**Introduction**

In May of 1958, the activist and singer Paul Robeson took to the stage of New York’s Carnegie Hall. For the previous decade, Robeson had been the target of U.S. government, McCarthyite, and other rightwing attacks, including the confiscation of his passport and a singular ban on traveling outside of the United States to prevent him from engaging in political speech abroad. A combination of racially and politically motivated oppression hindered Robeson from performing freely within the country. Right-wing violence, most famously in the Peekskill riots (1949), targeted Robeson as a symbol of racial and political progressivism (O’Dell 153-163). During the Carnegie Hall concert, Robeson performed the African American slave spiritual “We Are Climbing Jacob’s Ladder,” which he refers to in his autobiographical manifesto *Here I Stand* (1958) as containing a “driving power” (Robeson 100). Though Robeson does not elaborate on what he means by this, I would argue that the “driving power” of the spiritual emanates from its central image, Jacob’s ladder, a reference to the biblical Jacob’s dream of a ladder or staircase to heaven in Genesis 28:12. The spiritual harnesses what is implied but unrealized in Jacob’s dream (which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 2): if a ladder is there, it can be climbed. I want to suggest that Robeson’s stirring performance of “We Are Climbing Jacob’s Ladder” in Carnegie Hall evokes Jacob’s dreamscape as a space of radical political potential. In the spiritual, the climbing of the ladder signifies the ascent toward freedom and the elevation of the plural “we” above the domain of mundane oppression. In the case of Robeson’s 1950s America, this oppression meant Cold War political persecution (anti-communism), corporate domination, and the intensification of extremist racial-political terror in the face of rising legal and political demands for racial equality.¹ Robeson’s singing of the slave spiritual—created at some point in the late colonial or antebellum period of American history—renewed what I will show centuries of religious exegesis had all but discarded: the anarchic energy and political potency of Jacob’s dream. Robeson’s voice casts the dreamscape as a radical political space and his performance constitutes a poetic response to the authoritarian political impulses of the late 1950s. The

¹ In the postwar era in the United States, the issue of race was often filtered through the lens of the basic Cold War political dualism. This meant that white supremacists and others could make their case by utilizing the rhetoric of anti-communism. This constellation of discourses juxtaposed the categories of white/corporate/democratic (or American) with black radicalism/communism. While these lines were not always drawn in such an orderly manner, they provided conservative or radical rightwing forces with the discursive strategies to attack a diverse spectrum of political opponents. For Robeson’s relationship to this discursive constellation, see Perucci. On the impact of racism on the emergence of postwar rightwing politics in the United States, see Lowndes.
following chapters investigate various literary and cultural moments to explore how the dreamscape operates as a site of political contestation.

This study focuses on the politics of the dreamscape as a space contested by two archetypal modes of thinking about dreaming, one authoritarian and the other anarchistic. These modes, importantly, never exist in a pure form as either completely anarchistic or totally authoritarian—nor does one single political mode ever fully control the dreamscape. Each instance of the politics of the dreamscape, I will show, is a complex and contextually situated blend of political logics. The chapters that follow attempt to break down specific paradigmatic moments of dreaming in order to identify and describe the precise interplay of political forces converging in and around them. Because of the complexity of each instance of dreaming, this study eschews an attempt at a synthetic history of the politics of dreaming or dream interpretation. Instead, it focuses, in detail, on a limited number of illustrative examples of the politics of the dreamscape that establish or reflect important and influential ways of thinking about dreaming, mostly in western Judeo-Christian culture. Within this structure, the analysis proceeds more or less chronologically. It begins by proposing an “origin myth” of dreaming in Genesis’s Garden of Eden story and ends with the dreamscape’s neurobiological “erasure.” Between these two poles, I investigate the multifaceted nature of biblical dreaming, the rise of Freudian psychoanalytic dream interpretation, and a set of modernist alternatives to the Freudian paradigm in the work of Philip Roth, Carl Jung, Jean Rhys, and Franz Kafka. This methodology reveals the different dimensions of the dream as a site of politics. Far from marginal or peripheral, discourses on dreaming, I argue, have been central to the operation and challenging of power.

