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Supplementary Materials
Supplementary Material Chapter 2
Supplement 2.1: Pilot Study 1 (Additional Details on Method)

Emotional Intensity

Depending on their assigned condition, participants rated the extent to which they felt the target emotion (sad, angry, worried, regretful, or generally bad) about the event, both before and after sharing it with the other, using a 100-point slider bar (0 = not at all to 100 = very much). Furthermore, to check whether participants indeed recalled an instance primarily involving the target emotion, we asked participants to rate the extent to which they felt sad, angry, worried, regretful, and bad at the time of the event, on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much).  

Furthermore, participants were asked several control questions about their sharing partner, including their gender, age, the type of relationship they had with them, general affect towards their partner afterwards, amount of previous sharing, subsequent sharing and their sharing goals. These data are available upon request.
Supplement 2.2: Pilot Study 1 (Additional Results)

Manipulation Check
To check whether participants indeed recalled an instance primarily evoking the target emotion, we conducted a repeated-measures analysis, with Emotion Condition as a between-subjects variable, and the Emotional Intensity ratings for all five emotions at the time of the event as a within-subjects variable. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, \( \chi^2(9) = 37.53, p < .001 \). Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (\( \varepsilon = .97 \)). A significant interaction effect between Emotion Condition and the experienced emotions emerged, \( F(15.49, 1065.09) = 26.84, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .28 \). For all means and standard deviations, see Table S2.1 below. Pairwise comparisons across emotion conditions showed that those in the anger condition experienced significantly more anger compared to those in the other four emotion conditions (all \( p < .001 \)). Similarly, those in the worry condition experienced more worry compared to those in the other four emotion conditions (all \( p < .001 \)), and those in the regret condition experienced more regret compared to those in the other four emotion conditions (all \( p < .021 \)). Also as intended, those in the sadness condition experienced significantly more sadness compared to those in the anger, regret, and worry conditions (all \( p < .001 \)). However, those in the sadness condition did not experience more sadness compared to those in the GNA condition (\( p = 1.000 \)). Finally, those in the GNA condition felt equally bad as sad (\( p = 1.000 \)).

39 Similarly, pairwise comparisons within conditions revealed that participants always experienced the target emotion most intensely compared to the other four emotions (all \( p' s < .028 \), with one exception: Those in the GNA condition felt equally bad as sad (\( p = 1.000 \)).
Table S2.1
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of Emotional Intensity Ratings for all Five Emotion Conditions of Pilot Study 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rated Emotion</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sung</td>
<td>Sadness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>90.12 (17.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>59.29 (35.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>55.56 (37.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regret</td>
<td>54.00 (35.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNA</td>
<td>68.55 (31.96)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N | 58 | 56 | 58 | 51 | 57

Emotional Intensity

We conducted a hierarchical linear regression to test the relative importance of all types of fulfilled sharing motives in predicting emotional intensity after sharing, while controlling for emotional intensity before sharing. In the first step, Pre-Sharing Emotional Intensity was added as a predictor of Post-Sharing Emotional Intensity using the Enter method. In the next step, all six fulfilled motives were added. The first model, which included only Pre-Sharing Emotional Intensity, was significant, $F(1, 278) = 163.04, p < .001$. More importantly, however, the second model including all types of fulfilled sharing motives did not lead to a significant change in explained variance, $R^2$ change = .02, $F(6, 272) = 1.64, p = .137$. Adding interaction terms between Emotion and all six motives in a third block in the regression model did not lead to a significant change in explained variance, $R^2$ change = .01, $F(6, 266) = .57, p = .752$. Fulfilment of any of the six support motives thus did not predict emotional intensity after sharing.
Supplement 2.3: Complete Report of Pilot Study 2

Introduction

The first pilot study was exploratory, designed to examine the type of sharing goals individuals report when sharing their emotions with others and how these relate to beneficial outcomes. The findings showed that, across emotions, socio-affective and cognitive support were the most important contributors to a positive sharing experience. Furthermore, arousing empathy and attention appeared a negative predictor of perceived benefits. Given the multitude of measures included in the first pilot study, we conducted a replication of this study to strengthen the confidence in our findings.

In this study, we adopted a slightly different design. Again, we asked participants to recall an instance in which they shared a specific emotional experience with another person, this time either with someone who did or did not respond in the way they had hoped for. By manipulating the recollection in this way, we aimed to learn more about what contributes to whether people feel that a sharing episode is satisfying or not, without explicitly asking for it. Certain needs may be relatively implicit and thus less accessible to self-report, but may become more explicit when violated. Indeed, recent research is increasingly showing that people can have non-conscious goals that can shape how they want to feel (Tamir et al., 2013), whether they will engage in emotion regulation (Mauss, Bunge, et al., 2007; Mauss, Cook, & Gross, 2007), and what kind of strategies they will select for doing so (Williams, Bargh, Nocera, & Gray, 2009).

Method

Participants

A total of 438 participants completed the study in exchange for $0.40, and were recruited through Crowdflower. Forty-three participants indicated that they failed to successfully recall an emotional instance and they were therefore removed from the dataset. Eleven cases were deleted because they participated multiple times. Furthermore, 37 participants did not follow the instructions (i.e., they did not recall an emotional event). This resulted in a final sample of 347 participants (68% male), with a mean age of 32.8 (SD = 9.7), ranging from 18 to 70 years.

Procedure

Participants were asked to recall an emotional experience that they had shared with someone who, depending on their assigned condition, either had or had not responded in a way that they had hoped for. First, they were asked some general
questions about the emotional event. Then, they were asked to think back at the sharing episode with the other person, and were asked to fill out several questionnaires concerning general information about the sharing partner, their sharing motives, the degree to which these motives were fulfilled, and several other potential benefits of sharing. Finally, they provided basic demographics about themselves, after which they were debriefed and thanked for participating. In total, the study took 10 to 15 minutes.

**Design and Material**

The study involved a 5 (Emotion: sadness, worry, anger, regret, or general negative affect) x 2 (Sharing Experience: satisfying vs. unsatisfying) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 10 conditions. Depending on the condition, participants were asked to recall a past event that had made them feel sad, worried, regretful, angry, or generally bad. Furthermore, half of the participants were asked to recall an instance that they had shared with another person who was uninvolved in the emotional situation itself, and who responded in a way they had hoped for (i.e., satisfying condition). The other half of the participants recalled an event that they had shared with someone who had not responded in the way that they had hoped for (i.e., unsatisfying condition).

Fulfilled sharing motives, perceived benefits, emotional intensity, and interpersonal closeness were all measured using the same items as in the original pilot study. Furthermore, we measured not only fulfilment of participants’ sharing motives, but also the strength of these motives before sharing. To this end, participants rated all of the same items as used in Study 1 (i.e., an adaptation of the Social Sharing Motives Scale, see Appendix A). The fulfilment of these motives was assessed twice: before and after sharing. Based on the factor analysis results of the original Pilot Study, we calculated subscale means for each of the six motives separately for pre-sharing motives and post-sharing fulfilment of those motives. From now on, we differentiate between these two by referring to desired and fulfilled sharing motives.40

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40 Furthermore, participants were asked several control questions about their sharing partner, including their gender, age, the type of relationship they had with them, general affect towards their partner afterwards, amount of previous sharing, subsequent sharing, time lapse between the event and sharing, as well study participation, their confidence in fulfilling their goals, and anticipated improvement in affect. These data are available upon request.
Results

Perceived Benefits

First, in order to establish whether the pattern of results in the pilot study replicated in the second pilot study, we entered all six fulfilled sharing motives as predictors of the perceived benefits scale in a regression analysis. We found the same three significant predictors as in the original Pilot Study. Again, Socio-Affective Support (β = .51, t[339] = 6.94, p < .001) and Cognitive Support (β = .17, t[339] = 2.14, p = .033) were significant positive predictors of Perceived Benefits. Furthermore, Arousing Empathy and Attention was a negative predictor of Perceived Benefits (β = -.18, t[339] = -2.43, p = .016). Venting, Informing, and Warning did not significantly predict perceived benefits (all ps > .376). Adding interaction terms between Emotion and all six motives in a second block in the regression model again did not lead to a significant change in explained variance, R² change = .01, F(6, 334) = .50, p = .806.

Sharing Experience

Furthermore, this study included two different recall conditions in order to assess which types of motives contributed to whether people judged a sharing episode as satisfying or not. To this end, a repeated-measures analysis was conducted with Sharing Experience condition (satisfying vs. unsatisfying sharing episode) and Emotion (sadness, worry, regret, anger, or general negative affect) as between-subjects factors, and Motive Phase (desired vs. fulfilled sharing motives) as a within-subject variable, for each of the six motives separately. The Motive Phase variable is thus indicative of potential discrepancies between desired and fulfilled sharing motives.

For three of six sharing motives, a significant interaction emerged between Motive Phase and Sharing Experience. These included Cognitive Support (F[1, 337] = 10.17, p = .002, ηp² = .03), Socio-Affective Support (F[1, 337] = 31.42, p < .001, ηp² = .09), and Arousing Empathy and Attention (F[1, 337] = 4.54, p = .034, ηp² = .01). In the satisfying sharing episode condition, participants reported to have obtained an amount of cognitive support that was equivalent to what they had desired (F [1, 337] = 2.22, p = .138, ηp² = .01), whereas in the unsatisfying condition, participants reported having received less cognitive support than initially desired (F [1, 337] = 9.17, p = .003, ηp² = .03). Similarly, in the satisfying condition, participants reported to have obtained the amount of socio-affective support that they had desired (F [1, 337] = 0.73, p = .395, ηp² < .01), whereas in the unsatisfying condition, participants reported having received less socio-affective support than initially desired (F [1, 337] = 50.42, p < .001, ηp² = .13). For Arousing Empathy and Attention, we observed the opposite pattern. In the satisfying condition,
participants reported having aroused more empathy and attention than initially desired (\(F[1, 337] = 9.59, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .03\)), whereas those in the unsatisfying condition reported having aroused as much empathy and attention as they had desired (\(F[1, 337] = 0.02, p = .922, \eta_p^2 < .01\)). Finally, no significant interactions emerged with Emotion (all \(ps > .05\)), indicating that the observed patterns were similar across all five emotion conditions.

**Emotional Intensity**

We conducted hierarchical linear regression to test the relative importance of all types of fulfilled sharing motives in predicting emotional intensity after sharing, while controlling for emotional intensity before sharing. In the first step, Pre-Sharing Emotional Intensity was added as a predictor of Post-Sharing Emotional Intensity using the Enter method. In the next step, all six fulfilled sharing motives were added. Again, the first model including only Pre-Sharing Emotional Intensity was significant, \(F(1, 345) = 4.10, p = .044\). Replicating the original pilot study, the second model including all types of fulfilled sharing motives did not lead to a significant change in explained variance, \(R^2_{\text{change}} = .03, F(6, 339) = 1.73, p = .114\). Adding interaction terms between Emotion and all six fulfilled motives in a third step in the regression model also did not lead to a significant change in explained variance, \(R^2_{\text{change}} = .03, F(6, 333) = 1.84, p = .091\). Again, fulfillment of any of the six sharing motives thus did not predict emotional intensity after sharing.

**Interpersonal Closeness**

We conducted hierarchical linear regression to test the relative importance of all types of fulfilled sharing motives in predicting interpersonal closeness. In the first step, Pre-Sharing Closeness was added as a predictor of Post-Sharing Closeness using the Enter method. In the next step, all six fulfilled sharing motives were added. Again, the first model including only Pre-Sharing Closeness was highly significant, \(F(1, 344) = 276.84, p < .001\). More importantly, including all fulfilled motives in the second model led to a significant increase in explained variance, \(R^2_{\text{change}} = .06, F(6, 338) = 6.86, p < .001\). Similarly to the original Pilot Study, obtained Socio-Affective Support was a significant positive predictor of interpersonal closeness after sharing, \(\beta = .28, t(337) = 4.56, p < .001\). Furthermore, Arousing Empathy and Attention was a significant negative predictor of interpersonal closeness after sharing, \(\beta = -.15, t (337) = -2.47, p = .014\). Cognitive Support, Informing, Warning, and Venting did not significantly predict interpersonal closeness after sharing (all \(ps > .135\)). Finally, adding interaction terms between Emotion and all six fulfilled motives in a third step in the regression model did not lead to a significant change in explained variance, \(R^2_{\text{change}} = .03, F(6, 333) = 1.84, p = .091\).
change < .01, \( F(6, 332) = .51, p = .802 \). Fulfilled sharing motives thus predicted interpersonal closeness similarly across all five emotion conditions.

