Symposium on Alternative Compensation Systems for Digital Copyright

Summary Report
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On Saturday, 11th of July, 2015, the Institute for Information Law (IViR) at the University of Amsterdam organized a high-level symposium on alternative models of regulating large-scale non-commercial online uses of copyrighted works. A multidisciplinary research group at IViR has spent the last two years conducting a large-scale empirical study of Alternative Compensation Systems (ACS), which, for a small monthly fee would authorize non-commercial online uses by individuals, including the downloading and sharing of protected works (such as music, films, and books), while compensating rights holders.

The results of the research suggest that consumers are dissatisfied with the currently available legal access channels, and consequently, different forms of ACS are supported by the majority of the Dutch population. The results show that an ACS, if implemented, would provide extra revenues to music and audio-visual rights holders as compared to the status quo. The project also shows that it is possible to include lay people in highly complex copyright policy decisions.

The symposium was divided in three panels: an economics panel discussing alternatives to the current modes of financing creativity; a social and political panel discussing user involvement in
copyright policy; and a legal Panel, addressing possibilities of copyright reform through ACS. The report that follows is a summary of each panel and respective interventions, which has further been edited and condensed for clarity.

**Opening**

Professor Bernt Hugenholtz from the IViR opened the symposium. He started his intervention by pointing out that in the digital network environment the exclusive right, which has always been considered an essential feature of copyright law, has become practically unenforceable and has lost support amongst the general public. However, the right to fair remuneration appears to remain generally accepted. In this light, the question arises of how should the legal system be adapted to reconcile the social reality? The answer is that the legal framework should provide unfettered access to works, while guaranteeing a fair remuneration for authors. In achieving these goals, any proposed regulation has to be economically sound and socially acceptable.

In light of these objectives, researchers at the IViR have conducted an interdisciplinary research project on ACS in copyright law. ACS include a system of legalization for online uses that provides remuneration for the author and serves as an alternative for copyright enforcement in the digital environment. This research takes a multi-disciplinary approach, combining economic, social-political and legal methods in order to examine the feasibility of ACS. Although this symposium addresses the three disciplines in separate sessions, the research has been conducted in an interdisciplinary fashion and did not separate specific disciplines.

The symposium is organized as follows. The first panel addresses economic issues. The second panel examines social-political issues and focuses on user involvement. Finally, the last panel discusses legal issues and the compliance of different ACS models with the existing EU legal framework.

**Economics panel: alternatives to the current modes of financing creativity**

*Panel: Joost Poort (moderator), Christian Handke (speaker), Erwin Angad-Gaur, Andy Zondervan, Ruth Towse*

After the introduction of the panel members by moderator Joost Poort, the economic session started with a presentation by Christian Handke, who presented the preliminary results of the economic part of the research project.

The basis of the presentation was the paper *Going means trouble and staying makes it double: the value of licensing recorded music online.* The central question on debate is whether an ACS would be welfare increasing under current market conditions. Handke explained the background of the research. He recognized that authorized alternatives to a compensation scheme already exist. Why then would Dutch users pay for an ACS when a highly developed digital market exists in The Netherlands, without enforcement against private parties?

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Based on the preliminary results of the research, his answer is that such a scheme has the potential to generate significant revenues. Hence, it is interesting for all types of stakeholders, who may potentially be losing money. It is noted that the ACS differs from private ordering through direct transactions in that it comes with standard terms of service, thereby reducing transaction costs. From an economic standpoint, because an ACS may be viewed as a version of collective rights management where a central intermediary will exist, it is not a perfect solution.

The method applied in this study to determine the willingness to pay (WTP) in an ACS is a discrete choice experiment among a sample of the Dutch households. Earlier studies have shown that such WTP can be overestimated, but this is less likely to be so for hypothetical values below €10. Different types of compensation schemes were offered as a choice to the sample, with a distinction made between three participation treatments: mandatory participation, voluntary participation, and voluntary participation with stricter copyright enforcement. Variations are possible as to the allowed uses, catalogue completeness, monitoring, and price. The covered subject-matter is recorded music and the distribution of revenues is freely negotiated. The most popular compensation scheme for the Netherlands for which the effects are studied appears to be where the scheme covers download and sharing as allowed uses, where only temporal restrictions apply to the catalogue, and where there is no monitoring. Conclusions were made for the three different participation treatments.

