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Emotion in Conflict and Negotiation:
Introducing the Emotions as Social Information (EASI) Model

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Abstract

There is an increasing realization in the social and organizational sciences that emotions play a crucial role in organizational behavior. In this chapter I review the current state of research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation. The review shows that a great variety of emotions, such as anger, happiness, guilt, regret, disappointment, and worry, have pervasive effects on negotiation behavior and conflict development. However, the review also reveals some inconsistent findings, especially with regard to the impact of anger and happiness on cooperation and competition. To understand these apparent inconsistencies, I introduce a new model of the interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation—the *Emotions as Social Information* (EASI) model. The EASI model posits that emotions may exert interpersonal influence via two distinct paths—an informational-strategic path and an affective-relational path. Behavior is proposed to depend on the relative strength of these two routes, which is in turn determined by individuals' information processing tendencies and a number of situational characteristics, which are also discussed. I conclude by identifying some avenues for future inquiry.
Emotion in Conflict and Negotiation:
Introducing the Emotions as Social Information (EASI) Model

Conflict is omnipresent in organizational life. One of the most common and constructive ways of resolving conflict is through negotiation, which can be defined as a discussion between two or more parties aimed at resolving a perceived divergence of interests (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). For example, members of a work team may negotiate the division of labor, employees may negotiate with their bosses about a salary raise, and CEOs may negotiate the terms of a merger. As we all know from personal experience, conflict and negotiation often bring about intense emotions, which may in turn strongly influence negotiation behavior and conflict development (Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004). But how do emotions influence conflict behavior? In this chapter I review research that is pertinent to this question, and I introduce a model that accounts for the interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation: the Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model.¹

When thinking about the role of emotions in conflict and negotiation, it is helpful to distinguish between intrapersonal effects and interpersonal effects (cf. Morris & Keltner, 2000; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a). Intrapersonal effects refer to the influence of an individual’s emotions on his or her own behavior. Among other things, positive moods and emotions have been shown to increase concession making (Baron, 1990), stimulate creative problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), increase joint gains (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Carnevale & Isen, 1986), increase preferences for cooperation (Baron, Fortin, Frei, Hauver, & Shack, 1990), reduce the use of contentious tactics (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), and increase the use of cooperative negotiation strategies (Forgas, 1998). By contrast, negative affect has been shown to decrease initial offers (Baron et al., 1990), decrease joint gains
(Allred et al., 1997), promote the rejection of ultimatum offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), increase the use of competitive strategies (Forgas, 1998), and decrease the desire for future interaction (Allred et al., 1997). Because this research has recently been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere (see Barry et al., 2004), I will not go into detail here. Let it suffice to say that a substantial number of studies have now consistently demonstrated that individuals experiencing positive affect tend to be more cooperative and conciliatory, whereas individuals who are in a negative affective state tend to be more competitive and reluctant to make concessions.

The purpose of this chapter is to review and integrate research on the interpersonal effects of emotions, that is, the way one party’s emotions may affect other people’s behavior. After two decades of an almost exclusive focus on intrapersonal effects, recent years have witnessed a rapidly growing attention for this topic. Scholars working in this new area of research have asked themselves questions such as, How do negotiators respond to their counterpart’s emotions? Can emotions be strategically used to extract concessions? If so, which emotions would be most effective in eliciting compliance? And, how do negotiators react to opponent’s expressions of anger? Will they be intimidated and give in, or will they feel affronted and become intransigent? These and other questions will be answered in this chapter, which unfolds as follows. First, I briefly discuss relevant theoretical perspectives on the interpersonal effects of emotions in general, which will facilitate understanding of the effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation. I then review the rapidly growing body of empirical findings, and identify consistencies and inconsistencies among these findings. After that, I introduce the Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model of the interpersonal effects of emotions in social and organizational life, which aims to integrate the research that has been conducted so far and reconcile apparently inconsistent findings by distinguishing two distinct paths of emotional
Influence and identifying two sets of key moderators. The chapter closes with suggestions for future research.