**Discussion**

Replicating the results of the Pilot Study, we found that socio-affective support and cognitive support were the only positive predictors of perceived benefits, across emotions. Moreover, our more indirect test of contributors to a satisfying sharing episode largely supported these findings: Unsatisfying sharing instances were characterized by a lack of socio-affective and cognitive support (i.e., receiving less support than initially desired) as compared to satisfying sharing episodes, where no such discrepancy was observed. Slightly more puzzling, however, was that despite the finding that arousing empathy and attention was again a negative predictor of perceived benefits as well as interpersonal closeness, satisfying sharing instances were actually characterised by having aroused more empathy and attention than initially desired.

Furthermore, replicating the pilot study, we found that participants always reported a reduction in emotional intensity after sharing, regardless of whether the other responded in the way they had hoped for. Although this may seem surprising, this finding is in line with previous research showing that people seem to believe in the general effectiveness of sharing and always report benefits after having done so (see Zech & Rimé, 2005). Finally, also replicating the Pilot Study, socio-affective support was a positive predictor of interpersonal closeness, which is in line with previous research (e.g., Batenburg & Das, 2014; Nils & Rimé, 2012) as well as the general finding of Studies 1 and 2 indicating that socio-affective support is most appreciated.

In sum, based on the two pilot studies, it seems safe to conclude that socio-affective support and cognitive support are positive predictors of perceived benefits, contributing to a satisfying sharing experience. Furthermore, of these two types of support, it appears to be socio-affective support in particular that brings about enhanced interpersonal closeness.
Supplement 2.4: Pilot Test Vignettes Study 1

The content of the vignettes (see Appendix A) was based on a pilot test. Twenty-two participants read all vignettes and were asked by means of free labelling which emotion(s) the vignette evoked in them (maximum of three emotions). For the sadness vignette, 95% of the participants reported feeling sad. Similarly, for the anger vignette, 91% of the participants reported feeling angry. For the worry vignette, the most frequently reported emotions were worry (36%) and anxiety (41%). The general negative affect vignette evoked a mix of negative emotions, including irritation (41%), frustration (27%), anger (27%), a bad mood (‘cranky’; 27%), and sadness (18%). The regret vignette, however, unintendedly also evoked a mix of other emotions. Therefore, we changed this vignette. In the final version as used in the present study, a newly conducted free-labelling task resulted in regret (50%) and sadness (94%) being the two most frequently reported emotions for the regret scenario. In addition to testing the new regret scenario, we had participants (N = 16) read all five scenarios, and rate all five target emotions on a 7-point Likert scale (i.e. anger, sadness, worry, regret, and general negative affect). The data showed that across the different scenarios, the regret scenario did evoke more regret than the other four scenarios (see Table S2.2 for means and standard deviations). Furthermore, several pilot studies of regret vignettes revealed that regret was almost always accompanied by another negative emotion. This is not surprising, as people experience regret when they think that the outcome of a situation would have been better if they had acted differently (e.g., if one would have joined the holiday, one would not feel sad about missing out; Zeelenberg et al., 1998). We therefore did not adjust the vignette further.

Table S2.2
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of Emotional Intensity Ratings for all Five Vignettes of Study 1 (N = 16).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rated Emotion</th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Sadness</th>
<th>Worry</th>
<th>Regret</th>
<th>GNA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>6.63 (0.62)</td>
<td>2.25 (2.02)</td>
<td>3.69 (2.02)</td>
<td>3.37 (1.75)</td>
<td>3.81 (2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>3.00 (1.79)</td>
<td>5.25 (1.98)</td>
<td>6.94 (0.25)</td>
<td>5.38 (1.63)</td>
<td>3.50 (2.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>4.88 (1.78)</td>
<td>6.69 (0.70)</td>
<td>4.56 (2.13)</td>
<td>5.25 (1.29)</td>
<td>2.13 (2.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regret</td>
<td>4.44 (2.19)</td>
<td>1.75 (1.48)</td>
<td>2.56 (1.83)</td>
<td>5.94 (1.06)</td>
<td>2.00 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNA</td>
<td>5.63 (1.36)</td>
<td>5.44 (1.83)</td>
<td>6.44 (0.96)</td>
<td>5.63 (1.26)</td>
<td>5.63 (1.63)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Supplement 2.5: Additional Results of Study 1 (Control Questions and Supportive Reactions)

To make sure any differences between the support evaluations were not due to unintended differences between the vignettes, we asked participants in Study 1 to rate the extent to which they could imagine themselves being in the described situation ($M = 5.73$, $SD = 1.14$), the degree to which they judged the vignettes as realistic ($M = 5.57$, $SD = 1.23$), and how realistic they found the supportive reactions to be ($M = 5.56$, $SD = 1.18$). They were also asked to what extent the vignette reminded them of a real situation from their own life ($M = 4.14$, $SD = 1.89$). All four questions were answered on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all to 7 = very much).

ANOVA were conducted separately for each of the four control questions, with Emotion as a between-subjects factor. Participants did not differ in the ease with which they could imagine themselves in the vignettes, $F(4, 271) = 1.36, p = .249, \eta^2_p = .02$. Emotion had a small yet significant overall main effect on the realism attributed to the vignettes, $F(4, 271) = 2.43, p = .048, \eta^2_p = .02$. Bonferroni post-hoc tests, however, revealed no significant differences between the different vignettes (all $ps > .120$). All vignettes can thus be considered equally realistic. The supportive reactions did not differ significantly in perceived realism, $F(4, 271) = 2.19, p = .071, \eta^2_p = .03$. Finally, the vignettes differed in the extent to which they reminded the participants of personal experiences, $F(4, 271) = 8.10, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .11$. Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that the worry vignette ($M = 3.21, SD = 2.01$) reminded participants less of a personal situation compared to the vignette evoking general negative affect ($M = 4.93, SD = 1.33, p < .001$), regret ($M = 4.66, SD = 1.83, p < .001$), and sadness ($M = 4.13, SD = 1.96, p = .057$).
Supplement 2.6: Pilot Test Vignettes Study 2

Again, the vignettes were pilot tested to make sure that they would elicit the target emotions. Sixty-nine participants read one of the four vignettes (i.e., sadness, anger, regret, or worry) and reported a maximum of three emotions that they would feel if they would find themselves in the described situation. The anger vignette elicited anger in 56% of the participants; 93% of the participants reported experiencing sadness in response to the sadness vignette. The regret vignette evoked regret (53%), but sadness was equally frequently reported (53%). For the same reasons reported for Study 1, we did not further alter this vignette. Finally, in response to the worry vignette, sadness was mentioned more frequently (56%) than worry (22%). Originally, the target of the vignette was a friend who might have skin cancer. In order to increase self-relevance and worry, we changed the target to the self, and made the worry more explicit (i.e., by indicating the doctor was concerned and wrote a referral letter to a specialist to check whether it might be skin cancer).
Supplementary Materials Chapter 3
Supplement 3.1: Supplemental Materials

Supplement 3.1.1: Bogus Articles Used in Study 1

In Study 1, participants were presented with an article advocating the use of socio-affective support, cognitive support, or mere sharing, depending on the assigned condition. Please note that these are translations of the articles, which were originally in Dutch. The articles were presented to participants in a realistic-looking newspaper article layout.

Socio-affective support condition

ROUGH PATCH? TALK ABOUT IT!
Comfort and empathy appear to be the best remedy against emotional distress.

Everyone is troubled by negative emotions like anger, sadness or disappointment every once in a while. Some people are better able to deal with these emotions than others. Talking about your negative emotions can bring relief, but if it works depends on how the other responds. Researchers of the University of Birmingham followed 200 people for a period of two months to study the effects of talking about one’s emotions. Two kinds of responses were distinguished: comfort and a dissenting opinion. Comfort was things like providing attention, validation and empathy. A dissenting opinion is when the listener offers a different perspective on the situation. The results of the study showed that emotional recovery was most instant when conversational partners provided comfort by listening carefully and showing empathy. The listener’s sympathy made the sharers feel connected and supported, and they therefore felt less upset. Providing comfort and empathy thus form an effective way to reduce negative emotions in others.

January 2016, by Derk Versteeghen

Cognitive support condition

ROUGH PATCH? TALK ABOUT IT!
A dissenting opinion appears to be the best remedy against emotional distress.
Everyone is troubled by negative emotions like anger, sadness or disappointment every once in a while. Some people are better able to deal with these emotions than others. Talking about your negative emotions can bring relief, but if it works depends on how the other responds. Researchers of the University of Birmingham followed 200 people for a period of two months to study the effects of talking about one’s emotions. Two kinds of responses were distinguished: comfort and a dissenting opinion. Comfort was things like providing attention, validation and empathy. A dissenting opinion is when the listener offers a different perspective on the situation. The results of the study showed that emotional recovery was most instant when the conversational partners provided a dissenting opinion. With their new outlook they could help put the situation in perspective, and to approach it from a more positive angle. This helped the sharers to look at the situation differently, causing them to feel less distress. Providing a dissenting opinion and different perspective thus form an effective way to reduce negative emotions in others.

January 2016, by Derk Versteeghen

Control condition

ROUGH PATCH? TALK ABOUT IT!
Talking about your feelings appears to be a good remedy against emotional distress.

Everyone is troubled by negative emotions like anger, sadness or disappointment every once in a while. Some people are better able to deal with these emotions than others. Talking about your negative emotions can bring relief. Researchers of the University of Birmingham followed 200 people for two months to study the effects of talking about one’s emotions. To this end, they used daily-diary methods. At random moments during the day, participants were probed via a smartphone to indicate which emotions they had experienced during the previous hour and whether they had shared these emotions with others. Every probe ended with a measure of the emotional state of the participant. The results showed that talking led to emotional recovery. When the participants had shared their emotions, they felt much better than when they had kept their feelings to themselves. Sharing your emotions thus appears an effective way to reduce emotional distress.

January 2016, by Derk Versteeghen
Supplement 3.1.2: Instructions Used in Study 1

In Study 1, after reading the bogus article participants had been randomly assigned to read, they were presented with different instructions, dependent on their experimental condition. These instructions are presented below.

Socio-affective support goal condition

Previous research shows that people who feel upset are best helped by comfort and empathy. However, there is very little known about what people do to acquire comfort and empathy from others. To gain more insight into this, we would now like to ask you to share an emotional event in such a way that you think you stand the biggest chance that your conversation partner will provide comfort and empathy.

You will now start sharing your story in front of the camera. Please read the instructions below carefully and take your time.

1. Please take the time to think back at a situation in your life in which you were worried that a relationship would end, or that you might lose someone. You can think of a bad period in a romantic relationship, a good friend or a family member with whom you were in a fight, or a loved one who moved away, etc. Please go back in time and try to immerse yourself in the situation.

2. Now imagine you are right back into it, and you’re talking to your friend on Skype. You both globally discussed your day, and you’re about to tell them about the situation at hand. You have a very strong need to be comforted by someone who is empathizing with you.

3. Please switch the hourglass whenever you’re ready, look at the camera, and tell your friend in maximally 3 minutes about the situation at hand. Try to describe the situation in such a way that your friend will show empathy and provide comfort. Start the video message by looking at the camera and calling your friend by name. Please call the experimenter who is in the room next door to start the camera before you start sharing!
4. When you’ve finished your video message you can proceed by clicking the arrow below.

**Cognitive support goal condition**

Previous research shows that people who feel upset are best helped by a dissenting opinion and a different perspective. However, there is very little known about what people do to acquire that dissenting opinion and different perspective from others. To gain more insight into this, we would now like to ask you to share an emotional event in such a way that you think you stand the biggest chance that your conversation partner will provide a dissenting opinion and a different perspective.

You will now start sharing your story in front of the camera. Please read the instructions below carefully and take your time.

1. Please take the time to think back at a situation in your life in which you were worried that a relationship would end, or that you might lose someone. You can think of a bad period in a romantic relationship, a good friend or a family member with whom you were in a fight, or a loved one who moved away, etc. Please go back in time and try to immerse yourself in the situation.

2. Now imagine you are right back into it, and you’re talking to your friend on Skype. You both globally discussed your day, and you’re about to tell them about the situation at hand. You have a very strong need to hear a dissenting opinion and for someone to convince you there is also a different way of looking at the situation.

