The politics of the dreamscape

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Chapter 1
Dreams and Power: Authoritarian Territory, Anarchistic Space

Introduction
This chapter conceptualizes the relationship between the dreamscape as a pre-representational space or field and the dream-text as a politicized representation or territory. The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part identifies processes by which representations of dreamscape support authoritarian modes of power. This happens, I argue, in two related ways. Either the dream-text is part of the ideological and legitimizing structure of the dominant power or it seeks to challenge power in an authoritarian manner. Authoritarian dreams-texts rely on hierarchies, a politics of exclusion, and fixed notions of identity that seek to define and limit subjectivity in the service of unequal power relationships. The second part of the chapter defines an anarchistic strain of representations of dreamscape, one that seeks a path back into the raw, unrecoverable, chaotic attribute of the dreamscape. The residue of the dreamscape in the dream-text contains an impulse toward “chaos” or “un-creation,” a kind of self-effacing or disintegrative quality that challenges hierarchical assumptions along the lines of several key post-anarchist principles. These principles include Jacques Rancière’s notions of dis-identification and the presupposition of equality, and Emmanuel Levinas’s concept of a preconscious responsibility for the other. The third part of the chapter imagines an origin myth of the dreamscape as a zone of refuge from the post-Edenic order established after the expulsion of the human pair from the Garden of Eden. This imagined moment of dreamscape origins contains the potentiality for anarchistic relationships in everyday life based on the fashioning of a zone of freedom, one analogous to the pre-creation state of chaos, symbolized by the notion of the “deep.” The final part of the chapter draws on the discussions of dreams and power as well as on the origin myth of the dreamscape to frame a reading of Robert Frost’s poem “After Apple-Picking” as a dream-text that moves in both authoritarian and anarchistic directions.

Authoritarian Politics of the Dreamscape
The dreamscape has long been a site of political contestation. Regimes of power, from ancient Near and Middle Eastern kings to medieval religious authorities and more contemporary
psychological and scientific discourses, have attempted to occupy this space (in what I call a conquest) by relying on modes of interpretation and structures of interpretive legitimacy.\(^3\) Within these regimes, the dream interpreter (the conqueror of the dreamscape) becomes an agent of authority—establishing or reinforcing dynamics of power and concomitant ideologies.\(^4\)

The desire to control the dreamscape for the purposes of developing hierarchy and aggrandizing power runs through a wide array of ancient sources—from the first recorded dream on the Stele of the Vultures\(^5\) to the Sumerian cuneiform text of the Gudea cylinders describing the building of a temple for the god Ningirsu\(^6\) and Solomon’s dream at Gibeon after rising to occupy King David’s throne in the Bible.\(^7\) In the “Legend of Sargon,” a third millennium B.C.E. Akkadian account, the interpretation of dreams plays a pivotal role in the rise of Sargon against the kings Urzababa and Lugal-zage-si. Though the story sets the stage for Sargon’s seizure of the throne of Kish and his subsequent campaigns to dominate Akkad, and is therefore one of

\(^3\) Oppenheim, in his foundational study *The Interpretation of Dreams in the Ancient Near East*, discusses the legitimizing potential of dreams and dream interpretation without, however, specifically including power relationships.

\(^4\) This dynamic can be seen, for example, in the story of Joseph, his own dreams, and his interpretation of the Pharaoh’s dreams in the book of Genesis. As I argue in Chapter 2, the dream narratives in the Joseph epic work to impose a philosophy of history onto the biblical text that supports the development of the Moses movement.

\(^5\) Around 2450 B.C.E., the Sumerian ruler Eannatum I of Lagash commissioned the production of a stele to glorify his military victory over the kingdom of Umma. Known as the “Stele of Vultures” (because of the depiction of vultures carrying off the severed heads of the defeated) and currently housed in the Louvre Museum in Paris, the pillar contains fragments of the first recorded dream. In the dream, Ningirsu, god of war and patron deity of Lagash, stands by Eannatum’s head and blesses the fight against Umma. The messages of the dream are clear—Eannatum’s aggression is being done in the righteous name of Ningirsu and the expansion of the power of Lagash is in line with the will of the gods. This fusion of the secular ruler with the religious cult represents an important aggrandizement of the power of the king, as has been addressed by Scott Noegel in “Dreams and Dream Interpreters in Mesopotamia and in the Hebrew Bible [Old Testament]” (46), and by Irene Winter, who writes: “Thus, the primary, official state message presented through the innovative use of historical narrative on the Stele of the Vultures is that of the legitimate claim of Lagash over the Gu’eden…. The secondary message presented through the historical narrative is that of the centrality of the ruler in maintaining the state. It is our assessment that the stele would have been set up in the major temple to Ningirsu as a votive to the patron deity, who was given titular credit for the victory at the very time his authority was being eroded and his territorial prerogatives encroached upon by the secular city ruler. The god is given pride of place on the obverse; the king is on the reverse. But the challenge to the older, nominally theocratic base of the city-state is there. The hierarchy of the religious system is no longer identical with the administrative hierarchy of the state” (27).

\(^6\) The idea and strategies for building Ningirsu’s temple presented in the Gudea Cylinders are largely revealed to Gudea in dreams. The authority of the dream revelations is crucial for Gudea to justify the incredible social costs of the temple’s construction, which, as in the Stele of the Vultures, serves to solidify the king’s relationship to, and perhaps domination of, the religious cult.

\(^7\) In I Kings, Solomon goes to Gibeon to incubate a dream (a communication with God) in order to gain legitimacy from Yahweh for his consolidation of political rule after the death of David and the battle over succession. Clearly, Solomon’s military and political victory over his enemies is not enough to safeguard his new position as king. The dream provides the bridge between monarchy and theocracy, spurring the development (like in Gudea’s account) of the building of the Jerusalem temple. As Noegel states: “Like the Mesopotamian kings, this dream aims to remove doubt concerning Solomon’s fitness to rule” (55). For an interesting alternative reading of Solomon’s dream at Gibeon, which maintains that the dream is laced with anti-monarchical irony, see Wozniuk (1997).
rebellion against entrenched power, the authoritarian structure remains unchanged: the dream-
texts in the legend serve to legitimize the power of the new chosen leader and his religious cult
(Noegel 47; Heinz 67-86).

William Blake’s *Illustrations of the Book of Job* (1825) provides a particularly interesting
example of how the interpretation of the dreamscape can undermine authoritative structures in
quite radical ways, while at the same time asserting an alternative paradigm of power. Blake
(1757-1827) was an English artist and poet who straddled the ages of Enlightenment and
Romanticism, a transitional era marked by political radicalism and revolution, intellectual
exploration, and renewed religious fervor. One of the most hotly contested spheres of
intellectual and creative inquiry in this period was the relationship between an individual’s
rational side and the spiritual or non-rational side embodied by emotion, intuition, longing, and
religious exaltation (Izenberg 1-17; Michael 2). Dreams were an important site of this
relationship, because, as one can see in Goya’s etching *The Sleep of Reason* (1799), they
represented a state of being in which the rational mind was thought to have lost control and to be
subordinated to fears and desires (fig. 1.1).

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8 There are numerous reproductions of Blake’s series of illustrations of the book of Job. For simplicity’s sake, when
I discuss the images, I will refer to the images stored in Wikipedia’s Creative Commons.
9 Eric Hobsbawm refers to the era between 1789 and 1848 as “greatest transformation in human history since the
remote times when men invented agriculture and metallurgy, writing, the city and the state” (*Age of Revolution* 1).
Goya’s dream-text stages the crux of the debate between rationalists and their critics about how far reason could take a person in the search for higher, greater, or even total understanding of the “self” and the universe. On the one hand, that an owl in the work attempts to hand the sleeping man a stylus indicates that creative inspiration comes from the nightmarish zone of irrationality. On the other hand, the sleeper cannot take the stylus from the owl; only a mind

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10 The benefits and dangers of accessing a “dark side” of the human mind also are highlighted by Thomas de Quincey in the sequel to his *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*. He writes, “Among the powers in man which
awake and rational can translate the impulses of this nightmare vision into art—can create. This tension between the dangers caused by a loss of reason and the opportunities for a type of irrational imagination results in a kind of melancholy (represented by the sleeping man) reminiscent of Albrecht Dürer’s *Melencolia I*.\(^{11}\) In Goya’s case, as Guy Tal argues, this melancholy might indicate the presence of mental illness or disease, adding a clinical dimension to the dichotomy (115-127).

The book of Job, a text from the Hebrew Bible, presented Blake with a testing ground to explore the intersection of reason, traditional religious faith, and individual inspiration or spiritual enlightenment.\(^{12}\) In a series of 21 illustrations, Blake visualizes and re-invents the story of Job, an “innocent” man whose faith, upon the request of an accuser, is tested by God through intense suffering. Two dream scenes come around the mid-point of the book, illustrations 11 and 12, and play a pivotal role in Job’s ultimate acceptance of his guilt and his subsequent spiritual conversion (fig. 1.2).

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1\(^{11}\) The dilemmas or expressive possibilities presented by the melancholy artist were appealing to what we can broadly define as a European Romantic movement. Not only does Goya’s figure in *Sleep of Reason* gesture toward Dürer’s work, but artists like Baudelaire and de Nerval reference the work (Lears 132). Wicksteed mentions that Blake had a print of *Melencolia I* hanging in his room in Fountain Court, Strand (32). Panofsky formulated the dominant reading of Dürer’s *Melencolia I* in his *The Life and Art of Albrecht Dürer* (1943): “In the light of this system Dürer's Melancholia, the ‘Artist's Melancholy,’ can in fact be classified as ‘Melencolia I.’ Moving as she does in the sphere of ‘imagination’—which is, by definition, the sphere of spatial quantities—she typifies the first, or least exalted, form of human ingenuity. She can invent and build, and she can think, to quote Henry of Ghent, ‘as long as her imagination keeps step with her thought’; but she has no access to the metaphysical world... Thus Durer's Melancholia belongs in fact to those who ‘cannot extend their thought beyond the limits of space.’ Hers is the inertia of a being which renounces what it could reach because it cannot reach for what it longs” (170). Panofsky’s interpretation has been questioned in subsequent analyses of Dürer’s print, perhaps most persuasively by Patrick Doorly in “Dürer’s ‘Melencolia I’: Plato’s Abandoned Search for the Beautiful,” who sees in it a search for the “beautiful,” closely following Plato’s dialogue *Greater Hippias* and its Italian and Northern Renaissance reception. While Doorly’s argument that the subject in Dürer’s print is the search for the meaning of beauty and not the portrayal of artistic genius is quite persuasive, the central dynamic remains the striving for an unattainable goal.

1\(^{12}\) Nuttall writes: “Blake oscillates between the words ‘imagination’ and ‘vision’, as terms commanding his fundamental allegiance. This of itself suggests that he, like other Romantics, wished to reinterpret imagination as an organ of knowledge rather than a trivially fictive faculty. If imagination, reinterpreted in this way, is deemed to have been raised in status, the presupposition is clear: knowledge must be a good thing. But Blake’s obstinate hostility to reason remains” (239).
Blake’s illustrations begin by depicting Job as a prosperous and godly man, though with the textual hint that all might not be right with his conception of righteousness. In the text below the image in illustration 1, Blake adds, following Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians: “The letter killeth/The spirit giveth life/it is spiritually discerned,” foreshadowing the central conflict in the series between the moral law and spiritual faith. In illustration 2, the drama begins. The scene is split into two halves. On top, Satan (the accuser) appeals to God to allow him to afflict Job with suffering to test his faith. God agrees. In the bottom half, Job is portrayed discussing religious matters with angels and his family. Illustration 3 depicts the beginning of Job’s miseries as Satan falls upon his sons and has them killed. In illustration 4, Job hears about these

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13 This quote is an adaptation from 2 Corinthians 3:5-6. The full verse is: “Not that we are competent of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our competence is from God, who has made us competent to be ministers of a new covenant, not in a written code but in the Spirit; for the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life” (Revised Standard Version).
misfortunes from messengers. Illustration 5 is again split. In the bottom half, Job, though afflicted with misery, is upholding his religious duty by giving to the poor and downtrodden. Nonetheless, in the upper part of the illustration, God allows Satan to turn on Job directly. Illustration 6 finds Satan torturing Job by blighting him with boils as the sun sets on the horizon. In the next illustration, as darkness envelopes the scene, friends come to comfort Job. Job, however, does not find comfort, and in the next illustration, shrouded by night, he lashes out in despair, cursing the day he was born. The next two illustrations show Job discussing his case with his three best friends, all of whom side with God against him. Job rejects their reasoning (that he is to blame for his misfortune) and takes his case directly to God. The rejection of the friends’ accusations sets the stage for illustrations 11 and 12, in which Job has the two dreams that allow him the insight necessary to begin his journey to enlightenment and redemption.

