapter as relevant to support the ambition for new urbanity. The strategic framing had a clear influence on the operational domains. The domains that were successfully attached to the project clearly influenced the operational domains in Zuidas and Ørestad, namely the private sector and the local government in Amsterdam and, the local and national government in Copenhagen.

Figure 6.2 Conceptual framework
In Barcelona, there was a more connective framing in the first stage and this resulted in the operational domain acquiring an interesting duality. One part focused on the urban transformation and one on the cultural event. Although this was a very innovative formula, it was quite unsuccessful and only contributed minimally to the organizational framing in the social, civic and cultural domains. In all three cases the urban program was managed by a fairly corporatist body which was geared more towards facilitating (short-term) market interests and inner-governmental management than on the involvement of the society in broader terms. Only in the case of Forum was a special body set up via the Forum event strategy. In one case, the relationship between the limited strategic framing and the (failure to fulfill the) ambition for new urbanity is quite straightforward. In Ørestad this ambition was severely hampered, especially in the Ørestad Centre area, by its poor connection to the private sector economic domain. However this example also shows the relationship between the strategic framing (both symbolic-cognitive and organisational) and the built environment is always mediated via the operational domain and the social norms. Nevertheless, this relationship does not take the form of a hierarchical sequence. In Ørestad, the basis of the project was the Ørestad Act and the Ørestad Development Corporation. A rigid operational structure was set up quite early on in the planning phase and this made broader symbolic-cognitive and organisational framing in the future quite difficult. Although it was equipped with planning regulations, the Ørestad Development Corporation was not very successful in transforming its spatial concept of new urbanity into a social norm to influence the behaviour of other actors. For a large part this was due to its lack of capacity to reflect on this more strategic context level, for example regarding the competing office areas in the Copenhagen metropolitan area. This is an issue that reflects both a weak private domain framing and a lack of strategic thinking and capacity to intervene in the strategic planning in the Copenhagen area.

It is interesting to ask whether the links to all four subdomains are of equal importance. As regards the establishment of conditions that are favourable for a new urbanity outcome, our empirical study shows that the private sector, local government, social, civic and cultural domains are extremely important.

The private sector plays a key role in these projects since it is the ‘target’ that these projects try to attract and, at the same time, the agent that actually shapes – for a large part – the physical environment. In Amsterdam, for example, the private sector in general was much more interested in the development of the area than in the other two cities. This eventually resulted in a situation of a slow process of identification by private parties with an initially government-supported social norm of new urbanity in the Zuidas area.

The domain of inner regional government is crucial in order to facilitate political processes and (theoretically) to guide, steer and influence private interests to include other demands as well. Again, Amsterdam is a good example of the role a local government can play – in a situation of private interests – in influencing development concepts (Gualini and Majoor 2007). It is remarkable that in both Barcelona and Copenhagen the strong connectivity to the inner regional domain is especially used to safeguard ‘hard’ infrastructure investments, and to a much lesser extent to influence the implementation of the concept of new urbanity. The involvement of the national and interna-
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tional government domain is less crucial for the setting of the conditions necessary to create new urbanity, but it can have important strategic value. In all three projects the national government contributed to necessary infrastructures that improved the centrality of the areas.

The role of the social, civic and cultural domain is underdeveloped in all three cases. This makes it more difficult to access the (potential) value of a strong connection to this domain. However, it seems obvious that an area of ‘new urbanity’ without the connection to this domain seems to evolve into a very clinical money-oriented place, as the early developments in all three projects show. This domain seems to have a potential capacity to break open the introverted operational domains that characterise these projects. Our study has shown that these introverted operational domains made it difficult to establish and validate a social norm of new urbanity, especially due to a lack of involvement of wider representatives of society that could have led to a more comprehensive interpretation of the meaning of urbanity. Although we identified quite powerful actors in all the three projects that hold the new urbanity norm, it was scarcely possible to establish a common social norm. In certain situations, especially Ørestad, but maybe in Zuidas in the future, pure (short-term) financial mechanisms stayed more important than longer-term planning goals.

