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CityEvents

Place Selling in a Media Age

Ward Rennen

UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM

CityEvents: Place Selling in a Media Age

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CityEvents

Place Selling in a Media Age

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus,
prof. dr J.W. Zwemmer
ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde
commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Aula der Universiteit
op vrijdag 14 september 2007, te 10.00 uur

door

Ward Rennen

geboren te Leiderdorp

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	prof. dr. A. Kangas
	dr. J.A. Teurlings

Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen

TO LOA

FOR ALL YOUR STRENGHT, LOVE AND COURAGE

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The cliché goes that working on a PhD thesis is a lonely experience. In a small dark attic room, stuffed with books and piles of paper notes, the researcher reads and writes from dawn till dusk in solitude, pale from a lack of daylight. Even if he is not working in his little room, he spends his time in places that are far from sociable, like the numerous libraries, archives and museums that he visits for research purposes. He wanders there in silence just like the other visitors that keep on digging through layers of paperwork to find their pieces of the map that will lead them to their own intellectual treasures. Five years ago, I was haunted by this image. The idea of working in solitude attracted me and at the same time made me doubt about myself. Was I really capable of handling such tough intellectual labor alone? Was I not too young to start such a serious adventure? After all, I just graduated from university when I started to work on this thesis and I had not gained much working experience elsewhere. Looking back, I was worried about something that is rather a romanticized image of academic labor than reality. In the years that I spent on this research project, I visited more places and met more people than I ever did before. Sometimes I even found it difficult to find the seclusion to work in silence and concentration. During those rare moments the romanticized image became somewhat of a reality, especially in the last stages of working on this book. Yet, there was always the warm intellectual “bird’s nest” at ASCA and the Media and Culture department where I could exchange views and the latest news with my colleagues. Without these persons and all the people I have met and who have supported me over these last five years, this PhD project would indeed have been a rather solitary enterprise.

It is therefore a great pleasure to thank at least some of the extraordinary people who accompanied me through my postgraduate experience. In the first place I would like to thank *Ginette Verstraete* and *José van Dijk* who have been great supervisors throughout the years. It was Ginette who came up with the idea of me applying for a postgraduate position at the University of Amsterdam. Impressed by her great support and advice when I wrote my master’s thesis during my studies at Maastricht University, I felt from the start that with Ginette as a supervisor this project would become a challenging intellectual experience. And so it was. Ginette introduced me to many theories and perspectives and helped me to improve my theoretical and intellectual understanding by asking me questions over and over again to sharpen my arguments. In combination with her enthusiasm and humor, her sharp intellectual sense made it a pleasure to learn from her.

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cinema, Thomas opened the broader field of media studies to me, while at the same time exploring other areas of research. As the director of the project “Cinema Europe”, Thomas inspired me to approach the world from a cinematic viewpoint, expanding my focus from author cinema to cities, consumption patterns, Europe, politics, festivals and time and space. Through these experiences, my analysis of the cities and events has gained in depth. In this respect, I owe special gratitude to Thomas for bringing me back to the work of Bruno Latour, whose work has become a theoretical fundament in my research. My Cinema Europe experience would not have been complete without mentioning my fellow Cinema Europeans *Marijke, Malte, Floris, Tarja, Ria, Senta, Melis, Yesim, Drehli* and *Gerwin* with whom I was lucky to share office, ideas, thoughts, discussions, conferences meals, trips, parties, worries and the Cinema Europe seminars. A special word of thanks goes to Marijke de Valck for the great discussions we had on festivals and the city. Floris Paalman has been so kind to share his archief research on the Nenijs with me.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Crystal Palace is completely destroyed. In the most spectacular night fire in living memory, the world famous glass building that has dominated Sydenham Hill for eighty-two years is enveloped from end to end in a sea of flames. (...) This famous landmark is no more. First erected in Hyde Park for the Great Exhibition, inspired by the Prince Consort in 1851, it was removed to Sydenham three years later and has been one of London's chief showplaces ever since. Now it smolders in irretrievable ruin. (...) Nothing but twisted metal remains. (...) The ten thousand pound organ with its five miles of lead piping has gone and so much of the invaluable broad band television apparatus housed in the South Tower. (...) the Crystal Palace held a warm place in the affection of people throughout the Empire. It can never be replaced.¹

On the night of 30 October 1936, more than 100,000 Londoners gathered at Sydenham Hill to witness the Crystal Palace fire. Ironically, the destruction of the most famous and tangible remains of the first world exhibition became a spectacular event in itself, just as the opening of the pavilion for the Great Exhibition had amazed the world eighty-five years before. Apart from the dramatic nature of this event, there was another difference between the opening of the Great Exhibition in 1851 and the burning down of the Crystal Palace on that October night in 1936. The latter event was recorded by cameras, not only from the ground but also from the air. The above quote consists of fragments from the reporter's comments that accompanied the British Paramount News images of the disastrous event, supporting the spectacular visual narrative with information and simultaneously adding a sensational thrill. Because the event was recorded on film, the fire did not wipe out the memory of the Great Exhibition. On the contrary, the Crystal Palace as a structure was replaced by audiovisual material that revived the legacy of the Great Exhibition more powerfully than the pavilion—which was already in a state of decline before the fire—could ever have done. Ironically, the fire not only destroyed the pavilion, but also most of the Baird television studios, which were housed on the same site.

1936 was not only the year the Crystal Palace burnt down, but also the year the television medium was introduced to the wider public during the notorious Berlin Olympic Games (Zielinski, 1989). As was the case with the Great Exhibition, this event would write history. The reasons for its fame, however, lie not only in the scale and spectacle with which the Berlin Olympics were staged, but above all in the media

¹ Fragments from the audio commentary accompanying the television report on the Crystal Palace fire by British Paramount News, 30 October 1936. The author has extracted the speech fragments from the picture soundtrack. The film fragment can be found on Newsfilm Online <http://newsfilm.bufile.ac.uk>, last visited March 31, 2007.

technologies and propaganda strategies that were deployed to maximize the spectacular effect and to venerate and propagate the Third Reich and its leader. The 1936 Olympic Games put a stamp on Berlin as the Great Exhibition and its Crystal Palace had done for London, but not merely because of the imposing Grönewald Stadium or other architectural remains. The Berlin Games are mostly remembered by Leni Riefenstahl's film *Olympiad*, so that a film rather than spectacular architecture forms the basis for the event's memorialization.

Large events like the Berlin Games and the Great Exhibition are staged in order to be memorialized. Their purpose is to attract international attention and to put the host city and nation on the map. In this respect, they do not differ much from other prestigious projects, such as the signature buildings, museums and monuments cities construct to raise their international profile. Yet, in contrast to most of these flagship projects, large events do not remain. Apart from the few physical landmarks and media traces that they leave, such events are short-term occurrences in the lives of cities: they are not intended to last. *This raises the question of how such ephemeral projects enable(d) cities to raise their profile internationally.* It is this question on which this study focuses.

To answer this question, we have to look inside the production processes of large international events. Moreover, considering the broadness of this research question, a choice has to be made as to which events will be studied, within which period and in which places. In this research, six case studies will be examined, namely the 1928 Amsterdam, 1936 Berlin and 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games, and the 1987 Amsterdam, 1988 Berlin and 2000 Helsinki European Capitals of Culture. For this research archives have been analyses that have only

This research focuses on the hosting of large events within Europe. This choice was made not only because Europe is the birthplace of the world's first large international events, namely the World Exhibition (Auerbach, 1989) and the Olympics (Smith, 2004), but also because Europe has a different urban tradition than other developed regions such as North America. The development of the phenomenon of hosting large international events cannot be studied without paying attention to the urban context that produced this phenomenon (Mitchell, 1989). It is also for this purpose that the European Capital of Culture (ECOC) is included. The ECOC was founded in the mid 1980s at a time when European cities were increasingly gaining in importance at the cost of the traditionally dominant position of the nation state. Not coincidentally, the rise of European cities and the changing role of the nation state were intrinsically linked with attempts to establish a pan-European culture (Aiello, 2006) and with the process of economic European integration. In this context, urban cultures and identities entered into competition with national ones. It is also in cities that the most recent boom in festivals took and is taking place. In this respect, the ECOC is a typical phenomenon of an era in which Western European countries were undergoing many cultural and economic changes. The most vital change, in this regard, is the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial economy (Harvey, 1989, Castells, 1996), over the course of which culture, leisure and tourism gained in importance as economic growth fields (Zukin, 1995; Featherstone and Lasch, 1999; Urry, 1990, 1995; Bailey, Miles and Stark, 2000; Heinz, 2003).² In contrast to the ECOC, which predominantly advocates a Europe of the regions and cities, the Olympics are intrinsically linked to expressions of nationalism. The latter event has its roots in an archetypically modernist tradition (MacAloon, 2006; Young and

² Throughout this research, references are listed in order of their importance for the argument.

Wamsley, ed., 2005), which, together with the World Exhibition, stood at the beginning of a European urban tradition of hosting large international events, a tradition intimately interconnected with the emergence of mass media and mass consumption (Guttmann, et al., 2000; Segrave, 2000). The Olympics were chosen over the World Exhibition to ensure variety in the type of event studied here, since the World Exhibition resembles the ECOC in being a cultural event.

By selecting the Olympic Games and the ECOC, we are thus able to pay attention to two different events and to cover a vast section of twentieth-century European urban history. The contrast between the Olympics and the ECOC ensures that if we are able to identify shared developments and recurring patterns in the way cities hosted these two event types, it is more likely that these developments and patterns would also apply to the hosting of other events than would be the case if we studied events more alike in terms of theme and scale.

A pragmatic reason motivates the selection of the case cities. Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki are chosen because no other European cities have hosted both the Olympic Games and the ECOC. In addition, the selection of these three cities includes a rich variety of city types. Amsterdam appears as a mid-sized international city in the centre of Western Europe, Berlin as a metropolis in the centre of Europe as a whole and Helsinki as a relatively isolated capital city in the European periphery (Cantell, 1999; Bell and Hietala, 2002), which has recently repositioned itself as one of Europe's leading high-tech and convention centres (Castells and Himanen, 2002). This enables us to study the hosting of the Olympic Games and the ECOC in a great variety of local settings.

1.1 THE EMERGENCE OF EVENT-BASED PLACE SELLING

The patterns and developments that this study seeks to reveal concentrate on the phenomenon of cities trying to reposition themselves by means of large international events. At the time of writing this thesis, there was no accurate term to label this phenomenon. For that reason, I have introduced the term *event-based place selling*. This term captures the essence of this research project by pointing to the strategies that cities deployed throughout the twentieth century to put themselves on the map through hosting large international events. These events were used as specific instruments within a wider range of place-selling strategies.³ The contemporary

³ In its most basic sense, place selling concerns the promotion of places ranging from towns and cities to regions and nations. The rationale behind the promotion of places is the idea that in order to safeguard and increase a place's socio-economic vitality, its qualities have to be brought to the attention of desired target groups, such as tourists, residents, employers, investors, and businesspeople, who have to be persuaded to visit, work, invest and live there. According to marketing guru Philip Kotler, however, promotion is only one aspect within the overall process of raising a place's profile. To position a place effectively, investments have to be made in the assets that a place offers. Kotler defines the goal of place selling as the attempt "to strengthen the capacity of communities and regions to adapt to the changing marketplace, seize opportunities and sustain opportunity" (Kotler and Haider, et al. 1993: 18). Kotler's definition of place selling is based on marketing assumptions that highlight the relation between product development and product promotion. "Place marketing means designing a place to satisfy the needs of its target markets. It succeeds when citizens and businesses are pleased with their communities, and meet the expectations of visitors and investors" (1993: 99). This is a far more complex task than designing a product and brand label. Kotler uses the term *city marketing* instead of place selling in order to emphasize the relation between the development of distinguishable characteristics on the one hand, and the promotion of these features on the other.

practice of place selling or city marketing has become increasingly associated with terms such as creative industries, marketing, target groups, urban regeneration and gentrification, the post-industrial economy, and information and communication technologies (Florida, 2002, 2005; Hall, 2000; Verwijnen and Lethovuori, ed., 1999; McGuigan, 1996, 2001; Landry and Bianchini, 1997; Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993). This discourse presents place selling as a relatively recent phenomenon that developed concurrently with the transition from an industrial economy to a post-industrial economy in Western countries from the 1970s onwards (Harvey, 1989, 1996; Sassen, 1998, 2000; Castells, 1992).

However, the urban historian Stephen V. Ward objects to this interpretation of place selling. In his book *Selling Places: The Marketing and Promotion of Towns and Cities 1850-2000* (1998), he argues that place selling is a strategy that has been deployed by cities since the mid nineteenth century. Ward bases his argument on historical case studies of American and Western European places. In his view, the emergence of place-selling strategies coincides with the rise of American and European industrial urban centers, seaside resorts and suburbs between the 1850s and the 1920s. In this period, local governments and chambers of commerce, railway corporations, travel agencies and real estate businesses actively began to promote places as travel destinations, business locations and investment opportunities. More importantly, Ward signals an important change in place-selling strategies from the mid 1930s onwards. According to Ward, British seaside resorts increasingly started to organize events to attract media attention.

Meanwhile all [British seaside] resorts were giving great attention to public relations, with often inspired attempts to create media interest. The hosting of various newsworthy events such as entertainments or sports and the contriving of news stories were favoured devices (Ward, 1998; 49).

Before this time, the promotion of cities was mostly focused on advertising in print media. Even though cities have hosted spectacular events since ancient times (consider, for instance, Caesar Nero's inauguration of one hundred and fifty days of bloody festivities in Rome's coliseum or the Venice carnival), between the late 1920s and 1930s such events became increasingly important for cities to raise their profile and to attract media and audience attention. Previously, events had occasionally put cities on the map as a coincidental side effect (Evans, 2001; Hall, 1988). But in most cases, events were part of traditional folklore that enabled communities to reinvest in social bounding, or, especially in the case of the big-scale and most spectacular ones, expressed a ruler's or state's power (Bakhtin, 1984; De Certeau, 1988; Lefebvre, 1991, 2003). Events were seldom used by urban authorities to generate publicity for a place in service of socio-economic goals such as increasing the number of visitors. If such a goal was formulated at all, it was usually only something with which event organizers were concerned in order to cover costs.

Place selling differs from other marketing fields not because it has different basic principles—the methodology of marketing remains the same—but because of the complexity of the object on which it focuses: the city. Whereas a private company aims to sell its products or a defined range of products, a city is not a single, circumscribed product because it consists of a very complex set of place markets and networks. Since cities involve both public and private stakeholders, place selling features a mixture of marketing principles that stem from both the private sector and traditional urban management. “Unlike purely business or commercial product marketing, place marketing requires the active support of public and private agencies, interest groups, and citizens” (Kotler and Haider, 1993: 20).

The first break with this tradition was the 1851 Great Exhibition in London, which was meant to confirm and demonstrate British superiority to the world (Purbick, ed., 2001). Yet, while media did play an important role in generating international attention for the event, there were no mass media at the time that simultaneously communicated the event to an international audience of millions (Thompson, 1995). Following Ward's argument, event-based place selling really seems to have emerged in the period between the two World Wars when newspapers competed with radio and film for audiences. In the interwar period, more and more British cities discovered the staging of events as strategic instruments to attract publicity and audience attention (Ward, 1998; Evans, 2001). The change from place advertising to the increasingly strategic exploitation of events by more and more places coincided with substantial changes in the mediascape of modern Western societies. Radio, sound movies and television were all introduced in this period. It was also at this time that large international events were transformed into media events broadcast live on radio and television to large audiences. This will be discussed more extensively in Chapter 5, which deals with the 1936 Berlin Olympics.

The extent to which cities actually began to exploit events for place-selling purposes in the period between the two World Wars remains, however, an unresolved issue since detailed data and research on this topic are largely absent. Quite possibly, some cities already had a longer tradition of raising their profile by means of hosting events. However, the notion that a major transition happened in the way cities hosted large international events in the interwar period can nonetheless be supported by pointing to a change in the development of the world's first and largest international events: the World Exhibition and the Olympics.

In the interwar period, the Olympic Games grew significantly in size and reputation (Toohey and Veal, 2007), while the number of World Exhibitions staged also increased. This suggests that ever more importance was attached to using spectacular events as a means to attract publicity for cities. Until 1904, a city somewhere in the Western world organized a World Exhibition approximately once every four years, with the exception of the World Exhibitions in Barcelona and Paris, which came directly after one another in respectively 1888 and 1889. From 1904 to 1915, the interval time between individual World Exhibitions decreased significantly to almost every second year. After an interruption due to World War I and a period of economic restoration, World Exhibitions were hosted almost annually from 1929 to 1934. It is, moreover, remarkable that, from 1935 to 1939, a World Exhibition was hosted every year, with two exhibitions in 1939, one in New York and the other in Liege, Belgium.⁴ The fame and reputation of the World Exhibitions were causing such a degree of competition between cities and such organizational conflicts that in 1928, seventy-seven years after the first World Exhibition was staged, the Bureau des Exhibitions Internationales (BIE) was founded in Paris to prevent an overload of this type of large event. With the establishment of the BIE, the World Exhibition officially became institutionalized.

In the same period, the Olympics also rose to fame. In the first decades after its foundation in 1896, the event lacked prestige and reputation (Guttmann, et al., 2002). However, during the inter-war period, and especially after the Los Angeles

⁴ The author has calculated the intervals between World Exhibitions by dividing the World Exhibitions into three periods and then dividing the total length of each period by the number of World Exhibitions that were hosted in it. The first period ranges from 1851 to 1904. The second period covers 1904 to 1915, and the final period 1929 to 1939. The BIE website was been used to acquire an overview of all World Exhibitions hosted since 1851. See www.bie-paris.org, last consulted October 26, 2006.

Games in 1932 and the Berlin Games in 1936, the Olympics established itself as the sportive equivalent to the World Exhibition in terms of size, organizational costs and media attention.⁵ The World Exhibition remained, nonetheless, larger in terms of the number of visitors that it attracted. The increase in the number of World Exhibitions and the rise of the Olympics suggest that large events increased in importance in a culture that was becoming more and more event-oriented (Burgess and Gold, 1985) rather than place-focused.

The period in which the frequency of the World Exhibition increased, and in which the Olympics secured international fame, coincides with the rise of the mass media, mass consumption society, and a speeding up of news coverage. This is not a coincidence, since the emergence of mass consumption and mass media required the expansions and improvements in media, communication and transport technologies in order to increase mobility and facilitate the exchange of commodities and information. The world's first large international events are therefore not only typical cultural products of modernity, but they also evolved in accordance with the modernization process' reconfiguration of spatiotemporal relations.⁶

Even though the speeding up of social life had been going on for a much longer time, in the interwar period the significance attributed to place in pre-modern societies made way for a culture focused on the spectacular, mobile, ephemeral and eventful (Schwartz, 1995, 1998; Friedberg, 1993; Bruno, 1997a, 1997b). Whereas newspapers in the past had had great difficulties gathering news from remote places, with the introduction of the telegraph and telephone, and the concurrent improvements in transportation, editors were soon confronted with an overabundance of news from other places (Brooker-Gross, 1985). This had great consequences for the manner in which newspapers operated. Instead of physically gathering news from other places, editors increasingly focused on news selection. As a result, only the most newsworthy events would be reported in the media. According to the geographer Susan Brooker-Gross (1985), this shift in editorial policy led to a partial homogenization in the presentation of place, because 'what had happened' became more important than 'where something happened'. This does not mean that place no longer played a role in news reporting—after all, some places remained intrinsically newsworthy because of their spectacular and dramatic nature—but that, in general, the representation of places in the news became less prominent. Especially for smaller places, which tend to generate less spectacular news items than big metropolises, this meant that new ways had to be explored to generate publicity.

In the same period, Ward (1998) signals a decrease in the efficiency and effectiveness of traditional place-selling modes. With the emergence of big newspaper

⁵ While no research has been published that compares the Olympic Games and the World Exhibition to each other in terms of scale, costs and media attention, it can be concluded from the history of the Olympic Games (Sirracos, 2002; Miller, 2004; Guttmann, 2002) that it rapidly acquired the status of a grand international event after World War I. Whereas the Antwerp (1920), Paris (1924) and Amsterdam (1928) Olympics were still modest in scale, the Los Angeles Games in 1932 formed a point of transition in its staging of the event as a large international spectacle. In 1936, the Nazis would outdo the Americans and transform the Olympics into a media event (see Chapter 5).

⁶ The Canadian historian Harold A. Innis (1951, 1972, 1999a, 1999b) provides an illustrative account of the spatiotemporal changes caused by the modernization process in Canada and the United States. His argument can be applied to other regions as well, since his main focus is on the impact of the construction of transportation and communication networks on space and time, and eventually on everyday life. In this regard, Innis speaks of a transition from a time-biased society in which place played a prominent role, to a space-biased society in which geographical obstacles are rapidly reduced to the linear and rationalized system of clock time.

conglomerates in the interwar period, prices for advertising space increased significantly. At the same time, the railroads that had supported the many publicity campaigns of especially the British seaside resorts became less cooperative, no longer co-financing the posters through which these places had advertised themselves in railway stations and carriages. In summary, the rise of a popular mass culture, the speeding up of communication and transport, and major organizational and technological changes in the media all suggest that news coverage became increasingly focused on the spectacular and eventful in the period between the two World Wars. Thus, it is not surprising that events became strategically important to raise the profile of places and to grasp media and audience attention.

1.2 TEMPLES OF MODERNITY: URBAN PLANNING, POPULAR CULTURE AND THE NATION STATE

To understand the emergence of event-based place selling, we also have to pay attention to the role of the nation state and its relation to the cultural developments that took place in the interwar period. The nation-state played a key role in the reconfiguration of spatiotemporal relations by incorporating and homogenizing local and regional spaces into a single national space (Mosse, 1988; Anderson, 2003; Hobsbawm, 1991). In this regard, we have to realize that even though the World Exhibition and Olympics are the first large international events hosted by cities, expressions of nationalism rather than local urban culture initially dominated the staging of both events (Rydell, 1993; Rydell and Gwinn, 1994; Benedict, 1991, 1994; Hargreaves, 1992; Guttman, et al., 2002). Especially in Europe, with its strong imperial traditions, the urge to represent the nation's wealth and cultural superiority reflected on where and how these events were staged. "Since the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibitions London [were held], European international exhibitions had been characterized by a kind of national preening, with each host country showcasing its wealth and power and the glory of its capital city" (Rubens, 1994: 122). Large international events in the first half of the twentieth century were thus characterized by a dominance of the national (host country) over the local (host city).

The rise of the modern nation-state manifested itself most profoundly in urban environments. As the social geographer David Harvey (1989) argues, modernization is a process that is intrinsically connected to the urban conditions of society. It therefore does not come as a surprise that both the World Exhibition and the Olympics are typically urban phenomena characterized by a great spatial impact on their host cities (Hall, 1997; Graham, 1988; Liao and Pitts, 2006; Essex and Chalkey, 1998). Both events demand large and specific event locations and venues. An average World Exhibition requires about 100-150 hectares of exhibition space, with some, like St. Louis (1904) and New York (1939), covering 500 hectares.⁷ While such exact numbers are not available for the Olympics, all the venues for this event taken together require a considerable amount of space as well. More important, however, is the source of inspiration that these events formed (and still form nowadays) for large urban planning projects. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the World Exhibition inspired, for instance, the City Beautiful Movement and major infrastructural projects that represented an idealized modern and rational city (Evans,

⁷ See the BIE official website: www.bie-paris.org, last visited October 26, 2006.

2001; Hall, 1988; Chalkey and Essex, 1999). The historian James Gilbert illustratively describes the relationship between the World Exhibition, urban planning, Victorian morals and modernity:

Being urban exhibits, the great World Exhibitions of the turn of the century could not help but represent idealized cities. They had to deal with the most serious problems of urban life—crowds, sanitation, policing, feeding, providing leisure, entertainment, culture, and enlightenment. They required street cleaning and other sanitary facilities, water supplies, food distribution systems, efficient transportation, and ample lodging. They represented efficient cities located in real cities marred by just the opposite: slums, corruption, and disease. They were symbolic occasions for their sponsors to celebrate a carefully sanitized modern city life. It should be no surprise that expositions became occasions for large public works or wholesale urban planning efforts (Gilbert, 1994: 22).

Victorian morals and fears of social unrest in the more uncanny parts of the city, combined with modernist rationality and a love for great public works, led to the transposition of the ordered grid of the World Exhibition upon the entire city (Hall, 1988). The nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century devotion to great public works expressed itself in the construction of large-scale infrastructures, such as Barcelona's boulevard Diagonal (McDonogh, 1999) and in the commissioning of impressive landmarks, such as Paris' Eiffel Tower, the People's Palace in Amsterdam (Paleis voor Volksvlucht) and the enormous Palace of Justice in Brussels.

Whereas the World Exhibition inspired nineteenth-century urban planning and development, the Olympics became integrated with urban planning practices only after WWII (Essex and Chalkey, 1998; Chalkey and Essex, 1999), specifically in relation to the construction of post-war welfare societies in the West. During the inter-war period the spatial impact on the host city remained mostly limited to the construction of an Olympic stadium, a few sports venues and a relatively small-scale refurbishment and improvement of streets and infrastructure. With the construction of a temporary Olympic village for athletes, the Los Angeles Games of 1932 started the development toward the integration of the Olympics with larger urban projects. In 1936, the Nazis went one step further by constructing a permanent Olympic village and by enlarging the public transport infrastructure for trains and trams (Chalkey and Essex, 1999). And, as will become apparent in Chapter 5, it was the 1952 Helsinki Olympics that completely integrated the Games with larger urban planning programs when the construction of the Olympic village was commissioned as a social housing project. In post-war Europe, themes that had also been a cause for concern in the Victorian age, such as overcrowding, sanitation, policing and mobility, returned to the urban agenda. This time, however, a new generation of modernist architects and planners reduced all these problems to a single, triangular solution: light, space and air.⁸

The relationship between the World Exhibition and the Olympic Games on the one hand, and urban planning on the other, is not the only dimension that binds these events to modernity. Both events can appropriately be defined in Gilbert's (1994) terms as 'Temples of Modernity' with respect to their capacity to represent the central tenets of modernity. According to Gilbert, the World Exhibition displayed a universal highbrow culture that acted "as an instrument and privilege of class and status, and expression of unity, allure and superiority of the Western civilization" (1994: 21). The

⁸ For a critical review of modernist architecture and urban planning, see Berman (1987), Jacobs (1961), and Lefebvre (2003).

World Exhibitions were therefore above all displays of Western power (military force), imperialism and colonialism. Even though ethnic stereotypes did not originate in the World Exhibitions, they did emphasize and reproduce the superior heterosexual white Western male gaze by categorizing and displaying artefacts, and even people, from conquered societies (Benedict, 1991, 1994; Grever and Waaldijk, 1998). World Exhibitions showed, as Burton Benedict argues, “the power of the imperial nation and were meant to impress both foreigners and the home population” (Benedict, 1994: 28). Despite the cultural universality that the World Exhibition propagated, a fierce rivalry existed between participating (Western) nation-states. “The presumed unity of culture could not suppress the disunity of nationalism” (Gilbert, 1994: 21). Each of the participating nations proclaimed to be the most advanced and civilized, the one closest to the modernist ideal of a universal highbrow culture. In this respect, the host of a World Exhibition had an advantage over all the other nations because it could display its wealth, technological progress and military power through the grandeur of the event’s pavilion.

The Olympics, on the other hand, represented a race between civilizations in another way, namely through the display of a nation’s population’s physical and mental health (Segrave, 2000; Segrave and Chu, 1981; Arnoldussen, 1994). In this regard, it is crucial to mention that the introduction of sports to the masses had initially been a military project initiated by national elites (MacAloon, 2006). A strong, healthy and disciplined population was thought to reflect on the capacities and strength of one’s army. The Olympics were, and still are, characterized by international power politics between the world’s leading nations and between colonizing and colonized nations (Espy, 1979). In contrast to the World Exhibition, which represented the rivalry between civilizations through the display of (military) technology and anthropological collections, the superiority of the West was most profoundly expressed through the athletic body (Guttmann, et al., 2002). Just as the World Exhibitions displayed racist and inferiorizing representations of women, black and Asian people, African, Latin-American and female athletes were stereotypically represented in the Western press and subjected to the hegemonic gaze of the white male. However, the relationship between modernity and sports not only expressed itself in imperialist and nationalist discourses; the popularization of sports also went hand in hand with an increasingly rationalized approach to the athletic body and to sportive rules. Medical innovations and rationalized training schedules were applied to maximize the capacities of the human body, while more precise clocking systems and competition rules subjected all athletes to the same regulations regardless of their different social backgrounds (Mackenzie, 2003). The rationalization of sports was above all dedicated to the conquest of space by covering distances as fast as possible. This constitutes another manifestation of modernity’s move towards a world in which place made way for space and speed.

While the increase in the number of World Exhibitions and the rise of the Olympics are mainly symptoms that point to the increasing importance ascribed to events as a means for cities to attract publicity, this change was first and foremost expressed in the relationship between modernity and popular culture. In the case of the World Exhibition, it led to an increase in the share of entertainment-based elements, which eventually heralded the decline of the event’s reputation. Gilbert (1994) identifies two different typologies that describe the program content of the World Exhibition. Borrowing terms from the 1893 Columbian Exhibit in Chicago, Gilbert divides the World Exhibition into two constituent halves: the *White City* and the *Midway*. These typologies divide the program of the World Exhibition into an

entertainment or popular culture category on the one hand, and highbrow cultural and commercial-ideological elements on the other:

The White City represents the culture and business of the fair, its ideological and commercial center. The second term, the Midway, stands for pleasure and people—the entertainment and anthropology displays. In the evolution of fairs these elements change in relation to each other (Gilbert, 1994: 14).

Whereas the World Exhibitions in London (1851), Paris (1855), Vienna (1873) and Philadelphia (1876) did not include any amusement zone on the pavilion's site, the Midway moved closer to the center of the exhibitions in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, and even more so in the inter-war years. (Gilbert, 1994; Benedict, 1994). The World Exhibition's aspiration to display universal highbrow culture in combination with scientific and technological highlights gave way to an increasing share of anthropological, spectacular, and freakshow-like entertainment elements. The ideological Victorian themes represented in the White City of the early exhibitions—the aspiration to come as close as possible to the ideal universal culture, coupled with entrepreneurship and the display of (military) power—increasingly lost ground on popular cultural elements in the overall program.

At the Victorian fair, the conferring of authenticity played a crucial role. Besides its function of introducing new ideas and fashions and demonstrating new products, the World Exhibition was also characterized by the way it “granted a special authenticity to objects of mass production” (Gilbert, 1994: 23). In accordance with this, the World Exhibition was the first tourist attraction to introduce postcards and mass-produced souvenirs, enabling visitors to commemorate, testify, validate and share the authenticity of their experiences (Stewart, 1993). In Gilbert's view, the Midway took over the White City by reinvesting authenticity through, for example, anthropological exhibits. After World War II, the White City had been completely marginalized and placed at the service of the Midway. “The constituent parts of the Victorian Fair remain but are greatly altered. Anthropology reappears as the fantasy lands of Adventureland” (Gilbert, 1994: 25). Gilbert concludes that, as a consequence of the increasing share of popular culture in the World Exhibition's program, the event made itself obsolete in a world where Walt Disney “reproduces and inverts structures and negates the Victorian Fair while maintaining its fantasy of authenticity” (1994: 25). In the post-war era, the success of the Midway over the White City eventually led to the marginalization of the World Exhibition genre as a whole and its replacement by corporate theme parks, such as Disneyland. Developments in the media played a crucial role in this process, which deprived the World Exhibition event genre of its uniqueness. “Competition from television, shopping malls, new forms of mass tourism, and permanent theme parks have sapped their [the World Exhibitions'] potential (Gilbert, 1994: 26). Even though the World Exhibition will continue to exist, the event will never regain the glory days of the 1900 Exhibition, which attracted more than 50 million visitors.

This development contrasts sharply with the Olympic Games, which seem to have benefited from media expansion and the rise of popular culture in the twentieth century. These processes in fact led to the rise of the event. The Olympics gained in importance as a result of many factors, two of which stand out: the popularization and emancipation of sports as an integral part of daily life, and the increasing attention sports events received in the mass media. These factors are interconnected. In the first part of the twentieth century, sports became a vital part of both daily life and popular culture. As mentioned earlier, the rationalization of sports made all athletes equal to

each other for the length of the competition, regardless of their different social and ethnic backgrounds. MacKenzie (2003) argues that the rationalization of the athletic body led to a democratization of sports. Whereas in the decennia leading up to the first modern Olympics in 1896, sports had been reserved for the aristocracy and the upper classes, whose lives were dedicated to leisure, in the early twentieth century sports became part of popular culture and it gradually became more acceptable for people from different classes to engage in sportive activities (Mol, 1998; Eisen, 1998). Consequently, sports enjoyed a growing popularity among large parts of the populations of many countries and colonies worldwide. That said, within the realm of sports, class differences did remain a factor, since certain sports, such as hunting, horse riding and golf, were often too expensive for the middle and working classes (Findling and Pelle, 1996; Arnoldussen, 1994).

Apart from their great popularity, sports events are by nature highly suitable for being covered by media. The audience's excitement of watching a match can be vividly conveyed in cinema and later also in live radio and television broadcasts. Sports also create a sense of national community, which draws intensified audience attention to important national and international sports events (Andrews, 2003; Morley, 2000; Dayan and Katz, 1992). In such settings, time is a crucial factor, because an intensified community feeling is always only temporary. With the previously discussed shift in editorial policies (Brooker-Gross, 1985), newspapers, and later also other media, started to privilege the time factor in the reporting of news events. It came to be more important which newspaper published match results first than where the sports event took place. Sport was therefore a topic particularly suited to the event-centered news production that emerged in the interwar period. As a result of the increasing popularity of sports as leisure activity and the increasing media attention it received, the Olympics grew from an obscure event into a large-scale international spectacle.

This development was only possible because media attention in general increased and, even more importantly, because international media communication networks expanded and improved (Thompson, 1995). As a result, it became much easier for foreign newspapers to send journalists and reporters abroad to cover large events. In addition, the transmission, exchange and sale of information, pictures and sounds became easier and also increased. Thus, it was due to a combination of social reorganization processes between media corporations, the introduction of electronic media and communication technologies, and the geographical expansion of media networks linked with a simultaneous reduction in the time needed to cover large distances, that the Olympic Games could become a world-renowned event in the first place.

1.3 AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM⁹

Since the emergence or widespread introduction of event-based place selling in the inter-war period, the hosting of large international events has undergone a remarkable development. Whereas in the early decades of the twentieth century, European cities discovered large international events as unique and powerful opportunities to raise their profile internationally, in the final decades many cities began to integrate the

⁹ The title for this section is derived from Manuel Castells' (2000) third volume on the information society: *The End of the Millennium*

hosting of these events with large-scale proliferation and regeneration programs (Bailey, Miles and Stark 2000; García, 2004a; Cantell, 1999). By doing so, European cities aggressively try to reposition themselves in the European regional and global arena. Indeed, as various authors suggest, inter-city competition has increased in Europe and also worldwide (Bradley, Hall and Harrison, 2002; Turner and Rosentraub, 2002; Sassen, 2000; Zukin, 1995). Due to the creation of a single European market, cities in this region experience a need to “upscale their position from national to continent” (Rubalcaba-Bermejo and Cuadrado-Roura, 1995: 380). Furthermore, the ongoing processes of economic and cultural globalization confront European cities with new challenges and opportunities that demand they re-think their present and future roles. It is within this context that European cities increasingly organize and host spectacular events with the aim of boosting civic pride, attracting media attention and luring tourists and businesses. Unsurprisingly, in this same context the ECOC was initiated, not only as an initiative to demonstrate European cultural diversity, but also as an event that enables European cities to display their cultural attractions to international audiences. Moreover, the hosting of this and other similar event has increasingly become embedded not only in place-selling strategies, but also in urban regeneration schemes. Especially prestigious international events, such as major political summits, the Olympic Games, UEFA Soccer Championships, the World Expo, and the ECOC, are perceived as decisive opportunities to reposition cities in national, regional and global urban hierarchies (Andranovich et al., 2001).

This interest in prestigious events—which has dramatically increased since the 1980s—can be explained in part by pointing to the growing recognition that such events are powerful tools for creating city images and brands, which in turn are crucial prerequisites for (re)positioning cities in the global economy (Richards and Wilson, 2004; Avraham, 2000, 2004; Moor 2003). The staging of large international events typically involves a productive tension between processes of homogenization on the one hand, and differentiation on the other. Processes of differentiation occur because each host city tries to add exclusive elements to an established event format in the hope of staging a different and more exclusive spectacle than previous hosts. At the same time, some elements recur every time an event is staged. Repetition is crucial to safeguarding the continuity of an event over several editions because media and audiences build their expectations on their experience of previous stagings. They expect, for instance, that the Olympics will start with the torch ceremony and that the national anthem will be played for the winner of each gold medal. In this sense, the format has a ritual function (Dayan and Katz, 1992). Yet every edition also has to distinguish itself from previous ones because otherwise the public would lose interest. Organizers thus have to find a delicate balance between processes of differentiation and homogenization, just like cities planning another Guggenheim museum need a distinctive architectural design to differentiate their ‘McMuseum’ from the others. The Dutch philosopher Henk Oosterling (2002, 2005) has appropriately described this cultural development in terms of the ‘museumification’ and ‘theatralization’ of urban and public space.

The tension between homogenization and differentiation in the hosting of events reflects the general position of cities in a globalizing world. Cities progressively need to differentiate themselves from each other in order to attract ever more mobile capital, businesses, residents, tourists, media and audience attention (Evans, 2003, 2005; Lash and Urry, 1994, Urry 1990; 1995; Judd and Fainstein, 1999). In his analysis of the postmodern urban condition, Harvey argues that “the qualities of space are thereby to be emphasized in the midst of increasing abstraction

of space. The active production of places with special qualities becomes an important stake in spatial competition between localities, cities, regions, and nations” (1989: 295). Indeed, over the last decades, cities in developed countries have invested more and more in the construction of extravagant flagship projects, aggressive marketing campaigns, and spectacular events (Hall, 2000; Gospodini, 2001; Hauben, Ball and Brinkman, 2002). While undoubtedly an event, the ECOC can simultaneously be considered as a cultural flagship project. It is often hosted by cities that have already invested heavily in their cultural infrastructure and the event often seems to function as a quality brand reaffirming the cultural status of the host city. At the same time, these attempts to make cities as attractive as possible have resulted in a partial homogenization of places. After all, attractiveness is not solely based on a city's distinctive image; it also requires the presence of what Castells (1996) calls ‘spaces of the cosmopolitan managerial elite’. Whether one is in Hong Kong, Los Angeles, Dares Salaam or Düsseldorf, one will find virtually identical five-star hotels, golf resorts and conference centers. Furthermore, despite all their attempts to distinguish themselves from one another, many cities copy each other's best practices. Hence, an attractive city is the result of a combination of distinctive as well as widely recognizable elements.¹⁰

From the late 1980s onwards, the hosting of large events has therefore acquired a special position in the overall cultural proliferation of cities. These events seem to be used more and more as showpieces or premiere parties designed to present a ‘new and improved city’ to the outside world or as ‘kick-off events’ to generate support and generate enthusiasm for major urban redevelopment activities (García, 2002, 2004a; Getz, 1991; Hall, 1989, 1992, 1997; Gratton, et al., 2000). In this regard, Glasgow's staging of the ECOC in 1990 is perhaps one of the most famous examples of a city that wanted to do away with its image of a troubled, declining industrial centre by profiling itself as an emerging European cultural hotspot. In this manner, large events can become an integral part of a city's tourist and leisure industries. This argument especially applies to famous events that are frequently staged in the same city (Prentice and Andersen, 2003). Examples of such events are the Edinburgh theatre festival (Jamieson, 2004), Amsterdam's Queen's Day and Canal Parade, Berlin's Film Festival (De Valck, 2006), and the bull runs in Pamplona. Of course, the development of tourist industries touches only upon a single economic dimension. The boosting of cultural industries is also expected to attract other labor-intensive businesses, such as galleries, design studios, advertisement and consultancy agencies and all sorts of craft industries (Landry and Bianchini, 1997; Hughes, 1999; Harcup, 2000).

Because the competition between cities has increased over the last decades in general, cities also put more effort into obtaining the honor of hosting large events (Palmer et al., 2004; García, 2004a, 2004b, 2002; Chalkey and Essex, 1999). The bidding for events has become a media event in itself. Candidate cities constitute a locus of national, international and occasionally global media attention, providing cities—even before they host an event—with an opportunity to market themselves. Within this context, cities have become crossroads where media and events intersect. Considering the globalization of economies, capital, labor and media, we are urged to rethink what kinds of crossroads cities have become. The complexity that globalization confronts us with requires an approach to cities that supersedes the

¹⁰ For critical inquiries of city homogenization and differentiation, see Featherstone (1997), Featherstone and Lash (1999), Harvey (1989, 1996), Shields (1991), Soja (1990, 2000) and Zukin (1995).

vision of the city as no more than a built environment where events can be staged and where commodities, people, capital and information are exchanged. The question of how cities raise their profile by means of hosting large events therefore exceeds the analysis of the purely organizational aspects of these events. It also involves the question of the specific and complex interrelations between media, cities, events and the global economy, as well as many other questions—not least the one of scale.

A city is more than just an event location. As literary scholar Mieke Bal notes, “the locations where events occur are also given distinct characteristics and are thus transformed into specific places” (Bal, 1997: 8). In the specific case of large international events, this transformation of location into place is not limited to the ascription of specific characteristics only. Due to their scale and to the ways in which large international events are strategically exploited with a view to raising the host city’s profile, place is increasingly commercially reproduced. This commercial reproduction of place confronts us with questions about the ‘place of place’ in our global media age, and urges us to re-examine our thinking about ‘the city’.

1.4 DELINEATING THE ACADEMIC CONTEXT

This brings us to the academic context in which large international events and their host cities have been studied. While it is not always possible to define precise boundaries, in general the focus of investigation differs between academic disciplines and also between broader research fields. In urban studies, for instance, the relationships between urban planning and the hosting of large events are the main focus of investigation (Evans, 2003, 2001; Hall, 2000, Gospodini, 2001; Essex and Chalkey, 1998 Chalkey and Essex, 1997). Within management studies and economics, as well as in the field of marketing, attention is directed to the organizational aspects of large events and the economic impact and incentives generated by hosting them (Ashworth and Voogd, 1990; Berg, Braun and Otgaar, 2000; Berg, Klaassen and Van der Meer, 1990; Bradley, Hall and Harrison, 2002; Chatterton, 2000; McGill, 2001; Seo, 2002). Within these disciplines, the economic impact of the events is analyzed in relation to the number and type of target groups, such as tourists, businesses and residents, that are attracted (C.M. Hall, 1989, 1992, 1997; Kriekaard, 1993, 1994, 1996; Short et al., 2000).

In contrast with this focus on economic aspects, sociological and anthropological research on the hosting of large events is dedicated to the socio-political and socio-cultural dimensions of contemporary tourism and festivals (Getz, 1991; Urry, 1990; Lash and Urry, 1994; Featherstone and Lash, 1999). Much attention is devoted, for instance, to the ritual function of events (Nelson, 1986; Benedict, 1991). In the field of media studies, we find yet another focal point, namely on the ways media represent events, specific places and people (Dayan and Katz, 1992; Urban, 2002). However, since the mid-1980s, scholars from media studies and (social) geographical sciences have started studying the relationships between urban space, events, media technologies and processes of mediation in a more interdisciplinary manner (Brooker-Gross, 1985; Dyan and Katz, 1992; Couldry and McCarthy, ed., 2004; Robins, et al., 1995).

Despite the wide range of existing studies on large international events, a blind spot keeps recurring. The majority of studies conducted so far lack a fully integral approach that connects cities, events and media to each other. Most studies focus on

only one or two elements when analyzing the hosting of events for place-selling purposes. Place-selling or city-marketing aspects are, for instance, mainly approached from an economic or socio-political point of view. Also, within the field of media studies, the primary focus is on the analysis of media events and processes of mediation. This underexposes the economic impact of cities acting as stages to host events. Urban theorists, on the other hand, privilege the planning or restructuring of urban space over the study of the effects processes of mediation have on urban space. Yet while individual studies on large events focus exclusively on one or two elements, three recurring main themes can be distilled from the array of works on this topic: cities, events and media.

1.4.1 Positioning this Study

In this study, it is my purpose to develop an integral approach to understanding the productive relationships between media, large events and cities within the context of place selling. This demands a rethinking of cities as stages and hosts of large events, but also a re-modeling of the ways events and media are approached. The complex interrelationships between cities, events and media require a triangular approach to capture all dimensions of hosting large events as a strategy for selling places. Such an approach should also lend itself to a historical investigation of the evolution of place selling and large events, since neither phenomenon is a-historical.¹¹ The focus of this integral approach will be limited to the production of large international events and the promotion of such events and their host cities. In other words, the primary question underlying this study concentrates on how media, cities and large event owners, such as the International Olympic Committee, co-produce large events and, moreover, on how the staging of such large-scale spectacles is strategically utilized as a way to market cities. Consequently, the analysis of the audience reception of large international events and their host cities does not fall within the scope and purpose of this study. Also, questions on the consumptive aspects of hosting large events will only be analyzed as far as they fall within the productive dynamics, processes and relationships of the overall process of staging large international events.

Considering the multifarious nature of the strategic hosting of large international events, a concept of the city is required to theorize the complex historical and contemporary productive interlinks between cities, events and media. It no longer suffices to think of large international events as large-scale spectacles that simply take over a host city. Nor does it suffice to think of media as only covering or reporting large events. Just as cities are aggressively engaged in bidding processes to obtain the honor of hosting a large event, media corporations often compete for the media rights to events like the Olympics or the American Super Bowl. Thus, both media and cities are active co-producers of large events.

This research project is a contribution to the wider range of studies (Ashworth and Voogd, 1990; Evans, 2003; Avraham 2000, 20004; Greenberg, 2000; Resina and Ingenschay, 2003; Amin and Thrift, 2003) that examine the 'image-ing' and branding of cities, in particular those that focus on place selling, i.e. the exploitation of city

¹¹ The term 'evolution' is deliberately used to avoid any impression of a historical, linear and cumulative process. Chalkey and Essex (1999) show, for instance, that the willingness of cities to host the Olympics decreased substantially between the mid 1970s and the late 1980s. It was only after the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona that competition between cities over the event became fiercer again. This illustrates that the strategic hosting of large events for place-selling purposes evolved in a rather unpredictable manner and not as a linear development.

images for strategic purposes. However, this work distinguishes itself from the majority of such studies due to its specific focus on the hosting of large events as strategic trajectories of city image production. Furthermore, it distances itself from the contemporary discourse on creative industries and place selling¹² by offering a historical perspective on the question of how cities have produced and strategically mobilized city images and brands throughout the twentieth century.

Furthermore, while many scholars such as Kotler and Van de Berg, who work on place selling, point to media as a crucial factor in the creation and distribution of city images, they seldom make the effort of analyzing exactly *what* media actually do. Often, the analysis remains limited to how cities can attract media attention through using a wide range of marketing and public relation strategies. In my view, it is much more crucial to ask what happens once the media ‘fly in’ to cover a large event. Media are not only subjected to various strategies and tactics of public relations and promotion, but they in turn actively influence local actors through the way they organize and present a large event and its host city. The relationship between the organizers of large international events and the media is thus characterized by an interactive dynamic.

1.5 PREVIEW OF THE THESIS CONTENT

Based on the above, I will develop a CityEvent model to study the co-productive interrelations between large international events, media and event owners. By means of this model and its application to the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympics and ECOC's, the question of how cities raise their profile through hosting large international events will be examined.

In the first part of this book, the research object of the ‘large international event’ is specified and defined. In Chapter 1, I introduce the term CityEvent to delineate the category of events that this study focuses on. The purpose of introducing this term is twofold. The term CityEvent not only delineates a specific category of events, but, in the absence of an alternative accurate label, it also forms the model by means of which the phenomenon of event-based place selling will be studied. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the description of the conceptual framework. Drawing on Actor Network Theory, and in particular on the work of the French philosopher of science Bruno Latour, the methodological basis of the CityEvent model is outlined. The co-productive interrelations between the media, the host city and the event owner is approached as a network dynamic in which each of these actors tries to negotiate its interests. Chapter 3 elaborates further on the CityEvent model by exploring the spatiotemporal dynamics that are implied in the model. By drawing on the work of the British sociologist Kevin Hetherington, the ‘branding’ of cities is conceptualized in terms of a reordering and renaming of place, thereby proposing a networked ontology of place.

In the second part of this book, the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympics are analyzed by means of the CityEvent model. The effects of the negotiation of divergent interests on the way in which the Olympics are produced and the event and the host city are staged, are addressed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. In these chapters, attention is furthermore paid to two themes. In the first place, the historical shift from

¹² See, for instance, Dimanche (1997), Garcia (1991), Getz (1991) and Hall (1992, 1997).

print-dominated to electronic media coverage of the Games is reconstructed and analyzed. Second, there is a focus on the relationship between modernity, the host city and the nation state in the three Olympic case studies. At the end of the second part, a conclusion draws together the developments and patterns identified and analyzed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

The third part, consisting of Chapters 7, 8 and 9, is dedicated to the analysis of the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki European Capitals of Culture. As in the previous part, divergent actor interests will be identified and linked to the way they materialize in the specific city images that (re)present the host cities and the ECOCs. Together, the three chapters outline a historical development towards the ‘festive programming’ of the city. This term is introduced retrospectively and is elaborated on in the conclusion to this part of the book. Finally, the last chapter brings together all the outlined developments, patterns and transformations. Comparisons are drawn between the Olympic Games and the ECOC in each of the case cities and general developments and transformations derived from the analysis of the six case studies are presented. In addition, the last chapter evaluates the CityEvent model.

2. CITYEVENTS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, I described how, from the late 1920s onwards, the hosting of large international events was increasingly used by cities as a promotional strategy. Furthermore, we saw how the hosting of such events coincided with certain twentieth-century social, economic and cultural developments, such as, for example, the emergence of the mass consumption society. Consequently, by the end of the last century, large international events had become a widespread strategic tool deployed by cities to compete with other cities for capital, businesses, tourists, residents and media attention in a rapidly globalizing world.