**Interpersonal Effects of Emotions**

In his 1996 article titled "Emotions are social," Parkinson proposed that emotions are best viewed as social rather than individual phenomena. Indeed, inspired by the early writings of Darwin (1872), researchers have identified a number of important social functions of emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). At the interpersonal level emotions convey information to others about an individual's feelings (Ekman, 1993), social intentions (Fridlund, 1992; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), and orientation toward the relationship (Knutson, 1996). Further, emotional expressions may evoke reciprocal or complementary emotions in others that may in turn help individuals respond adaptively to social events (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). For example, expressions of anger have been demonstrated to elicit fear in observers (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), and displays of distress have been shown to elicit sympathy (Eisenberg et al., 1989). Finally, emotions have been argued to serve as positive or negative reinforcers for other individuals' behavior (Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1983). More specifically, positive emotions may encourage others to continue their course of action, whereas negative emotions may serve as a call for behavioral adjustment (Averill, 1982; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

Through these various mechanisms emotional expressions may influence interpersonal behavior and regulate social interaction. In the context of conflict and negotiation, the vast majority of studies focused on the effects of anger and, sometimes, happiness. My review of the empirical literature starts with these studies, not only because they are more numerous than studies on other emotions, but also because they marked the beginning of this new, burgeoning
area of research.

Studies on Anger and Happiness

In the first empirical study of the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations, Van Kleef et al. (2004a) investigated the effects of anger and happiness. In the course of a computer-mediated negotiation, participants received information about their (simulated) opponent's emotional state. For example, participants would read messages from their opponent saying that "this negotiation pisses me off" or "this offer makes me really happy." The results showed that participants with an angry opponent made larger concessions than did participants with a non-emotional opponent (control condition), whereas participants with a happy opponent made smaller concessions. A second study revealed that negotiators used their opponent's emotions to identify his or her limits, and subsequently used this information to make a counter-offer. Negotiators who were confronted with an angry opponent estimated the opponent's limit to be high, and to avoid costly impasse they made relatively large concessions. Conversely, negotiators with a happy opponent judged the opponent's limit to be low, felt no need to concede to avoid impasse, and accordingly made relatively small concessions. This experiment further revealed that the effects of anger and happiness are mitigated when the opponent makes large concessions and thereby undermines the focal negotiator's motivation to take the other's emotion into account. Finally, a third study indicated that the effects of anger and happiness are diminished when the focal negotiator's attention is distracted from the opponent's emotion.

Compatible findings were obtained in two experiments by Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006). In a scenario study and in a face-to-face negotiation experiment in which one of the negotiators was instructed to display either anger or no emotion, they found that participants conceded more to angry as opposed to non-emotional counterparts. Furthermore, and in line with Van Kleef et
al's (2004a) finding that negotiators use their opponent's emotions to infer the other's limit, Sinaceur and Tiedens demonstrated that the effects of anger and happiness are mediated by the focal negotiator's appraisal of the opponent's toughness, with angry opponents appearing tougher and therefore eliciting larger concessions than happy counterparts.

These studies suggest that emotions provide important strategic information (e.g., limits, toughness), which may in turn influence observers’ behavior. Building on this idea, Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2004b) examined whether the effects of anger and happiness depend on the focal negotiator's motivation to consider the information that is provided by the other's emotions. In three experiments they found strong support for this idea. Experiment 1 revealed that negotiators' tendency to concede more to an angry opponent than to a happy one was moderated by individual differences in need for cognitive closure (see Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Participants with a low need for cognitive closure (high motivation) were strongly affected by the opponent's emotion, whereas those with a high need for cognitive closure (low motivation) were unaffected. Experiment 2 revealed a similar pattern for a situational manipulation of motivation. Participants who negotiated under low time pressure (high motivation) were strongly influenced by the other's emotion, whereas those under high time pressure (low motivation) were not. Furthermore, this moderating effect of time pressure was mediated by information processing—participants who negotiated under high time pressure engaged in less thorough information processing, which rendered them impervious to the information about their counterpart's emotional state. Finally, in keeping with other research showing that power reduces the motivation to consider information about other people (e.g., De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Fiske, 1993), a third study showed that low-power negotiators conceded more to an angry counterpart than to a happy one, whereas high-power negotiators
were unaffected by the other's emotion.

