Civic networks and political behavior: Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin

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CIVIC HOPES AND POLITICAL REALITIES

Immigrants, Community Organizations, and Political Engagement

S. Karthick Ramakrishnan and Irene Bloemraad
Editors

Russell Sage Foundation • New York

Floris Vermeulen and Maria Berger

Chapter 6

Civic Networks and Political Behavior: Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin

Immigrant organizations play a central role in the political behavior of immigrants in host societies. Local organizations often serve as a bridge between local authorities and immigrant constituencies, providing authorities with access to the immigrant communities and representing collective interests of immigrants. The organizing process of immigrants is therefore of particular importance to understanding the political behavior and political positions of immigrant communities.

Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie (1999, 2001; Fennema 2004; Tillie 2004) have suggested that immigrant groups with a relatively high number of ethnic organizations, which are well connected through a dense network, can be characterized as more civic than those with fewer organizations and fewer networks. Networks among immigrant organizations are critical to a civic community, primarily because they create channels for communication. This process of community building is based on an accumulation of trust among organizations, achieved through the communication channels and an exchange of norms and values (Fennema and Tillie 2001). Fennema and Tillie also assumed that social trust among ethnic communities is carried over into a sense of trust in local political institutions, but only if immigrant community leaders in the ethnic elite are adequately integrated in the local political system.

The basic idea here is that the greater the number of interconnected organizations an immigrant group has, the more this group can be considered civic. A subsequent question is whether, within more civic immigrant groups, immigrants will also prove to be more politically active on the individual level. Fennema and Tillie's study of immigrant groups in Amsterdam seemed to suggest this relationship: of all the city's immigrant groups, Turks have established the densest and most extended network of organizations and have proved the most politically active group of immigrants (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001).

This chapter takes on these ideas by looking at the influence of the host state on the immigrant organizing process, and seeks to learn how immigrant organizing affects the political behavior of individual immigrants. The focus here is on Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin from 1970 to 2000. This was the

period during which a Turkish organizational structure first emerged in both cities and simultaneously developed, albeit in different ways. In the early 1980s, the Netherlands implemented a multicultural regime that was meant to integrate the growing immigrant population: newcomers could obtain Dutch citizenship with relative ease and ethnic minorities' right to maintain their cultural identities was recognized. By contrast, Germany's approach could be characterized as one of exclusion: by making naturalization difficult, immigrants and their descendants were denied access to the political community and, in general, little appreciation was shown for cultural diversity (Koopmans and Statham 2000). After 2000, the political environment for the Turkish communities in both cities changed significantly. Amsterdam witnessed a multicultural backlash, as did the rest of the Netherlands. In Berlin, multicultural practices slowly became institutionalized in local integration policies (Vermeulen and Stotijn 2007).[1] This analysis will also examine the relationship between degrees of group civicness and the political behavior of individual Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam and in Berlin.

We first analyze the impact of different policies and institutional environments on the Turkish organizing process in Amsterdam and in Berlin. We find that Turks in Amsterdam have established a relatively high number of organizations compared with those in Berlin. Amsterdam's Turks have also established a more civic associational community: the network structure of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam is characterized by numerous horizontal ties, as measured by interlocking directorates among board members. By contrast, Berlin's organizational structure is more ideologically polarized and hierarchical: few powerful organizations are included and extreme ideological organizations are excluded. In other words, different host state environments have produced divergent Turkish organizational landscapes.

We then examine whether differences in organizational networks affect political participation and political influence, demonstrating how Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have had more opportunities to influence policy making and how they seem to be better incorporated in the local political system. One example is that many Amsterdam politicians of Turkish descent have been active board members in at least one of the many local Turkish organizations.

Our research also shows that, at the individual level, membership in Turkish organizations has a positive influence on the degree of political participation by individual Turks in their host societies. This is true in both cities. Turks who are active in Turkish organizations are more likely to respond proactively to political issues at the national level.[2] However, in contrast to our expectations going into this project, and those of the literature, we did not find a necessary relationship between the degree of group civicness and individual political activity. Although Amsterdam has a more civic Turkish community than Berlin does, based on the number and ties of Turkish organizations, Turks in Amsterdam prove less politically active on an individual basis. It seems that a higher degree of group inclusion in Amsterdam relieves the city's Turkish organizations from a duty to mobilize their ethnic constituency. Turks' inclusion came not as the result of ethnic mobilization, but as a by-product of Dutch institutions and policies. Indeed, per-

haps because their organizations and leaders are more incorporated in the political system than their counterparts in Berlin, Amsterdam's Turkish immigrants have had fewer incentives as individuals to become politically active.

Turkish immigrants in Berlin have had, perhaps, more reasons to be politically active. They, along with their organizations, have had to face a greater struggle to become politically incorporated than their counterparts in Amsterdam. Because Berlin's Turkish organizations do not have access to the local political system, there is greater demand for a politically active community that will work to provide them with additional tools for access. We show that more Turks in Berlin are members of Turkish organizations than Turks in Amsterdam, and that it is the hierarchical network of organizations in Berlin that seems to enhance ethnic mobilization.

Still, it is worth noting that Amsterdam's Turks seemed more inclined to trust the political system than those in Berlin, which is also what Fennema and Tillie's research would anticipate. Our research endeavors to provide an answer for these different patterns of political participation and political trust by pointing to the relatively high degree of Turkish organizations that are incorporated in Amsterdam's political system. In Berlin, Turkish organizations contend with being more detached from the policy makers in their host state, a distance that enables them to act with greater independence and autonomy, but also a distance that encourages Berlin's Turks and their organizations to be more distrustful toward their city politicians. This analysis evokes Rahsaan Maxwell's findings (chapter 5, this volume) from his study of ethnic Caribbean political organizations in Britain and France: the inclusion or the exclusion of immigrant organizations in the political system plays a large role in motivating their strategies. Seeking to understand the political behavior of immigrants at the local level, this comparative study demonstrates the utility of measuring an immigrant group's civicness, both in terms of the number of organizations that belong to its network and its structure.

THE EMERGENCE OF TURKISH CIVIC COMMUNITY IN AMSTERDAM AND BERLIN

Similar reasons propelled Turkish migration to both Amsterdam and Berlin. Economic motives were the most important ever since the start of Turkish immigration during the early 1960s, when Turks began arriving in Western Europe, predominantly as guest workers. Later on, political motives for migration would gain importance, especially after Turkey's military coup in 1980, though economic factors continued to dominate. The influx of guest workers officially came to a halt in 1973 during Western Europe's economic recession, when the Dutch government, much like the German, imposed an immigration ban targeting all guest worker countries. However, guest workers who were already in the Netherlands and Germany were entitled to bring, or send for, their families, and many

of the Turkish workers did. Family unification transformed the Turks into a sizable migrant population in Western Europe and modified the group's demographic composition as more and more Turkish women and children began to arrive in the 1970s and early 1980s.

The arrival of Turks to Berlin began relatively late compared to the rest of Germany. This is an advantage in our comparison, because Turkish migration to Berlin occurred during the same period as Turkish immigrants began arriving in Amsterdam: between 1964 and 1968. In terms of numbers, Amsterdam's Turkish population was significantly smaller than Berlin's for the entire period of the study. The percentage of women among Berlin's Turkish population was high. Throughout the 1970s, 28 percent of guest workers in all of Germany were women, but in Berlin more than 40 percent were. This was a direct result of the favorable economic structure (Schwarz 1992, 123). Until the end of the decade, relatively more Turkish women were present in Berlin than in Amsterdam, though the distinction is not as great as that between Berlin and other German cities. As the process of family reunification unfolded, the percentage of women among Amsterdam's Turkish population also increased, creating greater similarities between the demographic compositions in both cities. In fact, by the end of the 1990s, the numbers were nearly even (Vermeulen 2006).