So far, this historical inquiry has taught us how cities came to realize that large international events could be exploited for strategic purposes, and how this phenomenon evolved during the twentieth century. Hitherto, I have not examined the specific nature of these events and what role media technologies and practices play in them. The events that form the object of our analysis are typically grand-scale and internationally renowned events that are characterized by a generic event formula that has to be implemented locally by a host city. Examples of such events are the Olympic Games, Super Bowl, World Expo, European Capital of Culture and Commonwealth Games. These events share a number of characteristics despite their differences, namely they are all large, international and famous events, which are periodically staged at different locations. In his study on mega-events and host-region impacts, Calvin Jones (2001) speaks of “large periodic rootless international events”. While this description might help us to group these types of large international events, it tells little about what constitutes their features. Events like the Olympic Games, World Expo, World Championship Football or European Capital of Culture characteristically evolve around a tension between the generic event formula, which is held by an event owner¹³, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Bureau of International Exhibitions (BIE), and the local implementation of this formula by a host city. We therefore need a more extensive delineation of this type of events, because a terminology alone does not help us to understand how a generic event formula like that of the Olympic Games is locally implemented, how implementation processes are negotiated along global and local scales, and finally how such processes affect the cities that host these events.

In this chapter, a theoretical perspective and a methodological approach will be offered to study these questions. I will thereby define the research object as *CityEvent*.¹⁴ A CityEvent is not only a category, but at the same time also a model to study large periodic rootless international events. I introduce the term CityEvent to

¹³ The term event owner has been introduced by Westerbeek et al. (2002).

¹⁴ Since the distinction between events and the locations where they take place is artificial—events always take place somewhere—the terms City and Events are written together to stress this interconnection. In addition, I have chosen to write CityEvent with two capital letters in one word to explicate that the events we are dealing with are always large events and that the cities where they take place are usually national capitals or large regional cities.

replace the category ‘large periodic rootless international event’ for the reason that this latter label is not completely adequate with regard to the term ‘rootless’. This term falsely suggests that such events are not bound to particular places. Events are, however, always bound to place. Even the generic event formula, which is usually no more than a concept, is not completely placeless. The owner of a generic event formula is always seated somewhere, for example the BIE’s office in Paris or the IOC’s headquarters in Lausanne. The term CityEvent is meant to stress the connection between large events and the cities where they are staged.

Furthermore, the extent to which the generic event formula is successfully implemented is largely determined by the willingness of other actors to cooperate. A host city alone cannot stage a CityEvent successfully, it needs the support of international news media to announce and report the event to remote audiences. CityEvents are therefore typically the result of the collaborative performance of *at least* three main actors: the host city, the media and the event owner. A CityEvent is an amalgamation of networks that is constantly produced and reproduced through the alignments that are established between the event owner, host city and media as well as many other actors. Through this network, a generic event formula is locally implemented and mediated to national, regional and global audiences. This can only successfully be achieved when the main actors are able to consolidate their interests. In order to understand better how large periodic rootless international events affect their host cities, we consequently have to focus on the actors and dynamics that constitute the production of these events and how these actors pursue and negotiate different interests. Another critical point is the temporal characteristic of CityEvents. On the one hand, such events are one-time happenings in a specific locale. On the other hand, these events derive their reputation and prestige from the fact that they are repeatedly hosted in different cities. An individual edition of a CityEvent, for instance Cork European Capital of Culture 2005, can therefore not be separated from previous editions. It builds further on a *chain of foregoing* events. CityEvents are *networked events* that integrate the discontinuity of events with the less abrupt features of networks.¹⁵

This chapter offers the theoretical framework on which the remainder of this research is based. Since the term CityEvent refers to both the object of research as well as to the underlying model to approach this phenomenon, the former will be delineated first. A general description will be given of CityEvents by drawing attention to the generic event formula, which ties the three key actors (the media, the host city and the event owner) together. In this regard, the delineation of CityEvents will be approached from the perspective of the host city. After all, this research focuses on how cities raise their profile and try to reposition themselves in national, regional and global urban hierarchies by means of large international events. The description of the generic event formula will confront us with a recurring tension between continuity and discontinuity or the ‘event-like’, urging us to balance the notion of event with that of network. This discussion will bring us to our second task to introduce the main concepts that underlie the CityEvent model, such as ‘actor’, ‘network’ and ‘alignment’. These concepts will be defined and specified by drawing on Actor Network Theory (ANT), and in particular the work of the French philosopher of science, Bruno Latour, in order to provide a solid theoretical basis for the CityEvent model. In the second and the third parts of this book, the model will

¹⁵ This is not to say that events do not take place in networks, or that networks are per definition stabilized. In contrast to events, networks can evolve into more and/or less crystallized relations between actors.

accordingly be applied to the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympic Games and European Capitals of Culture (ECOC).

The theoretical approach briefly outlined above offers two major advantages. By following an actor-network approach, the interests of actors become the focal points of the analysis. In this manner, we will be able to reconstruct how actors have to negotiate their interests with those of other actors in order to stage a CityEvent. From this approach new insights might be gained about the dynamics of large international events, rather than offering a reconstruction of causal and historical developments alone. This approach refrains, therefore, from an analysis in which a leading person or institution is placed on top of historical events. On the contrary, our point of departure is the necessity for actors to work together. In this regard, we can learn as much from failed CityEvents as from successful ones. Both instances remind us that the outcome could have been different, depending on how historical circumstances affected the ability and willingness of actors to consolidate their interests. A second advantage of this approach is its historical applicability. For each case study, the actors, interests, alignments and thus the network that produces a specific CityEvent have to be described. The approach enables us to examine how the hosting of CityEvents differs for each historical context and type of event. However, in contrast to most historical studies, the application of the CityEvent model also allows us to make historical comparisons between the case studies. By following how actors and networks change in history, we are able to trace transformations that take place in the actors, in their relations, and in the hosting of CityEvents. Developments can consequently be identified and studied without necessarily putting historical labels on them, or adhering to periodizations. In other words, the CityEvent model allows us to go beyond the constraints of much historical research that refrains from generalizations because of the specific historical contexts of case studies. To demonstrate these methodological advantages of the CityEvent model, we first have to delineate more precisely the object of our inquiry: the CityEvent.

2.2 DELINEATING THE OBJECT

A CityEvent is not a thing or an object in the common sense of these words. CityEvents are not fixed entities and, consequently, studying them is complex. Insofar as it is possible to delineate the main characteristic of a specific CityEvent, this is not a tangible element. What makes a CityEvent unique and different from other events is its generic event formula. It is the shared interest in an event format *and* in the actualization of this formula that brings the key actors, namely the media, host city and event owner, together. In other words, the generic event formula provides the reason for the media, the host city and the event owner to cooperate with each other, since, as will become apparent, the formula represents particular interests for each of the key actors.

2.2.1 *Generic Event Formula*

Every generic event formula is unique and owned by institutions such as FIFA, UEFA, IOC, BIE and, in the case of the ECOC, the EU. These event owners are the legal bodies that hold the exclusive rights to specific generic event formulas. An event formula is an exclusive format and can only be implemented by a city with the

permission of the event owner. The generic formula thus resembles a patent, with the event owner acting as patent holder. While event owners are subject to political and commercial forces, they are in principle independent bodies (Real, 1998). As such, they designate the cities and/or local organizers that will host their event. Consequently, a CityEvent is always an *actualization* of the generic formula, which is itself by no means static. Throughout the 20th century, several rituals and ceremonies have, for instance, been added to the formula of the Olympic Games. The Olympic flame was introduced during the Amsterdam Games in 1928, while the Nazis first included the torch relay as part of the opening ceremony of the Berlin Games in 1936.

Hence, a host city embodies more than an event location; it is through the host cities that changes occur in a CityEvent's concept and format. In this respect, cities function as catalysts of change, rather than as passive stages. Alterations to the formula can, however, never be overly radical. Generic event formulas derive their success from the reputation and prestige they build up over several CityEvents. Such reputation and prestige are only acquired when large audiences and the media recognize the generic formula. Overly radical changes in the formula could undermine this recognition and thus endanger the continuity of the generic formula and its institution (Bellamy, 1998).

Since the event owner has a monopoly on a generic formula, host cities and local organizers have to comply with certain procedures and rules inscribed in the event format. The rigidity of the formula varies. In the case of the Olympic Games, its formula is largely determined by international sports regulations, which are defined by international sports organizations, in combination with the fundamental principles of Olympism, as written down in the Olympic charter of the Olympic Movement.¹⁶ A host city cannot change these rules and has to ensure that all Olympic venues meet the requirements of the different sports competitions. Not all CityEvents are characterized by such a rigid format. In the case of the ECOCs, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have established only general criteria that leave host cities room to adapt the event to their own specific desires.¹⁷

Every generic formula implies specific spatial demands. It is, for example, inherent to the formula of the ECOC that the event takes place in a European city that has the reputation of being a highly valued cultural center or that has the potential to become a cultural 'hotspot' in the near future. The Winter Olympics are only hosted by cities with an Alpine climate and winter sports facilities, whereas the soccer World Cup only takes place in cities with a large soccer stadium and a rich tradition or great reputation in soccer. Hence, certain geographic criteria (e.g. climate, landscape (mountainous or flat), proximity to the ocean, a lake or a river and so on), cultural criteria (e.g. monuments, histories, arts scene and so on) and infrastructural criteria (e.g. the presence of an airport, international train connections, a well-functioning road infrastructure, sufficient accommodation etc.) are inscribed in the generic formula. This implies that any city that is considered to be a serious candidate for

¹⁶ The IOC is the highest institution of the Olympic Movement, which was conceived by Pierre de Coubertin at the International Athletic Congress of Paris in June 1894. The Olympic Charter, which forms the constitution of the Olympic Movement, can be found on the official IOC website. The document is available on: http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf, last consulted on July 6th, 2006.

¹⁷ Decision 1419/1999/, 25 May 1999 and decision 649/2005, 13 April 2005, amending decision 1419/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a community action for the ECOC event for the years 2005 to 2019.

hosting a CityEvent, is invested with certain qualities that distinguish it from other cities.

A generic formula is characterized by a specific time cycle. While a CityEvent is a one-time occurrence at the level of the individual host city, generic formulas are implemented at regular intervals. The Olympic Games, for instance, were characterized by a four-year cycle until the IOC decided to reduce the period between the winter and summer Olympics to two years. The World Expo is organized every five years and the ECOC is hosted annually. Thus, the staging of a CityEvent is part of a self-repeating cycle of events that takes place according to a predictable, often highly institutionalized pattern.

A CityEvent embodies more than merely the local implementation of a generic formula: *the chain of previous editions* also adds to the staging of the event. The prestige and reputation of the generic event formula result precisely from this string of events, which ensures that a CityEvent attracts broad international attention even before it is actually staged. The continuity and recognition of a generic formula are built up over successive local implementations that add layer after layer, anticipating and influencing future events. A CityEvent therefore incorporates both continuity and discontinuity: on the one hand, it is an event with a clear beginning (opening ceremony) and ending (closing ceremony) but, on the other hand, it is part of a larger cycle that is inherent to the generic formula.

The staging of a CityEvent can only be successful if the tension between continuity and discontinuity is converted into a productive relationship. The survival of the generic formula relies on a successful local implementation, while the local organizers of the event depend on the tradition and reputation of the formula to put their city in the spotlight. This productive tension not only expresses itself in time, but also manifests itself in space. It is a tension between place (the local) and space (the national, regional and global space in which the event owner, the media and also sponsors and advertisers operate). Hence, CityEvents are local *as well as* mobile and global: they supersede the local through processes of mediation, commodification and memorization.

2.2.2 Network/Event

CityEvents are characterized by complex and often conflicting spatiotemporal constellations. For the host city, which usually organizes it only once, a CityEvent is an event, a 'momentary happening'.¹⁸ However, depending on the security measures taken, the size of special construction works, the necessity to evict local inhabitants to make place for event venues, and the influx of visitors and media, a CityEvent can also have longer-lasting impacts (Olds, 1998; Shapcott, 1998; Dimance, 1997). In some cases, the impact of a CityEvent is so enormous that the event takes on the characteristics of a transformation process or rupture rather than those of a one-time festival. It is estimated, for instance, that for the Seoul Olympics (1988) 720,000 residents were evicted from their homes.¹⁹ This example clearly illustrates that

¹⁸ Of course, there are certain exceptions to this rule. Paris and London, for example, have both organized several editions of the Olympic Games. In general, however, CityEvents like the Olympic Games are hosted by individual cities only once.

¹⁹ See the research proposal *International Events and Forced Evictions: A Focus on the Olympic Games*, submitted by COHRE (an international NGO focusing on housing rights) to the RUIG (Réseau universitaire international de Genève) funding body and the Geneva International Academic Network. An extract from this proposal can be found on the personal webpage of Kris Olds, who is a geographer

thinking about hosting CityEvents solely in terms of a singular event does not do justice to the (sometimes dramatic) processes and effects on the long term.

The tension between the event-aspect and the long-term processes that may result from it forms the main reason for approaching CityEvents as networked events rather than as singular occurrences. I am aware that the CityEvent label may be slightly confusing in relation to my usage of the network metaphor, since the term 'Event' seems to preclude the idea of a network. I do, however, want to include the term event, because a CityEvent, no matter how tightly planned and organized, is in principle still an instantaneous happening. Each time a CityEvent is staged, several smaller events take place within its overall structure. Not all of these events are necessarily planned or foreseen within the general formula and neither is their outcome. Consequently, CityEvents never reach full stabilization and such stabilization is also not desired. Yet CityEvents are not completely spontaneous either. The overall happening within which the smaller (and sometimes spontaneous) events take place could be seen as a temporary but solid setting that requires a vast organizational network to realize itself. In this respect, the production of the overall setting through the implementation of the generic event formula is not radically different from the construction of a big building. The difference lies in the ontological status of the end product. Whereas a building is intended to remain standing, a CityEvent is staged as a momentary happening. This difference has consequences for the way we approach the networks that underlie the production of CityEvents. In the case of a building, the network reaches a certain stability because all the separate elements that make up the building, such as bricks, nails, wood and so on, are supposed to take up a fixed position in the network. If the relations between these elements do not remain fixed, the building will fall apart and be transformed into a ruin. CityEvents never reach this stage, because the network that constitutes them never stabilizes. CityEvents therefore position themselves in-between events and stabilized networks. The word event in the compound CityEvent highlights the flexible, dynamic and momentary aspects that form part of the network that produces it.

While the above-mentioned spatiotemporal extremes—continuity versus discontinuity and place versus space—seem to contradict each other, in practice they rely on each other and might even work to enforce each other.²⁰ This is my reason for

working on international events at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Source: <http://www.geography.wisc.edu/faculty/olds/welcome-pg2.html#4>, last visited May 4, 2006.

²⁰ Let me illustrate these seemingly conflicting spatiotemporal tensions. In the case of the Barcelona Olympics in 1992, for instance, we could ask what Barcelona's share was in the overall representation of this global sports event. Undoubtedly, the Games helped Barcelona to climb in the European and global urban hierarchies (Garcia, 2004; Berg et al., 2000; Chalkey and Essex, 1999). The reputation and prestige of the Olympics—a symbolic value that also has a considerable economic value—certainly yielded the city much in reward. In this regard, we could argue that Barcelona depended more on the Olympics than the IOC on Barcelona. Yet the relation between Barcelona and the IOC is more complex. It should be noted that by the time the city obtained the right to host the Games, the continuation of the Games themselves had come into question due to local protests, (Mexico City, 1968), terrorism (Munich, 1972), financial mismanagement (Montreal, 1976) and international boycotts (Moscow, 1980 and Los Angeles, 1984) (Chalkey and Essex, 1999). The number of candidate cities volunteering to host the Games had dropped dramatically. At one point, it was even unsure if any city would be willing to organize the 1992 event (Real, 1998). Only after Barcelona's successful staging of the Olympics did competition over the candidature intensify again. Hence, Barcelona not only profited from the Games, but the city's successful organization of the event, featuring powerful imagery of the Catalan capital, in turn contributed to the recovery of the Olympics, revitalizing the generic formula.

introducing the CityEvent model, of which a schematic overview will be given in the next section. The event as we see and experience it, either by attending the festivities and/or through media consumption, is only the tip of the so-called iceberg. The CityEvent model is intended to capture the networked nature of large rootless periodic events, without neglecting their discontinuous and event-like dimensions. Approaching events such as the Olympic Games, the World Expo, the Super Bowl and the ECOC as CityEvents enables us to theorize how such events affect host cities on the long term, both on a morphological level and on that of the city image. We therefore have to focus on the actual event as well as on the phases that precede and follow it — these phases will be discussed extensively in the next chapter. It is on this point that this study differs from many other inquiries into international events. Most studies that pay attention to the long-term impact of large international events are based on an evaluation of the event's organizational policies and on the collection and analysis of data. Such studies (see for instance Frey, 2000; Rubalcaba-Bermejo and Cuadrado-Ruora, 1995; Prayaga et al., 2004) mostly focus on the social and/or economic effects that are generated. The conclusions from these studies usually limit themselves to recommendations for future event management or to a presentation of quantifiable data that measures the extent to which a city has been successful in hosting an event by, for example, the increase in overnight stays. Such conclusions are no doubt valuable, but they tell us little about the processes underlying these social and economic effects. In other words, they do not help us much to achieve a better understanding of *how* cities try to create a distinct profile through organizing CityEvents and how the event itself is transformed as a result of its networked structure.

2.3 THE CITYEVENT MODEL

When we look behind the spectacle, ceremonies, scandals and victories that characterize CityEvents, we can distinguish a core dynamic composed of at least three actors: the event owner, the host city and the media. Without the involvement of these three key actors, no large event could be produced successfully.²¹ An event owner alone cannot stage a CityEvent; it needs the host city to implement the generic event formula and the media to draw attention to the event. Likewise, the host city cannot organize the CityEvent if the event owner does not give permission to implement its generic formula. In their constant search for newsworthy events, the media also need the cooperation of the event owner and the host city to be able to cover the CityEvent. The connections between the three key actors are therefore based on *relations of interdependency*. Each of the key actors needs the others to produce a CityEvent. Thus, if we want to achieve a better understanding of how cities raise their profile by hosting large events, we have to focus on this triangular relationship from which the network that I have called the CityEvent emerges.²²

²¹ The word 'production' is used here to make explicit that the event owner, host city and media in the first place function as production factors no CityEvent can do without.

²² I acknowledge that the network metaphor suffers from overuse in recent research and policy writings. Especially since the emergence of the Internet, the term 'network' has become subject to corrosion. Too often used to explain everything, it has lost its potency as a critical and analytical tool for undermining rigid notions such as institution, system, society and nation state (Latour, 1999b). Instead, it has become a method for flexibility and "is now the pet notion of all of those who want to modernize modernization" (ibid: 15). Despite this, I think that the application of the term network

Figure 1 illustrates this network in its simplest form. The thick black arrows represent the interactions between the main actors. The relations between these actors form the network core of a CityEvent. This core produces the event as we see and experience it, but it includes much more. As I aim to demonstrate throughout this book, the network core also includes those processes that remain hidden at first sight, such as conflicts and temporal alliances that might occur between the media and the event organizers or long-term transformations and consolidations of interests. Figure 1 is a fixed representation or ‘snap-shot’ of the dynamic relations that exist between the three key actors. The figure depicts the CityEvent model from a bird’s-eye view, emphasizing a spatial perspective. From this abstract perspective, we are able to approach and analyze the interaction and relations between the key actors in terms of their spatial consequences. In other words, we can discern how space and place are affected by the core network (the temporal dynamic of CityEvents will be discussed in the next chapter).

In the figure, the host city is placed at the bottom on purpose, in order to stress that this is the location where the event takes place. In spatial terms, the host city is the most dominant actor of the three that constitute the network core. The host city plays a crucial role by bringing different spatiotemporal constellations together in one location. It is the place where a generic event formula materializes and where new layers are added to its established event tradition. It is also the place where globally operating media organizations descend to report on the CityEvent, so that the locality of the host city exceeds its territory through processes of mediation and mobilization. Hence, by following a network approach to CityEvents we are able to think their spatial dimension in much more complex ways than if we considered them solely in terms of the locality where the event takes place—this issue will be further addressed in the next chapter.

within the interdisciplinary context of this study does offer new insights. Network theory enables me to analyze the relationships between actors, so that insights can be gained about the dynamics of large international events that exceed reconstructions of causal and historical developments alone. For further critical comments on the use of network metaphors, see Law (2003).

Spatial complexity is the product of the interactions between the key actors in the network. In this regard, it is crucial to emphasize that the relationship between the main actors is by no means natural. The network constituted by the event owner, host city and media is the result of what Latour (1987; 1988; 1999a) calls *acts of translation*. These acts are the constant efforts that one actor has to undertake to *align* other actors with the project. The event owner's aim, for example, is to actualize the generic formula and stage it as a large international event. To align the other key actors to this project, the event owner has to get them *interested*. In other words, alignments between actors are the result of the successful translation of interests (Latour 1987, 1988; 1999a). Networks such as CityEvents are therefore the result of numerous alignments between a manifold of actors. And these actors are unreliable because they can drift from the network at any time if they become disinterested. Consequently, alignments need to be maintained constantly to prevent the network from falling apart (Latour, 1999b).

In this regard, it should be mentioned that the CityEvent model is not a one-to-one reflection of 'real networks'. It is a perspective for analyzing 'large international rootless events' and their relation to host cities. The key actors are by no means the only actors essential to producing a CityEvent; they merely form the precondition for the emergence of the larger network that eventually produces the event. I have defined the event owner, the host city and the media with the purpose of developing a threefold focus that can be applied to the six case studies, but also to other events such as the World Expo or the Commonwealth Games, without excluding other important actors in advance. The key actors must therefore also be regarded as domains or perspectives.

Apart from the key actors, additional actors can be included in the model as well. These additional actors do not constitute the network core as such, but are nevertheless important in many cases for the production process of CityEvents. Each additional actor represents a particular *interest* for one or more of the key actors. An interest provides an actor with a script, a motivation or incentive for how to act. It creates a drive to *establish relations* with other actors (Latour, 1987, 1988, 1999c; Law, 2003a). What types of additional actors occur varies for each specific CityEvent. The nation state and the audience, however, are additional actors that recur in any amalgamation of networks that produces a CityEvent. In figure 2, the additional actor of the 'audience' is depicted at the center of the network core. In the network, the audience is an additional actor that provides a script for the three key actors. The event owner, host city and media share a common interest that binds them together: the more (positive) audience attention a CityEvent captures, the more the three key actors are able to realize their particular interests. Examples of such interests are increasing advertising revenues (media), selling the city and improving its image (host city) or building up prestige and recognition for a generic event formula (event owner). In this research, audiences will therefore be conceived of as incentives or motivations for the key actors to act, rather than being conceived of as tangible actors themselves. Concretely, this means that I will not focus on audience experiences and the reception of CityEvents, but rather on the way the three key actors act, establish alignments and implement various (propaganda) strategies to increase and influence audience attention.

Apart from the audience, the nation state forms another additional but nonetheless important actor in the network that produces a CityEvent. Often, the interaction between the key actors is negotiated via the nation state. In the case of the ECOC, for example, the nation state acts in part as the event owner, because it is an EU member state and therefore has a say in the designation of the host cities. At the same time, the state often aligns itself with the host city by financially backing its bid. The nation state thus occupies a twofold position in the network, mediating the interaction between the event owner and the host city. In fact, due to the scale of CityEvents, most cities are not able to host one without financial support from the state. This is just one illustration of the relationship; other examples include, for instance, the way the nation state affects the interaction between the media and the host city through national media laws. In contrast to the audience, the nation state is represented in the network by one or more tangible actors, usually concrete governmental institutions such as the police or certain ministries. In figure 3, the interactions and alignments between the nation state and the key actors are illustrated by the dotted lines.

In this regard, it is critical to stress that the configuration of actors in a network does not imply that these actors necessarily share the same or even common interests. Each actor aligning itself with the CityEvent will try to include other actors in the network, while simultaneously striving to realize its own individual agenda. To put it differently, even though the host city, the media and any additional actors align themselves with the event owner's project to stage a CityEvent, this does not mean that any consolidation necessarily takes place between them (Law, 2003a). The individual interests of each of the actors might even conflict. We already noticed that despite the shared interest in generating audience attention, the host city has different reasons (city marketing) for aligning itself with the CityEvent than either the event owner (safeguarding the prestige and reputation of its generic formula) or the media (increasing audience ratings and advertising revenues). Even though the realization of each of these interests relies on the extent to which the key actors are successful in generating audience attention, this does not imply that there are no conflicts. A host city's aim to enhance its profile internationally is seriously undermined if media coverage of a CityEvent is negative. From the perspective of the media, in turn, reporting negatively might lead to dramatic increases in audience attention, especially when scandals are concerned (Lull and Hinerman, 1997). Yet the conflicting interests cannot diverge too much, for then the staging of the CityEvent will fail altogether and serve none of the interests of the three key actors (Law, 2003b). Precisely because these divergent interests can only be realized by generating attention from large audiences, each of the actors needs for the others to recognize its agenda.

How does this work in the triangular relationship that constitutes a CityEvent? To increase audience ratings and advertising revenues the media rely on the prestige and reputation of the generic formula and on the extent to which the host city is successful in implementing this formula. Just like the media, the host city relies on the prestige and reputation of the generic formula. A 'not well-known' generic event formula would not guarantee worldwide media coverage or the expected influx of visitors. Both the media and the host city thus exploit the prestige and reputation of the formula to generate audience attention, whereas the event owner relies on the successful implementation by the host city and on positive media coverage to

safeguard the formula's prestige and continuity. This example shows that the relationship between the media, the host city and the event owner is based on a *productive interdependency*. In other words, the success of a CityEvent depends on the ability and willingness of actors to consolidate their interests.

It should be mentioned that not all the key actors occupy an equal power position in the network. The media do not necessarily have an interest in covering a CityEvent. Other newsworthy events might be considered more important. The host city and event owner have, however, a clear interest in the presence of the media, because (positive) media coverage to a great extent determines the success of any CityEvent. This does not mean that the latter actors are placed completely at the mercy of the media. Marketing strategies, public relations and other charm offenses have proved to be subtle but effective ways to make the media adopt favorable standpoints (Avraham, 2000, 2004; Gertner and Kotler, 2004; Kotler et al., 1999). This issue will be discussed in more detail in the second and third parts of this book. The above example shows that power positions in the network are not static, but have to be negotiated and maintained (Latour, 1987). Moreover, relations of power between the key actors change according to the different phases in the production process of CityEvents.²³ To understand this network dynamic, we first have to specify further the terms that have so far been introduced. To do this, I will draw on Actor Network Theory (ANT) and, in particular, the work of Bruno Latour.

2.4 ACTOR NETWORK THEORY

Indeed, many of the central concepts of ANT have already been introduced in the previous section. To comprehend how actors are aligned with networks through the translation of their interests, we have to focus on the way ANT defines the term 'actor'. As will become apparent, ANT is centered on a specific conception of actor and agency that has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of networks. This theory²⁴ or method, as Bruno Latour, one of ANT's founders, prefers to call it,

²³ In the next chapter, the temporal dynamic of the network producing a CityEvent will receive extensive attention and five distinct phases will be distinguished: the pre-bidding phase, the bidding phase, the organizational phase, the staging of the event and, finally, the event's closure and memorialization.

²⁴ French and British scholars such as Madeleine Aldrich, Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, John Law and many others jointly developed ANT in the late 1980s. The approach was formulated in reaction to technological determinism and argued that technologies and scientific facts are by no means 'natural discoveries' but highly influenced by social, political, economic and cultural factors. In this respect, the emergence of ANT was part of a larger theoretical development within the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). In the same period, other approaches to technology and science, such as the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) formulated by Wiebe Bijker and others, were also being developed (see for instance Bijker, 1995; Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987; Bijker and Law, 1992; Jasanoff, et al., 1995; MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1996). Both approaches advocate the idea that technological inventions and scientific facts are the contingent outcome of historical constructions. In other words, a scientific fact or technology is not waiting to be deduced from nature, but is always constructed and defined by humans. Both ANT and SCOT articulate a poststructuralist approach to knowledge and both have been influenced by thinkers such as Kuhn, Foucault and Derrida. So far, ANT and SCOT seem to agree. ANT is, however, more radical in its approach to science and technology in that it favors material dimensions over the social constructionist argument that our reality is discursively constructed and that the material world is the result of these discursive conditions of possibility (Teurlings, 2004). What made ANT such a radical approach in the 1980s was its development of an ontology that challenged what Latour (1993b) calls 'the Modern Constitution'. This

enables us to examine the relations between those elements that together constitute a CityEvent. Instead of drawing on the historical context, using causal relations and forces such as ‘capital’, ‘the market’ or ‘politics’ to explain *why* a CityEvent is staged in a particular way, ANT makes it possible to reconstruct *how* such an event is produced. In this regard, Latour distances himself from the work of sociologists like Durkheim or Weber, who rely on forces such as religion to explain social phenomena. As Latour remarks: “What is a force? Who is it? What is it capable of? Is it a subject, text, object, energy, or thing? How many forces are there? Who is strong and who is weak? Is this a battle? Is this a game? Is this a market?” (1993: 159). In Latour’s view, such broad categories cannot help us explain anything; instead, they are merely mobilized as ‘external powers’ to provide sociologists with answers to questions they cannot solve (Latour, 1993). According to Latour, research is incomplete as long as the observations and conclusions remain limited to factors such as causal relations, forces and contexts. An explanation can only be valid if a phenomenon can be unpacked at the level of tangible actors and the relations between them. “All these questions are defined and deformed only in further trials. In place of ‘force’ we may talk of ‘weaknesses’, ‘entelechies’, ‘monads’, or more simply ‘actants’” (1993a: 159). Instead of examining causal relations between phenomena, ANT focuses on what actors actually do in a network, what binds them together, how they depend on each other, and what the effects of these relations of interdependency are for each of the actors and for the network that they constitute. Thus, networks are not webs of abstract relations, but products of concrete alignments established between actors (Latour, 1987, 1988, 1993).

ANT not only offers a useful method for examining how cities raise their profile by means of large international events; it also enables us to develop an alternative vision of the historical development of this phenomenon. The reasons cities host such events have changed throughout the twentieth century, as has the way these events are staged. In this light, the concept of the CityEvent should be seen as a model that I will impose on the history of the phenomenon of ‘event-based place selling’ in order to reconstruct how the relationship between the event owner, host city and media has manifested itself throughout the twentieth century. ANT forms the theoretical basis for this approach and allows us to apply the CityEvent model to historical as well as contemporary large international events. By doing so, we will be able to understand present developments better and also to reconsider the past by focusing on the dynamics and processes that characterized past events. The main advantage of this approach is that it enables us to identify and analyze historical transformations, since it allows for a comparison of network dynamics between various case studies. Furthermore, such an approach also offers the possibility of conceptualizing those long-term dimensions that supersede the moment of the actual festivities, such as, for instance, the morphological impact of the Olympic Games on cities (e.g. through the construction of the Olympic venues and villages, infrastructures or the redecoration of public spaces).

refers to the modernist conception that there exists an intrinsic distinction between the human and the natural world and that each is characterized by its own internal dynamic. According to this conception, the study of the social and the natural should separate these two domains at all times. Against this, ANT argues that within the sciences the separation between the human and the natural world has never really existed. Instead of assuming that there is, on the one hand, a natural world to be discovered and categorized and, on the other, a social world where scientists produce knowledge, ANT points out that this division is artificial. Instead, it proposes an alternative ontology that conceives of both humans and nonhumans as actors in a network in which no privileged position is ascribed in advance to certain actors over others.

At the same time, ANT does not exclude the event-like aspect from the analysis. Events are the result of the sometimes sudden alignments or actions of actors in networks. Because ANT's purpose is to undermine categories such as system, structure or mechanism, it provides a flexible and dynamic conception of networks. Theoretically, networks do not have to stabilize or reach a phase of stabilization. Nevertheless, many ANT-inspired studies, especially the early ones, have focused on the (social) deconstruction of artifacts, technologies, scientific facts and institutions (cf Akrich, 1992; Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1994; Bowers, 1992; Callon, 1986; Latour, 1992a; Latour and Woolgar, 1979). These are all research objects that *have* reached certain stability, enabling them to manifest themselves as structures, institutions, mechanism or facts. Although it is precisely this 'natural order' that ANT scholars seek to question and undermine, the above-mentioned studies have unintentionally contributed to the incorrect assumption that actor-networks are characterized by an inherent dynamic that evolves into a phase of stabilization, which only disintegrates when actors drift away from the network. As argued earlier, by including 'event' in the term CityEvent, I want to emphasize that we are dealing with networks and 'objects' that are never meant to reach such stabilization. This research project, then, is a modest contribution to the increasing list of articles and books that critically reflect on ANT with the purpose of developing and adjusting this theory (cf. De Laet and A. Mol, 2000; Law and Hasard, 1999; A.Mol, 2001; Star, 1992).

To comprehend the flexibility of the amalgamation of networks that produces CityEvents and to analyze the complexity and dynamics of the relations between the key actors, we have to describe the term 'actors' more precisely. In Latour's view (1999a; 1999b), the study of networks and actors can never be theoretical or abstract, but is always the result of concrete descriptions. Networks are composed of tangible interrelations between actors that are unique for each object of investigation. Thus, the networks that constitute the Olympic Games, the World Expo or the ECOC have to be reconstructed by tracking the actors in each individual case. What exactly, then, is an actor? Latour provides the following definition:

I use actor "actor," "agent," or "actant" without making any assumptions about who they may be and what properties they are endowed with. Much more general than "character" or "dramatis persona," they have the key feature of being autonomous figures. Apart from this, they can be anything—individual ("Peter") or collective ("the crowd"), figurative (anthropomorphic or zoomorphic) or nonfigurative ("fate") (1993: 252 note 11).

This is another illustration of Latour's attempt to undermine the established categories of the social sciences. Categories such as 'the individual' and 'the collective' are, in his view, nothing more than empty categories that attribute meaning to actors *a priori* in a way that releases sociologists from the task of looking into what actors actually do. In Latour's view, an actor can be anything, so that only a precise, well thought-out description enables us to determine what it does in a particular network.

2.4.1 The Principle of Symmetry

Central to Latour's concept is his refusal to distinguish between human and nonhuman actors. Instead, ANT conceives of both human and nonhumans as actors in a network in which no advance privileged position is ascribed to some over others. The so-called *principle of symmetry* (Latour, 1993; 1999a) ascribes agency to human

and nonhuman actors and cautions us not to make any a priori distinctions between the two when we analyze a network. ANT focuses on what actors actually *do* in a network, not on how we can attribute different meanings to actors. This does not mean that ANT conceives of humans and nonhumans as entirely the same. In contrast to nonhumans, humans have the capacity to think, to process information and, accordingly, to choose to adjust their actions. The principle of symmetry does not contest this difference, but asks us to acknowledge that nonhuman actors also perform certain roles in a network.

In this respect, I adhere to a pragmatic interpretation of ANT, because in the case of sports and cultural events it is difficult not to attribute a leading role to human actors. Furthermore, it is us humans who define something as an event because we witness and/or experience the event and communicate it to others. A volcano can erupt, but if this eruption is not registered by humans, it might as well not have happened. This is a familiar argument that has been the subject of fierce debate among philosophers ever since Aristotle, Plato and Socrates (Coplestone, 1993). Latour could be counted among the critics of this anthropocentric view on the world. In our case, however, we can circumvent this debate, because we are dealing with a very concrete category, namely planned and highly organized events. In the case of such events, human actors clearly play a dominant role in initiating and stirring the processes that eventually result in the event. In my view, the principle of symmetry should therefore be applied pragmatically. Concretely, this means that human actors (either individual or collective) are ascribed a leading role in the network without, however, underestimating the role of nonhuman actors. In the case of the 1936 Berlin Olympics, I will, for example, include buildings, streets, flags, banners and transport systems in the analysis in order to demonstrate how the Nazis produced effective propaganda imagery. As will become apparent in chapter 5, without the alignment and mobilization of these nonhuman actors, the Nazis would not have succeeded in staging a successful event. In addition, none of the human actors occupy an absolute power position in the network. The network shows no pyramid-like hierarchical order with human actors invariably placed on top. Instead, each human actor constantly has to negotiate its interests with other human and nonhuman actors.

This does not mean that we can flatten out the ontological differences between human and nonhuman actors completely. Humans can reflect on their actions and intentions and can invent strategies, whereas artifacts cannot. Usually, projects like the staging of a CityEvent or a scientific quest are envisioned by human actors, who therefore often act as initiators in the formation of a network. This does not mean that they will necessarily continue to occupy a central position once other actors align themselves with the network. Various examples of human actors occupying an initiating role in networks can be found in Latour's own work. In *Science in Action*, Latour deconstructs the notion of scientific and technological discoveries by describing in detail how scientists and engineers have to align and mobilize various human and nonhuman actors to establish a scientific fact or technology. Here, Latour does place human actors in the center of his analysis. Again, this does not mean that these human actors necessarily occupy the most powerful position, because the numbers that capture certain comparisons or test results often act as the main actors, tying other actors, such as scientific journals, other researchers or academic and technological institutions, to the network. Thus, from Latour's own work it becomes clear that his plea for the abolishment of the distinction between human and nonhuman actors is less radical than it at first appears to be. I draw from this the general conclusion that we can learn from ANT that objects are not merely passively

used by humans and that their very materiality influences the role of other actors in a network. Much like with human actors, their meaning derives from their acts.

2.4.2 *The Abolition of Micro and Macro Social Categories*

Latour's resistance to a priori explanations and distinctions has been adopted by other ANT scholars to criticize other social categories. John Law, for instance, criticizes the division made by many sociologists between the macro and the micro level:

[I]t is a good idea not to take for granted that there is a macrosocial system on the one hand, and bits and pieces of derivative microsocial detail on the other hand. If we do this we close off most of the interesting questions about the origins of power and organisation and assume that interaction is all there is. Then we might ask how some kinds of interactions more or less succeed in stabilizing and reproducing themselves: how is it that they overcome resistance and seem to become "macrosocial"; how it is that they seem to generate the effects such as power, fame, size, scope, or organisation with which we are all familiar. This, then, is one of the core assumptions of actor-network-theory: that Napoleons are no different in kind to small-time hustlers, and IBM's to wheel-stalls. And if they are larger, then we should be studying *how* this comes about—how, in other words, size, power, or organisation are generated (Law, 1992: 380, original emphasis).²⁵

Law's refusal to distinguish between the micro and the macro not only raises questions about power relations, a topic I will deal with later in this text, but also adds to our understanding of actors. It is not the size of the actors that forms the point of departure for our analysis, but *how* they generate size, scale or power. The difference between Napoleon and small-time hustlers expresses itself in the number of actors and the number of alignments that constitutes these actors. This implies that each actor can itself be deconstructed as a network constituted by various other actors. For example, we can consider a person as an actor in a network, but we can also deconstruct him or her by investigating the network of organs, cells, bones, muscles, DNA strings and so forth that constitute this person. Actors are therefore always actor-networks. Thus, depending on the focus of our research, we approach someone or something as an actor when we want to analyze its role in a network, while at other times, the actor might itself be the network of our inquiry.

2.5 THE KEY ACTORS: AMALGAMATIONS OF NETWORKS

How, then, should we define the three key actors? Obviously, the event owner, the host city and the media involve both humans and nonhumans. They are all three assemblages of multiple human and nonhuman elements, such as technologies, people, streets, buildings, images and money. In other words, we are dealing with actors that are each constituted by numerous heterogeneous actors. When we look at the host city, for example, a municipality alone already forms its own network within this key actor. Key actors are thus always an *amalgamation of heterogeneous actor-networks*. Because such a broad definition of the key actors makes it difficult to describe them accurately, we should try to describe them more precisely. As mentioned earlier, the key actors should be interpreted as domains or perspectives instead of as fixed entities. They are not 'real actors' on this abstract level, but

²⁵ I am grateful to my colleague Jan Teurlings for bringing this passage in Law's work to my attention.

become ‘real’ only when they become manifest in concrete case studies such as those of the ECOC or the Olympic Games. The key actor ‘media’, for instance, is composed of different actors in the case of the Berlin Olympic Games in 1936 than in that of Helsinki ECOC in 2000. But even on the level of an individual case study, the key actors are flexible perceptual realities that change according to the perspective from which we look at them.

In addition, the key actors often overlap. A medium such as a brochure is, for instance, an actor in the network that constitutes the host city key actor when it is used to promote a CityEvent. On another occasion, a brochure may be a supplement to a newspaper or magazine that covers a CityEvent and thus part of the media key actor. In this respect, I adhere to a pragmatic version of Latour’s argument that the study of networks can never be abstract or general. I agree with Latour that we must describe the actors carefully and in detail before we can reconstruct the emergence of an entire network and postulate general claims. Only when we focus in greater detail on the individual actors does it become possible to expand the analysis to the network as a whole. Nonetheless, I believe that it is possible to delineate some general dynamics of the CityEvent based on the six case studies.²⁶

2.5.1 Event Owner

Every event owner is a specific amalgamation of networks. As will become apparent in parts 2 and 3 of this book, the EU and the IOC differ in many respects from each other. As this difference will be addressed in detail later, let me here delineate the event owner by using the IOC as an example. This particular event owner is constituted by innumerable alignments between heterogeneous actors such as a president, an executive board, an administration and the IOC members.²⁷ Together, these four institutional bodies form the core of the IOC, which also features links with other actors such as the National Olympic Commissions (NOC’s), advisory boards, permanent sponsors, and national and international sports associations. Other sports institutions such as the UEFA, NBA or BIE are characterized by a similar heterogeneity, but they feature different actors and thus form different networks. The alignments between the actors that compose such institutions take on a more or less stabilized form that never becomes a natural order because all alignments require constant maintenance. Even though the IOC manifests itself as a solid network, we should never overlook how it evolved from a small international sports movement—established in 1894 at the international sports congress in Paris by the French baron

²⁶ Implicitly, the possibility of generalization is present in Latour’s work. In *Science in Action* (1987), Latour follows several scientists and engineers, each working on a different project. In spite of this difference, Latour’s descriptions of the work of the various scientists show that each researcher has to undertake several comparable steps before his/her work becomes a scientific fact or ‘black box’. Each one has to convince his/her colleagues of the validity of their hypothesis. Moreover, the initial interpretation of findings and the setting up of experiments and test phases is altered over the course of the research process due to the involvement of other actors. Particularly in the final stages, when the scientist comes close to announcing his/her conclusions, the trajectory leading to the publication of the findings differs little between the cases. This example illustrates that even though networks are always descriptions of the interrelations between concrete actors and never abstract concepts, it is possible to discern certain general dynamics. This can, however, only be done when one already has an overview of several related cases. Thus, my general description of CityEvents in this chapter anticipates my findings in the case studies that will be discussed in parts 2 and 3.

²⁷ The IOC website contains a highly illuminating organizational chart in RealPlayer® format. For a complete overview of the IOC’s organizational structure see: http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/movement/index_uk.asp, last consulted on May 18, 2006.

Pierre de Coubertin and representatives of foreign and international sports federations—into the world’s leading sports event institution. To become this, the IOC had to acquire the position of *spokesman*²⁸ for tens of different international sport associations. While it is not my aim to discuss the establishment of this global sports institution and event owner here, I briefly refer to its history to make clear that the IOC requires the constant support of many international sports federations to maintain its position. In the same way, other event owners rely on the support of other actors. There is always a possibility that the actor-network of the IOC may disintegrate. The corruption scandals that plagued the IOC in the late 1990s, for example, seriously undermined its respectability and reputation, as well as that of the Olympic event formula. If the corruption had not been handled properly, important actors in the network, such as sponsors and international sports associations, might have left the network to avoid getting caught up in the scandal. We could think of similar examples in relation to other event owners.

2.5.2 *Host City*

Whereas the key actor ‘event owner’ allows for quite a straightforward description, in the case of the host city it is impossible to reconstruct, describe and oversee all the actors that constitute it. Cities are highly organized, but they are not organizations (Latour, 1999b; Hetherington, 1998). In ANT’s view, an actor-network such as the host city is not some organic self-enclosed entity that functions in accordance with internal mechanisms of self-regulation and preservation, described by the German philosopher Niklas Luhmann (1987) as “autopoiesis”. On the contrary, the host city is composed of heterogeneous networks of multiple actors such as local authorities, businesses, buildings, transport infrastructures, inhabitants, moving images and so on. The list of actors can be expanded almost indefinitely.

Indeed, the term city is more ambiguous than our common sense notion(s) suggest it to be. In our contemporary urban condition, the medieval walled city with its central market square is no longer the only reference point. The urban sprawl of Los Angeles (Soja, 1990, 1996, 2000; Harvey, 1989; Shields, 1991), Helsinki’s technopolis (Bell and Hietala, 2002; Cantell, 1999; Verwijnen and Lethovuori, ed., 1999) and China’s urban mega-regions (Soja, 2000; Graham and Marvin, 2001; O’Loughlin, 1993) are just a few examples of other forms of urbanism. Urbanism manifests itself in such diverse forms that it is no longer possible to give a universal definition of the city, if it ever was. Taking the number of inhabitants as a criterion, as the United Nations does, would do no justice to the innumerable nonhuman actors that form part of cities. We only have to think of the Forbidden City in Beijing or the Ukrainian city of Chernobyl to remind ourselves that not all cities have (permanent) inhabitants. The description of the host city as an actor can therefore never be exhaustive, which is why in the CityEvent model the key actors are not per definition tangible actors, but rather domains or perspectives. The term ‘host city’ functions as a label to identify and group together actors that form the networks we could identify as

²⁸ Latour describes a spokesman as follows: “Every actant decides who will speak and when. There are those it lets speak, those on behalf of whom it speaks, those it addresses. Finally, there are those who are made silent or who are allowed to communicate by gesture or symptom alone (Latour, 1988: 194). “Anything can be reduced to silence, and everything can be made to speak. Thus, any force may appeal they appealed to an inexhaustible *supply* of actors *who may be spoken for*” (Ibid: 195). In other words, a spokesman is an actor that has established such strong alignments with other actors that it is able to speak for them (Latour, 1988; 1999b)

the ‘host city’ or, in other cases, as the ‘event owner’ or the ‘media’. Henceforth, I will limit my description to those actors within this amalgamation of networks that are actually involved in organizing CityEvents, such as an organizing committee, local authorities, venues, monuments, and transport and communication infrastructures. Together, these actors and networks represent a host city as the actor that implements a generic event formula locally.

2.5.3 *Media*

Within media studies, ‘the media’ are often approached as a national or global system (cf. Schramm, 1964; Dayan and Katz, 1992; Collins, 1986; Thompson, 1995; Gorman and McLean, 2003; Croteau and Haynes, 2000; McCullagh and Campling, 2002). The media are, however, by no means a system. Similar to host cities and event owners, ‘the media’ stands for a heterogeneous and dynamic network of interrelations between numerous human and nonhuman actors, such as journalists, audiences, media corporations, cameras, fiber cables, satellites, print presses, editors and so on. Every time a CityEvent is staged, media corporations have to undertake multiple efforts to cover it. These efforts range from negotiations about media rights with institutions and advertisers via the announcement and promotion of the event to entice audiences, but they also include—and this is an often underexposed dimension—the setting up of production, communication and distribution facilities and infrastructures; in other words, technical operations at the local level. These material, spatial and logistic dimensions of the media have only recently begun to receive more attention from scholars within media studies, urban and social geography and related disciplines (see for instance Couldry and McCarthy, 2004; Hannerz, 2000). In later chapters I will discuss this issue in more detail.

Another pitfall in talking about media is the use of the word media as a ‘container term’ to refer to all kinds of mediation. If we follow, for example, Marshall McLuhan’s (1999) approach to media, then every technology that functions as an extension of the body and as a communicative vehicle for connecting to other people should be included in our definition. McLuhan’s concept of media includes everything from news media such as newspapers, television and radio to fashion. To address how cities create a distinct profile of themselves by means of successfully hosting CityEvents, we have to be more specific about which media will be included in the analysis. In general, I will focus primarily on news media. Because of the different historical periods in which the six case studies are set, the type of news media will differ. For the Amsterdam Olympics, for instance, emphasis is put on newspapers and magazines, and to a lesser extent on news reels and radio reports. The other case studies feature different emphases.

Following this logic, CityEvents are not always covered by the same media organizations. Often, the local media acquire a more prominent position in the medium spectrum than they would if the event were staged somewhere else. In addition, a distinction should be made between the ‘usual suspects’—leading national and international media organizations that are usually able to secure a comfortable position within the overall media network—and smaller media corporations such as local newspapers and media from the developing countries (Bellamy, 1998; Whitson, 1998; Hamelink, 1995; Hannerz, 2000). The latter generally occupy a marginalized

position within the overall media coverage of CityEvents.²⁹ In this respect, we should be aware of the historical development of media coverage, as well as of the specific types of reporting that different CityEvents generate. By approaching ‘the media’ as a network instead of a system, I want to emphasize that media are composed of complex alignments of technologies, infrastructures, people and places, alignments that are subject to constant maintenance. The notion of network draws attention to the precariousness of these alignments, as well as to their historicity and to the specificity of the media coverage that particular types of CityEvents generate. Lastly, the notion of network offers a spatial metaphor that enables a description of media—but also of event owners and host cities—as connecting places to one another, thus expanding or re-placing and mobilizing the restricted place of the host city across differential scale levels. This issue will be addressed further in the next chapter.

2.5.4 Networked Power

The maintenance of networks correlates with questions regarding power positions in networks. In this regard, the production of CityEvents is often characterized by hegemonic patterns, even though Latour would dispute the term as such. Usually only those actors that occupy a privileged position within social, political and economic networks are able to mobilize and engage other powerful players. Even though such actors might each pursue a different agenda, they can be collectively characterized as institutions, companies or people that fit in well with the establishment.³⁰ They all subscribe to a capitalist logic of maximizing profits and growth. The event owner wants to expand the reputation and prestige of the generic event formula, the host city hopes to boost economic growth and tourism, while the media aim to increase advertising revenues. Other actors such as, for example, residents, do not always subscribe to these same goals and are often excluded from the organizational process of a CityEvent. This does not mean, however, that residents cannot influence the production of a CityEvent. Sometimes less powerful actors are able to establish alignments that force even the most powerful actors to give way. This happened, for instance, in Amsterdam when residents obstructed the efforts of the local authorities to bid for the 1992 Olympics. Latour (1992b) speaks of *anti-programs* to designate attempts by certain actors to undermine the project or program that a network produces.

Power is always produced in networks as a result of the way in which actors establish relations among each other. Power is a network effect and the actors that occupy powerful positions in a network have to constantly work to maintain it. A powerful actor has to align itself with many actors in such a way that these actors become dependent.³¹ No actor, not even the most powerful one, has absolute powers.

²⁹ During my archive research on the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Games I have read and analyzed hundreds of press articles and press reports. Only a small segments contained references to non-Western media sources.

³⁰ In their analysis of media events (CityEvents are, of course, also often media events), Dayan and Katz (1992) conclude that such large events are intrinsically conservative. They are ritual performances that emphasize what binds a society together, rather than exposing internal conflicts and differences. Even when conflicts exist, media events tend to conceal differences and tensions in order to represent and perform the norms and values of the establishment.