In a study on online negotiation, Friedman et al. (2004) obtained compatible findings. They argued that responses to another's anger expressions depend on one's position in the negotiation. Negotiators who are in a weak position, they argue, are more likely to respond in a conciliatory fashion to an opponent's anger than are negotiators with a strong negotiation position. In line with this reasoning, Friedman et al. found that expressions of anger elicited concessions when observers had a vulnerable position (i.e., an unfavorable reputation). However, when observers had a strong position (a good reputation), the other's anger expressions triggered anger in the observing party, and thereby reduced the likelihood of settlement.

The importance of the negotiator's (power) position in determining the interpersonal effects of emotions is underscored by a number of other studies as well. Sinaceur and Tiedens' (2006) study revealed that only negotiators who had few alternatives to a negotiated agreement (i.e., low power) conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one; participants who had ample alternatives (high power) were unaffected by the other's emotion. Replicating and extending these findings, Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, and Manstead (2006) showed that the moderating influence of power generalizes across different samples (undergraduate students, general population, managers), research methods (laboratory experiment, field simulation, scenarios), and power bases (number of alternatives, quality of best alternative, managerial support, and legitimate power). In a series of five studies in the Netherlands and Italy, the authors showed that negotiators with few or poor alternatives to a negotiated agreement, little support from their management, or low legitimate power (i.e., power based on one's position in an organization) were strongly affected by their opponent's anger. In contrast, negotiators with many or highly attractive alternatives, strong support from management, or high legitimate
power were immune to their counterpart's emotional state.

The studies discussed so far point to what one might call the beneficial effects of anger (and the disadvantageous effects of happiness). However, as one might expect, research has also documented negative effects of anger. First, a number of studies have found detrimental effects of anger on interpersonal liking and related constructs. Negotiators dealing with an angry (as opposed to a happy or non-emotional) opponent have been shown to develop a more negative impression of the other and to be less satisfied with the negotiation (Van Kleef et al., 2004a), to become angry themselves (Friedman et al., 2004; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), and to be less willing to engage in future interaction (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004b). Furthermore, two of these studies provide support for the intuitively plausible idea that expressing anger may also have aversive consequences for a negotiator's immediate economic outcomes. Friedman et al. found that negotiations are more likely to break down when negotiators express anger toward an opponent with a strong negotiation position. Additional evidence is provided by a series of studies by Kopelman et al. (2006). In a first study, they showed that negotiators who displayed negative affect (or no emotion) were less likely to incorporate a future business relationship in the contract than were those who expressed positive affect. In a second study, Kopelman et al. found that negotiators who strategically displayed negative affect were less likely to close a deal than were those who expressed positive affect, because counterparts were less willing to pay a negotiator who expressed negative (rather than positive) affect. Finally, in a third experiment, negotiators made more extreme demands when facing a partner who strategically displayed negative (rather than positive or neutral) affect.

In sum, a number of studies have documented beneficial effects of anger, showing that negotiators make larger concessions when confronted with an angry opponent as compared to a
happy or non-emotional one. However, these studies also generated negative effects of anger on experienced emotions, impressions of the partner, and willingness to engage in future negotiation. Moreover, some studies provided evidence that expressions of negative emotions may backfire, decreasing the likelihood of successful deal-making and impairing negotiation outcomes. These inconsistent effects of anger versus happiness on conflict and negotiation behavior and outcomes suggest that one or more moderators are at play. Before discussing some candidate moderators I first review the sparse research on other emotions.

**Studies on Other Emotions**

Although the number of studies on the interpersonal effects of anger (and, to a lesser degree, happiness) is rapidly growing, the amount of research that has focused on other emotions is severely limited. Nevertheless, the studies that are out there provide some important insights into the workings of emotions in conflict and negotiation. For example, Thompson, Valley, and Kramer (1995) investigated how an opponent's signs of disappointment versus happiness affect a focal negotiator's judgments regarding negotiation success. They found that, independent of objective negotiation performance, negotiators felt more successful when the opponent was disappointed rather than happy. This finding indicates that negotiators take the other's disappointment as a signal that the other was hoping for more, suggesting that they themselves did a good job in extracting concessions from the other.