The first prerequisite for the establishment of a social norm that affects the behaviour of actors is that there is communication between the members of the group in order to establish an explanation of the norm, to simulate discussion and development of the norm and also to possibly sanction ‘norm offenders’. Zuidas is the only project of the three in which we can identify such a process, at least between a small club of very involved private parties, the municipality and – recently – some other layers of government. A prerequisite for the success of such an operational domain is that private investors with a longer-term goal start to become connected to the project, as seems to be the case in Zuidas. However, the effort still has a very internally-oriented character. Nevertheless, it is a step further than the situation in Copenhagen and Barcelona where, until now, there was hardly a forum in which private parties discussed programmatic issues, qualities and designs with each other and public parties. In Copenhagen, they were all individual clients of the Ørestad Development Corporation for example.

As far as these three projects are concerned, we can state that the establishment of project oriented ‘efficient’ forms of government has been a condition for the successful realization of an urban transformation project, although the opposite can be said if one regards the goal of the project to be to realize a new urban location.

The general failure of these three cases up to now has been that a quite innovative planning goal, new urbanity, has been furthered in their quite narrowly defined operational domains and that there has been a lack of strategic thinking and acting about its implementation. As such it stays a ‘disconnected innovation’. To create better conditions for its implementation it is necessary that such an innovation in planning goals is complemented with an innovative approach as well. In this case a form of governance which acknowledges the need for a more connective framing of projects in the metropolitan action space. Processes of strategic framing often develop slowly. Based on our fieldwork we can conclude that all three projects acknowledge their failings in respect of new urbanity: Amsterdam is working on an arts program, the Ørestad project is trying hard to attract private investors to invest and Barcelona aims to repair the links with the neighbourhoods in the post-Forum stage. However, to be successful these efforts
have to be framed in a connective way. This can help them to become more than only symbolic gestures to the ambition of new urbanity. In all three projects, there is a strong demand for operational interventions to accommodate strategic planning goals with visible results. It is certain that the success of these actions will largely determine the extent to which these three places can develop into more urban places in the future.

6.5 Theoretical and methodological reflections

The framework we used in this research was effective in shedding light on different relevant aspects regarding new urbanity and large-scale urban development projects. However, it also revealed weaknesses, both in the depth of the analysis and in the range of relevant factors it included. The following section includes some theoretical and methodological reflections.

6.5.1 Theoretical reflection

The concept of strategic framing, from both its symbolic-cognitive and organisational point of view, is quite useful for obtaining a general qualitative overview of the direction of the projects and their connectedness to the fragmented metropolitan action space. Our investigation has made clear that there are interesting differences in this respect between projects with a relatively similar aim. These differences did affect the organization of the operational domain and thus increased our understanding of the projects. The weakness of the concept is, however, connected to its strength since, in the way we have used it, it only gives a very broad classification of projects. The four domains of the metropolitan action space are an obvious simplification of reality, just like the broad symbolic-cognitive frames we identified in each project. These general labels mask a wide-ranging internal variety. We have stated a number of times that a project can be ‘successfully connected to’ a certain domain. However, this does not imply that it is successfully connected to all of the actors operating within this domain for example. This impreciseness makes the value rather limited when investigating a single case. Nevertheless, in a comparative way, it can reveal interesting differences. Another aspect is that different domains sometimes overlap. The social, civic and cultural domain has a private side as well. The differences between the inner metropolitan domain and the interregional and international domain are sometimes unclear in the case of intra-regional organizations.

However, in defence of the concept, its aim was never to use it for a fixed classification. Moreover, it was used for the fairly tentative and very qualitative first part of the investigation. In this respect it has proven its value. Though many ambitions are formulated in the operational domains by actors (including ambitions on new urbanity), the stability of the strategic framing strongly influences the development of these ambitions in micro-level acting. It is important to remember that the most analytical power is precisely in this connection between strategic framing and the micro level of acting in the operational domain. Strategic frames are not given, neither do they determine in a top-down manner the functioning of the operational domain. In reality, action and ambitions always come from a micro level. Actors formulate goals and strategies in this operational domain. The added value of the concept of strategic framing is that it gives an institutional meaning to action by analyzing it in the context of the metropolitan
action space.
The analysis of the projects’ operational domain is one of the most complex undertakings. There is so much complexity in the form of actors, interactions and decisions, that it is easy for the observer to lose the analytical track. This is not only difficult for an outside researcher, since practitioners have the same problem. They often have a very hard time reconstructing decision-making processes and all the interfering factors. Therefore, our analytical ambition in this dimension was rather limited. Only in Zuidas we could get a more in depth view due to more accessibility to the internal project environment. As regards the concept of rules that affect participants and modes of interactions and rules that affect the scope and strategy, we wanted to concentrate on the most important aspects. As regards the scope and strategy of the actors, we specifically limited ourselves to aspects relevant for the realization of the concept of new urbanity.