3. Please switch the hourglass whenever you’re ready, look at the camera and tell your friend in maximally 3 minutes about the situation at hand. Please share your story in such a way that your friend will give a dissenting opinion and provide a different perspective. Start the video message by looking at the camera and calling your friend by name. Please call the experimenter who is in the room next door to start the camera before you start sharing!

4. When you’ve finished your video message you can proceed by clicking the arrow below.
Control condition

Previous research shows that people who feel upset benefit from talking about this with others. However, little is known about what people tell exactly. To gain more insight into this, we would now like to ask you to share an emotional event.

You will now start sharing your story in front of the camera. Please read the instructions below carefully and take your time.

1. Please take the time to think back at a situation in your life in which you were worried that a relationship would end, or that you might lose someone. You can think of a bad period in a romantic relationship, a good friend or a family member with whom you were in a fight, or a loved one who moved away, etc. Please go back in time and try to immerse yourself in the situation.

2. Now imagine you are right back into it, and you’re talking to your friend on Skype. You both globally discussed your day, and you’re about to tell them about the situation at hand.

3. Please switch the hourglass whenever you’re ready, look at the camera and tell your friend in maximally 3 minutes about the situation at hand. There are no right or wrong answers. Start the video message by looking at the camera and calling your friend by name. Please call the experimenter who is in the room next door to start the camera before you start sharing!

4. When you’ve finished your video message you can proceed by clicking the arrow below.
Supplement 3.1.3: Coding Scheme Used in Study 1

Below is the coding scheme that was used in Study 1. It is an adapted version of a coding scheme developed by Feldkamp, Sauter and Fischer (2018). Not all categories were used in the analyses (see the Method section of Study 1).

**Emotion terms**

- **Specific emotion terms**
  - Explanation: Words *directly* referring to specific affective states. This also includes the described absence of a specific state (i.e. indicating not to feel a specific emotional state).
  - Subcategories:
    - Specific emotion terms referring to the self
      - E.g. “I felt sad”
    - Specific emotion terms referring to others
      - E.g. “She was very angry”

- **Valence-only emotion terms**
  - Explanation: Words *directly* referring to affective state but only in terms of valence.
  - Subcategories:
    - Valence-only emotion terms referring to the self
      - E.g. “I felt bad”
    - Valence-only emotion terms referring to others
      - E.g. “He was down”

- **Emotion-related actions referring to the self**
  - Explanation: Actions and emotional responses *indirectly* referring to affective states, such as physiological reactions, motor expressions and action tendencies.
  - Subcategories:
    - Specific emotion terms referring to the self
      - E.g. “I wanted to cry”
    - Specific emotion terms referring to others
      - E.g. “He was blushing”
Appraisals

- **Novelty/Expectation**
  
  o Explanation: Did you expect this situation to occur?
  
  o Subcategories:
    - Expected
      - E.g. “I was waiting for this to happen”
    - Unexpected
      - E.g. “I did not see this coming”

- **Intrinsic Pleasantness**
  
  o Explanation: Did you find the event itself pleasant or unpleasant?
  
  o Subcategories:
    - Unpleasant
      - E.g. “Something horrible happened”
    - Pleasant
      - E.g. “It was fun”

- **Coping potential**
  
  o Explanation: How do you evaluate your ability to act on or to cope with the event and its consequences when you were confronted with this situation?
  
  o Subcategories:
    - High
      - E.g. “I felt we could figure it out together”
    - Low
      - E.g. “I don’t know what to do”

- **Compatibility with external standards (Norms & Fairness)**
  
  o Explanation: If the event was caused by your own or someone else’s behavior, would this behavior itself be judged as improper or immoral? Would you say that the situation or event that caused your emotion was unjust or unfair?
  
  o Subcategories:
    - Fair
      - E.g. “She had a point”
    - Unfair
      - E.g. “I find it so disrespectful”
Emotion regulation strategies (i.e., attempts to regulate one’s own emotions)

- **Suppression**
  - Explanation: Describing that one is or was suppressing an emotional expression (or attempting to do so). This can also be an evaluation of inappropriateness of (expressing or experiencing) one’s emotion (but thereby indicating one in fact is feeling it).
  - Subcategories:
    - Current
      - E.g. “Who am I to say something about this?”
    - Past
      - E.g. ”I was holding back my tears”

- **Reappraisal**
  - Explanation: Putting the situation in perspective, trying to see it from a different angle (e.g., more positive, or broader perspective).
  - Subcategories:
    - Current
      - E.g. “[She was being very mean to me], but maybe she was just having a bad day”
    - Past
      - E.g. “[I knew it would be hard], but I tried to tell myself it would only be temporary”

- **Distraction**
  - Explanation: Diverting attention.
  - Subcategories:
    - Current
      - E.g. “I try not to think about it too much”
    - Past
      - E.g. “I decided to just go party”

- **Explicit request for the other’s view**
  - Explanation: Attempt to (emotionally) involve the imagined receiver of the message and ask for an emotional response, help, advice, their view or experience.
  - Subcategories:
Current

- Note that an explicit request needs to be made to the other person, thus implying two conditions: (1) the other is explicitly addressed ("you") and (2) they explicitly request a reaction from the other person. Thus, rhetorical questions or statements that do not necessarily require a response from the other person are not coded.
- E.g. “I’m curious what you think of this situation”

Past

- These concern past attempts to receive support from someone else. This can be any kind of social support: socio-affective, cognitive or physical
- E.g. “I called my friend to ask what she thought”
Supplement 3.1.4: Stories Used in Study 2

In Study 2, participants were presented with two stories. Depending on the condition they were randomly assigned to, they received one of the three versions emphasizing emotion terms, appraisals, or just facts (i.e. control condition). These are presented separately below.

Instructions (for both stories, same for all conditions):
Please imagine meeting up with a friend of yours. You haven’t seen each other for a week and you’re just catching up. They tell you the following story:

Story 1: Appraisal Condition
Last weekend was awful. Remember the camping trip me and Sam had planned for months? That was last weekend. So we were out there all weekend, in the woods. And all this time, Sam was being a bit distant, mostly in his own world you know, kind of ignoring me. It was very strange. Most of the time I just tried to enjoy the surroundings, our hikes, cooking dinner, sitting by the fire. But at the end of the weekend, I asked him what was up, why he was so quiet and distant. First, he didn’t say anything, he was being really quiet. But then, after a lot of probing, he in the end told me that he had cheated on me. It was really unexpected. It was with this girl who I even know – I thought she was just a friend of his. So crazy. He said it had only happened once, that he’s not in love with her, and that he still wants to be with me. It’s such a heartbreaking situation. We’ve been together for such a long time. And it turned out that people around me knew about it, and never told me or did anything about it. It’s so disrespectful that none of them told me, and there’s nothing I can do about it. And now it has been days since I talked with him, and I don’t know what to do.

Story 1: Emotion Terms Condition
So I felt awful last weekend. Remember the camping trip me and Sam had planned for months? That was last weekend. So we were out there all weekend, in the woods. And all this time, Sam was being a bit distant, mostly in his own world you know, kind of ignoring me. I felt very uncomfortable. Most of the time I just tried to enjoy the surroundings, our hikes, cooking dinner, sitting by the fire. But at the end of the weekend, I asked him what was up, why he was so quiet and distant. First, he didn’t say anything, he was being really quiet. But then, after a lot of probing, he in the end told me that he had cheated on me. And that really hurt me. It was with this girl who I even know – I thought she was just a friend of
his. I was shocked. He said it had only happened once, that he’s not in love with her, and that he still wants to be with me. I feel heartbroken. We’ve been together for such a long time. And it turned out that people around me knew about it, and never told me or did anything about it. I’m so angry, and sad. And now it has been days since I talked with him, and I feel so helpless.

**Story 1: Control Condition**

Remember the camping trip me and Sam had planned for months? That was last weekend. So we were out there all weekend, in the woods. And all this time, Sam was being a bit distant, mostly in his own world you know, kind of ignoring me. Most of the time I just tried to enjoy the surroundings, our hikes, cooking dinner, sitting by the fire. But at the end of the weekend, I asked him what was up, why he was so quiet and distant. First, he didn’t say anything, he was being really quiet. But then, after a lot of probing, he in the end told me that he had cheated on me. It was with this girl who I even know – I thought she was just a friend of his. He said it had only happened once, that he’s not in love with her, and that he still wants to be with me. We’ve been together for such a long time. And it turned out that people around me knew about it, and never told me or did anything about it. And now it has been days since I talked with him.

**Story 2: Appraisal Condition**

Remember I told you I about my annual review at work? I had it last Friday. And guess what? I was laid off. It was so unexpected. You know how much I liked my job. And I’ve been working there for five years now. I’ve always performed well, always been on time, never turned down extra chores. This is so unfair. My boss told me that they are having many layoffs, budget cuts you know. He said it wasn’t me, that there was nothing I could have done differently. But still. I will need to leave by the end of summer. It really sucks to have to leave the place. And it’s unclear whether I’ll be able to find another job soon. I still have to pay back my student loans from college. This sucks so badly. There are so many things I want to do, places I want to go to. I’ve been meaning to get a gym subscription, I wanted to travel next winter. So many things. Having no job and no money messes up everything. It’s such a difficult situation. And it’s totally out of my hands. And now I’ll need to start looking for a job. There may not be any jobs available.

**Story 2: Emotion Terms Condition**

Remember I told you I about my annual review at work? I had it last Friday. And guess what? I was laid off. I was so shocked. You know how much I liked my job. And I’ve been working there for five years now. I’ve always performed well, always been on time, never turned down extra chores. This really makes me angry.
My boss told me that they are having many layoffs, budget cuts you know. He said it wasn’t me, that there was nothing I could have done differently. But still.. I will need to leave by the end of summer. I’m really sad to have the leave the place. And I’m worried I may not be able to find another job soon. I still have to pay back my student loans from college. I feel so frustrated. There are so many things I want to do, places I want to go to. I’ve been meaning to get a gym subscription, I wanted to travel next winter. So many things. Having no job and no money messes up everything. I feel so annoyed and helpless. And now I’ll need to start looking for a job. This really worries me.

**Story 2: Control Condition**

Remember I told you I about my annual review at work? I had it last Friday. And guess what? I was laid off.. You know how much I liked my job. And I’ve been working there for five years now. I’ve always performed well, always been on time, never turned down extra chores. My boss told me that they are having many layoffs, budget cuts you know. He said it wasn’t me, that there was nothing I could have done differently. But still.. I will need to leave by the end of summer. I still have to pay back my student loans from college. There are so many things I want to do, places I want to go to. I’ve been meaning to get a gym subscription, I wanted to travel next winter. So many things. Having no job and no money messes up everything. And now I’ll need to start looking for a job.
Supplement 3.1.5: Stories Used in Study 3

In Study 3, participants were presented with two stories. Depending on the condition they were randomly assigned to, they received one of the four versions emphasizing emotion terms, appraisals, explicit request for the other’s view or just facts (i.e. control condition). These are presented separately below.

Instructions (for both stories, same for all conditions):
Please imagine meeting up with a friend of yours. You haven’t seen each other for a week and you’re just catching up. They tell you the following story:

**Story 1: Appraisal Condition**
Last weekend did not go as I had expected. Remember the camping trip with our college friends Alex and I had planned for months? That was last weekend. So we were out there all weekend, in the woods. And all this time, Alex was so focused on Melissa that I could hardly talk to him. You know, like, any time she would go anywhere, he’d follow her around. Most of the time I just tried to enjoy the surroundings, our hikes, cooking dinner, sitting by the fire. But then he sat with her by the bonfire. I thought that was a bit strange, and also quite inappropriate. I mean, I know we were with friends and all, but still, I had expected him to want to make a bit of a romantic weekend out of it too. So I really didn’t like seeing him being around Melissa all the time. We did have some quality time together though. We slept in our own little cabin. And when it was just the two of us, it was like any other day. But when we were all together, I just had the impression he was constantly looking at Melissa, trying to get her attention. I didn’t really know what to do about it. I don’t know if he might have feelings for her. That would suck.

**Story 1: Emotion Terms Condition**
Last weekend was quite disappointing. Remember the camping trip with our college friends Alex and I had planned for months? That was last weekend. So we were out there all weekend, in the woods. And all this time, Alex was so focused on Melissa. It really frustrated me. You know, like, any time she would go anywhere, he’d follow her around. Most of the time I just tried to enjoy the surroundings, our hikes, cooking dinner, sitting by the fire. But then he sat with her by the bonfire. That really surprised me and made me feel quite lonely. I mean, I know we were with friends and all, but still, I had expected him to want to make a bit of a romantic weekend out of it too. Seeing him being around Melissa all the time really made me feel sad. We did have some quality time together though. We
slept in our own little cabin. And when it was just the two of us, it was like any other day. But when we were all together, I just had the impression he was constantly looking at Melissa, trying to get her attention. I really felt a bit helpless. I’m worried he might have feelings for her. That would really hurt me.