In a similar vein, Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2006) addressed emotions that may arise as a result of the appraisal that one has taken too much or received too little from one's opponent. Specifically, the authors focused on the interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret on demands and concessions in negotiations. In a first experiment they showed that participants whose opponents expressed emotions of appeasement (guilt or regret)
developed a positive impression of their opponents but were non-conciliatory in the level of their demands. By contrast, participants whose opponents showed supplication emotions (disappointment or worry) rated their opponents less positively, but they made larger concessions in the course of the negotiation.

These findings were replicated and extended in a second experiment, which considered the role of trust. The data revealed that individuals with low levels of dispositional trust were more likely to discount the other's emotions rather than take them into account when forming their negotiation strategy. Accordingly, negotiators high in trust responded with high demands to a guilty opponent and with low demands to a disappointed opponent, whereas negotiators low in trust did not respond differentially to their opponent's emotions. This experiment also shed light on the processes underlying the effects of guilt and disappointment. Results pertaining to participants' interpretation of their counterpart's emotions indicated that guilt is interpreted to mean that the other has claimed too much, whereas disappointment is taken as a signal that the other has received too little.

The experiment further showed that negotiators with high levels of trust made smaller demands to a disappointed opponent than to a guilty one because the other's disappointment led them to lower their goals, whereas the other's guilt led them to raise their goals. In a third experiment, Van Kleef et al. (2006) manipulated trust by varying participants' expectations regarding the opponent's cooperative versus competitive orientation (see Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002), and the results of Experiment 2 were replicated. Participants who expected a cooperative opponent exhibited higher levels of trust and made larger concessions to a disappointed opponent and smaller concessions to a guilty opponent. By contrast, subjects who were led to believe that the opponent had a competitive orientation were
less trusting and did not respond differentially to the opponent's disappointment versus guilt.

In short, the few studies that have addressed emotions other than anger and happiness indicate that emotions such as guilt, regret, disappointment, and worry, too, have theoretically meaningful interpersonal effects on negotiation behavior and conflict development. These discrete emotions signal specific information that may subsequently feed into negotiators’ strategic decision-making, and thereby affect their cooperative versus competitive tendencies.

The Emotions as Social Information (EASI) Model

As is clear from the above, research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation has produced considerable converging evidence regarding the effects of discrete emotions on conflict behavior and outcomes. However, we have also seen inconsistent findings, especially with regard to the effects of anger. In order to integrate previous findings and resolve the apparent inconsistencies I now introduce the Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model (see Figure 1), which was developed to account for the interpersonal effects of emotions in social and organizational life. Below I discuss the main propositions of the model.

One of the core foundations of the EASI model is the idea that emotions provide information. As alluded to earlier, the idea is that emotional expressions convey information about an individual's thoughts, feelings, and intentions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). In this way emotions may influence other's behavior by informing them about the individual's wishes and possible future course of action. Emotions also tend to evoke complementary or reciprocal emotions in others, which may in turn inform their behavior (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Finally, emotions can serve as incentives or deterrents for others' behavior (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Klinnert et al., 1983).

Although the relationship between emotion and information is also featured in other
models, such as the affect-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), the affect priming model (Bower, 1981), and the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995), the EASI model is notably different in a number of respects. First, in contrast to other models, EASI is a model of interpersonal (rather than intrapersonal) effects. That is, the purpose of the EASI model is to predict how one person’s emotional expressions affect other people’s behavior. Thus, unlike other models, EASI can explain how negotiators are affected by their counterparts’ emotions. Second, EASI focuses predominantly on discrete emotions, as opposed to more diffuse mood states. As such, the EASI model moves beyond the valence approach that characterizes many other models, and posits that—just like each emotion has a specific appraisal pattern (see e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991)—each discrete emotion conveys specific information, the interpretation of which may depend on the situation. For example, in a negotiation an opponent’s anger may signal that one has to moderate one’s claims in order to reach an agreement. Finally, EASI distinguishes two distinct paths through which emotions may exert interpersonal influence: the strategic information path and the affective reactions path. The key assumption is that emotional expressions may elicit both strategic inferences and affective reactions, both of which may feed into behavior.