The difficulty of the concept of social norms is that it is quite hard to make the concept ‘researchable’. Although social norms can lead to written codifications, more often than not they are only revealed through practice, albeit hardly in a straightforward manner. In Chapter two we discussed the different ways social norms are expected to influence action. In this study we understood social norms in a rather sociological way. They are general directions for action with a delicate normative dimension that leads to a quite subtle, but possibly powerful impact. When analyzing urban planning practices we find a lot of social norms at work that simultaneously direct action. Urban planning is a normative activity par excellence! One only has to consider the many planning concepts that we use to enhance our collective understanding of space or the way to intervene in it. Obviously, ‘new urbanity’ is a similar concept. In a situation of fragmented means of power and knowledge, the importance of an ‘ought’ dimension to action becomes even more important. That is especially the case in these projects in which we identified a considerable discrepancy between original intentions on new urbanity in the original plans and the first realized parts/projects. However, reality is extremely complex and social norms are certainly not easily ‘visible’. At the same time they are in a continuous state of change. Therefore, just like the concept of framing, the concept of social norms has little value as a conceptual tool if used in a narrow sense. Social norms have to be understood in a more comprehensive analytical framework in which they are one of the tools to understand actor behaviour, among other things. Our multi-dimensional framework is an attempt to work with this philosophy.

We can therefore conclude that a strong aspect of our theoretical framework is that it gives two additional dimensions of understanding to the operational level. On the one hand it facilitates an institutional reflection which links action to its connection in the metropolitan action space and, on the other hand, it takes into account an ‘ought’ dimension to agency. The latter is of extreme importance for the study of normative planning concepts like new urbanity.

The theoretical weakness lies especially in the limited precision and explanatory value of the individual domains of our framework. An obvious way to create more valid results would have been to include more case studies and work with a variety of factors. The first would be very difficult for a single researcher to do, due to the complexity of the analysis. However, this might be feasible based on a format of less in-depth case study research (or more time). In this study we chose the initial difference in strategic framing as the major varying aspect between the three case studies. However, it turned out that there were also other factors which made it quite difficult to test hypotheses.
This limited the possibility of defining any significant number of generally applicable statements on new urbanity in large-scale development projects.

6.5.2 Methodological reflection

The methodology used in this study was the in-depth case study method. It is no surprise that such a method is extremely time-consuming, especially in the case of an international comparison. The decision was taken to study three cases at an early stage. There was an obvious methodological advantage in the study of the Zuidas case due to its proximity to the home base of the researcher and the lack of a language or cultural barrier. Due to the rather closed character of these projects, it is almost a necessity to enter the world of practitioners if you need in-depth knowledge. In the study on Copenhagen and Barcelona this was done by means of a series of in-depth interviews with practitioners and local people reflecting on the project (journalists, scientist etc.) during a relatively contained fieldwork trip. Amsterdam provided an opportunity to perform a long-term case following. In addition to the research methods used in the two other cases, namely in-depth interviewing and the review of documents, there were possibilities in the Zuidas setting to gain a much more in-depth insight by observing internal meetings, analyzing internal documents and having personal unofficial talks with practitioners involved in the project. This was not possible in the other projects due to a lack of time and/or contacts. As a result, the Zuidas became the sort of lead case study on the basis of which a more advanced understanding was achieved (leading to publications other than this dissertation). However, the knowledge gained on the Zuidas was used to increase the efficiency of the fieldwork periods in Copenhagen and Barcelona (which both lasted two months). Zuidas indicated which question had to be asked. In the two ‘foreign’ case studies, the distance to the research object was a lot greater.