**Story 1: Control Condition**
Remember the camping trip with our college friends Alex and I had planned for months? That was last weekend. So we were out there all weekend, in the woods. And all this time, Alex was so focused on Melissa. You know, like, any time she would go anywhere, he’d follow her around. Most of the time I just tried to enjoy the surroundings, our hikes, cooking dinner, sitting by the fire. But then he sat with her by the bonfire. I mean, I know we were with friends and all, but still, I had expected him to want to make a bit of a romantic weekend out of it too. We did have some quality time together though. We slept in our own little cabin. And when it was just the two of us, it was like any other day. But when we were all together, I just had the impression he was constantly looking at Melissa, trying to get her attention.

**Story 1: Explicit Request Condition**
Remember the camping trip with our college friends Alex and I had planned for months? That was last weekend. So we were out there all weekend, in the woods. And all this time, Alex was so focused on Melissa. You know, like, any time she would go anywhere, he’d follow her around. Most of the time I just tried to enjoy the surroundings, our hikes, cooking dinner, sitting by the fire. But then he sat with her by the bonfire. So yeah.. how would you feel? Have you ever experienced something like that? I mean, I know we were with friends and all, but still, I had expected him to want to make a bit of a romantic weekend out of it too. We did have some quality time together though. We slept in our own little cabin. And when it was just the two of us, it was like any other day. But when we were all together, I just had the impression he was constantly looking at Melissa, trying to get her attention. I don’t know.. what do you think of this whole situation?

**Story 2: Appraisal Condition**
Did I tell you that my company is merging with another company? It’s really unclear what to expect. I heard people say that there may be quite some layoffs. I did not see this coming. You know how much I like my job. And I’ve been working there for five years now. I’ve always performed well, am always on time, never turned down extra chores. It would be so unfair if they’d let me go. Also, it’s creating all this instability at work. People are fearing their jobs, which makes everyone so competitive all of sudden. I really don’t like it. Apparently they have
to make some serious budget cuts within my department. It really sucks. I don’t know if I’ll be able to keep my job. Yet I could really use the money. I still have to pay back my student loans from college. Also, I had planned a road trip in South America this winter. This whole thing goes against all my plans, and it’s so out of my hands you know.

**Story 2: Emotion Terms Condition**

Did I tell you that my company is merging with another company? It really worries me. I heard people say that there may be quite some layoffs. I was really surprised. You know how much I like my job. And I’ve been working there for five years now. I’ve always performed well, am always on time, never turned down extra chores. I’d be really angry if they’d let me go. Also, it’s creating all this instability at work. People are fearing their jobs, which makes everyone so competitive all of sudden. It makes me feel really uncomfortable. Apparently they have to make some serious budget cuts within in my department. I feel really bad. I’m worried whether I’ll be able to keep my job. Yet I could really use the money. I still have to pay back my student loans from college. Also, I had planned a road trip in South America this winter. This whole thing makes me feel so frustrated and helpless.

**Story 2: Control Condition**

Did I tell you that my company is merging with another company? I heard people say that there may be quite some layoffs. You know how much I like my job. And I’ve been working there for five years now. I’ve always performed well, am always on time, never turned down extra chores. Also, it’s creating all this instability at work. People are fearing their jobs, which makes everyone so competitive all of sudden. Apparently they have to make some serious budget cuts within in my department. Yet I could really use the money. I still have to pay back my student loans from college. Also, I had planned a road trip in South America this winter.

**Story 2: Explicit Request Condition**

Did I tell you that my company is merging with another company? I heard people say that there may be quite some layoffs. You know how much I like my job. And I’ve been working there for five years now. I’ve always performed well, am always on time, never turned down extra chores. Also, it’s creating all this instability at work. People are fearing their jobs, which makes everyone so competitive all of sudden. Have you ever been in a similar situation? Apparently they have to make some serious budget cuts within in my department. Yet I could really use the money. I still have to pay back my student loans from college. Also, I had planned
a road trip in South America this winter. I don’t know.. what do you think of this whole situation? Any thoughts on how to deal with this?
3.2. Supplemental Analyses

Supplement 3.2.1: Additional Measures and Analyses Study 1

Scale Construction Self-Reported Support Goals
In order to assess self-reported support goals, we used 20 items, based on the two factors reflecting socio-affective and cognitive support that were extracted in Pauw, Sauter, Van Kleef & Fischer (2018). In this study, we used the Social Sharing Motives Scale (SSMS-39; Duprez, Christophe, Rimé, Congard, & Antoine, 2014). We added two items to the scale to capture reappraisal more specifically (i.e., “get a different perspective on the situation” and “get a more positive view on the situation”), given that this component was relatively absent in the original scale (Duprez et al.; Rimé, 2009), yet was key to our study.

In order to verify the predicted two-component structure, we took a systematic approach involving three steps. First, based on recommendations by Russell (2002), we conducted a parallel exploratory factor analysis, using principle axis factoring and promax rotation. Based on three criteria we decided on the number of factors extracted: (1) the point at which eigenvalues of the actual data drop below the eigenvalues of the random data, (2) the scree plot and (3) the eigenvalues. According to the first criterion, four factors should be extracted. According to the scree plot, however, only three factors appear to fall above the randomly plotted factors, and the plot bends after the third factor. Finally, the eigenvalue of the fourth factor is lower than 1 and thus explains very little variance (3.4%). Therefore, the most reasonable and parsimonious number of factors to be extracted seemed to be three.

As a second step, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis with principle axis factoring and a promax rotation, now fixing the number of factors to be extracted to three (see Table S3.1 for the factor loadings). This resulted in a first factor representing Cognitive Support (8 items; explained variance 36.2%), a second factor representing Socio-Affective Support (6 items; explained variance 12.6%) and a third factor tapping into Clarification and Meaning (5 items; explained variance 7.2%). One item (i.e. “have my view of the event validated”) did not load sufficiently high on any of the three factors (i.e. factor loading lower than .3) and was therefore discarded.

Finally, as a third step, given that we were interested in using these items to verify whether our cognitive and socio-affective support goal manipulation succeeded, we created subscales of the first two factors representing cognitive ($\alpha = .91$) and socio-affective support ($\alpha = .87$) and discarded the third factor. It should
be noted, however, that combining all items belonging to the first and third factor into one overarching category of cognitive support (as originally intended) yields the same findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>F1: Cognitive Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Receive suggestions</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Learn their perspective on the situation</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Find out their opinion</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Receive an outside perspective</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Obtain another perspective on the situation</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. See how they would have reacted</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Find out how they would have reacted</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Get a more positive view on the situation</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Be supported</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Receive support</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Feel I can rely on someone</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Be helped</td>
<td>(.38) .56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Feel connected</td>
<td>.50 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Elicit empathy</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Analyze what happened</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Find meaning in what occurred</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Better understand what happened</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Clarify my feelings about what happened</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Put the situation into perspective</td>
<td>(.33) .42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Emotional Intensity**

Participants rated the extent to which they experienced six emotions when thinking back at the situation, using a 100-point slider bar (0 = *not at all*, 100 = *very much*). The target emotions were worry, sadness, anger, anxiety, frustration, and doubt.\(^41\) To check whether participants indeed recalled emotional instances mostly evoking worry, a Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted with Emotion

\(^{41}\) Furthermore, we measured self-reported experienced and expressed emotional intensity. These findings go beyond the scope of this chapter, but are available upon request.
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(worry vs. sadness vs. anxiety vs. anger vs. doubt vs. frustration) as a within subjects variable. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, $\chi^2(14) = 157.55$, $p < .001$. Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity ($\varepsilon = .71$). There was an overall significant effect of Emotion, $F(3.53, 656.46) = 26.18$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .12$. Simple contrasts revealed that as predicted, participants experienced more worry ($M = 45.70$, $SD = 32.45$) than anger ($M = 34.02$, $SD = 29.87$; $F[1, 186] = 13.73$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .07$) and anxiety ($M = 31.68$, $SD = 29.29$; $F[1, 186] = 43.95$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .19$). Participants did not, however, experience more worry as compared to frustration ($M = 45.99$, $SD = 30.81$; $F[1, 186] = 0.01$, $p = .926$, $\eta^2_p < .001$) and doubt ($M = 42.48$, $SD = 30.00$; $F[1, 186] = 1.82$, $p = .179$, $\eta^2_p = .01$). Finally, contrary to expectations, participants experienced more sadness ($M = 58.27$, $SD = 25.49$) than worry ($F[1, 186] = 27.89$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .13$). It thus appeared that participants recalled relatively mixed emotional experiences, including worry, doubt, sadness and frustration.

**Perceived Support Effectiveness**

To verify that participants had not only read and understood the article, but also endorsed the message that was conveyed, we asked participants to indicate to what extent the article had convinced them and led them to agree with eight statements about the effectiveness of either socio-affective or cognitive support. As expected, a promax rotated factor analysis yielded two factors: Socio-Affective Support ($\alpha = .70$) and Cognitive Support ($\alpha = .67$). An example item of the socio-affective support subscale is “Empathy of the listener is most crucial to making one feel better”. An example item of the cognitive support scale is “By talking to another person, you can put emotional situations in a more positive perspective”.

To check whether reading the article convinced participants of the effectiveness of socio-affective support, cognitive support or mere sharing, we conducted a mixed ANOVA with Support Goal Condition (socio-affective support vs. cognitive support vs. control condition) as a between-subjects variable and Support Type (perceived effectiveness of socio-affective vs. cognitive support) as a within-subjects factor. A significant main effect of Support Type emerged ($F[1, 184] = 42.67$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .19$), indicating that overall, participants perceived socio-affective support to be more effective than cognitive support. While there was no main effect of Support Goal Condition ($F[2, 184] = 2.73$, $p = .068$, $\eta^2_p = .03$), there was a significant interaction effect between Support Goal Condition and Support Type ($F[2, 184] = 12.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .12$). Follow-up tests indicated that Support Goal Condition significantly affected participants’ belief in the effectiveness of socio-affective support, $F(2, 184) = 3.48$, $p = .033$, $\eta^2_p = .04$. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the socio-
affective support goal condition (\(M = 79.69, SD = 10.52\)) perceived socio-effective support to be more important for emotional recovery than did those in the cognitive goal condition (\(M = 74.56, SD = 11.42; p = .037\)). However, there was no significant difference between the socio-affective support goal condition and the control condition (\(M = 75.74, SD = 12.10; p = .163\)).

Support Goal Condition also significantly affected the perceived effectiveness of cognitive support, \(F(2, 184) = 7.20, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .07\). Those in the cognitive support goal condition (\(M = 75.08, SD = 12.75\)) believed that cognitive support was (marginally) more important to emotional recovery compared to those in the socio-affective support goal condition (\(M = 69.72, SD = 12.41; p = .067\)) and those in the control condition (\(M = 66.33, SD = 13.81; p = .001\)). Taken together, reading the article affected participants’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of both types of support in the intended way, albeit with small effects.
Supplement 3.2.2: Additional Measures and Analyses Study 2

Inferred Support Goals
In order to assess inferred support goals, participants were asked the following question: “Now please imagine again being in the conversation with your friend. Having heard their story, to what extent do you think they wanted you to …”, followed by eight different types of support. A promax rotated exploratory factor analysis using principle axis factoring yielded two factors in both stories. All items including their component loadings across the two stories are presented in Table S3.2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Story 1</th>
<th>Story 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Put what occurred into perspective</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help them to look at the situation from a</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>different perspective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide an outside perspective</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help them to find meaning in what occurred</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show compassion</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be empathic</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convey understanding</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide care</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Manipulation Check
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation, we included two measures to tap the perceived use of appraisals and emotion words. Instead of asking for the perceived frequencies, we asked participants to what extent they thought the sharer had emphasized how they thought and felt about the situation. We chose these indirect questions to measure how listeners perceive expressions of emotions and appraisals because we did not expect participants to be familiar with the concept of appraisals. The ratings for both stories were averaged, yielding one score for perceived focus on thoughts and one score for perceived focus on emotions.

