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A Remark on Collective Quantification

Juha Kontinen · Jakub Szymanik

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Abstract We consider collective quantification in natural language. For many years the common strategy in formalizing collective quantification has been to define the meanings of collective determiners, quantifying over collections, using certain type-shifting operations. These type-shifting operations, i.e., lifts, define the collective interpretations of determiners systematically from the standard meanings of quantifiers. All the lifts considered in the literature turn out to be definable in second-order logic. We argue that second-order definable quantifiers are probably not expressive enough to formalize all collective quantification in natural language.

Keywords Collective quantification · Lindström quantifiers · Second-order generalized quantifiers · Type-shifting · Definability · Computational complexity

1 Introduction

Recently, there has been some interest in measuring the complexity of semantic constructions of natural language. These studies have been motivated by certain mathematical questions (see e.g. Hella et al. 1997) as well as cognitive considerations.
As the complexity of the semantics of a language heavily depends on the expressive power of its quantifiers, most of the studies have focused on quantification. In particular, Mostowski and Wojtyniak (2004), followed by Sevenster (2006), study computational complexity of natural language quantifiers. In all of these studies only distributive readings of natural language determiners have been considered. In contrast—as the properties of plural objects are becoming more and more important in many areas (e.g. in game-theoretical investigations, where groups of agents are acting)—this paper is devoted to the collective readings of quantifiers.

Already Bertrand Russell (1903) noticed that natural language contains quantification not only over objects, but also over collections of objects. The notion of a collective reading is a semantic one—as opposed to the grammatical notion of plurality—and it applies to the meanings of certain occurrences of plural noun phrases. The phenomenon is illustrated by the following sentences:

(1) Tikitu and Samson lifted the poker table together.
(2) Most of the card combinations do not contain a picture card.
(3) Most groups of students have never played Hold’em together.

The question arises how should we model collective quantification in formal semantics. Many authors have proposed different mathematical accounts of collectivity in language (see Lønning 1997, for an overview and references).

In Link (1983) one finds the idea of replacing the domain of discourse, which consists of entities, with the structure of a complete join semilattice. The idea is to enrich the structure of models to account for cumulative references. The main advantage of this algebraic perspective is that it unifies the view on collective predication and predication involving mass nouns.

van der Does (1992) noticed that all that can be modeled with the algebraic models can be done as well within type theory. This alternative tradition, starting with the works of Bartsch (1973) and Bennett (1974), uses extensional type theory with the basic types: \(e\) (entities) and \(t\) (truth values), and compound types: \(\alpha\beta\) (functions mapping type \(\alpha\) objects into type \(\beta\) objects). Together with the idea of type-shifting, introduced in the seminal paper of Partee and Rooth (1983), and then formally developed by van Benthem (1995), it gives a new approach to modeling collectivity in natural language. The strategy, introduced by Scha (1981) and later advocated and developed by van der Does (1992, 1993) and Winter (2001), is to lift first-order generalized quantifiers to a second-order setting. In the type theoretical terms the trick is to shift determiners of type \(\((et)((et)t))\), related to the distributive readings of quantifiers, into determiners of type \(\((et)(((et)t)t))\) which can be used to formalize collective readings of quantifiers.

In the next section we illustrate the idea of lifting first-order quantifiers by a few examples. Then we introduce both first-order and second-order generalized quantifiers, and show that the type theoretic approach can be redefined in terms of second-order generalized quantifiers. The idea of type-shifting turns out to be very closely related to the notion of definability which is central in generalized quantifier theory. We show that the type-shifting operations considered in the literature (i.e. lifts) are definable in second-order logic. This observation allows us to point out the restrictions of the type-shifting strategy used in the literature. In particular, we show that the
collective meaning of the determiner *most* can not be uniformly defined by any lift definable in second-order logic, unless the counting hierarchy collapses in computational complexity theory.

2 Lifting First-order Determiners

Let us consider the following example sentences involving collective quantification.