Throughout this study, I argue that the authoritarian tendencies of presenting dreaming work to reinforce hierarchical structures, to reify conceptions of identity that limit freedom and promote social and cultural conformity, and to support institutional and/or personal power. As I demonstrate in Chapter 1, even radical artists like William Blake fall into an authoritarian mode when they deploy dream interpretation in ways that overlap with repressive discourses or structures of institutional hierarchy. In the case of Blake’s Illustrated Book of Job, the dream-texts (illustrations 11 and 12), though containing disruptive elements, connect to the discursive history of European anti-Semitism as well as to a hierarchical construct of religious authority. The example of Blake points to what seems to be a structural issue in the politics of the
dreamscape: the authoritarian “conquest” of the dreamscape tends to be more prominent—and the moments or expressions of an anarchic politics of the dreamscape fragile and fleeting. Anarchic moments can, moments later, give way to or co-exist with authoritarian structures—especially as the norms of narrative and the allure or demands of interpretation seep in. I demonstrate this process in the section of Chapter 1 on Robert Frost’s poem “After Apple Picking.” At the same time, the process of overwriting and marginalizing these anarchic moments is never complete. As I suggest with Robeson’s performance above and in my analysis of Jacob’s dream of the ladder in Chapter 2, the anarchic potential and energy of the dreamscape remain alongside or buried beneath these authoritarian interpretive and narrative constructs, and apply pressure on them.

Much of what Susan Sontag writes about the interpretation of art can be said about the interpretation of dreams. In “Against Interpretation,” Sontag writes:

> Today is such a time, when the project of interpretation is largely reactionary, stifling. Like the fumes of the automobile and of heavy industry which befoul the urban atmosphere, the effusion of interpretations of art today poisons our sensibilities. In a culture whose already classical dilemma is the hypertrophy of the intellect at the expense of energy and sensual capability, interpretation is the revenge of the intellect upon art. (4)

Sontag’s notion that interpretation works against “energy” and “sensual capacity” aligns with the manner in which dream interpretation drains the dreamscape of its partiality, instability, chaos, and intensity—the very attributes that form the basis of its anarchic potential, which I discuss in the sections and chapters on Jacob’s dream of the ladder (Chapter 2), Jean Rhys (Chapter 4), and Franz Kafka (Chapter 5). At the same time, this study does not do away with interpretation. This would hardly be possible. Rather, it insists on reinterpretations that bring out the presence of the dreamscape as an anarchic space. Sontag, too, does not reject all interpretation, only types of interpretation that “destroy” the interpreted object by coopting it into a dominating interpretive logic. Sontag contrasts this destructive mode of interpretation with a type of interpretation that functions as a “liberating act,” interpretation as “a means of revising, of transvaluing, of escaping the dead past” (4, emphasis mine).
The anarchism of the dreamscape, as I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 1, is related to but not the same as anarchism as a political theory, which Robert Graham usefully defines as a “political doctrine based on anti-authoritarianism, anti-statism, anti-parliamentarianism, voluntary association, libertarian methods and direct action” (32). Though anarchistic conceptions of the dreamscape challenge authority, they do not propose a usable political model, system, or vision. Rather, the anarchism of the dreamscape can be found on a more fundamental level as a force for rupture or disruption that calls into question the building blocks of authoritarian power. In this study, the anarchism of the dreamscape is mainly conceived of as a mode of critique. This mode has common features that present themselves in sources ranging from Biblical times to modernist literature, though the precise operations of these features also vary from case to case. This diversity of strategies of disruption is an important element of the dreamscape’s anarchism. Absent the formation of a radically reinvented society, anarchism can remain vital primarily as a mode of critique—and this vitality depends precisely on its diversity and flexibility. These modes of critique work to destabilize the normative logic of the dominant, quotidian operations of power, thus opening up spaces—whether real or imagined—for alternative understandings and enactment of subjectivity and social arrangements.