The work on the Zuidas in particular created a quite vulnerable and sometimes tricky research situation in which it is quite easy, from an academic point of view, for people to level the accusation of bias based on a lack of academic ‘distance’ from the research object. On the other hand, from the point of view of practice, it was clear that academics are often portrayed as poorly informed about the informal processes and politics when they write their analyses. The research was performed on the basis of an awareness of these conditions, based on an openness regarding the research intentions. The preliminary research results (draft texts) were communicated to practitioners who provided valuable observations. Obviously they have different opinions and also a different goal. Most of them were only mildly interested in academic observations and they were more interested in practical recommendations. On the other hand, a lot of people were afraid that this research would generate negative publicity. For many of them the realization of the project is important for their professional careers. They are afraid that criticism – especially written criticism – will have a negative effect on the project. However, it is all too easy to paint all these people with the same brush. Practitioners have very different views on academic research, ranging from being very enthusiastic, supportive, cooperative and eager to discuss to being extremely reluctant to share information or opinions.

The municipality of Amsterdam made two grants available for this research in order to provide financial support for the fieldwork in Barcelona and Copenhagen. The only obligation attached to these grants was that a presentation had to be given of the results at the municipal planning office, with a particular focus on the learning aspects relating
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to the Zuidas project. A book on the Zuidas (Salet and Majoor 2005a) was commis-
sioned by the Zuidas Reflect, an organization set up to critically ‘reflect’ on the pro-
ject, with financial contributions made available by private parties involved in the Zui-
das project. Nevertheless, as regards that publication and the semi-public preparatory
meetings that took place, no restrictions were imposed on the editors as far as the in-
clusion of co-authors or the content of the published texts.

6.6 Possible further research

We explained that this study has many limitations as regards the depth of data gather-
ing and analysis and the scope of its conclusions. However, we are convinced that it
can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the framing and working of
the operational domains of large-scale development projects and, in particular, to the
conditions that are influencing new urbanity in these projects. It is certainly not the first
study to compare the various projects, and neither will it be the last. A quite straight-
forward suggestion for further research is to study more projects, including projects in
other regions. It might also be worthwhile to study completely finished projects, or
re-examine projects that have been studied in an earlier phase (by others). This would
most probably provide additional evidence that the development of large-scale devel-
opment projects, and especially their dimension of new urbanity, is in essence a very
long-term trajectory. Other lines of research could focus on specific subaspects that
received limited attention due to our more general framework. Two avenues appear to
be particularly interesting, based on the results of this study, namely (1) a specific focus
on the social, civic and cultural domain and (2) a specific focus on the private domain.

As regards point 1: A better understanding of the (possible) involvement of the social,
civic and cultural domain in large-scale development projects. This study could have
both an analytic and normative perspective. First it might be necessary to split up this
domain into two parts. These days there is considerable attention for the cultural di-
mension of cities and (spatial) interventions in cities. However, the link with
large-scale development projects is often either rather banal, in the form of a mega
event like the Forum 2004, or is limited to purely physical artefacts (museums, public
spaces) which may have a culturally enhancing effect. It would be very valuable to
study projects with a more comprehensive cultural approach, especially to find out how
such an approach could work as an effective way of framing over the long time span of
urban transformation.

Project initiators refer frequently to the social and civic character of projects, However
tangible results are hard to find. Often, social results are defined quite narrowly, for
example in terms of the project’s contribution to employment. As in the case of the
cultural dimension, further research could focus on studying projects with a more
comprehensive social approach, just like we studied projects here with a specific new
urbanity ambition. Our three cases reflect a slight development towards a more socially
responsive culture in which the social impacts of projects are taken into account more,
with links sometimes being made to other disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Although the
establishment of such links has traditionally been a task for government, it is slowly
becoming clear (for example in Amsterdam) that some players in the private domain
are starting to appreciate the importance of such links. Nevertheless, this is still under-developed in many cases. It would certainly be interesting to try and acquire more in-depth knowledge of how a stronger social framing of projects could enhance new urbanity. This seems to be a logical connection since current projects mostly result in the disparagement of social groups. The question is how can social and civic groups express themselves more effectively in these projects?

