Negotiation in dyads and groups: the effects of social and epistemic motives

ten Velden, F.S.

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CHAPTER 1

Motivation in negotiation: An introduction

In many of our interactions with other people, whether in work-settings or at home, we implicitly or explicitly negotiate: We try to reach agreement about our perceived divergence of interests. Negotiation occurs on a daily basis, at all levels of society. Unfortunately, a newspaper headline such as "Parties reached an impasse: Still no agreement" is not an exception: Negotiation often ends in impasse, which can have far reaching effects. When negotiators fail to agree, they leave dissatisfied, are less willing to engage in future interaction, and face conflict. Moreover, even when negotiators are able to avoid impasse and reach an agreement, these agreements often are less than optimal, leaving parties with unsatisfactory outcomes and a suboptimal distribution of resources (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). Therefore, as negotiation is such a pervasive aspect of day-to-day life in general, and in work-related settings in particular, it is important to know the variables that stimulate and undermine successful negotiation.

Negotiations are complex and difficult. To reach a high quality agreement, negotiators need to gain insight into the negotiation problem at hand, and make sense of this complex situation (De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007). Past research has identified two important processes through which negotiators make sense of their environment: Information exchange and information processing. This dissertation concerns these processes. Whether parties are willing and able to optimally operate these two processes depends on their motivation. Specifically, according to the Motivated Information Processing model of negotiation (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003), two types of motivation are crucial. First, social motivation – individuals' preferences for a collectively beneficial (pro-social) versus personally beneficial (pro-self) distribution of outcomes between themselves and interdependent others (McClintock, 1977) – drives the kind of information that negotiators search for. Second, epistemic motivation – the desire to develop and maintain an accurate and deep understanding of the world, including the negotiation at hand (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) – drives the depth of information processing that takes place. In essence, the idea is that negotiators exchange information in a more accurate and open way when they have a pro-social rather than pro-self motive, and that negotiators benefit from this open and accurate information exchange in particular when they have high rather than low epistemic motivation. As a result, negotiators reach collectively beneficial outcomes – so-called integrative agreements – when they combine a pro-social orientation with high epistemic motivation (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006).
Research on motivated information processing in negotiation has substantially increased our understanding about the way in which negotiators make sense of their complex negotiation situation and settle on more or less beneficial agreements (for reviews see Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; De Dreu et al., 2007). Nevertheless, knowledge about some crucial aspects of motivation and information in negotiation is largely lacking, and redressing this state of affairs was the goal of this dissertation. First, although heterogeneity of motives across negotiators is probably rule rather than exception, work on motivated information processing has considered situations in which both parties share the same social motivation (i.e., both are pro-social, or both are pro-self), and the same level of epistemic motivation. The present dissertation focuses on heterogeneity of motivation across negotiators, either in terms of their social motivation (Chapter 2) or in terms of their epistemic motivation (Chapter 3).

Second, work on motivated information processing, and related work grounded in interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) has predominantly focused on pro-social versus pro-self motivation. Interestingly, pro-self motivation can be decomposed in individualistic motivation on the one hand, and competitive motivation on the other. Under individualistic motivation, negotiators seek good outcomes for themselves and ignore what others get. Under competitive motivation, negotiators seek to avoid getting less than their counterpart and try to win from him or her. Despite the fact that competitive motivation seems prominent in many negotiations, systematic research into the affective and behavioral consequences of competitive motivation is largely missing. This dissertation increases our knowledge about competitive motivation by focusing on distinct forms of competitive motivation (Chapter 4 and 5). Before presenting the specific experiments in subsequent chapters, I will first explain the characteristics of negotiation situations in general. After this, I will review relevant research, and elaborate on those issues that are relevant for the research reported in this dissertation. This introductory chapter ends with a brief introduction to, and overview of the empirical studies that form the core of this dissertation.

**Negotiation: Mixed-motive interdependence**

The results of many social interactions depend not only on our own behavior, but on various aspects of the behavior of others as well (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Whether we get the job we want or enjoy our time spent at home depends, at least in part, on the choices made by others. This interdependence can take several forms (Davis, Laughlin, & Komorita, 1976). A cooperative interaction exists when one individual's behavior does not only affect his or her outcomes positively, but the
outcomes of other individuals involved as well. In contrast, competitive interaction exists when an individual’s behavior affects his or her own outcomes positively, but the outcomes of the other individuals involved negatively. However, most social interactions are characterized by mixed-motive interdependence, in that people have incentives to both cooperate and compete (Deutsch, 1949; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). This mixed motive interdependence (Schelling, 1960) also characterizes negotiation: Because agreement is better than no agreement, parties have an incentive to cooperate. But because each is better off with an agreement serving their personal interests optimally, parties also have an incentive to compete.