To assess whether the different emotional expression conditions were perceived as differentially emphasizing feelings and thoughts, we conducted a MANOVA with Emotional Expression condition as the predictor of perceived emphasis on feelings and perceived emphasis on thoughts. Overall, Emotional
Expression exerted a significant omnibus effect, $F(4, 394) = 11.08, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .10$. First, Emotional Expression condition had a significant main effect on the perceived emphasis on feelings, $F(2, 197) = 22.59, p < .001, \eta^2_p = 19$. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons showed that, as intended, participants in the emotion condition ($M = 85.96, SD = 12.63$) perceived the protagonist to emphasize their feelings significantly more compared to those in the appraisal condition ($M = 78.21, SD = 19.16; p = .046$) and those in the control condition ($M = 64.83, SD = 21.97; p < .001$). Furthermore, those in the appraisal condition also perceived the protagonist to emphasize more how they felt compared to those in the control condition ($p < .001$).

Second, Emotional Expression condition had a significant main effect on the perceived emphasis on thoughts, $F(2, 197) = 9.39, p < .001, \eta^2_p = 09$. While participants in the appraisal condition ($M = 78.85; SD = 17.00$) did not think the protagonist emphasized their thoughts more than did those in the emotion condition ($M = 79.51, SD = 17.38; p = 1.00$), both those in the appraisal condition ($p < .001$) and those in the emotion condition ($p < .001$) did perceive the protagonist to emphasize more how they thought about the situation compared to those in the control condition ($M = 67.52, SD = 19.30$). In sum, the use of emotion words led to a greater perceived emphasis on feelings compared to the use of appraisals and the control condition. The inclusion of appraisals led to a greater perceived emphasis on thoughts compared to the control condition, but not compared to the emotion condition.

**Exploratory Analyses: Distress and Severity**

To test whether our exploratory findings as discussed in the Results section of Study 2 would hold for the separate stories, we conducted two robust regression analyses, one predicting inferred socio-affective support goals and one predicting cognitive support goals, for story 1 and 2 separately. Perceived emotional distress and severity were entered as predictors. The findings are presented below in Table S3.3 (inferred socio-affective goals) and Table S3.4 (inferred cognitive goals). As can be seen in Table S3.3, the effects on socio-affective support goals observed across the two stories are highly similar to those of the two stories separately. Perceived emotional distress consistently positively predicts inferred socio-affective support goals, whereas perceived severity does not.
Table S3.3  
**Robust Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Inferred Socio-Affective Support Goals by Perceived Emotional Distress and Severity, for Story 1 and Story 2 Separately (Study 2).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Story 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Story 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>95% CI</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Distress</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>[0.39, 0.70]</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Severity</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>[-0.05, 0.18]</td>
<td>.266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Bootstrap results are based on 2000 bootstrap samples.

In contrast, as can be seen in Table S3.4, the observed effects on inferred cognitive support goals on the data for the two stories combined (reported in Chapter 3) do not replicate when conducting the analyses for the two stories separately. For both Story 1 and 2, perceived emotional distress and severity did not significantly predict inferred cognitive goals.

Table S3.4  
**Robust Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Inferred Cognitive Support Goals by Perceived Emotional Distress and Severity, for Story 1 and Story 2 Separately (Study 2).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Story 1</th>
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<th>Story 2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>95% CI</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Distress</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>[-0.14, 0.42]</td>
<td>.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Severity</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>[-0.04, 0.43]</td>
<td>.101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Bootstrap results are based on 2000 bootstrap samples.

Finally, even though emotional distress and perceived severity seem to differentially predict the inference of socio-affective and cognitive support goals, both predictors do correlate positively with the two types of inferred support goals. See Table S3.5 for the raw correlations.

Table S3.5  
**Raw Correlations between Perceived Distress of the Protagonist (D), Perceived Severity of the Situation (S), Inferred Socio-Affective (SA) and Cognitive (C) Support Goals, Story 1 and 2 Separately (Study 2).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Story 1</th>
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<th>Story 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distress</td>
<td></td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.49***</td>
<td>.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity</td>
<td></td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.19***</td>
<td>.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA support goal</td>
<td></td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C support goal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* *** p =< .001; ** p =< .01; * p < .05
Supplement 3.2.3: Additional Measures and Analyses Study 3

Manipulation Check

Similar to Study 2, we included two measures to tap the perceived use of appraisals and emotion words. To assess whether the different emotional expression conditions were perceived as differentially emphasizing feelings and thoughts, we conducted a MANOVA with perceived emphasis on feelings and perceived emphasis on thoughts as the dependent variables and Emotional Expression (emotion vs. appraisal vs. explicit request vs. control condition) as the independent variable. Overall, Emotional Expression exerted a significant omnibus effect, $F(6, 440) = 8.16, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .10$. Emotional Expression had a significant main effect on the perceived emphasis on feelings, $F(3, 220) = 14.98, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .17$. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons showed that, partially in line with our predictions, those in the emotion condition ($M = 82.63, SD = 15.13$) perceived the protagonist to emphasize their emotions significantly more than those in the control condition ($M = 65.35, SD = 19.23; p < .001$) and those in the explicit request condition ($M = 63.14, SD = 17.55; p < .001$), though not more compared to those in the appraisal condition ($M = 76.04, SD = 19.01; p = .307$). Those in the appraisal condition also perceived the protagonist to emphasize more how they felt compared to those in the control condition ($p = .011$) and those in the explicit request condition ($p = .001$). Contrary to the expectations, Emotional Expression condition did not have a significant main effect on the perceived emphasis on thoughts, $F(3, 220) = 1.65, p < .179, \eta^2_p = .02$. Thus, those in the appraisal condition ($M = 77.52, SD = 17.05$) did not perceive the protagonist to place a greater emphasis on thoughts compared to those in the emotion condition ($M = 73.21, SD = 19.68; p = 1.000$), control condition ($M = 70.85, SD = 19.33; p = .328$), or explicit request condition ($M = 70.93, SD = 16.04; p = .332$).

In sum, the use of emotion words led to a greater perceived emphasis on feelings compared to the control condition and explicit request condition, but not compared to the appraisal condition. Furthermore, the inclusion of appraisals did not lead to a greater perceived emphasis on thoughts compared to any of the other conditions. Emotions and appraisals were thus interpreted as communicating one’s feelings and thoughts to the same extent.

Exploratory Analyses: Distress and Severity

To test whether our exploratory findings as discussed in Results section of Study 3 hold for the separate stories, we again conducted two robust regression analyses, one predicting inferred socio-affective support goals and one predicting cognitive support goals, for story 1 and 2 separately. Perceived emotional distress
and severity were entered as predictors. The findings are presented below in Table S3.6 (inferred socio-affective goals) and Table S3.7 (inferred cognitive goals). As can be seen in Table S3.6, analyzing the two stories separately yields the same conclusions for inferred socio-affective support goals as when analyzing the combined effects. Replicating Study 2, perceived emotional distress consistently positively predicts inferred socio-affective support goals, whereas perceived severity does not.

Table S3.6
Robust Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Inferred Socio-Affective Support Goals by Perceived Emotional Distress and Severity, for Story 1 and Story 2 Separately (Study 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Story 1</th>
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<th>Story 2</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>95% CI</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Distress</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>[0.36, 0.63]</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Severity</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>[0.04, 0.17]</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Bootstrap results are based on 2000 bootstrap samples.

In contrast, as can be seen in Table S3.7, the prediction of inferred cognitive support goals is more variable across the two stories. Perceived severity seems a stronger predictor of cognitive support goals than emotional distress.

Table S3.7
Robust Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Inferred Cognitive Support Goals by Perceived Emotional Distress and Severity, for Story 1 and Story 2 Separately (Study 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Story 1</th>
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<th>Story 2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>95% CI</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Distress</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>[0.003, 0.36]</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Severity</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>[0.01, 0.28]</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Bootstrap results are based on 2000 bootstrap samples.

Finally, even though emotional distress and perceived severity differentially predict the inference of socio-affective and cognitive support goals, both predictors again do correlate positively with the two types of inferred support goals. See Table S3.8 for the raw correlations.
| Supplemental Materials |

Table S3.8

Raw Correlations between Perceived Distress of the Protagonist (D), Perceived Severity of the Situation (S), Inferred Socio-Affective (SA) and Cognitive (C) Support Goals, Story 1 and 2 Separately (Study 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Story 1</th>
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<th>Story 2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distress</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.54***</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>.62***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA goal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C goal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *** p =< .001; ** p =< .01
Supplementary Material Chapter 5
Supplement 5.1: Coding Scheme Interpersonal Emotion Regulation Strategies

Below is the coding scheme that was used by the coders. Coders read transcribed video messages and coded each text for the frequency of all (sub)categories (i.e., bold category names) as described below. Primary categories were those relevant to our hypotheses: socio-affective support, cognitive support, suppression and distraction. Each of these overarching categories was operationalized based on the theoretical definitions and prior operationalizations, leading some of them to include several subcategories. Socio-affective and cognitive support were based on Rimé’s (2009) definitions. Suppression and distraction were operationalized as has been done in previous research focused on instructed intrapersonal emotion regulation strategies (Gross, 1998). To this end, we used a taxonomy provided by a meta-analysis on the effectiveness of all strategies derived from the process model of emotion regulation (Webb et al., 2012). We additionally included three categories for exploratory purposes, given that these are often mentioned in the literature on support provision (i.e., instrumental and informational support) or are part of the process model of emotion regulation (i.e., concentration). The results pertaining to these exploratory categories have not been analyzed, but are available upon request.

Primary categories

- Socio-affective support
  - Validation/empathy/understanding (also includes describing emotional impact on themselves (i.e. listener indicating how the situation emotionally impacts themselves))
    - E.g., I understand you must feel super confused
    - E.g., I’m shocked
  - Love/intimacy: Verbal expression of wanting to provide physical support or explicit love
    - E.g., I wish I could give you a hug right now
    - E.g., I love you
  - Availability: Explicitly indicating to be there for the other
    - E.g., You can always call me
  - Esteem support: Enhance their confidence by naming positive qualities or competencies
    - E.g., You’re such a catch
  - Vicarious aggression: Convey vicarious anger directed towards the ‘cheater’
E.g., What a bitch

- **Social companionship**: Suggest doing something fun together.
  Note: The suggestion of the other doing something fun without the participant is coded as distraction; and the indication that one is available (in the absence of a suggestion to do something fun) is coded as availability.
  - E.g., If you like, we could go grab a drink?

- **Similar experience of the support provider**: Sharing a similar experience.
  - E.g., My boyfriend also once cheated on me (..)

- **Expressions of sympathy**
  - E.g., Take care

- **Cognitive Support**
  - **Reappraisal of the emotional situation**: Interpret the emotional situation (context or cause) differently or more positively (e.g., is there a silver lining?)
    - E.g., Maybe you can see this situation as opening new doors
  - **Reappraisal via perspective taking**: Alter the impact of the emotional stimulus by adopting a broader perspective (e.g., more distant, more objective perspective, bigger timer perspective).
    Note: The focus is on putting the situation in perspective, trying to see it *less negatively*
    - E.g., With time you’ll feel better
  - **Reappraisal mixed**: This category is coded when unsure, or when the reappraisal seems to encompass both types described above
    - E.g., Your relationship was already quite unstable

- **Distraction**
  - Focus attention on or redirect attention to non-emotional aspects of the situation, or distract attention from this immediate situation.
    Note: We define the emotional situation as the infidelity. Thus, when the participants suggest to direct energy to the interview, we consider this distraction (not advice).
    Note: This is not suppression (i.e., suppress thoughts about the situation), but *redirecting* thoughts elsewhere.
    - E.g., Try to think about something else
- **Suppression**
  - **Suppression of thoughts of emotion-eliciting event**: tell them to control their thoughts or not allow their thoughts about the emotion-eliciting event
    - E.g., Just try not to think about her
  - **Suppression of experience of emotion**: tell them to control their feelings, or not allow themselves to experience the emotions
    - E.g., Don’t let your emotions get a hold of you
  - **Suppression of expression of emotion**: tell them not to show (or hide) their feelings
    - E.g., Dry your eyes
  - **Suppression mixed**: this category is coded when the type of suppression is unspecified, or when multiple forms of suppression are implied
    - E.g., Just get yourself together

**Exploratory categories**

- **Instrumental (practical, tangential) support**
  - Provide practical support, wanting to do something for the other
    - E.g., Let me know if there’s something I can do for you

- **Advice (or Informational Support)**
  - Provide information or thoughts regarding what the other could or should do, how to deal with the situation or how to solve the problem
    - E.g., I would just wait it out a bit and see what happens

- **Concentration**
  - **Concentration on feelings**: attend to and focus on emotion, or ask to relive the emotional experience.
    - Note: This subcategory approximates understanding/validation. The difference lies in the fact that concentration on feelings concerns purely a statement, in the absence of conveying understanding or approval.
      - E.g., How do you feel?
  - **Concentration on cause and implications (rumination)**: concentrate on the causes, meanings or consequences of the emotional experience – without a judgment or explicit sympathy (in which case it would fall under socio-affective support).
    - E.g., What happened?
• **Concentration mixed**: concentrate on the causes, feelings, reasons and implications of the emotional experience
  
  o E.g., What do you think your sadness can tell you about how to continue with her?
Supplement 5.2: Additional Measures

Control Questions

In order to check whether regulatory demand and different film clips did not have any unintended effects on participants’ general experience of the procedure, we asked nine control questions. These included the experienced or perceived sincerity of the crying; appropriateness of the crying (i.e., good reason); self-efficacy in helping a crying friend through Skype; difficulty imagining talking to a friend; difficulty talking to camera; discomfort not being able to see their conversational partner; unpleasantness watching the crying person; seeing out the video; distractedness while watching the video.