Because individuals from urban areas are assumed to have higher educational and occupational skills than those from rural areas, we need to know from which regions in Turkey the immigrants came. A lack of reliable data makes it difficult to provide a precise comparison between the Turkish populations in the Netherlands and in Germany, but it is generally assumed that Germany recruited Turkish immigrants with higher educational backgrounds and occupational skills than the Netherlands did (Böcker and Thränhardt 2003, 37). Research in Berlin during the early 1970s showed that 15 percent of Turkish immigrants had been employed in the civil service sector before their departure, primarily as schoolteachers. In addition, a relatively high percentage of Turkish students were found studying at one of Berlin's numerous universities and an above-average percentage of Turkish immigrants had more than nine years of schooling. By the 1980s, the percentage of low-skilled workers would increase considerably with the arrival of immigrants from rural Turkey coming to join their families (Gitmez and Wilpert 1987, 90–92). Once again, this influx created more points of parity between Turkish communities in Amsterdam and in Berlin. Overall, size was the only major difference; otherwise, the Turkish populations in Amsterdam and Berlin between 1970 and 2000 were not notably different (Vermeulen 2006).

Turkish Ideological Movements in Western Europe

Founded between the late 1960s and early 1970s, the first Turkish immigrant organizations in Western Europe were mostly leftist and rightist political workers organizations. Their focus was overwhelmingly on their homeland and on each other. A wide array of political and religious movements jockeyed for power in

Western Europe's ever-growing Turkish communities. The left-right political polarization was imported from Turkey, a country that suffered serious political upheaval during this period. The major polarities were the radical left versus the radical right, Turkish versus Kurdish, Sunnis versus Alevis, and religious versus secular. The Turkish state founded and supported pro-state organizations, and opposition movements established groups of their own (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 63–66). Such ideological rivalries had a dramatic impact on the establishment of new Turkish organizations in Western Europe. No group could afford to stay behind. The number of new Turkish organizations hence exploded. Both Germany and the Netherlands witnessed the development of left wing and right wing political movements, Islamic movements (some of which even banned in Turkey), as well as Islamic organizations that were supported by the Turkish government.

Then, as now, Islam was the greatest and strongest common denominator across Turkish immigrant organizations in Western Europe (Doomernik 1995; Vermeulen 2006). Most Turkish immigrants are affiliated with one of the main Islamic Sunni denominations: the Diyanet movement, the oppositional Milli Görüş movement, and the more spiritually guided Süleymancilar movement. Both socially and politically, these religious groups have organized separately because they each support different political parties in Turkey. The Diyanet movement, naming itself after Turkey's Presidency for Religious Affairs, was established by advocates of a state-controlled, fairly moderate, yet nationalistic form of Islam. The Milli Görüş movement proved one of the most important oppositional forces against the influence of the Diyanet throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The Süleymancilar movement shuns being linked to Turkish politics and rejects state control over the Islamic faith (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Islamic denominations sought to improve their standing in Amsterdam's and Berlin's Turkish communities by establishing as many organizations as possible. This resulted in the registration of many small Islamic prayer sites among different Turkish neighborhoods throughout the 1980s. Each site was affiliated with a particular Islamic denomination.

Turkish oppositional leftist groups have historically comprised both radical and more liberal secular groups. The radical side includes numerous communist splinter groups, some of which were related to the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and some that were influenced by other forms of communism. The right wing organizations can be further classified into moderate and radical wings, most of them directly related to Islamic movements or having their own religious purpose. The moderate groups are categorized as Hür-Türk organizations and the extreme right wing organizations are better known as Grey Wolves organizations. The Grey Wolves movement strongly opposes organizations that are of a Turkish leftist vein or come from Kurdish background.

The Kurdish-Turkish conflict has had a long history in Turkey, and ever since its increased level of violence in the 1980s has been a major factor in the organizing process of Turkish and Kurdish immigrants in Western Europe. One of the main demands of Kurdish organizations is the recognition of the Kurdish people as an independent nation. Apart from this clear political agenda, Kurdish organizations are also engaged in celebrating Kurdish cultural events and studying the Kurdish language.

Two Opportunity Structures: Policies in Amsterdam and Berlin

Many immigration studies argue that the behavior of immigrants in a host society is shaped not only by the characteristics of the group and its immigration history, but also, and to a large extent, by the opportunities the host society offers. For instance, the local labor market's structure may be more significant in carving out work opportunities for newcomers in destination cities than an individual's skills or previous professional experience (Waldinger 1996; Morawska 1996; Lucassen 2002).

In a similar fashion, scholars have stressed the fact that host states often act as a catalyst for ethnic mobilization and that they provide opportunities and constraints for immigrants' ability to organize themselves. State policies may unintentionally stimulate ethnic mobilization by triggering a resurgence of ethnic markers or by assigning a status to immigrant groups (Olzak 1983). To a large extent, the state defines who the legitimate actors within the field of organizations are, and therefore has the power to provide legitimacy to certain immigrant groups or specific immigrant organizations (Kasinitz 1992).

A number of these studies have drawn on recent social movement literature, which stresses the importance of political opportunities for levels of social protest. Because the factors relevant to social protest vary across issues and constituencies, it is important to distinguish those elements of the political environment most relevant for immigrant mobilization. When it comes to collective immigrant action, the literature identifies citizenship regimes and integration policies as the main factors at play in political opportunity structures (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005; Odmalm 2005). It is useful to conceptualize the different citizenship regimes and integration approaches in a two-dimensional space (Koopmans and Statham 2000). The first dimension concerns the degree to which full and equal citizenship is accessible to individual migrants. The second deals with granting immigrants rights as a recognized cultural group. Although there are reasons to expect that organizational dynamics would differ from other collective behavior, researchers tend to employ similar models of explanation to both processes (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Fennema and Tillie 2004).

Turkish organizers arriving in Amsterdam and in Berlin encountered distinct political opportunity structures, despite the fact that they are in neighboring countries. First, these differences might be attributed to different national citizenship regimes. The Netherlands' citizenship regime for Turks was characterized as relatively open and tolerant. For example, Dutch citizenship and attaining dual nationality were easily accessible. By contrast, the German regime, at least until 2000, tended to be closed to Turkish newcomers. The acquisition of German citizenship through naturalization was relatively difficult and uncommon

for Turks and, compared with Amsterdam, Berlin demonstrated less cultural and religious tolerance (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005).

Amsterdam The Dutch citizenship regime, especially in terms of group rights, cannot be understood without referring to the traditional Dutch system of pillarization (verzuiling). Originally developed to cope with the country's traditional religious minorities, pillarization was based on the idea that each social or cultural group should provide its own organizational services, such as hospitals, schools, newspapers, broadcasting networks, trade unions, and voluntary associations. Cooperation existed, though primarily at the level of Dutch society's political elites (Lijphart 1968). Traces of the pillarization system can still be found in Dutch immigration policy at almost every level. It has been observed that Muslims, in particular, use legal structures that originated in the heyday of pillarization, and it is because of this specific structure that very few Islamic claims have been categorically denied by Dutch authorities (Rath et al. 2001). This tendency away from a routinely dismissive policy is illustrated, for example, by the fact that every religion in the Netherlands is entitled to establish its own school with full financing by the national government (Duyvené de Wit and Koopmans 2001).

In line with the system of pillarization, the Dutch government of the early 1980s introduced a multicultural policy designed to integrate the growing immigrant population. It officially classified the main immigrant groups as minority target groups whose socioeconomic positions needed improvement. The minority policy had two principal objectives for immigrant groups. First, their social and economic conditions were to be improved through the enactment of active public interventions in the labor market and the education system, thus ensuring equal access for all groups. Second, the Netherlands was to become a tolerant, multicultural society in which every immigrant culture would be accepted, respected, and valued (Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 148).