Negotiation settings are often ambiguous, and vary in complexity (De Dreu et al., 2007). This is particularly true when the negotiation is about several issues that are differentially valued by the negotiators. An example of such a complex, multi-issue negotiation is the talk between union representatives and representatives from management about a new employment contract. Typically, such labor-negotiations require agreement on several issues, such as salary and working hours, the duration of the contract, and the annual pay raise. These issues might be of different value for the negotiators involved, such that the duration of the contract may be very important to the employee but the annual pay raise may be of lesser concern, while the employer might find the annual pay raise more important than the duration of the contract.

When negotiations involve multiple issues that vary in value to the negotiators, an integrative agreement in which all parties’ interests are met becomes a possibility by making trade-offs. This is illustrated in Table 1.1, which shows the issue charts for both parties in a two-person negotiation. For each issue, there are 5 or 7 levels on which the negotiators can reach agreement. As can be seen, a simple 50-50 compromise in which the parties split the difference provides both negotiators with 375 points (€ 17,000 salary, 1.5 years duration of contract, 4% pay raise, and 30% medical coverage). Typically for integrative multi-issue negotiations, the negotiators value the issues differently. For the management representative, duration of contract and annual raise are the most important issues while for the union’s representative, salary and medical coverage are the most important issues. To obtain the maximum joint outcomes, both parties need to give in on their less valuable issues, a behavior known as logrolling (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). In the case of the two negotiators in Table 1.1, this would mean that the management representative would receive zero outcomes for salary and medical coverage but the maximum outcome for duration of contract and annual raise. The union’s representative would receive zero outcomes on duration of contract and annual raise, but maximum outcomes on salary and medical coverage. Their joint outcomes would be 1080
points, which is more than the middle-of-the-road compromise (750 points) or an agreement in which one negotiator gets all (750 points).

### Table 1.1

*Issue Charts for the Management and Union Representative*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Management</th>
<th></th>
<th>Union</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>Duration of contract</td>
<td>Annual Raise</td>
<td>Medical Coverage</td>
<td>Salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€14,000 (90)</td>
<td>0,5 year (180)</td>
<td>1% (360)</td>
<td>10% (120)</td>
<td>€20,000 (360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€15,000 (75)</td>
<td>1,0 year (135)</td>
<td>2% (300)</td>
<td>20% (90)</td>
<td>€19,000 (300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€16,000 (60)</td>
<td>1,5 year (90)</td>
<td>3% (240)</td>
<td>30% (60)</td>
<td>€18,000 (240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€17,000 (45)</td>
<td>2,0 year (45)</td>
<td>4% (180)</td>
<td>40% (30)</td>
<td>€17,000 (180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€18,000 (30)</td>
<td>2,5 year (00)</td>
<td>5% (120)</td>
<td>50% (00)</td>
<td>€16,000 (120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€19,000 (15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>€15,000 (60)</td>
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<td>€20,000 (00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>€14,000 (00)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Numbers in brackets refer to the value of the alternatives.

Unfortunately, as real life negotiations are rarely reducible to relatively simple issue charts, the parties involved in negotiation do not have full insight into the other parties’ preferences and the structure of the negotiation. Although negotiating parties are able to communicate their preferences, the mixed-motive structure of negotiation can potentially have detrimental consequences: Negotiators do not know with certainty that the information the other party provides is accurate and truthful. And vice versa: Negotiators face the difficult choice of providing accurate information that might help attain good outcomes for all, but at the same time might increase the risk of being exploited. As a consequence, all too often, negotiations end up in impasses or in sub-optimal agreements in which none of the parties’ goals are met, and neither party is satisfied (Rubin et al., 1994).