³¹ Although in his various studies on technological and scientific developments, Latour claims not to distinguish between human and nonhuman actors in advance, he does tend to follow the actors in the network from a human perspective. In *Science in Action*, he describes, for instance, how scientists and engineers had to interest and align other actors with their projects. In other words, despite Latour’s

Powerful actors constantly have to reproduce their position in the network by establishing and maintaining relations with other actors. Relations of dependency, moreover, are always subject to change, because powerful actors may lose their central position in the network when they are no longer capable of aligning other actors with their cause. In the case of CityEvents, as I have argued, there is not one powerful actor, but at least three main ones (event owner, host city, media), to which others, such as sponsors and advertisers, may be added. These actors determine to a large extent the conditions of production for CityEvents, but none of them has absolute power, since the relations between actors are based on an interdependent productivity. They interfere in each other's affairs,³² while simultaneously adhering to their own interests. Power, therefore, is not inherent to an actor, but always produced in a relation between actors.

In this respect, ANT adheres to a Foucauldian perspective on power.³³ Power is everywhere and everyone is subject to the production of power relations, which are the product of relations between people, objects and spaces. The difference between ANT and a truly Foucauldian conception of power is that ANT conceives of power as produced in many different ways, depending on the characteristics of networks, whereas for Foucault power is always produced in the same way, namely through disciplinary and discursive practices.³⁴

2.6 REFLECTIONS ON ANT

While ANT adheres to a more pluralistic conception of power production than Foucault, it only studies power from within networks. According to Law (2003b), this approach to power risks reproducing hegemonic discourses. Considering the widespread use of the network metaphor, ANT's talk about networks reinforces the dominance of this metaphor in contemporary discourse. As such, ANT risks being

radical claims, he still describes human actors as the driving forces of a network, ascribing different forms of agency to them than he does to nonhuman objects. In my view, therefore, ANT presents a radical ontology while at the same time adhering to a rather conservative epistemology. This gap has led me to interpret and apply ANT in a pragmatic way, allowing myself to supplement its method at those points in the analysis where ANT fails to adequately interpret the meaning of actors, objects and changes in a network.

³² In *The Breaking of Nations*, Robert Cooper (2003) describes such power relations as part of his analysis of the European Union. In his view, the model of the sovereign nation state has given way to a model of mutual interference in which member states interfere in each other's domestic affairs through European institutions. Cooper's model of mutual interference provides an analogy to the power dynamics in the amalgamation of networks that produce a CityEvent. A wider application of Cooper's model can be found in Thomas Elsaesser's *European Cinema: Face To Face with Hollywood* (2005), which uses the model of mutual interference to describe new developments in the relations between Hollywood and European film producers. According to Elsaesser, although Hollywood and the European studios compete with each other, they also depend on each other. Hollywood exploits European art house cinema to create a market for alternative film, whereas the European studios use the blockbuster format to attract wider audiences to European films.

³³ Although Latour (1993b) admits that he uses Foucault a lot in his work, he still believes that Foucault is a much more traditional thinker than he is usually portrayed as being. Latour's main criticism concerns the way Foucault neglected to apply his analytical apparatus outside the humanities to the exact sciences (on this issue, see also Teurlings, 2004).

³⁴ This is not the place to delve deeper into the differences and resemblances between ANT and Foucault's theory of power. For a thorough discussion on this topic, I refer to the dissertation of Jan Teurlings (2004).

“caught up in a *hegemonic way* of representing and (...) performing the world” (Law, 2003b: 5, original emphasis). Examples of hegemonic uses of the network metaphor can be found in Bill Gates’ talk about information networks or George Bush’s rhetoric on terrorist networks.

Law furthermore argues that analyses of networks in the social study of science and technology have a performative character. By talking about networks one brings them into being. According to Law, the performative character of networks can lead to a managerial view of networks. In that case, objects, but also people, are approached solely on the basis of their functionality in the network. In other words, the *meaning* of actors in a network becomes inextricably tied to their functionality in that network, thus narrowing down the wide range of other roles these actors could potentially also play. In Law’s view,

[i]t does not have to be that way. Meaning? Meaning that *the non-foundational logics of semiotic analysis do not have to hitch their wagons to functionalism*. It is possible to imagine relational orderings which perform other logics, logics which produce different kinds of politics, and different kinds of persons” (ibid: 7, original emphasis).

In addition, because many network analyses tend to focus only on those actors that make a difference in the network (those who are successful), such analyses often adapt institutional or official viewpoints. This argument also applies to the CityEvent model, because the key actors of the host city, the media and the event owner are produced by my perspective as a researcher. The centrality and power that I attribute to these actors could theoretically also be assigned to other actors such as, for example, local communities, audiences, fiber cables, documents or bricks. In the analysis of CityEvents, a too narrowly functional focus on actors would mean, for instance, that we neglect the roles of local residents who may oppose the staging of such events. Even if their resistance is not successful, by excluding them from the analysis one ends up reproducing official history. On the other hand, if one were to approach CityEvents solely as events, we might end up only looking at those actors that play a visible role during the time in which the events take place. In this sense, the network approach allows us to look ‘under the surface’. Nonetheless, the risk of exclusively describing official viewpoints and histories must be recognized and made explicit at all times. The power that I ascribe to actors in a network always has to be verified against what these actors actually *do* in the network. This also means that we have to look at the actors producing anti-programs designed to undermine the network, even when these anti-programs are rather insignificant in relation to the acts of other actors. This has a number of practical implications for the study of CityEvents.

2.6.1 Methodological Implications

Considering the main research question of this study—how do cities raise their profile by hosting CityEvents?—there is an inherent risk in following institutional histories. To some extent, I am guilty of this, because in order to address the main research question, institutional and official viewpoints have to be described. I recognize the danger of this set-up in my study. To counteract it, I also include in my analysis those actors that are not so powerful in the production process of CityEvent and those that oppose official viewpoints, such as marginalized communities, neighborhoods at the lower end of the social stratum, particular signs and images, and so on. The extent to

which official storylines allow for supplementation depends on the availability of archive material and interview data. In many cases, the actors excluded from the official narrative can be retrieved.³⁵ In this regard, media (re)presentations often reveal to us traces of actors that cannot be identified if one only analyses official documents, master plans, art works, buildings and so on. In other cases, even the tiniest traces of such marginal actors are absent and we can only guess at who they were and what they did by attempting a close reading ‘between the lines’ of texts, images and film, television or radio fragments.

Because of this, we should adopt a critical stance toward Latour’s phrase that we merely have to follow the actors in a network to reconstruct and deconstruct artifacts, scientific facts, technologies and potentially also CityEvents. In my view, to follow an actor and identify its links with other actors is not an objective or apolitical activity. The definition of an actor, its role in the network and the power it has, is attributed by the researcher and depends on his or her choices. Do we describe the emergence of a CityEvent on a general level by approaching the host city, the media and the event owner as homogeneous actors, or do we want to go deeper by breaking these actors up into heterogeneous networks? What we define as an actor is a subjective and political choice that should be made explicit. In this regard, I acknowledge that my introduction of the term CityEvent defines the object of research from a particular perspective, namely one that centers on the question of how cities create a distinct profile and try to reposition themselves in urban hierarchies. I am much more interested in the image-generating processes of CityEvents than in other aspects such as the effect the Olympic Games has had on the emancipation of women and ethnic minorities, even though these effects are of course *at least* as important as my main research question. It is not my intention to make any absolute claims for this study or to position it as the definitive work on large international periodic events. Rather, I want to contribute to the discussion on how these large events affect cities and vice versa by developing a critical perspective on how cities use CityEvents to sell themselves. I hope this approach will pave the way for further research capable of addressing more political questions regarding social inclusion and exclusion and identity.

2.7 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have introduced the term CityEvent to conceptualize the production process of so-called rootless periodic international events such as the Olympic Games,

³⁵ Traces can consist of anything from pieces of correspondence, photographs, souvenirs, buildings, personnel and statistics to bits and bytes. These are the actors or, rather, the remains of the actors that make up or made up a network. In our case, we are dealing with historical case studies: the networks may have fallen apart over time or may remain only in an altered state. Within the ANT paradigm, historical research is concerned with the reconstruction of relations between traces in order to describe a network. The selection and interpretation of traces is the result of the researcher’s subjective labor. My analysis and description of the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympic Games and ECOC is therefore by no means an attempt to write a ‘factual history’ or to articulate universal claims. I have had to select heavily from among the masses of traces found in archives, interviews and the urban environment. My inquiry concerns a reconstruction of past events based on my selection and analysis of traces and aimed at formulating a perspective on how cities use large events to raise their profile. I am therefore much more concerned with developing a way to understand how event owners, host cities and media come together to produce the particular networks that I call CityEvents than with historical research as such.

the World Expo and the European Capital of Culture. The CityEvent model enables us to widen our focus from the moment of staging to the longer-term processes that underlie such large events. In relation to event-focused perspectives, the network approach proposed by the CityEvent model has the advantage of enabling us to conceptualize events like the Olympic Games and the European Capital of Culture as part of an event tradition that results from the way preceding events have added layer after layer to a generic event formula. The preservation of the term 'event' in the compound CityEvent makes explicit that the networks producing such an event never reach a phase of stabilization. Another advantage of the CityEvent model is the framework that it provides for studying how the hosting of CityEvents differs in each historical context and for each type of event, while at the same time allowing for a comparison of the network dynamics between different case studies. In this way, developments and transformations in and between the media, host cities and event owners can be identified. Whereas most historical research refrains from generalizations, the CityEvent model enables us to go beyond the limits of specific historical contexts by comparing different case studies at the level of actors, alignments and network dynamics. This enables us not only to identify and analyze developments in the hosting of a single event, but also provides a frame for identifying and analyzing general transformations that apply to different kinds of 'large periodic rootless international events'.

Furthermore, the model draws attention to how actors negotiate their interests in order to produce a CityEvent successfully. CityEvents are typically the result of productive relations of interdependency that are constituted by at least three key actors: event owners, host cities and media. Together these key actors form the so-called network core that produces a CityEvent. Instead of merely describing *why* large international events are organized, the model helps us to identify and analyze *how* CityEvents are produced in the interaction between the media, the host city and the event owner. While network dynamics can be generalized to analyze transformations, these production processes are unique for each specific case. My description of the key actors has revealed that they are large enough to allow both human and nonhuman actors as their constituents. In principle, the three key actors are domains or perspectives that enable us to bring into focus the complex relations they have to establish with other actors to produce CityEvents successfully. In addition, due to the scale, complexity and heterogeneity of the key actors, we are also prompted to look into the complex internal networks that constitute each one. Thus, I have defined the key actors as amalgamations of actor-networks, as well as in terms of the overall network that produces a CityEvent.

Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the networks that produce a CityEvent are characterized by great flexibility and dynamism. Networks are never completely stable and can always increase in size, shrink, or even disintegrate. This flexibility draws attention to the complex temporal dynamics that characterize the amalgamation of networks producing CityEvents. In the next chapter, I will describe the four phases that characterize the production process and network dynamic of CityEvents on a general level. The fact that the production of a CityEvent is a dynamic process obviously affects the place where such an event is staged. The temporal dynamic of the network can therefore not be separated from the analysis of space and place. If we want to understand how cities raise their profile by hosting CityEvents, we have to expand the basic principles of the CityEvent model into an analysis of place and space in relation to time. The triangular network core, as it is constituted by the media, event owner and host city, constitutes in the first instance an

abstract spatial perspective. In this regard, the CityEvent model potentially allows us to profit from the 'spatial turn' (Rennen and Verstraete, 2005) in cultural analysis and media studies. We can only maximize this advantage, however, if we are able to think through the spatial complexity of CityEvents. In the next chapter, I will therefore refine the model by further drawing on ANT and, in particular, the work of Kevin Hetherington.

3. PLACE AS A NETWORK EVENT

Reconfiguring, Mobilizing and Branding Place

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, the term CityEvent was introduced as a model and as a specific category to describe large events such as the Olympic Games, the World Expo, the Super Bowl and the European Capital of Culture. What distinguishes CityEvents from other large, renowned international events such as the Berlin Film Festival, the International Documentary Festival (IDFA) in Amsterdam and the Edinburgh Theatre Festival, is their generic event formula, which is not rooted in one particular city. The staging of a CityEvent is thus a unique happening for the host city. Moreover, even though cities usually host a particular CityEvent only once, such events tend to leave a longer-lasting imprint due to their scale and the media and audience attention they attract. A CityEvent also offers a host city the unique opportunity to create attractive images and mediate them to remote audiences. To analyze the complex relation between the discontinuous nature of these events and their more continuous or longer-lasting effects, the CityEvent model was introduced as an analytical framework. The model enables us to approach these types of events as resulting from networked production processes. In this way, attention is partly drawn away from the moment of the festive celebrations itself to the underlying processes necessary to produce the event, in which actors constantly have to negotiate their interests and maintain relationships with one another. The model is based on ANT and enables us to unravel events as longer-term production processes through its focus on the interaction between the three actors that form the network core of every CityEvent: the media, the host city and the event owner. To understand the interactions between these actors and to get a sense of the general network dynamic that characterizes CityEvents, we have to develop a more precise perspective on time in the network.

In this chapter, time will be approached from the spatial perspective of the host city, because this is the key actor that has to implement the generic event formula. To comprehend how cities use CityEvents as an opportunity to raise their profile by producing city images, we have to examine and theorize the relationships between the host city, the media and the event owner in both spatial and temporal terms, without overlooking either one. The analysis of the temporal dynamic that characterizes the production process of CityEvents has to be integrated into the theorization of place. Network dynamics cannot be separated from the analysis of place, because places act as the sites where interactions between actors materialize, are transformed and/or dissolve. Place is therefore not some passive stage on which events descend, but represents an actor in the amalgamation of networks that produce CityEvents. At the same time, place is also actively shaped, ordered and transformed by the same amalgamation of networks that produces a CityEvent. In other words, place is both an actor in the CityEvent network *and* a networked effect.

In this chapter, place will be approached as a *networked event*. Whereas in the previous chapter we approached events in terms of networked production processes that supersede the ephemeral character of instant happenings, conceptualizing place as a networked event seeks to undermine static conceptions of place. This chapter aims to further specify the CityEvent model by drawing on ANT, and in particular the

work of Kevin Hetherington, who argues that place is not static but constantly produced and reproduced through the reordering of actors. In other words, changes in the relations between actors, as well as the addition and/or drifting off of actors from the network, lead to (partial) reconfigurations of place. From this perspective, it becomes possible to analyze the enormous impact that CityEvents have on host cities by reconstructing how the networks that produce such events reorder and rearrange actors in such a way that places are (partly) reconfigured. In this manner, places become networked events.

Hetherington's dynamic conception of place will moreover be extended to address the question how CityEvents enable host cities to create attractive images of themselves. In this regard, a materialist approach to city branding will be taken, arguing that city images are the virtual product of various acts of translation between tangible actors. This concept of city images will draw attention to their material constitution in order to achieve a better understanding of how such images are produced. City images change over time just as places do. The analysis of place and place branding can therefore not be separated from questions about time.

This chapter will therefore end with a description of the four different phases that characterize the production process of CityEvents. These phases are: the pre-bidding phase, the bidding phase, the organizational and staging phase and, finally, the phase of closure and memorialization. These phases are generalizations derived from my studies of the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympic Games and European Capitals of Culture. On the level of the concrete case studies, these phases tend to overlap. Rather than outlining absolute temporal categories, the four phases will be introduced to provide a general impression of the network dynamics that characterize CityEvents. In this regard, ANT helps us to explain interactions and network dynamics in terms of how actors negotiate specific interests at particular moments. The alignments that actors form to produce a CityEvent change in accordance with the different phases. For example, the alignment between the host city and the event owner evolves into a more stabilized relationship once the city has officially been designated the host of a CityEvent. The phases of a CityEvent's production process therefore correspond to the size of and the activity in the host city.

3.2 (RE)PLACING PLACE

Before we discuss the four phases in the staging of CityEvents, we have to draw attention to the question of how the temporal dynamic of networks becomes spatially manifest in the host city. After all, it is the fact that CityEvents lead to a partial spatial reconfiguration of the city that makes cities so eager to host these kinds of events: this enables them to (re)position themselves within national, regional and global urban hierarchies. To achieve a better understanding of place as a networked event, I draw on the work of Kevin Hetherington, who uses ANT in his analysis of place and space.

According to Hetherington (1997), the placing of objects in a network results in the circulation of these objects, but also in a mobilization of place itself. Hetherington argues that place is too often analyzed as an immobile site that "stands for something, that has an intrinsic or mythic meaning because of its supposed fixity in space" (1997: 188). In the Western philosophical tradition, place has mostly been defined as the meaningful and fixed 'Other' of space (Casey, 1998). Philosophers like Hegel and Heidegger conceive of place as localized, fixed, and linked to belonging, to the home, and to community feeling and history. In other words, place is portrayed as

the meaningful counterpart to Euclidean space. It is this view that Hetherington criticizes: “[w]e should think of places as relational, as existing in similitude: places *being in the process of being placed in relation to* rather than being there” (1997: 188, original emphasis). Instead of focusing on the semiotics of place alone, Hetherington points to the mobility of place:

Place is the effect of similitude³⁶, a non-representation that is mobilized through the placing of things in complex relation to one another and the agency/power effects that are performed by those arrangements. Places circulate through material placings, through the folding together of spaces and things and the relations of difference established by those folds. They are brought into being through the significations that emanate from those material arrangements and foldings. (1997: 187).

This quote shows many connections to the work of Latour. Indeed, Hetherington applies an ANT perspective to place by arguing that place is an actor-network in itself, constituted through various alignments between different actors. However, Hetherington makes explicit what remains rather unexplored in Latour’s work, namely the *networked ontology* of place. Where Latour chooses technological and scientific artifacts such as transport systems and penicillin as objects of investigation, Hetherington focuses on place. He adds a new dimension to ANT by presenting place as the result of acts of translation between human and non-human actors, arguing that changes in the interrelations between actors affect the place-network and thus alter place itself. Place then emerges as the result of the placing and ordering of objects.

This means that places are not fixed and passive platforms established prior to the emergence of networks. According to Hetherington, places “are constituted through boundary work” (1997: 186). They do not lie between boundaries, but indicate how these demarcations are themselves the result of a heterogeneous and flexible ordering and placing of objects. A re-ordering of objects—a change in the network—leads to changes in the boundaries that constitute places. Places thus result from a dynamic process of boundary crossing. Network changes that stir processes of boundary crossing can also have the characteristics of incidents or spontaneous happenings, which affect the constitution of places. Hetherington’s approach to place has great consequences for our thinking about the ‘place of place’ within the process of staging CityEvents. Place is not some a priori locality upon which large events descend. Instead, the heterogeneous, networked establishment of a CityEvent reconfigures and produces place itself. Just as in the previous chapter we conceptualized large events as the result of longer-term production processes, Hetherington’s approach allows us to nuance static conceptions of place by ascribing event-like characteristics to it.

This dynamic conception of place is easier to comprehend when we link it to our earlier description of host cities. Host cities are constituted by an amalgamation of multiple, heterogeneous networks. The production of CityEvents takes place within these and other networks. Changes in these networks, as well as the emergence of new networks and alignments with other actors, result in a re-ordering and replacing of objects and consequently affect the overall amalgamation that constitutes the host city. The most visible changes are interventions in and reconfigurations of a city’s morphology. The CityEvent’s impact is, however, not limited to morphological

³⁶ Hetherington adheres to Foucault’s (1983, 1986) notion of similitude and accordingly defines it as “the juxtaposition of things not usually found together, or which have no ordered meaning together and the ambiguity that they create in terms of representation. Similitude sets up a heterotopic space” (Hetherington, 1997: 186).

dimensions only; it also affects daily life practices, the relations that a host city has established with other places, as well as its image.

3.2.1 *Re-branding the City: Naming, Mobilization and Commodification*

The re-ordering and reconfiguration of host cities affect our perception of spaces and places and, as a result, the meanings, names and imaginations we attribute to place. This process therefore also involves the practice of *naming places*. Apart from physical spatial interventions such as the erection of event venues, CityEvents produce texts that are materialized in photographs, brochures, films, television programs and other media formats. In this regard, we have already introduced a distinction between material and immaterial images: the difference between, on the one hand, the city as it unfolds itself to us as a landscape and, on the other, the city as it is captured and reduced to media representations. Material images of place can be described in terms of the way places present themselves to us when we visit or move through them. Material images are not absolute realities; they are the product of the subject's perception and experience of place. Immaterial images are representations of places that are produced and circulated by the media (and in art). This also explains the difference that sometimes exists between people's personal perceptions of place and place images in the media. A common example of this occurs when the news media represent a particular place as violent and uncanny, whereas the people that live there associate the same place with positive experiences (Avraham, 2000). In such cases, there is a discrepancy between material and immaterial images.

In many cases, however, people's perception of a place is also shaped by media reports about it. If one visits a place one has never been before and it has been represented in the media as a dangerous area, one is more likely to experience the place in a negative manner (Kotler et al., 1993). There is thus an interaction between material and immaterial images. The latter are, moreover, not completely virtual, because the media that create them function just like any other object: their material presence reorders places. On the other hand, they are texts, which produce representations and meanings about a place. As Hetherington argues:

They [these media] arrange, border, include and exclude, they *make knowable* a space to everyone who might choose to look at these representations and also make possible to compare with another space.... Those representations contain truth claims (not necessarily scientific) about a space. They perform place myth as places (1997: 189, original emphasis).

Through the production, distribution and circulation of media, places are continually inscribed and re-inscribed with meaning. Events, especially spectacular and newsworthy ones, can significantly affect processes of naming. Events like the riots in the Parisian banlieus (suburbs) quite abruptly (re)inscribe meanings onto a place that, from an outsider's perspective, are usually less pervasive. At the same time, meaning is added to places through the production of more durable labels—used by media and people—which enable people to identify themselves with places and to distinguish different places from each other. An example of such a label is Amsterdam's widespread image as a tolerant city, especially with regard to soft drugs and sex. As Amin and Thrift argue, “[a] city named in certain ways also becomes that city through the practices of people in response to the labels. They perform these labels” (2003: 23). This also applies to Amsterdam. While the city is associated with famous cultural attractions such as the Rijksmuseum and the Van Gogh Museum, its coffeeshops

(places where you can purchase and consume soft drugs) and the red light district are still among Amsterdam's main tourist attractions. Tourists perform the 'tolerant' label by visiting these areas and by engaging in acts of drug and sex consumption. A place's meaning is thus the result of constant (re)inscriptions and of their performance by both human and nonhuman actors. The extent to which events can add or alter the meaning of places depends, therefore, on whether and how these events become labels that are reproduced and performed.

Drawing on Amin and Thrift, Hetherington defines inscription³⁷ as the naming of place. Naming is a process by which people try to make sense of the objects and places that surround them. Names are by no means neutral. Each name is a specific representation that ascribes a certain meaning to an object of place and it accordingly carries with it all sorts of assumptions and ideologies about this place. Moreover, the ordering of objects alone does not suffice to produce the difference that distinguishes one place from another. Arrangements of places need to be labelled, represented and circulated. Hetherington describes naming as follows:

Arranging is a selective process that includes and excludes. In doing so it allows some to name, to make known, a place as meaning something in particular: my home, the place I was born, a prison, a school, a scientific laboratory. The name of each of these places derives from an ordering that is given by a name that carries with it a utopic, a name implies some sort of meaning of what the place is about, what its purpose is and what it stands for and how that contrasts with places that are not of this kind (1997: 191).

Hetherington's description implies that naming involves acts of settling and fixing the (re)arrangement of objects that constitutes a place's mobility. As argued above, the reordering of place leads to a mobilization of place. Naming is not something that takes place only once, such as, for example, during the celebration of a CityEvent. It is a continuous process in which different actor-networks try to inscribe their name onto the city. A widely recognized city image is therefore the result of the efforts of those actors that have been most successful in this inscription and in aligning other actors with their network.

Let me illustrate this theoretical exposé with an example. The cliché figure that presents Paris as the 'capital of love' is particularly strong and based on a rather homogeneous, romantic imagery of Paris which, despite its coherence, cannot be reduced to a single element. It represents the accumulation of several elements such as Robert Doisneau's famous photographs of Paris, a Hollywood blockbuster like *Moulin Rouge* (directed by Baz Luhrmann, 2001), the Eiffel tower, the millions of tourists that annually perform this romance, the Pont Neuf and many other actors. Each of these elements represents Paris as the 'capital of love', but they can only do this because they function as part of a web of references that constantly reproduces this imagery. The various actors that together constitute this image have to constantly maintain their mutual alignments and keep traces such as postcards, souvenirs, moving images, maps and even songs in circulation to reproduce it. The Eiffel tower alone, however mighty, is by no means powerful enough to sustain this imagery (Latour, 1999b). Its iconic function is supported by an intertextual network of other actors including the city's alleys, street lighting, music (*La Vie en Rose*), movies like Jean-Pierre Jeunet's *Le Fabuleux Destin d'Amélie Poulain* (2001), the Parisian cafés and so on.

³⁷ See Henri Lefebvre (1991, 2003) and Michel De Certeau (1988) for a more thorough exposé on inscription and urban space.

Naming demobilizes place by labeling and thus ordering the arrangement of heterogeneous objects that constitute place. In this manner, naming enhances a process in which the heterogeneity of arrangements is reduced to the ordered and coherent representation of place.³⁸ These reductions are mobile and make a place knowable to anyone who 'reads' them. For example, postcards often depict rather cliché and hegemonic images of a place: Paris is represented by the Eiffel Tower, London by the Tower Bridge or Big Ben, Brussels by 'Manneke Pis' and Amsterdam by its canals and gables. These postcards represent only a small section of all the possible meanings of a place and in doing so, they reduce the heterogeneity of place to a homogeneous tourist image. In this manner, the meaning of place is fixed or demobilized. A place's other meanings are marginalized and pushed outside the perception of many visitors and inhabitants. At the same time, the postcard format allows this homogeneous place image to travel: it can be sent to any other place in the world. Hence, naming simultaneously mobilizes and de-mobilizes place by reducing complex arrangements to fixed, comprehensible labels and circulating them.

A concept that might be helpful to explore these simultaneous processes of fixing and mobilizing is *miniaturization*. The literary scholar Susan Stewart introduces this concept in her research on the cultural meaning of souvenirs. In her book *On Longing*, Stewart explores how souvenirs enable audiences to imagine cities, to "domesticate experience and to make it portable" (1993: 38). Souvenirs miniaturize people's experience of a city and render bodies and objects movable within an individual's life-narrative. This process of miniaturization develops on a twofold axis, which could be characterized in terms of the abovementioned mobilization and demobilization effects. On the one hand, the place that is represented is reduced and miniaturized to the extent that it becomes an object or sign, as with a souvenir or logo. In other words, visitors can purchase small paraphernalia that represent and symbolize the 'greater place'. Such an object can be taken from one locale to another, from the holiday destination to the home. On the other hand, the representation of space by means of objects correlates with the process of giving meaning to that place. The object or sign represents only a fraction of all possible meanings that can be given to a place. Hence, miniaturization revolves around processes of inclusion and exclusion.

Stewart's notion of miniaturization connects to my earlier use of Latour's (1999a, 1999c, 1988) acts of translation and Hetherington's concept of naming. According to Latour, every translation results both in something lost and something gained, just as Hetherington argues that the naming of arrangements of actors implies a certain fixation and reduction of the wealth of their possible meanings. The program brochure of the Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952, for instance, enables visitors to grasp the whole event in its essence. At the same time, we are aware that this piece of paper could never capture the context, variety and multiplicity of all the real events in the program. This example aptly illustrates the connection between Stuart's concept of miniaturization and what Latour calls a chain of translations. Both processes enable people 'to make the city and event small'. While helpful, it is at this point that

³⁸ I am aware that the CityEvent model works in a similar manner by reducing the complexity of such an event to a triangular core network. However, doing so makes possible a generalized perspective that allows for a comparison between different types and editions of large international rootless events. The model, moreover, does not rule out diversity and complexity altogether, because for every case study, the actors, alignments and relations will be described in their specificity. As I argued in the previous chapter, this means that what I label as key actors also differs per case. This way, justice can be done to the heterogeneity and specificity of the actors and networks, while simultaneously allowing for more generalized comparisons.

Hetherington's concept of inscription requires a more thorough explanation, because his analysis remains rather abstract with regard to the role that media play in the naming of places. This abstraction makes it difficult to render the role of the media key actor more concrete in the triangular network approach that has been set out so far.

Here, Latour's and Stewart's work prove their usefulness, for it is through acts of translation that the city is reduced and abstracted to the extent that it can be inscribed in small objects and transported across space and time. Latour's work enables me to interpret the souvenir but also objects of media output (moving images, articles, music and photographs) as the result of a chain of translations. While Stewart does not focus on the chains of translation that precede the transformation of the city into a souvenir, she formulates a similar argument to Latour's with regard to the function of the souvenir, so that her analysis can also be applied to media outputs. It is in the form of a souvenir, promotion film or other media product that a city is simplified, miniaturized and mobilized. Even more clearly, the sale of souvenirs and other memorabilia depicting a CityEvent and its host city transforms place into a commodity. In this way, cities become objects of desire that can be consumed and experienced from within, as tourists do, but also at a distance through the consumption of city-branded objects and media products (cf. Lash and Urry, 1995; Urry, 1995; Featherstone and Lash, 1999; Moor, 2003; Shields, 1991). Souvenirs and media products not only miniaturize cities but also turn them into portable and purchasable objects. They do so at a distance, but also by re-ordering place itself. The chains of translation that constitute souvenirs and media products reflect on the arrangement of the objects that constitute a place. Like any trace that remains of a past event, souvenirs and media products have the capacity to transport content—a particular meaning of place—across spaces and times without being subject to change.

We have established that it is through souvenirs and media output that cities are miniaturized, mobilized, circulated and commodified. We can explain commodification as a result of the partial re-ordering and renaming of the host city, a process that is propelled through the increased production and circulation of souvenirs, logos and media outputs. All these objects represent the host city as a consumable good and allow people to know and remember a place at a distance. This not only affects people's perception of a city at home, but changes any actual visit to the place they may undertake, because in a way they will have already experienced and consumed the place in advance. Their visit becomes an act of consuming the signs and signifiers³⁹ that are a city's buildings, parks, inhabitants and CityEvents. The extent to which urban space is commodified is specific to each historical context

³⁹ This is a familiar argument postulated by Lash and Urry (1994) in their analysis of tourism in contemporary societies. While their approach has contributed to new insights in the fields of tourism studies, urban studies, and cultural and social geography, it also risks culminating in a Baudrillardian conception of place and space. Even if one agrees with Baudrillard's (1988, 1997) argument that signs no longer refer to a reality but only to each other (as simulacra), his analysis remains problematic with regard to the production of these signs. What Baudrillard overlooks is the material constitution of simulacra. Although the hyper-reality of Disney World and Las Vegas might construct fantasy worlds that are more real than the 'real' world, the walls of Cinderella's castle and the casino are still made of steel, concrete, plaster and paint. In the same way, the television broadcasts, advertisements, consumer brands and city images that CityEvents produce consist not only of signs. This discussion, however, reaches beyond the scope of this research and I will therefore leave it at these comments, which might be worth exploring further elsewhere.

and each type of CityEvent. Such commodification has, furthermore, increased in scale and intensity throughout the 20th century (McGuigan, 1996; Miles, 1997).

What I described in the introduction to this book as ‘place selling’ or ‘city marketing’ can now be explained as a process that is much more complex than the promotion of cities alone. The successful marketing of cities requires a strategic reordering, renaming and re-imagining of place. What Hetherington calls (re) naming can in my view also be labeled a *re-imagining* of the city. Due to the massive reordering power of the amalgamation of networks that produce CityEvents, places are able to alter or adapt the way they present themselves and the way they are represented in the media. Thus, an event becomes a place’s image event that is (re)constituted by more durable alignments between actors. This explains why CityEvents are pre-eminently suited to creating a distinct city profile: they integrate places as network events with events as networks.

We should nonetheless acknowledge that a CityEvent only produces a partial rearrangement of the objects and networks that constitute the host city, because city images are not exclusively produced during the celebration of a CityEvent. In fact, cities also undertake numerous actions to attract the attention of media and audiences prior to and after the actual festivities. The strategies of display employed by cities often draw on existing urban imageries and aim to strengthen or change them. In this regard, it is crucial to remember that the rearrangement of place is a continuous process. Cities are always under construction and so is their imagery. CityEvents nonetheless constitute an exceptional situation due to the scale and the intensity with which their production processes interact with the host city and its existing image.

3.2.2 *Global-Local Media Economics*

The spatiotemporal complexity of CityEvents, as it has been discussed above, manifests itself most profoundly in the ways the media, sponsors and advertisers shape the relationship between the host city and event owner. As Jones notes in his analysis of the 1999 Rugby World Cup, “commercialisation of major events and sport in general has increasingly drawn benefit away from host economies and sports organizations and towards commercial sponsors and individuals” (2001: 242). Jones concludes that due to the increased influence of commercial forces over event owners, “[e]vents are more often than not controlled, organized and driven from outside the region” (ibid.). Media and sponsors, often representing international or global operating corporations rather than local businesses, increasingly negotiate deals with event institutions that draw the financial benefits away from the locality where an event is staged. In the case of the 1999 Rugby World Cup, Wales initially won the bid for the event. However, the internal politics of the World Rugby Association combined with sponsor interests, led to the organization of the event being shared with England, France, Ireland and Scotland. Jones suggests that the reason for this decision was the potential for greater media coverage and increased audience attention. By hosting the event at several locations, more local and national audiences could be targeted, thus expanding the event’s total audience and its advertising revenues. This example shows how media coverage, coupled with commercial interests, has increasingly become a factor affecting the relationship between the host city and the event institution.

The role of the media and sponsors was not always so influential. It is crucial to acknowledge that relations between the host city, the event owner and the media

(as well as, indirectly, those with sponsors and advertisers⁴⁰) have evolved over the course of time, as a result of historical developments specific to each CityEvent. Until the early 1950s, for example, sponsorship of the Olympic Games—nowadays the world's most commodified and commercialized event—was rather modest and mostly confined to local and national businesses.⁴¹ At the same time, not all contemporary CityEvents are subject to pressure from the media and sponsors in the same degree. Sports events show this pressure more than cultural events like the ECOC. The type of media coverage that sports events generate partly explains this. Sports events are exceptionally suited to live television coverage, due to the limited duration of individual matches and to the way in which sports competitions fuel audience excitement through the identification of viewers with their favorite team or country (Turner and Rosentraub, 2002; Wenner in Wenner, et al., 1998). Due to this specific temporal dynamic, they tend to attract much larger audiences and create a larger advertising market than many other events.

3.2.3 *Power and Hegemony*

The strategies deployed by cities put themselves on the map—to rearrange, rename and re-imagine themselves—evoke questions about power relations. Cities are amalgamations of heterogeneous networks and their use of strategies is therefore by no means representative of all the actors that constitute the city. In this respect, it is crucial to inquire who or what is involved in marketing the city? Who or what determines how a place is reconfigured? Who decides how a city is presented to the outside world? Who has access to certain venues and institutions, and who has not? Usually, institutions such as municipalities and corporations are intimately involved in the production processes of CityEvents, whereas inhabitants are often confronted with 'the facts' when plans have already been set in motion (Olds, 1998; Olds, Clark et al., 2001). The impact of a CityEvent can therefore never be analyzed without paying attention to power relations. Questions about power relations are related to questions about agency, because those who control how objects and networks are rearranged and how places are renamed also become powerful nodes in the network, capable of including and excluding other actors. The way a CityEvent reconfigures and renames a host city clearly involves processes of inclusion and exclusion. Some actors are made more visible, whereas others are pushed out of the network altogether. As Olds (1998) argues, the organization of large events leaves a deep social, economic, political and cultural impact on a city. It is the rule rather than the exception that the poor are evicted from their homes to make place for a CityEvent. This is done either by force or occurs as the (after) effect of rising real estate prices and rents. In addition, many individuals and groups that are perceived as undesirable

⁴⁰ Sponsors and advertisers influence the organization of CityEvents in many ways, but most immediately by exercising pressure on the event owner and media during the negotiations about sponsorship and advertising agreements. For this reason, but also to keep some clarity in my description of the CityEvent, I will for the moment limit my analysis to the media and event owner only. In later chapters, I will expand the analysis by involving sponsors and advertisers.

⁴¹ I draw this conclusion from my archive research on the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki summer Olympics. While it is possible that other Olympics, such as the 1934 Los Angeles summer Games, may have involved more elaborate sponsorship deals with multinational companies, such sponsorship was by no means dominant in the three case studies. Mostly, only large national and local businesses would advertise themselves through the Games. It should be acknowledged that even though advertising itself was well-developed in this period, sponsorship, especially involving large international events, was still a relatively new phenomenon.

by an event's organizing committee and by local authorities are often refused access to the site where a CityEvent takes place and even to the surrounding area.

(Re)placing and (re)naming place is therefore by no means a neutral network effect. Actors actively try to establish alignments with others in order to realize their interests and by doing so they sometimes marginalize or even exclude other actors from the network. In the remaining chapters, I will show that this is a recurring issue that manifests itself differently in all of the case studies.

3.2.4 Networking of Scale

At first sight, questions regarding power relations cannot be separated from questions regarding scale. In the previous chapter, we followed the ANT perspective, citing in particular Law's (1992) view that a powerful actor is not simply powerful because it is powerful, but because it is able to keep as many actors aligned as necessary to allow it to occupy a central position in the network. Law's conception of power implies that power depends on the amount or extent of an actor's alignments with other actors. How should scale be interpreted in relation to the CityEvent in this regard?

In the previous chapter, we noticed that ANT does away with dichotomies such as the micro versus the macro. What concepts or approaches does ANT offer to theorize the international and sometimes global dimension of CityEvents? Here, I will again draw on Latour (1993, 1999a, 1999b), who argues that there is no such thing as the global. A multinational cooperation essentially operates on the same local level as a bakery shop. In Latour's view, then, scale levels are a continuation of locally produced and linked networks. In other words, scale is the extent to which an actor is able to operate in multiple localities, and this constitutes the only difference between the multinational and the bakery shop. According to Latour, 'scale' can be placed among the categories of context, causal relations and other forces that he aims to undermine. Following his view, the dimensions of CityEvents that exceed the local are not the result of abstract global processes and phenomena, but rather of a networking between localities that together produce a CityEvent locally, while at the same time producing and reproducing the event on an international, even global scale. The mediation of CityEvents to remote audiences is thus merely a networked extension of the locality in which the event is staged. In Latour's account of network, the global is therefore always locally produced by the linking of one place to various others. When we connect Latour's argument to Hetherington's conception of place, the scale of the mediation of a CityEvent is not only networked, but the host city becomes entangled with this networking of scale as well. Every link that is established with another place to mediate a CityEvent connects the host city to another location.

Furthermore, it is not only through media networks that host cities are linked with other localities. The organization of a CityEvent requires the putting in place of extensive transport infrastructures as well. The large number of foreign visitors and participants, which CityEvents usually attract, leads to an increase in incoming and outgoing (foreign) traffic. Some of these links are of a temporary nature, such as, for example, adjustments in an airline's flight schedules to cope with the anticipated increase in the number of passengers during the celebration of a CityEvent. Often, however, the staging of CityEvents leads to large-scale investments in transport and communication infrastructures, resulting in the establishment of more permanent links to other localities. The construction of a telegraph cable between Helsinki and Stockholm to facilitate foreign communications for the 1952 Olympics is an example

of one such more permanent linkage. Through these connections, the world not only comes to the host city but the host city also comes to the rest of the world. For a host city to attract worldwide audiences, it has to transport itself to many locales across the globe and present itself there. In other words, the networking of scale is accompanied by the *mobilization of place*. This is the mechanism by which CityEvents enable cities to reposition themselves: they lead to a mobilization of cities and to the networking of scale.

This mobilization of place has two important consequences for our analysis of place. First of all, a CityEvent takes place at many localities simultaneously. Even though we might consider the host city as the main place where a generic event formula is implemented and actualized, it is by no means capable of producing the global scale of a CityEvent by itself. A host city therefore always depends on its alignments with many other locales. Examples of such locales are television studios, radio and telephone transmission centers, extraterrestrial satellite orbits, remote audiences, servers and airport terminals in different places around the world, which actively connect the host city to other remote places. Without all these different associated locales that turn it into a multi-place event, a CityEvent would indeed remain a local happening confined to the host city.

Second, when we involve Latour's and Hetherington's approaches to scale and place in our study of CityEvents, we can conclude that the staging of such events results in the expansion of the host city. By linking up with different locales, a host city's networked ontology expands along temporal and spatial lines. The amalgamation of heterogeneous actor-networks that constitute the host city increases in mass, size and geographical range. The scale and duration of this expansion depends on the number of links that are established and on the maintenance of these alignments. The majority of these linkages only last as long as the CityEvent is celebrated. Only a small part continues to exist after the event and even then they often do so in a different form. The few alignments that remain compose what is commonly referred to as the long-term impact of hosting large international events.⁴² They produce effects such as a lasting growth in the number of tourists, investments, and new businesses, as well as an improvement in a city's reputation and prestige in the context of urban hierarchies.⁴³

3.3 TEMPORAL DYNAMIC: PHASES IN THE PRODUCTION PROCESS OF CITYEVENTS

The spatiotemporal expansion and mobilization of place brings us to the four phases mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. These four phases characterizing the production process of CityEvents are: pre-bidding, bidding, organization and staging, and closure and memorialization. As I noted earlier, this division into phases is mine, based on my empirical research on the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympic Games and ECOC. When studying these cases, I noticed a recurring pattern in the way these cities obtained and staged these large events. This pattern should, however,

⁴² For an extensive discussion of the long-term impacts of large international events see: Burns and Mules (1986); García (2004); Verdaguer (1995); Richards and Wilson (2004); Hall (1992, 1997); Getz (2001); Ritchie (1984) and Roche (1992).

⁴³ See Rubalcaba-Bermejo and Cuadrado-Roura (1995) on urban hierarchies in Europe.

not be interpreted too rigidly, because phases tend to overlap and manifest themselves differently in each case. Nonetheless, the distinction between the four phases provides a general indication of the temporal dynamic that characterizes the production process of CityEvents from the standpoint of the host city. I have chosen to focus on the host city, because it is the only key actor for which the staging of the CityEvent is a one-time occurrence. In addition, the description of the phases from the perspective of the host city also allows us to delineate how place turns into a network event when the production process for a CityEvent is set in motion. Before this, however, I will briefly describe the network dynamic from the perspective of the event owner and the media, in order to emphasize that time works differently for each of the key actors.

In contrast to the host city, the temporal dynamic of the event owner and the media is generally characterized by cyclical patterns. The IOC and EU, for instance, have strict procedures about their roles in particular phases of the production process of their CityEvents.⁴⁴ These procedures lay out the cyclical pattern that characterizes the network dynamic from the perspective of the event owner. The interactions between the event owner and the host city may, for example, show the following cyclical dynamic: application by several candidate cities, selection of the host city, monitoring of the implementation of the generic event formula, evaluation of the CityEvent. In this cycle, the evaluation of the CityEvent usually happens during or after the selection of a host city for the next edition. The relationship between the media and the event owner is more difficult to generalize, because not all event owners maintain strong relations with the media. The IOC begins negotiations with media corporations on the sale of the photography and television broadcasting rights long before a host city is designated, whereas the EU (owner of the European Capital of Culture formula) does not maintain such relationships with the media, because there are no rights to be sold. Instead, the host city itself takes care of the public relations and promotion in relation to the European Capital of Culture.

In the case of the media, it is more difficult to make generalizations with regard to network dynamics. For local media, the staging of a CityEvent might be a discontinuous news event, whereas leading national and international news media might develop complete production scripts that only have to be 'activated' to cover different editions of the event successfully. Because cities host CityEvents to reposition themselves on a national and international level, our focus is mostly on leading national and international news media. These media, like the event owner, might be expected to operate according to a cyclical pattern. From their perspective, a CityEvent is just one edition in a chain of events. By means of an analysis of press cuttings of the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympics and European Capitals of Culture, I have been able to identify certain patterns of coverage in the national and

⁴⁴ The procedures regarding the selection of a host city and the implementation of the Olympic formula can be found in the Olympic Charter, accessible on: http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf, last visited 11 July, 2006. The selection procedures and implementation criteria for the European Capital of Europe are described in the following documents: *Report of the Selection Meeting for the European Capital of Culture 2010*, issued by the Panel for the European Capital of Culture (ECOC) 2010, Brussels, April 2006. See: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eac/other_actions/cap_europ/pdf_word/report_cap2010.pdf, last consulted 11 July, 2006. In addition, Decision No 649/2005/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 13 April 2005, which amends Decision No 1419/1999/EC establishing a Community Action for the European Capital of Culture for the years 2005 to 2019, describes the legislation regarding the procedures and implementation criteria of the European Capital of Culture. See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_117/l_11720050504en00200021.pdf, last visited 11 July, 2006.

international press. Coverage peaks tend to recur at particular moments: upon the application of a city to host a CityEvent, shortly before and after a host city is designated and, finally, during the event itself, when the opening and closing ceremonies in particular receive a great amount of attention. In addition, a gradual increase in press coverage can be identified in the run-up to the CityEvent. During this phase, many foreign press delegations visit the host city to report on the organizational preparations for the event. This phase is also often characterized by sudden, albeit smaller peaks in press coverage fuelled by scandals, rumors and, in many cases, by doubts cast on the organizational capacity of the host city. Press coverage usually ends abruptly after the closing ceremony of a CityEvent. In the first week after the festivities, some newspapers publish articles looking back at the CityEvent. Most of these articles have an evaluative character. After this, press coverage reduces to almost zero, with incidental peaks related to financial and other organizational scandals that come to light only after the festivities. Other temporary increases in press coverage occur when speculations emerge about potential host cities for the next edition of the CityEvent. In these cases, the press also tends to refer back to past editions.

Yet press coverage alone does not represent the whole spectrum of the media in relation to CityEvents. Consequently, it is not possible to make conclusive generalizations about the media's network dynamic in the overall staging process of a CityEvent, even if Dayan and Katz (1992) describe a similar pattern to the one I outline above in their analysis of media events. While a cyclical pattern characterized by peaks in media coverage might apply to leading national and international newspapers, we should refrain from concluding that all media act in accordance with this dynamic. Considering the enormous number of media that CityEvents attract, analyzing the network dynamic of 'the media' is a vast research project all by itself. This, however, is not the case for the host city.

By drawing on my six case studies, I have been able to abstract a general network dynamic from the perspective of the host city. This does not mean that each of the case studies is characterized by exactly such a network dynamic, but it does provide a reasonably reliable indication and overview. I look at the network from an organizational point of view, taking the efforts that the city has to make as a point of departure for sketching the network dynamic as it is illustrated in figure 4. The figure shows a rather irregular pattern, which can nonetheless be recognized as a 'wave-like' dynamic. This network dynamic represents the activity of the network in relation to a specific point in time, such as the bidding phase. The phases are depicted on the horizontal axis and will be discussed extensively in the remainder of this section. Network activity, which is depicted on the vertical axis, can be defined as the size of the network (the number of actors aligned with it) combined with the activity of the actors that make up the network.

The peaks and valleys in the overall pattern, which is illustrated in the figure by the undulating black line, show that the development of the network dynamic is by no means smooth or linear. The staging of CityEvents is often characterized by successes and problems in the organizational process. When Amsterdam obtained the Olympic Games for 1928, for example, the national parliament refused to pass a subsidy bill necessary to finance the event. Such a situation results in a temporary decline in network activity until the host city finds a way to align other actors with its network to help it proceed with the preparation for the CityEvent. To fully comprehend the network dynamic from the perspective of the host city, we have to examine the different phases more carefully.

3.3.1 Pre-Bidding Phase

In the pre-bidding phase, the first precarious alignments are established between the media, the host city and the event owner. First, the idea of hosting a specific CityEvent is raised by one or more persons. At this early stage, only a few actors are involved. Typically, CityEvents, like so many other large events, are initiated by leading figures from the social and political elites. In the case of the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympics, for example, the leading national sports figures Van Tuyll van Serooskerken, Lewald and Von Frenckel put the idea of hosting the Games on the political agenda of their cities and countries (Arnoldussen, 1994; Holmes, 1971; Kolkka, ed., 1955). Not coincidentally, these figures were also NOC representatives in the IOC. Before the municipalities of Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki considered supporting a bid for the Games, these sports figures had already established contacts with the IOC. Their prominent position, moreover, enabled them to get access to people high up in the national and local authorities, as well as to business elites in order to generate support for the bid.

At this stage, it becomes critical to generate wide public support. Even before the city's candidacy is officially announced, the plan to host the CityEvent is usually communicated to the media, so that the initiative becomes known to the public. In the

pre-bidding phase, we can therefore already see the first precarious alignments emerge between the key actors. The triangular relationship between the event owner, the media and the host city is nonetheless quite unstable at this stage. The city has not yet officially become part of the bidding process and it remains uncertain whether the initiators of the idea to host a CityEvent will be able to generate enough support to realize their ambitions.

While the CityEvent is in the first instance no more than a plan, its initiators gradually manage to interest more and more people and eventually entire organizations. The idea of hosting a CityEvent thus turns into a project. This is the late stage of the pre-bidding phase, when the basis is laid for the core network. Insofar as these were not already established, contacts with the event owner and the media are intensified.

By now, the idea of hosting the event has gained sufficient support to move from 'talk' to 'action': the host city starts to prepare for the bidding procedure. This is also the point from which the pre-bidding phase gradually evolves into the bidding phase. In the transitional stage between the two phases, studies are conducted to investigate the feasibility of the plan to host the event, preparations are made to obtain sufficient resources for organizing the event, and promotion campaigns are set up to boost the confidence of the city's inhabitants and decision makers (Andranovich et al., 2001; Hiller, 2000). Soon, publicity becomes more intense in order to warm the event owner and the national and international media and audiences up to the city's intention of hosting the CityEvent.⁴⁵ The bidding phase is fully entered once a city officially announces its candidacy.

3.3.2 *Bidding Phase*

To achieve an understanding of the bidding phase, we have to pay attention to the phenomenon of bidding itself. Because a city does not own the generic event formula of the CityEvent it wishes to host, it has to engage itself actively in the bidding process and compete with other cities to obtain the candidature (see also Ashworth and Voogd, 1990; Burns, 1991; Hughes, 1999; Prentice and Anderson, 2003).⁴⁶ The city has to convince the event owner that out of all the candidate cities, it is the most capable of successfully actualizing the event formula. To do this, candidate cities usually try to comply with the most stringent conditions required to implement the formula, thus demonstrating their organizational qualities and capacity for hosting the CityEvent (Westerbeek et al., 2002). Thus, the requisite bidding for a CityEvent has consequences for the way cities (re)position themselves. The candidature for these prestigious events often adds to the city's reputation well before the event is actually organized (Smyth, 1994; Beriatos, 2004; Verdaguer, 1995).