Rooted in the idea of the welfare state, the first objective became the focal point of Dutch minority policy and, consequently, was visibly manifested in actual practice. The second objective proved equally evident in attitudes toward immigrant organizations in the Netherlands and, in particular, Amsterdam. Such an outlook fostered the sense that immigrants could integrate into Dutch society yet retain their cultural identity. Politicians have long argued that group-specific services would be needed to accomplish the establishment of a tolerant multicultural society. The basic idea was that organizations run by immigrants themselves would provide enough opportunities to "maintain and develop their own ethnic immigrant culture and identity" (Lucassen and Penninx 1994, 148).

Amsterdam authorities complied with this new national policy development and, in 1981, introduced a multicultural policy for immigrant groups. This meant, among many other things, that from 1981 onward, different minority target groups (including Turks) would become eligible for direct operational subsidies for establishing and developing their own organizations. The city council envisaged three primary tasks for such organizations: to promote and preserve cultural identities, to emancipate their constituencies, and to represent community interests. In principle, political and religious organizations were not entitled to subsidy funding. Nevertheless, Amsterdam authorities insisted that all segments of guest worker communities be included, so as not to isolate certain groups or associations. The authorities explicitly called on religious organizations to found additional sociocultural organizations for the city to be able to support these groups financially (Vermeulen 2006).

By 1985, in a further attempt at political incorporation into Dutch society, resident aliens had been granted the right to vote at the municipal level (Tillie 2000). The same year, Amsterdam's city government decided to establish several minority advisory councils to guide local authorities on new integration policies, in addition to evaluating existing ones. The council for the Turkish community represented a broad range of Turkish organizations, including the left wing, the right wing, and the religious. The advisory council worked to enhance the structural collaborations among Turkish groups that were previously engaged in virulent struggles over funding, constituencies, and influence, yet were now obliged to collaborate on many issues (Vermeulen 2006).

In the 1990s, Dutch integration policy entered a new phase. Both politicians and the public had been disappointed by the previous ten years' worth of results in multicultural policy. Social and economic deprivation among immigrants seemed to have only increased, despite the fact that so much money and policy making had been directed to changing the situation. Politicians argued that the higher unemployment rates among immigrants deserved more attention, and that emancipation and cultural expression merited less. The most salient point of the new integration policy, therefore, was not to focus on cultural diversity, but rather to emphasize the participation of immigrants in the educational system and the labor market. Government programs became less multicultural and more integrative (Thränhardt 2000, 172). In Amsterdam during this period, the focus of the policy also shifted away from cultural diversity and toward social and economic integration.

Berlin Berlin began formulating its integration policy in the early 1970s as the city experienced an overall increase in its number of Turkish guest workers and immigrants through family reunion and asylum seeking. The early policy attempted to address contemporary social problems among the immigrant groups, including segregation, racial violence, unemployment, and housing challenges (Schwarz 1992, 125–26). This policy of the 1970s—one of cautious integration—became to be seen as totally inadequate as the political significance of immigration and integration issues increased, leading to political crises over these issues (Schwarz 2001, 129–30).

The Christian Democrats (CDU) won the 1981 local elections, proposing highly restrictive and occasionally even xenophobic measures for the growing immigrant population in Berlin (Hunger and Thränhardt 2001, 109). After the election, a new policy was introduced that was supposed to prevent further growth of the immigrant population while, at the same time, furthering integration of those immigrants already living in Berlin. The slogan used to sum up the policy program was "integration or departure" (Schwarz 2001, 131), which had

a very different resonance than Amsterdam's "integration while retaining ethnic identity."

Berlin's motto well illustrates the two sides of integration policy during the 1980s. On the one hand, there was an emphasis on restrictive measures meant to ensure that the number of immigrants in the city decreased. On the other, focus fell on a more integrative regime meant to incorporate newcomers into the host society, thus taking care not to leave them behind. The policy's restrictive side was formulated and subsequently implemented by several conservative CDU senators, of whom Heinrich Lummer (1981 to 1986) is the most renowned (Gesemann 2001, 16). The policy's integration side was to be implemented by the Ausländerbeauftragte, a new bureaucratic institution established in 1981 by a coalition of the CDU and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP).

Barbara John, a moderate CDU politician, founded the Ausländerbeauftragte, held her position for more than twenty years, and was undoubtedly the principal actor in the field of integration in Berlin throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Several similarities could be drawn between John's stance and Amsterdam's policies. Very different from German national policy, the Ausländerbeauftragte emphasized naturalization, around which it launched a successful 1981 campaign that focused particularly on second- and third-generation Turks. To this day, naturalization rates in Berlin are much higher than those in other German states (Böcker and Thränhardt 2003, 123). A second component was clear-cut support for immigrant organizations. The support may not have been as straightforward or structural as in Amsterdam, but proved critical to the development of Turkish organizations in Berlin.

A comparison of the subsidy policy for immigrant organizations in Berlin and in Amsterdam reveals differences reflecting the extent to which the two opportunity structures varied. In Amsterdam, the subsidy for Turkish and other immigrant organizations was integrated into the city's minority policy. The municipal government explicitly stated in reports that Turkish organizations would be helpful to the emancipation of the Turkish population and should therefore receive state money. In Berlin, the integrational aspects of the Ausländerbeauftragte and its accompanying support for Turkish organizations were not completely structured into local immigration policies. Ausländerbeauftragte policy was limited by both the exclusion approach at the federal level and restrictive measures created by the conservative wing of the local CDU (Gesemann 2001, 16).

Subsidy policy for Turkish organizations was therefore less straightforward in Berlin than in Amsterdam. For example, many organizations receiving financial support within the framework of self-help groups were not actually founded by Turks, but rather were created for Turkish people, which often had German board members. The Ausländerbeauftragte did, however, manage to fund several ethnic Turkish organizations. This was less a political decision than a practical strategy to sustain the position of the Ausländerbeauftragte within the local political field. Funding organizations would improve relationships with immigrant communities, which, in turn, would ensure the political legitimacy of the Ausländerbeauftragte over a longer period. Turkish organizations in Berlin were thus

not so much supported for the sake of their activities as they were for pragmatic reasons. According to Barbara John, too many Turkish organizations in the city would jeopardize the Turkish population's integration (Schwarz 2001).

The third difference between the two subsidy policies is that Amsterdam's was often operational or foundational and, in general, continued over a long period.[5] In Berlin, subsidies were normally devoted to individual projects and operational or general financial support for Turkish organizations proved rare.

To complete the comparison between the two policies, it is worth examining the position of Turkish religious organizations in Berlin. The political environment for these organizations has very much been influenced by the ambiguous status of Islam in Germany. Because Islam is not recognized as an official religion in Germany, it has been very difficult for Turkish religious organizations to participate in the local political system. In contrast to their counterparts in Amsterdam, where Islamic organizations have received subsidies and participated on advisory councils, Berlin's Turkish Islamic organizations are basically ignored or not recognized as partners by local authorities. Neither do they receive financial support or have official contact with politicians. The financial support given to religious Turkish organizations in Amsterdam would be unthinkable in the context of Berlin or, for that matter, throughout greater Germany (Gesemann and Kapphan 2001, 412–13; Jonker 2005).

Hypothesizing the Effects What distinct outcomes can be expected for the numbers of Turkish organizations and the networks between them, two central elements of a civic immigrant community? The political opportunity model predicts that mobilization, which includes the founding of organizations, is likely to occur when changes in the external political climate make collective action more conducive to success. Changes within mainstream political institutions work to facilitate certain groups, demands, and forms of action and to constrain others. Such a transformation will affect people's expectations regarding the success or failure of their collective behavior and, ultimately, their collective action (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998). One of the main differences between the two cities is that Amsterdam's citizenship regime was extended to include specific group rights for immigrants. This multicultural policy acknowledged Turks as an official minority entitled to particular rights as an immigrant group. Turkish organizations were seen as a product of the ethnic community, thereby receiving state funding and being given an official role within the local political system as a way to emancipate and integrate the Turkish community into Dutch society. Amsterdam authorities, moreover, attempted to target the entire Turkish community, which included both Islamic movements and more conservative ones. Some attempts to reach out to the community were also visible in Berlin, yet Turks received no special policy status, nor were the city's Turkish organizations seen as an important product of the group's collective identity. Instead, local politicians focused on using such organizations as a way to access the Turkish population.