**Motivated information processing in negotiation**

How negotiators deal with the mixed-motive structure of negotiations, and their information insufficiency, has been the focus of many studies. Research in
social psychology and the organizational sciences has focused on cognitive processes such as the use of heuristics (e.g., Neale & Bazerman, 1991) and on motivational tendencies to cooperate or compete (e.g., Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; Rubin et al., 1994). To integrate these lines of inquiry, De Dreu and colleagues developed and tested their motivated information processing model (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). It postulates that high-quality agreements that integrate all parties’ interests as much as possible require cooperative exchange of information and the subsequent deep and systematic processing of that information. It further proposes that two different motivational systems can account for the type of information individuals search for during negotiations, and the amount of information processing that takes place. Social motivation drives the kind of information that negotiators search for, and epistemic motivation drives the depth of information processing that takes place.

In the next sections I will first review past research on social motivation and epistemic motivation, their origins, and their consequences in negotiation. After this, I will review studies that simultaneously investigated the influence of social and epistemic motivation and showed support for the motivated information processing perspective. Finally, I will discuss the important questions that remain and introduce the empirical chapters in which these questions are addressed.

**Social and epistemic motivation**

Because of the mixed-motive nature of negotiations, negotiating individuals face a dilemma between their own interests, and those of others (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). How negotiators deal with this dilemma, depends on their social motive – the individual's preference for a particular outcome distribution between oneself and interdependent others (McClintock, 1977). Although a variety of social motives can be distinguished, including altruistic, cooperative, competitive and individualistic (e.g., Van Lange, De Cremer, Van Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007), many studies on conflict and negotiation have relied on the more general distinction between pro-self and pro-social motives (e.g., Gillespie, Brett, & Weingart, 2000; Olekalns & Smith, 1999; Roch & Samuelson, 1997). Individuals with a pro-self motive seek to maximize their own outcomes, and have no or negative regard for other's outcomes. They tend to see the negotiation as a competitive game in which power and personal success are key. Individuals with a pro-social motive seek to maximize both their own, as well as other's outcomes. They tend to perceive negotiation as a cooperative game in which harmony and inclusiveness, fairness, and joint success are key (e.g., Chen, Mannix, & Okumura, 2003).

Social motives can be rooted in individual differences such as social value orientation (McClintock, 1977; Van Lange, 1999) or specific aspects of culture, such
as collectivist or individualistic values (Hofstede, 1980). Social value orientation is usually assessed through a decomposed game methodology (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975), in which individuals have to choose, over several rounds, between three different outcome distributions (pro-social, individualistic and competitive; the latter two are often combined in a "pro-self" category). Based on their choices, individuals are classified accordingly. Individuals classified as pro-social value both their own, and the other party's outcome. Individuals with an individualistic orientation value their own outcome, and have no regard for the other party's outcome. Finally, those with a competitive orientation value their own outcome relative to the other party's outcome: Their choices indicate a desire to maximize the positive difference between one's own, and the other party's outcome.

In addition to individual differences, social motives can also be cued by situational features. For example, giving instructions or incentives to consider not only one's own, but also others' interests raises pro-social motivation (e.g., Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). Even referring to the counterpart as "partner", rather than "opponent," raises pro-social motivation (Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2001). Also, pro-social motivation is raised when future interaction is expected (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984), when a counterpart is a friend rather than stranger (Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1984), and when a counterpart is referred to as a member of the same social category (Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993).

A large number of studies examined the influence of social motives on negotiation behavior and outcomes (e.g., Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; 2002; Olekalns & Smith, 1999; Schultz & Pruitt, 1978; Weingart et al., 1993). A meta-analysis of this work, including a total of 28 studies, showed that compared to pro-self negotiators, those with a pro-social motivation more often engage in problem-solving behaviors such as the exchange of information, less often engage in contentious behavior such as persuasive bolstering, and achieve higher joint outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000).

Because negotiations often are multi-issue, complex, and ambiguous, negotiators are faced with the cognitively taxing task of making sense of their situation (De Dreu et al., 2007). They not only need to exchange information, but also thoroughly process the negotiation situation and the information that comes to the table (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). According to dual process models of information processing (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) individuals may process information in a shallow and effortless mode or, alternatively, they may engage in a more deep, elaborative and effortful processing of information. In the case of shallow, heuristic information processing negotiators tend to rely on fixed-pie assumptions (e.g., Thompson & Hastie, 1990), on stereotypes (e.g., Morris, Larrick, & Su, 1999), and are heavily influenced by anchoring (Ritov, 1996) and framing (e.g.,
Bottom & Stult, 1993). These biases and heuristics often prohibit the development of an accurate understanding of the task and the discovery of mutually beneficial, integrative agreements. In the case of systematic information processing, however, negotiators are more likely to base their judgments and decisions on thoroughly processed information and to revise inaccurate assumptions and preconceptions. As a result, high quality, integrative agreements are more likely (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003).