The scene in illustration 11 of Blake’s Job is divided into three zones. In the middle of the scene, Job lies sleeping. He is being afflicted by nightmares happening below and above him. The implication is that, as he is in waking life, Job is being tortured in his sleep. Below Job is the pit of hell. Demons (perhaps the demonic doubles of his three friends) reach up and grasp his sleeping body, threatening to pull him down into the fiery abyss of eternal damnation and suffering. The demonic beings are hideous creatures with scaly flesh, long fingers, and brutish faces. They carry chains—symbolic of confinement and torture. Above Job, a figure swoops down wrapped in a serpent. The figure is recognizable both as the God who sat on the throne in illustration 1 and as a demonic character, a false God. Around Job, ribbons of light or jagged lightning bolts cut through the sky. Looming above the serpent-wrapped figure is a stone tablet, a clear reference to the commandments or covenant given to Moses by God on Mount Sinai, the covenant that forms the basis of Hebrew law and the Jewish religion.

In the dream, as Blake imagines it, Job experiences a type of utter terror he is not able to experience in his waking life even under the most severe emotional and physical distress. Only in the dreamscape, according to Blake, can Job achieve such a state of terror, a state that opens up the possibility for eventual enlightenment and redemption. As in the rest of the series, symbols pervade the scene. The serpent wrapped around the false-god indicates his demonic nature, evoking the serpent from the Garden of Eden. The flying man also has a cloven hoof instead of a normal human foot, indicating that this “god” is the devil in disguise. The text above the divine/demonic figure states, “Satan himself is transformed into an Angel of Light.” Though in a
literal sense this would imply that this “god” is, in fact, Satan, the likeness between the divine figure and the God of the previous illustrations compels the reading that this being represents a fusion of God and Satan into a unified being—a direct contrast to the unification of the divine being that will occur after the dream sequence. The dark sky and stormy weather show that this “god” is not friendly and not coming in peace. Finally, the tablets above the flying devil-god refer to the Hebrew Bible, and in the watercolor versions of the illustration it is clear that these are God’s commandments. There, “God” has one finger pointed to the Hebrew law and the other pointed to the hellish inferno (fig. 1.3).

![Fig. 1.3: Watercolor illustration of Job’s Evil Dreams from the Butts Set (1805-06). Source: Wikimedia Commons](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/Job%27s_Evil_Dreams-butts.jpg)

Why would the Satan-God be drawing Job’s attention to the Mosaic Law, the foundation of Judeo-Christian monotheism? In illustration 2 of the engraved, printed version, in which the accuser is appealing to God to test Job’s faith, Blake adds the Hebrew words for “King Jehovah” (Wicksteed 51). Blake is indicating that the God who sets his minion upon Job is specifically the Hebrew or Old Testament God. This is emphasized by the image of God sitting on a throne with a book (the “legalistic” Torah) on his lap. In the dream, Job sees that this king/God is not the almighty source of good in the world. Rather, he is a vengeful, capricious, demonic force, who is
interested only in strictly upholding his oppressive laws. Obey the law, he seems to tell Job in the dream, or suffer in hell—indeed, both are part of the same system, the reflections of each other that represent the fusion of God and Satan. The stage is now set for Job to differentiate between the demonic Old Testament God (a unity of God and Satan) and a benevolent God and his son and co-equal Jesus, who does not oppress through the “Law” but who opens one up to the spirit (a unity of the Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). Indeed, as Henry Summerfield argues, this tension between legalistic religion and inner experience of the Gospel is a recurring motif in Blake’s Job, beginning with plate 2 (97). Following his dream vision in illustration 11, Job realizes that while he previously had adhered to the law, he had not embraced the spirit of faith, an unmediated inner experience of creative illumination and total unity of being. Job, in Blake’s re-invention, can now be successfully converted from an Old Testament dogmatist into a believer in (a Blakean) Christ.

In Blake’s version of the story, Job’s nightmare in illustration 11 transforms into the calm dream of illustration 12, in which Job, his wife, and Job’s three friends are visited by a young man named Elihu, who starts to reveal to them the truth of the divine message: that faith does not come from one’s actions or adherence to a set of laws but rather flows out from the inner being of the individual. Once Job starts down this path, the process of enlightenment begins, culminating in a visit to Job by the unified figure of God-Christ, who discloses to him the unity of the trinity (and of all things), bringing about the final conversion. Job, now aware of this unity, sees his good fortune restored. This stands in contrast with the biblical story of Job in numerous respects, most centrally in that the biblical account contains no reference to Christian theology. The biblical book of Job presents Job’s submission to God as a product of the recognition of the supreme difference between the power of the creator God and the limited perspective of a single human being. The only bridge between the two entities could be one of faith—faith in God’s moral perfection and the righteousness of a life lived through faith (Kaufmann 334-338).

In Blake’s re-interpretation of the book of Job, the connection to radical theology is clear: Job’s task is to probe his innermost self to discover the essence of the divine being and thus the unity of all things. It is a quest that can only occur in the deepest spirit of the person; it cannot be legislated from outside or grasped rationally. As Summerfield summarizes, “In Blake’s system a fall into moral legalism is accompanied by a lapse from imaginative vision into the Lockean
philosopher’s and the Newtonian scientist’s acceptance of the external objects the senses perceive as constituting reality” (94). The choice of dreams as the catalyst for this transformation is important. Whereas the earlier scenes show Job making a rational defense of his piety, the dreams allow his non-rational, emotive, intuitive senses to take over, as we see in Goya’s *Sleep of Reason*. As opposed to the religious disputation in illustration 2, which finds representatives of the Gospel attempting to sway Job away from legalistic faith, it is in the dreams, freed from the strictures of reason, that Job can perceive the basic truth leading to redemption.

Blake’s arc of spiritual transformation leads him to reposition the dream sequence at the center of the narrative (just as Goya’s *Sleep of Reason* provides the transition from the first half of the sequence of *Caprichos* to the second). In the original story, the dream is a fairly insignificant detail, a part of Job’s lament in the first part of the story, which sets up his charge against God. In chapter 7:14-15, Job says, “You frighten me with dreams, and terrify me with visions till I prefer strangulation, death, to my wasted frame” (Berlin 1514). In Blake’s re-imagining, this line comes to mark the transition point from one set of beliefs to another, from a life of sin to a life of redemption, from legalistic guilt to spiritual illumination.

Blake’s translation of Job’s dreamscape into dream-text allows him to radically challenge structures of religious authority as well as to postulate the limits of reason in relation to faith. Nonetheless, despite his theological radicalism Blake remains trapped by two authoritarian constructs. First, he replaces the Hebrew God with the Christian Trinity. While the location of submission is now different—submission remains. The theme of the embrace of submission is represented compositionally in plate 17, in which God-Jesus comes to Job. Here, Job and his wife kneel before this God-Jesus to receive enlightenment, which is symbolized by the brilliant sun in the background (fig. 1.4). The pair gazes up at the figure of divine unity, fully immersed in his message. Job’s three friends provide contrast, as they turn their backs to the figure and shield their eyes from the sunlight; thus they choose to remain in darkness. That God-Jesus’s

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14 While a full accounting of Blake’s religious vision is beyond the scope of this section, Altizer provides a useful summary of Blake’s religious radicalism and vision: “Blake’s prophetic poetry both transcends and negates its roots in the Christian tradition: it unveils a Jesus who is the totality of both God and man, envisions a cosmic history reflecting a movement from Fall to Apocalypse, and records an ecstatic immersion in the joy and the horror of concrete experience. To enter the world of Blake’s vision is to be initiated into a new and radical form of faith, a paradoxical but deeply modern faith which is both sacred and profane, both mystical and contemporary at once. For Blake was the first Christian atheist, the first visionary who chose the kenotic or self-emptying path of immersing himself in the profane reality of experience as the way to the God who is all in all in Jesus” (xi).
head is contained within the circle of the sun while his feet remain on the ground indicates that he provides the bridge between the material and the spiritual, the very bridge that was absent in Job’s previous conception of faith. The composition in illustration 17 acts as the visual counterpart to Elihu’s text in illustration 12, “Lo all these things worketh God oftentimes with Man to bring back his Soul from the pit to be enlightened with the light of the living.” In illustration 12, Elihu comes to Job as the emissary charged with announcing the coming of Christ. Enlightenment is gained through the acceptance of God-Jesus’s divine light. However radically Blake defines “Jesus” or the notion of the divine unity, the compositional power of the scenes in 12 and 17 derives from the hierarchical relationship between Job and the divine. There can be no faith without submission.15

15 Altizer captures the tensions between Blake’s radical theology and his reliance on traditional Christian ideas and images in the following: “When Blake attempted to transform Vala into a Christian epic by infusing it with the categories of traditional Christian symbolism and theology, he found that the poem simply dissolved and lost all coherent meaning. His triumph as a Christian artist and visionary came in Milton and Jerusalem, and the illustrations to the Book of Job and to The Divine Comedy; and we must be prepared for the paradox that in these works Blake is the most deeply Christian when his language is the most anti-Christian, his vision becomes most real when it is seemingly most blasphemous or atheistic, and his images of regeneration or of Jesus become most authentic when they are furthest removed from their seeming original. All of this is in accord with the radical Christian understanding of the Age of the Spirit, the spiritual Jesus must be antithetically related to the Church’s Jesus, the Eternal Gospel must be an inversion of the temporal gospel, and God can have no existence or reality apart from that which He has in the present and immediate acts of men” (56).
In addition to the submission of Job into the folds of faith in unity of God, Christ, and spirit, we find in Blake’s reimagining of the biblical story—and especially of the dream in illustration 11—influences of long-standing anti-Jewish polemic. In the broader Protestant context, the contrast between Jewish legalism and Christian faith, as well as the links between the Jewish God and demonic forces, stretch back to Martin Luther and other early Reformation figures (Rowan 88-90; Oberman 292-297). In turn, these Reformation polemics rely on even

Trachtenberg, in his discussion of Luther’s On the Jews and their Lies, quotes Luther, “Those compassionate saints whose misguided benevolence enabled the Jews to murder and to blaspheme sinned against God, for as Christ is His son and the New Testament His book, so has He through the course of world history rejected the Jews together with their father, the hellish devil. Therefore Christians must undertake energetically, in all earnestness, and
older medieval anti-Jewish traditions (Trachtenburg; Menache). One of the key medieval polemics against Jews was precisely the claim that the father of the Jews was not God but the devil—and that the Jews worked in the service of the devil and his false messiah, the Antichrist. Joshua Trachtenberg describes one of the core eschatological stories of medieval Europe in this context:

Leading scholastics, such as Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, devoted considerable attention to it, holding in general that Antichrist will be born in Babylon, of the tribe of Dan, will proceed to Jerusalem, where he will be circumcised, and will easily persuade the Jews that he is their long-awaited Messiah. He will then rebuild the temple, establish his throne there, and proclaim himself god. By means of miraculous deeds, bribes, and sheer force he will rapidly accumulate a vast army of adherents, but his power is destined to endure only three and a half years. God will then send Enoch and Elijah to raise an opposition against him, but he will overcome and slay them. Thereupon Christ will dispatch the archangel Michael to destroy him on the Mount of Olives. (34)

The link between Jew, devil, and Antichrist formed one of the central pillars of anti-Jewish sentiment, which in turn was linked to eruptions of violence and constant discrimination. In the case of Luther and others, the anti-Jewish polemic seeks to establish a clear hierarchy of faiths, to introduce a progressive interpretation of religious history (Christianity overcoming Judaism), and to legitimize the social, political, and legal exclusion and/or subordination of Jews in Christian realms. In the context of the early 19th century, Blake’s conjoining of Jewish religiosity with Enlightenment rationalism (especially deism) could thus be seen as an attack on the politics of Jewish legal emancipation of the Napoleonic era and as a legitimization of the post-Napoleonic reaction against Jewish integration, a reaction often dressed in Christian garb (Shabetai).