(4) Five people lifted the table.
(5) Some students played poker together.
(6) All combinations of cards are losing in some situations.

The distributive reading of the sentence (4) claims that the total number of students who lifted the table on their own is exactly five. This statement can be formalized in elementary logic by the formula (7):

\[ \exists x \left[ \text{People}(x) \land \text{Lift}(x) \right] \]

The collective interpretation of (4) claims that there was a collection of exactly five students who jointly lifted the table. This can be formalized by lifting the formula (7) to the second-order formula (8), where the predicate “Lift” has been lifted from individuals to sets:

\[ \exists X \left[ \text{Card}(X) = 5 \land X \subseteq \text{People} \land \text{Lift}(X) \right] \]

In the similar way, by lifting the corresponding first-order determiners, we can express the collective readings of sentences (5)–(6) as follows:

(9) \[ \exists X \left[ X \subseteq \text{Students} \land \text{Play}(X) \right] \]
(10) \[ \forall X \left[ X \subseteq \text{Cards} \rightarrow \text{Lose}(X) \right] \]

All the examples above can be described in terms of the uniform procedure of turning a determiner of type \(((et)((et)t))\) into a determiner of type \(((et)(((et)t)t))\) by means of the type-shifting operator called *existential modifier*, \((\cdot)^{EM}\). Fix a universe of discourse \(U\) and take any \(X \subseteq U\), and \(Y \subseteq \mathcal{P}(U)\). Define the existential lift \(Q^{EM}\) of a quantifier \(Q\) in the following way:

\[ Q^{EM}(X, Y) \text{ is true } \iff \exists Z \subseteq X[Q(X, Z) \land Z \in Y]. \]

In the literature, lifts have been defined also for distributive and so-called neutral readings of sentences. For example, Ben-Avi and Winter (2003) define the following lift—called *dfit*—abbreviating determiner fitting, to overcome some problems related to the monotonicity properties of the previous lifts considered in the literature. The *dfit* operator turns a determiner of type \(((et)((et)t))\) to a determiner of type \(((et)(((et)t)t))\), i.e., for all \(X, Y \subseteq \mathcal{P}(U)\) we have that

\[ Q^{dfit}(X, Y) \text{ is true } \iff Q[\cup X, \cup(X \cap Y)] \land [X \cap Y = \emptyset \lor \exists W \in X \cap Y \land Q(\cup X, W)]. \]

For us the most important observation is that all the lifts proposed in the literature (see Winter 2001, for an overview) are definable by the means of second-order logic.
3 Generalized Quantifiers

3.1 Lindström Quantifiers

Let us first recall the definition of a first-order generalized quantifier formulated by Lindström (1966). Let \( s = (\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_r) \) be a tuple of positive integers. A \textit{first-order generalized (Lindström) quantifier} of type \( s \) is a class \( Q \) of structures of vocabulary \( \tau_s = \{P_1, \ldots, P_r\} \), such that \( P_i \) is \( \ell_i \)-ary for \( 1 \leq i \leq r \), and \( Q \) is closed under isomorphisms.

To illustrate the notion let us look at some well-known examples of first-order generalized quantifiers.

\[
\begin{align*}
\forall &= \{ (M, P) \mid P = M \}. \\
\exists &= \{ (M, P) \mid P \subseteq M \text{ and } P \neq \emptyset \}. \\
\text{even} &= \{ (M, P) \mid P \subseteq M \text{ and } \text{card}(P) \text{ is even} \}. \\
\text{most} &= \{ (M, P, S) \mid P, S \subseteq M \text{ and } \text{card}(P \cap S) > \text{card}(P \setminus S) \}. \\
\text{some} &= \{ (M, P, S) \mid P, S \subseteq M \text{ and } P \cap S \neq \emptyset \}.
\end{align*}
\]

The first two examples are the standard first-order universal and existential quantifiers, both of type \((1)\). The other examples are also familiar from natural language semantics. Their aim is to capture the truth-conditions of sentences of the form: “There is an even number of \( A \)s”, “Most \( A \)s are \( B \)s” and “Some \( A \) is \( B \)”. Divisibility quantifier \text{even} is of type \((1)\), whereas the quantifiers \text{most} and \text{some} are of type \((1, 1)\).

