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How God Disappeared from Europe: Visions of a United Europe from Erasmus to Kant

ANNEMARIE VAN HEERIKHUIZEN

ABSTRACT This article traces the development of European ideas of peace and unity from the time of Desiderius Erasmus to Immanuel Kant. The argument will be made that these ideas, which were initially strongly determined by Christian religious thinking, gradually changed, and from the seventeenth century onwards were put forward in more political and legal terms. Erasmus’s way of reasoning about peace and war was still strongly influenced by his firm orientation on the New Testament and the teachings of Jesus Christ. Émeric Crucé, a French writer, was of the opinion that all human beings in the end had God in common, and so had to live peacefully together. Duc de Sully was one of the first not to argue as a religious man but as a politician: a system of balance of power could bring international stability. According to the English Quaker William Penn and the French Abbé de Saint-Pierre only the acceptance of international rules of justice could produce everlasting peace. Immanuel Kant finally directed attention to the form of government and to the founding of a federation of free republics. So God seems to have disappeared from Europe... but with what consequences for today?

From the time of Desiderius Erasmus to the time of Immanuel Kant, peace thinking in Europe developed from a mixture of logical-religious pleas for peace into political and legal arguments in favour of a united Europe. Peace planners were first inspired by the lessons of Jesus Christ, his prayers for one Father (and so one European community). Once the problems inside the Christian church became clear, religious arguments were put in more general terms and so it was said that God pointed the way to peace. Political thinking was stimulated in the seventeenth century by the French King Henry IV and his successful handling of religious problems in his own country. Legal thinking, on the other hand, was promoted by men of science, especially by the Dutch lawyer Hugo de Groot (Grotius), who argued that international society was a community, held together by legal principles of natural law. Finally, Kant introduced the idea that peace was totally dependent on the form of government, that is, on a republican constitution.

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“Our Father,” as the first section is called, considers Erasmus’ famous peace essay *A Complaint of Peace* (*Querela pacis* 1517), which is closely related to his earlier writings *Dulce bellum inexpertis* and *Institutio principis christiani*. Analysed carefully it becomes clear that Erasmus, in spite of his highly logical way of thinking, did not believe in a Europe based on treaties made by human beings. The argument made in the second section is that, because all human beings in the end had one God in common, a global arbitration system had to be set up with representatives from all over the world, although some representatives were definitely more important than others.

“Our King,” the third section, addresses Duc de Sully’s *Grand Dessein de Henry IV* (1638). Sully stressed the importance of an international balance of power which meant that European nations had to become more or less the same in size and wealth. His plan was definitely anti-Habsburg and pro-France, the France of his king, Henry IV.

The following section, “Our Legislator,” shows the influence of international lawyers like Hugo Grotius on the writings of William Penn and Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Against the background of aggression and war in Europe, they pleaded in favour of treaties and the extension of international law. A league of nations had to be set up, founded by European kingdoms (Saint-Pierre), and, as will be explained, by the founding of republics (Kant). In this way Europe could eventually reach eternal peace, without the help of God.

Although the peace thoughts of these European thinkers are still echoed in official EU-declarations, the question is what kind of future awaits the European Union, after its fiftieth anniversary, now that God is not there?

### OUR FATHER

To understand European peace plans it is important to understand the problems that existed in Europe when these plans were made. Europe in the time of Erasmus was a continent of wars, banditry, feudal rebellions and peasant uprisings. Central governments were weak and unable to enforce peace. At the same time, the political landscape of Europe was changing drastically. Spain, under the leadership of the Habsburg family, succeeded in becoming one of the most powerful European countries. Erasmus’ *A Complaint of Peace* was written against the background of Spain’s rise to power and the growing tensions and confrontations with Valois France. His essay, composed as a classical oration, was dedicated to Philip of Burgundy, bishop of Utrecht, in a letter urging reconciliation between France and the Habsburg Empire. Erasmus’s arguments, presented as “complaints of peace,” are partly based on natural science and his deep concern for humanity, and partly on his Christian belief and firm focus on the New Testament.