This section has shown that we can identify two distinct types of authoritarian representations of the dreamscape. The first type acts to directly buttress existing hierarchical power relationships. The example of King Solomon is an apt one here. Solomon is already king

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not in a spirit of levity, to burn their synagogues, to seize their books, to prohibit their religious exercises and their blasphemies; yes, to settle the matter once for all, the Jews must be driven out of Christian society altogether” (219).
when he goes to Gibeon to incubate a dream. The dream-text acts as a powerful legitimation of his rule by elevating his status and linking him intimately with the patron God. The second type of authoritarian occupation acts to both challenge authoritarian constructs and to rebuild them in an opposing, but still hierarchical, manner. Blake’s representation of Job’s dreamscape provides a key example. Blake’s Job strives for emancipation from legalistic rationalism and toward a unique and radical form of Christianity, only to find himself subordinated to the structures of hierarchical Christianity and subsumed into the discursive logic of long-standing anti-Jewish polemic. The main authoritarian thrust of Blake’s Job comes when he utilizes anti-Jewish traditions to present the Jew as the prototypical “other” to the Blakean Christian. Blake’s use of John 10:30 in illustration 17 (Job’s submission to God-Jesus) is telling in this regard. While the quoted text, “I and the Father are one,” seems rather uncontroversial, those familiar with the Christian writings would understand that the statement comes amid a scene of incredible tension between Jesus and the Jews. In the Gospel of John, Jesus’s statement about divine unity is followed by conflict in the subsequent verse 10:31: “The Jews took up stones again to stone him” (Revised Standard Version). Here the Jew has become, in the Christian imagination, the tormenter and murderer of Christ—and one might add *in the service of the devil*. Even a radical religious thinker like Blake falls into identity constructs with deep social and political implications that configure hierarchical structures of power.

If a radical like Blake cannot escape the authoritarian, hierarchical outcomes of translating Job’s dreamscape into dream-text, how is it possible to imagine an anarchism of the dreamscape? The next section presents a theoretical discussion of anarchism in relation to dreaming. It argues that in parallel to the authoritarian implications of most translations from dreamscapes to representative dream-texts, a counter-tradition exists that seeks to grasp (or to propose) the anarchistic potential of the dreamscape. This anarchistic force can be discerned most productively by framing it with concepts adapted from post-anarchist theory. The result of this framing is not a systematic political theory of the dreamscape but rather an opening up of the concept to radical, emancipatory possibilities.

**Anarchism and the Dreamscape**
A countercurrent exists to the authoritarian politics of representing the dreamscape—what I call a radical current or an anarchism of the dreamscape. While this anarchistic current is as shifting
and heterodox as the authoritarian side, it differs in that it rejects or calls into question authoritarian paradigms, even if not totally. The anarchic possibilities of the dreamscape have not yet been the focus of scholarly attention. Some common features of the anarchism of the dreamscape can be discerned when seen through the lens of post-anarchist theory. By uncovering and theorizing the anarchism of the dreamscape, this and subsequent chapters contribute new concepts to the history of dream interpretation, anarchist theory, and theories and practices of resistance to power. What follows are definitional discussions of anarchism and post-anarchist theory, and an exploration of the radical potential of an anarchistic politics of the dreamscape. I follow these framing propositions by introducing two case studies that indicate elements of the dreamscape’s anarchistic potential.

Definitions of anarchism have ranged from those rooted in historically contingent contexts (19th century Russia, for example) to those grounded in a set of trans-historical principles. In English, the concept of anarchy/anarchism first emerged in the 16th century and for the following centuries was used to describe a state of lawlessness and chaos (OED). In Book Two of Paradise Lost, for example, Milton evokes the concept of anarchy in the description of the “deep” that Satan and Sin encounter when the gates of hell are unlocked and thrown open:

So wide they stood, and like a Furnace mouth
Cast forth redounding smoak and ruddy flame.
Before thir eyes in sudden view appear
The secrets of the hoarie deep, a dark
Illimitable Ocean without bound,
Without dimension, where length, breadth, and highth,
And time and place are lost; where eldest Night
And Chaos, Ancestors of Nature, hold
Eternal Anarchie, amidst the noise
Of endless Warrs and by confusion stand. (Milton 50-51)

I will return to this relationship between chaos, anarchy, and the deep in the discussion of Genesis below. Milton’s mention of anarchy as the basic condition of nature without the steady and creative hand of God endows the concept with trans-historical meaning: anarchy is a
condition that precedes power, authority, and social organization. It is the negative of creation, which means in this sense the imposition of order and the elimination of chaos. The notion of a condition preceding the ordering and structuring of the world provides the starting point for other articulations of anarchism. In *Demanding the Impossible*, Peter Marshall attempts to compile some general principles common to many strains of anarchism:

If you dive into an anarchist philosophy, you generally find a particular view of human nature, a critique of the existing order, a vision of a free society, and a way to achieve it. All anarchists reject the legitimacy of external government and of the State, and condemn imposed political authority, hierarchy and domination. (3)

For Marshall, anarchism can be found among the ancient writings in most civilizations, but is especially pronounced in Taoism and Zen Buddhism. Leonard Williams echoes the central thrust of Marshall’s trans-historical definition, claiming, “Through it all, anarchism seems to retain its central character as a viewpoint opposed to the presence of coercion, hierarchy, and authority in human affairs” (300). If the target of anarchism is the existence of power wielded for coercive, authoritative, or hierarchical purposes, the question arises: what, exactly, is power and how does it operate? For anarchist thinkers like Bakunin, Kropotkin and Godwin, power is a coercive force expressed by institutions like state bureaucracy and the military, as well as through legal, familial, and economic relationships. Most commonly, authoritarianism combines force with organizational power. Ideology serves to buttress the authoritarian order.

Lucien van der Walt gives a more specific “origin” point for the emergence of anarchism, which he locates in middle to late 19th century Europe. “The historical record shows very clearly,” he argues, “that a specific, self-defined, consciously anarchist movement, only and first, emerged in the First International around Mikhail Bakunin and the International Alliance of

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17 Bakunin, Godwin, and Kropotkin, along with Max Stirner and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, are considered the foundering thinkers of modern anarchism, beginning with the late 18th century revolutionary era (Godwin) and continuing into the early twentieth century. William Godwin (1756-1836) was the earliest of the figures, publishing his seminal *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* in 1793. Michael Bakunin (1814-1876) was a Russian revolutionary who challenged Karl Marx for control over the International. Bakunin famously stated that “socialism without freedom is slavery and brutality,” an anarchist critique of what he saw as the Marxist trends in the politics of the workers’ movement. Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921), a Russian aristocrat like Bakunin, focused on the social possibilities of anarchism in relation to feudal or capitalistic relationships, emphasizing cooperation, mutual aid, and the reconfiguration of work (Ward 1-8).
Social Democracy. That puts it in the period from 1864, around 150 years ago—not in the Garden of Eden and not in the ancient world” (92). This dating is key, van der Walt argues, because it shows anarchism’s inherent connections to the broader workers’ movement. “A historical approach points us to the First International. That locates anarchism, as a consequence,” he writes, “as rooted in the working class and socialist movement” (92). Such historical definitions of anarchism link anarchist theory to movements of resistance to the emerging modern nation-state. Thus, Leonard Williams writes, “At the most basic level, anarchism is fundamentally opposed to the existence of the State and the authority relations that the State codifies, legitimates, or represents” (300).

In 19th and early 20th century anarchist discourse, the agent of resistance to authoritarianism in all its forms is the individual. In contrast to other radical programs like Marxism or Leninism, anarchism rejects the subordination of the individual to a broader group or social unit. A social unit might form as a state of anarchy comes to fruition, but this formation is always non-coercive. The unsubordinated individual can be characterized as the autonomous subject of the liberal imagination, as the Romantic individual, or (most commonly) as a combination of liberal autonomy and Romantic individuality. This unsubordinated individual exists, in the anarchist tradition, beyond, outside of, or against authoritarian power.

While from a historical perspective, anarchism as a modern political philosophy emerged in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period in Europe, the deeper roots of anarchist concepts point to the existence of anarchistic strategies of resistance dating back to ancient times. The anarchism of the dreamscape calls on both ancient and modern traditions of resistance, thus eluding strict historical periodization (which could itself be seen as a means of narrative control) and pointing toward the trans-historical nature of anti-authoritarianism. The confluence of modern anarchism and deeper anarchistic principles can be productively theorized through the lens of post-anarchist theory.

If the anarchist tradition presents the autonomous/Romantic subject as the central political actor, postmodern or poststructuralist variants of anarchism subvert this foundational pillar. Post-anarchism, a politics built around a synthesis of anarchist thought and postmodern or poststructuralist theory, sets itself the task of re-imagining a type of political critique that does not depend on absolute individual autonomy or a unified view of the subject. Post-anarchists like Todd May, Saul Newman, Andrew Koch, and Lewis Call argue that by holding onto notions of
autonomy and inherent unity, classical anarchism ends up perpetuating hierarchical power structures instead of subverting them. They maintain that radical politics can only be truly emancipatory if informed by the postmodern critique of subjectivity and a more nuanced understanding of power. Below, I outline the post-anarchist position on subjectivity and power before turning to a discussion of the three key principles that I graft or borrow from post-anarchism to frame the radical politics of the dreamscape.

Todd May’s *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism* (1994) marks the beginning of the “post” turn in anarchist theory. For May, what separates this new or poststructuralist variant of anarchism from its “classical” ancestors is its full break with humanism and the subsequent impact of this break on the notion of political subjectivity. The political theoretical landscape, according to May,

is dominated by an assumption that, as has been seen, forms the other (if at times abated) half of anarchism’s a priori: humanist naturalism, the concept of a benign human essence. If poststructuralist political thought could be summed up in a single prescription, it would be that radical political theory, if it is to achieve anything, must abandon humanism in all its forms. (75)

Whether or not May accurately describes classical anarchism,¹⁸ it is clear that his target is a type of liberal-Romantic thinking rooted in the concept of the autonomous subject. In place of a unified and autonomous subject, which he claims is based on “essence,” and in place of a structuralist notion of total constructedness grounded in the constitutive power of language, culture, politics and/or economy, May proposes “subjectivities” brought forth through “practice”; “subject and structures,” he writes, “are sedimentations of practice, whose source cannot be discovered in a privileged ontological domain but that must be sought, rather, among the specific practices in which they arise” (78). That is to say, there is no subject without the staging of

¹⁸ Allan Antliff (2007) questions some of May’s fundamental understandings of 19th and early 20th century anarchism. While it seems clear that earlier anarchists like Emma Goldman, Kropotkin, and Bakunin saw the individual as the central political actor, it does not follow that this individual is *a priori* “good,” as maintained by May, or simply reactive to oppressive power. Cohn and Wilbur (2010) discuss ten critiques of the post-anarchist position. They claim, similar to Antliff, that post-anarchists have limited engagement with the history of anarchist theory, its diversity, and its evolution. Furthermore, they argue, the post-anarchists’ classification of classical anarchism with terms like “humanism,” “rationalism,” and “Enlightenment” results in a reductive reading of a rich anarchist tradition.
subjectivity in context; there are no structures of power without their constant creation through performance. For May, no deeper essences of individuals or supra-individual communities exist beyond the enactments of them.