Manipulation Checks

Regulatory demand

To check whether participants in the high regulatory demand condition indeed perceived there to be a greater imminence to down-regulate the crying compared to those in the low regulatory demand condition, they rated the extent to which they thought it was a bad moment to be crying, as well as participants’ desire to stop crying. These measures were rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), and thus reflected the situational need as well as the protagonist’s motivation for immediate down-regulation.

Film clip

To check whether and how participants perceived the crying in the two film clips to be different, participants were asked to rate the perception of tears in the eyes, tears on the face, and the intensity of the person’s crying on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

Emotions

We measured inferred emotions, by asking participants to what extent they perceived the person in the video to feel sad, worried, powerless, desperate, hopeless and dejected. Furthermore, we measured participants’ own experienced emotions while watching the video. They rated the following emotions on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much): Sadness, worry, powerlessness, despair, hopelessness, irritation, empathy, compassion, dejection, and boredom.
Supplement 5.3: Additional Results

Standardization Checks

In order to check whether there were no unintended differences between the experimental conditions, a MANOVA was conducted with Regulatory Demand (low vs. high) and Film Clip (1 vs. 2) as between subjects factors, and the following control questions as dependent measures: perceived sincerity of the crying; appropriateness of the crying (i.e., good reason); self-efficacy in helping a crying friend through Skype; difficulty imagining talking to their friend; difficulty talking to camera; discomfort not being able to see their conversational partner; unpleasantness watching the crying person; seeing out the video; distractedness while watching the video. There was no overall significant effect of Regulatory Demand \( (F[9, 165] = 0.41, p = .931, \eta^2 = .02) \), nor of Film Clip \( (F[9, 165] = 0.59, p = .808, \eta^2 = .03) \). There was also no significant interaction between Regulatory Demand and Film Clip \( (F[9, 165] = 0.64, p = .760, \eta^2 = .03) \). Thus, participants overall seemed to experience the task and protagonist similarly across the different experimental conditions.

Manipulation Checks

Regulatory demand

In order to test whether participants perceived there to be a greater need for immediate down-regulation of the crying depending on the assigned condition, a MANOVA was conducted with Regulatory Demand (low vs. high) and Film Clip (1 vs. 2) as predictors of the perceived inconvenience of the crying and the protagonist’s desire to stop crying. As predicted, there was significant overall main effect of Regulatory Demand, \( F(2, 172) = 11.00, p < .001, \eta^2 = .11 \). A separate follow-up ANOVA indicated that those in high regulatory demand condition perceived it to be a worse moment to cry \( (M = 3.06, SD = 2.07) \) compared to those in the low regulatory demand condition \( (M = 1.99, SD = 1.27) \), \( F(1, 173) = 17.09, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09 \). Furthermore, those in high regulatory demand condition also perceived the protagonist to have a greater desire to stop crying \( (M = 3.51, SD = 1.74) \) compared to those in the low regulatory demand condition \( (M = 2.98, SD = 1.51) \), \( F(1, 173) = 5.24, p = .023, \eta^2 = .03 \).

There was also a significant omnibus of Film Clip, \( F(2, 172) = 10.01, p < .001, \eta^2 = .10 \). Follow-up ANOVA’s indicated that this effect was driven by the perceived desire to stop crying. Participants who watched the second film clip \( (M = 3.74, SD = 1.74) \), \( F(1, 173) = 19.81, p < .001, \eta^2 = .03 \). Film Clip did not have an effect on the perceived inconvenience of
the crying, $F(1, 173) = 0.39, p = .534, \eta^2_p = .002$. Finally, there was no significant interaction effect between Regulatory Demand and Film Clip, $F(2, 172) = 0.28, p = .759, \eta^2_p = .003$.

Taken together, these findings suggest that our manipulation of regulatory demand succeeded: Participants in the high regulatory demand condition perceived a greater situational inconvenience of the crying, as well a greater motivation to stop crying, compared to those in the low regulatory demand condition.

**Film clip**

In order to test whether participants perceived the crying in the two film clips differently, a MANOVA was conducted with Film Clip (1 vs. 2) and Regulatory Demand (low vs. high) as predictors of perceived tears in the eye, tears on the face, and intensity. There was significant omnibus effect of Film Clip, $F(3, 171) = 53.88, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .49$. Follow-up ANOVA’s suggested that this effect was driven by differences in perceived intensity of the crying: Those who watched the second film clip perceived the crying to be more intense ($M = 6.02, SD = 0.89$) compared to those who watched the first film clip ($M = 3.93, SD = 1.34$), $F(1, 173) = 149.11, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .46$. Film Clip did not affect the perception of tears in the eyes ($F[1, 173] = 0.47, p = .494, \eta^2_p < .01$), nor the perception of tears on the face ($F[1, 173] = 0.10, p = .755, \eta^2_p < .01$).

There was no significant main effect of Regulatory Demand ($F[1, 173] = 0.52, p = .473, \eta^2_p < .001$), nor a significant interaction effect ($F[1, 173] = 0.52, p = .472, \eta^2_p < .001$) on the dependent measures combined. In sum, the film clips were thus perceived as displaying different crying intensities. This could also explain why those who watched the second (higher intensity) film clip perceived the protagonist to be less motivated to stop crying compared to those who watched the first (lower intensity) film clip.

**Emotions**

**Inferred emotions**

In order to test whether the regulatory demand manipulation and film clip affected the emotions participants thought the protagonist was experiencing, we conducted a MANOVA with Regulatory Demand (low vs. high) and Film Clip (1 vs. 2) as predictors of inferred sadness, worry, powerlessness, desperation, hopelessness and dejection. There was no main effect of Regulatory Demand ($F[6, 168] = 0.95, p = .463, \eta^2_p = .03$). Film Clip did significantly affect the inferred emotions ($F[6, 168] = 2.96, p = .009, \eta^2_p = .10$). When looking at the individual ANOVA’s, those who watched the second (higher crying intensity) film clip thought the protagonist was experiencing greater powerlessness ($M = 6.21, SD = 0.89$).
1.10; $F[1, 173] = 3.72, p = .056, \eta^2_p = .02$) and greater desperation ($M = 6.11, SD = 1.07; F[1, 173] = 10.42, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .06$), compared to those who watched the first (lower crying intensity) film clip ($M = 5.91, SD = 0.97$ and $M = 5.52, SD = 1.17$, respectively). Film Clip did not affect any of the other inferred emotions (all $p$’s > .260).

**Experienced emotions**

In order to test whether the regulatory demand manipulation and film clip affected the emotions participants experienced in response to watching the video and imagining their friend in the proposed scenario, we conducted a MANOVA with Regulatory Demand and Film Clip as predictors of experienced sadness, worry, powerlessness, despair, hopelessness, irritation, empathy, compassion, dejection, and boredom. There was no main effect of Regulatory Demand ($F[10, 164] = .70, p = .722, \eta^2_p = .04$), nor of Film Clip ($F[10, 164] = 1.44, p = .168, \eta^2_p = .08$). Finally, there was no significant interaction effect ($F[10, 164] = 0.47, p = .909, \eta^2_p = .03$). Thus, participants experienced the same emotions in response to watching both videos, regardless of regulatory demand.

**Gender**

To examine whether gender affected our results, we reran our main analyses, now including Gender as a factor. It should be noted that the current study was not set up to test gender effects and therefore may lack sufficient power to detect such effects. Regarding our self-report findings, we ran a Repeated Measures ANOVA with Regulatory Demand, Film Clip and Gender as between-subject factors, and Self-Reported Support Type (socio-affective support, cognitive support, suppression and distraction) as a within-subjects factor. In addition to the significant hypothesized two-way interaction-effect between Support Type and Regulatory Demand, we did not find a significant three-way interaction with Gender, ($F[2.74, 470.97] = 1.29, p = .279, \eta^2_p = .01$). Thus, regulatory demand impacted support provision equally among men and women.

There was a significant interaction effect between Gender and Support Type, ($F[2.74, 470.97] = 3.62, p = .016, \eta^2_p = .02$). Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons showed that, first, women ($M = 6.09, SD = 0.73$) reported to have provided somewhat more socio-affective support than men ($M = 5.77, SD = 1.10$; $F[1, 172] = 4.96, p = .027, \eta^2_p = .03$). Second, men ($M = 4.66, SD = 1.84$) reported to have provided more distraction than women ($M = 4.12, SD = 1.86$; $F[1, 172] = 4.06, p = .046, \eta^2_p = .02$). Third, men ($M = 4.02, SD = 1.86$) reported to have provided somewhat more suppression than women ($M = 3.70, SD = 2.05$; $F[1, 172] = 3.38, p = .068, \eta^2_p = .02$). Finally, there was no effect of gender for self-reported cognitive support provision ($F[1, 172] = 0.22, p = .637, \eta^2_p < .02$). However, it should be noted
that this interaction effect between Gender and Support Type does not seem robust: When examining whether gender impacts support provision in a separate model (i.e., Repeated Measures ANOVA with Gender as a between-subjects factor and Support Type as within-subjects factor), we did not observe a significant interaction effect between Gender and Support Type ($F_{2.46, 429.58} = 1.71, p = .175, \eta^2_p = .01$).

Furthermore, we reran our analyses involving the behavioral measures of support provision including Gender as a factor. We again ran zero-inflated negative binomial regression models for suppression and distraction, and negatively binomial regression analyses for socio-affective and cognitive support. Regulatory Demand, Film Clip, Gender and the interaction terms between Gender and Regulatory Demand, as well as between Gender and Film Clip, were included as predictors. To control for word count, a log linear function of the word count was again included as an offset variable. Contrary to participants’ self-report, gender did not affect observed socio-affective support provision (RR = 0.79, $p = .154$), nor distraction (RR = 1.52, $p = .070$). Furthermore, cognitive support provision (RR = 1.35, $p = .486$) and suppression were similarly unaffected by gender (RR = 1.00, $p = .178$). Finally, in all four analyses, gender did not significantly interact with Regulatory Demand, or with Film Clip (all $p$s $> .05$). Taken together, it seems that people are somewhat impacted by gender stereotypes when reporting or reflecting on their own support behavior. However, when looking at their actual support behavior, men and women provided similar levels of support, and were similarly impacted by regulatory demand.
Supplement 5.4: Additional Tables

Correlations Self-Reported vs. Observed Interpersonal Emotion Regulation Strategies

To assess to what degree observed and self-reported measures of interpersonal emotion regulation strategies overlapped, we calculated their zero-order correlations as displayed below in Table S5.1.