Chuang Tzu’s “Butterfly Dream”

An important example of the dreamscape’s anarchistic potential appears in the second chapter of the Book of Chuang Tzu (late fourth century/early third century BCE). A brief discussion of Chuang Tzu’s “Butterfly Dream” will help frame the dimensions of this study and indicate the relevance of discussions about dreaming also outside the western Judeo-Christian context. In the key passage, Chuang Tzu writes:

Once upon a time, I, Chuang Tzu, dreamt that I was a butterfly, flitting around and enjoying myself. I had no idea I was Chuang Tzu. Then suddenly I woke up and was Chuang Tzu again. But I could not tell, had I been Chuang Tzu dreaming I was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming I was now Chuang Tzu? However, there must be some sort of difference between Chuang Tzu and a butterfly! We call this the transformation of things. (20)
Chuang Tzu’s “Butterfly Dream” calls into question the stability and existence of the self. From an epistemological point of view, the dream can be understood as challenging Descartes’ response to the regression into total skepticism through the postulation of the *Cogito, ergo sum* formulation (Han). The dream has been read by Harold Roth as reflecting Chuang Tzu’s mystical orientation in which self-based knowledge or identity/perspective is an imposition to the mystical union with the universe and the gaining of a greater type of knowledge of the totality of being. More radically, Kai-Yuan Cheng asserts that the butterfly dream is Chuang Tzu’s formulation of the non-existence of the self—what Cheng calls the “no-self” position. Cheng asserts that, for Chuang Tzu, even though a space or “arena” of selfhood can be described, it must be seen as being “empty” or without a “true ruler” in the sense of a core, stable, and discernible notion of selfhood. Cheng’s notion of the “no-self” goes well beyond others who see in the butterfly dream an indication of a self-in-flux.

The breakdown of the notion of the existence of a self in the form of a “true ruler” or core entity allows Chuang Tzu, according to Cheng, to posit an ethics that differs fundamentally from one based on notions of selfhood or the “I.” Cheng writes:

> Zhuangzi [Chuang Tzu] is strongly opposed to self-attachment and egocentrism, as he explicitly asks us to “abandon self” and to “treat oneself like others”…Knowing that self is an illusion gives us an intellectual understanding that there is nothing about me that needs to be protected with all my power and resources. For the innermost “I” does not really exist. This realization makes it possible for us to abandon ourselves and treat ourselves like others. (588)

Other scholars have proposed that the butterfly in the butterfly dream represents a kind of ethical example, one in line with the non-hierarchical, anti-egoistic notions expressed by Cheng. Jung H. Lee proposes the following meaning:

> To begin with, we can say that a butterfly possesses a light touch, an easiness of movement, a freedom in its behavior—a butterfly flitters and floats and does not seem to have a care in the world. Applied to a Daoist adept, what Zhuangzi [Chuang Tzu] seems to be advocating is a kind of existential freedom in one’s relationship with the world,
becoming unattached and carefree in regard to things, people, and social boundaries. (198)

Sandra A. Wawrytko compares Chuang Tzu to Nietzsche to emphasize the creative, non-hierarchical and playful nature of his philosophy:

Zhuang Zi [Chuang Tzu] is a fluttering yin butterfly, who invites us to play. Ever receptive and flexible, imbued with *wu-wei* effortless action, the butterfly has no purpose beyond its own play. The famous butterfly dream passage…that ends chapter 2 resonates with Both/And logic. The newly awakened Zhuang Zi is at first uncertain whether he is a human who dreamed of being a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming of being a human. Zhuang Zi ultimately rejects this false dilemma, embracing the underlying harmony of the “Transformation of Things” (*wu-hua*). He is both butterfly and human, the dreamer and the dream. (528)

Wawrytko’s idea of the “false dilemma” and an “underlying harmony” points to the more general Daoist conception of the limitation of the individual perspective on apparent reality. Cheng brings up this same limitation when contrasting the ideas of small and great knowledge. Great knowledge is that which is specifically freed from the limitations of the unitary (and unified) perspective:

Knowledge based on this special kind of experience or consciousness is free of attachment to any particular perspective, and may be classified as the so-called “great knowledge,” which, Zhuangzi maintains, is possessed only by the sages. In contrast, the kind of knowledge obtained through the weishi mode of consciousness is inherently tied to certain perspectives, and is hence doomed to be fragmented and may be classified as “small knowledge” in Zhuangzi’s terms. (587)