Mandatory compensation systems are not generally welfare increasing. Users’ WTP is too varied and possibilities for price discrimination and product differentiation will be limited in practice. The research results show that the mean WTP in such systems is €9.25/month, while right holders are fully compensated at €1.74/month. As to the voluntary participation treatments, the variation of stricter copyright enforcement does make them more effective. These systems have no negative effect on user welfare, as users with a low WTP will not participate. The revenue maximizing price for these is €23.42/month, meaning that 23.7% of the households in the Netherlands will voluntarily participate in the ACS. As with mandatory version, the price required for full compensation of losses assuming perfect substitution is €1.74/month.

These results do not take into account the costs of right holders, which are argued to be lower in ACS, resulting in greater benefits than calculated. Likewise, they do not consider the long-term effects on the supply of new creative works in the valuation by users. Price discrimination and product differentiation are argued to boost the benefits of an ACS. It is assumed that a compensation system will perfectly substitute for conventional purchases of recorded music (other purchases are not taken into account). It is further acknowledged that music retailers may be affected. A voluntary ACS will only increase the demand for Internet subscriptions and it is not likely that a mandatory variant will have a strong negative effect on that demand.

Based on these results, Handke concluded that experimental adoption of ACS is highly desirable and that all types of shareholders should seriously consider it, even though there may still be uncertainties. There is a lot of money on the table and everybody will be better off with any price approximating €1.74/month.

Following this presentation, each of the panelists intervened. The first was Ruth Towse. She started by noting that contingent valuation is a method commonly used for true public goods when there are no market prices, while in the case of recorded music market prices do exist. In that light, she questions whether the many options presented to users were not too confusing and whether users were aware of the status quo they had to compare to. She also wondered whether the current levies...
on computers do not already cover the uses of the compensation system and was surprised by the fact that WTP is higher than the sales figures, asking why such a consumer surplus is not already tackled by the market. She added that ACS are even less efficient than the current levy systems and that equity – rather than efficiency – is the real reason for advocating for such a system. It is therefore a system for redistribution instead of allocative efficiency. She further wondered who is going to pay for the enforcement costs.

Next up was Andy Zondervan. He considered 23% of households willing to pay €23.42 a rather high number, since only 11% of the people currently pay for a music subscription. He also claims that the near 90% decline registered in music piracy results in less interest in an ACS than before. He is concerned about the party responsible for the operation costs and the distribution of the fees, further arguing that these schemes will hamper innovation, since the key (profits) behind getting music to the audience are taken away.

Erwin Angad-Gaur was favorable to the idea of an ACS. In his view, the model should be taken one step further and extend to the offline world as well. It is not possible to prohibit these online uses so a system that allows people to do what they already do, while monetizing it, is preferable to repression. He prefers the mandatory scheme, since in a voluntary system enforcement will continue to exist.

After these interventions a lively discussion emerged. On the topic of the research method used, Handke disagreed with Towse’s suggestion that the survey overburdened the respondents, noting that only 2% did not finish the survey and that the high completion rate is not justified by the fact that survey members were paid, as such payment amounted only to a nominal fee. Furthermore, people were informed by being forced to reflect on issues such as worries about enforcement against private parties. As regards the current private copying levies, he notes that they can be replaced or absorbed by the surcharge on the ISP subscription suggested as the ACS payment mechanism.

Angad-Gaur pointed out that the study presented was too limited, since it only addresses music. In his view, the study’s numbers are very interesting in what they show that a large amount of money is not getting to right holders. Thus, an ACS should be studied in actual experiments. On this point, Handke responded that the research project also looked into films and books. The results were promising for films, but not so much for books. An ACS is therefore probably not suitable for all types of content.

On the subject of operation costs and practical implementation it emerged during the discussion that current costs for managing online uses in subscription models are higher than similar costs in the offline world. Zondervan explained this to be caused by the fact that CMOs currently must process millions lines of data from e.g. YouTube to determine what money goes to which right holder. In response, Handke argues that even if the operation costs turn out to be 15%, the margins reported in the study will still hold. Furthermore, if monitoring costs remain too high, it is sensible—although not perfect—to only monitor a small sample of the population.

On the question of how to ensure that the money goes to the right persons, Handke acknowledged that the study has not sought to solve the distribution system, but argues that an ACS will not cause it to get better nor worse than the status quo. Therefore, he is not convinced that the problems of implementation are worse than the current problems. Furthermore, users are better off because they will face less legal risks. In view of the study’s results, he finds the voluntary system the most
promising, as it leaves some space for the market, and emphasizes that it will promote innovation more than it will inhibit it.