Erasmus, in the person of Peace, starts by arguing that rejecting ‘me’ (Peace) is basically against nature. Harmony and peace exist between celestial bodies, so peace, he says, can be seen even inside the bodies of living creatures: “we see how faithfully the limbs support each other and how ready they are to provide mutual assistance.” Erasmus’s argument, a forerunner of socio-biological thought of the nineteenth and twentieth century, is also inspired by the way animals of the same species behave: “Savage
lions do not fight each, nor thus a boar threaten a fellow boar with his murderous tusks.’’
For him waging war is in fact an unnatural thing, and seen from a logical point of view, weighing its advantages and disadvantages, is also very unwise:

Are you longing for war? First take a look at what peace and war really are, the gains brought by one and the losses by the other; this will enable you to calculate whether there is anything to be achieved by exchanging peace for war. If it is something for admiration when a kingdom is prosperous throughout, with its cities soundly established, lands well cultivated, excellent laws, the best teaching, and the highest moral standards, consider how you will necessarily destroy all this happiness if you go to war. By contrast, if you have ever seen towns in ruins, villages destroyed, churches burnt, and farmland abandoned and have found it a pitiable spectacle, as indeed it is, reflect that all this is the consequence of war.²

Thus the facts prove that war produces only disadvantages for human society—a matter of simple calculation! But as important to Erasmus was his conviction that war was fundamentally contradictory to the lessons of Jesus Christ. Survey the life of Christ from start to finish, he says, “and what else is it but a lesson in concord and mutual love? What do all his commandments and parables teach if not peace and love for one another?” And Christ preached unity: didn’t the prayers of Christ start with the words “Our Father”? “The spoken prayer is for one God, the petition is one which is common to all men, for they are one household, one family, dependents of one Father.”³

Erasmus deplored the expression of national hatred in Europe. Nowadays, so he wrote, the Englishman hates the Frenchman “for no better reason than that he is French,” the Scot hates the Englishman, the Italian hates the German, and so on. “Why do these ridiculous labels do more to separate us than the name of Christ, common to us all, can do to reconcile us?”⁴ Erasmus’ pacifist ideas also influenced his view on the relations with the Islamic world: as long as peaceful means were not exhausted, war had to be avoided.

The only way to protect the peace in Europe was to call upon responsible men to come to the help of Jesus Christ and to intervene and arbitrate in conflicts. This is a remarkable point of view because Erasmus in fact didn’t believe in peace-loving human beings (“a man is a battlefield within himself: reason is at war with the passions”). In A Complaint of Peace he dramatically called upon the princes, priests, theologians, bishops, nobles and magistrates of Europe to unite and fight for peace. Note how easily Erasmus combines natural and religious thinking:

I call on you all alike who are counted Christians to work together with united hearts. Here you must show how the combined will of the people can prevail against the tyranny of the powerful; here must be the focal point of all endeavour. Eternal concord should unite those whom nature has made one in many things and whom Christ has unified in more, and all should join in a united effort to bring about what concerns the happiness of one and all.⁵

What about treaties and alliances, the way human beings try to bring an end to war? Erasmus is not very hopeful about non-Christian undertakings: “our human endeavours alone have not brought success; but Christ himself will bless sincere negotiations which he sees are undertaken with his own guidance and support.”
In 1623, more than a century after *A Complaint of Peace*, another interesting peace proposal was published, in which the influence of Erasmus was clearly seen: *Le Nouveau Cyrée*, after the old Cineas, adviser to King Pyrrhus (319–272 BC), who had tried to convince his king to stop fighting the Romans.6 The author, the French writer Emeric Crucé, was concerned with the problems of his own time, especially those between the Christians. He is one of the first peace thinkers who described the founding of a system of arbitration in more detail, and recognized the importance of free trade.

Christians at the time of Crucé could no longer be seen as a family: three forms of Christianity—Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism—were competing with each other, and this intensified the divisions in Europe. Against the background of the bloody Thirty Years War, Crucé published his plea for peace. A Catholic himself, Crucé was of the opinion that all religions, including the Jewish and Muslim religions, “tend to the same end, namely the recognition and adoration of Divinity.” He acknowledged that “certainly there is one confession of faith and form of ceremonies more acceptable than the other. But since it is a supernatural gift, it must come down from God, and not from men who, with all their arms have not the power to compel belief in the least of its mysteries.”7

Crucé supported his peace plea with evidence from natural science. Fighting was, in his view, an unnatural thing. The following quote leaves no doubt about how close Crucé was to Erasmus in this respect, although he put it in different words, visualising the horrors of the battleground:

There is an amity and kinship between men, based upon a conformity of nature and of figure. Each one willingly keeps his portrait, and takes pleasure in the representation of his features. Nevertheless we do not spare our living images: we glory in ruining our fellow beings, although we shamefully leave the field of battle to lions, tigers, wolves, and serpents, our natural enemies.8

Crucé was convinced of the uselessness of war, including wars fought in the name of religion. Everything in the end was in God’s hands and decided by the laws of Nature. As a deeply religious man Crucé sensed that monarchies had their own life cycle and that princes could do nothing to change it: “kingdoms have the same peculiarities as individuals, birth, growth, and decline. One must not here flatter one’s self, and say God favors just causes.”9

The only thing human beings could do was to set up an arbitration system to prevent the outbreak of war. Crucé suggested the founding of an international assembly in Venice because it was a neutral city and therefore indifferent to the princes and, so he argued, near the “most important monarchies of the earth.”10 His list of important monarchies gives us an interesting image of his world. He first mentioned the territories of the Pope, followed by those of the Turks, the Habsburgs, and the king of Spain. Venice was not far from France either, nor from Tatary, Moscovy, Poland, England, and Denmark. As for Persia, China, Ethiopia, and the East and the West Indies, Crucé writes “they are lands far distant, but navigation remedies that inconvenience, and for such a good object, one must not refuse a long voyage.” Even more interesting is Crucé’s view of the relations between these countries, their order and rank. He reassured his
audience that he had no favourites, that he was neutral “as if I had been born in the imaginary Republic of Plato, or in the region of his ideas.” He simply accommodated himself to “the most usual and apparent opinion.”

On the basis of this impartial point of view, Crucé proposed that the Pope was number one “for I am sure that few people will deny precedence to the Pope, both on account of the honor that Christian Princes accord him, and of the duty that they almost all render to him in spiritual matters.” Second was the Emperor of the Turks because he ruled the city of Constantinople, seat of the Eastern empire, “which is the twin equal of Rome.” The Habsburgs had to be satisfied with the third position, the king of France with the fourth, and the king of Spain with the fifth. All the other sovereigns were more or less the same in prestige and rank. Great Britain had to be satisfied with a minor position, for, Crucé, in spite of his self-declared impartiality, did not favour it as a leading non-Catholic country. Protestant Denmark and Sweden had to accept low positions too, as he diplomatically put it: other monarchs “must not be in the last ranks, all brave Princes, who maintain themselves and do not depend on anyone.” So in Crucé’s world, the Protestant princes were kept at a distance although not excluded. Also, all the monarchies had a right to vote, and decisions would be taken by majority vote. He supported a system of rotating chairs because, so he argued, princes see themselves as equal in majesty, force and opulence. Finally the “great republics” of Europe, such as Venice and Switzerland, were of importance too: if the votes were equally divided they could be called on to tip the scales.

Cruce thus proposed a detailed international arbitration system, the similarity of which with our own European Union—especially our careful politics regarding voting and chairing—can be seen. But Cruce not only pleaded for a system of international arbitration but also stressed the importance of promoting international free trade, a remarkable thing at the time, long before liberal economic notions became prominent. He favoured the lowering of levies, the improvement of canals and rivers and unifying weights and money. People had to be able to travel freely “as if the earth were as she really is—a dwelling-place common to all.”

**OUR KING**

Duc de Sully in his *Grand Dessein de Henry IV*, published in 1638, no longer defended the idea of a united world in which there were no religious divisions. On the contrary, referring to the situation in Europe, he argued that three religions were firmly established in politics and that therefore Europe was in fact no longer united. What had to be done was to strengthen the nations with their different religions “in the principles they profess, as there is nothing in all respects so pernicious as a liberty in belief.”

De Sully, minister of finance under (the French) King Henry IV, presented his design as the king’s political plan, though various commentators maintain that De Sully was its original designer. The aim of the plan was to defuse the religious problems of Europe, as the king had defused the religious problems in France by enacting the Edict of Nantes in 1598, which gave freedom and protection to the French Calvinists (Huguenots). In the same way Europe ought to accept that it was a continent of different nations and different Christian religions.
How, then, could this divided Europe survive? According to de Sully, a Huguenot himself, it could only survive on the principle of *equilibrium*, which is why all the nations in Europe had to become more or less the same in size and wealth. The Catholic Habsburg Empire was obviously too large and too dominant, as de Sully observed: “the larger the extent of kingdoms, the more they are subject to great revolutions and misfortunes.” The Habsburgs therefore had to give up their possessions in Italy, the Low Countries, and in Germany, although they were allowed, as compensation, to build up an empire overseas.