In *Postmodern Anarchism* (2002), Lewis Call takes full aim at the notion of unified subjectivity. Instead of conceiving of politics as a contest of power by or between subjects, he points to a counter-tradition of political thought based on the “anarchy of the subject.” For Call, this anarchistic subjectivity is “strictly provisional,” multiple, and in constant flux. He turns to Nietzsche to describe the radical implications of this subject position:

> To ensure that this anarchy of the subject will have the status of a permanent revolution, Nietzschean philosophy offers a corresponding anarchy of becoming. A postmodern anarchist in the Nietzschean mode must engage in a perpetual project of self-overcoming. By constantly immersing the “self” in the river of becoming, the Nietzschean anarchist evades the possibility that her subjectivity will recrystallize in a totalizing fashion. (22)

Like May and Call, Newman argues that classical anarchism is based on an essentialist concept of human nature as inherently good. For classical anarchists, he writes, “social revolution and the creation of a free society would allow man's immanent humanity and rationality finally to be realized” (“Anarchy” 13). Newman draws from Foucault to express the political implications of the “absolutization of man,” a concept that identifies the essential quality of the human being in his or her capacity for reason (*From Bakunin to Lacan* 85):

> Man has become, in the past couple of centuries, the dominant figure within scientific, medical, sociological, and political discourses. This absolutization of man, and the power/knowledge regimes associated with it, are oppressive. They tie the individual to a certain identity—the criminal, the insane, the homosexual, the heterosexual, man, woman, etc.—which is limiting and oppressive, and which further subjects the individual to strategies of power. (86)

The notion of staging the subject as a body in context is central to May, Call, and Newman’s conceptions of subjectivity; it proposes the subject as contextualized, partially
determined, and as inherently relational, formed by and through action, gesture, and speech. In this sense, the dreamscape can be seen as a double staging, or a staging within a staging, where even the subjectivities of waking life are radically disturbed. Against this chaotic dissolution of selfhood, the dream-text acts to (at least partially) re-solidify the subject and to locate subjectivity as contained within the stage of life.

For May, Call, and Newman, the shift away from a notion of the unified individual or essentialist subject necessitates a corresponding move away from a repressive understanding of power to a (Foucauldian) conception of power as a constituting force, a force that is all-encompassing with no realm free of power existing beyond it. This reorientation of the notion of power dislodges it as the arm or tool of state power—macro-political power—and moves it into the realm of micro-politics—how power operates day-to-day, moment-to-moment not only in a legal sense or connected to coercive force but as embodied in discursive practices, institutional structures, psychological understandings, and affective responses. Key to understanding the micro-politics is grasping the way power operates within the individual. The individual is no longer seen as a site of resistance or domination but is itself generative of power. “This internalized self-surveillance and self-subjection,” writes Newman, “is the central feature of Foucault’s description of modern power. There is no need for a massive, repressive power, because the individual represses himself” (From Bakunin to Lacan 83).

Drawing from these redefinitions of subjectivity and power, the anarchic potential of the dreamscape reflects several conceptions of radical politics often utilized by post-anarchist thinkers, including, most significantly, the following three concepts: 1) Jacques Rancière’s (1992) notion of “dis-identification” as the first stage of the development of the radical subject; 2) Rancière’s (1999) “presupposition of equality” as expressing the promise of equal-liberty or, in other words, the necessary coexistence of absolute freedom with absolute equality; and 3) Emmanuel Levinas’s (1991) assertion of anarchy as the disturbance of the self (or of one’s singularity) by its encounter with another singularity, the other.

For post-anarchists, the constructed nature of selfhood together with the ubiquity of power necessitate finding a subject or subjects of resistance beyond that of the autonomous

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19 As Newman notes, “For Foucault, power can no longer be confined within the institution of the state, or indeed in any institution. Power is a polyvalent force that runs through multiple sites throughout the social network. It is dispersed, decentered power, diffused throughout society...As Foucault says: ‘power is everywhere because it comes from everywhere’” (From Bakunin to Lacan 78).
liberal-Romantic individual. Rather than having a stable subject with a fixed identity, post-anarchism follows Rancière in positing a subject that emerges “in an unpredictable fashion through a rupturing of fixed social roles and identities” (Newman, “Post-Anarchism” 61). Rancière argues that the potential for radical or emancipatory politics begins with the breaking down of identity. Identity or identification, for Rancière, locates people in the structures of power and, by doing so, reinforces these structures and their hierarchies. The first step, then, in becoming “political” in Rancière’s sense, is “disidentification,” by which he means the rupture of all identity constructs determined by the structures of power. For Rancière, disidentification and a corresponding dislocation create the space necessary for radical assertions of subjectivity as enacted or staged presences (“Politics” 62). Post-anarchists see in Rancière’s concept of disidentification the emergence of a political subject freed from humanist assumptions and structural limitations. Rather than being caught in constructed discourses or “disciplinary cages,” Newman argues,

Post-structuralist approaches seek openings, interstices, indeterminacies, *aporias* and cracks within structures – points where they become displaced and unstable, and where new possibilities for political subjectification can emerge…The aim, from a post-structuralist point of view, would be for the subject to gain a certain distance from the discursive fields in which his/her identity is constituted – and it is precisely this distance, this gap, which is the space of politics because it allows the subject to develop new forms and practices of freedom and equality. (“Post-Anarchism” 62)

The break with identification—the refusal, in other words, to be understood as a subject within the structures of power—evokes Rancière’s central political idea, what he calls the presupposition of equality. For Newman and May, this presupposition is a core part of post-anarchistic ethics. “The effect of the presupposition of equality,” May writes, “is to undo the classifications of the police order—classifications by which some are given authority over others, whether by virtue of wealth, race, gender, or status” (“Jacques Rancière” 25). Here, May is drawing on Rancière’s division between the police order and the political. Rancière uses the term “police” as a way of describing the logic and structure of the systems of power—both macro and micro—built to support and protect inequality:
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution and legitimization another name. I propose to call it the police. (Rancière, *Disagreement* 28)

Resistance, or the state of the political, according to this view, emerges when one rejects the logic of a presumed natural or factual inequality in order to assert equality as factual. May sums up Rancière’s definition to capture the (post) anarchic potentiality of the concept:

> It is those who participate, and who participate on the basis of their mutual presupposition of equality, who create the political character of any politics. Moreover, it can be seen how the presupposition of equality allows us to conceive of anarchism in a positive way, without falling into the trap of speaking for others. If the critique of domination is one side of the anarchist coin, the presupposition of equality is the other. It is because equality is presupposed, that domination becomes intolerable. (“Jacques Rancière” 25)

The presupposition of equality is a social concept in that it defines the political subject by her or his recognition of another subject and not by her or his understanding of natural or legal rights as an individual. The social aspect contains the subjectifying move—the move from the disidentified subject (a negative concept) to the political or emancipatory subject (a positive concept). “What is a process of subjectivization?” Rancière asks, answering, “It is the formation of a one that is not a self but is the relation of a self to an other” (“Politics” 60). This politics of radical equality, for Rancière, forms the basis of a truly democratic order. He writes, “politics has no arche, it is anarchical. The very name democracy supports this point” (“Politics” 59). The encounter with the other and the formation (or reformation) of the subject through this relationship are central for post-anarchists to imagine political community or collective action without calling on notions of liberal rights or group identities.
Along with Rancière, Emmanuel Levinas emerges as a key theorist for post-anarchists in this regard. Levinas defines anarchy as the encounter with the other unmediated by consciousness: “Proximity,” Levinas states, “is thus anarchistically a relationship with a singularity without the mediation of any principle, any ideality” (100). Levinas proposes that real freedom can only be gained through this inter-subjective experience. This anarchistic encounter is juxtaposed with encounters between two beings conceived of as stable individuals. The latter individualist encounter leads to an imperialist subjectivity with the goal of one individual dominating the other. On the other hand, the anarchist encounter forces the recognition that the encountering subjects exist “through and for the other” (Levinas 114). The result of the encounter with the other that Levinas imagines is what he calls “a responsibility that is justified by no prior commitment…” (Levinas 102). This responsibility for the other, existing prior to the existence of the subject, in fact creates the subject in anarchic terms:

But the oneself is hypostatized in another way. It is bound in a knot that cannot be undone in a responsibility for others. This is an anarchic plot, for it is neither the underside of a freedom, a free commitment undertaken in a present or a past that could be remembered, nor slave’s alienation, despite the gestation of the other in the same, which the responsibility for the other signifies. (Levinas 105)

Levinas moves into poetic language when describing the generation of this anarchic situation, this preconscious responsibility to others. The poetry creates a set of concepts that can be deployed in the consideration of the relationship between the dreamscape and its representative dream-texts.

Of particular importance for Levinas is the notion of “substitution,” a recurrent call to be the other:

This recurrence would be the ultimate secret of the incarnation of the subject; prior to all reflection, prior to every positing, an indebtedness before any loan, not assumed, anarchical, subjectivity of a bottomless passivity, made out of assignation, like an echo of a sound that would precede the resonance of this sound. The active source of this passivity is not thematizable. It is the passivity of a trauma, but one that prevents its own
representation, a deafening trauma, cutting the thread of consciousness which should have welcomed it in its present, the passivity of being persecuted. (111)

Terms like echo, passivity, trauma, and persecution signify a slippage away from conscious or rational understandings or origins toward relational dynamics that cannot be grasped and consciously molded. Levinas’s responsibility for the other is a call back into this realm. Below, I argue that the dreamscape provokes a similar type of slippage by “persecuting” both waking reality and especially the representative dream-texts. One might say that the dreamscape is the “deafening trauma” of the dream-text.20

Post-anarchism points to key concepts that are useful for defining the anarchistic potential of the dreamscape. This is not to say that the anarchism of the dreamscape represents a full articulation of one or various post-anarchist systems of power and resistance. Indeed, the post-anarchist search for a systematic understanding of a new anarchism strikes me as antithetical to the very notion of anarchism, which should seek openness to and tolerance of theoretical and practical multiplicity—even if the result is contradiction or illogic. I contend that the dreamscape offers an a-systematic conception of power and resistance that presents some combination of the following four key post-anarchistic conditions.

First, the dreamscape hosts unstable subjects. Identity cannot be fixed in the territory of the dreamscape; any momentarily coalesced identity is immediately questioned, unraveled or dismantled. The example of Mike N. (see introduction) in my own dream is an apt one. He is at once my high school classmate, a member of a strange paramilitary organization, and possibly a member of an ethno-nationalist German political party. These identity shards are recognized as real and simultaneously as absurd and fictional. To attempt to transform this dreamscape into dream-text, as my presentation of the dream does, serves to fix identity and to draw the

20 Simon Critchley summarizes the political implications of Levinas’s proximity/substitution dynamic in the following way: “Better stated perhaps, ethics is the metapolitical disturbance of politics for the sake of politics, that is, for the sake of a politics that does not close over in itself, becoming what Levinas would call totality, becoming a whole. Following Levinas’s logic, when politics is left to itself without the disturbance of ethics it risks becoming tyrannical.” (Critchley 182). He continues, “One way of thinking about Levinas and politics, and I think it is the most convincing way, is in terms of ethics as an anarchic, metapolitical disturbance of the antipolitical order of the police…. If we are going to be able to face and face down the political horror of the present, and Levinas’s work was always dominated by that horror, then I think politics has to be empowered by a metapolitical moment of disturbance, an anarchic ethical injunction and the experience of an infinite ethical demand” (Critchley 182-183).
dreamscape into waking life, thereby re-inscribing the anarchistic potential of the dreamscape into the logic of authoritarian power. This process of re-inscription can also be seen in the example of Blake’s *Illustrated Book of Job*. While Job’s terror in the dreamscape is a potential anarchic moment, the application of the Jewish/Christian binary puts the terror in the service of religious dogmatism, subsuming the narrative into anti-Jewish polemic.