First-order generalized quantifiers enable us to enrich the expressive power of first-order logic in a very controlled and minimal way. We define the extension, \( \text{FO}(Q) \), of first-order logic by a quantifier \( Q \) of type \( s = (\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_r) \) in the following way:

- The formula formation rules of \( \text{FO} \) are extended by the rule:
  
  if for \( 1 \leq i \leq r \), \( \varphi_i(\overline{x}_i) \) is a formula and \( \overline{x}_i \) is an \( \ell_i \)-tuple of pairwise distinct variables, then \( Q\overline{x}_1, \ldots, \overline{x}_r (\varphi_1(\overline{x}_1), \ldots, \varphi_r(\overline{x}_r)) \) is a formula.

- The satisfaction relation of \( \text{FO} \) is extended by the rule:
  
  \[
  M \models Q\overline{x}_1, \ldots, \overline{x}_r (\varphi_1(\overline{x}_1), \ldots, \varphi_r(\overline{x}_r)) \iff (M, \varphi_1^M, \ldots, \varphi_r^M) \in Q,
  \]

  where \( \varphi_i^M = \{ \overline{a} \in M^{\ell_i} \mid M \models \varphi_i(\overline{a}) \} \).

First-order generalized quantifiers have been used extensively in formal-semantics of natural language to model distributive determiners (see Westerståhl and Peters 2006). However, they are not adequate in formalizing collective quantification. In the next section we present an intuitive and natural extension of Lindström quantifiers, second-order generalized quantifiers. They turn out to be a natural concept for interpreting the meanings of collective determiners in natural language.
3.2 Second-order Generalized Quantifiers

Second-order generalized quantifiers were first defined and applied in the context of descriptive complexity theory by Burtschick and Vollmer (1998). The general notion of a second-order generalized quantifier was later formulated by Andersson (2002). The following definition is a straightforward generalization from the first-order case. However, note that the types of second-order generalized quantifiers are more complicated than the types of first-order generalized quantifiers, since predicate variables can have different arities. Let $t = (s_1, \ldots, s_w)$, where $s_i = (\ell^i_1, \ldots, \ell^i_{r_i})$, be a tuple of tuples of positive integers. A second order structure of type $t$ is a structure of the form $(M, P_1, \ldots, P_w)$, where $P_i \subseteq P(M^{\ell^i_1}) \times \cdots \times P(M^{\ell^i_{r_i}})$. Below, we write $f[A]$ for the image of $A$ under the function $f$.

A second-order generalized quantifier $Q$ of type $t$ is a class of structures of type $t$ such that $Q$ is closed under isomorphisms: if $(M, P_1, \ldots, P_w) \in Q$ and $f : M \to N$ is a bijection such that $S_i = \{ (f[A_1], \ldots, f[A_{r_i}]) | (A_1, \ldots, A_{r_i}) \in P_i \}$, for $1 \leq i \leq w$, then $(N, S_1, \ldots, S_w) \in Q$.

In the following, second-order quantifiers are denoted $Q$, whereas first-order quantifiers are denoted $Q$. The following examples show that second-order generalized quantifiers are a natural extension from the first-order case.

$$\exists^2 = \{(M, P) | P \subseteq P(M) \text{ and } P \neq \emptyset \}.$$  
$\text{Even} = \{(M, P) | P \subseteq P(M) \text{ and } \text{card}(P) \text{ is even} \}.$  
$\text{Even}' = \{(M, P) | P \subseteq P(M) \text{ and } \forall X \in P(\text{card}(X) \text{ is even}) \}.$  
$\text{Most} = \{(M, P, S) | P, S \subseteq P(M) \text{ and } \text{card}(P \cap S) > \text{card}(P \setminus S) \}.$