If the equilibrium worked well, Europe would spontaneously be transformed into a confederation. If the balance, on the other hand, was disturbed and there was a serious risk of war, representatives of all the European nations had to come together and decide in council what steps must be taken. Apart from the Pope, who was seen as the “common mediator,” the clergy played no role at all in the activities of international meetings, for De Sully’s plan involved only non-religious persons, commissioners, ministers and plenipotentiaries.

Europe needed not only a council of representatives (some 66 in total) but also a common defence system. Armed actions were of importance against “infidel princes,” “those who refused to conform to any of the Christian doctrines of religion.” De Sully was referring mainly to Muscovy or Russia, schismatic countries in his view: “Should the Grand Duke of Muscovy, or Csar of Russia... refuse to enter into the association after it is proposed to him, he ought to be treated like the Sultan of Turkey, deprived of his possessions in Europe, and confined to Asia only.”

In the end all the faithful Europeans could expect gains, profits and advantages. Europe would save immense sums of money which military activities require, and would become a continent of peace and free trade. In return, countries would contribute to its common defence—soldiers, horses, cannons—which, de Sully argued, was not a heavy burden, when compared to the cost of the forces usually kept in service.

But eventually everything depended on a capable king, a man like Henry the Great, as de Sully concluded:

> If the force necessary to render such an enterprise successful does always depend on the person of the chief who conducts it, this could not have been better conferred than upon Henry the Great. With a valour alone capable of surmounting the greatest difficulties... with all those other great qualifications, whether as a warrior or politician, which were so remarkable in this prince,—what is there which might not have been obtained?¹⁴

**Our Legislator**

It would seem that God thus simply disappeared from European thinking on peace. Europe still had to be a Christian continent, but now it was a mortal king who pointed the way to peace. Remarkably enough it was during the reign of Henry IV that, in 1583, a man was born who shifted the argument resolutely from politics to law. This man was the famous international lawyer Hugo de Groot (Grotius), author of *On the Rights of War and Peace* (*De jure belli ac pacis* 1625). When we study the peace plans made after de Sully
we can clearly see Grotius’s influence. Grotius and his followers (e.g. Von Pufendorf, Vattel) argued that international society was a community, and that the only way to hold the community together was by rules of justice. Justice, Grotius explained, brought “peace of conscience,” while injustice “caused torment and anguish”; and justice was approved and injustice condemned, “by the common agreement of good men.”

Grotius nevertheless did not deny the existence of God. To him God was the creator not only of heaven and earth but also of the natural order, including a system of natural rights. God was thus the prime legislator. The problem was how could human beings recognise and understand the order God had created. Grotius claimed that it was really the responsibility of man and man alone to understand God’s world and to apply his rules to society, which was possible in two ways: by rational thinking and by empirical research, that is, comparing the customs of civilised nations and determining what was agreed upon by all nations.

Grotius was very certain that human nature, in contrast to animal nature, was driven in the direction of peace, order, and justice. So he abandoned the old Erasmean idea that humans could learn by observing the behaviour of animals. According to Grotius human nature was more peaceful than animal nature because humans could communicate with each other through language and organise themselves along certain rules of behaviour.

The influence of Grotian thinking can be seen for the first time in the work of the English Quaker William Penn. Penn was shocked by the politics of Louis XIV: the persecution of Protestants, the expensive wars with the Netherlands, Great Britain, Sweden and the German empire, and wrote An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe (1693–94) against the background of the bloody and devastating Nine Years War (1688–97). Penn, alarmed by the human misery, injustice, and numbers of refugees all over Europe, saw only one way out: acceptance of international rules of justice. To stabilise European politics, frontiers had to be frozen and a European parliament set up with representatives from all European countries, including non-Christian countries.