Second, the dreamscape is the space for inter-subjective encounters between dis-integrated identities that both serve to propose and to break down barriers between self and other. Again, my dream of Mike N. offers an example of this type of encounter. The encounter between the dream-I and Mike N. is dominated by antagonism—an antagonism primarily based on an understanding of identity as fixed and mutually inimical. The stepping forward of Mike N. out of the regimental line serves to spotlight the binary nature of the conflict. The unfixed nature of selfhood in the dream-text, however, reveals that the binary is a mythical or fictitious one. Mike N. and the dream-I are constructs. It is unclear whether the dream-I or Mike N. exists on its own or whether one is contained in the other. In other words, there is no Mike N. beyond the encounter with the dream-I and vice-versa. The relationship, thus, constitutes identity. One might posit that all dream identities are so constituted.

The mutuality of the encounter raises the third anarchistic concept of the dreamscape, the equality of subjects in its space. The subject’s lack of fixedness, its constructed nature, fluidity, and even its tendency to merge with others during an antagonistic (or erotic) encounter call into question attempts to establish hierarchy; in the dreamscape, all subjects are equally unstable—perhaps equally flat. Ideology permeates the dream-text—but the broken nature of dream-logic, the fluidity of the dream-space, and the instability of dream-subjects render that ideology unstable and open to diverse strategies of resistance. In the field of the dreamscape, constructs of authority seem brittle and crumbling at best. It is precisely the intrusion of interpretive schema as dream-text, inevitable as it may be, that disrupts the underlying “fact” of equality in the dreamscape through the formation of what Rancière calls the “police order”—or the presumed naturalness of inequality embedded at all levels in society. Such an ordering, for example, would elevate the “dream-I” above Mike N. (or vice-versa) to the position of protagonist. If the police order is juxtaposed, for Rancière, with the political, then the fundament of the political, anarchic dreamscape is the chaotic: fragmentation, disruption, rupture, and disorder.
Fourth and finally, the dreamscape could be seen as constituting a zone of anarchy in the sense of articulating a preconscious responsibility for the other, as posited by Levinas. To arrive at this anarchy, the dreamscape needs to put pressure on the order and narrative logic of the dream-text. For example, my dream-text presents the movement of Mike N. out of the regimental line and toward the dream-I as a threatening response to combative political speech. The dream-text, even in its attempt to be objective, has produced a strong narrative thrust. On the other hand, if Mike N.’s step forward is seen as a constitutive act that generates the dream-I through the recognition of otherness, the call of another human being, then the moment could be seen as Mike N.’s demand for recognition not as a paramilitary soldier but as a human being (or perhaps even as the human being). The rifle, then, becomes a vivifying object instead of a potentially deadly instrument—it is the ultimate tool of persecution, the executor of the traumatic wound.

The emergence of the dreamscape into the rhythm of everyday life through the diurnal rhythms of sleep creates tension between the territory of wakefulness, including and especially the creation of the representative dream-text, and the field or space of the dreamscape. The organized territory of wakefulness immediately and inevitably encroaches on the dreamscape through the fashioning of representation in its dominant terms, producing the dream-text. The political moment, then, orients around two general possibilities: 1) the crystallization of the dream-texts in support of authoritarian (broadly speaking) narratives or constructs, or 2) the attempt to work back out of the inevitable dream-text toward the irrecoverable field of the dreamscape, which, though vanished, has left traces of its anarchistic potential. The following section locates part of the dreamscape’s anarchistic potential in its origins as a space of escape from and resistance to the ideological construct that emerged with Adam and Eve’s banishment from the Garden of Eden. This “origin myth” connects the dreamscape with Eve’s multifaceted desire and with the presence of the primordial deep—the undifferentiated state of chaos.

An Origin Myth of the Dreamscape (Genesis 1-3)
Origin myths, even when perceived as fictions or allegories, serve to construct and perpetuate structures of authority. The Garden of Eden story (Genesis 2-3) has been fundamental in forming the foundation for numerous hierarchies, dualisms, and ideological concepts, including patriarchy, sin/evil, anthropocentrism, and the subordination of the human to the divine. In recent decades, re-readings of the Garden of Eden narrative have presented a more nuanced picture of
the story in order to destabilize traditional assumptions. Mieke Bal, for example, reads Genesis 2-3 in ways that challenge two fundamental positions articulated in Paul’s I Timothy, namely the primacy of Adam over Eve (hence Eve’s/woman’s subordinate status) and the notion that Eve alone, not Adam, was deceived by the serpent and (alone) transgressed God’s prohibition. Together, these two Pauline ideas reinforce patriarchy not only within the traditions of Christianity but also in the broader culture of the West. Bal counters the Pauline tradition by equalizing the creation moment—both male and female are created together and in relation to the other—and rejecting the notion of Eve’s deception. Bal writes:

If my interpretation of Eve’s position will show her in a more favorable light than is the case in the common uses of the text, I do not want to suggest that this is a feminist, feminine or female-oriented text. Rather, I will try to account for the nature and function of a patriarchal myth which is related to an ideology that cannot be monolithic. Efforts to make it so are the more desperate since it is an impossible aim. Therefore, that traces of the problematization of the represented ideology can be found does not automatically imply an improvement in the situation. (22)

The project of fracturing monolithic ideological implications of origin myths opens up pathways for asserting counter-narratives, as Bal does. Another type of counter-narrative to the ideological monolith is Donna Haraway’s notion of the “ironic political myth.” In contrast to the orthodoxy of traditional ideological structures, Haraway suggests the political power of the “blasphemous”:

Blasphemy protects one from the moral majority within, while still insisting on the need for community. Blasphemy is not apostasy. Irony is about contradictions that do not dissolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true. Irony is about humor and serious play. It is also a rhetorical strategy and a political method… (291)

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21 See Trible; Jobling; Armour and St.Ville; and Walker-Jones.
In the discussion that follows, I propose an origin myth of the dreamscape, a myth that emerges on the blasphemous and ironical periphery of the Garden of Eden narrative. This proposition of dreamscape origins imagines that the dreamscape opens up as a consequence of Adam and Eve’s expulsion from Eden, the beginnings of agricultural toil/work and thus recuperative sleep, and the imposition of a new paradigm of power that ties humanity to new hierarchical arrangements based on a combination of force, morality, and the formation of rigid dualisms/identities (male/female, divine/mundane, human/animal, etc.). The key attributes that comprise this dreamscape are its inherently fleeting, unstable nature, its inability to be retrieved, and the impossibility of its full representation. In its origins, this disorderly dreamscape contains traces of the primal chaos of the serpent and the multifaceted desire that enables Eve to overcome God’s authority. At the very moment of the formation of a new ideology and structure of power, in other words, comes the space for radical opposition: the dreamscape ruptures and destabilizes postlapsarian reality. On the ironical and blasphemous edge of postlapsarian order, then, the dreamscape presents a distinct type of anarchy.

To frame the type of anarchy present in the myth of dreamscape origins, it is necessary to explicate the shifting structures of power and authority contained in Genesis 1-3, as well as the moments of rebellion against these structures. Genesis contains two mentions of the creation of the first human being(s). The first, from Genesis 1, proposes what seems like an elevated concept of the human. “And God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. They shall rule the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky, the cattle, the whole earth, and all the creeping things that creep on earth’” (Berlin 14). In Genesis 2, the text replaces the more “god-like” human creation, the rulers of the new physical world that emerges from the primordial chaos, with a creature bound to material reality and further removed from the divine realm.

When the Lord God made earth and heaven—when no shrub of the field was yet on earth and there was no man to till the soil, but a flow would well up from the ground and water the whole surface of the earth—the Lord God formed man from the dust of the earth. He blew into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living being. (Berlin 15)

The account of the creation of the human being in Genesis 1 imagines a hierarchy of God and human, but the human is granted authority to rule the physical world as a representative or
deputy of God. The human, in a sense, is the image of God in the world—thus establishing a strong connection between the order of the material world and that of the metaphysical realm, which is modeled on the relationship between God and his angels. The account of creation in Genesis 2, by contrast, sees the human being first and foremost as the caretaker or gardener of God’s magnificent creation, the world. He is fit to take care of the earth because he comes not from heaven—from the divine realm—but from earth, from dust. The human of Genesis 2 is lowlier in origins, further from God, and closer to (or even on equal footing with) the animal world. Both Genesis 1 and 2 propose structures of power and authority, and it is within these structures that we find the origins of resistance, of a challenge to authority and hierarchy.

Genesis 2 sets in motion the historical story of humanity within the structures of paradisiacal authoritarianism. The generic human being—the being of dust—turns into the flesh and blood human. The God of Genesis is unlike other ancient Near Eastern God-kings; it is not an uncaring, ruthless, or amoral deity concerned mainly with its own comfort and luxury (Sarna 16-18). God is described as a “good” being, a just and loving presence. As such, Adam is not first given the spade or the hoe; rather, he is set down in an environment, Eden, in which there is no difference between work and play or work and leisure. Umberto Cassuto’s translation of the “creation of man” verses (2:5-7) is attuned to man’s original labor-less existence. “Now no thorns of the field were yet in the earth,” Cassuto begins, emphasizing the juxtaposition between this prelapsarian state of creation and the condition after the expulsion from Eden (“thorns and thistles it [the ground] shall sprout for you”). The juxtaposition continues with “no grain of the field had yet sprung up…” In Eden, sustenance is there for the taking as fruits from the trees (Stordalen 10-20). After the expulsion from Eden, sustenance must be earned through work (grains from the ground). The paradisiacal qualities of Eden are stressed further, according to Cassuto, in the text’s mentioning of the watering of the ground: “but the waters of the deep went up from the earth and watered the whole face of the ground” (100). Cassuto explains:

…at first the ground did not absorb water from above..., in other words, its fructification was not dependent on rain, which sometimes comes down in due time and sometimes is withheld, but it drew water from below, that is, it was constantly irrigated by the waters

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22 James Kennedy sees in Genesis 2 a political allegory for the submission of the peasantry to the elite: “Similarly, the Eden story of Genesis 2-3 is not a dispassionate rendering of how the world came to be, but a narrative describing creation in terms conducive to the Israelite elite's preservation of political power and privilege” (4).
of the deep. This blissful state of affairs prevailing in the garden of Eden and similar circumstances obtaining in Egypt served as classic examples of a land blessed with fertility...Man would have continued to enjoy these conditions had he remained free from sin, but when he transgressed the Lord punished him by decreeing that the soil should obtain its moisture from above, so that He might requite man according to his deeds, giving him rain in its season if he was worthy and withholding it if he was unworthy.

(100, italics in text)

As Cassuto argues, the original state of the human being in the Garden of Eden is free of work, suffering, hardship, and worry. It is a life of splendid ease, in which all is provided by the natural cycles of irrigation and fructification, liberated from the fickleness of rain and the necessity to labor.