The degree to which individuals engage in systematic and elaborative processing of information depends on an individual's epistemic motivation, - the desire to develop and maintain an accurate and deep understanding of the world, including the negotiation at hand (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Epistemic motivation can be rooted in individual differences, such as Need for Cognitive Closure (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) or Personal Need for Structure (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001). For example, individuals with a high personal need for structure are characterized by a chronic preference for simplicity and structure, view the world in less complex ways, and often rely on heuristic processing of information that is based on well-learned associations. On the contrary, individuals with a low need for structure are characterized by a chronic preference for complexity and spontaneity, are less likely to rely on heuristics and more likely to incorporate new information into their decision making process (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Thompson et al., 2001; Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, & Bargh, 1994). In short, those with low need for structure are more likely to display high epistemic motivation.

Similarly, Need for Cognitive Closure refers to the individual's desire for a firm, unambiguous answer, and it affects the degree to which people react and are influenced by early or pre-existing cues (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Individuals with high need for closure tend to seize information quickly, and subsequently freeze on that information (e.g., Freund, Kruglanski & Shpitzajzen, 1985; Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Individuals with low need for closure, in contrast, are more likely to continue information processing and are less influenced by initial impressions and stereotypic cues.

Epistemic motivation also depends on features of the situation. For example, time pressure has been shown to lower epistemic motivation (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), as has environmental noise (e.g., Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), and process accountability (Tetlock, 1992). Under process accountability, individuals expect to be observed and evaluated by others with unknown views about the process of judgement and decision making (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999;
Tetlock, 1992). Individuals held process accountable evaluate decision alternatives more thoroughly (Scholten, Van Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2007; Simonson & Staw, 1992), and rely less on heuristic cues (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000) than individuals not held process accountable.

Several studies examined the influence of epistemic motivation in negotiations. For example, individuals with low epistemic motivation were more likely to use heuristic cues including irrelevant anchor information or stereotypic cues about their counterpart (De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999). De Grada, Kruglanski, Pierro, and Mannetti (1999) showed that small groups composed of individuals with high need for closure were more task-oriented, were more tolerant of authoritarian leadership, and were less egalitarian in their decision making. Furthermore, when individuals were process accountable, and thus had high epistemic motivation, they were more likely to revise inaccurate pre-existing cognitive structures during negotiation, and consequently reached agreements of higher quality (De Dreu, Koole et al., 2000).

Taken together, the above review indicates that negotiators with a pro-social motivation are more likely to exchange information, and that negotiators with a high epistemic motivation are more likely to thoroughly process information. Given that thorough processing of accurately exchanged information helps negotiators to understand their situation, and to craft agreements that are mutually beneficial, one would expect most integrative agreements when negotiators combine high epistemic motivation with a pro-social orientation. This is indeed what De Dreu and Carnevale (2003) hypothesized, and what De Dreu et al. (2006) showed. In three experiments these authors manipulated epistemic motivation and social motivation, and showed that pro-social negotiators recall more cooperative tactics, report more trust and reach higher collective outcomes than pro-self negotiators, especially when they had high epistemic motivation.

Although it is clear that the constructs of social and epistemic motivation play a crucial role in influencing negotiation, unfortunately, several aspects of motivation have been overlooked in studies so far. First of all, in the studies discussed thus far, the focus has predominantly been on homogeneous settings in which all dyad or group members share the same social motivation. It seems reasonable however, that in groups and dyads those with a pro-social motivation meet those with a pro-self motivation, and vice versa. Unfortunately, very few studies have examined dyads and groups in which members have different social motives, leaving what will happen if groups that are mixed in composition in terms of social motivation unknown. In addition, thus far, epistemic motivation has only been studied in homogeneous settings, in which all parties share the same motivation. It seems likely however, that in dyads and groups not all members share
the same level of epistemic motivation, for example due to individual differences in epistemic needs, or differences in perceived time pressure. Finally, research thus far has largely ignored the competitive motivation, and instead has primarily focused on individualistic motives. In this dissertation, I will argue and show that especially in an interdependent social interaction such as negotiation, the competitive motivation – the motivation to maximize own outcomes vis-à-vis the counterpart, plays an important role. In the next section, these three issues will be discussed in more detail.