Chuang Tzu’s butterfly dream thus posits the kind of entropic force toward dissolution or chaos that opens up renewed creative potential, a critical piece of the anarchy of the dreamscape as I seek to develop it here. For Chuang Tzu, the finding of the Dao requires a discovery of the
unity of the universe in its undifferentiated state—the essence of “great knowledge.” The freedom of the non-self is part of the discovery of the inherent falsity of all individuated things. In an article on the 18th century Chinese novel *Dream of the Red Chamber*, Zuyan Zhou interprets the Daoist idea of chaos or “Hundun” evoked by Chuang Tzu’s famous parable at the end of his Chapter 7:

In Daoist thinking the primordial chaos personified in Hundun is viewed as a benevolent disorder or a true and perfect order, embodying the hidden harmony in nature. This condition is believed to have existed in a pre-historic stage, when “Yin and yang were harmonious and still, ghosts and spirits made no mischief.” [Chuang Tzu] When seven holes were dug into the “uncarved block,” primeval harmony was destroyed in Hundun’s symbolic death. The parable alludes to the creation myth and intimates the fall from an initial paradise to a civilized form of existence. Elsewhere in the Zhuang Zi [Chuang Tzu] this fall from original perfection is ascribed to the misguided effort of the legendary heroes Suiren, Fuxi, Shennong, the Yellow Emperor, Yao and Shun, whose imposition of rules, order, government and conventions gave rise to hierarchy and ambition, thereby disrupting the primordial chaos/harmony. (255)

As Eugene Eoyang points out, the word *Hundun* references the movement of water: “the rhymed compound conveys the sense of the turbulence, the whirling action of water currents, the turbid flowing, yet unfathomable rhythms of swirling action” (275). This reference to water connects the Chinese *Hundun* to the biblical notion of chaos as the pre-creation “deep,” which I will discuss in Chapter 1 as a vital anarchistic component of the dreamscape. Eoyang approaches the essential connection between chaos or *Hundun* and anarchism when he writes, “Understanding hun-dun as something physically and metaphysically impenetrable probably harks back to the parable in Zhuangzi, which reminds us that hun-dun, once penetrated, dies; the suggestion is that chaos once understood is no longer chaos” (275). For the dreamscape to remain an anarchic space, it, too, must remain impenetrable, “whirling,” “flowing”—unfixed by any specific paradigm or agenda of interpretation. Here the dreamscape connects to the central Daoist concept of “the way,” which, Ellen Marie Chen argues, in its “emptiness” and “pure motion” forms the basis for creation: “…*Tao* is…indefinable, nameless, shape of no-shape, sign of no-thing,
illusive and evasive…exactly because *Tao* is motion, a motion that produces all things” (396). It might seem paradoxical to refuse interpretive systems and at the same time to call for an understanding of the dreamscape as anarchistic. I would like to suggest, however, that the dreamscape’s anarchism is an attribute of its emergence as a rupture in the landscape of the “real”—not a quality conferred on it through interpretation. Following Sontag, an emancipatory type of interpretation seeks to preserve as much of this anarchic attribute as possible rather than to reorganize the dreamscape in the service of authoritarian and hierarchical political modes.

**Defining the Dreamscape**

At this point, it is important to specify my use of the term “dreamscape.” The word “dreamscape,” related to “landscape,” implies the existence of a space separate from the “territory” or “territories” of waking life and discrete from, though related to, the consciousness of the dreamer. In the theoretical literature in the field of geography, the difference between “space” and “territory” is generated by the assertion of power (authority) and the continuous (re)organization of politics and society. Stuart Elden links the English term “territory” to the Latin *territorium* and the verb *terrere*, which means “to frighten,” to the Greek *trein* or “to flee from fear, to be afraid,” and to the Sanscrit *trasati*—“he trembles, is afraid.” Elden writes:

> This means that the term territory has an association with fear and violence, an association that is more compelling in history than in etymology. As argued elsewhere, “creating a bounded space is already a violent act of exclusion and inclusion; maintaining it as such requires constant vigilance and the mobilization of threat; and challenging it necessarily entails a transgression.” (806-807)

The dreamscape as a space or field, in this sense, is a non-territory—a space resistant to boundaries (both of space and time) and strategies of control.