The existing literature on opportunity structures would suggest that as resources become more available, organizations are not only better able, but also

more inclined, to express their ideological distinctiveness and look for formal collaboration with similar organizations (Knoke 1990, 79). If the opportunity structure is less open, organizations will be more hesitant to express their ideology and remain, at least at the formal level, independent or isolated. We would thus expect, after 1980, more Turkish organizations to begin appearing in Amsterdam than in Berlin. In terms of the number of Turkish interlocks in the city, we would expect more overlapping Turkish board memberships in Amsterdam than in Berlin.

There are further reasons to expect that the hospitable opportunity structure in Amsterdam would encourage the number of Turkish interlocks. The Dutch political system of pillarization has always stimulated interlocking directorates among the political elite and civil society (Lijphart 1968). In other words, in the Dutch context, it makes sense to establish a formal elite network through which immigrant groups adapt to the Dutch political system. Amsterdam policy is also conducive to having a more direct influence on Turkish interlocks. The formation of immigrant advisory councils has essentially forced Turkish organizations to establish formal contacts and to collaborate with one another, which, in turn, may have encouraged the array of Turkish interorganizational relationships that exist in Amsterdam. In addition, providing state subsidy for immigrant organizations in itself can influence the emergence of interlocks. Subsidized organizations attract other organizations seeking collaborations that can help increase their resources. This results in more interlocks and, simultaneously, a centralized network (Tillie and Fennema 1998, 234).

DATA AND RESEARCH ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES

Following in the footsteps of Fennema and Tillie (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 200; Fennema 2004; Tillie 2004), this study gathered information on immigrant organizations from the archives of the Chamber of Commerce in Amsterdam (Kamer van Koophandel Amsterdam) and the Registration of Associations in Berlin (Vereinsregister Berlin Amtsgericht Charlottenburg). These archives hold data indicating the year an immigrant organization was founded and dissolved, as well as other details such as the organization's mission statement. The Amsterdam archives also provided personal information about board members and founders, including their names and dates and places of birth. In Berlin, only the nationalities of board members and founders are specified. Board member data are used to determine an organization's ethnic composition and to assess whether it is an authentic immigrant organization. An immigrant organization is defined as a formal, officially registered nonprofit organization of which at least half the board members are first- or second-generation descendants of a single immigrant group. Every formal nonprofit organization founded by members of a single immigrant group is included in the database, regardless of the organization's mission statement or the ethnic composition of its members (Fennema 2004).

Data from the chamber of commerce and the registration of associations provide interesting research possibilities for analyzing Turkish interorganizational relationships. Key to this analysis is the overlapping board membership that occurs when a person affiliated with one Turkish organization simultaneously sits on the board of another organization, thereby creating a link between the two. These links allow for a network of formal relations among Turkish organizations in both cities to be mapped and analyzed, and help to demonstrate how these relations evolve over time. By gathering the names of all Turkish board members in Amsterdam and in Berlin, spanning the period from 1960 through 2000, this study surveys overlapping board memberships at different points in time. Research on overlapping board membership, also referred to as interlocking directorates, is a method often used to study interorganizational relationships and elite networks (Mizruchi 1996; Fennema and Tillie 2001; Fennema 2004). This type of analysis, however, has not been used extensively to study interorganizational relationships among immigrant organizations over time.

We also use longitudinal analysis to identify the nature of Turkish interorganizational relationships. Longitudinal interlocking directorates occur when a person is active on the board of more than one voluntary organization for more than one year. The person need not necessarily be simultaneously active in more than one organization, but can instead be active in different organizations sequentially over certain periods (for example, five, ten, or thirty years). Because networks among Turkish organizations tend to be volatile, longitudinal network analyses help provide a subtler understanding. Further, these analyses reveal links between organizations that are otherwise often difficult to detect (Vermeulen 2006).[4]

This study also draws on survey data to examine the political behavior of individual Turkish immigrants. For the Amsterdam statistics, we rely on an annual municipal survey, *Burgermonitor*, in which citizens from all major ethnic groups are questioned about issues related to social and political participation. The 2001 survey produced a total of 2,171 Dutch interviewees and 167 Turkish interviewees (Bosveld et al. 2003). We rely on the Netherlands' official definition for classifying members of an ethnic group, which includes those who were born in a foreign country or whose parents were born in that country.

In Germany, there are considerable limitations to existing surveys. Few, for example, use mother-tongue interviewers, and samples of so-called immigrants, usually exclude those who hold German nationality (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004). To overcome these problems, this study conducted its own survey, which was carried out in collaboration with the Center for Studies on Turkey (Zentrum für Türkeistudien) in November 2001 and January 2002. The objective was to gain information on the degree of political participation at the individual level by Berlin's Turks.

The study opted to employ a sampling technique based on a sampling frame of Turkish names. This was facilitated by the fact that immigrant households can be identified by first names and family names. To first locate names, a CD-ROM database query of telephone registers was accessed.[5] This was particularly ad-

vantageous because it produced an unbiased sample based on names alone, rather than on legal status or subjective affiliations.[6] The interviews were conducted over the telephone by bilingual interviewers who used a standardized bilingual questionnaire for each migrant group. A quota plan was used to prevent problems related to gender (for example, women might dispense with a telephone directory entry for fear of being harassed) and age (for example, older migrants tended to exit Germany without deregistering at the registry office). Following this method thus, 306 Germans and 317 Turks were interviewed (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Berger forthcoming).

THE NUMBER OF TURKISH ORGANIZATIONS

Figure 6.1 displays the organizational activity of Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam and in Berlin between 1970 and 2000. The number of Turkish organizations is shown per 1,000 Turks in both cities. We see how, in the 1970s, relatively few organizations existed in either Berlin or Amsterdam. Nevertheless, it is evident that this decade marks the beginning of the Turkish organizing process in both cities. After 1974, Amsterdam and Berlin experienced an increase in their number of Turkish organizations. Until 1980, patterns in both cities look almost identical, mainly due to the associational activities of similar ideological movements. After 1980, however, there is rapid change in the relative number of Turkish organizations in each city: Turks in Amsterdam display more associational activities than Turks in Berlin. In 1985, there are two-and-a-half times more Turkish organizations in Amsterdam than in Berlin, and by 1995, the statistic quadruples. The implementation of multicultural policy clearly augmented Turkish associational activities in Amsterdam, as would be anticipated by the opportunity structure model. The largest increase in the number of Turkish organizations per 1,000 Turks came at the beginning of the 1980s, in parallel emergence to the Dutch minority policy and the introduction of organizational or administrative subsidies for Turkish organizations in Amsterdam. The second half of the 1980s does not show such impressive growth, though around 1985, two important policy measures were taken: granting local voting rights to immigrants and the establishment of a Turkish advisory council.

Despite the less hospitable situation in Berlin, especially as compared to Amsterdam, we do see some opportunity structure effects in Berlin. The Ausländerbeauftragte's establishment appears to have affected the city's number of Turkish organizations: Berlin's statistics steadily increase throughout the first half of the 1980s, producing in 1986 almost one Turkish organization for every 1,000 Turks.

In figure 6.2, we see, in both Amsterdam and Berlin, that the number of new Turkish organizations greatly increased by the end of the 1970s. The pattern of founding rates in both cities is almost identical to that of the 1980s: similar peak years can be seen in 1982 to 1983 and 1986, and similar drops in 1984 and 1988.