**Heterogeneity of social motivation**

Whereas social motivation resides at the individual-level of analysis, negotiation takes place in pairs or small groups of individuals. It may be the case that all individuals within a pair or small group share the same social motivation – all have a pro-self motive or all have a pro-social motive. However, it is equally or perhaps more likely that in a dyad or group one individual strives to obtain good outcomes for all, while another is merely concerned with the own outcome. Whereas one party may regard his or her counterpart as a partner, the other may not. Whereas some negotiators at the table are from a collectivist culture, others may not. Research evidence suggests that when those with a pro-social motive are confronted with someone with a pro-self motive they tend to apply more competitive strategies to avoid being exploited (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). For negotiators with a pro-self motive, this assimilation occurs less, or not at all. However, studies addressing heterogeneity of social motivation in negotiation are scarce and results are unclear. For example, some results suggest that the more pro-social negotiators there are in a group, the better it is (e.g., Weingart, Brett, & Olekalns, 2005). However, Schei and Rognes (2005) found that in negotiating groups, those with a pro-social motivation were exploited by those with a pro-self motivation. Thus, it appears that assimilation of those with a pro-social motivation does not always take place. In Chapter 2, I will argue and show that the effects of heterogeneity of social motivation depend on the interest positions group members hold, and the decision rule that groups use.

Especially in negotiation involving more than two parties, asymmetrical situations may arise, in which a numerical majority of group members have preferences that oppose those of a minority (Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1998). Consider, for example, a management team in which two members have aligned interests on all issues at stake, while a third member has different interests. Imagine as well that these two members both have a pro-self motivation, while the third member has a pro-social motivation. Would the aligned members include the dissenting minority's interests in their agreement? Research on coalition behavior (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Van Beest, Wilke, & Van Dijk, 2003) suggests that
individuals who are less disposed to consider the viewpoint of others are more likely to form small coalitions that benefit themselves at the expense of others. However, what would happen if the minority party has a pro-self motivation and in addition, has the ability to block a decision? Or, instead, has a pro-social motivation? In Chapter 2, findings will be reported that show that the common view that the more pro-social negotiators there are in a group, the better it is (e.g., Weingart, Brett, & Olekalns, 2005) is too simplistic: To determine whether the pro-social motivation of counterparts will have a positive effect, or whether the pro-self motivation of counterparts will have a negative effect, one needs to consider structural and procedural variables, such as the interest positions of the negotiators. Specific predictions were developed and tested in an experimental study reported in Chapter 2.

**Heterogeneity of epistemic motivation**

Although epistemic motivation, as social motivation, resides at the individual level of analysis, negotiation is an interpersonal task and thus takes place between at least two individuals. Of course, it may be that all individuals within a pair or small group share the same level of epistemic motivation – all are under the same amount of time pressure, and all are process accountable to the same extent. However, it is at least equally likely that within pairs individuals differ in their epistemic needs. Someone with low need for cognition may negotiate with someone having high need for cognition (Shestowsky, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1998; Schei, Rognes & Mykland, 2006). Whereas one party may experience high time pressure, his or her counterpart may not (cf., Moore, 2004). Whereas some negotiators at the table may be process accountable, others may not (cf., Tetlock, 1992).

Thus, when applying the concept of epistemic motivation to interpersonal processes including negotiation, we need to take into account that groups and dyads may be heterogeneous in individual epistemic needs. What would happen if one negotiator approaches the negotiation with a high motivation to thoroughly search and process information, while his or her counterpart makes sense of the situation by relying on simplifying heuristics? Unfortunately, research on epistemic motivation limited itself to homogeneous situations in which all parties have the same epistemic motivation, leaving it unclear how much systematic processing of information within the negotiation pair is needed. The question how homogeneity versus heterogeneity of epistemic motivation impacts negotiation processes and outcomes is unknown and will be further examined in Chapter 3.
Competitive motivation