With regard to Zondervan’s innovation remarks, Handke argues that subscription fees for services like Spotify will fall and right holders will receive more income from the scheme. As a result, such services will have to focus on more convenient uses and organizing core services, not on market power; innovation does not only require profits, but also a certain competitive pressure. An ACS will create both profits with copyright and a competitive pressure.

In response, Towse considered it wrong to solve competition problems through copyright law Zondervan asked where the incentive to innovate is to be found if music is available everywhere. João Pedro Quintais (IViR) argued that it depends on how you define blanket licenses, noting that non-commercial usage can also be monetized in a compensation scheme. Towse later argued that an ACS will compete with collective rights management societies, but Quintais responded that this all comes back to the legal implementation, being a common suggestion that such societies play a central role in the system. At this point, the debate was closed so as to give way to the subsequent panel.

Social and Political Panel: user involvement in copyright policy

Panel: Balázs Bodó (moderator), Joan-Josep Vallbé (speaker), Ian Hargreaves, Julia Reda, Member of the European Parliament, Agustín Reyna, Jim Killock

After the introduction of the panel members by moderator Balázs Bodó, the social and political panel session started with a presentation by Joan-Josep Vallbé on user involvement in copyright policy, on the basis of the paper Knocking on Heaven’s Door - User Preferences on Digital Cultural Distribution. The discussion started with an introduction to the topic, in which Vallbé described the main results and conclusions of the study. It has been demonstrated that a well-designed ACS has the potential to increase the welfare of consumers, producers, authors and artists by hundreds of millions of Euro a year in the Netherlands alone. However, the next questions asked in the study are: who would choose an ACS? Are these preferences related to distinct cultural consumption habits? What are the determinants of digital cultural consumption habits?

To answer these, a model was set up to study the preference distribution and to try to explain to what extent users would favor the implementation of an ACS. Two factors play a role and were predicted to influence preferences. First, structural factors such as age, education and income. Second, preferences such as to whether users’ rights are viewed as important. Within the model, there were 648 possible ACS combinations. Factorial design was used to limit this to 90 different alternatives, which were combined in 54 different choice sets. Each respondent was faced with 12 different choice sets, and a “no choice” option was always available.

The objective was to identify separate clusters of cultural consumers, and to do that, cluster analysis was applied. Multinomial logistic regression was used to test whether the structural factors or

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preferences had any effect on the type of cultural consumer that the respondent was. Further, it was used to test whether being that type of consumer would affect the likelihood of supporting a change in the status quo or adoption of an ACS.

Consumption is conceptualized in three dimensions: time since the last purchase or acquisition; the amount consumed; and consumption channel. A fairly stable classification of five types of consumers emerged: non-consumers who don’t really consume anything; occasional consumers, mostly people who consume free culture; digital consumers who pay for mostly digital culture; bookworms; and pirates, who carry out pirate consumption.

The non-consumers and the bookworms belong to older age groups, whilst digital consumers and pirates are younger, with the occasional consumers being somewhere in the middle. There were no substantial differences in terms of income in the types of consumers. Education, for its part, factors in the type of consumption that people have.

Who would then likely be in favor of change of the status quo? 32 per cent always chose the “no choice” option, while 30 per cent always chose one of the options. Digital consumers and pirates would be more likely to favor change, while non-consumers would be less eager to do so. “Bookworms” (older educated people who prefer print books) were more towards the middle. While education and income show no real effect on the likelihood of supporting change, age has a strong effect. In fact, the average WTP for an ACS by digital consumers and pirates was higher than in the other groups.

The first conclusion that can be drawn from these results was methodological: the experimental design adopted in the study can be useful to transform these results into policy statements. Further, the findings show that there is support for an ACS in key demographics. However, the preferences are heterogeneous and socially structured. Vallbé added that the implications of the aforementioned results of the study, for instance regarding the extent to which users should be involved in the decision making process in policy change and how this public participation could be inserted, should be left to be discussed by the panelists and the audience.

Following this presentation, the panelists intervened. Julia Reda kicked off the discussion by pointing out that feasibility is a concern when it comes to bringing change and there is a big difference between willingness to accept change and active support for it. There is a bias in citizen involvement. It is much easier to get support against a negative change in copyright policy than in favor of a positive change. In order to make this policy change politically feasible, citizens and other stakeholders must be convinced that it is worth putting energy into. From a consumer point of view, avoiding the legal difficulties of copyright law would be appealing. However, in practice large numbers of consumers are already ignoring copyright law. With an ACS, a certain revenue is guaranteed in exchange for less control regarding exclusive rights. Thus, there are more incentives for rights holders to get involved than there are for consumers. The stakeholders have different levels of power and resources in the policy process. Consumers and academics have lower resources and have to be more careful with deciding where to focus their energy than industry groups.