Only one thing is required of Adam for a life of perpetual (and perhaps immortal) luxury and ease—absolute obedience to God’s authority and renunciation of any claim to challenge the authority or singularity of God’s divine status. This authority and singularity are represented by the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, and the prohibition to eat from it. “The Lord God took the man and placed him in the Garden of Eden, to till and tend it. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, ‘Of every tree of the garden you are free to eat; but as for the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, you must not eat of it; for as soon as you eat of it, you shall die’” (Berlin 16). Cassuto replaces “to till and tend it” with “to serve and to guard” (121), which seems more fitting, as the requirement that humans work for food (tillage) is only imposed on them as punishment for disobedience. Moreover, Cassuto’s translation emphasizes the hierarchical relationship implicit in the prelapsarian Edenic moment (“to serve”). Cassuto also replaces “as soon as you eat of it” with “in the day you eat of it...” in order to unravel the seeming inconsistency of this statement with the fact that Adam and Eve do not die immediately in the aftermath of the eating of the forbidden fruit. The emphasis falls on “shall die”—that is, die at some point in the future as opposed to the possibility of immortality offered by Eden and its tree of life.

Until this point in the story, Adam exists only in the state of wakefulness without experiencing sleep. This is not surprising, considering that in the time after the creation there is no mental or physical exhaustion to make sleep necessary; Adam’s existence does not weary him
and thus there is no need for replenishment. Sleep is introduced into the story as part of the process of God fashioning a second being, Eve, out of the original human. God comes to Adam and induces a trance-like sleep, the first sleep, which Adam experiences as a dreamless and empty state of being—"So the Lord God cast a deep sleep upon the man." During Adam’s empty sleep, God dissects part of him (commonly considered a rib) and constructs a second human being out of this flesh—a woman, Eve. The fact that Eve is constructed during Adam’s empty sleep and therefore completely beyond his consciousness is notable. It is as if the trance-like sleep reopens the period of creation that seemed to end with the creation of human beings in Genesis 1 and the day of cessation on the seventh day. It represents a type of slippage that I will highlight again when discussing the serpent. Woman, Eve, is the artifact of this slippage and symbolically connects the state of sleep with both the act of creation and a time of (at least partial) chaos. In other words, the creation of Eve in the zone of empty sleep points to an entropic force, a tendency of creation to dissipate and then for things to be recreated.

In the voluminous commentary on Genesis 2, the empty sleep has been seen as having little significance. Cassuto sees Adam’s sleep as necessitated by the aesthetics of the narrative; to cut into the human flesh while awake would have been to destroy the poetics of the piece and to traumatize Adam (133-134). Midrashic traditions compiled by Louis Ginzberg emphasize that the deep sleep was necessary in order to shield Adam from witnessing Eve’s creation. Such a witnessing would have provided Adam a type of familiarly incompatible with amorous desire:

Adam was first made to fall into a deep sleep before the rib for Eve was taken from his side. For, had he watched her creation, she would not have awakened love in him. To this day it is true that men do not appreciate the charms of women whom they have known and observed from childhood up. Indeed, God had created a wife for Adam [Lilith] before Eve, but he would not have her, because she had been made in his presence. Knowing well all the details of her formation, he was repelled by her. (Ginzberg 67-68)

In terms of the power structure of prelapsarian Eden, another midrashic passage on Adam’s sleep is more on point, because it makes manifest one of the central themes in the Garden of Eden story: the total yet tenuous nature of God’s authority over creation, first and foremost over the human being. According to midrash—perhaps rooted in the seemingly semi-divinity of the
human being in Genesis 1—God’s grasp on total authority was undermined by the creation of the first human being:

And not alone the creatures of the earth, even the angels thought Adam the lord of all, and they were about to salute him with “Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of Hosts,” when God caused sleep to fall upon him, and then the angels knew that he was but a human being. (Ginzberg 64)

The prohibition of eating from the tree of knowledge of good and bad, the inducement of the first sleep, and the fashioning of Eve create the context for the great morality play of Genesis 3, the serpent’s “seduction”—I would say, rather, the serpent’s “provocation”—of Eve and the move of Adam and Eve from the original paradisiacal state and into the realm of struggle, pain, and immutable mortality (God, of course, did not initially forbid Adam from eating from the tree of life). The rebellion of Eve and then Adam against God, and the need to find a new structure of divine authority in postlapsarian time, begins with the serpent’s provocation of Eve to eat the fruit of the forbidden tree.

The serpent possesses some form of understanding greater than either of the two humans. While the humans bask in their innocence—knowing no shame, blissfully oblivious—the serpent is the “shrewdest of all the wild beasts that the Lord God had made” (Berlin 16). When the serpent questions Eve about the forbidden fruit, Eve tells him of God’s injunction. The serpent reveals to Eve that God has deceived them, saying, “You are not going to die, but God knows that as soon as you eat of it your eyes will be opened and you will be like the divine beings who know good and bad” (Berlin 16). The serpent’s words recognize the lie inherent in all relationships of power—in this case, the lie is that there is an inherent and impenetrable boundary between God (ruler) and human (ruled)—what Rancière might call the presupposition of inequality. In this case, the boundary consists of knowledge. Adam and Eve eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, and thereby gain the knowledge formerly reserved for those of a higher sphere—God and his angels.

The nature of what the serpent knows is unclear—he is described as “shrewd,” “cunning.” Analysis of serpents in Ancient Near East and the biblical literature points to a multitude of possible meanings—both positive and negative. As for relatively positive
associations, Nahum Sarna writes, “In the Near East the serpent was a symbol of deity and fertility, and the images of the serpent-goddesses have been found in the ruins of many Canaanite towns and temples” (26). Midrashic traditions also portray the serpent in a relatively positive light:

Among the animals the serpent was notable. Of all of them he had the most excellent qualities, in some of which he resembled man…Had it not been for the fall of man, which brought misfortune to them, too, one pair of serpents would have sufficed to perform all the work man has to do…As a matter of fact, it was the very ability of the serpent that led to the ruin of man and his own ruin. (Ginzberg 71-72)

On the other hand, contextual parallels frequently contain notions of serpents as something like Manichean antagonists to God. Cassuto and others argue that Genesis transforms the notion of the serpent as divine antagonist in line with its broader monotheistic revolution. Typically the strictest of readers with regard to the literal statements of Genesis, Cassuto explains the serpent through metaphor:

But since in the popular thought and language the concept of evil was strongly associated with that of the serpent, it was possible for the Torah, without changing its attitude to the ancient poetic tradition, to use the accepted folk ideas and phraseology that were a product of that tradition, and hence to choose specifically the serpent out of the animal world as the symbol of evil. And in order to make it quite clear that we have here only a symbol, and that we must not regard the serpent as an independent entity in opposition, as it were, to the Creator of the world, as the ancient tradition of the poets narrated, the Torah stressed at the very outset that the serpent belonged to the category of the beasts of the field that the Lord God had made. (142, italics in text)

By reading the “serpent” as a symbol of evil and not as a fully embodied character, Cassuto is able to make a psychological move. The serpent, he argues, is in fact a dimension of Eve. The dialogue between the serpent and Eve is actually a dialogue within Eve, “between her wiliness
and her innocence, clothed in the garb of a parable. Only in this way is it possible to understand the conversation clearly; otherwise it remains obscure” (Cassuto 142).

Rather than following Cassuto and viewing the serpent as symbolic of the potential for evil within Eve, it seems more plausible to me to see the serpent as a discrete character that represents the environment from which serpents in the ancient Near East originally came—the deep. In these ancient traditions, the deep represents the primal antagonist to the creator god, a watery being that the creator god is forced to conquer in order to fashion the universe. In the case of Genesis 2, reference to the deep through the serpent (a creature—like Leviathan—associated with the watery domain) indicates, like the slippage during Adam’s sleep/trance, the presence of the inherent potential for chaos in the post-creation world, the likes of which are found in the state of pre-creation, when “the earth being unformed and void, with darkness over the surface of the deep…” (Berlin 12). Sarna, while holding on to the notion of evil, makes precisely this link between the “deep,” the Leviathan/serpent, and primal chaos:

The role of the creature [serpent] is that of seducer, laying before the woman the enticing nature of evil and fanning her desire for it. The use of the serpent symbolism in this situation has most likely been conditioned by the place of the serpent in the old cosmic combat myth…There, be it noted, the serpent is one of the epithets of Leviathan, one of the chief opponents of God and the representative of cosmic chaos. (26)

The serpent, then, is far from being simply a symbol of Eve’s inherent potential for evil—or even necessarily a symbol of evil itself (despite what Sarna claims); it is an allusion to the primal chaos of the deep, a state of resistance to the acts of creation and to the order and hierarchy fashioned by God to overcome the primal chaos. Thus, the serpent’s statements to Eve are meant specifically to introduce an element of primal chaos into the world by asserting that the hierarchies of creation are not inherent or primary but were fashioned by the will of God for the purpose of establishing and maintaining authority. It is this notion that sets in motion the development of Eve’s act of eating the fruit.

Eve’s embrace of the serpent’s kernel of chaos provokes her to begin to reflect on God’s prohibition. For the briefest moment, the Garden of Eden has the potential to become an anarchistic paradise instead of an authoritarian one; once the hierarchy of God and human breaks
down, so too does that between human and animal, god and angels, etc. God, however, has no intention of submitting to the rising power of the human being. He displays his profound distrust of unfettered human power—and the structure of the rest of the Pentateuch shows an attempt to replace the original paradisiacal authoritarianism of creation with the development of a type of ideological authoritarianism, one that now has to deal with the radicalism unleashed by the rebellion of the human pair.

God recognizes in the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge a profound threat to the hierarchical, authoritarian order of creation and rushes through the garden to confront Adam and Eve. Some commentators’ notion that God preordained the breaking of his one command and then feigned disappointment or anger seems to drain the dramatic power of the story (Bechtel; Bal). I disagree with this reading, which renders God’s jealousy (downplayed by these commentaries) and his expulsion of the human pair from Eden too sedate. Rather, when God finds the human pair with the knowledge once reserved for him, he knows he needs to punish them before they use this wisdom to eat from the tree of life. If they eat from the tree of life and combine knowledge with immortality, man and woman would be God’s equal, and his reign over them would come to a swift end: “And the Lord God said, ‘Now that the man has become like one of us, knowing good and bad, what if he should stretch out his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat and live forever!’” (Berlin 17) This is a terrified God—an authoritarian trembling before a potentially imminent revolution from below. This moment is the dramatic core of the narrative—the threat of the human rebellion against the order of creation, which is tantamount to a rebellion against creation itself.

God punishes Adam and Eve by casting them out of Eden, the place where there is no work, where sleep has to be induced, and where dreams do not exist. At the garden’s entrance, God places insurmountable barriers to prevent the human beings from returning to Eden and gaining access to the tree of life. Paradisiacal authoritarianism is replaced by a type of authoritarian sovereignty backed up by violence: “So the Lord God banished him from the garden of Eden to till the soil from which he was taken. He drove the man out and stationed east of the garden of Eden the cherubim and the fiery ever-turning sword, to guard the way to the tree of life” (Berlin 18). Not only is the new hierarchy based on territorial division (inside Eden versus beyond) and backed up by enforcing police (the cherubim) and military technology (the fiery ever-turning sword), it also leads to a radically new mode of existence for human beings.
Humans shift from being sybaritic if subservient creatures to subservient and abject toilers. God’s punishment of Adam rings out, “Cursed be the ground because of you; by toil shall you eat of it all the days of your life: Thorns and thistles shall it sprout for you. But your food shall be the grasses of the field; by the sweat of your brow shall you get bread to eat…” (Berlin 18).