A dreamscape has been defined as a “scene that is reminiscent of a dream,” as a “representation of a dream in a painting or other work of art,” and as a “landscape or image seen in a dream” (OED). These three definitions, though seemingly complimentary, are in some tension with each other. The first purports to extrapolate the qualities of oneiric space in order to define a non-dream space as dream-like. This points to the blurred boundaries between dreaming
and waking life, ultimately calling into question the existence of two states of consciousness opposed in binary fashion. The second definition maintains that the dreamscape is synonymous with its graphic and/or literary representation. The third stands opposed to the second: here the dreamscape is not a secondary representation but rather is the space of the dream itself, the dream’s environment, its world. According to this definition, representations of dreamscapes are not dreamscapes; they are descriptions or translations of dreamscapes into (audio) visual or written language. This distinction is critical, because the politics of the dreamscape as discussed in this study concerns precisely the translation or transformation of the oneiric field into dream-image, dream-text, dream-data, etc. As I will show, the tools for fashioning such a representation of the dreamscape—the “mapping” of the dreamscape and its transformation into “territory”—are not only the pen and paintbrush but also interpretive paradigms and ideological positions.

The dreamscape, like a landscape, is not an objective and clearly delineated physical space or zone. Two integral elements distinguish the dreamscape: its fluidity and its subjectivity. Arjun Appadurai discusses the suffix “–scape” in Public Worlds: Modernity at Large, where, in an attempt to propose a structure for understanding the “disorganized” nature of modern capitalism, he uses it to designate what he sees as the “five dimensions of global cultural flows”:

> The suffix –scape allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes of these landscapes, shapes that characterize international capital as deeply as they do international clothing styles. These terms with the common suffix –scape also indicate that these are not objectively given relations that look the same from every angle of vision but, rather, that they are deeply perspectival constructs… (33)

Extrapolating from Appadurai’s conceptualization, a critical feature of a dreamscape is precisely that, because its shape is not fixed or fixable, it cannot be represented or translated 1:1 into image, text, or audio-visual experience. Amorphousness and borderlessness are core attributes of the dreamscape. The dreamscape is a disordered space. The imposition of order onto it is a political act.

In addition to being fluid, the dreamscape is also a “perspectival construct” in that it depends on a subject (or subjects) engaging with the space. While it is commonly assumed that the dreamer, the person having or generating the dream, is the subject interacting with or even
fashioning the dreamscape, it would be more accurate to say that the dreamscape is the field inhabited by various dream-subjects, who might share characteristics with the sleeping person but who are not reducible to that person. I would like to give an example of this from my own dream journal. I had a dream in which I am standing below a group of people dressed in blue and white military uniforms and carrying rifles in formal military pose. They are standing on a mezzanine above me, while I castigate them about how horrible it is that they are members of the *Alternativ für Deutschland* (AfD) political party.\(^2\) As I am ending my rant, one member of the ranks steps forward without saying a word. I recognize him as someone with whom I once went to high school—Mike N., a terrible student who, I knew even decades ago, would never go to a university and had little chance at social-class advancement. It occurs to dream-me at this moment that nothing I have just uttered could be comprehensible to those I was addressing. Just as this dawns on me, Mike N. points his rifle and fires at me.

This example demonstrates several key elements of the relationship between the dream-text and the dreamscape. First, while the ranting character in the dream-text can be identified with the pronoun “I,” or the name Seth Rogoff, this character is by no means the same as the sleeping (or waking) I. Right away, then, the unidirectional perspective of the dream-text is doubled: there is the dream-I and a more distant dreamer-I. Each of these subjects views the dreamscape from a unique vantage point, creating an inherent fluidity of borders and scope of the dreamscape, and gesturing to the partiality and artificiality of the representative dream-text (my narrative). In addition, the other subjects in the dream, Mike N., for example, perceive the space from different perspectives from both the dream-I and the dreamer-I. The choice of one perspective over the others is a narrative act of translation and interpretation—a political and (potentially) ideological act that comes with the creation of the dream-text.