The first example is the familiar unary second-order existential quantifier. The type of $\exists^2$ is $((1))$, i.e., it applies to one formula binding one unary second-order variable in it. The type of the quantifier $\text{Even}$ is also $((1))$ and it expresses that a formula holds for an even number of subsets of the universe. On the other hand, the quantifier $\text{Even}'$ expresses that all the subsets satisfying a formula have an even number of elements. The type of the quantifier $\text{Most}$ is $((1), (1))$ and it is the second-order analogue of the quantifier most.

As in the first-order case, we define the extension, $\text{FO}(Q)$, of FO by a second-order generalized quantifier $Q$ of type $t = (s_1, \ldots, s_w)$, where $s_i = (\ell^i_1, \ldots, \ell^i_{r_i})$, in the following way:

- Second order variables are introduced to FO.
- The formula formation rules of FO are extended by the rule:
  if for $1 \leq i \leq w$, $\varphi_i(\overline{X}_i)$ is a formula and $\overline{X}_i = (X_{1,i}, \ldots, X_{r_i,i})$ is a tuple of pairwise distinct predicate variables, such that $\text{arity}(X_{j,i}) = \ell^i_j$, for $1 \leq j \leq r_i$, then
  $$Q\overline{X}_1, \ldots, \overline{X}_w (\varphi_1(\overline{X}_1), \ldots, \varphi_w(\overline{X}_w))$$
  is a formula.
The satisfaction relation of FO is extended by the rule:

\[ M \models Q \overline{x}_1, \ldots, \overline{x}_w (\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_w) \iff (M, \varphi_1^M, \ldots, \varphi_w^M) \in Q, \]

where \( \varphi_i^M = \{ R \in \mathcal{P}(M^{\ell_i}) \times \cdots \times \mathcal{P}(M^{r_i}) \mid M \models \varphi_i(R) \} \).

### 3.3 Definability

Informally, definability of a quantifier \( Q \) in a logic \( L \) means that there is a uniform way to express every formula of the form \( Qx \varphi \) in \( L \). Formally, let \( Q \) be a first-order generalized quantifier of type \( s \) and \( L \) a logic. We say that the quantifier \( Q \) is **definable** in \( L \) if there is a sentence \( \varphi \in L \) of vocabulary \( \tau_s \) such that for any \( \tau_s \)-structure \( M \):

\[ M \models \varphi \iff M \in Q. \]

Let \( L \) and \( L' \) be logics. The logic \( L' \) is **at least as strong as** the logic \( L \) (\( L \leq L' \)) if for every sentence \( \varphi \in L \) over any vocabulary there exists a sentence \( \psi \in L' \) over the same vocabulary such that:

\[ \models \varphi \iff \psi. \]

The logics \( L \) and \( L' \) are **equivalent** (\( L \equiv L' \)) if \( L \leq L' \) and \( L' \leq L \).

Below, we assume that the logic \( L \) has the so-called **Substitution Property**, i.e., that the logic \( L \) is closed under substituting predicates by formulas. The following fact is well-known for Lindström quantifiers.

**Proposition 3.1** Let \( Q \) be a first-order generalized quantifier and \( L \) a logic. The quantifier \( Q \) is definable in \( L \) iff

\[ L(Q) \equiv L. \]

**Proof** Since \( Q = \text{Mod}(\varphi) \), where \( \varphi = Q\overline{x}_1, \ldots, \overline{x}_r (P_1(\overline{x}_1), \ldots, P_r(\overline{x}_r)) \) the implication from right to left follows. For the other direction, we use recursively the fact that if \( \varphi \) is the formula which defines \( Q \) and \( \psi_1(\overline{x}_1), \ldots, \psi_r(\overline{x}_r) \) are formulas of \( L \), then

\[ \models Q\overline{x}_1, \ldots, \overline{x}_r (\psi_1(\overline{x}_1), \ldots, \psi_r(\overline{x}_r)) \iff \varphi(P_1/\psi_1, \ldots, P_r/\psi_r), \]

where the formula on the right is obtained by substituting every occurrence of \( P_i(\overline{x}_i) \) in \( \varphi \) by \( \psi_i(\overline{x}_i) \). \( \square \)