As regards point 2: It would also be very worthwhile to carry out further investigations into the framing in the private domain and its relationship with the operational domain and the social norms that give an 'ought' dimension to action. We explained that, in our study, we were rather imprecise on the differences that occur within the private sector domain. There are a lot of relevant differences. First there are lots of different kinds of private actors, ranging from investors and developers, to end-users. This is usually a very dynamic domain full of takeovers, mergers and new upcoming players. Generally speaking there seems to be a strong tendency towards scale enlargement and internationalization. What influence does this have on local projects? In Amsterdam, ABN/AMRO and ING are part of the Dutch corporate ‘culture’. They seem to be making an extra effort as regards the development of the Zuidas. However, what will happen if they are taken over by even larger international financial institutions that have no particular relationship with Amsterdam or the Netherlands? To what extent can multinational firms or globally operating hedge-funds be linked to a local planning agenda? More specific insight into these two domains could enrich project understanding. It could also lead to a greater realisation in practice that different trajectories are possible for large-scale development projects. In a situation of competitiveness and a search for unique characteristics this could be an important added value.

6.7 Possible orientations as regards practice: new urbanity in large-scale development projects

In addition to our scientific-orientated research question we formulated a more policy-orientated research question in Chapter two: What can we learn from these projects regarding the conditions for the realization of new urbanity in large-scale development projects?

Based on the empirical results of our study, this section provides general recommendations for projects in which initiators want to improve the conditions for new urbanity. Our five main recommendations derived from our research are:

1. New urbanity not in every location
It is quite easy in an initial phase of a project to make proposals for ‘new urbanity’. Nowadays these concepts are often welcomed. However, one has to make sure that it is not an impossible ambition. Although this study did not investigate the physical prerequisites for new urbanity, it also learns that it makes sense for them to be treated as important, long before one starts thinking about such ambitions. The three projects in our study show that centrality in infrastructure networks is a very important supportive condition. The centrality of a place is something that can be enhanced by (public) in-
vestments. However, due to the high costs and the complexity of these investments it makes more sense to focus first on large-scale development projects that take advantage of existing centrality, like multi-modal transport hubs. In Copenhagen and Barcelona, major public investments were needed to create a new ‘centrality’ of Ørestad and Forum. Zuidas had a much more natural centrality and was initiated successfully without too many infrastructure burdens.

However, (infrastructure) centrality is not the only important physical condition for new urbanity. A number of factors can be advantageous, such as physical connections to existing built-up areas and the city centre and the presence of old buildings that give the area a certain character. The former was an issue in all three projects we studied and was safeguarded with relative success. The latter was, however, very problematic. Zuidas and Ørestad were ‘greenfield’ developments that had to reinvent urbanity from the scratch. In Forum the self-proclaimed ambition was to integrate the environmental infrastructures. Although they give the area a distinctive image, they do not provide any direct conditions for a more urban character. From this perspective it is no surprise that, generally speaking, revitalized old harbour areas generate more supportive conditions for new urbanity. It is no coincidence that this was the case in all three of the cities we studied: the Southern IJ-banks in Amsterdam and the old harbours of Copenhagen and Barcelona have all been redeveloped in recent decades as successful new mixed-use urban areas.

A good understanding of the market is also extremely important. Zuidas had a major advantage over the other two projects in that it was able to capitalize on existing market interests for development. The situation was different in the case of Forum and Ørestad. In such a situation it is even more difficult not only to convince private investors, but also to trigger them to adopt a new planning concept.

Our advice is not to try to realize new urbanity in every location; only make it a planning goal if supportive physical conditions and market interests are present or can be easily enhanced.

We have shown that there is often a large discrepancy between the planning intention for new urbanity and the built reality, even in a situation of supportive physical conditions. The following four points of advice focus on the creation of more receptive conditions for new urbanity in the case of receptive physical conditions:

2. Create connective framing

The three cases show the importance of a connective framing. All four domains of the metropolitan action space are of importance for the enhancement of the conditions for new urbanity as we explained before. However, as our case studies show, a connective framing is not established easily. It demands strategic thinking and manoeuvring of the project initiators. It is important for them to look beyond the short term framing that is often successful. In our case studies we saw this most clearly in Ørestad (with the municipality – national government framing) and in Zuidas (with the municipality – local business elite framing). In both cases the framing proved to be too narrow to create conditions for new urbanity. This narrow framing seems to have been established due to lack of strategic thinking as regards the relevant frames required. A more connected framing increases the bargaining capacity of local initiators versus private investors.