FIGURE 6.1 *Ethnic Organizations per 1,000 Turks in Berlin and Amsterdam*



Source: Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce; Berlin Registration of Associations.

FIGURE 6.2 *Number and Density of Newly Founded Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin*



Sources: Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce; Berlin Registration of Associations.

This parity may be attributed to a comparable sequence of successive political and religious Turkish movements. Such a pattern indicates the strong influence of transnational political influences from Turkey on the Turkish organizing process in both cities during this decade. In other words, the Turkish organizing process patterns in Amsterdam and Berlin do not differ so much. Turks in Amsterdam, however, used opportunities to establish and maintain a relatively greater number of organizations.

These results argue against the idea that state intervention crowds out immigrant associational activities. Much as Irene Bloemraad (2005) revealed for Toronto, the Amsterdam case illustrates how a government support of immigrant organizations can play an important role in building organizational capacity among immigrant communities. However, the influence of the host state is not neutral. It influences the organizational capacity not only of an immigrant group, but also of a certain constituency within the group. Vermeulen (2007) shows how, in Amsterdam, religious and conservative Turkish organizations hold a significant position, whereas left wing secular organizations hold the equivalent position in Berlin. This distinction may be explained by the fact that Amsterdam extended an equal opportunity to organize to the whole Turkish ideological spectrum, and even the most powerful transnational movements (Islamic and right wing) were able to exploit the opportunity. In Berlin, strong ideological movements tended to be hindered in their organizational activities, and politicians relied on contact with left wing Turkish organizations to gain access to the Turkish community. As a result, these left wing organizations became more influential than those representing other ideologies. This result seems to correspond with the conclusion that the Dutch political institutional environment, at least in comparison to the German, has produced a form of immigrant mobilization highly focused on religious identities (Duyvené de Wit and Koopmans 2005). There is also some indication that Amsterdam's funding policy has been especially supportive of Turkish social-cultural associations operating at the neighborhood level, the occurrence of which are in fact more numerous in Amsterdam than in Berlin (Vermeulen 2006).

INTERNAL NETWORK TURKISH ORGANIZATIONS

Until 1980, there were few formal contacts among the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and in Berlin. The Turkish networks in both cities during the 1980s could be characterized by high degrees of isolation and polarization. Violent competition between left wing and extreme right wing organizations dominated the strategies of all Turkish organizational leaders, whose main goal was to establish organizational structures for their own political or religious movement. Most leaders concerned themselves with only one organization and no formal networks emerged (Vermeulen 2006).

During the 1980s, both cities saw a change as many interorganizational relationships began to form. Surprisingly, this decade's development in the two cities is fairly similar, even despite their completely different opportunity structures. Both cities demonstrated a relatively large left wing network and a separate Islamic network whereby different Islamic denominations actively collaborate. Religious leaders in both cities simultaneously held positions in other types of Islamic organizations to support the establishment of a greater Turkish religious organizational structure. The Islamic network in both cities connected the more liberal Diyanet organizations with the more fundamentalist and controversial Islamic organizations such as the Grey Wolves Mosque ULU Camii in Amsterdam and the Milli Görüş Mevlana Mosque in Berlin. Yet, in both cities, collaboration between local Islamic leaders came to an end in the second half of the 1980s. By then, the Turkish religious organizational structure was firmly established and, due to increasing competition, old religious dividing lines reappeared (Vermeulen 2006).

By the 1990s, however, behavior among local Turkish organizers in Amsterdam and in Berlin became very different, primarily as the result of the cities' different opportunity structures. In Amsterdam, there was more collaboration between left wing and religious and conservative groups. One of the main goals of the Amsterdam policy was to encourage internal cooperation among Turkish organizations. Although Amsterdam authorities were apprehensive to include the entire span of the Turkish political and religious spectrum in their programs, they did so. Moreover, they provided subsidies for all groups (including more extreme organizations that were commonly banned in Berlin) and established advisory councils welcoming almost all movements.

Figure 6.3 shows the main interlocks of the extended and inclusive networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam during the 1990s. The network consists of 113 Turkish organizations and 255 interlocking directorates, which means that 65 percent of the existing Turkish organizations from this period are accounted for in this one network. Displayed here are two paths that lead from the Grey Wolves organizations to the left wing organizations, indicating a high degree of convergence among Turkish organizations in Amsterdam during this period. Three nonpolitical foundations operating at the city district level provide the connection from left to right: Stichting Turks Volkshuis Osdorp, Stichting Turks Platform Bos & Lommer en de Baarsjes, and Stichting Turkse Algemene Belangengroep Amsterdam-Noord.

Turkish organizational leaders from the various movements came to meet in more neutral organizations and created a communication network that included all the parties from their community. It took nearly a decade for city policy and the activities of Turkish leaders to become visible within the structure of Amsterdam's Turkish interlocks. During the 1990s, Turkish leaders across the various movements collaborated on the boards of neutral, nonaligned Turkish organizations, which operated at the city district level. Together, they engaged in welfare programs for youth and the protection of Turkish interests within a particular neighborhood. These organizations have also profited the most from the structural state funding programs of Amsterdam's city council (and city districts). Because the more extreme Turkish organizations were incorporated in integration



FIGURE 6.3 *Longitudinal Interlocking Directorates Among Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam in the 1990s*

Source: Vermeulen (2006), reprinted with permission from Amsterdam University Press.

programs and advisory councils, it became acceptable for others to collaborate with them as well. Kurdish leaders established interlocks with left wing leaders; left wing leaders established links with the Islamic leaders of the Diyanet; and the Diyanet leaders were in close contact with more conservative religious groups such as Milli Görüş and Grey Wolves mosques.

The Turkish interlocks in Berlin during the 1990s paint a completely different picture from those of Amsterdam. Here, authorities were hardly inclined to include all aspects of the Turkish community. Rather, the city's Turkish organizational process was controlled by two new Turkish umbrella organizations, the Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB) and the more conservative Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB). The TBB's left wing leaders came mostly from the left wing student organization Berlin Türk Bilim ve Teknoloji Merkezi (BTBTM), which was Berlin's most influential Turkish left wing organization in the 1980s. The TBB established strong relationships with numerous other leftist Turkish groups, and the leaders of the TGB commonly emerged from religious Diyanet organizations and made ties with the more conservative groups. The TBB is characterized as a classic top-down intellectual interest organization, whereas the TGB is a typical grass roots organization, originally founded by local Turkish businessmen. The TGB tends to appeal to a larger group of Turkish people than the TBB (Yurdakul 2006). This study's survey shows that 82 percent of Turks in Berlin are familiar with the TGB, and that just 53 percent are with the TBB. Moreover, Turks in Berlin have greater actual contact with the TGB (calculated at 19 percent) than with the TBB (8 percent). The most renowned Turkish organization among Berlin's Turks, however, is the soccer club Türkiyemspor (91 percent). Overall, Turks in Berlin show a rather low level of confidence in Turkish organizations: only 18 percent say they trust the TGB to do a good job in representing their interest and only 15 percent, the TBB (Berger forthcoming).

Figure 6.4 displays the main interlocks in Berlin during the 1990s and illustrates how the TBB and the TGB came to dominate this city's interorganizational relationships. The complete network consists of forty-four organizations (22 percent of all existing Turkish organizations during decade) and is produced by fifty-seven interlocks. In addition, there are four other smaller networks, not displayed in figure 6.3: two Milli Görüs groups (by now separated from the Diyanet organizations), one Kurdish component, and one Grey Wolves network. The more extreme movements in Berlin such as the Grey Wolves, Kurds, and the Milli Görüs are isolated as separate entities.