In the second-order case, analogous notion of definability can be formulated. We do not give the formal definition here. However, things are not completely analogous to the first-order case. With second-order generalized quantifiers \( L(Q) \equiv L \) does not imply that the quantifier \( Q \) is definable in the logic \( L \). The converse implication is still valid.

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**Proposition 3.2** (Kontinen 2004) Let \( Q \) be a second-order generalized quantifier and \( \mathcal{L} \) a logic. If the quantifier \( Q \) is definable in \( \mathcal{L} \) then

\[
\mathcal{L}(Q) \equiv \mathcal{L}.
\]

4 Defining Collective Determiners

In this section we show that collective determiners can be easily identified with certain second-order generalized quantifiers.

At first sight, there seems to be a problem with identifying the collective determiners with second-order generalized quantifiers; some of the collective determiners discussed have a mixed type \(((et)((et)ti)))\).\(^1\) However, this is not a problem since it is straightforward to extend the definition to allow also quantifiers with mixed types. Denote by \( \text{some}^{EM} \) the following quantifier of type \((1,(1))\)

\[
\{ (M, P, G) \mid P \subseteq M; \ G \subseteq \mathcal{P}(M) : \exists Y \subseteq P (Y \neq \emptyset \text{ and } P \in G) \}.
\]

Obviously, we can now express the collective meaning of sentence (5) by the formula (11).

(11) \( \text{some}^{EM} x, X[\text{Student}(x), \text{Play}(X)]. \)

Analogously, we can define the corresponding second-order quantifier appearing in sentence (4), here as (12).

(12) Five people lifted the table.

We take \( \text{five}^{EM} \) to be the second order-quantifier of type \((1,(1))\) denoting the class:

\[
\{ (M, P, G) \mid P \subseteq M; \ G \subseteq \mathcal{P}(M) : \exists Y \subseteq P (\text{card}(Y) = 5 \text{ and } P \in G) \}.
\]

Now we can formalize the collective meaning of (12) by:

(13) \( \text{five}^{EM} x, X[\text{Student}(x), \text{Lift}(X)]. \)

Already these simple examples show that it is straightforward to associate with every lifted determiner a mixed second-order generalized quantifier. Also, it easy to see that for any first-order quantifier \( Q \) the lifted second-order quantifier \( Q^{EM} \) can be uniformly expressed in second-order logic assuming the quantifier \( Q \) is also available. In fact, all the lifts discussed in Sect. 2, and, as far as we know, all proposed in the literature, are definable in second-order logic. This observation can be stated as follows.

**Proposition 4.1** Let \( Q \) be a first-order quantifier definable in \( \text{SO} \). Then the second-order quantifiers \( Q^{EM} \) and \( Q^{\text{dfit}} \) are definable in \( \text{SO} \).

\(^1\) Note that the lift dfit of Ben-Avi and Winter (2003) turns a first-order quantifier of type \((1,1)\) directly into a second-order quantifier of type \(((1),(1))\).
Proof Let us consider the case of $Q^{EM}$. Let $\psi(x)$ and $\phi(Y)$ be formulas. We want to express $Q^{EM}_X, Y(\psi(x), \phi(Y))$ in second-order logic. By the assumption, the quantifier $Q$ can be defined by some sentence $\theta \in \text{SO}[\{P_1, P_2\}]$. We can now use the following formula:

$$\exists Z (\forall x (Z(x) \rightarrow \psi(x)) \land (\theta(P_1/\psi(x), P_2/Z) \land \phi(Y/Z)) .$$

The other lifts can be defined analogously. □

Proposition 4.1 shows that the type-shifting strategy cannot take us outside of second-order logic. In the next section we show that it is very unlikely that all collective determiners in natural language can be defined in second-order logic. Our argument is based on the close connection between second-order generalized quantifiers and certain complexity classes in computational complexity theory.