Table S5.1. Correlations between Self-Reported and Observed Socio-Affective (SA) Support, Cognitive (C) Support, Suppression and Distraction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-Reported Regulation Strategies</th>
<th>Observed Regulation Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA support</td>
<td>C support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reported Regulation Strategies</td>
<td>SA support</td>
<td>.38**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C support</td>
<td>&lt; .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suppression</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distraction</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * p < .05; ** < .01

Correlations Emotions and Emotion Regulation Strategies

For exploratory purposes, we examined the relationships between perceived and experienced emotions on the one hand, and observed emotion regulation strategies on the other hand. As can be seen below in Table S5.2, perceived emotions did not predict the use of any type of interpersonal emotion regulation strategy. Furthermore, only three significant correlations emerged between experienced emotions and socio-affective support provision: Whereas experienced empathy positively predicted socio-affective support provision, experienced irritation and boredom negatively predicted socio-affective support. However, these correlations are no longer significant when controlling for multiple testing.
Table S5.2.
Zero-Order Correlations between Experienced and Perceived Emotions and Observed Socio-Affective (SA) Support, Cognitive (C) Support, Suppression and Distraction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Interpersonal Regulation Strategies</th>
<th>SA support</th>
<th>C support</th>
<th>Suppression</th>
<th>Distraction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experienced Emotions</td>
<td>SA support</td>
<td>C support</td>
<td>Suppression</td>
<td>Distraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dejected</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerlessness</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>&lt; -.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despair</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>&lt; -.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopelessness</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>&lt; -.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irritation</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boredom</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Emotions</td>
<td>SA support</td>
<td>C support</td>
<td>Suppression</td>
<td>Distraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dejected</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>&lt; -.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>&lt; -.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerlessness</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despair</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopelessness</td>
<td>&lt; -.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * p < .05
Supplementary Material Chapter 6
Desired Support

In addition to measuring perceived support, after each conversation, participants also rated their desired support using a 100-point slider bar (0 = not at all, 100 = very much). To this end, participants rated the exact same items as for perceived support, but this time indicating to what extent they had wanted each of these eight forms of support. For example, assessing their socio-affective support needs, participants answered, “To what extent did you want Julie to be empathic?” (α = .94 for Anger; α = .91 for Worry). Tapping into their cognitive support needs, participants for example answered, “To what extent did you want Julie to help you look at the situation from a different perspective?” (α = .95 for Anger; α = .94 for Worry).

In order to test whether the two different emotion conditions were indeed associated with different support needs (cf. Pauw et al., 2018), a Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted with Support Condition (Socio-Affective vs. Cognitive Support) as a between-subjects variable, and Desired Support (Socio-Affective vs. Cognitive Support) and Emotion Condition (Anger vs. Worry) as within-subjects variables. Contrary to our expectations, there was no main effect of Emotion Condition (F[1, 108] = 1.11, p = .294, ηp² = .01), nor a significant interaction effect between Emotion Condition and Desired Support (F[1, 108] = 0.45, p = .506, ηp² < .01), indicating that participants had similar support needs across the two emotion conditions. Furthermore, there was no effect of Support Condition (F[1, 108] = 0.82, p = .367, ηp² = .01), indicating that the obtained support did not affect their support needs. There was a main effect of Desired Support (F[1, 108] = 11.31, p < .001, ηp² = .10), indicating that overall, participants reported to have desired somewhat more socio-affective support (M = 73.02, SE = 2.37) than cognitive support (M = 65.90, SE = 2.58).

Thus, these findings show participants’ (post-sharing reported) support needs did not vary as a function of the discrete emotion that was predominantly experienced. This may also help explain why both types of support were (perceived as) equally helpful across the anger and worry conversations. However, these findings are not in line with prior work showing that anger was associated with a clear preference for socio-affective support, whereas cognitive support was much more appreciated in case of experienced worry (Pauw et al., 2018). These discrepant results may be due to the differential experimental set-up of these studies. The findings in Pauw et al. (2018) relied on vignettes intended to manipulate specific emotions. The current findings represented emotional situations from participants’ daily lives, which likely reflected a wider range of experienced emotions and thereby may have resulted in less pronounced support needs.
English Summary
Common wisdom holds that we should not bottle up our emotions, but instead, we should talk about them: A problem shared is a problem halved (Zech, 1999). Indeed, when people are in emotional distress, they have the urge to tell others about their experience – a phenomenon termed social sharing (Rimé et al., 1991). However, despite the widespread belief that sharing helps, there is little scientific support for this notion. Even though people perceive sharing to be helpful, it does not typically make people feel better in the long run (Rimé, 2009; Zech & Rimé, 2005). The present dissertation sought to understand why social sharing so often is an ineffective means of emotion regulation, and to uncover the ways in which sharing might in fact foster beneficial outcomes for the sharer.

Prior research suggests that whether or not sharing is beneficial in the long run critically depends on the type of support that listeners provide. Generally, two different types of support are distinguished (Rimé, 2009): Listeners may offer socio-affective support, which includes comfort and validation, or cognitive support, which is directed at changing the way the other thinks about the emotional experience by reappraisal. Whereas socio-affective support increases temporary feelings of closeness and perceived benefits, only cognitive support is effective in fostering long-term recovery (e.g., Batenburg & Das, 2014; Brans, Van Mechelen, Rimé, & Verduyn, 2013; Lepore, Fernandez-Berrocal, Ragan, & Ramos, 2004; Nils & Rimé, 2012; Rimé, 2009; but see also Lepore, Ragan, & Jones, 2000). Yet it remains unclear (1) what type of support sharers usually seek, (2) what determines the type of support listeners think sharers need and choose to provide, and, crucially, (3) whether and how sharers may play an active role themselves in eliciting the support that they desire. The present dissertation sought to answer these questions. We investigated the overarching hypothesis that social sharing typically revolves around socio-affective support provision, which would explain why sharing is often perceived as beneficial, despite the absence of emotional recovery (cf. Rimé, 2009). In five empirical research lines and using a range of different methodological approaches, we examined different aspects of the social sharing process in order to illuminate different ways through which social sharing functions as an effective or ineffective means of emotion regulation.

In **Chapter 2**, we first examined whether sharers indeed have a preference for socio-affective support, as compared to cognitive support. Furthermore, we tested whether sharers’ support evaluations vary depending on the specific emotion that is shared. To this end, we first established in two pilot studies that these two types of support could be reliably distinguished. Then, in Study 2.1 and 2.2 we experimentally tested participants’ support evaluations in response to different emotional situations using vignettes. The results showed that participants generally felt that receiving any type of response that included socio-affective support would be more favorable than receiving purely cognitive support. This
preference for socio-affective support was mainly driven by anger and sadness: Those who imagined feeling worried or regretful were more open to cognitive support. Overall, these findings support our general hypothesis that sharers might typically be seeking socio-affective support when sharing their emotions with others.

Building on these findings, in Chapter 3, we examined the hypothesis that sharers communicate their support goals by sharing in such a way that it allows listeners to infer the sharer’s needs. This would demonstrate one way through which social sharing may come to disproportionally center around support that is not helpful in the long run. To investigate this hypothesis, we first manipulated participants’ support goals, and showed that socio-affective support goals led participants to express more emotions, whereas cognitive support goals resulted in greater use of appraisals (Study 3.1). In Study 3.2 and 3.3, we tested whether these differential expressions affected the support goals that listeners inferred the sharer to have. We found no evidence for such an effect: Listeners consistently perceived the sharer to predominantly want socio-affective support. While these findings do not speak to effective communication of sharers’ needs, they do suggest that sharers might still obtain the support that they desire.

However, the experimental rigor implemented in Chapter 3 may have led to an underestimation of sharers’ capability to effectively communicate their support needs. Sharers may have expressed their support needs in additional ways that we did not assess in Study 3.1, and thus did not manipulate in Study 3.2 and 3.3. Therefore, in Chapter 4, we took a more naturalistic approach by inviting participants to engage in a social sharing interaction. Participants were randomly assigned to the role of sharer (who was asked to discuss an upsetting situation) or listener (who was instructed to respond naturally). Afterwards, both sharer and listener separately watched the interaction on video in 20-second fragments. For each fragment, sharers rated their experienced emotional intensity and socio-affective and cognitive support needs, and listeners rated their perception of the sharer’s emotional intensity and their own support provision. We found that sharers’ experienced emotional intensity shaped their support needs, which in turn shaped listeners’ support provision. Moreover, the more accurately listeners judged sharers’ emotional intensity, the more they fulfilled sharers’ socio-affective (but not cognitive) support needs. These findings suggest that sharers may elicit the support they desire, explaining why they typically perceive sharing as beneficial although it does not engender emotional recovery.

Importantly though, whether or not support is helpful is also context-dependent: What works in one situation, may not work in another (e.g., see Aldao, 2013; Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Cutrona, 1990; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). In Chapter 5, we investigated whether and how listeners adapt their support
provision to the regulatory demand of the sharer’s situation – that is, the extent to which their distress needs to be immediately down-regulated or not. In addition to an overall predominance of socio-affective support provision, we found that under high (as compared to low) regulatory demand, listeners provided less socio-affective support, and tried to distract the other person from the emotional situation or guide them to suppressing their emotions to a much greater degree. Cognitive support provision, however, was unaffected by regulatory demand. In line with our hypotheses, participants thus employed more regulation strategies aimed at disengaging from the emotional experience when the context required more immediate down-regulation. As such, Chapter 5 provides a first step in showing that listeners may regulate sharers’ emotions in ways that are functional to the specific situational demands.

Overall, these chapters showed that sharers have a strong preference to receive socio-affective support (Chapter 2 and 3) – a preponderant need that listeners also infer (Chapter 3), and are likely to fulfill (Chapter 4 and 5). However, as described earlier, to promote effective emotional recovery, cognitive support is warranted (e.g., Nils & Rimé, 2012; Rimé, 2009). Therefore, in Chapter 6, we investigated virtual humans’ potential as an alternative route through which effective support may be provided. We examined whether sharers have a preference for socio-affective support – as when sharing with other humans – or, in fact, are relatively receptive to cognitive support from virtual humans. We reasoned that people have different expectations of virtual humans than of humans, given that they do not ascribe virtual humans the mental capacity to experience empathy, which might make them more willing to accept cognitive support. To test these two competing hypotheses, participants shared two personal emotional experiences with a virtual human, who provided either socio-affective or cognitive support. We found that the provision of cognitive support was experienced as equally helpful in coping with the emotional experience as compared to socio-affective support, led to a similar level of experienced interpersonal closeness and desire to interact with the virtual human again, and was similarly effective in reducing experienced emotional intensity regarding the upsetting event. These findings thus suggest that interacting with a virtual human may be a way to overcome sharers’ resistance to cognitive support, which should be conducive to emotional recovery.

Thus, by revealing a preponderance of socio-affective support provision, the present dissertation sheds light on the paradoxical finding that sharers may typically perceive sharing as beneficial even though it does not engender emotional recovery. Our studies demonstrate that (1) sharers are strongly motivated to receive socio-affective support, (2) listeners are inclined to provide socio-affective support, though are guided by sharers’ emotional intensity, support needs and situational demands, and (3) sharers may play an active role in
eliciting the support that they desire. As such, sharing may come to center around support that alleviates temporary distress and fosters interpersonal closeness, but does not facilitate long-term recovery. Future research is warranted to better understand how exactly sharers may effectively communicate their (cognitive) support needs. Furthermore, we demonstrated that despite sharers’ typical preference for socio-affective support, sharers might be receptive of cognitive support when provided by a virtual human, thereby pointing to a fruitful area for future research. Finally, these findings highlight that to understand when and why sharing is effective, it is crucial to define the goal for which sharing may be instrumental. Our research suggests that sharers may have a predominant motivation to feel understood and connected with others, and that social sharing is typically effective in fulfilling this socio-relational function. Perhaps, then, a shared problem is a halved problem after all.
Nederlandse samenvatting
Een alledaagse wijsheid luidt dat we onze emoties niet moeten opkroppen, maar dat we er juist over moeten praten: ‘gedeelde smart is halve smart’ (Zech, 1999). Wanneer mensen in emotionele nood zijn, hebben ze de neiging om anderen te vertellen over hun ervaringen – een fenomeen dat sociaal delen wordt genoemd (Rimé, Mesquita, Boca, & Philippot, 1991). Maar ondanks de wijdverbreide overtuiging dat delen helpt, is er weinig wetenschappelijke onderbouwing voor deze veronderstelling. Hoewel men het delen van emoties als behulpzaam ervoert, voelt men zich er op de lange termijn doorgaans niet beter door (Rimé, 2009; Zech & Rimé, 2005). In dit proefschrift is onderzocht waarom het delen van emoties met anderen zo vaak een ineffectieve manier is om emoties te reguleren, en op welke manieren het delen van emoties mogelijk wel positieve gevolgen voor de deler heeft.