Jorge Luis Borges refers to dreams as works of fiction and rightly points out that when one speaks of dreams, one is speaking only of a partial memory of a dream or a distorted version of the dream transformed into narrative or image (26-27). Access to an original and multi-perspectival dreamscape is impossible—as is access to an equivalent “landscape.” A landscape

\(^2\) The Alternative for Germany (AfD) political party began in 2013 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis as an anti-euro (currency) and Eurosceptic party. Beginning with the so-called “refugee crisis” in Germany, the party adopted increasingly xenophobic, racist, and nationalist rhetoric, and now is positioned within the framework of radical rightwing populist politics in Europe and beyond. AfD’s political identity has been expanded to include other core issues on the far right, including climate change skepticism. For more on the historical development of the AfD, see Frank Decker, Dudášová, and Richard Moeller.
painting, like a dream-text, is thus a “fiction” in the Borgesian sense. Accordingly, my study of the politics of the dreamscape aims to explore representations of dreamscapes (dream-texts) by positing the presence of tensions between structures of authoritarianism in dream representations and a countervailing impulse toward anarchy contained in the pre-organized (non-territorial) dreamscape. While the vast majority of dream-texts are concerned with transforming the dreamscape into discernible territory through the application of structures of power, other dream-texts attempt to preserve or articulate elements of the pre-territorial, anarchic dreamscape. My work, following Borges, takes all dream-fictions—from those purportedly objective reports of “real” dreams (Freud’s dream of Irma’s injection or my dream of Mike N.), to seemingly invented dreams (like K.’s dream of wrestling an official in Kafka’s *The Castle* or Sasha Jensen’s “Exhibition Dream” in Jean Rhys’s *Good Morning, Midnight*)—as manifestations of the same phenomenon: attempts to represent a dreamscape by refashioning it as a dream-text.

Chapter 1 presents a more thorough theoretical discussion of the politics of the dreamscape in its authoritarian and anarchistic tendencies. In this first chapter, I define what I consider the main features of the anarchism of the dreamscape, drawing on the works of “post-anarchist” thinkers and their utilization of concepts from Jacques Rancière and Emmanuel Levinas. From Rancière, post-anarchism borrows the notions of “dis-identification” and the “presupposition of equality.” Dis-identification points to the movement of the subject beyond fixed categories of identity. The breaking down of these categories enables the subject to become political, to escape the structuring forces of hierarchical formations and to be in a position to challenge them. In the space of the dreamscape, I argue (as I have presented above in the case of Chuang Tzu), identities become radically destabilized. They are salvaged only through interpretive and narrative mechanisms of the derivative “dream-texts.” By utilizing Rancière’s notion of dis-identification, I am able to investigate the political nature of the shift from the dis-identified subject of the dreamscape to the more identifiable and categorized subject of the representative dream-text. The creation of identity out of the interpretation of dreams is key, for example, to both Freudian and Jungian analysis, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Like post-anarchist theory, my understanding of radical politics is based on the subject as becoming or performing itself and not on the subject as representing any secondary position, like class status, race, or even as a bearer of rights. Rancière’s notion of the “presupposition of equality” is an important ethical stance in post-anarchist discourse. The dreamscape, before any secondary
representation of it, can be seen as a place for staging this equality. Subjects in the dreamscape are fluid—they fracture, double or triple, mirror, combine, and dissolve into airy nothingness. All subjects emerge as vaporous or spectral and solidify and rigidify only through the imposition of the representative dream-text and its corresponding interpretation. Finally, some post-anarchist theorists look to Levinas and his idea of the preconscious responsibility for the other as another foundational piece of anarchist ethics. In the dreamscape, the “other” is entangled or even inseparable from the subject. This is partly the result of how the emergence of the dreamscape ruptures the notion of the real and opens up parallel possibilities of consciousness. I will expand on this again in Chapter 1 as I continue the discussion of my dream of Mike N.

In addition to these post-anarchist principles, Chapter 1 proposes an “ironic origin myth” of the dreamscape. This origin myth of dreaming maintains that, in western Judeo-Christian culture, the dreamscape—the physical space of the dream—opens up only after the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. Dreaming—a state different from being awake and from the emptiness of prelapsarian sleep—contains the force of the entropic dissolution of order toward a primordial state of chaos, symbolized by the notion of the “deep” and the Edenic character of the serpent. The force of chaos and the presence of the pre-creation deep in the dreamscape connect to the fundamental “disordering” act in Genesis, Eve’s rebellion against God’s authority by eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Eve’s rebellion, I argue, is one of multifaceted desire against the hierarchies and circumscriptions of the Edenic order. In the postlapsarian world, this disordering impulse, or urge toward chaos, finds its home in the dreamscape.