⁴⁵ In *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting*, Dayan and Katz argue that "advance notice gives time for anticipation and preparation on the part of both broadcasters and audiences. There is an active period of looking forward, abetted by the promotional activity of the broadcasters" (1992: 7). Even though not all CityEvents involve television broadcasts and would therefore not be defined as media events by Dayan and Katz's criteria, a similar publicity logic can be detected. Just like television broadcasters give advance notice to increase audience anticipation, a city has to make audiences, media and the event owner enthusiastic about its ambition to host a CityEvent. To do so, a publicity offensive has to be launched long before the city secures the event itself.

⁴⁶ In this respect, CityEvents differ from other rootless periodic events like the Eurovision Song Contest, because the latter can only be obtained by a European capital—or Israel—if its national delegation won the contest the year before.

But this does not happen automatically. Cities have to make huge investments to show that they are worthy candidates. Many organizational and institutional networks and infrastructures are created or improved before any concrete decision is taken by the event owner (Carlson and Taylor, 2003; Chalkey and Essex, 1999). In this period, an attractive and distinctive image has to be created (Hauben et al., 2002), which means that media play a critical role. Candidate cities often invest large amounts of money and manpower in promotion and public relations (Gertner and Kotler, 2004; Kavaratzis, 2004). Since positive media coverage and audience reception increases the chances of winning the bid, cities are eager to intensify their interaction with the media. The precarious alignments between the event owner, candidate city and the media established in the pre-bidding phase increase in strength. But as long as a candidate city has not been designated as host city by the event owner, the triangular relationship remains fragile. If the candidate city is not designated, the triangular core network will dissolve and only very little will remain of the interaction between the three key actors.

Thus, in the bidding phase, cities take a considerable risk. Habitually, large amounts of public resources are invested at the risk of not obtaining the candidature. This happened, for instance, with Manchester and Birmingham's failed bids for the 2000 summer Olympics (Jones, 2001). Even when a city does obtain the honor to host a CityEvent, a substantial part of the investments necessary to organize the event will hardly serve the city's longer-term goals, even though local authorities often claim otherwise. Especially in the cases of the Olympic Games and the World Expo, which both demand large investments in terms of infrastructures and facilities, a long-term, full utilization of these is extremely unlikely, since their scale vastly exceeds the requirements of normal use (Higham, 1999; Evans, 2003; Jones, 2001). In this regard, we can think of many examples of sport venues that have hardly ever been used after the Olympic Games, or of the deserted World Expo terrains that can be found in Lisbon and Hanover (Evans, 2003).

Lately, host cities have become more aware of these risks, especially since the financial disaster of the Montreal summer Olympics of 1976 and the Sheffield Student World Championships in 1991 (Roche, 1994; Chalkey and Essex, 1999). Nowadays, cities tend to focus more on the long-term planning and impact of hosting CityEvents (Ritchie, 2000; Berg et al., 2000; Hall, 1992, 1997). As a result, they try to integrate major construction works with larger urban projects, using the run-up to the CityEvent to gain momentum for social and economic change. The outcome of these strategies, however, differs considerably between cities. Barcelona and Sydney are often praised for their integration of the Olympics with long-term urban regeneration strategies, while Sheffield is an example of a failed attempt that left the city with a debt of 400 million pounds after the Student World Championships (cf. García, 2004a; Chalkey and Essex, 1999; Roche, 1994; Jones, 2001).

3.3.3 Organizational Phase and Staging of CityEvents

While the risks of hosting a CityEvent can never be reduced to zero, the start-up investments a city makes in the pre-bidding and bidding phase are partly secured once the event owner officially designates the host city. At this point, the interaction between the event owner and host city transforms from a precarious alignment into a *formalized* relationship and power positions in the network change. The event owner

no longer acts as an *obligatory point of passage*⁴⁷ and partly delegates its responsibilities for the local implementation of the generic event formula to the host city. This delegation of responsibilities, including inviting participants or developing a promotion and public relations strategy, does not imply that the host city now becomes the main stakeholder in the network. The transfer of organizational tasks is accompanied by the inclusion of a new actor to the network: the organizing body of the CityEvent. This actor acts as a central node in the network by binding the event owner, the host city and the media to its project of producing a CityEvent. It strengthens the alignments between the host city, event owner and media by formalizing and institutionalizing the triangular relationship.

Figure 2 depicts the network at this stage of the production process of a CityEvent. While not every detail of the organization of a CityEvent has to pass through the organizing body, it does function as the central coordination point in the network at this time. This does not mean that the organizing body is the complete embodiment of the CityEvent. Direct relations between the three key actors, for instance, remain in place. Alignments established by the event owner with the news media through the selling of media rights, for example, are not necessarily channeled via the organizing body. The CityEvent is the specific way in which the media, the host city, the event owner and the generic event formula are entangled, with the organizing body functioning as the temporary node of that entanglement in the organizational phase and during the event itself. In the figure, the strength and intensity of the alignments between the actors is represented by the thickness of the arrows. The thick black arrows that connect the key actors directly to the organizing body thus stand for the strongest and most dynamic alignments. Note moreover, the position of the additional actor ‘nation state’ in the network. The state not only acts as a mediator between the event owner and the host city, but also between the host city and the organizing body. These mediatory alignments are represented by the dotted lines. Such mediated interaction emerges, for instance, when security measures are taken. Usually, this involves cooperation between the local police, the ministry of home affairs or homeland security and the organizing body (cf. Organisations-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936, 1937; Kolkka, ed., 1955; Arnoldussen, 1994). In this phase of the production process of a CityEvent, the organizing body remains, however, the central node in the network.

⁴⁷ This term has been introduced by Latour (1987, 1993) to describe an actor that occupies a central position in a network. All the other actors have to pass through this actor, who holds the proverbial key to the door. A CityEvent has several obligatory points of passage, which emerge and dissolve over the course of the process that leads to the actual event. From the perspective of the city, the event owner is an obligatory point of passage in the bidding phase. Another example of an obligatory point of passage is the organizing committee. During the staging of a CityEvent, an organizing committee sometimes acts as an obligatory point of passage for issuing press passes. Smaller media organizations in particular then have to depend on the willingness of the organizing committee to admit them to the event venues.

It should be mentioned that the depiction of the organizing body's position in figure 5 is not completely accurate with regard to its actual geographical placement. The figure may falsely suggest that this agency is located in-between the three key actors. Yet even though the organizing body operates at several levels, it is inherently located in the host city. My distinction between the organizing body and host city is a theoretical separation intended to explain the difference between the bidding and the organizational phase. In reality, this distinction cannot be made so sharply, because the organizing body and host city are usually integrated actors.

The institutional design and functioning of the organizing committee is often the result of negotiations between the event owner and local and national authorities. In many cases, the organizing committee is an independent foundation or institute supported by the authorities and the event owner. This legal construction is often chosen to minimize financial and juridical liability on the part of the event institution and the local authorities. An independent foundation was, for example, established for the organization of Helsinki ECOC 2000. Some of its employees, like its director, were appointed especially, whereas others were civil servants who temporarily changed jobs within the Helsinki municipality (Cogliandro, 2001). In the case of the Amsterdam ECOC, the organizing agency consisted of two established cultural institutes, the Dutch Theatre Institute and the Holland Festival, which were jointly appointed to coordinate the event (Palmer et al. 2004). Within each edition of the same CityEvent, the organizational committee can thus be formatted differently. This is due to the CityEvent's specific characteristic of having each edition staged in a different locality and, consequently, having it shaped by different actors.

Once an organizing body has been established, we come to the point where the host city concentrates its efforts on creating the required conditions for *actualizing* the generic event formula. These preparations eventually result in the staging of the event itself. Even though this might be approached as a separate phase, it is in fact a continuation of the organizational phase. From the perspective of the audience, the staging is the most visible part of a CityEvent. For the organizers, this final stage in the organizational phase manifests itself as a peak in activity. An inflow of guests, participants, media and visitors has to be managed and security has to be increased. Often, this stage is characterized by a hectic network dynamic in which the organizing body manifests itself as the central node and point of reference. Soon after the closing

ceremony of the CityEvent, the organizing body begins to lose this central position and this is when we enter the phase of closure and memorialization.

3.3.4 Phase of Closure and Memorialization: Network Traces

In comparison to the three key actors, the organizing committee only aligns itself with the CityEvent temporarily. This does not mean that the key actors do not also undergo some transformations after the staging of the event, but in contrast to the organizing body, some of their alignments remain in place. The organizing committee, however, emerges only after the bidding phase and is, moreover, never meant to stay in place. As an institutional product of the temporary alignment of the host city and the event institution, it might temporarily function as an established network, but in the end it *has to be dissolved* after the event's closing. This may not happen immediately, since there will still be evaluations, financial reports and other affairs to be dealt with after the festivities. Nonetheless, the organizing committee's final act is to be dismantled. In this respect, the organizing committee is the very embodiment of the discontinuous dimension of CityEvents.

Some parts of the network will remain, such as, for instance, the venues that were constructed or the organizational changes implemented within a municipality's bureaucracy over the course of an event's organizational process. In addition, traces of the event will also remain in the media. Photographs, articles and film material are all objects that can be stored and circulated to memorialize the event. In this regard, we can make a distinction between material and immaterial traces of the network. Documents, buildings, media products and many other tangible artifacts compose the material traces of the CityEvent. Many of these artifacts are in part also immaterial traces. The most illustrative example of this is film, because although on the one hand CityEvents leave behind material film traces, on the other hand the films only show representations when we screen them. As moving images, they are partly immaterial. Apart from the material and immaterial traces left by the event, the organizing committee has facilitated the establishment of relations between certain actors in such a way that some of these links will continue to exist even after the organizing committee has been dissolved. Just as a matchmaker becomes obsolete after the marriage ceremony, the organizing body is no longer required to maintain a relationship between two actors once this link has been established.

This implies that, after the event has ended, the network does not completely dissolve. Some of the alignments between the three key actors remain in place, albeit in a transformed state. Certain other traces or elementary parts of the network are maintained as well. The place where the event was staged has therefore partly been transformed. The order of the actors that constituted this place has been partly replaced and supplemented with other actor relations. Thus, the networked nature of the CityEvent remains encased in the host city in a more permanent, but never static manner. In the phase of closure and memorialization, the CityEvent transforms from a network that produces a prestigious event into a network that constitutes the memory of this event. In fact, CityEvents are intended to be remembered and each of the three key actors has an interest in producing such memories. The event owner needs successful memories to safeguard and expand the reputation and prestige of the generic formula, whereas the host city uses memories to enforce the long-term impact of the event and to strengthen its image and position within regional, national and global urban hierarchies. The media, finally, require memories of past events to intensify audience interest for the following edition. Traces such as postcards,

souvenirs, press articles, moving images and posters achieve the commemoration of a CityEvent through processes of mobilization and circulation. It is through these various actors that CityEvents extend beyond the limited temporality of their staging.⁴⁸ Interestingly, the memorialization of CityEvents takes place in many different locations. Film material might, for instance, be archived in a different place than the host city, just as recaps of the event on television might be broadcast in many countries. The dynamic of the amalgamation of networks that produces CityEvents turns the event into a longer-term process, while place is invested with dynamic processes in with actor relations are reordered and renamed, ultimately reconfiguring place and (re)connecting it to other locales. The temporal dynamics of CityEvents can therefore not be understood without paying attention to place and *vice versa*.

3.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have added a theoretical dimension to the CityEvent model that provides us with a conceptual framework capable of addressing the spatiotemporal complexity of large international periodic rootless events, an aspect that is often overlooked in studies of large events. The theoretical dimension that has been added to the CityEvent model in this chapter helps us to achieve a better understanding of how the interaction between the three key actors and the other additional actors manifests itself in time and space. The spatiotemporal complexity of CityEvents has been described in two manners. A generalized overview has been given of the dynamic that characterizes the network that produces a CityEvent. From the perspective of the host city, four different phases were distinguished: the pre-bidding phase, the bidding phase, the organizational and staging phase and, finally, the phase of closure and memorization. While these phases should not be interpreted too rigidly, their description allows us to theorize how a network emerges, expands and finally evolves into a set of traces that constitute the memorization of CityEvents.

Instead of approaching the impact of large events on host cities in measurable social and economic terms (charting, for instance, the increase/decrease in civic pride, overnight stays or retail revenues), we focused on how the long-term impacts of CityEvents are the result of processes of reordering, renaming and re-imagining. The networked nature of CityEvents is not only characterized by several phases that exceed the ephemeral character of events, but also by the way in which place is reconfigured. In this chapter, place has been approached as a network event that results from the arrangement and ordering of actors. A change in the alignments between actors, therefore, will affect place. Due to their scale, CityEvents inevitably lead to a partial reordering of place. A consequence of this process is that the meaning of place is also subject to change, because the emergence of a new order is coupled to a labeling or renaming of this order. On the basis of this insight, an argument has been postulated that is central to this research, namely that the (re)profiling of cities is by no means a purely virtual process of creating images, but always a result of rearrangements in the material constitution of places and the translation of these rearrangements into images.

This chapter has expanded this argument in relation to the distribution and circulation of city images. The reordering, renaming and re-imagining of place are

⁴⁸ I cannot engage in an extensive analysis of these processes here, but I will return to memorization in the conclusion of this book.

processes that not only affect a place itself but also its relations to other localities. These processes lead to an expansion of host cities through the establishment of new alignments with other places. Media play a critical role here. Media technologies and infrastructures not only establish relations between the host city and other localities, but they also mobilize places by translating processes of reordering into transportable images. What is commonly referred to as the (re)positioning, selling or marketing of cities is in fact the result of these processes.

In this and the previous chapter, the theoretical framework (the CityEvent model) on which this research is based has been set out. This model has been developed by drawing, on the one hand, on ANT and, on the other, on the insights gained from my case studies on the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympics and European Capitals of Culture. The CityEvent model is therefore the result of the interaction between theory and empirical research. However, at first, the insights gained from the case studies that have been used to develop the model were merely patterns that I discerned in the first phase of my archive research. While such research provides an array of rich material, without a coherent approach it is difficult to understand developments on a more general level and to distinguish developments from transformations. Archive data and interviews do not offer new insights if they are not analyzed in a consistent way. Now that the CityEvent model has been described in detail, it will be applied to the six case studies in order to analyze each of these cases in their specificity, but above all to identify and examine transformations in the hosting of CityEvents in general. At the same time, these case studies will provide an opportunity to test the CityEvent model as I have outlined it here.

Part II

Reordering and Renaming Place in Modernity

Preface to Part II

In the previous part, we theorized 'large international rootless periodic events' such as the Olympic Games and the ECOC as CityEvents. In this second part, the CityEvent model will be applied to the summer Olympics of Amsterdam (1928), Berlin (1936) and Helsinki (1952). This comparative analysis will demonstrate how the triangular relationship between the event owner, the host city and the media that constitutes CityEvents, manifests itself differently in each case study, leading to a modification of the description of the key actors. Furthermore, the case studies will build on the extensive discussion of Hetherington's concept of place in the previous chapter so that the question of how cities try to raise their profile by staging large international events can be approached from a more precise angle. *Creating a distinct city profile will be understood as the result of simultaneous processes of reordering and renaming (re-imagining) places.* The CityEvent model will be used to reconstruct how city images have been produced by means of the Olympic Games and how these images resulted from the negotiation and adjustment of the different interests pursued by the various actors involved in organizing the Olympics.

This approach raises the question of how place is rearranged and invested with meaning to produce and present city images. More specifically, we need to examine how Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki tried to persuade foreign news media to adopt their official imagery. To answer these questions, , promotion strategies will be examined in relation to the improvements made to the host cities. This involves paying attention to how architecture, urban planning and the (re)decoration of streets were used to produce powerful images and investigating the types of media coverage each of the three Olympics generated to spread these images. This brings us to a theme that will be central throughout the three case studies, namely the transformation in media coverage patterns from the printed press to electronic media. The Amsterdam and Berlin Olympics were hosted in the interwar period when live radio and television broadcasting were first introduced to the public, potentially threatening the position of the printed press. The Helsinki Olympics was mediated through even newer technology. How did this change affect the way Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki staged the Olympic Games? A related theme runs parallel to this question in all three cases: the relationship between modernity, the host city and the nation state. Media form(ed) a critical factor in shaping and expressing this relation. As the title of this second part indicates, the Olympic Games are typically modernist events, established in an era in which the relationship between the city and the nation state was predominantly defined by the latter (Ashworth, 1998; Evans, 2001; Featherstone and Lash, 1999; Graham, 1988, 1998). This shows in the way Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki utilized CityEvents to create distinctive profiles for themselves, as well as in the way places were arranged to produce and display desired imageries in the national context.

To examine the relationship between modernity, the nation state and the host city, and to explore how this relationship affected the (re)presentation and (re)production of place, each of the chapters in this second part will start with a reconstruction of the interests the host city exhibited in hosting the Olympic Games. This will enable us to expose divergent interests between the key actors, most notably between the IOC and the host city, but also within the key actor 'host city' in terms of its relation to the nation state. The second stage in the analysis of the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Games will draw attention to the question of how these divergent

interests were negotiated and bridged. Special attention will be paid to how the host cities tried to translate the generic event formula of the Olympic Games in terms of their own interests. This raises the related question of how the host cities approached sports, and specifically the implementation of the Olympic formula, as a means to create distinctive images of themselves. In the cases of the Berlin and Helsinki Olympics this issue will be addressed particularly extensively.

By following the analytical approach outlined above, we will be able to reconstruct the process by which Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki used the Olympic Games to create distinctive images of themselves. Our approach prompts us to think city images not merely in symbolic terms, but also as the result of a complex process of translating interests in which tangible actors have to be mobilized, place has to be reordered and media have to be actively aligned. Thus, attention will be shifted away from the reading of images onto the complex networked production processes from which city images emerge. As will become clear at the end of this second part, this way of thinking about the relation between city images and the hosting of CityEvents has important consequences for our conceptualization of cities.

4. THE 1928 AMSTERDAM OLYMPICS

Commerce, Popular Culture and Nationalism

Its people are perhaps not the oddities which the picture postcards sometimes represent them to be. (...) There appear to be other flowers besides tulips at the stalls in the Sophia Plein, and other drinks besides gin at the cafés in the Rembrandt Plein. The typical Amsterdammer of today appears to drive himself, not as a toy person inhabiting a toy country, but rather as one of a serious, energetic and important people—a people who consider themselves fully abreast of the times and with every intention of remaining so (Price, 1928: 72)⁴⁹.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The above quotation is a fragment from an article that was published in the *New York Times* during the 1928 Olympic Games in Amsterdam. The author tries to nuance stereotypical images of Amsterdam by emphasizing that the city's inhabitants are above all a modern people. This short fragment refers to two different modes of (re)presenting Amsterdam as host of the ninth Olympiad. On the one hand, cultural clichés are mobilized to raise Amsterdam's profile as a tourist destination. On the other hand, images of progress are presented to emphasize the city's advancements in trade, industry, financial services and architecture. The quotation presents these two imageries as possibly conflicting and as representing different interests. This raises the question of which interests were involved and pursued by which actors in hosting the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics? Following on this, we may ask to what extent the organizers were able to consolidate these divergent actor-interests and how this negotiation of interests reflects on the way Amsterdam was presented by means of the CityEvent?

To reconstruct how Amsterdam staged and exploited the 1928 Olympics to raise its profile internationally, we have to examine how the network that produced the event was formed. In our analysis of the network formation process, we have to pay attention to the different actors involved in staging the Games and to the ways these actors negotiated their different interests. As such, this chapter will be the first test case for the CityEvent model as it was described in the previous two chapters. The 1928 Amsterdam Olympics provide an opportunity to apply the abstractly described triangular relationship between the key actors of the media, host city and event owner to a concrete case. An additional focus will be on the role played by different media technologies and organizations in covering the sportive events in Amsterdam. After all, print media represent events in a different manner than live radio broadcasts or cinema do. To understand the role of the media in the production process of the Games and the promotion of Amsterdam, we have to start at the beginning by asking how the city obtained the honor of hosting the 1928 summer Olympics?

⁴⁹ The article has been obtained through the New York Times on-line archive service.

4.2 FROM ACTOR TO NETWORK: THE PRE-BIDDING AND BIDDING PHASE

Almost two decades before, the idea to host the Games was raised by Baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken, a national sports leader and IOC member. In the latter capacity, he proposed Amsterdam as a candidate for the 1920 Olympics and after many diversions his initiative finally resulted in the city's official designation as host city for the 1928 Games.⁵⁰ What were Van Tuyll's interests in the Olympic Games and which actors did he have to align with each other to create enough support for his project?

Van Tuyll wanted to propagate⁵¹ the benefits of sports practice among the Dutch population. Like Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the Modern Neo-Olympic Movement, Van Tuyll developed the idea to introduce sports and exercise to the masses for chauvinistic reasons. In this regard, it is illustrative briefly to describe de Coubertin's approach. In 1870, France had been defeated by Germany and had lost the territory of Alsace Lotharingen. De Coubertin saw the bad physical and mental condition of the French youth as the main reason for this defeat. He believed that sports would improve the French youth morally as well as physically, consequently re-establishing France as a world power.⁵² This militaristic approach to sports was shared by many sports leaders in the West, including Van Tuyll.⁵³ The latter's idea of

⁵⁰ In 1911, at a banquet hosted by van Tuyll, de Coubertin personally suggested Amsterdam as a suitable candidate for the 1920 Olympics. At the annual IOC meeting on 27 and 28 March 1912, van Tuyll officially presented Amsterdam as a candidate for the 1920 Olympic Games. Shortly after the 1912 Olympic Games in Stockholm, the Nederlands Olympisch Comité (NOC or Dutch Olympic Committee) was founded by several national sports associations (Gaarenstorm, 1986: 327-333). Because the NOC was founded only after Amsterdam's candidature for the 1920 Olympics had been announced, it is legitimate to perceive van Tuyll as the principal initiator of the early bidding process. The nomination was, however, far from secure, since the Belgian baron de Laveleye put his country forward as well. World War I delayed the IOC's decision and in 1919 van Tuyll thought it would be appropriate to step aside for war-torn Belgium, leaving Amsterdam the candidature for 1924 or possibly even later (see the NOC minutes of 29-03-1919 and 20-09-1919, available at the Dutch National Archive, The Hague, access number 2.19.24, folders 141-143). At the annual IOC meeting of 1921 in Lausanne, de Coubertin proposed Paris for the 1924 Olympics. The founding father of the Modern Neo-Olympics insisted on celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the Games in the place where the Olympic movement had been established. At the same meeting, de Coubertin proposed that voting for Paris in 1924 would mean that Amsterdam would become the host city for the 1928 Olympics (see the NOC minutes of 08-02-1921 and 19-07-1921, The Dutch National Archive, The Hague, access number 2.19.24, folders 141-143). This was quite an unusual proposal and came to be referred to as de Coubertin's coup (Gaarenstorm, 1986). The Italians, who had hoped to obtain the 1928 candidature for Rome, as well as the Americans, who wanted it for Chicago, were furious (see the NOC minutes of 19-07-1921). Even though Amsterdam was officially voted host city for the 1928 Olympics, the Americans and Italians unsuccessfully tried to frustrate the city's designation (Arnoldussen, 1994).

⁵¹ In the early twentieth century the term propaganda had a more neutral connotation than current meanings of the word. Therefore, I will use it here as a substitute for promotion and vice versa. For further reading on propaganda see Welch (2002); Clark (1997); Jowett and O'Donnell (1999).

⁵² "His [de Coubertin's] major objective was to bolster the lagging fortunes of the French nation by developing strong character and vitality in the youth of France through the spirit of competition and athletic participation" (Espy, 1979: viii).

⁵³ In the NOC minutes of the third annual report 1915-1916 (p. 5), the benefits of sports are described in explicitly military terms: "It is becoming more and more apparent that the mobilization of our defences has become an extraordinarily opportune occasion for propagating physical exercise, while simultaneously the understanding of exercise as a powerful factor for strengthening the national spirit is gaining ground everywhere. It may therefore be deemed a natural phenomenon that the propaganda for our movement was centred around the military" (author's translation). Original Dutch text: "Meer en meer blijkt dat de mobilisatie van onze weermacht een buitengewoon gunstige gelegenheid is

bringing the Olympic Games to Amsterdam should therefore be understood in this light. In Van Tuyll's view, this particular CityEvent gave the Netherlands an opportunity to demonstrate the health and strength of its youth to the rest of the world. Moreover, the event was expected to increase the popularity of sports among the population.

Interestingly, Amsterdam's bid originally resulted from Van Tuyll's individual initiative and was not supported by the massive public relations campaigns we have become accustomed to. The Olympic Games had not yet evolved into the world's largest event and competition from other cities remained limited to Rome, Chicago and Los Angeles (Arnoldussen, 1994). To back up his bid, however, Van Tuyll needed other actors, in particular the local and national authorities, to convince other IOC members that he could generate the wide support needed to organize the 1928 Games successfully. Whereas Van Tuyll's reasons for initiating a bid for the Games were strictly related to the propagation of sports, the municipality of Amsterdam and the national government had other interests, namely economic and political ones. This becomes clear from the following quote in which Amsterdam mayor de Vlucht explains why the municipality and the Ministry supported Van Tuyll's bid: "The envy of other cities sufficiently proves it; thousands of foreigners will visit the Games" (author's translation).⁵⁴ Clearly, it was expected that the Olympics would boost Dutch tourism and in particular the Amsterdam tourist industry. Since the Netherlands faced a severe recession at the time, such an economic boost was extremely welcome. From the above quotation it also becomes clear that the economic benefits expected from the Olympic Games were defined as the direct revenue from ticket sales and the increase in tourism. During my archive research, I did not find any documents indicating any intentions or strategies to maximize the economic impact of the Games on the long term, after the event itself. Short-term economic gain also constituted one of the reasons for the national government's proposal for a subsidy of one million guilders, to be paid out over four years.⁵⁵ The government defended this proposal by stressing the economic and political benefits of hosting the Olympics. The event was expected to draw international attention to Dutch trade and industry and, in addition, would enable The Netherlands to position itself as a serious player in the international political arena by bringing the former enemies of World War I together (the 1928 Games were the first post-war Olympics in which Germany was again allowed to participate).⁵⁶ The event was thus also perceived

geworden tot verbreding van lichaamsoefeningen, terwijl tevens allerwegen het besef opkomst, welk een machtige factor lichaamsoefeningen voor de versterking der volkskracht vormen. Het mag dan ook een natuurlijk verschijnsel geacht worden, dat de propaganda voor onze beweging in het militaire teken stond." The minutes can be found at The Dutch National Archive, The Hague, access number 2.1.9.24, folder 171.

⁵⁴ Author's translation of a quote taken from official correspondence between the mayor of Amsterdam and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Original Dutch text: "De naijver van andere steden bewijst dit voldoende, duizende vreemdelingen bezoeken de spelen."

⁵⁵ In defending the government's motivation to grant the subsidy, prime-minister Colijn stressed the economic, political and promotional advantages of hosting the 1920 Olympics for the country and for Amsterdam in particular. This is illustrated by the commentary of journalists following the debate about the subsidy in Parliament. "The Olympic Games will generate tremendous advantages for retailers, telegraphy, the railway and tourism" (author's translation). Original Dutch text: "Nering, telegrafie, spoorwege en vreemdelingenverkeer zullen geweldige voordelen behalen door de Olympische Spelen". Source: "Van ons parlement". *Het Algemeen Handelsblad*. May 7, 1925. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453. The 12th annual report, 1924-1925 of the Dutch Olympic Committee constitutes an additional source; it can be found under access number 2.19.124, map 171 in The Dutch National Archives in The Hague.

⁵⁶ "Het subsidie voor de Olympische Spelen". *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*. March, 10 1925. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

as a political prestige project. When Amsterdam officially obtained the honor to host the 1928 Olympics, its designation was, however, controversial. The government's subsidy bill, for instance, was vetoed by a majority of the parliament that included the prime minister's own party, the ARP (anti-revolutionary party). Without the necessary financial resources, the realization of the Olympic project, which by now had evolved from Van Tuyll's personal initiative into a network of various heterogeneous actors, would be seriously endangered.

At this point, Van Tuyll was no longer the spider in the web. To generate enough support for his project, he had founded the Dutch Olympic Committee (NOC) together with other Dutch sport leaders. The NOC designated the organizing committee for the 1928 Olympics in cooperation with the Amsterdam municipality and the national government, thus delegating responsibilities and powers in the network.⁵⁷ Whereas Van Tuyll was a central network actor in the pre-bidding and bidding phases, in the organizational phase he no longer played a leading role.⁵⁸ In the forthcoming analysis it will be argued that the staging of a CityEvent like the Olympic Games can never be attributed to a single actor or person. During the production process of these events, several actors will occupy leading positions in the network at different moments. In this case, one such actor was the national parliament, which refused to support the government's subsidy bill.

4.3 'THE POPULAR ROUTE': SPORTS, POPULAR CULTURE AND THE MEDIA

The parliament's rejection of the subsidy bill draws attention to two important interrelated processes. In the first place, the parliament manifested itself as an obligatory point of passage in the network. To circumvent the parliament, an alternative route had to be constructed to obtain sufficient funding for the Games. This required the alignment

⁵⁷ The organizing committee, officially called the 1928 Olympic Committee (Het Comité Olympische Spelen van 1928) was founded in 1924. In 1923, critics had already pointed to the lack of leadership and organizational progress on the part of the NOC. The Dutch National Committee (NOC) lacked the funding necessary to appoint a secretary to lead the administration of the organizing committee. NOC Vice-chairman Captain P.W. Scharroo requested help from the government. The Ministry of Defense responded by delegating two officers, who were to be relieved of their military duties for the whole organizational period. The organizing committee eventually consisted of Scharroo and the two officers, W.A.M. Westeroijen van Meeteren and G.W. van Rossem. The notion of government support was quite controversial at the time, because many representatives from the Dutch sports world and local politicians in Amsterdam feared a militaristic organization of the 1928 Olympics. The death of van Tuyll van Serooskerken on 13 February 1924 left the NOC without a chairman and worsened the organizational crisis. In December 1924, the 1928 Olympic Committee was housed on the Weesperzijde 32-33 in Amsterdam in facilities granted by the municipality of Amsterdam as a subsidy. On 6 April 1925, a new NOC chairman was installed: Baron Schimmelpenninck van der Oye was mayor of Doorn and former national fencing champion, but above all a wealthy aristocrat. The organizing committee nonetheless remained internally divided as a consequence of conflicts between certain committee members as well as conflicts with the NOC. Although this is not the place to discuss all the details, these affairs frequently reached the press and led to negative reports in national and sometimes also foreign newspapers. Sources: Schlüter (1989); NOC annual reports 1921-1928 (The Dutch National Archive, The Hague, access number 2.19.24, folders 1971, 1977 and 1978); NOC minutes 1916-1928 (The Dutch National Archive, The Hague, access number 2.19.24, folders 61-64); Press Cuttings from the 1928 Olympics, Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

⁵⁸ Even more tragic, van Tuyll sadly died in 1924, four years before the Games took place.

of other actors to the network. As I will soon explain, such an alternative 'route' was eventually achieved by establishing a relationship between the leading liberal national newspapers and the Dutch population through the deployment of popular culture (sports) and nationalism.

At the same time, another process was going on. The subsidy for the Olympic Games was rejected by the parliament on moral grounds. With the exception of the liberals, each of the other social pillars⁵⁹ had its own moral, religious or ideological reasons for rejecting the pagan and competitive character of the Games. The religious political parties in particular considered a pagan sports event like the Games an inappropriate manifestation. This controversy shows that the reputation and prestige of the Olympic Games were still under construction and that the IOC had not yet achieved such authority that the formula of the Olympics was generally accepted, at least not in the Netherlands. In other words, the IOC, but in particular its associated national sports associations and leaders, actively had to establish alignments in order to generate support for the Games. This in contrast to later editions of the Games, where plans to host this CityEvent often aroused protests – as in Amsterdam's failed bid for the 1992 Olympics and the massive protests provoked by the Games in Montreal (1976) and Mexico (1968) – but where these protests seldom attacked the generic formula of the Olympics itself. Instead, such protests are usually directed at the scale of the event, which is thought to lead not only to doping affairs and huge financial expenditures, but also, because of the construction of venues and infrastructures, to environmental damage and social disturbances (Chalkley and Essex, 1999). The principle of practicing sports is, however, rarely critiqued anymore.

The two processes mentioned above became intertwined as the parliament's rejection of the government's subsidy bill and the contested nature of the Olympic formula drew attention to the position of sports in 1920s Dutch society, as well as to the need for generating support from other actors in order to proceed with the preparation of the Amsterdam Games. To transform Amsterdam into the host city of the ninth Olympiad, a national and sometimes even international network had to be created, thereby superseding the local. The emergence of this network was not confined to Amsterdam's territory, but took place in many different locales, such as The Hague within the Netherlands, but also beyond.

Let us briefly discuss the parliament's decision to reject the subsidy before we examine how sufficient finances were ultimately secured for organizing the Games. The two Protestant-Christian political parties, the CHU and the ARP, considered sports to be an overexposure of 'the flesh' and a detraction from women's honor and respectability.⁶⁰ Although the socialists did not object to sports practices in general, the competitive

⁵⁹ At the time, Dutch society was characterized by a sharp division between four pillars: Catholics, Protestants, Socialist and Liberals. Social life was constructed around these pillars, ranging from education and politics to sports clubs. Protestants, for example, would go to a Protestant school, vote for a Protestant political party, exercise in a Protestant sports club, etc. Public and private life was almost fully constructed around the pillar to which one belonged. Dutch society was therefore characterized by a sharp segregation between parts of the population, with each part sticking to its own ideological pillar with its own institutions. Although this internal division of the Netherlands has become more diffuse from the 1960s onwards, it is still present in many institutional settings, such as education and health care (Becker, 1993; Pennings, 1991).

⁶⁰ Buuren, W., van & Stevens, T. (1998). *Sportgeschiedenis in Nederland*. Amsterdam, De Raddraaij B.V.; "De Olympiade". *Het Handelsblad*, February 2, 1924.; "Het Subsidie voor de Olympische Spelen". *De Telegraaf*, February 18, 1925; "Het subsidie voor de Olympische Spelen: Protesten van A.R. zijde" *Het Volk*, February 21, 1925, Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

element of sports matches was seen as bourgeois, militaristic and as subverting solidarity among the proletariat.⁶¹ Apart from moral and ideological objections to sports in general and religious objections to the Olympic ceremony, the parliament also considered it unwise to grant a huge subsidy to an event at a time when the government had reduced the salaries of civil servants to maintain a balanced budget during the economic recession.⁶²

The search for funding became more urgent when rumors spread abroad that the IOC had requested the organizing committee to present a financial plan for the Amsterdam Games at the annual IOC meeting in Prague on 25 April 1925.⁶³ If the committee turned out to be incapable of guaranteeing a stable financial basis for the organization of the Games, Los Angeles was more than willing to take over.⁶⁴ From this, it becomes clear that there were limits to the risks that the IOC as event owner was prepared to take. The continuity and augmentation of the international reputation of the Olympic event formula were considered more important than any individual host city. From the perspective of the IOC, it was of the utmost importance that the hosting of the ninth Olympiad would succeed. Consequently, the IOC monitored the organizational process and put pressure on the organizing committee to ensure that the production of the CityEvent would not come to a standstill. This pressure was certainly felt in Amsterdam, particularly since there was only a two-month period between the moment the Dutch parliament vetoed the subsidy and the IOC meeting. During its search for alternative funding sources, the organizing committee requested that the government hold an Olympic lottery. This was refused because a private lottery would undermine the state's monopoly on lotteries and gambling (Arnoldussen, 1994). In a last-ditch attempt to generate resources for the Games, the NOC initiated a national fundraising campaign, encouraging the Dutch population to donate money. The response from the Dutch people exceeded the expectations of many and the required minimum amount was collected within two weeks. In total, the Dutch people contributed approximately one million guilders to the 1928 Olympic Fund.⁶⁵ At the same time, the Amsterdam city council approved a loan of half a million guilders⁶⁶ to the Olympic Fund.⁶⁷ The city authorities

⁶¹ Dora, H., (1981); "Sport & wereldvrede". *Rotterdamsche Courant*, February 2, 1925. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

⁶² "Subsidieering der Olympische Spelen". *Controleur*. February 14, 1925; "Uit de pers: Het miljoen voor de Olympiade". *Maasbode*. February 20, 1925. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

⁶³ "De Olympische Spelen 1928: Amsterdam of Los Angeles?". *Het Volk*, March 27, 1925. (Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453) ; Correspondentie Olympische Spelen, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. The latter document is available in The Dutch National Archive, The Hague, access number 2.19.124, map 171.

⁶⁴ "De Olympische Spelen in 1928: Als Nederland mocht weigeren. Los Angeles houdt zich gereed". *De Telegraaf*, March 2, 1925. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

⁶⁵ Source: 13th annual report, 1925-1926 of the Dutch Olympic Committee. This document is available in The Dutch National Archive, The Hague, access number 2.19.124, folder 171.

⁶⁶ Amsterdam City Archives, Register Gemeentebblad 1925, folders I 825; II 957.

⁶⁷ Recalculating the fl. 500,000 guilders subsidy that was granted by the municipality of Amsterdam to contemporary values, the amount would equal fl. 6, 563,830, or €2,943,421.5 in 2003 (at the request of the author, this information was provided by the Dutch National Bank, De Nederlandse Bank). This recalculation does not provide the full picture of the value at that time, as one has to take into account that one could build a new Olympic sports park for approximately 2 million guilders (Amsterdam City Archives, Registratie Gemeentebblad 1925, folders I 33, 1944, 2161; II 36, 42). Nowadays, the construction costs of a sports stadium relatively and absolutely exceed the costs in the 1920s by at least four times. Thus, it is legitimate to consider the municipal subsidy as representing a huge amount of money at the time. This means that the Amsterdam city council and the national government must have

had clearly not withdrawn their support of the event. How was this massive support generated in so little time, considering not only that sports practices were controversial among large segments of the political parties, but also that the Olympic movement was virtually unknown among the Dutch population?⁶⁸

Critical in this regard was the establishment of alignments between the ‘Olympic project’ and leading liberal newspapers. In the national press, the parliament’s decision to reject the subsidy bill was criticized by liberal newspapers such as *De Telegraaf* and *Het Handelsblad*. These newspapers presented the threat of a possible withdrawal of the Games from Amsterdam as a matter of the utmost national importance and in strongly nationalistic vocabulary. In their view, not only Amsterdam but the Dutch nation as a whole would be embarrassed if the event were to be cancelled. Both the NOC (together with its organizing committee) and the media appealed to the general public deploying sentiments of national honor and disgrace. This is clear from the following sample of citations from various newspapers published during the Olympic funding campaign: “With your support, the Olympic Games in the Netherlands in 1928 can become ‘A FRONT PAGE ADVERTISEMENT’ for the Netherlands in the book of nations”⁶⁹; “To all Dutchmen!”⁷⁰; “Would it not be a shame (...) if the Netherlands would not succeed [in securing the Games]?”⁷¹; and “Disgrace for the Netherlands in front of the world”.⁷² In addition to the articles and advertisements in daily newspapers, two thousand cinema theatres across the Netherlands featured a short film about the 1924 Paris Olympics during which a collection box was passed through the audience (Arnoldussen, 1994). In this way, alignments were being created all over the Netherlands such as, for example, in the many shops in which NOC collection boxes for the Olympics were placed. The amalgamation of networks even expanded across the national boundaries when, in Prague, the IOC reaffirmed its support for the Amsterdam Games after the organizing committee presented a firm financial plan.

had a clear interest in the Olympics. It is likely that they expected to gain economic, cultural and political advantages from hosting the Olympics. Nevertheless, as has been noted, the initiative to propose Amsterdam as a host city for the Olympic Games was not governmental, but an individual action on the part of Baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken. Although it is difficult to reconstruct van Tuyll’s exact reasons for proposing Amsterdam, the propagation of sports undoubtedly was his main concern and not the economic, cultural and political objectives that were explicitly identified by the national government in its reaction to a proposal to grant a subsidy to the 1928 Olympics.

⁶⁸ An article in *Het Handelsblad* of 2 October 1921 entitled ‘Olympische Spelen’ (Olympic Games) explicitly states that the NOC and the Olympic Movement are largely unknown in the Dutch population: “It is one of the weaknesses of the Olympic Committee that not enough of an Olympic popular movement has been created. A propaganda committee for the Olympic popular movement should be established”. Author’s translation from Dutch original: “Het is een van de zwakke zijden van het Olympisch Comité, dat er te weinig een Olympische volksbeweging gemaakt wordt. Er zou moeten worden gesticht een propagandacommissie voor Olympische volksbeweging”. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

⁶⁹ “De Olympische Spelen in 1928”. *Het Handelsblad*, April 14, 1925. Author’s translation from original Dutch advertisement: “Omdat: De Olympische Spelen in Nederland in 1928 mede door Uw hulp kunnen worden: „A FRONT PAGE ADVERTISEMENT” voor Nederland in het boek der natien”. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

⁷⁰ Author’s translation of headline in *De Telegraaf*, May 9, 1925, titled “Aan alle Nederlanders!”. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

⁷¹ “Aan wie de Zege?: De tactiek van den „domper””. *De Telegraaf*, May 13, 1925. Author’s partial translation of Dutch original: “Zou het geen schande voor het buiten den strijd gebleven Nederland zijn, indien het daarin niet slaagde, hoewel het vijf jaar van te voren de toezegging had voor de spelen, die thans nog geen drie jaar van ons af liggen, doch waarover binnen twee weken de beslissing valt?”

⁷² This article is from an unknown newspaper available at the Amsterdam City Archives. Author’s translation of Dutch original: “(...) een blamage van Nederland in de oogen van de wereld”. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

What interest did the Dutch newspapers have in the Olympic Games? To maintain a large readership and remain attractive to big advertisers the newspapers had been paying increasing attention to popular topics.⁷³ Popular tastes and, consequently, popular culture acquired a more prominent position within newspapers at the cost of high-brow culture. While the leaders of the different social pillars were critical about the popularization of sports practices, sports did prove to be a popular topic with a large section of the Dutch population. The alignment of the media with the Olympics was therefore also part of the emergence of a larger development, namely the emancipation of popular culture. The emergence of this culture involved the creation of new and alternative alignments, such as the establishment of sports clubs, sports magazines and sports sections in newspapers, whose audience surpassed that of traditional and high-brow cultural institutions (Buuren and Stevens, 1998; Mol, 1998). This struggle between the emancipation of popular versus elite tastes has characterized a large part of twentieth-century cultural life and has been much debated (Debord, 1970; Bourdieu, 1984; Ang; Bennett, 1999; Silverstone, 1994; Hermes and Reesink, 2003). As Latour (1999a, 1999b, 1999d) reminds us, we should never use the 'context' as the argument to identify or explain relations. In this respect, the alignment between the leading newspapers and sports points to what is commonly referred to as a macro-transformation: the emergence of popular mass culture is in fact an accumulation of the establishment of multiple concrete relations between actors, including the alignment of the liberal national newspapers with the Olympic Games.

Segments of the Dutch press thus established a link between sports and the nation by presenting the Olympic Games as a matter of national importance. Sports competition, and in particular the hosting of the Olympic Games, was presented as an occasion for the Dutch nation to defend its honor and show the rest of the world that, despite its small territory, it deserved a place among the great modern civilizations. Popular taste was coupled to sensational and emotional appeals, another proven strategy to increase audience interest. This link also enabled the newspapers to create a momentum through which the pillar-based division of Dutch social and political life

⁷³ In the inter-war period, Europe experienced the transition to a mass consumption society. Although the Netherlands were running behind in this development, the country nevertheless experienced the first signs of mass consumption. This development also manifested itself in the media when popular media, such as newspapers, magazines and cinema, underwent organizational and economic changes and started to adapt the principles of mass production. Whereas newspapers and magazines were already printed in relatively large numbers in the nineteenth century, the emergence of mass society led to a dramatic increase in the number of published issues. Due to the benefits of scale, the cost per print was reduced enormously. Moreover, because the machinery required for mass printing exceeded by far the costs of a small printing press, only those companies with large financial resources were able to survive. Perhaps even more important was the change in advertising. Whereas printing companies had been able to make profits, the revenues earned from subscriptions and individual sales of newspapers proved insufficient to make a mass printed newspaper profitable. In the 1920s, therefore, print media generated more revenue through advertising than through sales (cf. Gorman and McLean, 2003). The first manifestations of mass society and mass media mutually reinforced each other, as the emergence of a mass society was accompanied by an increase in the number of literate people, which in turn led to a dramatic growth in the demand for a wide variety of media products. This expansion in the number of media consumers formed the basis for a mass media production that relied on the benefits of the economy of scale to cut down production costs and maximize profits. Simultaneously with newspaper corporations shifting to advertising as a new source of revenue, advertising again supported and promoted consumerism (Thompson, 1995). Due to the emergence of a mass reading public, newspapers started to pay more attention to popular tastes and created new print media accordingly, such as the yellow press, the feuilleton, photo books and cartoons (see Schwartz, 1998 for an account of early mass culture). Advertising contributed to this development since advertisers, especially the big corporations, were concerned with reaching audiences as large as possible.

could temporarily be overcome. The newspapers addressed their readers as Dutch rather than as Protestants, Socialists or Catholics. Of course, not all media followed this line and the Olympic Games were often criticized, for a variety of reasons, by the papers belonging to the different social pillars. Nonetheless, the Olympic Games were exploited by several of the leading newspapers to create a moment of national unity that had the potential to increase their readership and advertising revenues. In this way, a concerted attempt was made to address and mobilize the Dutch population through a highly emotional and moral appeal to support the NOC with its funding campaign.

From the creation of this alternative route, which, if one considers the wide support from the Dutch population as resulting from the mobilization of popular culture, can ultimately be characterized as a 'popular route', it becomes clear why I have defined the key actor of 'the host city' as an amalgamation of heterogeneous actors and networks. On a very basic level, the organizing committee, the NOC and the municipality of Amsterdam can be identified as the main actors in this network actor, but clearly these actors did not manage to organize the Olympic project by themselves. They needed support from national newspapers and large segments of the Dutch population. Moreover, the establishment of the host city as the 'local organizing network' of the Amsterdam Games illustrates how the productive interrelationship between the three key actors that constitute each CityEvent (media, host city and event-holder) is characterized by cross-network collisions, which are subject to constant change. Thus, some actors that would fall under 'the media', such as *De Telegraaf* en *Het Handelsblad*, here aligned themselves to the 'host city'. At the same time, other media, such as the French magazine *l'Auto*, tried to discredit Amsterdam by highlighting the unstable financial position of the NOC.⁷⁴ This example illustrates that even though each key actor forms an identifiable domain, each is itself an amalgamation of various heterogeneous actor-networks characterized by internal incongruities and alignments to other actors and networks. These incongruities and alignments are the result of conflicting interests within each key actor(network): between foreign and domestic newspapers, between the

⁷⁴ Between 1923 and 1925, several newspaper articles reported on American attempts to discredit the organization of the Amsterdam Olympics. For instance, *Het Handelsblad* of July 12, 1924, in an article headed "*Één Canard*", reported that a New York journalist had received a message from Paris that Amsterdam would withdraw from hosting the 1928 Olympics. The Americans planned to seize this opportunity to bring the Olympics to Chicago, as can be deduced from the following quotation: "Chicago has plans to put a spoke in our wheel. A city council member of this American city, a certain Sir Kostner, has said certain things to this effect to a French journalist [journalist of *l'Auto*]. This councilman had ample reason to assume that Amsterdam would have little or no objection if the ninth Olympiad would take place somewhere else. He added to this that General Allen, the secretary of the American Olympic Committee, also had this impression. And finally this: Chicago, which had already dug into its municipal treasury to support the Paris Olympiad, would be willing to make the maximum financial sacrifices if the next Games would be held there. Certainly a surprising announcement! One that should, however, not be taken seriously". Author's translation from original Dutch: "Chicago n.l. loopt met plannen rond om roet in het eten te gooien. Een gemeenteraadslid van deze Amerikaanse stad, een zekere weledelgestrenge heer Kostner, heeft er een en ander aan een Fransche journalist over verteld. Meer genoemde vroede vader had alle reden om te mogen veronderstellen, dat Amsterdam er weinig of niets voor gevoelde en het heel best zou vinden, wanneer de negende Olympiade, ergens anders zou plaats vinden. Ten overvloede voegde hij er nog aan toe, dat ook generaal Allen, de secretaris van het Amerikaansche Olympisch Comité, dezen stelligen indruk had. En tenslotte dit: Chicago, dat reeds voor de Parijsche Olympiade zoo diep in de gemeentebankkast getast had, zou zich de grootst mogelijke geldelijke offers willen getroosten, wanneer inderdaad de volgende Spelen daar gehouden zouden worden. Een bepaald verrassende mededeeling! Welke men echter niet au serieux moet nemen". "Amsterdam of Chicago?", undocumented newspaper title, July 12, 1924. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

liberal and Protestant press or, as will become apparent in the remainder of this chapter, between different media technologies and regimes.

So far we have analyzed how Van Tuyll's individual 'Olympic project' evolved into a network or, rather, amalgamation of heterogeneous actors that is constituted by the triangular relationship between the media, host city and event owner. The emergence of this network was not only the result of the establishment of relations between the three key actors, but each of the actors was also formed during this process. 'The media', for instance, are not an *a priori* entity but a key actor that becomes manifest through specific tangible actors such as *De Telegraaf* en *Het Handelsblad*. Thus, 'the media' can sometimes be comprised of film companies and in other cases, such as the 1928 Games, of the printed press. Likewise, in the case of the 1928 Games the host city manifested itself as a network established through the alignments between the organizing committee, the municipality of Amsterdam, leading liberal national newspapers and a large share of the Dutch population. Moreover, the IOC was only able to act as event owner on the local level because the NOC had been founded. In line with the ANT principles set out earlier, our analysis therefore demonstrates that it is impossible to attribute the bidding and organization of the Amsterdam Games to one person and to act as if that person is an almighty actor that bends all other actors to his will. Van Tuyll actively had to peak the interest of the municipality of Amsterdam and the government to safeguard his bid. The further this process evolved, the more actors had to be aligned in order for the Olympic project to succeed and the less significant Van Tuyll himself became as an actor in the network. In the end, he no longer played a central role in the network since other actors, most notably the organizing committee (a network by itself), took over.

4.4 CONSTRUCTING IMAGES: REORDERING AND RENAMING ON A MODEST SCALE

Actor and networks are thus heterogeneous entities that manifest themselves in different ways. When we apply this insight to our main research question—how did Amsterdam raise its profile by hosting the Olympics Games—we are confronted with a tension between the heterogeneity of actors and networks on the one hand, and the relative homogeneity of the images by which Amsterdam was (re)presented on the other. In other words, the heterogeneity of the host city does not seem to accord with the aim to present a strong and easily recognizable image. How was this gap, between the 'real' Amsterdam and the 'imagined' or 'represented' Amsterdam, overcome?

