Appendix A

Resolution and C-command

I mentioned in section 2.1.2 that Strong Crossover effects are sometimes considered to be a special case of so-called Condition C effects (cf. Chomsky, 1981). Stated in our present terminology, the generalization embodied by Condition C is that traces, names, and descriptions cannot be covalued with expressions that c-command them. This generalization applies to strong crossover configurations, such as those in (A.1), but also to other constructions, such as those in (A.2). In (A.1), Condition C predicts that the pronouns cannot be resolved as indicated because, as a result of this, the traces would be cobound with a c-commanding pronoun. In (A.2), Condition C predicts that the pronouns cannot be resolved as indicated because, as a result of this, the name Max would corefer with a c-commanding pronoun.

(A.1)  

a. [every man]₁ [he likes t₁]  # he → t₁
b. [who]₁ [does he like t₁]  # he → t₁

(A.2)  

a. He loves Max.  # he → Max
b. He called Max’s mother.  # he → Max
c. He says that Mary called Max’s mother.  # he → Max

A unified account of (A.1) and (A.2) is attractive of course, but there are many problems with the generalization embodied by Condition C. For example, coreference is possible in:

(A.3)  Whom did the candidates themselves vote for?
     Not surprisingly, John voted for John and Bill voted for Bill.

(A.4)  I know what John and Mary have in common:
     John hates Mary, and Mary hates Mary as well.  (cf. Evans, 1980)

(A.5)  Only Max voted for Max.  (cf. Reinhart, 1983)

(A.6)  I think that this is exactly what happened:
     Peter forced Tom to call Peter’s girlfriend.  (cf. Schlenker, 2004)
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(A.7) He didn’t give her a diamond ring because,
although he’s madly in love with her,
Walter’s just not ready to tie the knot. (McCray, 1980)

Furthermore, as various authors have observed, and as mentioned in section 4.1,
the c-command restriction that is operative in constructions like (A.1) and (A.2)
appears to be of a rather general nature. In particular, as illustrated by the
following paradigm from (Wasow, 1972, p.81), a c-command restriction also seems
to apply to VP anaphora:

(A.8) a. John tried LSD after Bill did Δ Δ → tried LSD
b. After Bill tried LSD, John did Δ Δ → tried LSD
c. After Bill did Δ, John tried LSD Δ → tried LSD
d. John did Δ after Bill tried LSD # Δ → tried LSD

Condition C does not capture this pattern, and thus seems to miss a significant
generalization. As an alternative, I propose that (A.1), (A.2) and (A.8) are
accounted for by the following constraint on resolution:1

A.1. Definition. [C-command Constraint on Resolution (CCR)]
An anaphoric element cannot be resolved to a constituent that it c-commands.

The CCR at once accounts for (A.1), (A.2) and (A.8), and avoids the counterex-
amples in (A.3)–(A.7). Notice that the constraint could not have been formulated
in terms of binding, coreference, covaluation, codetermination, or any other
derivative notion of anaphoric relatedness. Also, it could not have applied at
once to (A.1), (A.2) and (A.8) if pronominal anaphora and VP ellipsis were not
handled uniformly. Thus, we have further evidence here for the central
ideas defended in chapter 5: (i) anaphora should be treated in a unified way, and
(ii) anaphora are resolved.

I take the CCR to be a cognitive processing constraint. It may be language
specific, but it may also be more general and affect other cognitive processes as
well. A proper investigation of this question is left for future work.

Finally, I should remark that the CCR does not account for all alleged Con-
dition C effects. And this is as it should be, I think. Here is a case in point:

(A.9) Max called Max’s mother.

Condition C rules out coreference between the two occurrences of Max. The CCR
doesn’t. I think the latter prediction is correct, a coreferential interpretation of
(A.9) is very well possible. It is true that the repetition of names in (A.9) is
not entirely natural. But that, I think, is another issue, which is, for one thing,

1Wasow (1972) and Evans (1980) have proposed similar constraints. A detailed comparison
is beyond the scope of this appendix.
independent of c-command. For instance, repetition of names is equally marked in constructions like (A.10) and (A.11).

(A.10) Max’s mother called Max.
(A.11) Max called his mother.
        Max invited her for dinner.

Moreover, speakers sometimes actually have good reasons to use a repeated name or description rather than a pronoun. In fact, this is why (A.3)–(A.6) are perceived not nearly as marked as (A.9)–(A.11).

A general theory of the use of pronouns versus names and descriptions can be found in (Nesson, Roelofsen, and Grosz, 2008). I think that this theory provides a satisfactory explanation of alleged Condition C effects which involve repeated names or descriptions (and are therefore beyond the reach of the CCR). A detailed defense of this claim, however, must be deferred to future work.