The major network of Turkish interorganizational relationships reveals several interesting elements. First is the central position of the TDU (Türkisch-Deutsche Unternehmervereinigung in Berlin-Brandenburg), an organization for Turkish entrepreneurs that played a vital role in combining the secular left wing Turkish umbrella organization TBB with the conservative and religious organizations of the conservative umbrella organization TGB. The link between the TBB and the TGB was created by two Turkish leaders: Hüsnü Özkanli, a TGB and TDU founder, and Bahattin Kaya, a TDU founder, TBB board member from 1996 until 1999, and founder and president of the Vereini-

FIGURE 6.4 *Interlocking Directorates Among Turkish Organizations in Berlin in the 1990s*



Source: Vermeulen (2006), reprinted with permission from Amsterdam University Press.
[a] It is interesting to note that the TGB's national organization has not established an interlocking directorate with the TGB, but rather with the TBB.

gung Türkischer Reiseagenturen Berlin (BETÜSAB), an organization for Turkish travel agencies.

It is worth noting that the link between the extremes within the community was not due to Berlin's opportunity structure, but rather came from the Turkish community itself. Not a state-sponsored association, the TDU is an organization of Berlin's remarkably more successful Turkish immigrants. However, the fact that the TBB and the TGB came to play such a central role in this network did indeed come as a direct result of Berlin's opportunity structure. The Ausländerbeauftragte provided financial support to both umbrella organizations in an endeavor to gain a better foothold in the Turkish community.

The emergence of two new Turkish umbrella organizations could easily have resulted in polarizing left wing and religious sides. However, this did not happen, thanks to collaboration by the leaders of both blocks in founding the TDU, a Turkish association for entrepreneurs. This organization provided Berlin's Turkish elite a means to become connected and subsequently establish a communication network. Nevertheless, several important movements and organizations were not incorporated in this large network, which did lead to other forms of polarization in Berlin's Turkish community of the 1990s. Milli Görüs, the Grey Wolves, and a number of Kurds established their own networks of interlocks that were completely separate from all other Turkish organizations. During this decade, the number of Turkish organizations that established no interlocks also increased. Polarization within the network is also apparent at the individual level. More so than other ethnic groups, Turks in Berlin are considered very well aware of their community's most prominent organizations. Still, a high level of distrust toward these organizations exists, significantly more than is observed among Berlin's other ethnic groups (Berger forthcoming).

This overview of the number of Turkish organizations and their networks in Amsterdam and in Berlin proves consistent with the belief that different opportunity structures influence their communities. In Amsterdam, Turks have relatively more organizations and are well connected through a dense network of interlocks. In other words, they have created a more civic and less polarized organizational network than their counterparts in Berlin. It is important to note that Amsterdam's opportunity structure has had its greatest effect on precisely the two elements of the Turkish organizing process we are examining—the number of organizations and the number of internal networks. The political opportunity structure's effect is less apparent, however, on other elements, for example, types of organizations and founding rates (Vermeulen 2006).

FROM CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS TO POLITICAL PRESENCE AND PARTICIPATION

A subsequent question is the extent to which differences in Turkish organizational structures affect the political presence of Turkish organizations and the

political behavior of individual Turks. Here we deal with the political weight of Turkish organizations. Are Turkish organizations politically more influential in Amsterdam, seeing as they are greater in number, better connected with one another, and have received more opportunities to participate in city life? At the individual level, do Turks in Berlin behave differently than Turks in Amsterdam, and to what extent can we attribute possible variation to different organizational structures? Does the Turkish community in Amsterdam, being characterized as more civic, facilitate participation in local politics more than in Berlin?

Political Presence of Turkish Organizations

Most studies on immigrant organizations that deal specifically with Turks (as well as with immigrants in general) in Germany and the Netherlands ascribe a low political relevance to Turkish organizations (Rijkschroeff and Duyvendak 2004; Weiss and Thränhardt 2005; Schrover and Vermeulen 2005; Pfaff and Gill 2006). Steven Pfaff and Anthony Gill (2006) said that Muslims have yet to become an organized force in European politics, despite the fact that there are so many salient political issues pertaining to them. Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and in Berlin are, first and foremost, providers of religious, cultural, and social services. Only subsequently does interest representation become relevant (Vermeulen 2006). Other studies on civic participation among Turks in Germany come to similar conclusions. One study (Cyrus 2005) found that religion is most important for Turkish organizations (29 percent), followed by sports (28 percent), cultural activities (17 percent), educational activities (14 percent), and representation of professional interest (11 percent). Interest representation only accounts for 5.6 percent of Germany's Turkish civic participation.

Explanations given for a lack of political influence by Turkish organizations are varied. They include the decentralized organizational structure of Turkish Islamic immigrants, which provides ample opportunity for a small faction to undermine broad-based immigrant collective action (Pfaff and Gill 2006), preoccupation with homeland politics (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), and other associational priorities (Rijkschroeff and Duyvendak 2004; Vermeulen 2006). Among Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and in Berlin, there seems to be a strong tendency toward narrow interest articulation on a local level. On the national level, political relevance of these Turkish organizations is even lower. Most interaction between host state authorities and Turkish organizations relates to practical issues such as finding accommodations or securing a permit to conduct activities, especially those pertaining to religious organizations (Van Heelsum 2004; Maussen 2006).

Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have always complained about their lack of influence on the process of policy making (Vermeulen 2005). The main opportunity proved to be in the Turkish advisory council, established in 1986 to advise Amsterdam authorities on policy topics related to immigrants and integration. The official status of this advisory council worked to enhance the sociopolitical legitimacy of appointed Turkish organizations. Research on the development of Amsterdam minority policy during the 1990s indicates that when

it came to the formulation of minority policy, the advisory council played a small role, in fact much greater than that of any individual Turkish organization (Berveling 1994, 279). However, the council's political influence, relevance, and performance were often questioned in policy reports by local authorities, as well as by Turkish organizations. In 2003, Amsterdam authorities abolished the council, arguably without ever having been able to prove its political significance.

The atmosphere in which Turkish organization in Berlin could influence local politics was indeed less favorable than that of Amsterdam. Even the main official institution involving Turkish organizations, the Ausländerbeauftragter, did not formulate integration policy. Until 2003, there were no immigrant advisory councils in Berlin, and the city's senate did not issue its first official integration policy report until 2006. Local politicians would occasionally hear out Turkish organizers regarding their opinions on certain topics, though, in general, there were few opportunities for Turkish organizations in Berlin to influence the policy-making process. Islamic organizations, in particular, had few opportunities to come into contact with local authorities in Berlin (Vermeulen 2006).

Nevertheless, there were other ways to influence policy makers and to make contact with political parties. For instance, the individual linkages were made between Turkish organizations and local politicians. Both cities have had a number of active local Turkish politicians, many of whom once served as board members for one or more local Turkish organizations. It proved doubly advantageous for political parties to incorporate Turkish representatives with ethnic civic experience: they were familiar with local political issues, and, more important, they brought potential voters into the party who would eventually become the rank and file of the organizations. Maria Berger and her colleagues (2001) found that local immigrant politicians in the Netherlands gained their primary civic experience while sitting on the boards of secular interest organizations. At the same time, a significant fraction (nearly one-fifth) had been active on the boards of Islamic organizations. The great majority of the immigrant politicians said that they were frequently contacted by immigrant organizations to request that their interests or their constituency be represented. This indicates that organizations rely on personal linkages to augment their political weight. Laure Michon and Floris Vermeulen (2007) found that 70 percent of Amsterdam's Turkish city councilors and almost 60 percent of the Turkish city district councilors were board members of a local Turkish organization (for the period 1990 to 2006). This clearly illustrates the central position that local Turkish organizations have in recruiting local immigrant Turkish politicians.