Eve’s punishment seems even more severe. Not only does she have to endure the agricultural revolution that turns human beings from fruit-pickers and creatures of abundance to tillers and creatures of scarcity, she is also punished in two other ways. First, God decrees that Eve will experience pain in childbearing: “In pain shall you bear children” (Berlin 17). Second and more important for my purposes here, Eve’s relative social position becomes fixed in the new post-Edenic hierarchy as subordinate to Adam—the “original” articulation of patriarchy, a patriarchy that is based on the circumscription and unidirectional channeling of her desire. After presenting the punishment about the suffering in childbirth, God tells Eve, “Yet your urge shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you” (Berlin 17). This is of major significance, because it is an attempt to instrumentalize the selfsame desire encountered as the force behind the eating of the fruit—Eve’s startling act of rebellion and emancipation. God’s decree re-inscribes desire back into the authoritarian paradigm. Once a multivalent substance that could combine diverse impulses and migrate across sensory and cognitive boundaries, desire becomes fixed in the realm of sexuality (or at the very least domesticity)23 and is utilized as a tool of oppression and the creation of hierarchical social formations. This circumscription of desire plays a key role in the patriarchal structure that develops beyond Eden. This structure, in turn, sets the stage for the development of full-fledged ideology, the likes of which is presented in the remainder of Genesis and the subsequent books of the Pentateuch. The core dualisms that form around the ultimate authority of God’s presence in the post-Edenic world include God/human, life/death, good/bad, male/female, human/animal, human/nature, pleasure/pain, and obedience/punishment. In addition, it could be postulated that a key element of the development of the patriarchal system was predicated on the politics of desire set forth in the postlapsarian moment of punishment. The descendants of Adam subordinate themselves to God, collaborate with Him, and thus lord over the descendants of Eve.

23 Lohr expands upon the use of the Hebrew term that is often translated as “desire” and provides a compelling argument that it could mean a “turning” toward or a “return” to.
Beyond the gates of Eden, Adam and Eve’s toil and suffering give rise to regenerative sleep. The link between sleep, toil, and the need for replenishment appears in the midrashic literature. The implication of the following quotation is that regenerative sleep is a product of the fall:

The purpose of the sleep that enfolded Adam was to give him a wife, so that the human race might develop, and all creatures recognize the difference between God and man. When the earth heard what God had resolved to do, it began to tremble and quake. “I have not the strength,” it said, “to provide food for the herd of Adam’s descendants.” But God pacified it with the words, “I and thou together, we will find food for the herd.” Accordingly, time was divided between God and the earth; God took the night, and the earth took the day. Refreshing sleep nourishes and strengthens man, it affords him life and rest, while the earth brings forth produce with the help of God, who waters it. Yet man must work the earth to earn his food. (Ginzberg 64-65)

Though temporally confusing, this midrashic passage clearly sets the origins of regenerative sleep in post-Edenic time. It is imaginable that at this moment, with the beginning of a type of sleep that comes from toil/exhaustion as opposed to inducement, the dream emerges as a third state of being different from both empty sleep and wakefulness. This “origin myth” of dreaming, as I said above, is not meant to reflect biblical literalism. Rather, it is proposed in the spirit of an “ironic” origin myth in order to open up dominant cultural formulations of authority and hierarchy to new radical potentialities for critique. If, as in Adam’s first slumber, sleep is nothingness, a fall into oblivion, and wakefulness is the (divinely) constructed territory beyond the gates of Eden, then the dreamscape might be seen as a zone beyond God’s power that can preserve the primary knowledge gained from the eating of the fruit from the tree of knowledge: that there exists the potential for a return to conditions that include an element of the chaotic “deep” in the post-creation world. The destabilizing of the creation narrative through the preserved element of chaos opens up a space for the introduction of anarchy in the sense of being singular, fluid, and resistant to fixed identities and hierarchy.

In the realm beyond Eden, ruled by sovereign and ideological instead of paradisiacal authoritarianism, the field of the dreamscape becomes a redoubt of human resistance to the
domination of a new paradigm of subjugation, created by a God concerned above all with controlling his “knowing” subordinates—the authoritarian ideal. But if the dream can be seen as an anarchic space, it is hardly a secure one. It comes under siege as soon as it emerges as a field distinct from postlapsarian territory—as demonstrated in Blake’s *Job* and, as I will show below, in Robert Frost’s “After Apple-Picking.” The notion of the dreamscape as a besieged space of freedom that is potentially beyond the grasp of authoritarian power and yet also subject to the encroachments, intrusions, and conquests of authoritarianism provides a new conception of anarchistic resistance. The movement from the territory of wakefulness to the field of the dreamscape contains a profound and yet diurnal rupture, one which evokes anarchy while immediately and often decisively weaving one back (at least partially) into the fabric of submission as the dreamscape gives way to its representation, the dream-text. In the daily rhythms of wakefulness, sleep, and dreaming, in other words, freedom and equality are radically proposed just as submission is reconstructed and reinforced.

The radicalism of the dreamscape understood as the post-Edenic space of chaos-in-creation opened up by Eve’s rebellion provides an alternative political conception to the liberal or traditional anarchistic view of power. While the liberal/anarchist origin myth of the individual rests on the “natural” right of freedom, the biblical origin myth of the dreamscape proposes that, rather, the human being is first created into a structure of authoritarian power—albeit a seemingly benign and materially comfortable one, a paradisiacal authoritarianism. The first act of resistance comes from a combination of material, aesthetic, and intellectual impulses into a multifaceted desire. Genesis describes Eve’s radical action in the following way: “When the woman saw that the tree was good for eating and a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was desirable as a source of wisdom, she took of its fruit and ate” (Berlin 17). This rebellion of corporeal (good for eating), aesthetic or sensorial (delight to the eyes), and intellectual (source of wisdom) desire results in a fundamental shift—what Genesis calls the gaining of “knowledge.” Freedom, then, is not outside of power or natural. It is, rather, the product of action/resistance won through the rebellion of multifaceted desire. Seen as such, Eve’s action resonates with Lewis Call’s description of the Nietzschean anarchist subject as “immersing the ‘self’ in the river of becoming” and Todd May’s understanding of the relationship of subject and power as “sedimentations of practice.”
The reading of Eve’s act as radical—and of her own volition (provoked not seduced)—cuts against attempts to read Genesis 2-3 in more harmonious ways. Specifically, the radical interpretation of Eve’s act challenges the understanding of Genesis 2-3 as a tale of human maturation (Bechtel; Bal). In the maturation story, Eve plays a key role in the transition from a preliminary state of being into a fully articulated human form—an inevitable transition into a state that includes differentiation, procreation, work, and death. In this reading, Eve’s act does not seem radical (anti-authoritarian) but desirable, a necessary plot device in line with God’s ultimate plan. Walker Jones summarizes Bal’s provocative understanding of the serpent’s role in this process:

Mieke Bal understands God and the serpent as teachers. They work together to help humanity mature and accept reality. God “the teacher prohibited a tree, in order that the humans should learn differentiation.” God and the serpent cooperate in helping the humans see the truth. Both God and the snake “are sly, withholding information but not actually lying. Yahweh stresses one aspect, mortality, the serpent the other, knowledge, of the same idea. Both God and the snake, in collaboration, trick the humans into accepting the unavoidable.” The woman’s decision to seek knowledge is good. “The wisdom alluded to cannot be but the acceptance of the human condition, including death, and the continuity of history that it allows.” The woman “is open to reality and ready to adopt it.” In this interpretation the humans disobey, but that disobedience is not a sin. It is a God-given opportunity for “emancipation from blind obedience.” The woman’s decision to seek knowledge displays God and the snake’s success as teachers. (282)

This argument seems to me to tame Eve’s desire. It avoids the strong traces of antagonism between serpent and God, and thus between forces of chaos and creation, accepting the monotheistic “revolution” as a total process of remaking the older poetic and New Eastern traditions. This more harmonious interpretation explains God’s swift and angry reaction not as authentic but as histrionic. In short, to argue that the whole scenario from the creation of Eve to the eating and sharing of the fruit was God’s design would mute key tensions in the text and empty the story’s dramatic core. Alternatively, the tensions can be accounted for if Eve’s desire
is connected with the serpent’s primal chaos. Together, desire and chaos threaten the order of creation and the hierarchy of authority in the world.

This conception of desire overlaps with the poststructuralist notion of desire found in Deleuze and Guattari in that it sees desire as a current or force with emancipatory possibilities. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, desire is not a product of a confluence of various types of impulses but a homogeneous force that brings “partial objects” together and breaks the flow of energy between them (Anti-Oedipus 5). Eve’s desire, by contrast, is a complex combination of impulses that gesture toward synthesis and (at least the positing of) momentary, if unstable, wholeness. The moment of rebellion depends precisely on the ability to unite the fragmented—to propose, in other words, a self with its body, senses, emotions, and intellect as a single political entity. The dreamscape does not promise such a radical act as the eating of the fruit, but by creating a rupture with, or a shattering of, the constructed, authoritarian world of wakefulness/reality it opens up the space for an assertion of anarchy. The difficulty, however, comes with preserving the potential of this space when moving from the dreamscape back into the landscape of the “real.” The challenges of this can be seen by looking at the radical articulations and authoritarian re-inscription of the dream in Robert Frost’s “After Apple-Picking.”

**Robert Frost’s “After Apple Picking”**

Robert Frost’s poem “After Apple Picking” (1914) demonstrates the complexity of the political contest over the dreamscape outlined above—between the potential for a radical opening of an anarchistic space and submission to subjugating authoritarian constructs. The poem opens with a scene of abandoned labor—a toiling scene reminiscent of the type of work God decrees to be Adam’s fate after the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Two images in the opening of the poem connect to Genesis. First, the “two-pointed ladder” that is “sticking through a tree” indicates the human attempt to aspire to a higher realm—one that gels with the irreversibility of the banishment from Eden and the subsequent inaccessibility of the divine space (68).24 The aspiration, in other words, is as constant or fixed as it is hopeless. More importantly, second, the apples gesture to the fruit of the tree of knowledge, which in the Western imagination is typically characterized as an apple (Júnior). The relevant aspect here is that the narrator of the poem has

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24 This notion of an ascent to the inaccessible is also symbolized by a ladder in Dürer’s Melencolia I.
no thought of eating the fruit—“there may be two or three/Apples I didn’t pick upon some bough” (68). The fruit is to be harvested and processed and/or sold. The eating of the fruit, an act of pleasure or desire, seems directly opposed to the harvesting of fruit as an act of work. The juxtaposition between pleasure/desire and work shows that this narrator has fully assimilated to the post-Edenic world. Meaning and a sense of self are gained through one’s labor.

The essence of agricultural labor is incompleteness—work begets work in an endless cycle—“And there’s a barrel that I didn’t fill…”—leading to dissatisfaction. The line “but I am done with apple picking now” is nicely ambiguous—meaning either a daily cessation or a stopping forever, a termination (68). It could be that the poem is suggesting that all cessations are potential terminations. This chafing against the world of toil acts as a prelude to the oncoming of a dream: “Essence of winter sleep is on the night,/ The scent of apples: I am drowsing off” (68). The accentuation of “winter” sleep works in a similar way as “done with apple picking now.” It could resonate with literal meaning, a sleep in wintertime—and the autumnal New England is certainly wintery. Alternatively, it can imply a last sleep, a death. A third option is that “winter sleep” can mean hibernation, the long regenerative sleep built into the cycle of nature. The literal meaning suggests an ordinary recuperative night’s sleep after a long day of labor—a bucolic image. Reference to hibernation adds a darker tint to the scene—for we know that hibernation is extremely unlikely and that the life rhythms of this toiler do not align with surrounding forces of nature. Even when nature retreats into a long slumber, in other words, this narrator must wake up each day and continue his work. The theme of death is even darker still and could be related to Adam and Eve’s ultimate punishment, the placing of an eternal obstacle blocking the tree of life and its promised immortality. The dominant concepts of work, nature, and sleep/death define the realm of wakefulness in the poem before the slip into the dream.