In this regard, we have to draw on the second theoretical chapter in which Hetherington's ANT-inspired notion of reordering and renaming place was discussed in relation to the way host cities seek to raise their profile. From Hetherington's approach we learned that this involves processes that affect both the physical-material and the virtual dimensions of cities. Hetherington argues that the actual and the virtual are extensions of each other rather than two entirely different realms. Images, signs and symbols that represent the host city are not virtual entities, but the result of a chain of translations between various tangible actors. To raise the city's profile, new, adjusted or stronger images about the city have to be created. Such place images are produced because places are themselves subject to processes of reordering and rearranging. City images are the final translation and reduction of these processes and even this translation is not completely virtual, for the images' distribution and

circulation is effected by media technologies, communication networks and innumerable other tangible actors.

To comprehend how the heterogeneity of place is renamed and finally translated into reduced impressions (images, imaginations, signs and narratives) of the host city, I extended Hetherington's argument to the work of Latour and Stewart. Drawing on Latour's (1999a, 1999b) notion of reduction and circulation and on Stewart's (1993) concept of the miniaturization of place and space, we have to pay attention to the promotional objects and activities that represented Amsterdam and the Netherlands as the hosts of the ninth Olympiad. These objects could only achieve an effective promotional effect by functioning in a web of references that constantly (re)produced images. This process also required the implementation and circulation of Olympic symbols. After all, images of Amsterdam and the Dutch nation alone could not suffice to produce an Olympic city; this also involved a partial renaming of the Olympic venue and its nation. The Olympic logo and the generic formula had to be implemented and appropriated. This literally meant a re-branding of the city through the inscription of buildings, spaces and commodities, as well as the placement of branded objects in the city. This renaming was by no means absolute; the branding of the Olympic Games was linked to existing images of Amsterdam and the Dutch nation. Wooden shoes and *jenever* (a typical Dutch variant of vodka) were, for example, sold in special Olympic editions. Both products are souvenirs that present the stereotypical historical image of the Netherlands as a country of cheese, windmills and tulips that was, and still is, cultivated by the Dutch tourist industry. Thus, the renaming of Amsterdam as Olympic city required the miniaturization of the city into easily graspable and recognizable images that connected to existing reductions/images.

This partial re-branding of the city, or even of the whole nation, could only be achieved by physically reordering place to the extent that the hosting of the Olympic Games became visible to inhabitants, visitors and the press alike. After all, these groups had to experience Amsterdam as the host city of the ninth Olympiad in order to be able to translate these experiences into narratives and images. To achieve this, places had to be reordered to break with the 'routine' visibility or experience of Amsterdam. Such reordering occurs, for example, in the way the city's main shopping streets were decorated with Dutch and Olympic banners and flags. This at first sight perhaps unremarkable and small act of reordering was a necessary condition for producing a festive and exclusive atmosphere. By adding decorations, the routine meaning and use of the shopping street were temporarily supplemented with new meanings. Other examples of 'Olympicizing' national spaces included shops that sold special Olympic souvenirs, companies using the Olympic logo in their advertisements and the national postal service, which sold special Olympic stamps. The ANT approach to these rather modest attempts to 'Olympicize' Amsterdam and the Netherlands demonstrates that practices and processes such as presentation, representation and (re)imagination are not constituted by macro transformations, external influences or causal relations, but instead result from networking and translation between various actors, ranging in scope from simple banners to large buildings like the Olympic stadium.

In this regard, the construction of the Olympic venues should not be overlooked. The Olympic stadium, which was built especially for the event, was designed by Jan Wils in accordance with the principles of the *Nieuwe Amsterdamse School* (the New Amsterdam Architectural Movement, led by Berlage) and exuded an atmosphere of industrious and progressive modernism. Its architecture fitted in with

the surrounding housing blocks, which were designed in the same style. As such, the stadium formed an icon and advertisement of Dutch architecture and planning, displaying an image of Amsterdam as a modern city. This image was the effect of the emergence of an inter-textual network constituted by different buildings, Olympic banners, souvenirs and so on, part of a process in which the heterogeneity of arrangements was reduced to re-ordered coherent representations of place. What did these reductions look like and how were they produced? To reconstruct the imagery through which Amsterdam presented itself, we have to analyze the promotional strategies and practices that were deployed alongside the construction of the Olympic venues and the Olympic decoration of the city. For it is through these strategies and practices that certain meanings of place are highlighted or marginalized in an active attempt to reduce the heterogeneity of place into desired imageries.

4.5 PROMOTIONAL STRATEGIES: CULTURAL CLICHÉS AND IMAGES OF PROGRESS

Creating a profile for Amsterdam on an international level in the first place involved creating, displaying and performing attractive images. Ideally, these desired images had to be communicated to foreign journalists in such a manner that the foreign press would adopt the promotional messages as uncritically as possible and distribute them to remote audiences. To achieve this, a public relations charm offensive was initiated by the organizing committee, in cooperation with the *Amsterdamsche Pers Vereeniging* (Amsterdam Press Association) and subsidized by the municipality.⁷⁵ The charm offensive materialized in an excursion for foreign journalists representing leading foreign newspapers and magazines. This joint initiative again points to the intertwinement between the host city and the media. The local press, local authorities and organizing committee shared the same interest, namely to present a positive image of their city and country. In this regard, the excursion was an instrument to create goodwill among foreign journalists. The tour took place a few months before the actual celebrations and should be understood as a serious effort to promote Amsterdam and the Netherlands as an attractive tourist destination and advanced industrial nation—as will become apparent later on, the promotion of Amsterdam readily connected to the presentation of the nation and vice versa.

Since foreign newspapers had cast doubts on the ability of the Dutch organizers to finish the preparations for the Games in time, the excursion was designed to generate enthusiasm, create goodwill and familiarize foreign journalists with Amsterdam, the Netherlands and the organization of the Olympic Games. In addition, foreign journalists were given the opportunity to establish contacts with colleagues and local informants. Finally, the excursion enabled the trip organizers to position themselves as the first contact and information point for visiting media personnel. However, although many journalists relied on the information distributed by these institutions, we should be careful not to describe the organizing committee and the *Amsterdamsche Pers Vereeniging* as obligatory points of passage. In general, the absence of a vast local network of contacts, information sources, time pressure and unfamiliarity with the local situation in the host city on the part of foreign

⁷⁵ “Culturele propaganda tijdens de Olympische Spelen”. *Het Handelsblad*. October 11, 1927; “Culturele propaganda voor ons land”. *De Telegraaf*. September 7, 1927.

correspondents creates an advantage for the organizers of CityEvents, because visiting media are more likely to use official information than to put efforts into establishing alternative information networks (Avraham, 2000; Hannerz, 2004). At the same time, it should be acknowledged that journalists tend to write more positively about a place when they are more familiar with it (Kotler et al., 1993; Kotler, ed., 1999; Avraham, 2004). The excursion, therefore, was an instrument to inform foreign journalists in a recreational manner and to facilitate the establishment of alliances on an emotional interest level through a charm offensive, which mobilized hospitality rather than aggressive propaganda.

The excursion enabled its organizers to selectively present Amsterdam and the Netherlands by visiting only certain attractions. Visits to grand technological projects like the locks in IJmuiden, to tourist attractions like the bulb cultivation fields, the mills of Kinderdijk and the cheese market of Alkmaar, as well as to impressive examples of industrial progress, such as a new cheese-making factory, were included in the program.⁷⁶ But the Jordaan, an area inhabited by Amsterdam's poor, was not part of the program. While the excursion's presentation of Amsterdam and the Netherlands was widely recognized as a promotional endeavor, its nature as a propaganda strategy deployed to cover up the less attractive features of the city and the country was not criticized in foreign and domestic newspapers.⁷⁷ The selective presentation was not contested and, for precisely this reason, it may have been effective.

The aims of the program are vividly summarized in a speech given by Amsterdam mayor Mr. de Vlught at the excursion's welcome dinner, hosted in the city hall.

The Netherlands covers just a small area on the map. Unfortunately, this equals the knowledge that many foreigners have of our country. To them, the Netherlands is the country of Rembrandt, Frans Hals, windmills and cheese, Lorentz, the International Peace Palace, bulbs, Hugo de Groot and Schiedam.... And the landscape: a green plane with cows and canals, innumerable canals.... However, the Netherlands has more to offer, and if you were to become convinced of this fact during your stay in this country, if you were to experience our glorious past and the beautiful and important monuments that symbolize that past, if you were to recognize how the Netherlands, as a modern country, holds its place among the civilized nations of the world, and how it continues to strive for healthy and strong progress and development in all areas, many a Dutchman, myself included, would consider ourselves fortunate that this had been achieved..⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Documentation on the foreign journalists' excursion can be found in the Amsterdam City Archives, Register Gemeentebblad 1928, folders II 107, 629. Both folders contain official publication about all the decisions and discussions that took place in the city council of Amsterdam in 1928 on the issue.

⁷⁷ I draw this conclusion on the basis of my archival research into press cuttings on the Amsterdam Olympics.

⁷⁸ "Het bezoek der buitenlandsche journalisten: De wonderen van IJmuiden". *Het Handelsblad*. May 17, 1928. Author's translation from Dutch original text: "Nederland heeft op de kaart slechts een zeer klein oppervlak en helaas is bij veel buitenlanders de kennis, die zij van ons land bezitten, recht evenredig aan de grootte. Nederland is voor hen: het land van Rembrandt, van Frans Hals, van molens en kaas, van Lorentz, van het Vredespaleis, van bloembollen, Hugo de Groot en van Schiedam..... En het landschap: een groene vlakte met koeien en veel slooten, eindeloos veel slooten... Maar Nederland omvat nog meer, en indien U door het verblijf in dit land van deze waarheid doordrongen mocht worden, wanneer gij iets zoudt kunnen beseffen van ons glorievol verleden, van de schoone en belangrijke monumenten, die daarvan spreken, wanneer U zoudt zien op welke wijze het moderne Nederland zijn plaats onder de beschaafde natiën handhaaft en hoe hier een gezond en krachtig streven bestaat naar vooruitgang en ontwikkeling, op alle gebied, dan zouden vele Nederlanders zich met mij

From de Vlught's speech it becomes clear that the emphasis lay on presenting the Netherlands as a modern industrialized nation, rather than on exploiting its successful folkloric image. Yet this former presentation had to be consolidated with the interests of the tourist industry, which pursued a stereotypical imagery of tulips, cheese and mills. To be successful, the promotion of Amsterdam and the Netherlands had to integrate images of progress with cultural clichés.

The ensuing (re)presentation was the typical result of different interests that had to be negotiated to keep different actors (the tourist branch, the manufacturing industry and trade companies) aligned to the network. To serve the commercial interest of the Dutch tourist sector, cultural clichés were exploited to present a picturesque and "authentic" image of Amsterdam and the Netherlands. This presentation and performance of Dutch culture and heritage could easily be integrated with the (re)presentation of Amsterdam. The wooden shoes, tulips and cheese were (and still are) an integral part of the city's tourist image, which links folklore to major cultural attractions and history by combining, for example, the Rijksmuseum's collection of famous Dutch masters with the city's flower market. Many of the Amsterdam attractions are also national cultural institutions, integrating national culture and history with that of Amsterdam and thus enforcing the city's status as the capital of the Netherlands.

At the same time, in order to serve the interests of the manufacturing industries and trading companies, serious efforts were being made to supplement stereotypical images and to propagate the Netherlands as a modern, civilized and colonial power. Thus, cultural clichés were displayed and performed simultaneously with icons of progress. However, the organizers did not develop a strong promotional concept that bridged and connected images of process with the performance of stereotypical tourist images on an associative level. In the 1920s, place-selling developed in close relation to the advertising of consumer products (Ward, 1998). This advertising regime was based on a rather descriptive approach in which certain 'objective' characteristics of consumer products, such as price and quality, would be praised instead of addressing consumers on an emotional interest level by developing concepts in accordance with specific life-styles, desires and experiences (Bowlby, 2000; Friedberg, 1993; Rappaport, 1995; Schwartz, 1998). Therefore, the excursion program was not organized around a strong and binding marketing concept for presenting Amsterdam and the Netherlands, but offered *parallel imageries* of, on the one hand, a highly advanced modern trade nation and, on the other, cultural clichés and attractions. These parallel imageries served the interests of both national and local tourism branches, as well as trade and industry, without either explicitly undermining or explicitly reinforcing each other.

In this regard, the *New York Times* article I quoted in the introduction to this chapter could be interpreted as a reference to the parallel promotion of Amsterdam in its explicit argument that the stereotypical tourist images that most people hold of the city do not accord with the local reality of modern everyday life. In a different passage, the article again stresses the difference between both modes of representing Amsterdam:

Its new architecture is not the only respect in which the face of Amsterdam has been changing of late years; for the life which throbs in this fine old merchant city is too

gelukkig rekenen dat dit zou zijn bereikt". Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453.

many-sided to be contained in a single avenue of advance. One of the finest and richest cities in Europe, it is never been more powerful than it is today. Since the war ended it has succeeded to Berlin's place as the centre of financial influence on the Continent and as an international money market it ranks today with New York and London (Price, 1928: 72).

The author subtly lays bare the parallel imagery that was being presented and performed by drawing on the city's glorious past while at the same time stressing its growing power in trade and the financial world (by positioning the city in the top of the world's financial centers, most notably as a serious rival to Berlin).

The emphasis on Amsterdam's modern architecture and achievements in trade and finances smoothly fitted in with the imagery that was displayed in Rotterdam at the Nenijto exhibition, an international industrial exhibition hosted at the same time as the Games. The Nenijto was a showcase for national and foreign companies that combined popular entertainment and anthropological attractions, including a 'negro village' and a Luna park. By hosting the Nenijto, the city of Rotterdam hoped to draw some of the attention that Amsterdam received during the Olympics to itself, but also to other parts of the country, such as Eindhoven (Philips) and Rotterdam (harbor), and to the colonies (Indonesia with its rubber and oil) (Dekking, ed., 1928; Daalder, 1990; Halbertma, 2004). Since the Nenijto also received contributions from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, it became a showcase that enabled nations to compete with each other, instead of a solo presentation of the Rotterdam business community.

I draw on this exhibition because the excursion organized for foreign journalists before the Olympics was by no means sufficient to create the type of strong and attractive imagery of Amsterdam featured in the *New York Times*. Consequently, the excursion should be analyzed in relation to other promotional strategies and interpreted as part of a larger promotional network that consisted of independently organized initiatives, all linked to the Olympic Games. Apart from Nenijto, other examples of promotional activities organized for the occasion of the 1928 Games were: an International Peace Exhibition, a photo exhibition 'Nederland in Beeld' (A View on the Netherlands) in Amsterdam, and a colonial exhibition in the city of Arnhem (Daalder, 1990).⁷⁹

In this manner, I approach the promotion of Amsterdam and the 1928 Games as an 'imaginary gateway' to the rest of the Netherlands. Certainly, when one considers the city's capital status and the dominant role it played in the historical process that led to the formation of the Dutch nation state, the promotion of Amsterdam fitted into a historical tradition of presenting the city as the symbolic, cultural and economic center of the Netherlands. Amsterdam was able to pursue an imagery through which it claimed to represent the entire Dutch nation. Consequently, the strong involvement of the nation state with the organization of the Olympics did not lead to a marginalization of the host city. Precisely because the host city and nation state were able to align their interests, the (re)presentation of the two overlapped. This in contrast to host cities that strongly push for a local agenda, as Barcelona did when it used the 1992 Olympics to present itself as the capital of the Catalanian nation, thus advocating conflicting interests with the Spanish (Castilian) nation state.

⁷⁹ "Cultureele propaganda tijdens de Olympische Spelen". *Het Handelsblad*. October 11, 1927. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 5/3/1927-30/5/1928, number 78454-78641.

In 1928, the images of progress, industrialism and technological advancement easily lent themselves to being extended from the presentation of Amsterdam to that of the nation as a whole. Within the excursion program, the visits to grand industrial and technological works image-wise connected more to the Neniĳto industrial exhibition in Rotterdam and the Colonial Exhibition in Nijmegen than to specific local features of Amsterdam. Not coincidentally, the latter two exhibitions were organized by cities trying to profit from the foreign attention that the Olympic Games would attract (Daalder, 1990). The presentation of industrialism, trade and technology were therefore most of all national affairs, certainly when one considers the presentation of the Netherlands as a colonial power. Both exhibitions are typical of the world exhibition genre, albeit on a more modest scale.

Furthermore, the Amsterdam Olympics and the Neniĳto related to each other to the extent that both events could be defined as typically modernist manifestations. Such events are constructed around a striving for a universal (read Western) culture of reason and progress, which was thought to be achievable through technological advancement or cultural practices (Rydell and Gwinn, 1994; Grever and Waaldijk, 1998). One such cultural practice is sports, which became increasingly rationalized through the introduction of universal regulations and clock time (Mackenzie, 2003). The modernist universal culture is described by Gilbert (1994) as the embodiment of Victorian values and morals, which despite its claims to universality also evoked fierce competition between nations. Each country aimed to present itself as the most civilized and advanced, as closest to the ideals of this universal culture (Rubens, 1994). The formula of the Olympic Games also epitomizes this event genre by incorporating an aspiration for a universal culture, translated into an official Olympic ideology, which can be summarized as follows: “to adhere to an ideal of a higher life and to strive for perfection”.⁸⁰ Olympism embraces universal values such as fair play, peace, friendship, respect, youth, health, strength and courage and aims at pacifying interstate rivalry through sports competition. In this respect, both the Amsterdam Games and the Neniĳto exude an aura of modernism through a strong belief in universal values and culture, while simultaneously providing a platform for performing nationalism and channeling interstate rivalry.

Precisely because the Amsterdam Games and Neniĳto were ‘temples of modernity’, which (partly) derived their success from the competition between nations, they highlighted national rather than local identity. Yet in the case of the Olympics this emphasis on the national did not conflict with the (re)presentation of Amsterdam. As already became apparent earlier in this section, the promotional activities that occurred during the organizational phase and the staging of the 1928 Olympics were clearly not solely directed at presenting Amsterdam to the rest of the world. The Amsterdam Games lent themselves easily to being appropriated by the nation state and vice versa because the presentation of the city and the nation enforced each other: Amsterdam stood in for the nation and the nation stood in for Amsterdam.

4.6 DISTRIBUTING THE MESSAGE: MEDIA RIGHTS AND COVERAGE

Our analysis of the promotional strategies has enabled us to reconstruct the parallel imageries through which Amsterdam presented itself as the host of the ninth Olympiad.

⁸⁰ See www.ioc.org/museum, last visited April 1, 2007.

So far, our reconstruction of these imageries has remained limited to a narrative description and has not been specified in terms of the different types of media technologies, such as the print medium, cinema and radio. It is crucial to distinguish between different media technologies and modes of covering events because the same narrative can be represented in different manners depending on the media technology and organization involved. A film fragment of the opening ceremony for the Games offers media consumers a different view than an article in a newspaper. While narratives do not necessarily change altogether, different media technologies, such as live or delayed reporting on events, do produce different media effects (Bal, 1997). To get an idea of the media impact of the 1928 Olympic Games and also of the extent to which Amsterdam was able to raise its profile through hosting this CityEvent, we have to focus on the roles that different media technologies and organizations played in relation to the different interests that were at stake.

In this regard, we first have to draw attention to the organizing committee as the holder of the exclusive film and photography rights to the 1928 Games. Media corporations that wanted to obtain the right to film and photograph the events within the Olympic stadium—outside the Olympic venues, film and photography was allowed for everyone—were dependent on the willingness of the organizing committee to cooperate. In other words, the organizing committee was in the comfortable position of being able to select the film company that best suited its interests. Initially, the organizers sold the film and photography rights to a Swiss-German co-operation for the amount of 180,000 Guilders, quite a large sum at the time. In March 1928, the company withdrew its offer because it was unable to secure its finances in time. The Dutch film industry, which had felt passed over during the first round of negotiations, reacted furiously when the Italian firm Luce was given the exclusive film monopoly in the second round because of its higher bid (Arnoldussen, 1994). The domestic film industry accused the organizing committee of following short-term commercial interests and reacted promptly by prohibiting all its personnel from co-operating with Olympic film productions. In addition, the Nederlandse Bioscoopbond (Dutch Association of Movie Theatres) banned all news reports and promotional films about the 1928 Olympics from Dutch movie theatres.⁸¹ As a consequence, the Dutch public was not able to see newsreels and reports about the Olympics during and shortly after the events. In addition, a considerable number of foreign film audiences, for example in Germany, also had to do without film coverage of the Games because the Nederlandse Bioscoopbond had expanded its protest campaign internationally by persuading other European cinema associations to also boycott newsreels of the 1928 Olympics.⁸² Visual coverage of the 1928 Olympics was therefore predominantly limited to photography. Thus, the spectacular potential that the moving image provided for

⁸¹ “Geen film van de Olympische Spelen.”, *Het Handelsblad*, May 15, 1928. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 5/3/1927-30/5/1928, number 78454-78641.

⁸² See “Gerommel om den Olympus: Geen voortdurende omroep -- De ontevreden bioscopen”, *Het Algemeen Handelsblad*, May 24, 1928 on the boycott by the Nationale Bioscoopbond. Despite this national (and to some extent also foreign) boycott, cinema was not totally absent from the mediation of the 1928 Olympics. Before the opening of the Games, domestic and international audiences were able to watch propaganda movies. In the U.S. alone, the Dutch-American Chamber of Commerce was able to distribute the NOC propaganda film to two thousand movie theatres “De Olympische Spelen 1928: De propaganda voor het buitenland”, *Het Handelsblad*, September 15, 1927 (Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 22/3/1921-28/1/1928, number 54942-78453. Nevertheless, during the Olympic festivities, the Dutch themselves were essentially faced with a blind spot. Both sources are available at the Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 5/3/1927-30/5/1928, number 78454-78641.

increasing audience excitement and the overall media impact of the Games remained underused.

The failure to exploit the potential offered by media technology was not limited to the cinema apparatus but also involved radio after the Deutscher Rundfunk (German Radio Broadcasting Corporation) requested permission to broadcast the Amsterdam Games live in Germany.⁸³ The main reason given by the organizing committee for not granting a radio license involved the fear that German tourists would stay home and not attend the Games.⁸⁴ Here, the organizing committee followed commercial interests. Yet another, perhaps even more important argument for not granting the license was related to a request from the Association Internationale de la Presse Sportive (AIPS) not to broadcast the Games abroad because this organization was afraid that in that case the international press would stay away from the event. The AIPS considered the 'new' radio medium too competitive.⁸⁵ According to the AIPS, foreign journalists would object to reporting on the Olympics if live radio broadcasts were permitted (Arnoldussen, 1994). In this regard, the organizing committee was more or less forced to choose between the radio medium and the press. Since newspapers and magazines were the dominant news media at the time, the organizing committee decided to make the best of a bad situation and only allowed radio broadcasts of match results after their completion.⁸⁶

The prohibition on live radio broadcasting and the film boycott, as well as our earlier analysis of the role of *De Telegraaf* en *Het Handelsblad* in the bidding and organizational phase, demonstrate that 'the media' should never be considered a monolithic actor. Its constituents have different commercial, partisan and political interests. The amalgamation of heterogeneous actor-networks that constitutes what is commonly referred to as 'the media' sometimes advocates conflicting agendas. The film boycott and the prohibition on radio broadcasting not only show that the organizing committee did not optimally exploit its formal means (its ownership of the exclusive rights on film and radio broadcasting at the Olympic venues) to maximize the media effect of the Games, but these cases also point to the dependency of the host city on the cooperation of 'the media' in the production process of promotional images. The efforts that were put, for instance, into decorating the main shopping streets of Amsterdam were hardly noticed by remote audiences, since coverage of the Olympic Games was mostly limited to the printed press. Even illustrated articles provide a different and certainly less spectacular and dynamic representation of the city and the event than would have been

⁸³ "Foutief besluit". *De Telegraaf*, January 1, 1928. Private Archive of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam, folder 5/3/1927-30/5/1928, number 78454-78641.

⁸⁴ Ibid. Radio was not yet a widespread medium and private ownership equaled that of television in the early 1950s. Nonetheless, a potential radio audience of hundreds of thousands of German listeners was ignored as a result of the organizing committee's refusal to allow the broadcast of the Olympics abroad.

⁸⁵ In this respect, Shaw and Bradley (2000) argue that the introduction of new media technologies has always been met with anxiety. New media technologies threaten the dominant position of established media and, as such, do not replace old media but lead to a fragmentation of media usage: "In short, the evolution of mass media and the research about media suggest that social systems do move from a wholeness to fragmentation (...). All media fragment over time. The message is always shaped to fit the smallest, most compatible social boundaries. In a social system where technology is moving us toward entropy, the individual or group uses media for personal interests" (2000: 75). The time consumers traditionally spent on established media will be divided over more media technologies as a result of the appearance of new media. This works to undermine the dominant market position of established media.

⁸⁶ On a national level, the AVRO (General Free Radio Broadcasting Association) was allowed to broadcast the results of different competitions to Dutch audiences, albeit from outside the stadium. This restriction prevented live reporting on the matches to domestic audiences. See Arnoldussen, 1994: p. 107

achieved in film. The print media present readers with a distanced view on events, whereas film and radio enhance the feeling of immediacy even when there is no live transmission (Kittler, 1999; Wark, 1994; Thompson, 1995). Moving images as well as auditory reports on events enable audiences to experience more dimensions of CityEvents than the exclusively narrative-based coverage of the print media, including, for example, the sound of cheering audiences in the stadium. As a result of the film boycott and the prohibition on live radio broadcasts, the (re)presentation of Amsterdam in the media remained rather static and distanced. The interaction between, on the one hand, different media regimes and technologies and, on the other, the reordering and renaming of place affects the kinds of city images that are produced. Different media technologies and organizations not only result in a different coverage of place and space, but they also affect processes of renaming and re-imagining through the specific ways in which particular media interact with the objects and subjects that constitute places.

4.7 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the CityEvent model was applied to the staging of the 1928 Olympic Games in Amsterdam. The chapter therefore constituted a first test case for the CityEvent model, a test case in which we put particular emphasis on the roles of and interaction between the host city and the media. The model provided an analytical tool to study the Amsterdam Olympics from a threefold perspective by analyzing the roles of the three key actors (media, host city and event owner) as actors in a network having to work together to produce this international sports event successfully. The application of the CityEvent model not only enabled us to examine the Amsterdam Games from an integrated threefold perspective, but the case study in turn was used to translate the elements of the model from abstract categories into tangible actors, thus drawing attention to the heterogeneity of the key actors. .

The host city, for instance, is not a homogeneous entity confined to a specific territory. Instead, the host city is a constantly changing network composed out of various actors that operate at different scales, ranging from Van Tuyll the individual to the organizing committee, the municipality of Amsterdam and the national government. The key actor 'host city' therefore is not equivalent to the spatial territory of the city of Amsterdam. Our analysis has pointed out that the host city is a networked reality that manifests itself locally, but is nonetheless the result of alignments between actors and networks that also operate beyond the geographical boundaries of the city. In this respect, the Olympic Games appeared not merely as an event, but rather as a networked process that enabled Amsterdam to establish alignments with actors such as foreign newspapers and magazines, which under normal circumstances would not easily adjust their interests in line with the city's project to raise its profile.

Indeed, our inquiry pointed out that the Amsterdam Games could never have been staged if the media had not aligned themselves with the 'Olympic project'. In the early bidding and organizational phase, the support of *De Telegraaf* en *Het Handelsblad* proved crucial to securing Amsterdam's candidacy for hosting the Olympics. After the national parliament's veto on the subsidy bill, there was an urgent need to establish new alignments in order to obtain alternative financial resources. In response to this need, the two leading national newspapers actively mobilized the Dutch population in support of the Olympic Games by appealing to the population's

love for sports and its nationalism. Significantly, it was not only the host city that relied on the cooperation of these newspapers. The IOC as event owner also needed the support of *De Telegraaf*, *Het Handelsblad* and a large segment of the Dutch population to build up the reputation of the generic Olympic formula and its institutions in the Netherlands. Even though the 1928 Games were the ninth Olympiad, it illustrates well how the reputation and prestige of the generic event formula and its event owner were still under construction in the Netherlands and possibly also in other European countries. The high reputation of the IOC and its Olympic Games, which nowadays seems almost self-evident to us, was therefore still under construction in 1928. The role played by the Dutch liberal leading newspapers in generating support for the Amsterdam Games, suggests, moreover, that media form(ed) indispensable allies for the IOC and organizing committee (host city) to safeguard the success of the event. Yet the media is never a monolithic actor as became clear from the case of the foreign newspapers that questioned the ability of the organizers to secure the necessary finances for the Games in time. Another example of this was provided by the Dutch film industry and cinema theatre association's national and international boycott of the Games.

Our analysis not only comprised the promotional narrative, but also the different media technologies, which were examined to determine to what extent the printed press, radio and cinema determined the way in which images of the city were produced and what kind of images they were. The example of the excursion organized for foreign journalists showed that putting the city on the map exceeds the level of mere representation. Physical-material rearrangements had to be made to display and perform attractive images of Amsterdam and the Netherlands, ranging from the decoration of the city's main shopping street to the construction of the Olympic stadium. In addition, we reconstructed the 'interreferential' network that was built up in order to put Amsterdam and the Netherlands on the map, comprising the Neniito in Rotterdam, the Colonial Exhibition in Arnhem and the Olympic souvenirs sold in Amsterdam.

We saw that the images through which Amsterdam presented itself were the result of the negotiation of different interests. As became clear from our analysis of the promotional strategies, the presentation of Amsterdam collided with that of the nation state because both actors shared the same interests. Furthermore, a close reading of the promotional strategies revealed that the city was not presented by means of a coherent imagery. Instead, parallel imageries of, on the one hand, cultural clichés and, on the other, images of progress (industry, trade, technology and architecture) were displayed, thus negotiating the different interests of the tourist sector and the industry, trade and financial sector respectively. By linking these parallel imageries to the media technologies and organizations involved in covering, mobilizing, circulating and distributing them, we expanded our analysis from a close reading of the imageries themselves to a discussion of how specific media affected the promotional strategies. The printed press clearly dominated the media coverage of the Amsterdam Games. Cinema and radio were underused, not so much because of technological complications but because of divergent economic and political interests on the part of the organizing committee. As a result, the media coverage of the 1928 Olympics remained rather distanced and static. This raises the question to what extent the introduction and application of a richer variety of media technologies in later editions of the Games affected the development of this CityEvent and the ability of host cities to profile themselves internationally through this event. In the next two

chapters, this question will be explored further by examining the Nazi Olympics of 1936 and the Helsinki Games of 1952.

5. THE NAZI OLYMPICS⁸⁷

Sports, Propaganda and Architecture

“In a few minutes,” he said, “the torch bearer will appear to light the Olympic fire on this tripod, where it will rise, flaming to heaven, for the weeks of this festival. It creates a real and spiritual bond or fire between our German fatherland in the sacred places of Greece founded nearly 4,000 years ago by Nordic immigrants.”⁸⁸

5.1 INTRODUCTION

With these words, Adolf Hitler emphasized the perceived historical and racial link between ancient Greek civilization and the German fatherland in his speech at the opening ceremony of the eleventh Olympiad in Berlin, 1936. Hitler's words are not only representative for the National socialist reconstruction of history, but also for the way the Nazis appropriated the Olympics to present a ‘New Germany’ to the rest of the world. The presentation of the Third Reich was carefully coordinated by Goebbels’ Ministry of Propaganda, which experimented with a wide variety of media technologies to stage a spectacle unlike any other.

In order to answer our main question – how do cities, in this case Berlin, raise their profile by means of staging CityEvents – we have to focus on *how* relations were established between the three key actors and, in particular, which interests had to be negotiated to stage the 1936 Olympics as a grand propaganda spectacle. As became clear in the previous chapter, key actors emerge and take shape in a networked process that produces a CityEvent. Rather than stable, pre-existing entities, they are constructed domains or perspectives that help us to approach the complex phenomena of the CityEvent from a threefold perspective. To understand how Berlin put itself on the map by means of the Olympics, we therefore have to investigate how the key actors established themselves in relation to one another.

In this chapter, the complexity of the relations between the actors in the CityEvent model will manifest itself in a number of ways. We will begin by analyzing how the Nazis appropriated the Olympic event formula and the extent to which they marginalized the IOC. In other words, how *Deutschtum* replaced Olympism. In this manner, we will be able to reconstruct the different interests that were at stake. The process in which these interests were consolidated will be approached by drawing on Latour’s (1999a, 1999c) notion of acts of translation, which was introduced in chapters 2 and 3. This concept will help us to reconstruct and

⁸⁷ The title of this chapter derives from Mandell’s book *The Nazi Olympics*, which was the first substantial publication on the 1936 Olympics in the Anglo-American academia.

⁸⁸ This fragment was quoted from Hitler’s speech at the opening ceremony of the eleventh Olympiad by *New York Times* journalist Frederick Birchall. Reference: Birchall, Frederick, T., “100,000 Hail Hitler; U.S. Athletes Avoid Nazi Salute to Him”. *The New York Times*. 2 August, 1936, p. 33. The article starts on the front page and is continued on page 33, where the fragment is cited. The article has been obtained through the New York Times on-line archive service.

analyze the imageries through which Berlin presented itself as Olympic host. In relation to this, we will ask how urban space and media technologies were mobilized as propaganda strategies to produce a smooth and powerful propaganda imagery. Implied in this question is the question of how and to what extent the Nazis reordered and (literally) renamed places with the aim of influencing foreign media coverage. However, before we are able to reach this stage in the analysis of the 1936 Games, we have to pay attention to the early phases in the production process of this notorious event.

5.2 BERLIN: A HOST CITY UNDER THREAT

Even though Hitler proudly presented Berlin as the imperial capital of his New Germany at the opening ceremony of the Games, the Nazi leadership initially rejected the idea of organizing the event. Berlin had already been designated by the IOC as host city for the eleventh Olympiad in 1931, but the city's, or rather the German Olympic Committee's (GOC) aspirations had been frustrated by the change in the national political situation in 1933. Whereas the previously discussed case of the Amsterdam Olympics showed a limited influence of national politics on the organization of the event, in the case of the 1936 Games local aspirations were almost completely taken over by national interests. The establishment of the national socialist regime created an uncertain future for the Berlin Games because the Nazis objected to the universalistic aspirations, pacifist ideals and cosmopolitan culture of the Olympic Games. In addition, the Nazis adhered to a different conception of sports than the IOC.

From the perspective of the Nazi leadership, there was a conflict between national socialist ideology and 'Olympism', the ideals for which the Olympic Games stood and still stand. Just as with the Amsterdam Games, the generic event formula was again a topic of controversy. However, this time the idea of sports practice as such was not contested. It was, rather, the IOC's specific approach to sports that was rejected by the Nazi establishment. The Games were eventually hosted in Berlin because the IOC managed to generate interest among the Nazi leadership. Yet in order for the Nazi regime to align itself to a famous international event that conflicted with their ideological principles a way had to be found first to bridge these ideological differences. This could only be achieved if the Nazis were able to translate the Olympic Games into their own terms. To understand this complex process, we have to describe the differences between National Socialism and Olympism in more detail and reconstruct the precise interests that were at stake. We will then be able to analyze how the Nazis appropriated the Olympic Games through various acts of translation.

Olympism propagates the idea that participating and competing in the Games is more important than winning (Guttmann, et al., 2000). At first sight, this does not seem to contradict the national socialist emphasis on the collective aspect of sports. However, even though Olympism is closely connected to nationalism, the individual still occupies a central role within this ideology (Hargreaves, 1992), which it does not do in National Socialism. In Olympism, to win a match is a matter of the athlete's individual effort and the athlete's individual qualities (such as courage, patriotism and fair play) determine her or his success. In addition, the incongruity between Nazism and Olympism should be related to a broader development in the field of sports in the early twentieth century. The popularization of sports practice was accompanied by

modernization processes, including the introduction of objective and measurable standards and clock time. This rationalization of sports made the outcome of sports matches less determined by one's class, ethnicity or race. The athlete's individual performance rather than his or her background increasingly determined success (MacKenzie, 2003). Together with national and international sports associations, the IOC introduced new international standards and rules, supporting the rationalization process by propagating a universalistic and individualistic conception of sports.

This approach to sports contrasted with the national socialist conception. For the Nazis, the individual body was subjected to the greater 'body' of the racial community (Weindling, 1989). National Socialism linked sports to racial doctrine by establishing a connection between the German soil and the Aryan body in the celebration of the nation. The Nazis used sports to stage pagan mass demonstrations as bodily events in which individual participants immersed themselves in the masses, thereby performing the larger body of the Aryan nation (Mosse, 1988). Thus, it was not the athlete's individual performance but the nation that stood at the centre of the bodily culture in Nazi Germany. Collective sports practices with a non-competitive character, such as gymnastics and dance, were propagated by the Nazis over individual sports like athletics or swimming (Mackenzie, 2003). The rationalization of sports was perceived by the Nazis as an obstacle to immersing oneself in the masses. The ideological divergence between Olympism and National Socialism can in general terms be described as the difference between cosmopolitanism, individualism, rationalism and competition on the one hand, and nationalism, *Volksgemeinschaft*, anti-modernism and immersion on the other. I am aware that these terms can by no means do justice to the complexity of this subject: they are mere indications to explain why Berlin's designation for the 1936 Olympics became endangered.

Why did the Nazis want to align themselves with the Olympic Games when such fundamental ideological differences existed between National Socialism and Olympism? What interests made the Nazis adjust their standpoint? In fact, ideological differences were put aside partly for pragmatic reasons. The Nazis soon realized that the Olympic Games would provide an excellent opportunity to present the national socialist regime to the rest of the world and to reestablish diplomatic relations, which had been reduced after Nazi Germany withdrew from the League of Nations in 1934 (Shirer, 1960). Indeed, in its first years Nazi Germany was politically quite isolated. The Games provided an opportunity to change this situation. It has also been suggested that the Nazis used the Olympics to create goodwill by presenting itself as a friendly and peaceful nation (Mandell, 1972; Bohlen, 1979; Hart-Davis, 1986).⁸⁹ In addition, economic motives might have played a role too, since the German economy needed foreign currencies to stabilize the rate of the Reichsmark on the international monetary market.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ The Nazis hoped that in this manner foreign pressure could be reduced. This would enable the regime to distract attention from the build-up of the armed forces, the question of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, attempts to reunite Austria and Germany and, most notably, the remilitarization of the Rhineland in the spring of 1936 (Espy, 1979; Mandell, 1972).

⁹⁰ Commentary from several foreign newspapers suggests that economic interests were at stake. Because of the Versailles Treaty, followed quickly by the severe international economic crises of 1929, the Reichsmark (RM) had been suffering from a constant devaluation. Germany was therefore in great need of foreign currency to stabilize its import balance. The Olympic Games were expected to attract many foreign visitors, which would bring extra foreign currency into the country. During the period of the Games, foreign guests were, for instance, not allowed to cash more than 100 RM daily when exchanging (traveler) checks. This temporary measure more or less forced foreign visitors to cover their expenses mostly by exchanging their currency against local and disadvantageous rates. Source:

Although the Nazis became interested in the Olympics for pragmatic reasons, it was still necessary to construct a relation with the Olympic Games on an ideological level. After all, the event could only successfully be exploited to propagate the New Germany if Olympism was replaced by a national socialist reinterpretation and appropriation of the Games. Such a strategy would undermine the position of the IOC and some of the fundamental principles of the Olympic event formula. The IOC could, however, not be dismissed completely, because the support of the event owner remained necessary to proceed with the organization of the Games. Since each CityEvent is constituted by at least the three key actors, each of these actors has to keep the others aligned, even if it is on a minimum level. We therefore have to focus on how the Nazis constructed alternative alignments to appropriate the Games and overshadow the IOC without losing the latter's support.

5.3 THE NAZIFICATION OF OLYMPISM

The Nazi leadership was interested in the Olympic Games because the event provided an opportunity for strengthening the national socialist ideology. Despite the revolutionary pace at which Germany had been 'nazified', National Socialism itself was still a young ideology full of paradoxes, which was under permanent construction. In addition, as the historian Ian Kershaw (1993) points out, the Nazi regime was more chaotic, inefficient, bureaucratic, hierarchical and heterogeneous than its authoritarian character suggested. Due to the contradictions within national socialist ideology and the recent establishment of the Nazi regime with all its internal complications, there was a strong need among the Nazi ideologists to legitimize and strengthen the national socialist project. To achieve this, the Nazis had to align and mobilize as many actors as possible to their project in order to be able to translate history, scientific 'facts', the economy, politics, but also an event like the Olympic Games into their own terms. The enormous efforts that the Nazis had to undertake to translate the Olympic Games into national socialist terms was a process that, in this section, I will approach as a journey through history, (pseudo) science and sports in which alignments were established with what may at first sight seem to be the most improbable kinds of actors.

National socialist racist doctrine was partly based on a radical reinterpretation of Darwinism. While Darwin refrained from deducing social implications from his evolution theory—he insisted that evolution was based on non-rational and coincidental processes of selection and adaptation—other scientists and intellectuals soon appropriated his work to construct hierarchies between species and to explain social differences (Barondess, 1998). Taxonomy became invested with a social variation of Darwin's evolution theory, which advocated the distinction between superior and inferior species, ranging from plants to humans. In late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe and North-America, social Darwinism provided a fruitful ground for explaining and legitimizing class and gender differences, colonialism and racism (Shipman, 1994). National Socialism also relied on social

Olympia Pressedienst: Olympische Spiele Berlin 1936, number 30, 20-04-1936, published in Berlin by the Organization-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936. Available at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße, accessnumber Os 6601/236-1933/36, Olympia Pressedienst nr. 1 (21/12/1933) till nr. 33 (10/11/1936).

Darwinist arguments, which were mobilized to function as quasi-rational and quasi-scientific reasons for asserting the superiority of the Aryan race and for legitimizing the suppression and extermination of inferior races and individuals (Weindling, 1989).

But what does social Darwinism have to do with the Berlin Games? The national socialist interpretation of Darwinism required the rewriting of history to 'prove' the evolutionary superiority of the Aryan race. The Olympic Games provided the opportunity to construct additional historical arguments for embracing the national socialist ideology. It is at this level, in addition to the pragmatic reasons given above, that the Olympics became an 'interesting' event to the Nazis where they could present the Aryan race as the descendants of the ancient Greek and Roman civilization. Western civilization was consequently founded by Aryans or, to quote Hitler's speech from the opening ceremony again, "the sacred places of Greece [were] founded nearly 4,000 years ago by Nordic immigrants" (Hitler quoted in Birchall, 1936: 33). The establishment of a relation between the ancient classical civilizations and the Aryan race was crucial to defending the Nazi claim that the German nation and culture was superior to any other. The Nazi regime therefore made huge investments to align the ancient classical culture to its cause. The Olympic Games were used as a platform to demonstrate this connection and strengthen it. This shows, for example, in a letter from von Tschammer und Osten, the head of the organizing committee of the Berlin Games, to Hitler. In this letter, von Tschammer und Osten asked Hitler to grant a subsidy of 300,000 Reichsmark to finance an archeological expedition in Greece.⁹¹ On the day of the opening ceremony, Hitler announced that the Greek government had accepted the German offer to restore the site of the original Olympic Games so that it could become "an enduring remembrance of the Berlin Olympics in 1936" (Birchall, 1936: 33).

Through archeological expeditions the Nazis attempted to link German culture to the glorious classical civilizations. By following an ANT perspective, we are able to understand that this appropriation and rewriting of history is not primarily a virtual process that solely involves 'ideas'. Archeological expeditions lead to a reordering and renaming of places because hidden objects are brought to the surface, thereby investing sites with new meanings. This is by no means an abstract process. Archeology derives its strength from the fact that objects are dug up, brought to the surface, described, categorized and exhibited in order to reconstruct histories. In this process, the archeological object is translated into an idea or historical fact. Objects such as, for instance, pieces of pottery, are transformed from forgotten objects into precious historical objects as soon as the archeologist carefully digs them up, cleans them and separates them from the soil in which they have been preserved for centuries. The cleaned pieces of pottery are then measured, described, indexed and, after having been compared to the other objects found on the same site, categorized. In every stage of this translation process, the pieces of pottery become increasingly abstract. This abstraction process is not per definition an objective or rational process, because those (human) actors who describe, categorize and compare the objects make subjective judgments.⁹² In the end, the objects themselves hardly play a role anymore,

⁹¹ The letter is archived in the Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde (German National Archives, location Berlin Lichterfelde), in folder R/43/II/729.

⁹² It is on this point that I disagree with Latour's refusal to distinguish between human and non-human actors. Although I acknowledge that non-human actors play an important, often crucial role in networks, in the end humans inevitably lead the translation processes. After all, humans select, categorize, name and interpret the objects and data they gathered by means of various measurement tools, numbers and other instruments.

because they have been transposed into texts and numbers that make it possible to compare them with many other objects, but also with entire archeological expeditions conducted elsewhere and at other times.

Yet archeological expeditions alone were not enough to establish a connection between the ancient Greek civilization and the Third Reich. The distance between Germany and the archeological sites in Greece had to be covered in order to bring the cultural heritage of the Aryan ancestors to the Third Reich. To bridge this geographical and symbolic distance, the organizing committee introduced the Olympic torch relay. On the hill of Olympia, mirrors would be used to light the torch with sun rays, which symbolized the light of the Gods. The torch was to travel over land from Olympia to Berlin, carried by athletes from the different nations through which the Olympic torch traveled (Downing, 1992). In this light, the torch relay functioned as a real, if highly symbolic connection between the sacred sites on the Olympia hill and the unparalleled Olympic stadium in Berlin. After 1936, the torch relay became an Olympic tradition and it is a typical example of the way a generic event formula evolves over time. Every time a CityEvent is staged, small changes are made in the generic event formula by the hosts. However, as I explained in chapter 2, the central concept of the formula is seldom subject to radical changes, because this would undermine the reputation and recognition of the event. The introduction and absorption of the torch relay as a standard element in the formula of the Games is a typical example of what the historian Eric J. Hobsbawm (1991) defines as invented tradition. In addition to the introduction of the torch relay, the Nazis exchanged the laurel used to crown the Olympic champions for oak leaves, handing each champion a pot with a little oak tree to emphasize the historical connection between the Berlin Games and the ancient Olympics. The purpose of the Nazis was to use the Olympic Games not only to invent tradition, but to invent a whole history that affirmed the superiority of the Aryan race.

The archeological expedition, the introduction of the torch relay and the replacement of laurel wreaths by oak leaves all demonstrate that the construction and propagation of the national socialist ideology was not an abstract process. Instead, this process was based on the strategic alignment and mobilization of tangible actors such as oak leaves and torches. In this regard, it should be mentioned that oak leaves and little oak trees as such are 'innocent objects'. However, as soon as they are mobilized in a web of relations with other actors – such as, for example, flags, banners, but also jars imprinted with swastikas – the oak leaves and little oak trees are invested with meanings that deprive them of their 'innocence'.

Thus, the construction of a racial and historical link between classical culture and the Aryan race enabled the Nazis to mirror the 'New Germany' on ancient Greek and Roman civilization. Drawing anachronistically on these civilizations, the Nazis used the Olympic Games to display an imagery of Berlin as the imperial capital of the Third Reich (Scobie, 1990). Berlin was no longer simply a host city of the Olympic Games; rather, the event became a demonstration of the capital's imperial status as the political, economic and cultural center of Nazi Germany and the Aryan race. This unfortunate analogy also applied to Hitler who, according to *The New York Times*, presented himself as "the new Caesar of this era" (1990: 1). Thus, in their attempt to present the New Germany and its capital to the rest of the world, most notably to their former enemies, the Nazis appropriated the Olympic Games to produce a mythological past designed to defend the regime's historical legitimacy. This mobilization and reinterpretation of the past was not only important to legitimating the Third Reich. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Berlin had grown from a

provincial Prussian town into one of Europe's largest metropolises. But as a young capital it still had to compete with the much older metropolises of Paris and London (Richie, 1998). The Olympic Games were an opportunity to stand on equal foot with these competitors. The Games and the production of a mythological, albeit anachronistic past strengthened the legitimacy of Berlin as capital of the New Germany.

Nonetheless, the Olympic Games were above all a national affair. According to official Nazi doctrine, the Greek and Roman cultures had vanished due to a degeneration of blood lines caused by mixing Aryan blood with inferior races (Weindling, 1998). In this view, culture was the result of racial qualities. Accordingly, inferior races were destined to be distinguished by inferior cultures. The Nazi leadership constructed this version of ancient history to propagate an ideology and policy of racial purification. Any contamination with alien blood would lead to the decline of the Aryan race and the German culture (Barondess, 1998). The Nazis 'mined' the classical era to produce a mythological narrative that enforced the relationship between pure Aryan blood and the German soil. The Olympic Games played an important role in this process, because the Nazi leaders exploited the event not only to propagate the Third Reich abroad, but also in order to celebrate the racial foundation of the German nation. The Games thus became a vehicle for mobilizing and unifying the German (Aryan) population (Mandell, 1972).

Indeed, Nazi propaganda not only thrived on the creation of collective enemies that allegedly threatened the German nation, such as Jews and Bolsheviks. Support for the national socialist regime was also generated by addressing individuals as members of the larger 'national family' (Bathrick, 1997). The domestic newspapers, which were already under the strict control of Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda, proclaimed that the full support of the entire German population was necessary to accomplish the successful organization of the 1936 Olympics and that the honor of the fatherland was at stake. The task of organizing the Olympic Games was presented as a collective challenge, but also as a celebration of Aryan nationhood. Illustrative in this regard is the Olympic Bell, inscribed with the text "Ich rufe die Jugend der Welt", which was cast especially for the occasion of the Games. The transportation of this enormous bell from the iron factory in the Ruhr area to Berlin became a domestic variant of the torch relay. The journey took several weeks and the bell was accompanied by a propaganda procession consisting of several trucks and buses equipped with film projectors and loudspeakers that announced the Olympic Games in every village and city through which the convoy passed.⁹³ Each village or city that was visited in turn hailed the bell by staging a procession and festivities. In this manner, the Olympic Games traveled from the corners of the Third Reich to its capital, mobilizing the entire German nation in a celebration of mythical *Deutschtum*.

The propagation of the Games and the frantic celebration of *Deutschtum*, however, served not only domestic purposes. From the *Official Report of the Organizing Committee of the Berlin Games* it becomes clear that the mobilization of the German masses was part of a larger propaganda strategy aimed at impressing foreign audiences and visitors:

Die Inlandspropaganda müßte und konnte am frühesten anlaufen. Ihr fiel zunächst die Aufgabe zu für die Spiele im deutschen Volk eine so starke Anteilnahme fände,

⁹³ Organisations-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936. (1937). *XI Olympiade Berlin 1936: Amtlicher Bericht (Band 2)*. Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag. Available at the Bundesarchives, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde, access number 24339.

daß sie dem Ausland und dem nach Deutschland kommenden Ausländer bemerkbar wurde.⁹⁴

Domestic propaganda for the Games was thus set up in an earlier phase than international propaganda in order to prepare the entire German population for its role as ambassador of the Third Reich.