The Strategic Information Path

The EASI model posits that one of the two main processes through which emotions may exert effects on the interpersonal level is by providing strategic information. For example, as mentioned earlier, in a negotiation an opponent's anger may indicate that s/he has ambitious goals and is “hard to get” (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b), implying that one needs to make a better offer in order to reach agreement. As another example, an opponent's expressions of guilt or interpersonal regret may signal that the opponent feels s/he has asked too
much or conceded too little, which would imply that one can adopt a tough stance. Conversely, expressions of disappointment or worry may signal that the other has not received enough, which would mean that one may have to give in (Van Kleef et al., 2006). In short, the model posits that each discrete emotion conveys unique information, which observers may use to draw strategic inferences to determine their behavior.

**The Affective Reactions Path**

According to the EASI model, emotions may also exert interpersonal influence through a more affective route. Research has documented that, much in agreement with lay intuition, positive affect is more conducive to positive impressions, interpersonal liking, and constructive interpersonal relationships than negative affect (Fredrickson, 1998; Isen, 1987). Compatible effects on impressions have been found in negotiation research. As indicated earlier, negotiators’ expressions of anger (compared to neutral or positive expressions) have been found to produce negative impressions, low satisfaction, negative feelings, and a reduced willingness to engage in future negotiation (Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b), which promote competitive behavior. The association between emotional expressions and affective reactions is not confined to anger and happiness, for other emotions, too, have been found to affect interpersonal impressions. For instance, Van Kleef et al. (2006) showed that expressions of guilt and regret contribute to more favorable impressions than expressions of disappointment and worry. In sum, in addition to affecting negotiators’ behavior by providing strategic information about a counterpart’s intentions and aspirations, emotions may also influence behavior by eliciting affective reactions.

**Strategic Inferences Compete with Affective Reactions.**

The foregoing discussion suggests that individuals' reactions to another person's
emotional expressions may be fueled by two different motivations: (1) to act strategically and (2) to act on their “gut feelings”. In some situations these motivations may be congruent, but in many other cases they are likely to conflict. For example, when faced with an angry opponent one’s gut feelings may motivate one to retaliate, whereas strategic considerations may advice one to give in. Conversely, when faced with a happy opponent positive affective reactions may motivate affiliation and cooperation, while strategic considerations may invite competitive behavior. As a final example, expressions of guilt or regret may motivate one to reciprocate with cooperative behavior, but they may also promote exploitation. The EASI model proposes that the interpersonal effects of emotions on behavior depend on the relative strength of these two, often conflicting, motivations. In some situations strategic considerations may be so powerful that they completely overshadow affective reactions, while in other situations the reverse may be true. What, then, determines the relative predictive strength of the two motivations? The EASI model proposes two sets of moderators to answer this question: variables affecting individuals' information processing motivation and social-relational factors.

Information Processing

As pointed out above, a core assumption of the model is that emotions provide strategic information. Building on this idea, and drawing on models of information processing (see e.g. Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the EASI model posits that the interpersonal effects of emotions depend on the extent to which the emotion-perceiving individual is motivated to process the information that is inherent in those emotions. More specifically, the stronger the motivation to process the information, the stronger will be the relative predictive power of the strategic information path. Conversely, the relative predictive power of the affective reactions path is assumed to increase to the extent that information
Information processing motivation differs as a function of individual differences and characteristics of the situation (see De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003, for a review). Personality characteristics that promote information processing include, among other things, need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and fear of invalidity (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001). Examples of personality variables that are associated with a reduced processing motivation are need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) and personal need for structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Situational factors that increase information processing motivation include attractiveness of and personal involvement in the task (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), accountability (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Tetlock, 1992), and framing of outcomes in terms of losses (Dunegan, 1993). Conditions that have been shown to decrease processing likelihood include environmental noise (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991), mental fatigue (Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996), time pressure (Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991; Van Kleef et al., 2004b), and power (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000).