Ian Hargreaves pointed out that there has not been a movement that systematically presses for improvement in copyright law. Pursuing the argument primarily on an economic level will have the most chance of being effective, since Europe’s economy is in the middle of a productivity crisis. The argument has to be made that changing the status quo is pro-innovation and pro-economy, whilst
also arguing for the cultural and human rights dimensions of the copyright debate. Hargreaves made the point that the arrangement of copyright law is of primary importance to companies whose business is built upon maximization of the value of copyright. Thus, it cannot be expected that consumers are equally energetically involved in the discussion as those companies. Finally, Hargreaves argued for an experiment in the Netherlands with an ACS.

**Jim Killock** commented on the large influence of lobbyists on the copyright discussion in the UK. He noted that rights holders are quite loud, rude and argue for a conservative stance that changing the copyright system will upset business models. Conversely, consumers and artists do not have their voices heard. In his view, this explains the failure to innovate at the regulatory level. The consumer interest groups should strive to work together, as their interests are much more aligned.

**Agustín Reyna** noted that the BEUC (Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs) has looked at an ACS, but the policy making climate in Brussels had to be taken into account. Reyna pointed out that there is already a specific compensation system in place for the private copying levy, which does not work. The compensation does not reach the creators and is mostly absorbed by administrative costs. He argued that adding a new levy without solving the existing problems first is not the right approach. Reyna concluded by making a point of distinguishing between the economic rights holders who have the economic mandate, and the authors, who have not given a political mandate to the rights-holders to represent them.

Following these interventions the floor was opened for discussion. The question was posed if it was surprising that younger consumers, mostly digital consumers and pirates, were the ones most in favor of reform. Reda answered that it was not, because those are the groups that actually come in contact with the copyright laws. Since the younger consumers were most in favor of change, Reda predicted that copyright reform was only a matter of time. The English copyright reform process was seen as promising because it was mainly based on economic studies. Killock commented that political leadership, and not only academic effort, was the most important aspect in the English copyright reform process. The evidence on which the policy is based should then be sufficiently disclosed to the public. Reyna added that it should be clear not only how the data is collected and assessed, but also how it is interpreted later.

Vallbé stated that there are two ways to track consumer preferences: evidence-based policy frameworks with experiments, and public consultation processes. The latter may suffer from a strong self-selection bias. He asked the panelists about the relationship between the two preference tracking systems and their role in evidence-based policy. Reyna answered that evidence-based studies can provide data on, for instance, how the consumer behaves. Public consultation may be used to draw political conclusions.

In response to Hargreaves’s suggestion, Professor Hugenholtz informed that the proposed experiment with an ACS will take place, as the IViR is preparing it with the relevant stakeholders at the moment. Hugenholtz asked to what extent reducing the pressure on privacy is a factor in the copyright debate, since historically levies were used to safeguard privacy. Reyna answered that relieving pressure on privacy, as well as decriminalization, are important factors. However, he sees many problems in trying to implement an ACS on a European level and prefers giving flexibility to the states so that it can be implemented on a national level. Killock added that cross-industry support is key in achieving legislative change.
Reda stated that another problem with evidence-based policy is that academics are seen as merely another stakeholder in the process, and treated at the same level as lobbyists. Transparency is an issue, since commercial studies are often not very clear about their data or how it is interpreted. She also commented that the compensation to authors could take the form of a tax. However, that would make it impossible to opt out of the system.

The question was asked why there is such a large gap in innovating companies in the market, when the conclusion from the economic panel was that there is a lot of money to go around. Reda pointed out that there is an issue with trying to scale and navigate around the complexity of 28 different copyright systems. These problems may inhibit companies from investing and thus hamper innovation. The debate was closed at this stage.

Legal Panel: Copyright reform ahead – limits of the imagination

Panel: Bernt Hugenholtz (moderator), João Pedro Quintais (speaker), Christophe Geiger, Martin Senftleben, Jacqueline Seignette, Christiaan Alberdingk Thijm.