The collective support and sacrifices that had to be made to defend the honor of the fatherland also applied to individual athletic performances. The appropriation of the Olympic Games as a celebration of *Deutschtum* enabled the Nazi leadership to represent the individual performances of athletes as sacrifices for the fatherland. Moreover, the aesthetic dimension of the well-trained athletic body was mobilized as an icon of youth and health, symbolizing the strength of the whole nation, as has especially become apparent in Riefenstahl's film *Olympiad* (1938). The athlete's pain, courage, stamina and beauty were not presented as individual qualities, but as the result of the individual's immersion in his or her quest to serve the nation. A commentary on the victory of the Japanese marathon runner Ritei Son in the *Tageblatt Wocheschau* vividly illustrates this collectivization of the athlete's performance:

Man spürt die Energie, mit der er sich jahrelang auf den Lauf seines Leben vorbereitete, und man glaubt zuerkennen daß weder Leitung noch Ruhm aus ihm einen solchen Mensch gemacht haben. Es ist Dienst am Vaterlande und an den Göttern. Der Augenblick der Siegesehrung seigt ihn in andächtiger Demut.⁹⁵

Instead of stressing that participating in the Games is more important than winning, the Nazis emphasized the nationalist aspects of the Olympic Games so that nationalist rivalries triumphed over amateurism, pacifism and fair play.

Reiterating what has been said so far, in this section we reconstructed how the Nazis appropriated the Games. The Nazis overcame the discrepancy between national socialist ideology and Olympism by identifying and subsequently negotiating their interests within the network that produced the 1936 Games. The Nazi leadership presented the event as an opportunity to collectively defend the nation's honor. In this manner, the Games were framed as a historical moment enabling the mobilization of the entire German population in support and celebration of their nationhood. Such a celebration of the nation would not have been possible without the construction of a mythological past. By rewriting history, the Nazis were able to legitimize National Socialism, and in particular the doctrine of the superiority of the Aryan race, which was supported by a radical interpretation, or rather appropriation of Darwinism. To produce, visualize and propagate this mythical past, tangible evidence was needed. The Nazis constructed, visualized and propagated this 'evidence' by means of archeological expeditions and the introduction of the torch relay and other rituals, like crowning the Olympic champion with wreaths of oak leaves instead of the common laurel ones. To appropriate the Olympic Games in this manner, the Nazis had to align a multitude of heterogeneous actors, such as archeological sites, antique objects, oak leaves and torches. The result of aligning all these actors was that the Nazis were able to use the Olympic Games as a platform to propagate and anchor a national socialist mythical version of history. This mythical and collectivist approach to the Olympic Games also opened up possibilities for re-conceptualizing sports and the athletic

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 352.

⁹⁵ "Der Marathon Sieger". *Tageblatt Wocheschau*. 16 August 1936, vol 6, issue 33. Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde, access number NS/5/VI/19415.

body. Sports competition became a matter of sacrificing oneself for the nation. Thus, the individualistic approach to athletic performance advocated by Olympism was replaced by a collectivist conception that integrated the individual body into the larger body of the nation.

But what happened between the IOC and Berlin? I will discuss Berlin's position in this network in the next paragraph, but let me focus on the IOC first. Although the Nazification of the Olympic Games was successful, it was by no means absolute. This can be illustrated by an incident that received quite some attention in the foreign press. When the first German athletes won medals, Hitler invited them to his private box to congratulate them personally. However, when the African-American athlete Jesse Owens won gold, he refused to do this, which evoked a lot of criticism from foreign athletes and the press. The IOC then summoned Hitler to either congratulate all the winners or none at all. Hitler complied and refrained from congratulating any athletes in public during the rest of the Olympic festivities (Mandell, 1972). The Nazis could simply not totally dismiss the IOC, because the event owner formed such a crucial element in the network that produced the Berlin Games. Without the IOC, no valid implementation of the Olympic event formula would be possible. An unofficial edition of the Olympics would not be recognized by other National Olympic Committees and, as a result, hardly any foreign teams would want to participate. This confirms the principle of the CityEvent model that if one of the three key actors is removed, the network that constitutes a CityEvent collapses.

5.4 TOWARDS GERMANIA: STAGING BERLIN AS THE IMPERIAL CAPITAL OF THE THIRD REICH

What role did Berlin play in the Nazification process of the 1936 Olympic Games? The construction of a narrative alone was not sufficient to produce a relationship between the Nazi regime and the noble Greek and Roman civilizations. As with the archeological expeditions, the torch relay, the oak leaves and the journey of the Olympic bell, the Third Reich's mythical connection to the ancient Greeks and Romans would only be convincing if this relationship was also materialized and performed by Berlin. The city had to exude the atmosphere of an imperial capital in order to impress domestic and foreign audiences. This required a reordering and renaming of spaces and places. City images do not appear out of the blue; they are produced in a translation process in which tangible alignments and interactions between various heterogeneous actors become increasingly abstracted and virtual. By aligning and mobilizing actors such as buildings, people, uniforms, street decorations and public transport networks, place can be produced and represented. Imageries of Berlin are therefore networked imageries: they do not exist in some virtual or symbolic space but are always linked to material actors. This does not mean that a city image is a reflection of reality. On the contrary, audiences perceive, interpret and experience the city in different manners, just as media not always adopt the imagery that is officially presented. An inquiry into the audience reception of city images, however, lies beyond the scope of this research. In the case of the 1936 Olympics, my primary focus will be on how Berlin attempted to raise its profile by reconstructing the efforts of the Nazis to present the city and the regime in an impressive, positive manner.

In this regard, the iconic function of the Olympic Stadium deserves our attention first. The stadium was larger than any other stadium ever built, and had a capacity of over 100,000 seats. The Nazis publicly announced that the stadium was bigger than its ancient predecessors in Olympia and Rome. This reference to the great works of the classical era and to the Roman coliseum in particular, was enforced by the many sculptures, ornaments and inscriptions that decorated the entrances and columns of the Olympic stadium. These sculptures (most of which still exist today) are representative of the national socialist realist style, which drew heavily on the classical ideal of the human body (Antliff, 2002). The noble Greek athlete formed the inspiration for the national socialist realist conception of the ideal Aryan figure, which was represented as such by the sculptures and ornaments in the stadium (Mandell, 1972). In this respect, an emphasis on muscular bodies and athletic poses was coupled with semi-historicized or militaristic representations. The figures often refer to a rural and tribal society, a reference supported by the inscription of the names of ancient German tribes on the stadium's six towers.

The neo-romantic ideal of a heroic and rural tribal society was further emphasized by the location of the main Olympic venues on the west side of the city in a park landscape with large trees. In addition, the Olympic village was built more than 10 miles from the city's outskirts near the ruins of an ancient German village, as if to emphasize the mythical relationship between culture and soil. The design of the village exuded a very different atmosphere than the Olympic Sport Park. The cozy houses where the foreign athletes resided were located in a forested area near a lake. The location of the Olympic village in such a natural environment, as well as the facilities, which included a sauna and a jogging track, exhibited an ideal of a natural, healthy and youthful way of life or, in other words, an anti-urban way of life in which health and youth were also associated with the wellbeing of the community as a whole. The large wooden building that functioned as recreation and dinner hall expressed this ideology: long rows of tables and benches, a wooden interior and carved figures of healthy-looking farmers all worked together to create an intimate atmosphere of togetherness and community feeling.⁹⁶

But the Third Reich also exuded an aura of modernism, even though national socialist ideology fiercely rejected modernization. A romanticized vision of the past, in which a rural Germany was worshipped, was constructed to support the presentation of the New Germany as a well-ordered, efficient and highly advanced civilization. Progress in the sense of technological and industrial development had to be reconciled with a historicized image of the nation. Berlin was therefore not only presented as the mythical imperial capital of the Third Reich, but also as the nation's industrial and economic center. German historian George L. Mosse vividly describes this tension between modernism and radical neo-romanticism: "It [National Socialism] bestowed a rootlessness upon members of industrial mass society by erecting an ideal way of life that was this society's very antithesis" (1988: 361). Despite its authoritarian character, even the Nazi regime was not able to present a homogeneous imagery. Nonetheless, this contradiction within National Socialism was partly overcome by emphasizing the analogy between Berlin and the classical civilizations. Anti-urbanism was substituted by an imperial imagery that enabled the Nazis to represent industrialization and progress as victories of the Aryan civilization.

⁹⁶ Organisations-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936. (1937). *XI Olympiade Berlin 1936: Amtlicher Bericht (Band 1)*. Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag. Available at the Bundesarchives, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde, access number 24339.

While sculptures, decoration and ornaments conveyed an analogy between the Nazi regime and the classical Greek and Roman civilization, it was above all scale that was used as a strategic asset to create an overwhelming experience. The Olympic Stadium's size was already impressive, but this effect was further enforced by the surrounding spaces and buildings. The Nazis constructed an extravagant Olympic Sports Park with large spaces between the various venues. The entrance to the stadium, for instance, was marked by an enormous square, which gave visitors entering the sports park a feeling of being a miniscule figure, a tiny part of a much larger whole. Not only did this architecture demonstrate the magnificence of the Third Reich by articulating an imperial imagery, it also embodied the submission of the individual to the larger body of the nation.⁹⁷

This representation of collectivism was established by aligning scale to mass performances. The design of the Reichsportfeld (the State sports field) illustrates this well. This venue was an extension added onto the back of the Olympic stadium, which included an enormous field offering place to more than 100,000 people and a large stand topped by the Fuehrer Tower, a robust tower in which the Olympic bell was hung to enhance the celebration of the Volksgemeinschaft. The Reichsportfeld was thus especially designed to stage mass rallies like the ones held during the opening day of the Berlin Games. In this way, the Nazis materialized and performed an imperial imagery of the Third Reich by aligning scale to architecture and crowds.

This strategic relationship between mass performances and the built environment was not confined to the Olympic Sports Park but also applied to other parts of Berlin. The construction of Olympic venues and large infrastructures—I will discuss the latter in a moment—were part of Hitler and Speer's plan to transform Berlin into Germania: the imperial capital of the Third Reich. Although, as we know, their megalomaniac plans were never (completely) realized (van der Vat, 1997), the Berlin Games were central to the attempt to create an impression of Germania. This required a more extensive reordering and renaming of urban space than the construction of the Olympic Sports Park alone. It was not coincidental that the sports park was erected at the end of a ten-mile-long avenue that started at the Palace Square. For the occasion of the Games, this boulevard was temporarily renamed the 'Via Triumphalis', inscribing another reference to ancient Rome in Berlin's space.⁹⁸ This analogy was underlined by other elements of the built environment such as the Brandenburger Tor, which functioned as a classical triumph arch.

The convenient connection with the Olympic Sport Park enabled the Nazi authorities to mobilize the masses in the right places at the right times. On the day of the opening ceremony, throngs of people stood at both sides of the enormous avenue to salute Hitler making his way to the stadium as if he were Caesar entering Rome after one of his victories. The presence of the masses was by no means a spontaneous gathering. In the weeks and days preceding the Games, the city's inhabitants were actively called upon to gather at the Via Triumphalis to welcome the Fuehrer and the Olympic guests (Mandell, 1972; Hart-Davis, 1989). The presence of the masses served two purposes. In the first place, the masses demonstrated to the rest of the world the enormous support of the German population for their national socialist regime.

⁹⁷ This interpretation of the Olympic Stadium is based on my impressions during a visit to the former Olympic Sports Park, as well as on the analyses of the stadium by Richard D. Mandell (1972) and Duff Hart-Davis (1986).

⁹⁸ Organisations-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936. (1937). *XI Olympiade Berlin 1936: Amtlicher Bericht (Band 1 und 2)*. Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag.

Secondly, the masses performed the unity of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Obviously, these two aims overlapped.

The mobilization of the masses was one thing, but they also had to be distributed properly so that every mile of the Via Triumphalis would be packed with a cheering crowd. Furthermore, crowds had to be directed to and from the Olympic stadium in an effective and orderly manner. Chaotic scenes had to be prevented at all times, because this would undermine the carefully orchestrated image of the Third Reich as a well-organized and efficient regime. For this purpose, several tram and commuter train lines were extended to the Olympic Sports Park and a new train station was constructed from which a system of fences directed visitors to and from the sports park.⁹⁹ However, the construction of this infrastructure alone was not sufficient. The support of hundreds of signs and thousands of uniformed members of the Hitler youth, the SA and the SS was needed to channel the movement of the crowds effectively. It was precisely because the Nazis were able to establish such strong connections between the built environment (architecture and urban planning), transportation systems, signs and thousands of uniformed personnel, that they were able to impose an efficient, almost militarized script (cf. Akrich, 1992; Latour, 1992) upon place.

Together, the actors that produced this script functioned more or less as obligatory points of passage. Crowds and individuals had to submit to the script in order to enter and leave the Olympic venues. This does not mean that no one could escape this logic, but that the majority of visitors were (in different ways) 'disciplined', to use a Foucauldian term (cf. Foucault, 1979), into moving, residing and behaving in specific ways in specific spaces. This scripting of place and space is best explained by drawing an analogy with an art museum. At the entrance, one is directed to the ticket-counter. Upon passing the ticket control, which is a check to ensure that one has followed the procedure of buying a valid ticket, signs and wardens instruct us to store our bags in the cloakroom. Long before entering the first exhibition space, other visitors and wardens make clear to us that we are not supposed to talk too loudly, even though in many museums no official prohibition of shouting is in place. Thus, order in the museum is created by a specific and deliberate arrangement of objects and humans (Bal, 1996; Bennett, 1999; Hudson, 1999). While an art museum is by no means comparable to a city like Berlin, it provides a more concrete example of how the reordering of space produces a script that disciplines people's behavior. The main difference lies in the scale and the aggressiveness and forcefulness of the (re)ordering processes.

Even before the Nazis seized power, Berlin had been subjected to a constant rearrangement of place driven by the national socialist urge to establish an authoritarian order. Intimidation by the SA already affected Berlin's street life in the late 1920s and early 1930s and the script that was produced to mobilize and circulate the masses in an orderly fashion during the Olympic Games was therefore based on previous rearrangements of place. Nonetheless, substantial efforts had to be undertaken to present to foreign visitors a spectacular imagery of Berlin. As will become apparent in the next section, these efforts included a temporal relaxation of rules and prohibitions (Levi, 1994), while others were aimed at producing an image of Germania by expanding and intensifying the connections between the masses, nationhood and history.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

It is in this light that I interpret the extensive redecoration of Berlin's main streets for the occasion of the Games. As became clear from the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics, the addition of decorative elements invests places with a meaning that supplements or transforms their existing meanings. In contrast to the Amsterdam Games, the decoration of Berlin's main avenues for the 1936 Olympics was accompanied by the removal of objects and subjects. Prior to the embellishment of the city's streets with thousands of red flags and banners on which the swastika was printed, a campaign was launched to clear the streets of all 'superfluous signs, advertisements, billboards, murals and construction works'.¹⁰⁰ Whereas the main streets of Amsterdam were decorated with the aim of increasing retail sales during the 1928 Olympics, in the case of the Berlin Games political interests clearly dominated over economic interests.¹⁰¹ The removal of 'superfluous' elements from gables and street furniture was an attempt to remove from public spaces any other signifiers than the Nazi symbols. The redecoration of Berlin's streets was required to display unity and in this regard the street decoration subscribed to a similar logic as the script that had been produced to mobilize and circulate the masses. The alignments that were established between the cheering crowds, the orderly directed flows of people, the Via Triumphalis and the thousands of flags and banners together performed the mythical unity of the *Volksgemeinschaft*.

To achieve unity, the Nazis removed as many 'dissident elements' from the city's most prominent places as possible. This rearrangement and reordering of place was part of an aggressive, even violent propaganda strategy aimed at countering rumors about the Nazis' racist policies. The exclusion of Jewish athletes from the German Olympic team had been widely reported in foreign media, especially leading American newspapers (Bohlen, 1979). The issue had led to an influential lobby in America, which had almost led the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) to withdraw from the Games. Although Hitler initially refused to make concessions, even after a meeting with the American ambassador¹⁰², the Nazis ultimately relaxed

¹⁰⁰ Correspondence about the removal of abundant signs between, on the one hand, the Prussian Prime Minister and Finance Minister and, on the other, Dr. Posse, the Secretary of Justice, can be found in the the Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde, access number R/55/1473 under the title 'Bereinigung des Stadtbildes. Ortssatzung zur Bereinigung des Stadtbildes'.

¹⁰¹ In a letter to the Prussian Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Dr. Posse complains about the introduction of even more regulations for street and gable advertisements and construction sites. In his view, these regulations will negatively affect the economy and in particular the advertising industry, which, in 1935, had already declined by 59% compared to 1929. From this letter, it becomes clear that the removal of 'unnecessary signs' before the Olympic Games was by no means an incident, but rather yet another measure based upon existing legislation. The dramatic decrease in the advertising market that resulted from these measures clearly was not a priority for the Nazi leadership. Political interests were considered paramount. Source: see the previous footnote; the letter is included in the same folder, access number R/55/1473.

¹⁰² In folder, access number R/1501/5613 of the Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Kichterfelde, notes can be found of a meeting between Hitler and the American Ambassador Sherill in Munich on 24 August 1935. In the meeting, Sherill warns Hitler several times to reconsider his standpoint with regard to the participation of Jews in German sports associations and the Olympic team. According to Sherill, an influential anti-German lobby has been started in America by influential Jews with close connections to the central government, so that an American boycott of the Olympic Games is now a realistic danger. Hitler responds by saying that he will not reconsider his standpoint and that if the USA boycotts the Olympics in Berlin, Germany will withdraw from all other international sports competitions. However, shortly after this meeting, Pfundter, the German Interior Minister, announces adjustments in the policies regarding the exclusion of Jews from sports competitions and the Olympic Games. Pfundter's letter is dated 9 September 1935, demonstrating that Hitler could ultimately not resist foreign pressure.

their anti-Semitic legislation and allowed a few German-Jewish athletes (albeit with Aryan looks) on their team (Mandell, 1972; Hardt-Davis, 1986).

How did an American lobby evolve into such a strong network that it became a serious threat to the organizers of the Berlin Games? In other words, why did the Nazis eventually allow Jews on the German Olympic team? This could only be achieved because the lobby was able to get the leading American news media, the IOC and the USOC interested. The event owner and the media, two of the three key actors that constituted the CityEvent, were about to turn against the host city and leave the network. The American media paid attention to the discrimination of Jewish athletes in Germany because this furnished rich material for a scandal likely to increase audience interest. In addition, for some newspapers, their large numbers of Jewish readers might have been an added incentive to cover the topic extensively. The exclusion of Jewish athletes from the German Olympic Team also opened up the domestic debate on the discrimination of blacks (Mandell, 1972) and once a few newspapers had decided to publish stories about the discrimination of Jews in Germany, other media could no longer ignore the issue. Although the affair divided the American sports associations and the USOC internally (Mandell, 1972; Espy, 1979), by this time the anti-German lobby had become a matter of national concern. To disregard the topic would mean that a newspaper or radio channel placed itself outside the news spectrum, possibly losing audiences and eventually advertisers. In European countries such as France and the United Kingdom, attention was also paid to the issue but the different national agendas meant that most European media emphasized other aspects of the Berlin Games. The French media were, for instance, more concerned with the question whether Nazi Germany posed a military threat to national security.¹⁰³ Considering the country's turbulent relation with Germany in previous centuries, national defense played a more dominant role in media reports than the discrimination of Jewish athletes.

Because the USA was by far the largest country participating in the Games, the IOC could not simply disregard the American lobby against the Nazi Olympics. The support of the American athletes and audiences to a great extent determined the success of the Olympic Games and their withdrawal was likely to do extensive damage to the reputation and prestige of the Olympic event formula and its owner. Both the IOC and USOC shared a similar concern in this regard. A possible withdrawal of the USOC would not only undermine the project of the eleventh Olympiad, but also harm the USOC itself because this institution also derived its prestige and reputation from the Olympic movement. The IOC and USOC were therefore mutually dependent on each other's cooperation and to prevent America from withdrawing, the IOC put pressure on Germany to adjust its racist policies.¹⁰⁴ Since the American sports associations and American Olympic Committee were internally divided about participation, the relaxation of anti-Semitic legislation on Germany's side was received with mixed feelings. The American boycott was

¹⁰³ The Nazis monitored and analyzed international press coverage of the 1936 Olympic Games. According to these reviews, criticism of the Nazi regime differed per country. From the Nazi review of the French press it becomes clear that the French were mostly concerned about national security. I have checked the references in the Nazi press review report as much as possible against the actual articles in the French press. The Nazi press review reports are available at the Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde, access number R/55/1054.

¹⁰⁴ In a letter dated 13 January 1934 to Dr. Lewald, head of the Organizing Committee of the Berlin Games, Baron Baillet-Latour, chairman of the IOC, expresses his concern about Germany's racist policies with regard to the Olympic Games. Reference: Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde, access number R/1501/5613.

eventually prevented at a late stage when the USOC decided not to give in to public pressure. Germany's difficulties with the Jews were presented by Average Bundage, the chair of the USOC, and by high-ranking officials in the American government, as a similar problem to the lynching of blacks in the south of the USA. (Findling and Pelle, 1996). According to the USOC and the IOC, Germany did not exclude Jews from sports participation or any other public activities. On the contrary, Germany was presented as an ally of the USA due to the Nazis' strong commitment to fighting Bolshevism (Espy, 1979). In this way, the alleged opposition between the two countries was bridged through the definition of a common political interest. This shared interest enabled the American sports leaders to draw attention away from the discrimination of Jews and to strengthen alignments with the American government, the national news media and the Nazi regime. Because the relationship between America and Germany was presented as a matter of great national interest, the USOC and its allies were able to align particular news media and segments of the public to their cause, thereby undermining the network of the American anti-German lobby.

Despite some fierce criticism of the Nazi regime, such as that raised by the American anti-German lobby, the deep fear of communism in America and many European nations had created sympathy for authoritarian forms of leadership among a considerable minority of the American and European population (Joll, 1990). Democratic governments in the West were exposed to an almost continuous threat of revolution caused by the deep economic, social and political crisis that characterized the Interwar period. Countries with a longer democratic tradition than Germany, such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, experienced great difficulties in protecting their democratic systems against revolts from the extreme left and right sides of the political spectrum (Caljé and Hollander, 1996). In this turbulent context, in which democratic, fascist and communist ideologies competed with each other, the presentation of the New Germany and its capital Berlin should be understood as a serious effort to convince foreign audiences and in particular their governments of the advantages of National Socialism. This exploitation of the Olympic Games is clearly expressed in an interview with the Mayor of Bremen, where the Olympic sailing contests were held:

We Germans have indeed an idea of what Bolshevism really is. And I am of the opinion that it is just the uniting of the good powers of a people, born out of suffering, which will give a certain firmness in the fight against Bolshevism to the other peoples of the world. Let it be well understood that the Germans don't want to National Socialism to be regarded as an export article. But each nation must develop the authoritative guidance which it needs out of itself and accordingly build it up in its own way. But, I wish to emphasise that without this authoritative guidance no people can exist in the long run. This does not only prove true in the reorganization of political and economic conditions, but also in sport.¹⁰⁵

The fight against Bolshevism provided the Nazis with a reason to legitimate their totalitarian state form. Generating foreign sympathy for this state model was precisely what the Nazis aimed to achieve with the temporary relaxation of the Nuremberg laws. To disarm any potential negative media attention and to prevent any other criticism in the future, Goebbels ordered the temporary removal of all anti-Semitic signs from those places that foreign guests were expected to visit during the 1936 winter and summer Olympics (Krüger, 1999; Eisen, 1998). Places were thus literally

¹⁰⁵ 'The Mayor Greets Bremen's Olympic Guests'. *Bremer Zeitung*. nr., 229, August, 18, 1936. Special English sections were included in German newspapers during the Olympic Games for foreign visitors. Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde, accessnumber NS/5/VI/19415.

renamed to present a false image of the Nazi regime. But such renaming could not effectively be carried out without a rearrangement of places. The removal of anti-Semitic signs was one example of such a rearrangement, but humans were also involved in this process. In Berlin, the authorities removed groups of people that were perceived to undermine the propaganda potential of the Games. "In the run-up to this monumental show, there was a wave of excessively brutal arrests of potential resisters, creating the appearance of internal peace by force" (Zielinski, 1999: 170). In combination with the removal of 'unnecessary' objects such as advertisements on shop fronts, windows and street furniture, the Nazis attempted to give foreign guests an orderly, effective and overwhelming impression of Berlin and the national socialist regime. The imagery had to be as homogeneous as possible, reducing any ambiguity or counter images to a minimum. To a great extent, the Nazis had already achieved this prior to the Games. From the moment the Nazis seized power, political dissidents were incarcerated in so-called 're-education camps' (Shirer, 1960; Bohlen, 1979). Although reports had appeared about these concentration camps in the foreign press before the Games began, the camps were far removed from the main venues and foreign visitors were actively kept away from them.¹⁰⁶

While the Nazis covered up the discrimination of Jews by admitting half-Jewish athletes to participate in the German Olympic Team and by removing anti-Semitic signs, they used even more violent measures to keep the Roma community carefully out of foreign visitors' sight. When plans were made to replace the Grunewald Stadium with a larger Olympic Stadium, a Roma community of 2,000 people living near the planned Olympic Sports Park was deported to a concentration camp on the outskirts of Berlin, in the village of Marzahn. Only a small number of them would survive the terror of forced labor, starvation and torture (Benz, 1994). The authorities considered the presence of the Roma inappropriate because they would undermine the presentation of the 'Neue Deutsche Mensch'. Hence, great human sacrifices were made to construct a false imagery.

This imagery was nonetheless perceived as very real. The historian Richard D. Mandell (1972), in his book *The Nazi Olympics*, suggests that the Olympic Games led to a temporal relaxation of the aggressive racist and militaristic policies of the Nazis. In his view, the Olympic Games were not only a charm offensive, but caused a hush to fall over Europe before the dark clouds of war gathered over the continent. German newspapers, which frequently portrayed non-Aryans and Jews in particular as national enemies, softened their tone for months before and after the Games. In addition, public intimidation and violence towards non-Aryan Germans was reduced, certainly in those places frequented by foreign visitors and media (Levi, 1994). Political pressure on neighboring countries such as Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland was also relaxed.

The Nazis realized that a militaristic presentation of Germany would scare away foreign guests and undermine the carefully constructed image of a friendly ally in the fight against Bolshevism. From the beginning, the Nazi leadership had stressed that the Olympic Games were to be an apolitical event (Zielinski, 1989). Even though this message contradicted the abovementioned attempts to convince other Western

¹⁰⁶ In an article in *Le Figaro* of 2 August 1936, the journalist Wladimir d'Ormasson complains that the Games are being used by the Nazis to draw attention away from the dictatorial characteristics of the regime. Foreign guests were overwhelmed by spectacle, but saw nothing of the concentration camps. From Ormasson's criticism it becomes clear that the presence of these camps was already known abroad before the Olympic Games took place. Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde, access number R/4902/1710.

powers of the advantages of National Socialism in the fight against Bolshevism, the Nazis issued such 'hollow phrases' in an effort to create an effective balance between, on the one hand, political propaganda, which aimed at impressing foreign and domestic audiences, and, on the other, the creation of a friendly and welcoming atmosphere. One example of the measures that were taken to prevent the projection of a militaristic image of Germany was the 'Standortbefehl' (order) of 23 July 1936, which prohibited the wearing of uniforms in bars and hotels while obliging it in and around the Olympic venues themselves.¹⁰⁷

To a great extent, the Nazis managed to convince the foreign press that the New Germany was a well-organized, efficient and friendly nation. Leading international newspapers such as *The Times* and *The Independent* adopted this imagery. There were nonetheless also limits to the Nazi propaganda. Precisely because the Nazis turned the Olympics into a huge media event, the presence of foreign media also made them vulnerable to criticism. In comparison to the Amsterdam Games, there were many more foreign journalists present in Berlin. On the one hand, this offered the Nazis the opportunity to influence world opinion, while on the other it meant that 'cracks' in the carefully constructed presentation of the regime and its capital would also be easier to notice. This is demonstrated, for instance, by two incidents that were widely picked up by the foreign press. In the first case, due to a lack of security forces, an enthusiastic crowd was able to break through a police cordon to greet Göring on his way to the stadium. In the second case, a Dutch woman broke through Hitler's security cordon to greet him. The Ministry of Propaganda immediately summoned the organizing committee to confiscate all photographs taken by amateur photographers of the latter incident (Mandell, 1972). This order was issued in order to contain the damage to the Nazi image caused by the incident, but the organizing committee refused to carry it out. These incidents, the attention they were given in the foreign press, and the disobedience of the organizing committee, show that despite their attempts to propagate the Third Reich as a well-organized, orderly and efficient society, the Nazi leadership did not succeed in producing a completely incontrovertible and smooth imagery. Moreover, even if they had accomplished this, not all foreign journalists would have been impressed: the bombastic political propaganda of the Nazis was criticized by various foreign newspapers including the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Manchester Guardian* and the French *Oeuvre*. On the other hand, in line with contemporary political affiliations, the Austrian and Sudeten-German newspapers in Czechoslovakia praised the spectacular staging of the Games.¹⁰⁸

The most contested and at the same time most praised element of the spectacular staging of the 1936 Games is undoubtedly Leni Riefenstahl's two-part *Olympia* film, *Festival of the People* and *Festival of Beauty*. In Europe, the film was received with great enthusiasm, with only a few left-wing media commenting negatively upon the film's release in April, 1938. Riefenstahl's *Olympia* was praised for its aesthetic approach to the athletic body, crowds and the built environment. Although they did experiment with camera techniques and technologies, Riefenstahl and her team would not have been able to produce such a cinematic aesthetic and spectacle without the megalomaniac setting the Nazi created for the Games. In other words, the grandiose architecture and boulevards, the illumination of the impressive

¹⁰⁷ Standortbefehl, 23-07-1936, Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde, access number NS/31/88.

¹⁰⁸ Nazi press monitoring reports of the American, Austrian, Belgian, British, Danish, Czechoslovakian, Dutch, Egyptian, Finnish, French, Italian, Russian, Swedish and Turkish media: Bundesarchiv, Berlin, categorized under code R/55/1054.

Olympic stadium, the hyper-ordered channeling of crowds of people and the purification and unification of public space by means of decorations bearing Nazi symbols in combination with the removal of ‘dissident’ objects and subjects, produced a gigantic ready-made film décor for Riefenstahl and her team.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, much of the efforts the Nazis undertook in organizing the Olympic Games were directed at transforming Berlin into a spectacular image-generating landscape. It was only after the *Kristallnacht* (Crystal Night) of 9 to 10 November 1938, that the film, and consequently the general Nazi propaganda imagery, became controversial and that boycotts of the film increased, especially in the United States (Downing, 1992). Thus the film was generally perceived positively abroad, until political events put the Nazis and many things associated with National Socialism, like Riefenstahl’s work, in a negative light. This shows that the propaganda strategies of the Nazi were quite successful: the Games themselves were not associated with dangerous politics by large segments of the European and North-American public until Germany’s unification with Austria (March, 1938), the annexation of Sudetenland (September, 1938) and the *Kristallnacht*, years after the festivities (Shirer, 1960; Mandell, 1972; Downing, 1992).

Since our inquiry into the Nazi Olympics focuses on the production process of imageries in the run-up to the Games and *Olympia* was not released until Hitler’s 49th birthday (20 April 1938), almost two years after the event, Riefenstahl’s film falls beyond the scope of our inquiry. We will therefore not engage in an analysis of the film, but will focus instead on the whole array of media technologies that were mobilized during the Olympic events to produce the above-mentioned propaganda imagery.

5.5 MEDIA ANNEXATION

What distinguished the Nazi display strategies from those employed by previous hosts of the Olympic Games was not only the scale of their architecture, audiences and street decorations, but also their deployment of various media technologies to augment the propagation of National Socialism. In contrast to the Amsterdam Games, the Nazis did not solely rely on independent media coverage. They actively constructed their own media technologies and networks to mediate the eleventh Olympiad. On the theoretical level of the CityEvent model, this annexation of media technologies and organizations implies that the key actors of the host city and the media increasingly merged. Of course, the Nazis were not able to align all the news media organizations covering the Berlin Games with their propaganda network. Foreign newspapers on the left side of the political spectrum remained especially critical.¹¹⁰ The increasing integration of the key actors media and host city is

¹⁰⁹ I base this argument on my extensive reading about the cinematic city. The works of Bruno (1997a, 1997b); Bullock (2003); Clarke, ed. (1997); Donald (1995); Friedberg (1993); Gunning (1995) and Uricchio (1982) in particular have been very helpful in achieving a better understanding of the relationships that exist between the cinema apparatus and the city in all its physical, dynamic and symbolic forms.

¹¹⁰ According to Nazi press monitoring reports, some foreign newspapers like the *New York Herald Tribune* criticized the opening ceremony of the Games for focusing too much on spectacle and drawing attention away from sportsmanship. For this newspaper, the Games became too much of a celebration of Germanhood and propagation of a regime that was considered to be the most nationalistic and militaristic of its kind in Europe. The French paper *Oeuvre* accused the Nazis of staging a charm

nonetheless clearly illustrated by the institutional difference that existed between the Luce Film Company, which produced the Olympic film for the Amsterdam Games, and Riefenstahl's production company. Even though Riefenstahl has always claimed that she worked independently of the Nazi party, she received more than 1.5 million Reichsmark from the Ministry of Propaganda for the production of her films (Barkhausen, 1974; Downing, 1992). While the extent to which this financial dependency influenced Riefenstahl's work remains a topic of fierce debate, the direct state financing shows that the Nazis adhered to a very different strategy than the organizers of the Amsterdam Games. The Nazis did not sell the film and photography rights off to the highest bidder, but instead aimed to keep as much control as possible over the media by establishing their own news media networks or by granting media rights to institutions and persons like Riefenstahl that were loyal to the Nazi party.¹¹¹

In the case of the Berlin Games, the distance between promotion on the one hand and media coverage on the other was smaller than in the case of the Amsterdam Games, because the Nazis produced media content on a much larger scale by annexing various news media organizations and technologies. Hence, the host city aligned and incorporated segments of the media into its network. The printed press, radio, cinema and various other art forms such as dance and theatre had already been brought under the strict control of Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda long before the Games were staged (Kershaw, 1993; Barthrick, 1997). In addition, the Nazis experimented with broadcasting technology on an unprecedented scale in order to maximize the effect of the carefully produced imperial presentation of Berlin (Zielinski, 1999). The presentation of Berlin was therefore not limited to specific strategies of display like the ones the organizers of the Amsterdam Games had deployed by organizing various exhibitions and an excursion program for foreign journalists. The Nazis also invested heavily in processes of mediation by transforming urban spaces into large media arenas. On the one hand, the Nazis produced as many representations as possible ('factual information', images and news stories), all presented in a news medium format that pretended to be objective in style. On the other hand, the Nazis 'bombarded' Berlin's inhabitants and visitors with live radio reports and screenings which were broadcast all over the city. The intended effect of this strategy was to immerse audiences completely in the Olympic spectacle and the performance of German nationhood.

This annexation of urban space and media technologies is most vividly illustrated by the television broadcasts of the Berlin Olympics. In 26 places across Berlin, large tents were erected with screens to broadcast the Games live to those who were not lucky enough to be able to follow the matches in the stadium. In addition, the same broadcasts were also featured in two big screen projection theaters. In this

offensive to create goodwill amongst the French political establishment in the hopes of weakening the country's pact with Russia. In addition, *Le Figaro* suggested that the Games were being used to increase the inflow of foreign currencies to finance Germany's weapons industry. The Nazi press monitoring reports of the American, Austrian, Belgian, British, Danish, Czechoslovakian, Dutch, Egyptian, Finnish, French, Italian, Russian, Swedish and Turkish presses are available at the Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde, access number R/55/1054.

¹¹¹ Even though Riefenstahl has always denied any awareness of the ideological implications of her work for the Nazi party, her vision on cinema aesthetics certainly did not undermine the national socialist ideology and institutions. Considering the warm personal relations she maintained with Hitler and other high officials in the Nazi party, she was certainly an insider to the regime even if she perhaps did not fully adhere to National Socialism. For extensive readings of Riefenstahl's relation to Nazism and aesthetics see Sontag (1966); Infield (1976); Riefenstahl (1987); Downing (1999) and Mackenzie (2003).

manner, a link was established between the public outside and inside the stadium, who could share an experience of the Olympic Games. With viewing figures averaging 10,000 per day, 162,228 people in total watched the television broadcasts during the Olympic Games.¹¹² Such a vast number of people had never been reached through television before. The shared experience was further reinforced by hundreds of loudspeakers positioned along the Via Triumphalis.¹¹³ By placing loudspeakers and television screens in public space, the Nazis transformed the street into an almost absolute propaganda space.

In this regard, an opposite deployment of television and radio technology can be identified. Whereas radio was initially introduced as a medium for the private sphere and later used to invade the public space, the Nazis developed television as a collective and public medium first.

Radio developed in such a manner that first came the home set for individual reception and from this, about ten years later, developed the appliances for collective listening. With television, it is the other way round: the first urgent task to be tackled is collective television... and then—perhaps—television sets for the home may be developed.¹¹⁴

By deploying radio and television technology on such a large scale, the Nazis constantly tried to immerse audiences in a collective experience. Even if one did not want to take part in the celebration of the Games, of nationhood and of the Fuehrer, there was hardly any escape. While television viewing took place in private space, the sound of the loudspeakers was omnipresent, penetrating even windows and walls, while neighbors' radio sets also invaded the private sphere of the home (Welch, 2002). The whole purpose of deploying radio and television as collective media was to interlock the public and the private in order to create shared local and national spaces.¹¹⁵ In short, the Nazis used broadcasting technologies as nation-writing media that transgressed the boundaries between public and private with the aim of creating a total and absolute propaganda space.

The television broadcasts united the inhabitants of Berlin, while the loudspeakers and radio broadcasts established an even larger alignment with the entire German population. Remote audiences across Germany could experience the Olympic Games at the same time as the audiences in the stadium and on the streets of Berlin (Welch, 2002; Zielinski, 1999). In addition, the Nazis adhered to a flexible media policy with regard to amateur film and photography in the stadium.¹¹⁶ The innumerable amateur films and photographs shot during the Berlin Olympics formed an effective manner to align even more people with the celebration of *Deutschtum*. Photos and films functioned as souvenirs that enabled audiences to share part of their

¹¹² During the sixteen days of the Olympic festivities, live broadcasts were sent out from the Paul Nipkow transmitting station between 10 and 12 a.m. and between 3 and 7 p.m., while between 8 and 10 p.m. a program showed the highlights of the day. Thus, the majority of the broadcasts were live. Organisations-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936. (1937). *XI Olympiade Berlin 1936: Amtlicher Bericht (Band 2)*. Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Fernsehen und Tonfilm, Vol. 6 (2), April, 1935, p. 15 quoted in: Zielinski (1999) *Audiovisions: Cinema and Television as Entr'actes in History*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, p. 162.

¹¹⁵ For a more extensive analysis of the creation of national spaces I refer to Benedict Anderson's book *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (2003). London, New York: Verso.

¹¹⁶ Organisations-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936. (1937). *XI Olympiade Berlin 1936: Amtlicher Bericht (Band 2)*. Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag.

experience with their friends and family at home (Stewart, 1993). In this way, the event could be commemorated on an even larger scale, further contributing to the staging of the Berlin Games as an important historic moment.

Indeed, the Nazis made strategic use of media technologies to produce live history. In this respect, the Berlin Games can be regarded as one of the world's first true media events. Such events, according to Dayan and Katz (1992), are typically presented as historical moments even before they have come to a close. It was precisely the shared experience among remote audiences constituted by the deployment of electronic media technologies that attributed prestige and historical importance to the 1936 Olympics. Furthermore, the Nazis also actively emphasized the Games as a great moment in history, as is vividly illustrated by a rather cynical commentary in the *New York Times*:

Big metal loud-speakers every thousand feet gave them a running account of what the more fortunate individuals were seeing with their own eyes. According to the announcers, the whole affair consisted largely of the Fuehrer and what the Fuehrer did. The international Olympic Committee barely had arrived at the Fuehrer Tower to begin the ceremonies when the broadcaster announced to the rapt hundreds of thousands, "We await the Fuehrer every moment. Never would this great field have been erected except for the Fuehrer. It was created by his will".¹¹⁷

The deployment of media technologies, and in particular electronic media technologies such as loudspeakers, microphones (in total more than 350 microphones were installed in the Olympic venues), radio and television, enabled the Nazis to construct and impose a dominant narrative. This narrative could only successfully be constructed because annexed media technologies enlarged the spectacular effects that were realized by mobilizing the masses, creating impressive art works, architecture and infrastructures, clearing and decorating public spaces, and mining history by drawing anachronistic analogies between the Third Reich and classic Greek and Roman civilizations. Hence, media technologies were used to reorder and rename place in an even more radical fashion. The relationship between the renaming of place and media technologies is most clearly illustrated by the special effects that the Nazis were able to produce by means of these technologies. When, for instance, the natural sound of the bells in the Olympic bell tower was not considered loud enough, the Nazis installed electric amplifiers to maximize the acoustic effect, thereby overruling all other sounds (Zielinski, 1999).

Of all the media that were used, radio broadcasting dominated the Berlin Games. Apart from the extensive broadcasting network and programs that were set up for domestic audiences, reporters from forty countries sent approximately 3,000 radio reports abroad.¹¹⁸ Most of these broadcasts were transmitted live. In comparison to the mediation of the Amsterdam Games, the media effect of the Berlin Games was therefore less distanced and much more dynamic. The live reporting added to the excitement of watching sport matches, enabling audiences from different parts of the world to share the same experience. The radio medium enhanced a feeling of immediacy not only because reports were broadcast live, but also because the sounds of the cheering crowds in the stadium, Olympic hymns, bombastic Nazi music and the ringing of the Olympic bells were mediated simultaneously with reporters'

¹¹⁷ 'Fuehrer Key Man in Olympic Show'. *The New York Times*. August 2, 1936, p. 33. The article has been obtained through the New York Times on-line archive service.

¹¹⁸ Organisations-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936. (1937). *XI Olympiade Berlin 1936: Amtlicher Bericht (Band 2)*. Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag.

commentaries. The auditory mediation of the Olympic events thus enabled remote audiences to experience more dimensions of the CityEvent, maximizing the spectacle that the Nazis staged. In addition, prior to the Games the Nazis had provided foreign radio stations with special programs that announced the Olympic Games. As Dayan and Katz (1992) argue, such pre-announcements heighten audience excitement and enthusiasm for the event. The same media impact could not be generated by the printed press, because of the temporal delay in covering events that is inherent to this mode of mediation.

Nevertheless, the role of the printed press should not be disregarded. Since the 1928 Olympics in Amsterdam, printing techniques had improved. More articles were, for example, being illustrated with photographs, which were also of a higher quality. In addition, the Nazis distributed thousands of brochures and illustrated newsletters abroad in advance of the Games.¹¹⁹ The pre-announcement was therefore much better organized and on a much larger scale than was the case with the Amsterdam Games. The increase in the visual quality of the printed press was further enhanced by the international distribution of newsreels and promotion films before, during and after the Berlin Games. When we compare the quantity and quality of media technologies and organizations that covered the 1936 Olympics with those of Amsterdam, we can conclude that audiences had a much wider choice of available news media. In contrast to the 1928 Games, the representation of the Berlin Games was the product of an interlinking of texts, photographs, moving images and sound broadcasts. This richness in the presentation and coverage of the event and its host city was a necessary condition for the Nazis to stage their mega propaganda spectacle successfully.

All these developments point to a transformation in the relation between the host city and the media. In the case of the Amsterdam Games, the host city relied more on the cooperation of the printed press than the other way around. The Nazis anticipated this dependency and established their own news media networks to reduce as much as possible their reliance on independent news media for positive coverage. When we interpret this development in terms of the CityEvent model, we can identify an increasing integration of the media and host city key actors. The host city not only incorporates segments of the media domain, it also has to do more to align independent news media to its project. This is illustrated by the enormous efforts that the Nazis put into the staging and propagating of the eleventh Olympiad and its host city, as has been discussed throughout this chapter. In relation to the overall organizational costs, the investments that were made to produce and mediate images of the event, city and nation were also substantially higher than was the case in Amsterdam in 1928. At the time of the Amsterdam Games, a well-organized edition of the Olympics, in combination with a few promotional activities, was still considered sufficient for successfully raising the

¹¹⁹ In the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin and the Zentrum für Berlin Studien, several brochures and illustrated newsletters can be found. Zentrum für Berlin Studien, Berlin, access number B 975 OLY 12, contents: Promotion brochure "Olympische Spiele Berlin 1936: 1-16 August"; access number: B 975 OLY 39, contents: Olympia Zeitung: offizielles Organe der XI. Olympische Spiele 1936 in Berlin; Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Platz, access number Os 6601/236-1933/36, contents: Olympia Pressdienst: Olympische Spiele Berlin 1936. Berlin: Organisation-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936 Herausgegeben von Olympisch Komitee. In addition, the official report by the organizing committee describes in detail and in exact numbers the promotional material that was distributed abroad in advance of the Games. Source: Organisations-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936. (1937). *XI Olympiade Berlin 1936: Amtlicher Bericht (Band 2)*. Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag. Another valuable source is: Zentrum für Berlin Studien, Berlin, access number B 975 OLY 51, contents: XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936: Pressführer.

international profile of its host. In the case of the Berlin Games, the successful organization of the CityEvent alone was no longer considered sufficient to achieve this. Since the celebration of the first Olympic Games in Athens in 1896, the staging of this CityEvent has increasingly been transformed from the organization of a sports event into the mounting of a grandiose public relations offensive. The Berlin Games certainly formed a transition point in this process in the way it maximally integrated the staging of the Olympics with image production processes. Sports competition was no longer the main ingredient of the Games as mediation more and more became a goal in itself.

5.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we examined the production process underlying the imageries through which the Nazis presented themselves to the world as hosts of the eleventh Olympiad. This event enabled the Nazis to stage a charm offensive unlike any other. In this regard, we reconstructed how the Nazi leadership presented the city as the imperial centre of the Third Reich by anachronistically drawing an analogy with ancient Rome. The Nazi establishment exploited the Olympic Games as an opportunity to construct a historical connection between the Third Reich and the classical Greek and Roman civilizations in order to emphasize the racial superiority of the Aryan race. This rewriting of history not only enabled the Nazis to present domestic and foreign audiences with a preview of *Germania*, Hitler and Speer's megalomaniac plan for a new Berlin (Reichshardt and Schäche, 1985), but also resulted in an almost absolute 'nazification' of the Olympic Games, which undermined the Olympic generic formula and marginalized the IOC's position as event owner.

The nazification of the Olympic formula draws attention to the formation of the key actor host city. In comparison to the Amsterdam Games, the nation state increasingly began to operate as the dominant actor within the heterogeneous amalgamation of networks that makes up the host city. In the case of Berlin, local agendas and aspirations were overshadowed by those of the nation state, as was the (re)presentation of Berlin. Even more telling was the way that Berlin underwent a substantial reordering and renaming process, explicitly designed to adapt its profile to the needs of the Nazi regime, which was to propagate the greatness of the Third Reich. Huge investments were made to achieve this desired imagery. The Olympic Sports Park was built, art works were commissioned, transportation systems were set up to mobilize the crowds in an orderly manner, streets were decorated with swastika-imprinted flags and banners, advertisements and anti-Semitic signs were removed, and political dissidents and a Roma community were deported.

The reordering and renaming of Berlin occurred as a process in which the media became increasingly integrated with the network of the Olympic organizers. Radio and television technology was widely used to create a public and highly controlled news media network that penetrated as many public and private spaces within the Berlin area as possible. In addition, the enormous efforts that were undertaken by the Nazis to influence foreign media coverage showed that the key actor 'media' was gaining in importance in the network. In this regard, we can make a distinction between, on the one hand, annexed news media, which had become an integrated network within the organizing network of the host city, and, on the other, independent foreign news media. The latter constituted a risk, because the Nazis could

not control them. To reduce the risk, the Nazis set up their own news media networks to influence foreign media as much as possible.

When we compare the interconnections between the media and Berlin as the host city of the 1936 Games to the previously analyzed Amsterdam Games, a development can be identified. The media impact of the Olympics seems to have increased due to the introduction of different forms of media coverage, ranging from the distant reporting of the rather fixed printed press to the immediacy conveyed by cinema, live radio and television broadcasting. When we link this transformation in media usage and coverage to the increasing integration of the staging of the Games with urban planning, architecture and urban policies, we are able to identify a development in which the (re)presentation of host cities increasingly seems to rest on interventions in the built environment that serve and support media in their image-generating capacity. In the next chapter, this conclusion will be taken one step further in our analysis of the 1952 Helsinki Games, where the emphasis shifts from the visible urban environment to the infrastructures that have to be constructed to facilitate media coverage.

6. THE HELSINKI OLYMPICS OF 1952

*A Gateway between East and West*¹²⁰

*Ancient Ceremony Today to Open Olympic Games for 70 Nations at
Helsinki*

**TORCH AT HELSINKI
TO LIGHT NEW HOPE**

**Igniting of Flame Today Seen
Striking a Spark of Peace
Through Understanding**

5,870 ATHLETES TO MARCH

**Finnish President to Declare
Games Open—U.S. Confident
Despite Russian Entry**¹²¹

6.1 INTRODUCTION

These assorted headlines from the *New York Times* accurately illustrate how international politics affected the Helsinki Olympics. The 1952 Olympics were a political event in which sports competition became a vehicle for the United States and Soviet Union to outdo each other. At the height of the Cold War, hosting the Games required diplomatic tact in order not to displease one of the two world powers.¹²² This

¹²⁰ This subtitle derives from a marketing slogan that was used to promote Helsinki as the European Capital of Culture in the year 2000. The slogan, as will become apparent in this chapter, turns out to be even more appropriate to the 1952 Games.

¹²¹ These headlines are quoted from an article in the *New York Times* published the day before the opening ceremony of the Helsinki Olympics. Reference: Danzigs, Allison. "Ancient Ceremony Today to Open the Olympic Games for 70 Nations at Helsinki". *The New York Times*. July 19, 1952, p. 9. The article has been obtained through the New York Times on-line archive service.