The EASI model predicts that individuals are more likely to act on the strategic information conveyed by other’s emotions to the degree that they are motivated to pay attention to and process this strategic content. In line with this prediction, research has found that negotiators exhibit stronger strategic responses to their counterpart’s emotions (i.e., more concessions to an angry opponent than to a happy one) when they have a low rather than a high need for cognitive closure, when there is low rather than high time pressure (Van Kleef et al., 2004b), and when they have low rather than high power (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni et al., 2006). Apparently, factors affecting individuals’ information processing
tendencies moderate their reactions to the strategic information provided by other’s emotions. As a further illustration of this point, Van Kleef et al. (2004b) demonstrated that the moderating influence of time pressure on negotiators’ responses to their counterpart’s emotions was mediated by the depth of their information processing.

**Social-Relational Factors**

The second class of moderators that determine the relative impact of the affective reactions path and the strategic inferences path concerns social-relational factors. Among other factors, these include status relations (e.g., equal or different), the structure of interdependence (e.g., who depends more on whom), organizational or cultural norms pertaining to the expression of emotion (e.g., the presence or absence of “display rules”; Matsumoto, 1993), the way the emotion is expressed (e.g., whether the intensity of the expression is commensurate with the significance of the situation), and the appropriateness of the emotion in light of its cause (e.g., whether the emotion is warranted given what happened). The idea is that emotional expressions are more likely to elicit strong affective responses (and thereby trigger the affective reactions path) when they are in some way unfitting given the situation. As the power of the affective reactions path thus increases, the relative predictive power of the strategic information path decreases, and negotiators should be less likely to act on the strategic implications of their counterpart’s emotions.

Some initial support for this prediction comes from a recent study by Steinel, Van Kleef, and Harinck (in press), who showed that negotiators responded in a conciliatory fashion to angry (as opposed to happy) opponents when the anger was directed at their offers, whereas they responded with competitive behavior when the anger was directed at them personally. According to the EASI model, directing negative emotions at a negotiator's behavior rather than at them
personally might be advisable for two reasons. First, directing negative emotions at someone's behavior may be seen as more acceptable and less affronting, resulting in less powerful affective reactions. As a result, the affective reactions path should have relatively low power in driving the target's behavior. This idea fits nicely with the famous advise to "separate the people from the problem" and direct negative feedback at a negotiator's offers rather than at them personally (Fisher & Ury, 1981). Second, emotions may be more informative when they are specifically targeted toward a person's concrete behavior. As a result, the predictive strength of the strategic information path should be higher when anger is directed at a negotiator's offers rather than at their behavior. In support of this idea, Steinel et al. (in press) found that the opponent's expressions of anger affected negotiators' appraisals of the opponent's limits (and thereby their behavior) when the anger focused on the negotiator's offers, but not when it focused on them as a person.

In another recent study, Van Kleef and Côté (2007) examined the interplay between the two classes of moderators that determine the power of the strategic information path and the affective reactions path. They varied participants’ power (high or low) and manipulated the appropriateness of the counterpart’s emotion by installing a display rule that prohibited expressions of negative emotion (or not). They found that low-power negotiators (i.e., those with a relatively high information processing motivation) conceded more when the opponent expressed anger than when the opponent expressed no emotion. In contrast, high-power negotiators (those with a relatively low processing motivation) did not give in to their counterpart’s anger. Moreover, when the opponent’s anger violated a display rule, negotiators developed a strong desire to strike back at the opponent. As a result, high power (but not low power) negotiators with an angry opponent became more competitive than negotiators with a
non-emotional counterpart. This study illustrates that the effects of anger can be accurately predicted and understood by considering moderating variables that influence the relative impact of the strategic information path and the affective reactions path on conflict and negotiation behavior.