5 Lifting the Determiner most

Let us return to the example sentences (2)–(3) from the introduction. For readability, we repeat (3) here as (14).

(14) Most groups of students have never played Hold’em together.

It is easy to see that (14) can be formalized using the quantifier MOST by:

(15) MOST $X, Y[\text{Students}(X), \neg \text{Play}(Y)].$

We assume above that the predicates Students($X$) and Play($Y$) are interpreted as collections of sets of atomic entities of the universe of discourse. Obviously, this is just one possible way of interpreting (14). However, it seems that something like MOST is needed in the formalization assuming that Students($X$) and Play($Y$) are interpreted as collective predicates.

For the sake of argument, let us assume that our formalization of sentence (14) is correct. It is easy to see that the lifts discussed before do not give the intended meaning when applied to the first-order quantifier most. We shall next show that it is unlikely that any lift which can be defined in second-order logic can do the job. More precisely, we shall show (Theorem 5.1 below) that if the quantifier MOST can be lifted from the first-order most using a lift which is definable in second-order logic then something unexpected happens in computational complexity. This result indicates that the type-shifting strategy used to define the collective determiners in the literature is probably not general enough to cover all collective quantification in natural language.

We shall next discuss the complexity theoretic side of our argument. Recall that second-order logic corresponds in the complexity theory to the polynomial hierarchy, PH, (see Stockmeyer 1976). The polynomial hierarchy is an oracle hierarchy with NP as the building block. If we replace NP by probabilistic polynomial time (PP) in the definition of PH, then we arrive at a class called the counting hierarchy (CH). PP consists of languages $L$ for which there is a polynomial time-bounded nondeterministic Turing machine $N$ such that, for all inputs $x, x \in L$ iff more than half of the computations of $N$ on input $x$ end up accepting. The counting hierarchy can be defined now as follows in terms of oracle Turing machines.
(1) $C_0 P = \text{PTIME}$,
(2) $C_{k+1} P = \text{PP}^{C_k P}$,
(3) $\text{CH} = \bigcup_{k \in \mathbb{N}} C_k P$.

It is known that $\text{PH}$ is contained in the second level $C_2 P$ of $\text{CH}$ (see Toda 1991). The question whether $\text{CH} \subseteq \text{PH}$ is still open.

Now, we can turn to the theorem which is fundamental for our argumentation.

**Theorem 5.1** If the quantifier $\text{Most}$ is definable in second-order logic, then $\text{CH} = \text{PH}$ and $\text{CH}$ collapses to its second level.

**Proof** The proof is based on the observation in Kontinen and Niemistö (2006) that already the logic $\text{FO}(\text{Most})$ can define complete problems for each level of the counting hierarchy. On the other hand, if the quantifier $\text{Most}$ is definable in second-order logic, then by Proposition 3.2 we would have that $\text{FO}(\text{Most}) \leq \text{SO}$ and therefore $\text{SO}$ would contain complete problems for each level of the counting hierarchy. This would imply that $\text{CH} = \text{PH}$ and furthermore that $\text{CH} \subseteq \text{PH} \subseteq C_2 P$. □

**6 Conclusion**

We have showed that the higher-order approach to collective quantification in natural language can be formalized in terms of second-order generalized quantifiers. The previous attempts have relied implicitly on quantifiers which can be defined in second-order logic. We have presented an argument indicating that second-order definable quantifiers are probably not general enough to cover all collective quantification in natural language.

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2 In Kontinen and Niemistö (2006) the claim is shown to hold for the extension of first-order logic by the unary second-order majority quantifier of type $((1))$ which is easily definable in terms of the quantifier $\text{Most}$.