¹²² In this regard, the problems encountered when invitations were sent to the national Olympic teams are illustrative. In accordance with IOC rules, only one team can represent a nation. In post-war Europe this posed problems in the case of Germany, since the German Democratic Republic (GDR) insisted on sending its own delegation. China was equally problematic because the Chinese government that had fled to Taiwan during the Chinese civil war also wished to send a team. The representatives of the mainland People's Republic of China argued, however, that the Taiwanese team did not represent the Chinese people. The IOC tackled this issue in the German case by recognizing the West German team as the only representative delegation of Germany. In the Chinese case, the matter was settled accidentally when the Chinese government in Taiwan did not send a delegation and the People's Republic sent only one athlete, who arrived too late to participate in any of the matches. Despite the IOC's policy to distance itself from political matters, the IOC's refusal to recognize the East German team and its indecisive attitude toward the China dilemma led to rumors that the Soviet Union was threatening to withdraw itself and its satellite states. "But much more bitter is current Soviet comment on and reaction to the Olympic plans of Communist China. This, some believe, could cause a Russian walk-out" (Wright, 1952). In this context, the Helsinki Games were a remarkable event because it was the first Olympiad in which the Soviet Union participated (Espy, 1979). While the organizing

situation was representative for the larger politico-economic circumstances in which Finland found itself after World War II. Although Finland secured its sovereignty after signing a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, the country's politics, especially with regard to foreign affairs, were still strongly influenced by the Kremlin.¹²³ Simultaneously, the West was trying to soften Soviet influence in Finland to prevent a further expansion of the iron curtain. The Finnish state was therefore subject to political pressures from the East and the West, which were both trying to use Finland as a buffer zone. Consequently, the 1952 Helsinki Olympics were mostly staged as a national affair enabling the state to seize the opportunity to exhibit Finland's sovereignty and achievements to the rest of the world and to (re)intensify international political and economic relations (Cantell, 1999).¹²⁴ This poses the question of how the Finnish authorities used the 1952 Games to *network* their country and capital on an international scale.

Drawing on our previous inquiry into the Nazi Olympics, we are urged to examine the role that the nation state played in the hosting of the 1952 Games. Did it result in an overshadowing of Helsinki's aspirations as a city or did the interests of the state coincide with those of its capital, as was the case for the Amsterdam Games? This also raises the question of how the Olympic Games were used to (re)present and (re)imagine the host city and the nation. Drawing on ANT, our focus will be on the interests that were involved in hosting the Games and on how, early on, these interests were consolidated into scripts for Helsinki's relations with the IOC and the media.

With regard to the mediation of the Helsinki Games, we will focus on the telecommunication infrastructures that were constructed especially for the occasion in order to facilitate media operations. In this regard, we will build on the insights gained in our analysis of the Amsterdam and Berlin Olympics. Whereas in those two cases

committee had little to say about the invitation policy of the IOC, the Soviet Union's participation did create all sorts of problems. The Soviet Union demanded, for example, to be accommodated in a separate Olympic village together with the teams from the Eastern Block. There were, however, also attempts at reconciliation between the East and the West, as when the Soviet team invited the American athletes to a dinner in their Olympic village.

¹²³ In November 1939, the Soviet Union attacked Finland, but the Finns managed to bring the offensive to a hold. Another attack followed and the dispute between the two countries was finally resolved in 1944 by a peace treaty. Even though fierce Finnish resistance made the Soviet leaders decide to cancel their conquest of the country, Finland did have to accept a loss of 11% of its territory, most notably in Karelia, and had to pay war retribution payments amounting to 300 million US dollars over a period of 6 years. In 1948, the Soviet Union forced Finland to sign an YYA Treaty (Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance), just as it had done with other Eastern European countries, albeit with very different clauses. Finland kept its sovereignty, but the influence of its strong neighbor was constantly felt by the Finnish authorities, who had to keep the country connected with the West without provoking the Soviet Union. This situation sometimes made Finland's status a matter of international confusion (Bell and Hietala, 2002).

¹²⁴ According to the final report of the organizing committee of the Helsinki Games, additional investments had to be made into transport infrastructure and telecommunication in order to meet the demands that arose during the events (Kollka, 1955). I draw two conclusions from the report. First, existing international telephone, telegraphy and broadcasting connections, as well as international passenger transport lines, were indeed fairly limited (see the appendix at the end of this book). Even if the existing infrastructures were constantly used to maximum capacity, international contacts would still remain modest. This confirms that Finland was relatively isolated in 1952. Second, since the national and local authorities financed most of the additional investments into infrastructure that were commissioned in the preparation period for the Helsinki Games, I conclude that there was a clear political will to intensify international contacts. Timo Cantell confirms this in his book, *Helsinki a Vision of Place*, by arguing that "the 1952 Olympic Games provided a symbol for the internationalization and opening up of Helsinki and the whole of Finland to the world" (Cantell, 1999: 84).

we focused on the reordering and renaming of the city on a visible level, in this chapter emphasis will be placed on the often ‘invisible’ infrastructures needed to mobilize and circulate images. This is not to say that Amsterdam and Berlin did not invest in telecommunication infrastructures to enable foreign news media to cover the Olympics.¹²⁵ But in the case of the Helsinki Games, the organizers faced a double challenge. On the one hand, Helsinki had to present itself as favorably as possible, which required huge investments into the improvement of urban spaces. On the other hand, the rise of electronic news media such as radio required the organizers to set up telecommunication systems that had not been needed when only the printed press reported on the Games. By focusing on media infrastructures, we will be able to expand our analysis of the reordering and renaming of place to the mobilization of place. After all, the construction of international telecommunication networks enabled the news media to cover the Olympic Games in Helsinki and simultaneously enabled the city to come to the rest of the world. But before we arrive at this point in the analysis of the Helsinki Games, we have to go back to analyzing the dominant interests that played a role in staging the Helsinki Games.

6.2 FINNISH NATIONAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES

The 1952 Games were not the first Olympics used by Finland as a platform to present itself to the rest of the world. Initially, the 1940 Olympics were going to be hosted by Helsinki.¹²⁶ At a very late stage, when the organizing committee had already sent out

¹²⁵ I did not address this topic in the previous case studies because, unlike Helsinki, Amsterdam and Berlin encountered hardly any infrastructural problems with regard to international telecommunication. Both cities were already well connected to international transport and telecommunication networks, and they were also centrally located in Europe. From the start, a European hub like Berlin was better equipped to handle peaks in international telecommunications than a small and remotely located city like Helsinki. Even though the media spectacle of the Nazi Olympics might be regarded as more extravagant than that of the Helsinki Games, it should be acknowledged that the news media technologies the Nazis employed were mostly directed at domestic audiences. In the case of Helsinki, as this chapter will show, the principal problem lay in the city’s and Finland’s overall poor international telecommunication connections.

¹²⁶ From the 1910s on, especially after Hannes Kolehmainen ran “Finland into the map of the world” in the 1912 Olympics in Stockholm, the idea of hosting the Olympic Games was frequently discussed in Finnish sports circles (The Sport Archives of Finland, Helsinki, access number: Suomen Olympiakomitea: Helsinki 1940 Olymialaiset; Painotuotteita; 1936-1940, contents: Official Newsbulletins and promotion material of the Organizing Committee of the 1940 Helsinki Olympic Games). In 1927, the idea became more concrete with the establishment of a Stadium Foundation by the City of Helsinki and Finnish sports organizations (Nygrén, 1988: 136). The foundation collected funds from the Finnish public to build an Olympic Stadium, even though at this time Helsinki had not even engaged itself in bidding for the Olympics. In 1932, at the IOC meeting in Los Angeles, Helsinki submitted a tentative bid to host the 1936 Olympics. Bell and Hietala (2002) suggest that this bid was a propaganda stunt designed to draw attention to the possibility of bringing the Games to Helsinki. Bidding for the 1940 Olympics seemed a more realistic option. Since the IOC was not able to make a final decision on the host city for the 1940 Games in 1932, the final vote was postponed to the IOC meeting at the 1936 summer Olympics in Berlin (Kollka, ed., 1955). In 1934, however, the Stadium Foundation began the construction of an Olympic Stadium in Helsinki. Thus, before Helsinki was even granted the opportunity to host an Olympiad, the Finns had already begun their preparations (Hasu, ed., 2002). By 1938, the venue was completed, but at the 1936 IOC meeting, Helsinki faced fierce competition from Tokyo. In the first instance, IOC members cast 26 votes in favor of Helsinki and 21 for Tokyo. Absent members had, however, been able to send in proxy votes in advance. This resulted

the invitations, the Soviet Union attacked Finland. Consequently, the 1940 Games had to be canceled. These Games were to have been an expression of Finland's sovereignty and its achievements in the field of sports. In the official 1940 brochure, participation in the Games is described as a way to articulate and fuel Finnish patriotism.

*The enthusiasm with which the nation participated in the London and Stockholm Olympic Games was not wholly inspired by athletics, but sprang in the first instance from a strong patriotic feeling and the wish to display to the world Finland's capacity also in the sphere of physical prowess. Participation in the Olympic Games and the struggle on the stadium's tracks and fields were Finland's protest against Russian politics. Thus the Olympic Games reached deep into the heart of the Finnish nation.*¹²⁷

Sports provided room for exposing and expressing patriotic feelings, but sports competitions were also used by Finnish nationalists to pursue a political agenda.

This relationship between Finnish nationalism and the Olympic Games was already established in 1896 when the first Modern Neo-Olympic Games were held in Athens. The participation of a Finnish athlete in these Games raised awareness amongst Finnish nationalists of the great political potential of sports practice. The nationalists became interested in sports because they thought that sports could be a way to perform Finnish identity and resist the Russian occupation by "foster[ing] a vigorous youth for the defence of the country's rights".¹²⁸ It should be acknowledged that Finland was still an autonomous province of the Russian Empire at the time. As became clear in the previous two chapters, in the late 19th and early 20th century, militaristic conceptions of sports were widely accepted among European sports leaders. In Finland, the mobilization of sports as a political instrument became more urgent from 1880 onwards when the Tsarist regime changed its traditional liberal course to a policy of Russification. Many liberties that had been acquired over the years were scaled back and socio-cultural activities were increasingly subjected to strict monitoring in order to repress any aspirations for an independent Finland. Contrary to Russian intentions, patriotic and nationalistic sentiments grew and sports became a way of performing resistance to Russian domination and enhancing Finnish nationalism. In 1905-06, when internal Russian affairs weakened the Tsarist regime, the Suomen Voimistelu- ja Urheilulitto (The Finnish Gymnastic and Athletic Association) was founded and accepted as a member of the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF). This admittance to the IAAF implied the recognition of the Finnish nation, because the Finns were now able to send their own sports delegations to international competitions. Since the IAAF is one of the actors that constitute the IOC, an additional alignment could also be established between Finland

in a 36 to 27 vote in favor of Tokyo (Kollka, ed., 1955). In 1938, the IOC forced Tokyo to withdraw its candidature because of the Japanese invasion of China. This armed conflict was seen as incompatible with the ideals of the Modern Neo-Olympic movement, which aimed to support peaceful co-operation and co-existence among nations through international sports competition. As a result, Helsinki was finally granted the honor of hosting the 1940 Games on 18 July 1938 (Kihlberg, 1952; Nygré, 1991).

¹²⁷ Promotion brochure: *Finland and the 1940 Olympic Games* (1938/1939). Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, p. 1-2. The publication date of the official promotion brochure for the 1940 Games is not documented. Considering its purpose, it seems likely that it was printed in 1938 or 1939, just before the Soviets attacked Finland and the 1940 Games had to be cancelled. The brochure can be found in the Sport Archives of Finland, access number: Suomen Olympiakomitea: Helsinki 1940 Olympialiaset: Painotuotteita: 1936-1940.

¹²⁸ *Finland and the 1940 Olympic Games* (1938/1939) Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö.

and the Olympic movement via the Suomen Voiisterlu- ja Urheiluliito. While Finland's road to independence was much more complex than what has been discussed here, sports played an important role in this historical process. It is through the strategic deployment of sports and the alignments that the Finnish sports association established with the IAAF and the IOC that Finnish athletes could participate in international sports competitions as ambassadors of a nation, even though the country was not yet independent. The participation and victories of Finnish athletes in international sports competitions, and in particular in the Olympic Games, fuelled nationalistic sentiments and empowered calls for independence.

On 6 December 1917, Finland declared independence, taking advantage of the power vacuum that emerged during the Russian revolution. After a turbulent start,¹²⁹ the young nation sought to establish relations with the West to develop its economy and free itself from Russian influence. Again, sports played an important role in this process of nation building. The international successes of Finnish athletes such as Paavo Nurmi, Hannes Kolehmainen and Ville Rittola in the Stockholm, Antwerp, Paris, Amsterdam and London Games, boosted national confidence and turned these Finns into ambassadors of the newly independent Finland. From the onset, the achievements of these athletes were advertised and used to draw attention to the young Finnish nation. Even though Finland remained an unfamiliar and obscure country to large segments of the foreign audience and media, the achievements of Nurmi, Rittola and others were actively used to present Finland abroad. In comparison to the Dutch, for example, who built their image on cultural clichés such as wooden shoes, tulips and mills, the Finns used sports as a means to construct an identity through which they could promote themselves. The Olympic Games played an important role in this 'sports-based promotion' of the Finnish nation, because the event provided a platform for opening up the country to the rest of the world. In the official brochure for the cancelled 1940 Olympics, all victorious Finnish athletes from the past and their records are depicted to promote an image of Finland as a sports-minded and sturdy nation.¹³⁰ From the press cuttings collected by the organizing committees of the 1940 and 1952 Olympics, it becomes clear that many foreign newspapers adopted this image, representing Finland as a small nation which nonetheless could not be ignored in international sports competitions.¹³¹ Thus, by establishing alignments between Finnish athletes and the Olympic Games, Finland tried to put itself on the map.

As became clear from the analysis above, the alignments between Finland and the Olympic Games existed long before Helsinki engaged itself in bidding for the Olympic Games. In addition, some alignments had also been established with the

¹²⁹ Shortly after declaring independence, Finland became divided into a Red movement, which sympathized with the Russian communists, and a liberal, bourgeois-oriented White movement. The tensions between the Reds and Whites resulted in a civil war. By the end of 1918, Baron Mannerheim defeated the Reds with the military support of Germany. But the civil war was only structurally resolved when Finland had to defend itself against the Soviet army in 1939. In this way, a collective enemy helped to dissolve internal conflicts.

¹³⁰ *Finland and the 1940 Olympic Games* (1938/1939). Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö; *Helsinki and the 1940 Olympic Games*, (1938). place of publication unknown: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran, available at the Sport Archives of Finland, access number: Suomen Olympiakomitea: Helsinki 1940 Olympialiaset: Painotuotteita: 1936-1940.

¹³¹ Examples of such articles include: "Finland stelt zijn kandidatuur voor de Olympische Spelen van 1940". *De Schelde*. June 28, 1936; Daley, A. "Sport of the Times: Advance Notice". *The Times*. February 14, 1949; Nane, J. "Pour les jeux Olympiques de 1952 la Finlande envoie ses ministres sur les stades". *Le Rouge et le Noir*. September 9, 1950. These articles are available at the City of Helsinki Archives, access number: Helsingin Kaupunki XV Olympia 1952, Sanomalehtiosasto: Ja: 7 and 9.

media, because the victories of Finnish athletes caused the foreign press to categorize Finland as a sports nation, reiterating the victories of Nurmi and Rittola at each new edition of international athletic competitions and the Olympics. This shows that CityEvents never emerge out of the blue. Before any concrete wish to host such an event is articulated, alignments have usually already been established between the potential host city and nation, the event owner and the media. At a later stage, these alignments evolve into the productive network that governs the actual staging of the CityEvent. In the case of the 1952 Helsinki Games, the evolution of these precarious alignments was not only fuelled by a desire to enhance Finland's image as a sports-minded nation. As briefly explained in the introduction to this chapter, Finland's isolated position in the postwar era formed another important reason for exposing Finland to the outside world. Even more than in 1940, the 1952 Games provided Finland with an opportunity to present its sovereignty to the West and proclaim that it was now a 'non-satellite state'. At the same time, the Games opened up space to establish friendly relations with its former enemy, the Soviet Union. Finland aimed to present itself as a gateway between East and West. Economic interests played an important role as well, since the Games were thought to open up possibilities for establishing trade relations, which were much needed to redevelop the Finnish economy. Even though the 1952 Games were mostly a national affair, Helsinki was to become the center point of this gateway. Thus, "the 1952 Olympic Games provided a symbol for the internationalization and opening up of Helsinki and the whole of Finland to the world" (Cantell, 1999: 84).

We should nevertheless be cautious in describing all the alignments with the Olympics and in particular those with its event owner in positive terms. The IOC adhered to its own agenda, which it did not always adjust to the interests of the Finnish hosts. A good example in this regard is the IOC's invitation policy (which is also described in footnote 121). The IOC only recognized the West German team, thereby excluding the German Democratic Republic from participation in the 1952 Olympics. This provoked the Soviet Union, which threatened to withdraw from the Games. If the Soviet Union and its satellite states were to pull out of the Games, the aim of the Finnish authorities to intensify contacts with both the East and the West would be undermined. This incident illustrates well how the host of a CityEvent is always dependent on the cooperation of the event owner, just as the latter is always dependent on the host city. Whereas the Nazi Olympics forms an illustration of a host that marginalizes the event owner, the Helsinki Games provide an example of how a small and relatively isolated country had to negotiate the interests of the IOC with those of the Soviet Union and the United States. The Olympic Games turned into an international political event once more.

6.3 IMAGES OF PROGRESS: SPORTS, HEALTH AND THE WELFARE STATE

The necessity for Finland to demonstrate its sovereignty thus played an important role in staging the 1952 Olympics. This raises the question of how Finland and its capital were (re)presented to foreign media and audiences. In this respect, the intrinsic relationship between sports and Finnish national identity alone did not suffice to present Finland and its capital to the world. A translation had to be made, connecting sports to other national achievements. Sports, or rather the network of actors that together constitute sports practices and institutions, were part of a larger development,

namely the post-war construction of the Finnish welfare state. In contrast to the Nazis, the Finnish authorities and sport leaders adhered to an individualistic and rationalized approach to sports that was in line with the modernization of sports advocated by the IOC.¹³² This approach was not limited to the introduction of objective and measurable standards only, but was also connected to broader social policies and to the establishment of national welfare provisions, in particular health care and education.

This also shows in the Finnish approach to sports. Hard exercise was not seen as the only key to improving athletic performance. Increasingly, attention was being paid to keeping the body fit and healthy. As such, the athletic body was subjected to a whole array of monitoring, measurements, tests and training schemes. Illustrative for this medicalization of the athletic body is the following fragment from an article in the *Official News-Service* bulletin of the 1952 Olympics organizing committee.

In these examinations, importance has been attached to the complete development of the athlete, beginning with his first training and continuing up to his achievement of the highest performance. All occupational disturbances of health, previous diseases and injuries are thoroughly tabulated and described; also noted are the training schedule and way of life, including alcoholic and tobacco habits, the quality and quantity of food consumed, the effects of massages and bathing, and the development of fitness.¹³³

This article was, moreover, illustrated by a picture of an athlete being examined by a doctor using X-rays, thus establishing a close relation between medicine (health care and science) and sports. Athletic performance was accordingly represented as a result of how well trained and *maintained* the body was. Exercise and training were supplemented with diets, medical examinations and the prescription of a proper lifestyle to maximize athletic performance. Winning a sports match was not the only goal. Following this logic, staying in shape became a challenge for every athlete. Whereas the initial militaristic approach to sports exercise, as advocated by De Coubertin and others, had already established a relation between sports and health as a condition for fostering the strength of the nation's youth, health, or rather health care and science, now became an integral part of sports training and exercise.

By exhibiting this relationship, the organizers of the Helsinki Games were able to demonstrate the advancements of the Finnish welfare state in relation to sports. Showing the care that was given to Finnish athletes became a way of introducing foreigners to the achievements of the Finnish welfare model. The training and maintenance of the athletic body became an icon of progress expressing a larger picture of the emerging Finnish welfare state that privileged education, hygiene, health care and science. This also shows in the promotional material for the 1952

¹³² This rather individualistic approach to sports is apparent in one of the promotion films made for the 1952 Olympics. This color film, entitled *Helsinki Capital of Sports*, was produced by the Swedish-American Lines in 1952 and directed by the Finn Erik Blomberg. In the film, the narrator comments that the Finns are not keen on spectator sports, but rather on individually enjoying sports activities. This commentary is accompanied by a fragment showing Paavo Nurmi, the famous Olympic gold medallist. Available at the City of Helsinki Archives, no further index specifications.

¹³³ XV Olympiad Official News-Service. Helsinki: Organizing committee for the Helsinki Games 1952. These bulletins were published by the organizing committee from January 1950 onwards. The above quote comes from an article entitled "Medical Research to Aid the Modern Athlete", p. 5. Unfortunately, the issue number of this bulletin is missing. It must have been published sometime between January 1950 and the start of the 1952 Games, when the last Official News Service came out. Reference: City of Helsinki: Helsingin Kaupunki, XV Olympia Helsinki 1952, Sanomalehtiostos JeI: 1

Games, which often included pictures and descriptions of the recently built 'Children's Castle', the largest children's hospital in Scandinavia.¹³⁴ This hospital was proudly presented as the country's latest achievement in its endeavour to promote collective well-being by investing in its youth as: the future of the young nation. By aligning sports with images of progressive social care, in particular health care, the hosts of the Helsinki Games articulated an image of Finland as a modern and advanced nation.

6.4 URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE 1952 OLYMPICS

This imagery was also deeply embedded in Helsinki's urban planning and housing programs, which had been designed and implemented from the 1920s onwards. From our analysis of the Berlin Games, it has become clear that raising the profile of the Olympic host requires a substantial rearrangement and renaming of places. In the case of Berlin, the city underwent a partial transformation to produce a favorable and impressive—though, as we now know, false—imagery. A false propaganda imagery was temporarily imposed on the city. In the case of the Helsinki Games, the displayed imagery was the result of an accumulation of decades of urban planning and development. In comparison to the Amsterdam and Berlin Olympics, the 1952 Games were more fundamentally integrated with the overall development of Helsinki. Whereas Amsterdam and Berlin constructed new sports venues on their outskirts and redecorated their main streets—the latter on a much larger and more impressive scale than the former—the preparations for the 1952 Helsinki Games built on those made for the cancelled 1940 event. In this regard, the Finns by no means staged an equivalent to the spectacular Berlin Games. On the contrary, instead of concentrating on staging a momentary spectacle, the presentation of Finland and Helsinki was much more a process of articulating what had been achieved over decades of planning and building.¹³⁵

The image of a modern, advanced welfare state was (partly) materialized and displayed by Helsinki's architectural design. Town planning and architecture in Finland and above all Helsinki were based on the principles of a Scandinavian functionalist ideology, also known as 'Funkis'. This movement advocated progress, rationality, order, and a strong belief that science, engineering and technology would enable mankind to control its future (Cantell, 1999). A scientific approach to architecture and planning were conceived to provide solutions for a wide range of social problems. Indeed, shortly after the war Helsinki experienced a rapid increase in

¹³⁴ An example of such promotion material is a booklet by Kihlberg, J. (1952). *Speaking of Finland*. Helsinki: Kustannus Oy Mantere. In the official news service bulletin of the organizing committee, the 'Children's Castle' is also presented as Finland's latest achievement in health care (City of Helsinki Archives, access number: Helsingin Kaupunki, XV Olympia Helsinki 1952, Sanomalehtiostosasto Jel: 1). In addition, several foreign newspapers mention the hospital in relation to the country's post-war implementation of social legislation in education, health care and housing. Source: City of Helsinki Archive, access number: Helsingin Kaupunki XV Olympia 1952, Sanomalehtiostosasto: Ja: 7 and 9.

¹³⁵ This does not imply that the organizers did not attempt to stage a spectacle at all. The difference lies in the final result. The Helsinki Games by no means equaled the scale of the spectacle staged by the Nazis. In general, Helsinki and Finland were presented by highlighting very different qualities, such as functionalist architecture, health care and achievements in sports, rather than concentrating on mass demonstrations and megalomaniac architecture. As a result, the Helsinki Games were less overwhelming, but not necessarily unspectacular.

such problems, most notably alcoholism and increasing crime rates. According to the city's decision-makers, Helsinki's inhabitants' moral and physical health was declining, especially in comparison to agrarian Finland (Schulman et al., 2000). In addition, housing shortages had increased dramatically since a vast flow of refugees from Karelia, the territory annexed by the Soviet Union, needed to be accommodated. This caused all sorts of problems, such as overpopulation (Bell and Hietala, 2002).

From a Funkis' perspective, functionalist and science-based town planning and architecture had to be implemented to cure these urban diseases. Through a systematic application of three principles, light, air and space, problems like pollution, lack of space and light, overpopulation, crime, moral decline and epidemics could be contained (Härö, 1992). Functionalist architects and planners therefore aligned themselves with the 'welfare state project'. "Funkis and the building of the Scandinavian welfare society were interlinked; it was believed in part that architecture enabled social modernization to be carried out" (Cantell, 1999: 83). Social and physical hygiene coupled with social modernization became a metaphor for a collective well-being that was not only a corporeal matter, but extended to the whole human environment. Medicine could cure the diseased, but its effect would be limited if a contagious environment threatened to reinfect the cured. The alignment between sports and welfare was thus embedded in a larger modernist project in which Funkis' architecture and progressive social legislation were meant to lift the Finnish population to a higher standard of living.

To achieve this, national and local authorities, together with architects and planners, aimed to encapsulate cultural, leisure and sports facilities in overall town plans in order to educate and discipline the urban masses. In this regard, the construction of sports amenities was strongly connected to the development of new educational and health care institutions, cultural centers and public transport systems. The Helsinki policymakers foresaw a positive element in stimulating sports practices among the city's residents, since sports provided possibilities to civilize and discipline. Through disciplined training, the city's population could be kept away from moral decline (Schulman et al., 2000). The hosting of the 1940 and 1952 Olympics was therefore part of a larger urban development project jointly undertaken by the City of Helsinki and the Finnish state.

The planning and construction of Olympic venues, for instance, was integrated in the Helsinki Central Park Concept. This almost archetypal functionalist project aimed to provide a green and healthy environment with plenty of sports facilities for the city's inhabitants. Thus, the Olympic venues were built with an eye to the future. This shows, for example, in the financing of the Olympic Games, as outlined in the *Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVth Olympiad Helsinki 1952*. "[T]he state and municipality undertook solely such works and procurements as would be of lasting benefit to the country and the inhabitants of the cities concerned after the Games" (Kollka, ed., 1955: 198). The Olympic Games were therefore not only an opportunity to present Finland to the world, but also provided a socializing potential for reeducating and civilizing Helsinki's population.

A different example of this alignment between the Games and welfare politics is the Olympic village. This facility was not only built to accommodate foreign athletes during the Games, but also designated as a social housing project to provide Karelian refugees with new homes after the events. The functionalist design of the Olympic village propagated a new way of life. Light, space and air formed the preconditions for a hygienic environment that was thought to have a positive moral influence on residents. Apartments had large windows, central heating and electricity,

and were equipped with a modern kitchen and bathroom. All these provisions were presented as 'the final solution' to dust, darkness and dirt. Green spaces between the housing blocks ensured that enough light entered each house and that fresh air could circulate.¹³⁶ In Helsinki, and in a few other cities where specific parts of the Olympic program were held, the construction of sports venues and other facilities was therefore part of a social policy to propagate sports exercise and a healthy lifestyle among the urban population.

6.5 HELSINKI: SHOWCASE OF THE NATION

Traditionally, in Finland, urban life has always been negatively perceived in relation to rural community ideals after rapid urbanization and industrialization detached cities and the countryside from each other. According to urban critics, traditional culture, green surroundings and agricultural labor was increasingly being replaced by concrete housing blocks, mass culture, and factory and office jobs (cf. Cantell, 1999). Sports provided a way to bridge the discrepancies between urban and rural life without undermining the presentation of an advanced and progressive Finland or suppressing rural cultural traditions for the sake of modernization. The corporeal elements manifest in traditional rural culture, such as the sauna cult, its close relationship to nature and its penchant for hard physical labor, could partly be aligned to urban mass culture through sports. To some extent, the propagation of sports was an institutionalized attempt to modernize a tradition of physical exercise. The organizers of the 1940 Games, for instance, presented sports practice as an intrinsic part of traditional Finnish life.¹³⁷ According to this view, long before the first sports associations were founded, many sports, such as skiing, sailing and rowing, had been a necessary part of Finnish rural life due to the country's climate, landscape and the long distances between villages and towns.¹³⁸ Physical exercise was therefore related to Finnish culture long before such activities became associated with modern notions of leisure and sports. Consequently, sports could be presented as an essential part of 'the Finnish way of life'. In this way, the instrumentalization of sports not only served social policy purposes, but also contributed to the construction of a Finnish national identity.

The social instrumentalization of architecture and the propagation of a modern lifestyle thus also became a way to express Finnish culture and identity. Moreover, Finnish architecture, dominated by the Funkis movement, exuded the nation's desire to be part of the developed western world. The international successes of architects and designers like Alvar Aalto and Eliel Saarinen, greatly contributed to this. The Helsinki Olympic Stadium symbolized these Finnish desires. "In its original form the stadium was a reduced, clean, lined functional building, one of the key works of modernist architecture in Finland" (Härö, 1992: 183). Because the stadium had been built for the 1940 Olympics and was heavily damaged by Soviet air raids during the

¹³⁶ This view on housing is illustrated by the news bulletins issued by the organizing committee of the Helsinki Games. In several editions, attention is lavished on the Olympic village and the modern facilities it offers. Sources: Bulletin 60B, July 16, 1952; Bulletin 11, July, 12, 1952. The bulletins can be found in the City of Helsinki Archive, access number: Helsingin Kaupunki, XV Olympia Helsinki 1952, Sanomalehtiostos JeI: 1. Additional information on the relationship between architecture, the Olympic venues and the Finnish welfare state can be found in Friman et al., (1992).

¹³⁷ *Finland and the 1940 Olympic Games* (1938/1939). Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

war, its reconstruction and expansion for the 1952 Games became a matter of national prestige, a demonstration that the Finnish nation had triumphed over its enemy. The 'new-old stadium' became a national symbol of independence. "It was a stadium built more for Finland and less for Helsinki, more for selling Finland than Helsinki" (Cantell, 1999: 84). The stadium's tower in particular functions as an icon of modern Finnish society and was depicted on posters, stamps and other promotion materials for the 1952 Games.¹³⁹

We can therefore conclude that modern town planning and the construction of public buildings (including the Olympic venues) were meant in the first place to expose national achievements rather than putting Helsinki on the map. "Helsinki's planning over much of the twentieth century was geared towards emphasizing national monumental qualities" (ibid: 81). The Helsinki Sports Park, but also other national symbols like the Parliament building, the Lutheran Cathedral and the Children's hospital, represented national institutions rather than city ones. The Helsinki Sports Park, with its Olympic venues, was presented as an icon of the nation's welfare policies and of the Finnish nation's historical relation to sports. Thus, Helsinki's role as host city of the fifteenth Olympiad to a great extent consisted of being reduced to serving as a project of nation building and nation selling. "It was a spectacle of nation building that in Helsinki promoted identity formation (...) rather than advertising the city itself" (ibid: 84). Helsinki became a showcase of the nation.

6.5.1 Displaying Finnish Culture: Homogeneity versus Diversity

While presentations of Helsinki and Finland were varied to the extent that attention was given to a wide variety of topics, ranging from sports to architecture, all these aspects were ultimately related to 'the' Finnish national cultural identity. In the case of the 1952 Olympics, a rather homogeneous culture was presented and we can see how the renaming, presentation and representation of place led to a reduction in the richness of the potential meanings of place. This shows, for example, in the absence of Sami and Roma minorities in the official promotional and public relations material on the Games and Finland. The official guide to the fifteenth Olympiad contains a paragraph on Finnish national history, but while the Swedish-speaking Finns are mentioned, the Sami and Roma people are absent.¹⁴⁰ Reference is made only to the first Finnish settlements that were established at the beginning of the Christian era: "About the beginning of the Christian Era, the Finns are known to have migrated into the area now called Finland".¹⁴¹ This ignores the fact that the nomadic Sami had already been living in Lapland for centuries before the Finns arrived.

This particular version of history, which marginalizes the Sami, is enforced by linking Finnish history to race: "The Finns, who number 4 million, possess the racial characteristics of a blond race, viz., fair complexion, blond hair and blue or grey eyes".¹⁴² The guide articulates racial boundaries between Finns and others, thus

¹³⁹ In the official public relations magazine of the organizing committee, the tower of the Olympic Stadium is frequently depicted to demonstrate the Finnish achievements in architecture, an organizational capacity. Available at the City of Helsinki Archives, access number: Helsingin Kaupunki, XV Olympia Helsinki 1952, Sanomalehtiöasto JeF: 1

¹⁴⁰ *Finland Olympiad Tours 1952*, published by Olympiad Tours 1952, text and pictures provided by the Finnish tourist Association. Helsinki: Otava Publishing, 1952. Available at Sport Archives of Finland, Helsinki, access number: Suomen Olympiakomitea: Helsingin Olympialaiset: Painotuotteet Matkoikiäisitteet vuosi 1952.

¹⁴¹ Ibid: 3.

¹⁴² Ibid: 2.

reproducing a relationship between a national territory and a history of belonging. At the same time, the emphasis on the racial characteristics of the Finns as a blond race could be read in the context of the Finnish desire to be recognized as a Scandinavian and Western European nation (Castells and Himanen, 2002). Thus, the racial definition of 'Finnishness' not only excludes the Sami and Roma people, but also creates a distance between the Finns and the Slavic races of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. The implicit racial connection to Western Europe has clear political connotations and in this respect race functions along two axes. On the one hand, it excludes Sami and Roma; on the other, race is mobilized as a category of inclusion to connect the Finns to the West. It is this twofold meaning of race, in combination with an absence of destructive racist policies, which distinguishes this case from the Nazi Olympics.

Even though the Sami were marginalized, this is not to say that this minority was not represented at all. During the Olympic Games, a reindeer village was set up for foreign tourists.¹⁴³ Although no visual material is available of this exhibit, notes in the Helsinki City Archive give an impression of the village that resembles much of the anthropological oddities found at nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century World Fairs.¹⁴⁴ The exhibition thus represented the Sami as an anthropological rarity or tourist attraction instead of using the village to articulate cultural differences within Finland.

6.6 MEDIA INFRASTRUCTURES

So far, our analysis has concentrated on how Helsinki and Finland were (re)presented through the Olympic Games. Of course, presentation is only part of the story. Its effect remains limited if leading foreign news media do not adopt and *distribute* the message to remote audiences. Since the Amsterdam Olympics, news media had gained in importance, increasingly forcing the host city to adjust its interests to those of the media. In the case of the Berlin Olympics, this became clear from the influential role leading American newspapers played in the anti-German boycott movement. The growing power of the news media in the amalgamation of networks that produced the Helsinki Olympics can be illustrated by the concessions the organizing committee had to make with regard to the sale of the photography rights. Initially, the committee came to an agreement with the Finnish company Olympia Kuva Oy. (Olympic Pictures Ltd.), giving them a monopoly on photo rights for the XVth Olympiad. This decision resulted in a flood of protests from Finnish and foreign news agencies. In early 1952, the committee made alterations in the agreement with Olympia Kuva, opening up new negotiation possibilities for domestic and foreign press agencies. A co-operation of the large picture agencies, UP, AP, NP and Keystone Pictures, was allowed to send its own photographers' pool to the Games on the condition that it would not sell any of the resulting pictures in Finland except through Olympia Kuva. The Soviet press agency TASS was also given access and agreements were made between other foreign and Finnish news agencies and Olympia

¹⁴³ Notes and letters between the organizing committee and various cultural and official organizations mention the construction of a Reindeer Village. Sources on this topic can be found in the City of Helsinki Archive in folder: Helsingin Kaupunki XV Olympiad Helsinki 1952; Käännöstoimisto Da: 2-Fa: 2.

¹⁴⁴ See also Benedict (1994) for an extensive analysis of the Eurocentric character of the World Fair.

Kuva, allowing their own photographers to be employed in the official Olympic photographers' pool.¹⁴⁵ A similar adjustment, albeit involving different companies, was made with regard to the film rights (Kolkka, ed., 1955). A total of four official films were made about the Helsinki Games. In contrast to the Amsterdam and Berlin Games, the organizing committee was no longer capable of exercising a monopoly over the film and photography rights. Large international media agencies such as Keystone Picture and AP had become such influential actors that the committee apparently could not risk these agencies pulling out of the Games altogether.

The increasing influence of the news media on the organization of the Olympics also shows in the investments the host city was prepared to make to distribute images of itself and of the event. Spatiotemporal obstacles had to be reduced to a minimum. In this case, Helsinki's geographically remote location manifested itself in the small number of outgoing international telephone and telegraph lines and in the limited capacity for other technological devices necessary to establish a well-functioning international telecommunication network. Finland's telecommunication and transmission networks were not capable of handling the expected increase in international teletraffic during the Olympics. A larger network capacity and an improved technological facilitation of international teletraffic were required, since the presence of foreign journalists would be of little use if they were unable to communicate with their home offices abroad. As with the construction of the Olympic village, the Finnish authorities focused on the long-term impact; the construction of lasting media infrastructures was seen as at least as important as dealing with the short-term media impact. In the introduction of this chapter, it was briefly mentioned that raising the profile of the host city and nation not only requires the construction of favorable imagery, but also relies on infrastructures to mobilize, circulate and distribute information, images and signs. The following paragraphs seek to explore this underlying dimension, which is often ignored. Following an ANT perspective, we identify and describe the actors that were involved in setting up the international telecommunication network that allowed the 1952 Olympics to be mediated from Helsinki all over the world. This does not imply that we are necessarily dealing with a different analytical level. The infrastructure needed to circulate and distribute images of place is merely a further extension of the networks established to present and profile the city. In this regard, the construction of the Helsinki Sports Park and the application of Funkis housing and urban planning are as much a part of the production of images of Helsinki and Finland as the creation of international telecommunication infrastructures.

While such infrastructures are often less visible, they do have a profound impact on how the host city is represented in foreign news media. At the time of the 1952 Games, the Olympics had been transformed from an international sports event into an almost global live radio experience. Not only had media coverage increased, the number of nations participating in the Games had grown from 46 in 1928 and 49

¹⁴⁵ Besides information in *The Official Report of the Organising Committee for the Games of the XV Olympiad Helsinki 1952*, correspondence on photo rights can be found in the Helsinki City Archives in folder: Helsingin Kaupunki XV Olympia Helsinki 1952: Käännöstoimisto, Ba: 1-Da:1. An example is a letter of 19 June 1952 to Herrn H. Babies, photo-reporter, signed by the Photo and Film Bureau of the Organizing Committee: "In Beantwortung Ihres Schreibens vom 6.5. an Herrn Stadtdirektor v. Frenckell kann ich Ihnen mitteilen. Dass für Sie eine Möglichkeit zu photographieren besteht falls Sie eine bestimmte Zeitung vertreten, Eintrittskarte zum Stadion besitzen und nicht einde Brennweite, die grösser als 25 cm ist, benutzen".

in 1936 to 69 in 1952.¹⁴⁶ As a consequence, foreign audiences had rapidly grown too. Without the required infrastructure, the Helsinki Games could not be broadcast live to all these audiences, which would certainly diminish the impact of hosting the Games. Moreover, it was initially also expected that the Games would be broadcast on live television to foreign audiences. Finally, the dominance of radio had led to a quicker turnover time for news, forcing the printed press to keep up with the latest developments. To a greater degree than had been the case for the Amsterdam and Berlin Olympics, the printed press demanded more and faster international telephone, teleprinter, telephoto and telegraphy connections (cf. Burgess and Gold, 1985). Consequently, the organizers of the Helsinki Games were well aware that a positive outcome of the event relied more on media coverage than it had ever done before.

The organisers of the Games and the Governmental institutions and offices co-operating with them were aware at the outset that failure in the working facilities for the international Press and Radio would be a major loss to the Games (however successful the Games themselves might be in a purely sportive sense (Kollka, ed., 1955: 115).

For this reason, a Main Teletechnical Committee was appointed in December 1947. This committee was responsible for the planning and co-ordination of telecommunications during the Games. In order to establish the larger and better-equipped telecommunication infrastructure that would connect Helsinki with Western Europe and countries overseas, the committee defined a threefold strategy. In the first place, newly constructed telecommunication networks had to continue to serve Finnish teletraffic after the Olympics. Secondly, within the Helsinki area, new lines would be added to the existing network in order to improve internal communications during the Games. Finally, temporary telecommunication structures at arenas and field tracks would be installed by the army, using military equipment. The actual realization of the telecommunication plans was carried out by public offices and private parties, while financing came from government institutions, state-owned and private companies such as the Helsinki Telephone Corporation, the Postal and Telegraph Service and the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation.

Thus, huge investments had to be made to construct new physical connections that enlarged Finland's internal and international information exchange capacity. What kind of connections were constructed and what was their impact upon Finland's and Helsinki's ability to exchange information on an international scale? A number of permanent international telecommunication projects were commissioned and supervised by the Main Teletechnical Committee, of which the construction of a new submarine cable to increase the teletraffic (telegraphy and telephone) between Finland and Sweden was the largest project.¹⁴⁷ Via Sweden, the Finnish teletraffic network

¹⁴⁶ These numbers can be found on the official IOC website, http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/index_uk.asp, last visited 24 July, 2006.

¹⁴⁷ Since most of Finland's international teletraffic was channeled via Sweden and Denmark, alignments had to be established with postal and telegraphy corporations there. In 1949, after a survey conducted jointly by the Postal and Telegraph Service and the Swedish Telegraph Service, an agreement was signed for a new submarine cable between Finland and Sweden, which would increase the teletraffic capacity during and after the Games. In this case, the survey functioned as a strategic instrument to negotiate between the interests of the Swedish Telegraph Service and its Finnish colleague. The survey formed an 'objective standard' that enabled each of the actors to identify and adjust their interests by, for instance, estimating how much teletraffic was expected to be generated and how much turnover and profit might be realized. In 1950, the Finnish National Parliament decided to commission and finance the cable. Despite delivery problems with the terminal apparatuses at both

could be connected to Copenhagen, which was the closest international teletraffic hub for Finland at the time. The new submarine cable almost literally gave Finland a bigger voice internationally, because it enlarged the number of voice circuits from 26 in 1951 to 72 in 1952.¹⁴⁸ The increase in voice circuits made it possible, for example, to make direct telephone connections with cities such as Amsterdam, East Berlin, Hamburg, Paris and New York. Before this time, telephone calls from Helsinki to these cities always had to be channeled via other foreign telephone-centers.

In addition, a total of 7 new telegraph connections were added to the existing 9 international connections, which, for the first time in Finnish history, made direct telegraph traffic possible with London, Nagasaki, Tokyo, Paris and Rome. Indirect connections were also set up with other telegraph services, making it possible to send messages across the globe to destinations that could not be reached before. Until this time, it had not been possible to send telegrams from Finland to many countries on the African, Asian, Australian and South-American continents.¹⁴⁹

Besides the construction of permanent telecommunication networks, a number of temporary structures were also set up. For the period of the Olympics, a European basic radio broadcasting network was put in place. This basic network connected Helsinki to many of Europe's major broadcast nodes, namely Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Cologne, Stuttgart, East Berlin, Hilversum, Brussels and London. From these cities, other countries could be connected to the basic network.¹⁵⁰ The network was extensively used: during the Helsinki Olympics "radio reporters from 40 countries spoke for altogether 639 hours to 47 countries in 34 languages. The total number of broadcasts was 1474" (Kolka, ed., 1955: 135).

As mentioned earlier, the printed press needed more technical facilities to keep up with the latest events in order to compete with the dominant radio medium. Apart from the expansion of telegraphy lines, the number of teleprinter connections was also enlarged from 12 channels to 36 permanent and 12 temporary connections. The teleprinter channels were connected from Helsinki to the rest of the world via Stockholm and Copenhagen, using the new submarine cable. This enabled journalists to send their reports to their home offices with a minimum time loss. In addition, since the London Games of 1948, telephoto (picture transmission by telegraph) had become an important instrument for news agencies, especially the printed press. It enabled journalists to send pictures from any location in the world to their home office as long as there was a telephoto apparatus and a telegraph connection available.

ends, the new international telephone and telegraph line was ready for use just in time for the Olympics. Source: Kollka, ed., (1955).

¹⁴⁸ One voice circuit represents one direct speech connection from one locale to another via cable or wireless transmission. A capacity of 26 voice circuits means that 26 different live international radio broadcasts and/or telephone calls could be channeled at the same time. In this respect, an analogy can be drawn with a 26-lane highway. While 26 is still a modest number of voice circuits compared to present-day standards, the investment was significant because it tripled Finland's international telephone capacity. Information about voice circuits was obtained in a telephone interview with Cor Moerman on 25 July 2006. Moerman is the founder of Museum Jan Corver: Museum voor Radiozendamateurisme (Museum for Amateur Radio Broadcasting) in Budel, The Netherlands.

¹⁴⁹ A factor that contributed to this increase in capacity was the temporary extension of working hours and the employment of extra telegraph operators. Source: Kollka, ed., (1955).

¹⁵⁰ This network could, however, not run efficiently without a well-functioning local infrastructure. Successful live radio broadcasting required a smooth transmission from the venues where the sports matches took place to the central radio station that would transmit the reports further afield. For this purpose, the Finnish army placed temporary field telephone lines and radio transmitters, thus enabling journalists to effectively send their live radio reports to the central radio station. Source: Kollka, ed., (1955).

In this manner, the printed press was able to compete with radio by offering audiences visualized news that was perhaps not as up to date as live radio reports, but that compensated for these delays with images.¹⁵¹

This overview of telecommunication projects illustrates the enormous efforts that the host city had to undertake to be able to catch up with international media operations. Numerous actors had to be aligned to construct completely new networks. These networks were needed to meet the demands of the international media. In comparison to the Amsterdam Games, much more effort and money had to be spent on telecommunications, due to the widespread introduction of electronic media, most notably radio, and the increased need on the side of the printed press for fast telecommunication connections in order to remain competitive. Indeed, since the Nazi Olympics, the media have manifested themselves as critical factors in determining the international impact of the Games. The Helsinki Games thus depended to a great extent on how much and how positively the foreign media would report on it. To serve the interests of the media, the organizers of the 1952 Games had to align many other actors. In contrast to Berlin, which was already an European telecommunications hub at the time of the 1936 Olympics, Helsinki and Finland were in many respects placed outside these networks. To connect Finland and Helsinki to the rest of Europe, it was no longer sufficient to focus on impressing outsiders by staging grand spectacles or building impressive monuments. Instead, huge and hardly visible investments had to be made to connect the city and the nation to the electronic media spaces of the twentieth century. As the abovementioned projects illustrate, this was by no means a virtual process, only less immediately visible than the dramatic visual spectacles we commonly associate with CityEvents.

6.6.1(Non) Television Broadcasting

A great deal of the infrastructure that was set up to facilitate foreign news media operations could also have been used for the international live television broadcasting of the 1952 Games. In the beginning, therefore, the organizing committee expected to gain a lot of revenue from the sales of television rights. The post-war boom in commercial television in the United States promised a great deal of interest in broadcasting the Games. This was, however, far from the reality. In the *Official Report of the Organizing committee for the Games of the XVth Olympiad Helsinki 1952* it is stated that television broadcasting of the event was in the end very limited. Disagreements about the financial terms set by the organizing committee for obtaining the broadcasting rights formed the main reason for the 'non-televization' of the 1952 Olympics. The American channel NBC had offered live broadcasts of the Games in exchange for free broadcasting rights, but the organizing committee refused. The negotiations with broadcasting associations from different countries continued until the last moment and a few deals were eventually made. A recently closed-down television transmitter in Hamburg was allowed to broadcast short newsreels for experimental purposes. The BBC, moreover, bought film material from the Olympic Film Pool, which had been especially established to shoot exclusive film material of the 1952 Games, and achieved rights to broadcasts this material in the United Kingdom. Later references in the Finnish Film Archive point out that

¹⁵¹ Since the Finnish Postal and Telegraph Service did not have a telephoto device, one was bought in 1951 especially for the Olympics. In December of that year, the first picture transmission was realized. A second telephoto apparatus was borrowed for the period of the Games to secure sufficient capacity. Source: Kollka, ed., (1955).

American and Canadian television channels also broadcast film fragments. But all in all television broadcasting of the 1952 Olympics was limited and no live broadcasting occurred.

In contrast to the Amsterdam Games, the official reasons given by the organizing committee do not reveal any anxiety toward the medium itself. On the contrary, the organizing committee saw a great potential in television broadcasting. Although the first limited television broadcasting services had begun in the late 1930s in Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom, it was only after World War II that television expanded to other countries. As Lyn and David McLean (2003) argue, the development of television as a private medium was not determined by the technology of television itself: “television’s development would be shaped in part by technology but also by political and social systems and by the institutional arrangements already established for radio broadcasting” (2004: 127).

In this regard, the organizing committee’s expectations with regard to selling the television rights reveal a framing of television in legal and financial terms similar to that of other established news media systems. Whereas the organizational and juridical structures for older news media such as newspapers, press photography, radio and film had already been crystallized in relation to the Olympic Games, for television this was not the case. Even though television had been heavily influenced by radio broadcasting systems, in the early 1950s American television, for instance, was characterized by a very different model for financing programs. In contrast to radio, audience ratings were of minor importance since television programs were primarily financed by sponsors rather than by advertisers (Boddy, 1993). In the American case, television broadcasting regimes were less fixed, even though they were predominantly based on radio systems (Engelman, 1996). The relative openness of television broadcasting regimes may have conflicted with the Finnish organizing committee’s approach to the medium as being similar to radio. Reasons for the non-televization of the Helsinki Games should therefore not be sought in any resistance to new technologies, but rather in the different financial interests.

As a consequence, the Helsinki Games were predominantly represented by means of radio reports. The visual representation of the host city and nation remained limited to traditional news reels, promotion material and illustrated newspaper and magazines articles. Because of this audio-centered representation of the Games, the host city and the nation, the investments that had been made to raise the profile of both Finland and Helsinki were not maximally exploited.

6.7 CONCLUSION

The 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games were above all a national affair with Helsinki serving as the nation’s showcase. Helsinki’s own aim of repositioning itself internationally by means of the Olympics was therefore coupled to the aim of presenting Finland as a whole. In this chapter, the question of how Finland and Helsinki raised their profiles abroad by means of the fifteenth Olympiad was approached in two steps. First, attention was paid to how sports, and in particular participation in the Olympic Games, were mobilized to (re)present the nation and to contribute to the project of nation building. We reconstructed how the ‘sportive presentation’ of Finland was expanded to other areas by linking athletic performance to the welfare state. By translating sports in these terms, the organizers of the 1952

Games, as well as the national and local authorities, were able to (re)present the victories of Finnish athletes as part of Finland's project of establishing a modern and model welfare state.