Frost’s poem captures the moment of transition between wakefulness and dream—that very moment when the pillars of reality seem to crumble away and new potentialities emerge. As the narrator drifts off to sleep, he pauses at the border between memory and the dreamscape. “I cannot rub that strangeness from my sight,” the narrator says, “I got from looking through a pane of glass/I skimmed this morning from the drinking trough/And held against the world of hoary grass” (68). This ice-screen distorts the gaze, and the narrator, the looker, is cast into uncertainty. All of a sudden, from the ordinary work-a-day world nothing can be known, nothing is sure. The momentary failure of vision brings forth the dreamscape, despite the almost instinctual attempt to
defend against it by rubbing “the strangeness” away. The ice sheet begins to melt in the narrator’s hands. He lets it “fall and break.” This shattering of the ice simultaneously creates and announces the presence of the dreamscape. This is the anarchistic moment, as the shattering of the ice sheet indicates the fracturing of constructed “reality” and the spiraling toward a state of unbound chaos, which resonates with the moment in Genesis 1, discussed above, directly preceding creation when the earth was “unformed” (Berlin 12). The shattering, in this sense, announces the presence of the metaphoric “serpent” of creation, the entropic force of un-ordering within the constructed order.

Not only does the melting and subsequent shattering (a combination of a metamorphosis and a destruction or annihilation) of the ice sheet usher the narrator forward into the dream, it casts turbulence back onto the other side of the border—calling into question the ability to clearly and cleanly distinguish one state of being (dreaming) from the other (wakefulness). “It melted, and I let it fall and break,” the speaker says, adding the qualification, “But I was well/Upon my way to sleep before it fell,/And I could tell/What form my dreaming was about to take” (68). This qualification of the melting and shattering of the ice sheet circles the poem back to its beginning and to the image of “My long two pointed ladder’s sticking through a tree/Toward heaven still” (68). The images of the ladder, of the apples still clinging to the boughs of the tree, and the partially filled barrel now sway between waking memory and dream, making it impossible to draw a temporally absolute line between them—calling to mind one formal definition of “dreamscape” as a “dream-like” space. The claim that the narrator could “tell what form [his] dreaming was about to take” is rendered highly questionable. Most likely, he can tell what will take place in the dream because he is there experiencing it. The ice sheet has already been shattered. The temporal confusion and the blurred distinction between memory and dream add to the narrator’s dislocation. The content of the reported dream continues to blur the dreamscape with memory. This blurring is not confined to thoughts, but includes traces of the senses—touch, smell, hearing, and even one’s very equilibrium.

Magnified apples appear and disappear,
Stem end and blossom end,
And every fleck of russet showing clear,
My instep arch not only keeps the ache,
It keeps the pressure of the ladder-round.
I feel the ladder sway as the boughs bend.
And I keep hearing from the cellar bin
The rumbling sound
Of load on load of apples coming in. (68-69)

Individual images in this dream-text could be analyzed in a multitude of ways, but instead I want
to point to the way the narrator of the poem offers the first inklings of an interpretation even
while, seemingly, still at least half-immersed in the dreamscape, a sort of hypnagogic state. In so
doing, the narrator presents the anarchic potential of the dreamscape and then proceeds to weave
it into the fabric of subjugating power through the dream-text.

The critical moment comes directly after the flood of sensory images presented above.
With the rumbling sound of apples still resonating in the narrator’s ear, he states, “For I have had
too much/Of apple-picking: I am overtired/Of the great harvest I myself desired” (69). The
dream, then, inspires in the narrator an expression of weariness. It is a nightmarish replaying of
the daily sensorium of harvesting. In this nightmare, work loses its bearing on a higher purpose,
and the collapse of the notion of purposeful work in turn calls into question the purpose of sleep
as an act of strengthening and rejuvenation. If work and therefore sleep have no greater purpose,
then the picking of apples appears nothing but an endless repetition of the same act, as the
narrator says, “There were ten thousand thousand fruit to touch,/Cherish in hand, lift down, and
not let fall” (69). The doubling of the word “thousand” transforms the description from one of
ordinary labor into one of a behavior bordering on the mechanistic. If the act of harvesting has
lost meaning, the division between good apples and cider apples is also meaningless—as is the
extreme care taken in inspecting and preserving each individual specimen. These are economic
decisions, decisions about value and fungibility—and there is no doubt that the work of
harvesting has transformed this man into a being guided and organized by economic concerns.
Even if the apple picking can (or should) be read metaphorically, the logic is still that of the
market.

Aspects of the dream-text, however, undermine this logic by presenting to the narrator
the apple as an aesthetic object rather than an economic unit: “Magnified apples appear and
disappear,/Stem end and blossom end./And every fleck of russet showing clear…” (68). Henry
David Thoreau, too, makes the distinction between apples as market objects and their nature as wild fruit when he describes the farmer carting his harvest to market for sale: “Though [the farmer] gets out from time to time, and feels of [the apples], and thinks they are all there, I see the stream of their evanescent and celestial qualities going to heaven from his cart, while the pulp and skin and core only are going to market. They are not apples, but pomace” (Wild Fruits 75). Thoreau continues:

Almost all wild apples are handsome. They cannot be too gnarly and crabbed and rusty to look at. The gnarliest will have some redeeming traits even to the eye. You will discover some evening redness dashed or sprinkled on some protuberance or in some cavity. It is rare that the summer lets an apple go without streaking or spotting it on some part of its sphere. It will have some red stains, commemorating the mornings and evenings it has witnessed; some dark and rusty blotches, in memory of the clouds and foggy, mildewy days that have passed over it; and a spacious field of green reflecting the general face of Nature,—green even as the fields; or a yellow ground, which implies a milder flavor,—yellow as the harvest, or russet as the hills. (Wild Fruits 87)

Glimmers—but just glimmers, and maybe mere suggestions—of Thoreau’s thoroughly anti-economic view of the human’s relationship to the apple—and by extension to nature—are contained in Frost’s narrator’s interpretation.

Of the radical implications of the dreamscape in the poem, however, the anti-market economic one is the safest. The anarchic elements—the distorting/failure of vision, the melting and shattering of the ice sheet, the blurring of the boundaries between memory and dream, the collapse of the linearity of time—are pushed aside in order for the narrator to turn back to the opening question of the poem—whether the essence of his sleep touches on ordinary daily routines, the relationship between the individual and nature, or whether it evokes the notion of death:

One can see what will trouble
This sleep of mine, whatever sleep it is.
Were he not gone,
The woodchuck could say whether it’s like his
Long sleep, as I describe its coming on,
Or just some human sleep. (69)

The clear allusion to death with the phrases “long sleep” and “human sleep” re-solidifies the subjectivity of the narrator and pulls him out of the dreamscape, even though this thought could very well have occurred within it. Vision is reaffirmed (“one can see”) as the dreamscape becomes an interruption of recuperative sleep and therefore bothersome and useless (“what will trouble/This sleep of mine”). Seemingly within the dream, or at the very least on the border of the dreamscape, the narrator begins to interpret the dream (to create a dream-text of it) in ways that lessen or ignore its radical implications, its anarchic moments, and instead focus on inscribing meaning back into the broader system of power that the dream seems to be chafing against—the world of diurnal toil guided by economic logic.

If “long sleep” and “human sleep” with their allusions to regeneration and/or death point to the re-solidifying and fixing of subjectivity, the moment with the ice sheet indicates the opposite: the potential fragility and fragmentation of the self, the unreliability of vision, and the heightening and at the same time confusion of the senses, which inverts or at least equalizes the relationship between reason and affect. The radical moment, in other words, calls unified or crystalized subjectivity into question by forcing it to exist simultaneously to the shattered or “dis-identified” self. It calls vision into question—and with it the whole system of cognition based on knowledge and judgment. The radical moment, the shattering, topples the hierarchical dominance of reason over affect, without, however, inverting the hierarchy to claim the primary of the senses over thought. Here, Frost is closer to Thoreau’s description of transcendence and self-becoming as a type of dis-identification:

Drifting in a sultry day on the sluggish waters of the pond, I almost cease to live and begin to be. A boatman stretched on the deck of his craft and dallying with the noon would be as apt an emblem of eternity for me as the serpent with his tail in his mouth. I am never so prone to lose my identity. I am dissolved in the haze. (Journal 7)
In the post-anarchist imagination, authority is built on the hardening of identity as part of a broader structure of power that supports hierarchy and material inequality. The anarchism opened up by the emergence of the dreamscape ruptures this structure of power by calling into question—or radically challenging—its basic assumptions about selfhood, relationships, time, space, and perception. Frost’s narrator experiences such a moment of radical possibility. As my analysis of the poem indicates, however, this anarchism is fleeting and fragile. It is immediately challenged by the intrusion of authoritarian impulses, demonstrating the ubiquity of power as discussed above in relation to post-anarchist theory. On the other hand, the authoritarian concepts cannot fully displace the primary anarchism, and thus Frost’s poem exists in a state of tension between its radical impulses and its authoritarian reflections. The following chapters will explore this tension across an array of dream-texts, mapping the twin trajectories of anarchism and authoritarianism in the traditions of thinking about dreaming.

Conclusion
The dreamscape’s potential as a site of anarchy in the sense described above positions it as a contested field or political space. Regimes of power recognize this anarchistic potential and seek to impose ideological/territorial structures on the dreamscape, foremost by establishing interpretive schemata and utilizing them for the production of dream-texts. Such interpretive schemata become embedded in culture and consciousness, making it difficult to think about dreaming without immediately applying narrative logic and interpretive concepts. This logic and these concepts shift over time—though not necessarily in a progressive sense. Elements of ancient dream interpretation still infuse popular consideration of dreaming today, as evidenced by Jungian dream theory’s reliance (see Chapter 4) on a set of traditional symbols or concepts that reflect the “collective unconscious.”

However, despite attempts of regimes of power to invade, dominate, or conquer the dreamscape, thus banishing or limiting its potential as an anarchistic site of resistance, the dreamscape continues to evade total occupation and to assert a counter-force against interpretive circumscriptions. This counter-pressure can be productively understood as a product of the origin of the dreamscape, in other words as the remnant of the chaos-in-creation contained in Eve’s “desirous” rebellion against the authoritarianism that structured the prelapsarian Garden of Eden. This chaos can be understood in two ways. The first is as an entropic force against all fixed
orders, definitions, and identities. This is the chaos of the primal “deep,” represented by the serpent. This “serpent” enacts the principles of radical equality, freedom from authority, and the disintegration of selfhood. There can be no “self” before the creation of a cosmic order that houses it. At the same time, the second force, the force of desire, is an integrating one—a momentary bringing together of affective, intellectual, and aesthetic impulses in order to act. Eve becomes a free self through this emancipatory act. The origins of the dreamscape in the aftermath of the humans’ expulsion from Eden mirror the development of the authoritarian structures of post-lapsarian life: the development of a controlling and internalized ideology, a regime of work together with the hierarchical structures of agrarian life, and a social structure built on clear lines of power, with the patriarchal formation as one of the first articulations.

As the following chapters will demonstrate, these anarchistic impulses of the primal dreamscape put pressure on their representative dream-texts. Dream-texts, therefore, despite their ideological implications, are fundamentally unstable—containing within themselves the metaphorical serpent, that entropic or disintegrative force of disorder and deconstruction of hierarchy. This anarchistic potential can be almost entirely circumscribed, as I argue is the case with Freud and Jung (Chapters 3 and 4). It can also be minimized in the (witting or unwitting) service of supporting authoritarian structures, as I have demonstrated with Blake’s Job, Frost’s “After Apple-Picking,” and Jacob’s dream of the ladder in Genesis (Chapter 2). Close analysis of the dream elements in these works situates them as hovering between radical and authoritarian impulses, and presents new frameworks for understanding their politics. Other works, like those of Jean Rhys and Franz Kafka (Chapters 4 and 5), undermine to a greater extent the stable status of the dream-text to gesture toward the anarchic attribute of the dreamscape. Both Rhys and Kafka have been described as anarchists without much specificity. By focusing on dreams in their works, I aim to articulate a more developed understanding of what type of anarchism their work represents. Finally, while the neurobiological discourse on dreaming described in Chapter 6 presents a possible opportunity to escape the narrative logic of the dream-text partially or even fully, it does so only by immersing itself into the discursive streams of pharmacological capitalism and technophile fantasy.