Our advice is to secure the connective strategic framing of a project through the estab-
Disconnected Innovations

lishment of another (network) body which is not related to operational decisions but which is purely focused on the strategic connection of the project in the metropolitan action space.

3. Politicize planning / keep operational domains extroverted
In the three cases we studied, but also in other comparable projects, the operational domain is often characterized by special project-oriented modes of governance. Our study has shown that their introverted character is often not the best condition for safeguarding strategies for new urbanity. Introverted settings often lead to the reproduction of established answers to problems. Opportunities for new urbanity are lost especially when the operational domain is dominated by short-term private sector interests and a public sector that is afraid of losing its short-term competitive edge.
The other aspect is that they tend to depoliticize planning. The result is that (decisions on) large initiatives often take place outside a societal forum, leading to possible public resistance on the one hand and a lack of identification with projects on the other.
Our advice is to keep the operational domains extroverted and politicize the decisions that are taken in them. Explore models for the operational domain in which a goal-oriented developing agency – on private terms – is directed by a more public-oriented body that safeguards the political processes.

4. Support the establishment of a social norm on new urbanity
We identified different supportive conditions for new urbanity. However, there is no immediate link between these conditions and realization. It is important to remember that in these projects such a planning concept can hardly be introduced in a top–down manner due to a very scattered field of power. For the establishment of a social norm regarding new urbanity, we identified the importance of the group composition in the operational domain, the importance of an increase in the power of actors holding the norm and/or the role of a charismatic norm entrepreneur.
These conditions can be influenced to some extent. An extroverted operational domain can lead to a group composition that is (more) supportive of new urbanity. Planning rules or incentives favouring new urbanity could enhance the position of the actors holding this norm. A charismatic norm entrepreneur cannot be created. However, a supportive environment could be formed in which powerful (public) individuals are linked to the project. For a government it is very important to search for private parties that are seeking long-term stakes in the development. Networks should be created in which these private parties can establish social norms in the built environment. Governments should continue to have faith in the creativity of the market but also be ready to intervene or to set a minimum standard.
However, these are only conditions. The transformation of concepts into built projects is the ultimate test. We introduced new urbanity in the first chapter as a planning innovation. It is a good idea to make some initial physical statements to underline such an innovation. These might be realized against the dominant social norm at the time but attract attention and offer a glimpse of a different future. In the three projects we studied, this approach was most successful in the Ørestad Nord area, with its new university, concert hall and university housing. In the case of Forum and Zuidas, the first buildings did not contribute to this ambition. The result is that no link is being established with other parties and the general public regarding the new urbanity ambition. This has a
clearly negative effect.

Our advice is to recognise that ambitions for new urbanity can only be made on the basis of a joint effort and cannot be directed in a top-down manner. However, public authorities should not be afraid to make initial ‘pioneering’ investments which reflect the new urbanity ambition. This will increase other groups’ awareness of (and possibly identification with) this ambition for new urbanity. Forums should be set up in which sustainable stakeholders and others reflect on the preferred form of urbanity in a project.

5. Stay flexible
The last aspect is to see the development of such a large-scale scheme not only as the realization of a spatial and social ‘product’ but to understand the objective as the management of an ongoing spatial, economic and social transformation in a particular area. It is therefore better to regard an urban ‘project’ as an urban ‘plan’ as well. We do not wish for rapidly-replaceable architecture, but for an open mind towards the future, so as to anticipate new functions and new interpretations of the notion of ‘new’ urbanity and realise that the built artefacts will be a part of a living and changing environment. A flexible form of organization is important, as is an alternative way of using spatial plans. This is no easy task and can also have a contradictory effect. It seems, for example, that the large infrastructure investments that are being made (or are to be made) in our three cases are necessary on the one hand to create the physical conditions for new urbanity. At the same time they result in forms of physical or financial inflexibility that hampers the achievement of this precise goal. Finding a balance between organized physical interventions and more organic processes of city-building in a broader sense continues to be at the heart of our profession.

Our advice is to work with flexible strategic visions. Ensure the quality of the area not only with spatial plans which locate functions but with qualitative guidelines regarding the future environment to be created.