Contributions

Applying the EASI model to the area of conflict and negotiation is useful for two main reasons. First, it helps integrate and organize current scientific knowledge pertaining to the interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation. The idea that emotions provide strategic information, which is a central assumption of the model, serves as an organizing principle that helps to integrate and understand the effects of a great diversity of emotions, including anger, happiness, guilt, regret, disappointment, and worry. Furthermore, this notion may serve as a guiding principle in developing new research and generating hypotheses about the effects of other emotions which have not yet been studied. According to the model, the effects of any emotion can be predicted and understood by considering its specific meaning and the strategic and social information it conveys.

The second main contribution of the EASI model is that it helps to explain seemingly inconsistent findings by distinguishing two distinct paths of emotional influence and identifying two classes of moderators that determine the relative importance of each. For example, we can now begin to understand why anger sometimes has beneficial effects while at other times it has detrimental effects. To understand the disparate effects of anger, we must consider social-relational factors, such as the appropriateness of the anger expression, as well as considering individual and situational factors that determine negotiators’ information processing tendencies.

Directions for the Future
As became clear from the literature review, most research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation has focused on anger and happiness. In stark contrast, only a few studies have addressed the effects of other emotions, and as a result we know very little about their impact on conflict and negotiation behavior. There is a lot of room for fruitful research in this area. It would be interesting, for example, to investigate the workings of the strategic information path and the affective reactions path with other emotions such as guilt and disappointment. Can the interpersonal effects of guilt and disappointment on concession making be reversed by manipulating social-relational factors? For example, would disappointment backfire in a situation where such an emotion is inappropriate? And would expressions of guilt play out more favorably when the situation puts a strong emphasis on the importance of the interpersonal relationship, thus rewarding expressions of guilt? Furthermore, future research could invest in studying the interpersonal effects of emotions that have not yet been addressed in the context of conflict and negotiation, such as fear, sadness, embarrassment, and contempt, to name but a few.

Another avenue for future study concerns the long-term consequences of emotions. For example, how does anger influence the relationship between parties in conflict over time? Do the beneficial effects of anger persist over time, or do they diminish or even backfire in the long run? And how long or how often can one express anger without risking negative consequences? The EASI model would suggest that the effects of emotional expressions depend at least in part on the perceived appropriateness of the expression. One possible hypothesis that could be derived from the model would be that the favorable effects of anger persist for as long as the anger is deemed appropriate, and fade away or possibly reverse when the anger is perceived as inappropriate.
A final suggestion for future research concerns the role of conflict issues in negotiations. Negotiations may involve interests, factual issues, and normative issues (Harinck, De Dreu & Van Vianen, 2000). The conflict issue at hand influences the extent to which parties reach win-win agreements, and how they communicate with each other. For instance, negotiators are less likely to yield to the other party when normative issues rather than interests are at stake. The idea is that individuals are personally attached to their norms and values, and that making trade-offs on issues related to norms and values is inappropriate (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green & Lerner, 2000; Wade-Benzoni, Hoffman, Thompson, Moore, Gillespie, & Bazerman, 2002). Based on the EASI model it can be expected that anger will be less effective or even harmful when the negotiation centers around normative issues rather than interests, because in the former case people are more likely to perceive other's expressions of anger as unacceptable.

Conclusion

The review of research presented in this chapter shows that the study of interpersonal effects of emotions is burgeoning. Over the last ten years or so, a considerable number of studies have been conducted, which have contributed in important ways to our understanding of the social effects of emotions in organizational life. Now that there is a solid amount of empirical data, the time is ripe to start thinking about ways to integrate our current knowledge. In this chapter I made a first attempt to do so by introducing the Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model. Using a number of simple and testable assumptions, the model helps to integrate the knowledge we have accumulated so far, reconcile seemingly inconsistent findings, and guide future research endeavors. Beyond providing an overview of the current state of the art of research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in organizations, I hope that this chapter will stimulate future investigations in this fascinating and important area of research, which I expect
to blossom for years to come.


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Footnote

1 The Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model is a general model of the interpersonal effects of emotions in social and organizational life. Since a great deal of support for the model stems from research on conflict and negotiation, it provides a useful framework to organize and synthesize current knowledge about the interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation.
Figure 1. The Emotions as Social Information (EASI) Model