In his Essay Penn compares the problems of Europe with the internal problems of several European countries: “It is better seen and understood ‘at home,’” he said, “for that which prevents a civil war in a nation, is that which may prevent it abroad, viz: Justice.” Since “at home” it became clear that only justice could maintain peace, and that justice was in the end the “fruit of government,” Penn recommended the Dutch parliamentary system, as described by his compatriot William Temple. In the same way as the provinces of the Netherlands sent deputies to the States General at the Hague, so also deputies had to be sent to a European Diet or Parliament.

Penn’s political and somewhat Kantian way of reasoning (see below) didn’t prevent him from formulating the advantages of a peaceful Europe in a typical Erasmean way: “Let it not,” he writes, “be the least, that it prevents the spilling of so much humane and Christian blood: for a thing so offensive to God, and terrible and afflicting to men, as that has ever been, must recommend our expedient beyond all objections.” Further, the reputation of Christianity would “in some degree be recovered in the sight of infidels: which, by the many bloody and unjust wars of Christians, not only with them, but one with another, hath been greatly impaired.”

A similar mixture of political and legal thinking is still to be found in the peace plans of Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Saint-Pierre, a Catholic and a clergyman, was a subject of Louis XIV, but highly critical of his king. As a man of the Enlightenment he deplored
politics that undermined human happiness and progress. Similar to de Sully, Saint-Pierre believed in the good will of the rulers of Europe to build a peaceful continent. So his plan was directed to the sovereigns of Europe: they were to form a Grand Alliance and had a right to send deputies to a Perpetual Congress or a Senate. But in line with Grotius and Penn, the alliance had to be based on written rules, on “fundamental articles of general alliance,” which they all had to sign and therefore to obey. Among the various regulations, of vital importance was their agreement on a fundamental condition—the “actual possession and the execution of the latest treaties.” They were mutually bound “to guarantee, one to another, that each Sovereign who shall have signed this fundamental treaty shall be preserved for all time, him and his house, in all the territory and in all the rights which he possesses at present.” So with the help of articles, signatures, and guarantees, Europe would reach a status quo in which war was no longer possible.

These optimistic ideas must be understood against the background not only of Saint-Pierre’s intellectual environment but of the successful peace talks that brought an end to the wars of Louis XIV. These peace talks took place in the Netherlands, at Utrecht in 1713. Saint-Pierre wanted to make Utrecht the centre of Europe, the seat of the Grand Alliance. Not surprisingly the first extensive edition of his famous European peace plan, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, was published at Utrecht in the year in which the peace treaty was signed. But despite this, the Grand Alliance was not to be modelled on the Dutch States General, but on the German Diet because the German Diet had “secured the peoples of Germany for so many centuries.” The Dutch republic that had come into existence at the end of the sixteenth century apparently still had to prove itself.

**Towards Eternal Peace**

After Saint-Pierre, political thinking gave way entirely to legal thinking. Jean Jacques Rousseau was an admirer of Saint-Pierre’s project but also a serious critic of it. According to Rousseau the project could never become a success because kings and princes were too proud and too ambitious to accept a fixed and legal order: “The whole life of kings is devoted to two objects: to extend their rules beyond their frontiers and to make it more absolute within them.” Similar arguments were put forward by Leibniz, Montesquieu, and Voltaire: powerful kings were not capable of promoting peace.

At the end of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant published his famous peace essay *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf* (1795). Although Kant referred to Saint-Pierre and his plea for eternal peace, he underlined more strongly the importance of justice to promote a legal order, and the fact that this could only be the result of a republican constitution. God might still be there, but in Kant’s view His presence was completely dependent on politics and law.

Kant was among the first to stress that peace was not a natural thing or God’s wish but had to be created by human beings, step by step. He was much more a follower of Hobbes than of Grotius and believed that human nature was not peaceful but inclined to war, and that therefore states were warlike by nature. From this he reasoned that human beings were forced to set up a system of legal rights so that peace could somehow be achieved. Already the title of his essay makes clear that there was a long way to go
towards peace: in “Towards Eternal Peace” (a more correct translation than “Eternal Peace”), he first addresses the so-called preliminary articles without which a peace system could not be set up. These articles have a strict, prohibitive character and include, among other things, the important principle of non-involvement: “No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state.”23 There are three definitive articles, of which the first is the most essential: “The civil constitution of every state shall be republican,” that is, based on the principles of freedom, dependence (upon a single common legislation), equality, and the separation of powers. In a republic the decision to engage in a war required the consent of the citizens, who would approach it with great caution, Kant argued. Erasmian thinking obviously underpinned this way of reasoning, for by starting a war the citizens would bring upon themselves enormous calamities:

Having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future.24

Given these frightening prospects, the participation of citizens in national politics was a guarantee for peace. Kant then turned his attention to the international environment. The second article stipulated that “the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states.” An alliance of free republics had to be set up, a league to secure the liberty among the states. Finally, the third definitive article dealt with the rights of men as “citizens of the world”: the right of a stranger in another country not to be treated as an enemy.