This understanding of the anarchism of the dreamscape as a mode of critique allows for a shift of focus away from the interpretation of a narrative or graphic dream-text and toward elements such as the movement from wakefulness into dream, the emergence of the field of the dreamscape, the stability (or lack thereof) of the dreamscape, the intensity of the dream, and the movement out of the dreamscape or the dream exit. My discussions of texts by Robert Frost, Jean Rhys, and Franz Kafka engage with these elements. Dreaming, when seen in this light, I argue, acts as an anarchic force that is woven into the textures of daily life and puts pressure on authoritarian, hierarchical constructs. Though this notion of dreaming has not been emphasized in either the literature on dreams or the literature on anarchism, I contend that the anarchic force
of the dreamscape encourages authoritarian interpretive models of dream analysis designed to quash or contain these “chaotic” pressures.

After presenting a theoretical framework for thinking about the politics of the dreamscape in Chapter 1, Chapters 2 and 3 discuss two important paradigms in the history of dream analysis: biblical dream interpretation and Freudian psychoanalysis. Chapter 2 develops the biblical dream interpretation introduced in Chapter 1 by offering a speculative critique of the dominant interpretation of the stories of Jacob and Joseph in the book of Genesis. While the standard narrative views Joseph as the chosen son of Jacob and as the continuation of the divinely ordained patriarchal line leading from Abraham to Moses, I propose that the biblical text contains two incompatible portraits of Joseph and that the best way to understand the narrative logic of these conflicting portraits is through close analysis of the ways the dream-texts work in the story. In the case of Joseph, the dream-texts support a philosophy of history that foregrounds the subsequent Exodus story, the founding myth of ancient Israelite religion, statehood, and identity. I speculate in this chapter that an alternative tradition can be traced in the Joseph story that sees Joseph not as a continuation of the patriarchal line and as a heroic figure in Jewish history but as a tyrannical figure and enemy of the faith of Jacob. By seeing Joseph in this light, I propose a new reading of Jacob and specifically his vision of the ladder as a more immediate, less hierarchical, and more personal and open conception of faith. It is precisely this anarchistic conception of faith, I contend, that the Joseph tradition seeks to bury in the text through the interpolation of the dream-texts and, with it, the idea of divinely controlled history. In Genesis, an authoritarian conception of dreaming overwrites the more radical and immediate politics of Jacob’s dreamscape. As I suggest above with the example of Paul Robeson, however, the radical politics of Jacob’s dreamscape continue to present emancipatory possibilities despite the authoritarian exegetical tradition.

Chapter 3 looks at Freud as the first part of a discussion of modernist and contemporary conceptions of dreaming. The subsequent sections on Carl Jung, Philip Roth, Jean Rhys, Franz Kafka, and sleep/dream science all implicitly or explicitly draw on and critique Freud’s work. Chapter 3 focuses on Freud’s reading of two dreams, the so-called “specimen dream” or dream of Irma’s injection in Interpretation of Dreams (1900) and Dora’s first dream in Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905). I argue that Freud’s creation and analysis of the dream-text express the developing politics of the dreamscape in the emerging theory and practice of
psychoanalysis. Evoking the analogy of late 19th century European imperialism—a movement concurrent with the development of psychoanalysis—I discuss Freud’s “colonization” of the field of the dreamscape, the transformation of this field into “territory,” and the importance of this territorial construction and occupation in terms of psychoanalysis’ relative position in the medical field and the position of the analyst in relation to the patient. The occupation of the dreamscape sets the stage for a “civilizing process” by which the analyst attempts to assert order and control over the “sick” psyche. With the specimen dream, Freud maps the general terrain of the dreamscape, understanding it as the site of a complex multiparty contestation between psychoanalyst, patient, medical institutions and discourses, and the social norms governing the public and private spheres. In the case of Dora’s first dream, Freud’s weaving of scientific methods and hermeneutical analysis aspires to total occupation and control of the territory of the dreamscape, and represents a complexly articulated expression of the authoritarian structure of psychoanalytic dream interpretation. In attempts to reanalyze Dora, critics of the case study have contested nearly all of Freud’s conclusions without, however, calling into question the political nature of the structure of his dream analysis. As a consequence of this neglect, the search for dream meaning in contemporary culture remains anchored to professionalized psychological discourse and dependent on the relationship between scientific and hermeneutical logics—a blending that is enacted through the hierarchical nature of therapy and iterated in the story or text of the case study, whether it be in the form of a written report or as an oral construct produced by the therapeutic communication.