This same mechanism seems to work in Berlin, with the important caveat that fewer Turkish politicians were recruited in Berlin than in Amsterdam. Of notable significance seems to be the personal linkages between the TBB as an umbrella organization with Berlin's Social Democratic Party (SPD). The TBB's former director is chair of the SPD working group that specializes in immigrant issues and presents reports to the party's authorities and is married to an SPD member on the Berlin senate. The TBB's treasurer is a member of the SPD in the women's commission (Yurdakul 2006).

Table 6.1 illustrates the number of local Turkish politicians in both cities, in-

TABLE 6.1 *Number of Turkish Representatives*

	Amsterdam	Berlin
2002 City Council	4 (8.9%)	—
2002 City Districts	16 (5.0%)	—
2002 share Turks in population	5.0%	—
2006 City Council	3 (6.6%)	6 (4.0%)
2006 City Districts	22 (6.8%)	—
2006 share Turks in population	5.2%	+/~ 5.5%

Source: Authors' compilation from Michon and Tillie (2003).
Note: Percentage of total in brackets.

dicating possible access points of influence for Turkish organizations. It shows that Turks in Amsterdam have a better position in the local political system than their counterparts in Berlin. The percentage of Turkish people who serve as representatives in the city council (as well as in city district councils) is higher than the percentage of those Turkish civilians who comprise Amsterdam's population, a sign of overrepresentation. For example, in 2006 almost 7 percent of members of the city council and city district councils were Turkish, whereas just over 5 percent of the city population was Turkish. In Berlin, Turks are politically under-represented: 4 percent of representatives in the Berlin senate are of Turkish background, whereas the Turkish community constitutes about 5.5 percent of the city population.

The discrepancy between the proportion of Turkish politicians in the two cities is easily explained by the fact that many more Turks have the right to vote in Amsterdam, thanks to the Netherlands' 1985 provision of local voting rights for immigrants. Political parties in Amsterdam have more to gain in terms of possible voters if they have a Turkish representative on their candidacy list, especially given that Turks have shown much higher turn-out rates over the last four local elections than other immigrant groups (Van Heelsum and Tillie 2006). Hansje Galesloot (2004) found Amsterdam's situation as particularly interesting, when compared to other Dutch cities, because of the unusually high number of female immigrant politicians, almost 40 percent between 2002 and 2006. In addition, at both the city district and the city levels, Amsterdam has had several immigrant aldermen, many of whom have been active on the board of immigrant associations.

The number of local Turkish politicians, which is high in Amsterdam and increasingly so in Berlin, would suggest the possibility that Turkish organizations have the opportunity to augment their political weight. Yet numbers notwithstanding, immigrant politicians usually have a very difficult position within political parties and many fail to become successful politicians (Berger et al. 2001; Michon and Vermeulen 2007). Amsterdam's immigrant aldermen have, so far, proven to be more an exception to the rule; furthermore, none of them is of Turkish origin. Berlin demonstrates the same scenario. Despite strong links

between the TBB and the SPD, the influence of the former over the latter's integration policies seems rather limited (Yurdakul 2006).

Overall, until now the political weight of Turkish organizations has been relatively low. Some umbrella groups, such as Berlin's TBB and TGB, are more visible than others and have more contacts with local politicians, but even these do not seem to have a clear political influence. Nonetheless, the degree of inclusion of Turkish organizations into the local political system is much higher in Amsterdam than in Berlin. Amsterdam has had a Turkish advisory council for almost twenty years, as well as witnessed the election of many more local Turkish politicians, a large majority of whom once served as members of a local Turkish organization.

Individual Political Participation

What is the degree of political participation of Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin? Table 6.2 presents scores on political participation for Turks in both cities, as well as for the nonimmigrant German and Dutch populations. The results show that 62 percent of Germans had undertaken at least one political activity within the last year, but only 29 percent of the Dutch had done so.

Furthermore, and perhaps surprisingly, Berlin's Turks are also more politically active than those in Amsterdam. One could perhaps expect Turks in Amsterdam to be more politically active than those in Berlin. There are more Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, and research shows that membership in Turkish organizations enhances the degree of political participation among individual Turks in both cities (Tillie 2004; Berger forthcoming). Yet table 6.2 suggests the opposite is true. Among Turks in Berlin, 45 percent took up one or more political activity during the last year, whereas only 14 percent did so in Amsterdam. In line with a higher level of political activity, the expressed intention to vote at the next election also proved much higher in Berlin (83 percent) than in Amsterdam. The Dutch proved to be far less inclined to vote, and Turks in Amsterdam demonstrated even lower interest: only 30 percent said they would vote at the next local election, which was precisely the percentage of Turks who showed up at the 2002 local elections (see table 6.3).

What explains these counterintuitive findings? More Turkish organizations may not always mean more active members. Interviews and survey data from the larger project on which this chapter draws gave the impression that, in Berlin, more Turks are members of a Turkish organization (Berger forthcoming; Berger and Koopmans 2004). Table 6.2 shows how, in general, Turks have a similar degree of associational membership in nonethnic organizations in Amsterdam and in Berlin: 41 percent in Berlin and 45 percent in Amsterdam are members of a nonethnic organization. However, the number of Turks who are members of ethnic organizations is significantly higher in Berlin. The incentive is probably lower in Amsterdam, where Turkish organizations and leaders are more incorporated in the political system than their counterparts in Berlin. This means that there is less demand for a politically active community to provide ethnic organizations with additional tools for access.

TABLE 6.2 *Political Behavior and Association Membership*

	Berlin		Amsterdam	
	Germans	Turks	Dutch	Turks
Political participation (1)	62	45	29	14
Political trust (2)	59	25	59	42
Intention to vote	86	83	66	30
Membership association (3)	62	41	62	45
Membership ethnic organization (3)	—	23	—	11
N	306	317	2171	167

Source: Berger (forthcoming); Bosveld et al. (2002); Tillie (2004); Amsterdam Bureau of Research and Statistics (2005).

Notes: (1) Percentage of respondents who participated in at least one political activity within the last twelve months. In Amsterdam, the following question was posed: "Have you, alone or together with someone else, engaged in any activity that concerns public life in your neighborhood or city? Could you please indicate whether you have engaged in any of the following activities listed (for example, contact with politicians, a demonstration)?" In Berlin, the following question was posed: "Have you, within the last twelve months, engaged in any activity that concerns public life in Berlin or Germany? Could you please indicate whether you have engaged in any of the following activities listed (for example, contact with politicians, a demonstration)?"

(2) Percentage of respondents who disagreed with at least one of the following statements: "Political parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion;" "Berlin/Amsterdam civil servants are only interested in rules and forms;" "Representatives do not care about people like me."

(3) Amsterdam membership data on Dutch: Raat (2005); data on Turks: Tillie (2004). In Amsterdam, the following question was posed: "Are you active in any of these organizations or are you associated with them (for example, a sports association, cultural association, or a national or ethnic organization)?" In Berlin, the following question was posed: "Could you please indicate if you are a member of any organization on this list and whether it could be considered an ethnic organization (for example, a sports association, cultural association, political organization)?"

TABLE 6.3 *Turnout Rates of Turkish Voters at Local Elections*

	Amsterdam	Berlin
1994	67	—
1998	39	—
2002	30	—
2006	44	—

Source: Michon and Tillie (2003); Van Heelsum and Tillie (2006).

In addition, it should be noted that more organizations and greater interorganizational linkages do not necessarily yield a better functioning network. The Berlin network of Turkish organizations may function more effectively as a mobilizing network than Amsterdam's. It is not hard to imagine how much more effective Berlin's hierarchical network of Turkish organizations—depicted as a star-shaped diagram revealing three main organizations in the middle—is for mobilizing people than the inclusive, albeit more extended, network found in Amsterdam. Furthermore, Amsterdam's network seems to be strongly influenced by a city policy that is particularly inclined to support small and localized Turkish interest organizations, which connect leaders of different ideological backgrounds. In contrast, Berlin's organizational network originated from within the Turkish community, independent of city authorities, while leaders from the main umbrella organizations together established an organization for successful Turkish businessmen. This likely led to Berlin's having a stronger and more effective mobilizing network than Amsterdam.