Eerder onderzoek suggereert dat of delen op de lange termijn al dan niet voordelig is, in belangrijke mate afhangt van het soort steun dat de luisteraar biedt. In het algemeen worden twee verschillende vormen van steun onderscheiden (Rimé, 2009): Luisteraars kunnen sociaal-affectieve steun bieden, zoals troost en erkenning van de gevoelens, of cognitieve steun, welke gericht is op het veranderen van de manier waarop de deler over de emotionele ervaring denkt (bijvoorbeeld door deze positiever te herwaarderen). Waar sociaal-affectieve steun zorgt voor een tijdelijk gevoel van verbondenheid en opluchting, is alleen cognitieve steun effectief om het herstel op lange termijn te bevorderen (e.g., Batenburg & Das, 2014; Brans, Van Mechelen, Rimé & Verduyn, 2013; Lepore, Fernandez-Berrocal, Ragan, & Ramos, 2004; Nils & Rimé, 2012; Rimé, 2009; zie ook Lepore, Ragan, & Jones, 2000). Onduidelijk is echter (1) wat voor soort steun delers meestal zoeken, (2) welke factoren bepalen wat voor soort steun luisteraars denken dat delers nodig hebben en zij dus besluiten te geven, en, wat cruciaal is, (3) of en hoe delers zelf een actieve rol kunnen spelen bij het verkrijgen van de steun die ze wensen. Beantwoording van deze vragen stond centraal in dit proefschrift. We onderzochten de overkoepelende hypothese dat sociaal delen doorgaans draait om sociaal-affectieve steun, wat zou verklaren waarom het delen, ondanks het ontbreken van emotioneel herstel, vaak als behulpzaam wordt ervaren (zie Rimé, 2009). Aan de hand van vijf empirische onderzoekslijnen en een reeks verschillende methodologische benaderingen hebben we diverse aspecten van het proces van sociaal delen onderzocht om zo de verschillende manieren te belichten waarop het delen van emoties fungeert als een effectieve dan wel ineffectieve emotieregulatiestrategie.

In **Hoofdstuk 2** is eerst onderzocht of delers inderdaad een voorkeur hebben voor sociaal-affectieve steun ten opzichte van cognitieve steun. Bovendien is nagegaan of de waardering van de steun door de deler varieert afhankelijk van de specifieke emotie die gedeeld wordt. Daartoe is eerst in twee pilotstudies
vastgesteld dat deze twee vormen van steun betrouwbaar van elkaar te onderscheiden zijn. Vervolgens zijn in Studie 2.1 en 2.2 de waarderingen van de steun van de participanten in reactie op verschillende emotionele situaties experimenteel getest door gebruik te maken van vignetten (ingebeelde scenario’s). De resultaten gaven aan dat de participanten over het algemeen van mening waren dat het ontvangen van elk vorm van sociaal-affectieve steun behulpzamer zou zijn dan het ontvangen van louter cognitieve steun. Deze voorkeur voor sociaal-affectieve steun trad vooral op bij woede en verdriet: degenen die zich inbeelden bezorgdheid of spijt te ervaren, stonden meer open voor cognitieve steun. Al met al ondersteunen deze bevindingen de algemene hypothese dat de delers voornamelijk op zoek zijn naar sociaal-affectieve steun bij het delen van hun emoties met anderen.

Voortbouwend op deze bevindingen onderzochten we in Hoofdstuk 3 de hypothese dat delers hun behoefte aan sociaal-affectieve en cognitieve steun communiceren door hun emoties zodanig te delen dat de luisteraars de behoeften van de deler kunnen afleiden. Hierdoor zou het delen van emoties onevenredig vaak gericht kunnen raken op steun die op de lange termijn niet nuttig is. Om deze hypothese te onderzoeken, manipuleerden we eerst de steunbehoeften van de participanten en toonden we aan dat sociaal-affectieve steunbehoeften de participanten ertoe brachten om hun emoties meer expliciet te uiten, terwijl cognitieve steunbehoeften resulteerden in een sterkere neiging tot het uiten van hun inschattingen van de emotionele situatie (Studie 3.1). In Studie 3.2 en 3.3 testen we of deze verschillende wijzen van uiten de steunbehoeften beïnvloedden die de luisteraars de delers toeschreven. We vonden hier echter geen bewijs voor: luisteraars gingen er stelselmatig van uit dat de deler voornamelijk op zoek was naar sociaal-affectieve steun. Hoewel deze bevindingen dus niet duiden op effectieve communicatie van de behoeften van de deler, suggereren ze wel dat de deler nog altijd de steun krijgt die hij of zij wenst.

De strikt experimentele benadering toegepast in Hoofdstuk 3 kan echter tot een onderschatting hebben geleid van het vermogen van de delers om hun steunbehoeften effectief te communiceren. Het is mogelijk dat de delers hun behoefte aan steun hebben uitgedrukt op andere manieren dan die in Studie 3.1 zijn gemeten, en die dus niet zijn gemanipuleerd in Studie 3.2 en 3.3. Om die reden is in Hoofdstuk 4 voor een meer naturalistische benadering gekozen door participanten uit te nodigen om een sociale interactie aan te gaan. De participanten werden willekeurig toegewezen aan de rol van deler (die werd gevraagd om een emotionele ervaring te bespreken) of luisteraar (die de opdracht kreeg om op een natuurlijke manier te reageren). Nadien keken zowel de deler als de luisteraar afzonderlijk de interactie terug op video in fragmenten van 20 seconden. Voor elk fragment beoordeelden de delers hun ervaren emotionele intensiteit en hun
sociaal-affectieve en cognitieve steunbehoeften en beoordeelden de luisteraars hun perceptie van de emotionele intensiteit van de deler en de door hen geboden steun. We vonden dat de ervaren emotionele intensiteit van de delers bepalend was voor hun steunbehoeften, die op hun beurt bepalend waren voor de geboden steun van de luisteraar. Bovendien, hoe beter de luisteraars de emotionele intensiteit van de delers beoordeelden, hoe meer zij de sociaal-affectieve (maar niet cognitieve) steunbehoeften van de delers vervulden. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat delers de steun kunnen ontlokken die zij wensen, wat zou kunnen verklaren waarom zij het delen van hun emoties als behulpzaam ervaren, hoewel het niet leidt tot daadwerkelijk emotioneel herstel.

Bij het bepalen van de effectiviteit van steun is het echter ook belangrijk om de rol van de context in acht te nemen: wat in de ene situatie werkt, werkt mogelijk niet in andere situaties (zie bijvoorbeeld Aldao, 2013; Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Cutrona, 1990; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). In Hoofdstuk 5 hebben we onderzocht of en hoe luisteraars hun steun aanpassen aan de urgentie, dat wil zeggen, de mate waarin de situatie vereist dat hun emotionele nood onmiddellijk wordt verlicht of niet. Naast de neiging tot het overwegend bieden van sociaal-affectieve steun, vonden we dat wanneer de situatie om onmiddellijke emotionele verlichting vroeg participanten minder sociaal-affectieve steun boden en in plaats daarvan veel meer geneigd waren om te proberen de ander af te leiden van de emotionele situatie, of de ander te stimuleren zijn of haar emoties te onderdrukken – in vergelijking tot wanneer de situatie niet om directe emotionele verlichting vroeg. Het bieden van cognitieve steun werd echter niet beïnvloed door de mate waarin de situatie om onmiddellijke verlichting vroeg. In lijn met onze hypotheses pasten de participanten dus meer regulatiestrategieën toe die gericht waren op het loskomen van de emotionele ervaring wanneer de context meer directe emotionele verlichting vereiste. Hoofdstuk 5 vormt daarmee een eerste stap in het aantonen dat luisteraars de emoties van delers mogelijk reguleren op een manier die functioneel is voor de specifieke situatie.

Samenvattend blijkt uit deze hoofdstukken dat de delers een sterke voorkeur hebben voor sociaal-affectieve steun (Hoofdstuk 2 en 3) – een overwegende behoefte die de luisteraars ook veronderstellen (Hoofdstuk 3) en geneigd zijn te vervullen (Hoofdstuk 4 en 5). Zoals eerder beschreven, is cognitieve steun echter essentieel om effectief emotioneel herstel te bevorderen (e.g., Nils & Rimé, 2012; Rimé, 2009). Daarom is in Hoofdstuk 6 onderzocht of het inzetten van virtuele personen een vruchtbaar alternatief zou kunnen vormen waarmee effectieve steun kan worden geboden. We redeneerden dat mensen andere verwachtingen hebben van virtuele personen dan van gewone mensen, omdat ze virtuele personen niet het mentale vermogen toeschrijven om empathie te ervaren, waardoor ze wellicht meer bereid zijn om cognitieve steun te accepteren. Om dit idee te testen, deelden
De participanten twee persoonlijke emotionele ervaringen met een virtueel persoon, die ofwel sociaal-affectieve steun ofwel cognitieve steun bood. Hierbij bleek dat het ontvangen van cognitieve steun als even nuttig werd ervaren in het omgaan met de emotionele ervaring als sociaal-affectieve steun. Bovendien leidden beide typen steun tot een vergelijkbaar niveau van ervaren verbondenheid en tot een vergelijkbare wens om nog een keer met de virtuele persoon in gesprek te gaan. Tot slot waren beide typen steun even effectief in het verminderen van ervaren emotionele intensiteit met betrekking tot de emotionele gebeurtenis. Deze bevindingen suggereren dus dat het praten met een virtueel persoon een manier kan zijn om de weerstand van de delers tegen cognitieve steun te overwinnen, wat bevorderlijk zou moeten zijn voor het emotionele herstel.

Dit proefschrift werpt licht op de paradoxale bevinding dat delers het delen van emoties meestal als behulpzaam ervaren, ondanks dat het niet tot emotioneel herstel leidt, door aan te tonen dat er een onevenredige nadruk ligt op het bieden van sociaal-affectieve steun. De in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde studies tonen aan dat (1) delers sterk gemotiveerd zijn om sociaal-affectieve steun te krijgen, (2) luisteraars geneigd zijn om sociaal-affectieve steun te bieden, hoewel zij hun steun aanpassen aan de emotionele intensiteit, de steunbehoeften en de situationele eisen van de deler, en (3) delers een actieve rol kunnen spelen bij het verkrijgen van de steun die ze wensen. Op deze wijze kan het delen van emoties met anderen hoofdzakelijk gericht raken op steun die tijdelijk leed verlicht en verbondenheid creëert, maar die op lange termijn niet bevorderlijk is voor het emotionele herstel. Toekomstig onderzoek is gewenst om beter te begrijpen hoe de delers hun (cognitieve) steunbehoeften effectief kunnen communiceren. Daarnaast hebben we aangetoond dat, ondanks de algemene voorkeur van delers voor sociaal-affectieve steun, delers mogelijk ontvankelijk zijn voor cognitieve steun wanneer deze door een virtueel persoon geboden wordt, wat duidt op een vruchtbare terrein voor toekomstig onderzoek. Tot slot benadrukken deze bevindingen dat om te begrijpen wanneer en waarom het delen van emoties effectief is, het van cruciaal belang is om te bepalen welk doel het delen mogelijk dient. Ons onderzoek suggerereert dat delers voornamelijk gemotiveerd zijn om zich begrepen en verbonden te voelen met anderen, en dat sociaal delen over het algemeen wel effectief is in het vervullen van deze sociaal-relationele functie. Misschien is gedeelde smart dan toch halve smart.
Contributions to Empirical Chapters
Chapter 2
The studies were designed by L.S.P., D.A.S., G.A.v.K., and A.H.F. Data were collected by L.S.P with assistance of several students. Data were analyzed by L.S.P. The manuscript was written by L.S.P. D.A.S., G.A.v.K., and A.H.F. provided valuable comments and revisions.

Chapter 3
The studies were designed by L.S.P., D.A.S., G.A.v.K., and A.H.F. Data were collected by L.S.P with assistance of several students. Data were analyzed by L.S.P. The manuscript was written by L.S.P. D.A.S., G.A.v.K., and A.H.F. provided valuable comments and revisions.

Chapter 4
The study was designed by L.S.P. and A.H.F. Data were collected by L.S.P with assistance of several students. Data were analyzed by L.S.P. and L.S. The manuscript was written by L.S.P. D.A.S., G.A.v.K., L.S. and A.H.F. provided valuable comments and revisions.

Chapter 5
The study was designed by L.S.P. and A.H.F. Data were collected by L.S.P with assistance of several students. Data were analyzed by L.S.P. The manuscript was written by L.S.P. D.A.S., G.A.v.K., and A.H.F. provided valuable comments and revisions.

Chapter 6
The study was designed by L.S.P., D.A.S., G.A.v.K., J.G., and A.H.F. Data were collected and analyzed by L.S.P. The manuscript was written by L.S.P. D.A.S., G.A.v.K., J.G., and A.H.F. provided valuable comments and revisions.
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