As mentioned briefly in the beginning of this introduction, individualistic and competitive motives are often combined in a single category labeled "pro-self" (Au & Kwong, 2004; Olekalns & Smith, 1999). It is striking that although non-cooperative, competitive motivation is often seen as central in conflict and negotiation (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991; Tjosvold, 1998), relatively few studies actually incorporated competitive motivation into the analysis. In his review of the relevant literatures Van Lange (2000) noted that "... it should be clear that the pursuit of self-interest is too limited to fully explicate the ways in which we behave and interact ... It is, therefore, all the more surprising that many or most theories and models of interpersonal behavior do not [seek to include] ... competitive orientation" (p. 326). A few studies have shown competitive motivation to influence perceptions, behavior and feelings in a variety of interdependent situations (Deutsch, 1973). Competitive individuals emphasize differences rather than common ground (Deutsch, 1973), show high levels of distrust, use contentious tactics (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993) and expect both the interaction and the other party to be competitive (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).

Early experimental game research has suggested that competitive tendencies can be based on two fundamentally different types of motivation (e.g., Messick & Thorngate, 1967). First, competitive individuals may focus on getting ahead and try to outdo their counterpart. This type of competitive motivation is called appetitive competition. Alternatively, individuals may focus on avoiding getting behind and on preventing to lose (Messick & Thorngate, 1967; Van Lange et al., 2007). This type of competitive motivation is called aversive competition. Appetitive and aversive competition bear resemblance to promotion and prevention focus (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998). Promotion focus is characterized by a concern for accomplishment, getting ahead, and behavior is directed by a positive event. Prevention focus is characterized by a concern for safety, and behavior is directed by fear for a negative event. The literature on promotion focus would suggest that appetitive competitors are characterized by a concern for accomplishment, getting ahead, and that their behavior is aimed at obtaining a positive event. Consequently, in an interdependent negotiation setting, appetitive competition motivates negotiators to outperform their counterpart. In contrast, aversive competitors are characterized by a prevention focus, leading them to be concerned with safety, and their behavior is driven by fear for negative outcomes. Consequently, in negotiation they are concerned with not falling behind. In Chapter 4, I will argue and show that this difference underlying competitive motivation has important implications for negotiators’ behavior and outcomes.
INTRODUCTION

Summary and overview

The above overview shows that research on the effects of motivation in negotiation has thus far ignored at least three important issues: The effects of motivational heterogeneity in terms of social motivation and asymmetry of preferences, the effects of motivational heterogeneity in terms of epistemic motivation and the effects of competitive motivation. This dissertation attempts to shed light on these three areas.

In the remainder of this dissertation I will report a number of studies that address social and epistemic motivation in negotiation. Chapter 2 focuses on the effects of heterogeneity of social motivation in negotiating groups, and the moderating effects of structural majority and minority positions negotiators hold on the one hand, and the decision rule the group uses on the other. Thus, besides furthering insight into the influence of heterogeneity of social motivation in negotiation, this chapter extends research on social motivation in negotiation into the realm of coalition formation and group decision-making.

Chapter 3 addresses the more general question of what happens when one negotiator, who is highly motivated to think deep and process information systematically, negotiates with another negotiator, who engages in shallow, heuristic processing of information. Research thus far has predominantly focused on homogeneous dyads, in which both members share the same level of epistemic motivation. Chapter 3 reports findings of two experiments. The first experiment examined effects of epistemic motivation (measured as Need for Structure) on negotiation outcomes. The second experiment expands the findings of Experiment 3.1, and identifies the processes that lead to these findings. In addition, Experiment 3.2 examined the interaction of epistemic motivation and the amount of available information.

Although pro-social and pro-self motivation in negotiation has received considerable attention, competitive motivation has been largely ignored. The experiments reported in Chapter 4 and 5 were designed to fill this void. In these chapters, two specific types of competitive motivation are distinguished: Appetitive and aversive competition. Chapter 4 reports findings from four different experiments. Together, these studies highlight how appetitive and aversive competition influence the feelings of anxiety and optimism, the valuation of equality, tendencies to exploit one's counterpart, and willingness to settle on deals that yield high, equally distributed value. Chapter 5 builds on Chapter 3 and 4. In Chapter 5, findings of an experiment that focused on the effects of competitive motivations and Need for cognitive closure on concession size will be discussed. In addition, the experiment examined effects of stereotypic information about the counterpart.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I will summarize the main findings and their implications for negotiation.