Another important factor possibly at stake is the relationship between the ethnic elite and the rest of the community. This study suggests that the distance between the organization's elite (the organizers who constitute the network) and its members can be influenced by state policies. The cases of Amsterdam and Berlin produce the conclusion that a higher number of state policies, as manifested in subsidies, could increase the sense of detachment between board members and their constituency. Or, as one of the presidents of a large Turkish organization said during an interview when asked for his opinion regarding the lack of state subsidy for his organization: "Da wir keine finanzielle Unterstützung bekommen sind wir unabhängiger [Because we do not receive financial support we are more independent]" (Berger forthcoming).

Table 6.2 indicates, furthermore, that Turks in Berlin are participating almost as much as nonimmigrant Germans when it comes to political activities, intention to vote, and associational membership. However, Turks show only half as much trust in the German political system as Germans do. Considering the policies of Germany and, in particular, Berlin, this distrust is not very remarkable. In comparison, in Amsterdam, where there has been greater outreach to immigrants and minorities, Turks express much greater political trust.

CONCLUSION: POLICIES, CIVIC NETWORKS, AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

We have looked into the possible relationships between a host state's political opportunity structure and an immigrant group's organizational structure, and between the immigrant group's organizational structure, along with the political weight of its organizations, and the level of political activity among its individuals. We anticipated findings in which a stimulating host state environment would

work to promote the number of existing immigrant organizations and the networks between them. We also expected that more organizations and more networks would produce a more civic community in which organizations gain greater political influence and their members become more politically active, as well as place greater trust in the political system.

The study's first expectation was met. Indeed, on comparing the Turkish organizing processes of Amsterdam and Berlin, Amsterdam's policies and the city's institutional environment resulted in relatively more Turkish organizations and a more connected network of interlocks between them. The organizations and networks also proved to be better incorporated in Amsterdam's political system than in Berlin's. Examples such as the Turkish advisory council and the number of existing Turkish representatives illustrate that Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have played a more central role in the local political system than those in Berlin. At the same time, it must be noted that Turkish organizations in both Amsterdam and Berlin hold relatively little political weight.

The study's second expectation, however, was not completely met. Despite the fact that there are more Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, with a greater extended and inclusive network among them, survey results revealed that Turks in Berlin are much more politically engaged when it comes to their activities and electoral participation as expressed in intentions to vote. An explanation for this unexpected result is, first, that Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam have less incentive to participate in local politics than their counterparts in Berlin because the former city's organizations and leaders are already more politically incorporated. Second, in Amsterdam, fewer Turkish immigrants are members of a Turkish organization. Third, the distance between board members and their constituencies is greater in Amsterdam, which would mean that, though the Turkish elite are better incorporated in the city's local political system, it is more difficult for them to mobilize their ethnic constituency. Finally, Amsterdam's extended and inclusive interorganizational network of Turkish organizations may have less mobilizing potential than Berlin's hierarchical grass roots network. At the same time, Turks in Amsterdam report greater political trust than their counterparts in Berlin.

What, then, is the importance of place in this study on Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and in Berlin? The answer is twofold. First, as this chapter illustrates, the host city can have a significant influence on key characteristics that shape the organizing process. Consider, for instance, the role that small local Turkish interest organizations play for the entire network of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam. These organizations, which are strongly supported by state subsidies, have lessened ideological polarization among Turkish organizations by functioning as a nexus between different Turkish ideological movements. The fact that this network of Turkish organizations was, to a certain degree, incorporated into the local political system explains why Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam show few tendencies for political participation yet exhibit substantial confidence in the political system. Because, at the individual level, Turks trust their leaders and organizations to represent their interests, personal political activity is deemed less necessary. In Berlin, the opposite proves true. Turkish organizations are politically excluded, but individual Turks display high levels of political participation and low levels of political trust. An active but distrustful Turkish community is thus necessary to pressure Berlin politicians to provide more opportunities for participation by Turkish organizations. This explanation closely resembles Rahsaan Maxwell's findings in chapter 5 of this volume. He shows that Caribbean activists in France have been especially motivated to pursue ethnic-specific political mobilization in response to a lack of Caribbean-elected representatives who can respond to the specific needs of the Caribbean community, especially compared to their more incorporated and less ethnically focused counterparts in the United Kingdom.

At the same time, however, the direct political influence of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam is weak and their political position is vulnerable, despite better political incorporation. Since 2000, Dutch society has experienced a multicultural backlash and the situation for immigrant organizations in the Netherlands has changed drastically. An important reason for the backlash can probably be attributed to an unwillingness by Dutch politicians to openly discuss multicultural issues, ignoring the feelings and interest of other groups. Many consider the integration of immigrant groups in Dutch society a failure. One of the main causes is attributed to immigrant groups' reluctance to denounce old cultural ways. Immigrant organizations and, in particular, Turkish organizations are often accused of serving only to enhance ethnic identities and preventing successful integration.

Although this backlash has been less severe in Amsterdam than in other parts of the Netherlands, the political climate for Turkish organizations has clearly worsened. Subsidies for ethnic-specific organizations have disappeared, the Turkish advisory council has been shut down, and the political position of immigrant ethnic organizations has been strongly criticized. Within just a few years, the inclusion of Turkish organizations into the Amsterdam political system diminished, illustrating both the intensity of the backlash and how politically powerless immigrant organizations actually are, despite their former incorporation in the system. Turkish organizations have not been able to circumvent these developments. They have also failed to successfully mobilize their ethnic constituency to protest the increasing exclusion from the political system. This is probably related to a weak relationship between the constituency and its leaders.

In Berlin, opposite developments come to the fore. In 2006, in line with national political developments, the city transformed its approach toward immigrant groups into a more accommodative stance. Since then, Berlin has seen the establishment of immigrant organization advisory councils, an official integration policy framework, and an appointed senator for integration affairs. These measures have all worked to increase the degree of political incorporation of Turkish organizations into Berlin's political system. We expect that such incorporation will eventually lead to a decreased level of political activity among individual Turks in Berlin and, conversely, increase their trust in the local political system. However, looking at recent developments in Amsterdam, a lack of individual political participation may leave Turkish organizations in a vulnerable po-

sition, because their link with the ethnic constituency is in many ways their most powerful political asset.

NOTES

1. Here we focus on the period before 2000, but in the conclusion we return briefly to the striking policy developments early in the twenty-first century.
2. This also holds after controlling for socioeconomic background variables (for Amsterdam, see Tillie 2004; for Berlin, see Berger forthcoming).
3. Only in the second half of the 1990s was more emphasis placed on subsidies for individual projects in Amsterdam.
4. One of the disadvantages of focusing on longitudinal interlocking directorates is that it can produce interlocks between organizations that are mainly coincidental. If, for instance, an individual sits on the board of a certain Berlin Turkish organization between 1976 and 1981 and then serves as a board member of another Berlin Turkish organization between 1989 and 1991, the longitudinal network analysis will display a longitudinal interlocking directorate between these two organizations for the 1980s. It is, however, possible that this individual has had a complete change in ideology between 1981 and 1989. In such a case, the interlock in question could not be considered a genuine ideological interorganizational relationship. Nevertheless, the individual does carry into the second organization the skills and knowledge gained in the previous organization. The interlock is thus not totally without meaning.
5. Among non-German households, 90 percent have telephones, the equivalent to the percentage possessed by German households.
6. Such controls were set to minimize potential biases in favor of migrants who might be more integrated linguistically and, often as a result, culturally and politically.

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Part II

Variations Across Ethnic Groups