Chapter 4 builds on the analysis of Freud’s dream interpretation by analyzing two cases, Philip Roth and Carl Jung, in which dream-texts act as a force for narrative and thematic integration. My analysis of the integrative function of dream-texts in terms of narrative and thematic structure is based on Neil Klugman’s “Island Dream” from Philip Roth’s novella Goodbye, Columbus (1959) and the sequence of dream reports from Carl Jung’s “Individual Dream Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy” (1944; revised 1952). These two texts represent bookends to the thinking about dreaming at the height of Freudian power within the scientific community and society at large. With Roth, my aim is to show how the integrative functions of the dream-text are deployed in popular literary narratives (Roth’s collection won the National Book Award in 1959). Jung’s piece on dreams and alchemy, on the other hand, represents one of the most sophisticated uses of the dream-text in the quest for wholeness or totality in post-
Freudian modernism. The chapter contrasts these integrative approaches with Jean Rhys’s novel *Good Morning, Midnight* (1939). In the latter, the dream-text becomes a potential site of disintegration, gesturing toward anarchistic possibilities. The chapter proposes that *Good Morning, Midnight* challenges dominant and authoritarian models of modernist integrative dream interpretation, and asserts, as a counter-position, the emancipatory possibilities of disintegration.

Chapter 5 continues the discussion of the dreamscape as a site of radical politics and argues that one of Franz Kafka’s most anarchic political expressions, the expression of freedom in *The Castle*’s dream scene, relies on an understanding of dream experience that is grounded in notions of disintegration, intensity, and escape. The analysis pivots around the politics of dreaming in the single dream-text in *The Castle* (written in 1922, published in 1926). I contextualize my discussion of the novel by offering a detailed analysis of the dynamics of power in Kafka’s short stories “The Judgment” (written 1912, published in 1913) and “In the Penal Colony” (written in 1914, published in 1919), as well as in his unfinished novel *The Trial* (written in 1914-1915, published in 1925). This analysis identifies key characteristics of Kafka’s conceptions of power, including the hermetic quality of systems of power in his work, the expression of power as performance or everyday practice, the inherent fragility (despite their apparent invulnerability) of power structures, and the tendency of one system of power to overtake, displace, or marginalize competitors. I then present an analysis of Kafka’s writings on dreaming, reading passages from his diaries as containing post-anarchic impulses. The chapter concludes with a close reading of K.’s dream in *The Castle* against Kafka’s conception of power in the novel.

The final chapter, Chapter 6, turns from modernist conceptions of dreaming to what I term the neurobiological “erasure” of the dreamscape. The chapter focuses on dream science and its relationship to scientific and popular discourses of neurobiology, including those related to the marketing of psychotropic drugs and sleep medication. The focal point in this chapter is an investigation of an exhibition held at Harvard’s Carpenter Center for the Arts in 1977 called *Dreamstage*. *Dreamstage* was the brainchild of the Harvard psychiatrist J. Allan Hobson and combined popular science with art in order to publically present recent neurobiological discoveries in relatable terms. The chapter argues that *Dreamstage* and related discourses helped to transform dreaming from primarily an illusory or imaginative construct into a physical and biochemical process, thus stripping it of “meaning” and rendering it part of the sleep cycle.
(cotemrinos with REM sleep). This stripping away of the illusory realm works to obliterate the dreamscape as a space apart and different from any physical manifestation, in effect denying or erasing its existence. The chapter places this erasure of the dreamscape in the context of the rise of 24/7 consumer capitalism and the increasing technophile society of the late 1970s and 1980s—developments continuing (and further accelerating) today.