Following an introduction of the panel members by moderator Professor Bernt Hugenholtz, the legal panel session started with a presentation by João Pedro Quintais on the legal issues with regard to the ACS. Quintais set out the basic components of an ACS: a blanket license for digital works, covering the online rights of reproduction and communication/making available to the public, for non-commercial purposes, to the benefit of individual end-users, and subject to adequate compensation, paid through a surcharge on the ISP subscription fee.

There are different legal models for ACS, which mostly rely on collective rights management and can be either voluntary or mandatory to rights holders. Compensated legal licenses cause the greatest restrictions on exclusive rights – by turning them into remuneration rights for the exempted uses – and therefore require deeper copyright reform. Hence, if a limitation or exception is adopted, it would have to pass the three-step test, which allows use privileges in (1) certain special cases, (2) that do not conflict with the normal exploitation of works, and (3) do not unreasonable prejudice the legitimate interests of right holders. In this respect, the biggest challenges to ACS lie with the second criterion, i.e. whether such a system conflicts with the normal exploitation of works. Quintais suggested that, if an ACS is properly restricted to non-commercial uses, articulates with existing limitations in the ISD, and provides adequate compensation, it is possible that it does not pose such a conflict and complies with the test.

Following this presentation, the panelists intervened. Christophe Geiger explained that the three-step test is vague. It does not have one single application; it may be adjusted to each situation, which makes it very successful. However, this feature does not enhance legal certainty. Courts and legislators do not provide guidance on the application of the test and each country has its own interpretation. It is therefore difficult to assess whether ACS would satisfy the test. According to Geiger, the second criterion of the test should be understood in a normative way. In this view, ACS is a normal way to exploit a work. If research shows that an ACS provides similar or more compensation for the right holder, it is possible that it does not pose such a conflict and complies with the test.

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Next up was Martin Senftleben, who questioned whether the three-step test is indeed a legal obstacle to adopt ACS. From an historical perspective, it is clear that the test allows compulsory or
statutory licenses. In fact, the test was originally devised to solve issues with private copying acts by individuals. Private copying is now mostly regulated on the basis of a compulsory levy system. This would indicate that ACS also satisfies the three-step test. In line with Quintais, Senftleben acknowledges that the second criterion is most difficult to satisfy. He explains that the normal exploitation criterion can be analyzed from two different perspectives, namely an empirical and normative perspectives. According to the empirical (and traditional) view, ACS would not be allowed because they inhibit the normal exploitation. According to a normative perspective, all reasonable ways to exploit a work have to be taken into account. When considerable income is generated, this indicates that there is a normal exploitation. The empirical research reported in the previous panels suggests that ACS provide more compensation for right holders than a normal exploitation through exclusive rights. An extreme normative approach would argue that only ACS should be regarded as a normal exploitation because this model generates the most revenues for right holders. Any other form of exploitation should not be regarded as normal exploitation. Senftleben argued that also under a milder normative perspective it is possible to consider ACS as a normal exploitation and satisfy the second criterion of the test.

In the following intervention, Jacqueline Seignette questioned whether it is necessary to adopt a consumer-based approach, in which consumers have to pay a levy to compensate right holders, or rather, as she deems more adequate, we should target the actual disseminator of copyright works. She examined how this consumer-based approach has emerged in EU copyright law and concluded that the E-Commerce Directive’s (2000/31/EC) “safe harbor” regime and the technical approach to the notion of communication to the public adopted by the CJEU have led to the adoption of a consumer based approach and moved the liability burden away from the actual infringer. Seignette argued that copyright has to return to its essence, which is addressing the party that disseminates unlawful content. The grey area between the safe harbor regime and direct liability – i.e. “secondary” or intermediary” liability – has to be harmonized through legislation. If this occurs, there is no need to focus on consumer liability and adopt an ACS. In fact, this and other levy systems would hinder the development of a harmonized regime for secondary liability.

The final intervention belonged to Christiaan Alberdingk Thijm. He started by explaining that different copyright works should be treated differently. There is no “catch-all” regime for all categories of works, i.e. music, film and software. Alberdingk Thijm further explained that the real drivers of copyright reform are the business models and not technology or the industry itself. Innovation commonly comes from outside the industry. For example, Apple changed the record industry and opened the market to music downloads. The music copyright and neighboring rights market had been a remuneration market for many years due to the strong position of collective rights management societies. According to Alberdingk Thijm, the introduction of an exclusive right of making available right for neighboring rights in the InfoSoc Directive (2001/29/EC) was a big mistake because it foreclosed the market and prevented innovation in the digital market place. It is important to open the market. He views the IViR research has suggesting the existence of a business model for file sharing, for which consumers want to pay. However, it has not been adopted by the music industry. The question therefore is how to adopt a new business model legally. A good example, susceptible of adaptation to file sharing (to which he is favorable) could be to follow the mandatory collective management model of art. 9 of the Satellite and Cable Directive (93/83/EEC).