Kant was optimistic about the possibility of peace being realised in the far future. In his view, France, on the basis of the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, had taken the first step, and could become the centre of a federation of liberal republics. It is thought that the Treaty of Basle of 1795 especially influenced Kant’s thinking regarding the possibility of a federation of republics in the future. The treaty gave France a right to annex parts of the Rhineland and proposed convening a European peace conference. As we can see, also Kant, with his sympathy for the liberal ideas of the French Revolution, had a favourite country in mind, a country through which he could affirm that eternal peace was everything but an illusion.

CONCLUSION: A NEW CRUCÉ?

As we have seen, the teachings of Jesus Christ were the main source of inspiration for Erasmus, and therefore the New Testament was more or less his manual for international relations. Also Crucé was a religious thinker, although he presented his ideas in more universal terms. Duc de Sully, inspired by the politics of his king, advised that Europe should be organised on the principles of a balance of power. William Penn and Saint-Pierre, influenced by the ideas of Hugo Grotius, did not believe in a peaceful world without a solid legal foundation—written rules, treaties and articles. It was Kant who connected peace to a form of government and to the founding of a federation of free republics.
All these peace thinkers believed that ultimately human nature was harmonious and peaceful and that therefore an alliance system—with courts or parliaments—had to be set up. Even Kant, who rejected the idea of a “peaceful” human nature without violence, believed that precisely because of this, nature forced human beings to strive for peace.\(^\text{25}\)

It is interesting to compare the ideas of these peace thinkers with the Berlin Declaration of March 2007, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome. We can observe the echo especially of the legal thinkers—Penn, Saint-Pierre and Kant. The Berlin Declaration looks back to the time before the EU and underlines human achievements, including a general acceptance and strengthening of the rule of law:

For centuries Europe has been an idea, holding out hope of peace and understanding. That hope has been fulfilled. European unification has made peace and prosperity possible. It has brought about a sense of community and overcome differences. Each Member State has helped to unite Europe and to strengthen democracy and the rule of law.

In the Berlin Declaration there is no reference to the Christian religion at all. Also with respect to the future, God is missing:

In the European Union, we are turning our common ideals into reality: for us, the individual is paramount . . . We are striving for peace and freedom, for democracy and the rule of law, for mutual respect and shared responsibility, for prosperity and security, for tolerance and participation, for justice and solidarity.\(^\text{26}\)

We know—the debate on the European constitution has made this clear—that many people, among them the Christian-Democrats of Angela Merkel, favour a more Christian European Union. Merkel fully supported the campaign of Pope Benedict XVI to include a reference to Europe’s Christian heritage in the new constitution. But there were concerns in France and Great Britain that such a reference would offend the Muslims, not least the Muslims in Turkey, a candidate state of the EU.

We may expect the discussions of Europe and the Christian religion to continue in the coming years. After all, religious problems, not only internally among Christians but between Christians and Muslims, are part of European history, and linking Europe to exclusively Christian values will not change this. Perhaps what Europe, in search of its roots and identity and so of its future—a future with the Islamic world—most needs is a new Cyneas or a new Crucé, a multi-religious universal pacifier, to overcome its many divisions.

**Notes**

5. Rummel, The Erasmus Reader, 314.
10. The quotations in this paragraph are from Balch, The New Cynes, 102–22.
15. The quotation is from the Prolegomena to the Rights of War and Peace as cited by http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/hp1302/philosophers/grotius.html (accessed 1 June 2006).
17. According to Richard Tuck, Kant’s idea that God was not only the maker of universe but also the designer of a system of natural law becomes clear especially in the 1631 edition of De jure belli ac paix. See Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order From Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 101.
18. The quotations are from William Penn, An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe: First Published in 1693–94 (Washington DC: The American Peace Society, 1912), 9, 40–41, 60.
24. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 4.