Fiscal policy under rules and restrictions
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List of Tables

2.1 Calibration of the model .................................. 53
2.2 Results of the model with benchmark calibration .......... 54
2.3 Results of the model with different $\beta_g$ ................. 55
2.4 Results of the model with different interest rates ($r$) ....... 56
2.5 Results of the model with different $\sigma^2_e$ ............... 57
2.6 Results of the model with different $\rho$ .................. 58
2.7 Results of the model with different $\mu$ ................... 59

3.1 Marginal effects of an increase in the tightness of the deficit restriction .. 152

4.1 List of variables ........................................... 212
4.2 Unweighted average - cyclically-adjusted primary deficit (as % of pot. GDP) in OECD countries ............................ 213
4.3 Unweighted average - output gap (in %) in OECD countries .... 214
4.5 Comparison - effects of the MT and the SGP on the CAPD - EU-14 (1980 - 2004) .................................... 216
4.6 Comparison - effects of the MT and the SGP on the CAPD - OECD-17 (1980 - 2004) ...................................... 217
4.7 List of variables of the robustness tests ...................... 218
4.8 Results summary of the robustness tests ..................... 219
4.9 Unweighted average - total deficit (as % of actual GDP) in OECD countries 227
4.1 Instrumental variables estimations .......................... 228
4.2 Effects of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the CAPD for the EU-14 (1980 - 2004) - homogeneous control variable coefficients 229
4.3 Effects of the MT and the SGP on the CAPD for the EU-14 (1980 - 2004) - heterogeneous control variable coefficients 230
4.4 Comparison - Effects of the MT and the SGP on the CAPD for the EU-14 (1980 - 2004) - homogeneous control variable coefficients 231
4.5 Effects of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the CAPD - OECD-6 (1980 - 2004) ............................................ 232
4.6 Effects of the MT and the SGP on the CAPD for the OECD-17 (1980 - 2004) - heterogeneous control variable coefficients 233
4.7 Effects of the MT and the SGP on the CAPD for the OECD-17 (1980 - 2004) - homogeneous control variable coefficients 234
4.8 Comparison - effects of the MT and the SGP on the CAPD for the OECD-17 (1980 - 2004) - homogeneous control variable coefficients 235
4.16 Inclusion of trade openness - EU-14 (1980 - 2004) ............ 244
4.17 Inclusion of trade openness - OECD-17 (1980 - 2004) ............ 245
4.23 Inclusion of GDP volatility - OECD-17 (1980 - 2004) ............ 251
4.29 Inclusion of GNEW - OECD-17 (1980 - 2003) ................... 257
4.38 Inclusion of GTYPE - OECD-17 (1980 - 2003) ................... 266
4.41 Inclusion of RAE - OECD-17 (1980 - 2003) ...................... 269
4.42 Estimation with heterogeneous output gap - Euro-11 .............. 270
4.43 Estimation with heterogeneous inflation - Euro-11 ............... 271
4.44 Panel unit root tests - results ...................................... 273
# List of Figures

2.1 Impulse responses for non-myopic government with benchmark parameters .......................................................... 60
2.2 Impulse responses for myopic government under debt constraint with benchmark parameters .......................................................... 61
2.3 Impulse responses for myopic government under primary deficit constraint with benchmark parameters .......................................................... 61
4.1 Cyclically-adjusted primary deficit (as % of potential GDP) - OECD regions .......................................................... 220
4.2 Cyclically-adjusted primary deficit (as % of potential GDP) - OECD countries .......................................................... 221
4.3 Scatter plots - cyclically-adjusted primary deficit x output gap .......................................................... 222
4.4 Total deficit (as % of actual GDP) - OECD countries .......................................................... 223