After the interventions the floor was opened for discussion. During the discussion, the question was raised whether ACS could be sold to national lawmakers on the basis of the three-step test. It was noted that in Europe there is a very strict interpretation of the test. For instance, author-friendly
countries, such as France, which provide a high level of protection for authors, may block copyright reform for ACS. For these countries, it is important to frame ACS in an author-friendly way, for example by explaining that this model provides more and possibly fairer compensation to creators.

It was also pointed out that levy systems are not prohibited per se under the three-step test. This is confirmed in art. 11bis of the Berne Convention (a compulsory license for the broadcast of works) and the private copy levy system for private copies based on art. 5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive. The overall conclusion on this point was that if the three-step test is interpreted in a normative way, ACS would satisfy the normal exploitation criterion.

Another question that arose was whether ACS would imply that unauthorized websites, such as The Pirate Bay, would become legal as a result of the legalization of non-commercial acts of reproduction and making available by individuals. In relation to this point, Quintais noted that this would boil down to a legislative policy choice on how to frame the contours of the ACS, even if based on a copyright limitation. In particular, it would depend on the scope of the limitation (which in theory would only extend to non-commercial uses), the legal definition of the acts of these platforms and the articulation between direct and secondary liability, taking into account that this matter is to a large extent regulated by national tort law.

Finally, a discussion arose with regard to the consumer-based vs. direct infringer approaches, as previously explained by Seignette. She explained that there should be more clarity on the responsibilities of platforms that disseminate illegal content, and that the priority of legislators should be to first clarify the legal regime applicable to intermediary liability and safe harbors before any other regime introducing other legal mechanisms, such as ACS, in which consumers have to pay.

At the end of the legal panel, the symposium proceedings were closed.

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Speakers and moderators

- Agustín Reyna, Senior Legal Officer, Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC)
- Andy Zondervan, New Business Development Manager, Buma/Stemra
- Balázs Bodó, Researcher, IViR, University of Amsterdam
- Bernt Hugenholtz, Professor of Intellectual Property Law, IViR, University of Amsterdam
- Christian W. Handke, Assistant Professor of Cultural Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam
- Christiaan Alberdingk Thijm, Partner, bureau Brandeis, and Lecturer, IViR, University of Amsterdam
- Christophe Geiger, General Director and Associate Professor, Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI), University of Strasbourg
- Erwin Angad-Gaur, General Secretary, Ntb
- Ian Hargreaves, Professor of Digital Economy, Cardiff University
- Jacqueline Seignette, Partner, Höcker Advocaten Amsterdam
- Jim Killock, Executive Director, Open Rights Group
- Joan-Josep Vallbé, Post-Doctoral Researcher, IViR, University of Amsterdam, and Assistant Professor of Political Science, Universitat de Barcelona
- João Pedro Quintais, PhD Researcher, IViR, University of Amsterdam
- Joost Poort, Associate Professor, IViR, University of Amsterdam
- Julia Reda, Member of the European Parliament (Greens/EFA group)
- Martin Senftleben, Professor of Intellectual Property, VU University Amsterdam
- Ruth Towse, Professor in Economics of Creative Industries, Bournemouth University

Website references

- Project webpage: [http://ivir.nl/onderzoek/acs](http://ivir.nl/onderzoek/acs)
- Symposium webpage: [http://www.ivir.nl/acs-symposium](http://www.ivir.nl/acs-symposium)

Recordings of the symposium

- Opening and Economics panel: [http://webcolleges.uva.nl/Mediasite/Play/cd92846b60d04fb98c332def5141a7981d](http://webcolleges.uva.nl/Mediasite/Play/cd92846b60d04fb98c332def5141a7981d)
- Social and political panel: [http://webcolleges.uva.nl/Mediasite/Play/3607b029e7144c2eb9d73cf88f1d113e1d](http://webcolleges.uva.nl/Mediasite/Play/3607b029e7144c2eb9d73cf88f1d113e1d)
- Legal panel: [http://webcolleges.uva.nl/Mediasite/Play/60b6c1d379d14b598010cc9e9726f231d](http://webcolleges.uva.nl/Mediasite/Play/60b6c1d379d14b598010cc9e9726f231d)