Yet this translation process alone did not amount to a successful promotion imagery. Images also had to be produced by creating a vision of Helsinki as the capital city of a modern welfare state in progress. Sports victories and practice were actively linked to images of welfare, in particular the new rational architecture of the Funkis movement. Considering Helsinki's earlier attempt to host the 1940 Games, the staging of the fifteen Olympiad was deeply embedded in the development of the city on both a physical and a social level. Architecture, urban planning and progressive social policies were all mobilized to get a maximum socializing *and* promotional effect out of hosting the Games. The Games were used as an opportunity to realize a higher standard of living for Helsinki's population, while these achievements and advancements were also actively exhibited to foreign visitors, media and audiences. In this regard, the Olympic Games constituted not just an event, but a dynamic network of which the actual festivities formed only the most visible part. The Helsinki Games were a mega-project that aimed to (re)connect Finland and its capital to the West.

The second step in our analysis drew attention to the construction of telecommunication infrastructures to facilitate media operations and maximize promotion strategies. CityEvents require vast infrastructures to accommodate and transport foreign visitors, but also to facilitate news media coverage of the events. By the time of the 1952 Olympics, media coverage had shifted from the printed press to live radio broadcasting and television was also increasingly becoming an important mass medium, even though, as became apparent, the organizers of the Helsinki Games underexploited this latter medium. In addition, live radio broadcasting had incited the printed press to reduce delays in news coverage as much as possible (Brooker-Gross, 1985). As a result of this development, the printed press demanded a greater capacity of telecommunication infrastructures to distribute more information at a faster pace. Because Helsinki did not have the infrastructure to handle the peak in international telecommunication traffic the Games were expected to generate, huge investments were made to equip the city with international telecommunication connections in order to accommodate the news media, in particular the foreign press and foreign radio broadcasting corporations (Kollka ed., 1955).

With regard to this process, we were able to make explicit that media infrastructures are often taken for granted, as if their large-scale implementation can be ignored as a political-economic (f)actor. Although the media text is often taken as a research object, the wider production and distribution context tends to be ignored (Couldry and McCarthy, 2004). Before the introduction of global satellite networks and mobile media production units, the exploitation of CityEvents for raising the profiles of the host city and the nation principally depended on local infrastructures that connected one locale to the other by means of telegraph and telephone cables and radio transmitters. Mediation has never been a virtual process alone; infrastructures have always been needed to overcome spatiotemporal obstacles (Graham and Marvin, 2001). The creation of an appealing imagery is therefore only one facet in raising the host city's and the nation's profile: the message also has to be transported or transmitted beyond national boundaries.

This insight enabled us to reconfirm our earlier statement that the Helsinki Games were used by the local and national authorities to open up Finland and Helsinki to the rest of the world. The electronic telecommunication networks that

were constructed for the Games fulfilled a condition for (re)establishing economic, political and cultural relations with the West, and for intensifying bonds with the Soviet Union. In this respect, the hosting of the Helsinki Games differs from that of the Amsterdam and Berlin Olympics. The Helsinki Games were approached as a long-term investment, rather than as a momentary event for generating immediate media attention and revenue.

From a theoretical perspective, raising the profile of the host city and nation not only requires the reordering and renaming of space, but also a (temporary) expansion of the amalgamation of networks that constitutes the host city. This offers opportunities for the host city to establish new alignments. Raising the profile of cities is therefore more than mere promotion; it is a process accompanied by a geographical expansion of the city across many different localities. By setting up new transport and telecommunication infrastructures, the amalgamation of networks that constituted Helsinki expanded outwards, aligning more and more localities to its network. Selling the city is therefore not simply a matter of urban development within a city's territory, but also of a geographical expansion that goes far beyond the local territory. In other words, during the Olympic Games the worldwide attention that Helsinki received was not only a matter of the nations of the world assembling in Helsinki, but also a matter of Helsinki coming to the rest of the world in a way it had previously not been able to because of its isolated geographical position.

Conclusion of Part II

Comparing the Three Olympic Games

The past three chapters have applied the CityEvent model to the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Games. The main question that has been addressed is how these cities used the Olympics to create a distinct profile for themselves. This question has been approached in the following steps: identifying which interests were pursued by which actors; reconstructing how different interests were negotiated by various actors; linking the different interests to the way the host city intended to present itself; reconstructing the production of city images by focusing on the reordering and renaming of place; and, finally, involving media coverage patterns in the analysis to reconstruct how the city and event turned virtual (became immaterial images) and place became mobilized. Even though different aspects and themes came to light in every case study, by following this analytical pattern we are able to compare the network dynamics of the three events. It is precisely here that the CityEvent model proves its value: it enables us to identify, reconstruct and understand transformations and developments. This conclusion therefore mainly focuses on the developments and transformations that can be identified by comparing the three Olympic cases, rather than reiterating the cases themselves. In this regard, one recurring theme and two transformations can be identified: the theme is the relation between the nation state and the host city and the transformations are, respectively, the shift from the printed press to live coverage of the Games and the change from merely organizing the Games as a sports event to the integration of the Olympics in larger urban development schemes.

Let us first draw attention to the recurring theme of the relation between the city and the nation. From the analysis of the cases, it became clear that the nation state played a dominant role in how the host city presents itself by means of the Olympics. In the early phases of the production process of the Games, the state already actively interfered in the relation between the city and the IOC, the event owner. Sometimes the state's role suited the interests of the host city; at other times, it worked against them. The Amsterdam case is a good example here, because the Dutch government initially backed the bid for the 1928 Games, while the parliament later rejected the subsidy bill to finance the event. In the case of the Berlin Games, on the contrary, the new Nazi government initially rejected the idea of hosting the Olympics, almost canceling it completely. In both cases, the interests of the state (or important actors such as the parliament that with others constitute the 'state network') did not coincide with the generic event formula of the Games. In the case of the Amsterdam Games, many parliament members were of the opinion that the Games constituted a pagan happening and many of them also opposed the idea of women participating in sports. The Nazi regime also considered the Olympic formula, and in particular the IOC's rationalized and pacifist approach to sports, incommensurable with national socialist ideology. Thus, the dominant role that the state played in the amalgamation of networks that constitutes the key actor 'host city' severely affected the relations between the city and the IOC as event owner.

The cities of Amsterdam and Berlin themselves did not have a particular problem with the generic event formula of the Olympic Games. It was the nation state, or influential actors within the 'state network', which opposed the idea of sports competition in general and/or the specific vision on sports that the IOC advocated.

However, because at the time the reputation and prestige of the Olympic formula was by no means incontrovertible yet, the IOC needed the host nation to create wider support for its generic event formula. This situation provided room for the state to translate the Olympic Games into its own terms as much as possible. The Nazi Olympics in particular (and to a lesser extent the Helsinki Games) forms an illustrative example of how the state appropriated the event. In each case, a particular approach to sports was advocated that enabled the German and Finnish nations to demonstrate their achievements. The state dominated the relation between the host city and the event owner by attempting to manipulate the generic event formula. In the case of the Berlin Games, the Nazis tried to undermine the Olympist conception of sport by translating the Games into a celebration of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. The Finnish state in turn used the Games to demonstrate its sovereignty to the rest of the world by exploiting the relation between Finnish participation in the Olympics and the country's road to independence. From our analysis, it became clear that these attempts to appropriate the Games also reflected in the way the host city presented itself and the nation through the Olympic Games. To sum up, national agendas overshadowed local agendas in the hosting and presentation of the Olympic Games and its local host.

Yet a nuance has to be made here, since the nation state could only claim a dominant position in the network because it shared certain interests with the host city. This became apparent, for instance, in the presentation of the Amsterdam Olympics. The state and the leading national newspapers had a clear interest in promoting the Netherlands rather than Amsterdam alone. Since the city's image in many ways already stood for that of the nation as a whole, it was easy for Amsterdam to adjust itself to the interests of the state and the newspapers, because the city would benefit just as much from the presentation of the entire nation as it would from only promoting itself. The presentation of the nation reaffirmed Amsterdam's capital status and added prestige to the city. This same argument applies to Berlin and Helsinki. The dominant position of these cities within the national territory was reinforced. Moreover, the relation between the nation state and the host city draws attention to the heterogeneity of the three key actors of the host city, the media and the event owner. The Amsterdam case showed that the nation state and the domestic press formed an indispensable actor-network in the amalgamation of networks that we label the 'host city'. The city of Amsterdam needed the support of the national government, but also had to establish alignments with leading newspapers to circumvent the parliament. Thus, in this case, the key actor of the 'host city' included many more actors than solely local actors like the municipality.

In this respect, it might be tempting to dismiss the theoretical distinction between the three key actors and the reconstruction of historical reality in terms of interests. Such a conclusion would, however, result in an approach in which everything would seem to relate to everything else. The CityEvent model is not a reflection of reality, but a *construction of reality* that helps us to construct and recreate networks as critical tools to unravel the relationships between 'large international periodic rootless events' (CityEvents), cities and the media. The model allows for the analysis of the complexity of the interdependent relations that are established when a CityEvent is staged. In this respect, the three Olympic case studies demonstrate that none of the key actors is able to completely overrule, integrate or absorb the others. While a key actor can occupy a dominant position in the network, it will always be dependent on the cooperation of the others. The Berlin Olympics formed an illustrative case in this regard. Whereas the Nazis tried to 'nazify' the Games, the American anti-German lobby and the public reprimand after Hitler's

refusal to congratulate Jesse Owens show that there were limits to this attempt. The Nazis had to accept these limits because otherwise the Games would officially be cancelled by the IOC and/or be declared a failure by the international press.

Even though none of the key actors established an absolutely dominant position, a remarkable development can be identified with regard to the role that the media played in the production process of the three CityEvents. From the 1928 Games onwards, news media gained a more powerful position in the network that produced the Olympic Games. This shows in the efforts that the host cities had to undertake to keep the media aligned in such a way that positive media coverage was generated. In the case of the Amsterdam Games, the controversy surrounding the sale of the film and photography rights resulted in a domestic boycott that extended to some other countries. This boycott prevented the organizing committee from advertising the 1928 Games in cinema theatres in many European countries. Nonetheless, the damage was relatively limited compared to the pressure that the American news media put on the organizers of the Berlin Games. In that case, the organizers temporarily had to alleviate national racist policies in order to prevent the Olympics from being boycotted by participants. Thus, it is clear that the foreign news media, and especially the larger foreign newspapers and international news agencies, increasingly manifested themselves as obligatory points of passage. That is to say, if leading foreign news media did not cover the preparations and festivities in a positive manner, the chances of a successfully staged Olympic Games would be minimized. As a result, compromises had to be made occasionally to align the news media to the Games. In the case of the Berlin Games, this meant that the Nazis had to accept Jewish athletes on their Olympic team and that they temporarily had to mitigate the Nuremberg laws. The growing influence of the news media also became apparent in the case of the Helsinki Games when the organizing committee had to make concessions to leading international news agencies such as Keystone Pictures, AP, NP and UP and allow these companies to bring in their own photography pool.

The type of media coverage also underwent a transformation. After the Berlin Games, live reporting increased in significance, overtaking the dominant position of the printed press. By the time of the Helsinki Olympics, media coverage had evolved from the printed press to international live radio broadcasting. In 1952, the Games could potentially also have been broadcast live on international television. Even though this was not realized due to financial disagreements between the organizing committee and American television broadcasting corporations, the infrastructure and technological facilities were mostly present. A part of the required infrastructure was even especially constructed, because it was also needed for the live radio broadcasts. From the Amsterdam Games onwards, the Olympics evolved from a relatively modest event to a large-scale event in which not only the number of participating athletes and countries increased but media coverage too. While this is difficult to quantify in terms of directly related data, the substantial increase in press seats from 300 during the Amsterdam Games to over 1,100 in Berlin and Helsinki Olympics suggests a definite increase. Yet while news media grew in significance, we cannot identify a linear growth pattern. When we compare, for instance, radio broadcasting between the Berlin and Helsinki Games, a rather mixed picture emerges. During the Berlin Games, 105 radio reporters sent out 2,328 broadcasts to 40 countries¹⁵² in comparison to 141 reporters who sent out 1,474 broadcasts to 47 countries (Kolkka, ed., 1955: 134-135).

¹⁵² Organisations-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936. (1937). *XI Olympiade Berlin 1936: Amtlicher Bericht (Band 2)*. Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag, p. 340-342.

Whereas more radio broadcasts were sent out during the Nazi Olympics, the number of countries that received live radio coverage of the Games was higher during the Helsinki Olympics. Unfortunately, there are no exact data that reveal the percentage of live broadcasts during the 1936 Games. During the Helsinki Games, 945 out of the 1,474 radio broadcasts were live. The growing importance of the news media, and in particular the radio, should therefore be discerned from the efforts that the host cities undertook to influence media coverage and the investments they had to make to meet the technical demands the media required for their successful operation.

In this regard, another transformation can be identified in relation to the above-mentioned shift from the printed press to live radio coverage. In chronological order, the host cities increased their investments to create a distinct profile for themselves. Whereas Amsterdam tried to raise its profile by means of a rather modest decoration of its main streets and a couple of exhibitions, in the case of Berlin enormous investments were made to stage an unprecedented spectacle. Not only were the Olympic venues larger than ever before, their location was carefully planned and connected to the city's main boulevard in order to impress domestic masses and foreign guests alike. The production of such an impressive and spectacular imagery required a partial re-imagination of Berlin that went far beyond the addition of some decorative elements. Public space had to be cleared of 'subversive signs' and entire transport and public broadcasting networks had to be installed to circulate and enchant the masses in an effective manner. The Helsinki Games perhaps did not quite equal the spectacle of the Nazi Olympics, but nonetheless its organizers had to make even larger investments to connect their city to international media networks (this in spite of the fact that foreign news media coverage was probably lower than during the Berlin Games). The efforts that had to be put into enabling international media operations were relatively bigger for a small host city and nation than for the Nazi regime. Moreover, the organization of the Helsinki Games was much deeper embedded in overall town planning programs. The construction of the Helsinki Sports Park and the Olympic Village were part of a broader social policy, so that we may conclude that the hosting of the Olympic Games increasingly became intertwined with urban development schemes.

In this respect, a development can be identified from a focus on the direct impact of the Games to an interest in its long-term effects. In the case of Amsterdam, the organizing committee and the local and national authorities were mostly focused on 'cashing in' through direct revenues, which were expected to be generated by ticket and souvenirs sales, and overnight stays by domestic and foreign visitors. Even though the promotion of Dutch industry could be considered a long-term goal, there were no policies and plans in place to maximize this effect. In Berlin's case, immediate and medium-term political and economic impacts were the primary focus. The 1936 Games were staged as a charm offensive the impact of which was intended to last after the event itself. This is illustrated, for instance, by Riefenstahl's film, which was especially commissioned to reinforce the memorization of the event. Nevertheless, the hosting of the Berlin Olympics was not integrated with long-term urban planning. Only in Helsinki's case can a development be identified towards the long-term planning and implementation of social and economic policies and objectives that would benefit the host city and the nation. This is most vividly illustrated by the major infrastructural works, such as the new harbor terminal, airport and telegraph cable, the Olympic Village and the Sports Park, which were not only undertaken to facilitate the hosting of the Games, but were also intended as future investments to foster long-term economic growth.

This transition from short-term goals to long-term planning, together with the increasing integration of the hosting of the Olympics with larger urban planning schemes, should also be related to the transformation in media coverage. With the emergence of live coverage patterns, the Olympic Games evolved into great historical happenings even before they ended. Through live broadcasting, audiences could experience the event *as if* they were participating in 'live history' (Dayan and Katz, 1992). The Games not only increased in size in terms of direct media coverage, but more and more became events that were to be memorialized. In this regard, it is not coincidental that the most famous of all Olympic documentaries, namely Riefenstahl's *Olympiad*, was produced at the moment the Games turned into a true media event, that is, a live happening. With the increase in live coverage, the need for the commemoration of the events grew as well and Olympic films were commissioned to extend the promotional impact of the Games. As a result, the Olympic Games were transformed from a large international event that is hosted above all for reasons of prestige into a long-term process designed to raise the profile of the city-image.

In this process, creating a distinct profile of the host city is not the same as mere promotion. Raising a city's international profile by means of a CityEvent requires the establishment of many alignments and a substantial reordering and renaming of places. Whereas the Amsterdam Games might still be seen as defined by a strictly promotional approach, the enormous efforts undertaken by the organizers of the Berlin and Helsinki Games suggest that advertising alone was no longer sufficient. Images had to be produced by actively interfering in the built environment. In this regard, architecture and urban planning primarily served the political purposes of impressing foreign guests and media and/or of civilizing and educating the domestic masses.

By focusing on the relations between the key actors, but also on the level where interactions take place between the actors that constitute the key actors, we have been able to approach the creation of distinctive city images as a process of translating interests. In this regard, we have emphasized in our analysis the emergence of the 'host city' as key actor and its interactions with the media. To generate positive media coverage, the host city literally has to construct attractive images by reordering and renaming places. The construction of these images is the result of negotiations between those actors and networks that together constitute the 'host city', such as the nation state, the municipality, urban planning, architecture and social policy. In this respect, ANT offers the advantage of also involving nonhuman actors in the analysis, which helps us to demonstrate that the ordering of the built environment plays a crucial role in the creation of city images. Selling the city is a process of constructing material images—images directly constituted by tangible actors such as buildings, street furniture, trees, people etc.—and their translation by the media into immaterial and above all transportable images. Consequently, the increasing integration of the hosting of the Olympics with urban development schemes should be seen in relation to the transition from the printed press to live radio broadcasting. This transformation in media coverage accelerated the translation of material images into immaterial images, because live coverage opens up the geographical space (locality) of the host city to the world by turning place virtual in the very moment of transmission. In live coverage, geographical and temporal obstacles are reduced to almost zero and place can consequently be mediated and mobilized at a much faster pace.

This line of reasoning has consequences for our thinking about cities. With the acceleration of media coverage, cities are no longer purely geographical entities

confined to a specific territory. Instead, cities are partly mobile amalgamations of networks that manifest themselves both within the specific territory that is traditionally called 'city' and simultaneously at other locations around the globe. To paraphrase the conclusion of the chapter on the Helsinki Games: the world-wide attention that Helsinki received during the Olympic Games was not only a matter of the nations of the world assembling in Helsinki, but also a matter of Helsinki coming to the rest of the world. The 1952 Games, but certainly also the 1936 Games, were therefore more than just mega-events that attracted worldwide attention. The production of these CityEvents also resulted in the temporary expansion and mobilization of the host cities. The Games made these cities big for a moment by expanding their alignments with other localities in quantity and intensity.

Thus, we can come to the tentative conclusion that changes in media coverage patterns affect how cities are able to raise their profile and reposition themselves by means of CityEvents. In this regard, it is worthwhile to look at a different CityEvent in another historical period to examine whether this conclusion can be generalized. In the next part, therefore, the European Capitals of Culture will be analyzed. By comparing the cases of the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympic Games to the European Capitals of Culture, we will be able to identify network dynamics and, by doing so, the transformations and developments that are characteristic for the hosting of CityEvents in general rather than for specific cases.

Part III

**Towards a Festive Programming of
the City**

Introduction to Part III

In the previous part, we ended our inquiry into the Olympics with the 1952 Helsinki Games, held at the beginning of the Cold War era. This third part starts at the end of this era when the first ECOCs were staged. The late 1980s not only signal the end of a bipolar world and of the hegemony of neo-liberalism over communism, but also mark a new phase in the hosting of CityEvents in which host cities use these events not only to raise their international profile, but also to generate new economic incentives. The emergence of a new CityEvent, the European Capital of Culture (ECOC), enables us to examine this development and allows us to reconstruct the development of this CityEvent itself. In this part, we will study the ECOCs of Amsterdam (1987), Berlin (1988) and Helsinki (2000). The title of this third part already gives an indication of how the ECOC has developed. However, we cannot fully explain this title until we have analyzed the case studies. Let us therefore first delineate the ECOC as our research object.

The European Capital of Culture (ECOC) is one of Europe's biggest cultural events, initiated in 1983 by the Greek Minister of Culture, Melina Mercouri. The establishment of the ECOC should be placed in the broader context of European integration. In the 1980s, the European Economic Community (EEC) was mostly focused on European economic integration. Little action and initiative were devoted to stimulating European integration in other areas. In the field of arts and culture, for example, there was no formal and durable cooperation. Most existing plans remained vague and there were insufficient resources to realize them. In 1983, at an EEC meeting for Ministers of Culture in Athens, Mercouri launched the idea for a European Capital of Culture (ECOC). In her view, the process of ongoing European integration was too exclusively focused on economic aspects. Many other European Ministers of Culture and Jacques Lang, the head of the European Commission, welcomed her idea. From this it is clear that the ECOC was not an isolated initiative, but part of a much broader debate on the EEC's role in the cultural realm, in which both Mercouri and Lang played leading roles.

According to the former Dutch Minister of Education and Culture, Elco Brinkman,¹⁵³ who was also actively engaged in this debate and who initiated the Amsterdam ECOC, three main points dominated the EEC's agenda with respect to cultural policy. In the first place, there was a growing fear that the American entertainment industry, most notably Hollywood, would overshadow European cultural products. This evoked a fierce debate about European culture, identity and heritage. Lang's argument for introducing a quota system for American films to protect the European film industry is illustrative in this regard. The second issue was the question of the restitution and protection of cultural heritage. Mercouri dominated this debate in her attempt to persuade the British government to return the Elgin Marbles, taken from the Acropolis, to Athens. This debate would be (partly) resolved in the Treaty of Malta. Finally, there was a strong sense that cultural cooperation and exchange on the European level required a more substantial framework. It was this concern which eventually resulted in the ECOC being established, among many other initiatives.

In 1985, Athens staged the first ECOC. At this point, the formula of the event had not taken definitive shape and it has since undergone dramatic changes. These

¹⁵³ Telephone interview held with Mr. Brinkman on January 10, 2006.

changes can be summarized as a transition from exclusive, highbrow arts programming to a much broader programming by the host city that also includes popular culture. The ECOC has moreover transformed from a cultural manifestation into an event that is actively exploited for place-selling purposes. So far, this transition has only been described in a few studies (Richard and Wilson, 1994; Seo, 2002; Verwijnen and Lehtovuori, ed., 1999). Most studies of the ECOC focus only on the promotional, economic and/or socio-cultural impact of recent and individual editions and not on the historical development of this CityEvent, thereby neglecting the question of how the ECOC has evolved as a result of the different implementation strategies that were used over the course of its various editions. Typically, only the successful and/or very recent ECOCs, such as those organized by Glasgow (1990), Helsinki (2000), Rotterdam (2001) and Porto (2001), receive academic attention (Garcia, 2004; Berg et al., 2000). With the exception of two reports, one of which (Palmer et al., 2004) was commissioned by the European Commission and the other (Cogliandro, 2001) by the nine cities that hosted the ECOC in the millennium year, few comparisons have been made between different ECOCs. Most studies therefore fail to acknowledge the generic character of the ECOC.

Since the event is organized annually by different cities, its impact on these cities cannot be comprehended if the development of the ECOC as a generic event formula remains unexplored. Many host cities try to learn from previous ECOCs and copy each other's best practices (Palmer et al., 2004). The ECOC therefore offers us a suitable case for studying the evolution of a generic event formula. By focusing on the Amsterdam (1987) and Berlin (1988) ECOCs we will analyze how the generic formula developed in relation to the way in which different interests were negotiated. Furthermore, the Helsinki ECOC (2000) allows us to compare the early and later phases of the ECOC.

As with the Olympics, the CityEvent model enables us to reconstruct how host cities try to raise their profile by means of hosting CityEvents—the central question of this study.¹⁵⁴ In this part, the CityEvent model will be used to identify divergent actor-interests, to reconstruct how these interests were negotiated and, finally, to show how these interests were translated into the ECOC program. In addition, the model draws attention to the ways in which the different actor interests materialize in the specific city images that (re)present the host city and the ECOC. The model furthermore allows us to relate the 'imaging' of the host city and the ECOC to interventions made in places that support desired images. In other words, the model enables us to examine how the reordering of place relates to specific (news) media coverage patterns and promotion and publicity strategies. Finally, the CityEvent model allows us to deconstruct and analyze actor relations. In this regard, special attention will be given to the relation between the host city and the nation state. But first we have to return to the main question that will be addressed in this part: how do host cities raise their profile (inter)nationally by means of the ECOC?

¹⁵⁴ For clarity's sake, the CityEvent model can briefly be summarized as a triangular approach that presupposes that CityEvents—rootless periodic international events—are co-produced by three key actors: the host city, the event owner and the media. Each of these actors tries to negotiate its interests in the network that produces a CityEvent, thereby trying to align other actors that support its cause.

7. ACH'87: AMSTERDAM EUROPEAN CAPITAL OF CULTURE 1987

Brinkmanship or Miscalculation?

L'intérêt porté par les habitants d'Amsterdam à l'événement reste médiocre. Pire, dans certains cas, on peut parler d'indifférence, voire de reticence (Ephimenco, 1987)¹⁵⁵.

7.1 INTRODUCTION:

In 1987, Amsterdam was one of the first cities to host the ECOC. At the time, the concept and purpose of the ECOC were not familiar to large shares of the public. The above quote from the French newspaper *Liberation* illustrates that the event could not count on much interest from Amsterdam's inhabitants. This raises the question whether Amsterdam European Capital of Culture 1987 (officially abbreviated as ACH'87) was a 'failed event' insofar as audiences and perhaps also the media did not show much interest in it. What were the reasons for this disinterest in the third edition of the ECOC? Could there be a correlation between the lack of enthusiasm and the fact that the ECOC had only recently been founded (in 1985)? More importantly, what can such an at first sight less successful edition of the ECOC tell us about the way cities raise their profiles by means of CityEvents? In this regard, ACH'87 might be comparable to the first editions of the Olympic Games, which were also rather obscure events that received relatively little international media attention. Precisely because the ECOC was such an obscure event in 1987 we have to examine to what extent, if any, this manifestation was used to raise Amsterdam's profile. Therefore, special attention will be given to the strategies through which the organizers of ACH'87 approached the various news media, in particular television, to maximize coverage of the event.

The lack of enthusiasm on the side of the local population could also suggest that there was little support for ACH'87 from the local authorities, from cultural institutions, from the domestic press and from many of the other actors needed to organize this CityEvent. Thus, we may ask whether it could have been not the relative obscure formula of the ECOC that was the reason for ACH'87's obscurity, but rather an inability of the hosts to stage this CityEvent in such a way that audiences and media would be attracted to it. This question demands that we examine the local network that was established in Amsterdam to produce a program for ACH'87: how was the key actor 'host city' formatted? Aside from reconstructing the key actor 'host city', we are also obliged to describe the triangular network core that was established between the host city, the event owner and the media to accomplish the staging of ACH'87. After all, without the support of the event owner and the media, no host city can successfully stage a CityEvent. For, whether the formation of the host city and the

¹⁵⁵ The article is available at the Archives of the Dutch Theatre Institute, Amsterdam, access number: ACH'87. The complete archive of ACH'87 contains three boxes. There are no specific codes to indicate folders, apart from box "algemeen", which contains correspondence and documents of the organizers of ACH'87. The other two boxes contain press cuttings from Dutch and foreign newspapers.

triangular network are successful depends on the degree to which actors are able to negotiate their interests, how many actors share certain interests and, finally, how strong the established alignments are. ACH'87 offers us a remarkable case since the lack of audience interest noted by *Liberation* might be a result of the way in which other actors aligned themselves with the network. Obviously, a network did emerge. Otherwise, ACH'87 would never have happened. The question, therefore, is not whether alignments were established, but rather how strong these alignments were.

7.2 INTERESTING THE DISINTERESTED

In this regard, we have to focus on the pre-bidding and bidding phases, because these are the stages during which relations between the media, event owner and host city are principally established. In addition, these are also the phases in which the key actors themselves come into being. Let us therefore start at the beginning by focusing on how Amsterdam obtained the honor of hosting the 1987 ECOC.

7.2.1 Bidding: Cuckoo in the Nest

To identify the interests that played a role in the designation of Amsterdam as ECOC we have to go back to the moment when the generic event formula of this CityEvent emerged. At the same meeting where Melina Mercouri first launched the idea, a compromise was reached between the EEC member states that were to host the first ECOCs. Elco Brinkman, the Dutch Minister of Culture,¹⁵⁶ had initially proposed Amsterdam for 1986, but later agreed that 1987 was a more feasible option. Thus, unlike contemporary editions of the ECOC, Amsterdam's designation was the outcome of political negotiations instead of a bidding procedure. Interestingly, the Amsterdam authorities were not informed of the city's candidature at this point in time.¹⁵⁷ It was the nation state, represented by the Minister of Culture, that proposed Amsterdam. Hence, the state occupied a twofold role: that of event owner *and* host city. As will become apparent in our analysis, this interference of the state with the city's affairs had great consequences for the organization of ACH'87.

From the beginning, Amsterdam's candidature for the ECOC was locally perceived as something that had been forced upon the city rather than as a challenge supported by the city authorities, its business community, cultural institutions, news media and inhabitants. By proposing Amsterdam as host city without consulting the municipality and other prominent actors, Brinkman had not been able to cultivate their interest beforehand. When the designation of Amsterdam was made public, it was therefore not surprising that the announcement was received with indifference by the public, the media and large shares of the municipality and cultural institutions.

¹⁵⁶ At the time, Elco Brinkman was the Minister of Culture (officially, the ministry was called 'Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Cultuur': Welfare, Public Health and Culture). Since Mr. Lemstra stood in for Brinkman at the Athens meeting at which Amsterdam was proposed as a candidate for the ECOC, I will refer to the individual Brinkman only when a text fragment represents his personal opinion. In all other cases I will use the term "Minister" or "Ministry of Culture" to emphasize that not Brinkman the individual, but the ministerial institution/network is being referred to. Sources: interviews with Brinkman (by telephone, January 10, 2006) and Jan Riezenkamp, former secretary-general of the Ministry of Culture (in person, Amsterdam, December 14, 2005).

¹⁵⁷ All the interviewees who cooperated with this research confirmed this rather unusual situation.

These actors simply had not had the time to consider whether the ECOC would be of interest to them as a format.

Whether the Minister of Culture had expected such disinterest or not, the rather unusual designation of Amsterdam raises a question: what interests motivated the Minister to designate Amsterdam without consulting the city's authorities beforehand? According to Brinkman, the Dutch government played an active role in the emerging debate on European cultural policy. Due to this active involvement, Amsterdam's designation could easily be negotiated at this early stage. In other words, it was an historical opportunity for proposing Amsterdam as host city for the ECOC. In addition, Amsterdam's great historical and cultural value in the European context made the city an obvious choice for ECOC. Specifically, Amsterdam would fit perfectly in the chronological order that had been established by designating Athens for 1985 and Florence for 1986. In this sequence, Amsterdam would represent the late or post-Renaissance period of the reformation, the era in which the scientific revolution took place and Northern Europe experienced an economic and cultural period of prosperity.

In addition to these motives, Brinkman had a clear interest in hosting the ECOC as soon as possible. The outcome of the debate about the need to broaden the EEC's focus from strictly economic issues to other areas such as culture was difficult to predict. With the idea for the ECOC being a novelty and, as mentioned before, with the EEC offering no clear guidelines or resources, it was considered a distinct possibility that it would cease to exist after a couple of years. Brinkman was of the opinion that if the Netherlands wanted to contribute to the development of the ECOC and European cultural policy in general, it had to get involved as soon as possible.

Despite these good intentions, Brinkman's plan vitally lacked broad local support in Amsterdam. The value of the ECOC, or rather, of its generic event formula was underdeveloped and largely unknown. Few people understood the purpose of the event and many wondered why Amsterdam needed to host an ECOC when the city was already widely recognized as one of Europe's leading cultural capitals. Furthermore, the city's authorities, cultural elites and many of its inhabitants stuck to the rather confident, even arrogant attitude that considered Amsterdam to be the absolute intellectual and cultural center of the Netherlands.¹⁵⁸ With many, this claim was (too) easily extended to Amsterdam's position in Europe. At the time, Amsterdam followed on the heels of London and Paris on European ranking lists of most popular tourist destinations. Considering the city's comfortable position in terms of attracting visitors, the need to raise Amsterdam's profile by organizing a cultural event was widely questioned.

According to Steve Austen and Ad 's Gravesande, the directors of respectively the Nederlands Theater Instituut (The Netherlands Theatre Institute, abbreviated as NTI) and the Holland Festival (abbreviated as HF), whose organizations would become responsible for the production of ACH'87, the rather blasé reaction to the ECOC was especially strong among the city's established cultural institutions.¹⁵⁹ The novelty and lack of profile of the ECOC's generic formula made it difficult for the cultural sector to see the added value of the event compared to the regular programs already being offered by the city's cultural institutions. In other words, these actors

¹⁵⁸ Interviews with Austen (Amsterdam, June 14, 2004 and January 5, 2005), Bloemers (interview by telephone, November 21, 2005), Brinkman (January, 10, 2006), 's Gravesande (November 29, 2005), Luimstra (October, 25, 2005) and Riezenkamp (December 14, 2005).

¹⁵⁹ Interviews with Austen (Amsterdam, June 14, 2004 and January 5, 2005) en 's Gravesande (November 29, 2005).

were not able to identify a particular interest in ACH'87, nor had the Ministry of Culture made many efforts to generate such actor interests.

Another negative factor was the failed Amsterdam bid for the 1992 Olympics. The local authorities had spent much energy and financial resources on preparing the bid, but protests by inhabitants had undermined the smooth imagery with which Amsterdam had aimed to present itself. Consequently, there existed a certain reluctance to organize any other events on the part of the public, authorities, tourist sector and cultural institutions (Palmer et al., 2004). On top of this, Amsterdam's designation as ECOC was perceived as the individual prestige project of the Minister of Culture rather than as an Amsterdam-based initiative. Not everyone appreciated the idea of an outsider telling Amsterdam what to do. Indeed, as one of the interviewees¹⁶⁰ joked, "ACH'87 was like having a cuckoo in the nest".

Hence, from the beginning there was friction between the initiator of ACH'87 (the nation-state as represented by the Minister of Culture) and the local actors in Amsterdam that had to be aligned with the project. As mentioned above, the latter did not see any of their interests represented in the ECOC. Because there were barely any shared interests, it was difficult for the Ministry of Culture to align these actors to its project. The Ministry nevertheless managed to get some support from the municipality of Amsterdam. Despite their irritation and surprise at the Minister's approach, the local authorities reacted positively to Amsterdam being awarded the ECOC.¹⁶¹ The event was thought to present an opportunity to raise the profile of Amsterdam's arts and cultural scene on an international level.¹⁶² In fact, the Amsterdam authorities had little choice but to accept the ECOC designation, since the Ministry had already appointed two independent cultural institutions, the Netherlands Theatre Institute (NTI) and Holland Festival (HF), to organize the event. This brings us to the question of how the organizational network that was to produce ACH'87 was set up locally and what kind of institutional shape it took.

7.2.2 *Organizational Frameworks*

Although it may not have been the main reason for the Ministry of Culture to ask the NTI and HF to organize ACH'87, by creating a local organizational network the Ministry became capable of staging the ECOC with or without the support of the local authorities. Thus, if it turned out to be necessary, the Ministry would be able to undermine the municipality's position as an obligatory point of passage. Before we discuss the consequences of this approach for the way the municipality aligned itself with the ECOC project, we will focus on what the official institutional framework for the organization of ACH'87 looked like. In the first instance, a third institution, namely the Amsterdam Uitburo (Amsterdam Promotion and Ticket Office for the cultural sector) was also involved in the organization of ACH'87 and was supposed to take care of its promotion. However, due to its limited resources, which rendered it unable to carry out the promotion while remaining within the tight budget assigned to ACH'87, the Uitburo pulled out of the organizational network.¹⁶³

There are several reasons why the Ministry chose this somewhat unusual organizational framework instead of founding, for instance, a new agency to

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Riezenkamp (December 14, 2005).

¹⁶¹ Interview with Minnie Luimstra, former alderman of cultural affairs for the city of Amsterdam. The interview was held in Amsterdam on October 25, 2005.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Interview with Freek Bloemers (November, 21, 2005).

coordinate ACH'87. In the first place, economics played an important role. Embedding the organization within an established Amsterdam cultural institution was expected to save overhead costs.¹⁶⁴ The reason for sharing the organization between the NTI and HF was a political compromise. The HF was thought to be more suitable for setting up large productions in cooperation with Amsterdam's major cultural institutions, such as the Concert Gebouw (Concert Hall) and the Carré Theatre, whereas the NTI was considered more suitable for the smaller and more experimental parts of the program. NTI, moreover, specialized in theatre, whereas the HF had experience with a much wider range of artistic disciplines.¹⁶⁵ Austen, the director of the NTI, has also suggested that the involvement of the HF was the result of pressure from the established cultural institutions, which felt threatened by the NTI's temporary expansion as the organizing agency of ACH'87. In Austen's view, the involvement of the HF therefore constituted an attempt to align the established cultural institutions of Amsterdam with ACH'87.

Once the NTI and HF had been chosen, the Minister of Culture delegated the preparation of ACH'87 to them. While they remained in touch with the ministry over funding, the minister did not interfere with content-related affairs. In comparison to the Amsterdam Games of 1928 we are thus confronted with a very different situation. Despite the state's strong involvement in designating Amsterdam as ECOC, it was considerably less dominant in the actual staging of ACH'87 than in that of the 1928 Games. Although the organization of the Olympic Games was perhaps not dominated on the direct organizational level, the state certainly played a leading part in how the Olympics were used to present the nation to the rest of the world. At the time, the host city was perceived as a stage supposed to support the (re)presentation of the entire nation. In the case of ACH'87, the host city, or rather two of its cultural institutions, had more room to realize their own agendas.

This is partly inherent to the generic event formula of the ECOC, which focuses on exhibiting European cultural diversity. The Olympics, on the contrary, advocate a universal culture. As we have seen, the presentation of universal values in the Olympics is linked to sportive inter-state competition, enhancing the celebration of nationalism. The ECOC, on the other hand, focuses in the first instance on the local features of the host city. Despite the freedoms granted to the NTI and HF in composing the program of ACH'87, both institutions were limited in the possibility to fully realize their ambitions. These limitations were mostly due to the controversy that occurred between the Ministry of Culture and the municipality of Amsterdam. Because the local authorities felt they had hardly had any say in the designation process of Amsterdam as ECOC and were not really involved in the set-up of the organizational framework, they aligned themselves only in a very loose way with the ECOC project. The municipality, for instance, made it very clear that although it would support the ECOC, as the event would raise the city's cultural profile on an international level, it was the state which would have to pay for it.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Interviews with Austen (Amsterdam, June 14, 2004 and January 5, 2005), Brinkman, (January 10, 2006), 's Gravesande (November 29, 2005) and Luimstra (October 25, 2005).

¹⁶⁵ Interviews with Austen (Amsterdam, June 14, 2004 and January 5, 2005) en 's Gravesande (November 29, 2005).

¹⁶⁶ Interviews with Luimstra (October 25, 2005) and Austen (Amsterdam, June 14, 2004 and January 5, 2005).

7.2.3 *Controversial Subsidies: Generating the Wrong Interests*

It is therefore not so much the question *whether* the municipality aligned itself with the ACH'87 project as *how* it did so. Both the state and the municipality had an interest in the event, but at the same time other interests, mainly financial, were considered more important. As a result, neither of the two was prepared to invest large sums of money in ACH'87. The NTI and HF estimated the total cost of ACH'87 at € 9.2 million (20.5 million guilders at the time). The Ministry of Culture contributed € 1.34 million and the municipality of Amsterdam €673.000.¹⁶⁷ Thus, the NTI and HF saw themselves faced with two actors that supported ACH'87 but did not fully commit themselves to the project in a financial sense. This is the point where we can detect a 'crack' in the network. Both the state and the municipality were aligned with the network, but these alignments were not strong enough to enable the NTI and HF to stage the ECOC as a big prestigious event. Consequently, the organizers either had to establish further alignments in order to generate the funding necessary to realize their ambitions or adjust their goals and stage ACH'87 in a more modest form.

The latter option was preferred by the Ministry and the municipality. According to these two actors, expectations had to be tempered. ACH'87 was to be a cultural event, but certainly not a mega-event. In 1983, when the ECOC was initiated, the idea was still in an experimental phase and Brinkman had not expected it to become so big in such a short time. For this reason, no extra resources had been reserved to finance the Dutch edition. However, the first hosts of the ECOC, Athens (1985) and Florence (1986), had spent an estimated €9 and 13.5 million respectively on organizing the event. Even when we take into account that some expenditure from the regular cultural budget was included in these numbers, the resources for ACH'87 were significantly smaller. In Brinkman's view, the € 1.34 million subsidy was nevertheless a large amount by Dutch standards, certainly when the country's economic recession and cuts in public expenditure were taken into account.

In addition, many members of the Amsterdam city council and city board thought that the cultural year was an attempt to brand and market the city's regular programming of arts and culture, rather than an autonomous manifestation that would provide new cultural initiatives. Thus, they perceived the ECOC as a promotional campaign for the cultural sector instead of as an autonomous event. Again, the rather conceited attitude of the local authorities and cultural institutions played a role here. After all, they argued, Amsterdam was already a cultural capital.¹⁶⁸

The subsidy the municipality granted to ACH'87 was controversial for two reasons and formed the catalyst for a lot of negative press coverage on the event. First, the NTI and HF considered the subsidy too small to stage ACH'87 as truly an ECOC. They feared that due to the limited funding the event would be doomed to remain a small and insignificant happening rather than an event with European appeal. Interestingly, the municipality's subsidy for ACH'87 was proposed simultaneously with a €1.3 million cut in the city's budget for arts and culture. Even though there was no direct relationship between the budget cut and the subsidy, both decisions were presented in the local and domestic press as linked by a causal relationship.¹⁶⁹ Many of the city's cultural elites and institutions thought that the

¹⁶⁷ The estimated costs for ACH'87 were presented to the Minister of Culture in the Concept Plan for ACH'87, written by Austen and 's Gravesande in February 1985. This document can be found in the NTI archive, indexed as the ACH'87 archive, box "algemeen".

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Luimstra (October 25, 2005).

¹⁶⁹ The € 1.3 million budget cut was not actually related to the ACH'87 subsidy. The latter was financed out of incidental monies, which came from a completely different account within the

municipality was reducing expenditure on arts and culture in general to finance the ECOC. This evoked protests and made ACH'87 quite unpopular in these circles.¹⁷⁰

Consequently, the NTI and HF found themselves in a rather uncomfortable position. On the one hand, they needed more money to stage ACH'87 as a truly European cultural manifestation, but on the other hand the NTI and HF were part of the cultural sector and it was also in their interest that cuts in the budget for arts and culture would not take place. Thus, the directors of the NTI and HF, Austen and 's Gravesande, publicly criticized the cut in the municipality's regular budget for arts and culture, because they felt this would undermine not only ACH'87 but also the vitality of the city's cultural sector as a whole.¹⁷¹ The protests that the ACH'87 subsidy evoked show (again) that the alignments between the various actors that together constitute the amalgamation of networks we have labeled 'host city', is by no means a solid unity. On the contrary, in this particular case some actors even refused to align themselves with the ECOC altogether. The public protests by the NTI and HF illustrate that actors constantly have to negotiate their position in the network. The media also played an important role in this regard, because their negative coverage made ACH'87 a controversial manifestation long before the opening festivities took place.¹⁷² In other words, some interest in the cultural year was generated, but it resulted in alignments that produced negative results, in particular critical press coverage.

7.2.4 Defining a Key Actor: Too Small To Be a Host City

The controversy about the ACH'87 subsidy illustrates that even though the NTI and HF were aligned with the municipality, this alignment was by no means stable and strong. The negative press coverage on the financing of ACH'87 was not the only factor in this. Financing from the municipality and the state remained insecure for a very long time. Since the preparation time was already very short, the NTI and HF had to cope with delays in setting up the ACH'87 program. Apart from some smaller program parts and the opening festivities, the program would only start in the summer of 1987 instead of in January. The HF eventually took out a 3 million loan to finance its part of the ACH'87 program.¹⁷³ The limited financial resources and the pulling out of the Amsterdam Uitburo resulted in a strategy in which the NTI and HF produced their parts of the program separately. Consequently, the label of ACH'87 was on many occasions the only thing that related individual program parts to each other. In

municipality's overall budget than the monies reserved for arts and culture. Source: interview with Luimstra.

¹⁷⁰ See, for instance, Oomkes, J. "Stekeligheden bij 'opening' Amsterdam culturele hoofdstad". *Haarlems Dagblad*, January 6, 1987. In the press map of the ACH'87 (boxes 2 and 3) in the NTI archive more critical articles can be found from *De Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad* en *Het Parool*.

¹⁷¹ The ACH'87 archive in the NTI library contains a transcript of a letter written by Austen and 's Gravesande to Mrs. Luimstra, Amsterdam's alderman of culture. In this letter, Austen and 's Gravesande protest against Luimstra's decision to economize 2,8 million guilders on arts and culture while granting a subsidy to ACH'87. In their view, this could give the impression that ACH'87 was being paid for out of the regular budget for arts and culture. Such an impression could undermine the success of ACH'87 because the Amsterdam public and cultural institutions might reject the event on these grounds. Source: NTI archive, under the index of ACH'87: box "algemeen".

¹⁷² Löwenhardt, A. "Amsterdam kan voor 2 miljoen geen culturele hoofdstad zijn". *Trouw*. November 22, 1985; Huisman, J. "Klinkend feest als slot van culturele hoofdstad Europa". *De Volkskrant*. December 14, 1987; "Cultureel jaar onder de maat: Veel kritiek op festiviteiten in Amsterdam". *Algemeen Dagblad*. December 15, 1987. NTI archive, access code: ACH'87, box "algemeen".

¹⁷³ Interview with 's Gravesande (November 29, 2005).

their comprehensive evaluation of the ECOC, Palmer et al. state: “One [the Amsterdam Uitburo] withdrew and the remaining (Holland Festival and NTI) had different management styles, interests and priorities, and in the end developed parallel rather than integrated programmes” (2004: 151). Thus, ACH’87 is an illustrative example of how a key actor sometimes cannot resolve its internal differences.

In fact, we cannot truly speak of the key actor ‘host city’ in this case. The alignment between the NTI and HF on the one hand, and the municipality and other local institutions on the other, was rather weak. Apart from financial support, the NTI and HF were hardly aligned with the municipality at all. Insofar as time pressures, organizational and financial concerns did not interfere, they followed their own course in composing the ACH’87 program. As will become clear in the next section, the NTI and HF were more interested in raising the profile of Amsterdam’s cultural sector than in using the ECOC as a broader place-selling strategy. In other words, these two actors followed their own common agenda and scarcely adjusted their course to align other actors with their project. Their ambitions, which we will discuss in the next section, were not really shared by other actors or embedded in local networks. While not completely isolated, the NTI and HF operated too much on their own to truly speak of a key actor ‘host city’.

7.3 FROM CONCEPT TO PROGRAM

The above-mentioned cracks in the organizational network became most visible in the scale at which ACH’87 was produced. A larger network would have been needed to produce this CityEvent as a big cultural manifestation. Because of the lack of such a larger network and sufficient financial support, the NTI and HF had to adjust their ambitions and focus on a smaller version of what they had in mind. The ‘failure’ of ACH’87 was therefore not a matter of nothing being organized, but related to the inability of the city of Amsterdam to stage the ECOC at the scale of a true CityEvent, which attracts large domestic and foreign audiences and media attention, and puts the host city at the centre of attention. The relative ‘failure’ in establishing the key actor ‘host city’ therefore does not imply that no edition of the ECOC was realized or that all program parts were negatively perceived by the public and the media. Within the limited organizational framework of the NTI and HF some rather innovative and well-attended and -reported program parts were staged. To examine how this ‘small edition’ of the ECOC was produced, we first have to analyse the interests of the NTI and HF and, more importantly, the way they translated these interests into a program for the cultural year.

7.3.1 *The ACH’87 Concept: A Future for Ideas*¹⁷⁴

What was the agenda of the NTI and HF, and how did it appear in the way ACH’87 was staged? The NTI and HF wanted ACH’87 to be a cultural event aimed at strengthening (international) cultural activity in Amsterdam rather than at promoting the city as such. Thus, the NTI and HF did not have a clear interest in selling the city. Promotion was only considered necessary to draw attention to the event, not for putting Amsterdam on the map. Austen and ‘s Gravesande considered ACH’87 a ‘deep investment’ in the arts and culture scene, an opportunity to set up initiatives that

¹⁷⁴ The original Dutch theme for ACH’87 was ‘een toekomst voor ideeën’ (‘a future for ideas’).

could normally not be realized.¹⁷⁵ This approach reconfirms the point we made in the previous section, namely that we are not really dealing with the key actor 'host city' here. The NTI and HF adhered to their own agendas by aiming to stage the ECOC in such a way that the artistic and cultural sector in Amsterdam would profit from the event.

To prevent competition between these two institutions, Austen and 's Gravesande divided the tasks and the available budget.¹⁷⁶ This separate production scheme eventually resulted in the abovementioned parallel programming for the cultural year. Even though no integrated program was realized, the program parts of the NTI and HF were based on a common concept and a joint approach to arts and culture. Austen and 's Gravesande defined a set of selection criteria with which the event's program had to comply in order to secure coherence. At a later stage, these criteria were redefined into the overarching concept *A Future for Ideas*. Thus, the parallel programming for the cultural year was the result of the way this concept was practically worked out by both institutions (as a result of different management styles, priorities and interests), rather than of a lack of vision.

In the initial plans, the NTI and HF stressed an entrepreneurial approach to arts and culture.¹⁷⁷ In reality, this was a rhetorical strategy to ensure the state and municipality's financial support. Once the NTI and HF had secured financial support, both institutions were able to operate quite autonomously. As a result, ideological motives inspired the content and selection criteria of the event's program more than economic ones. ACH'87 was supposed to encourage and enhance exchanges and cooperation between cultures. Austen and 's Gravesande wanted to present culture in line with the original idea of the ECOC as a means to promote European cultural exchange and cooperation. Special focus was placed on small language areas, such as that of Dutch. ACH'87 was intended to be a celebration of cultural diversity, but also an event in which questions about the developments that threatened European cultures would be discussed and examined. New media developments in Hollywood and Japan were mentioned as some of the challenges that Europe would have to deal with. Anti-

¹⁷⁵ Interviews with Austen (Amsterdam, June 14, 2004 and January 5, 2005 and 's Gravesande (November 29, 2005).

¹⁷⁶ The NTI and HF split the subsidies from the Ministry of Culture and the Amsterdam municipality according to the projects that each was going to coordinate within the overall ACH'87 program. With regard to sponsorship it was decided that contributions that were not linked to a particular part of the ACH'87 program would be divided equally. Sponsorship was therefore mostly undertaken separately, with the NTI and HF each trying to find sponsors for individual projects. ACH'87 was in fact the result of two separate production networks that were presented as one under the banner of ACH'87. Information obtained through interviews with Austen and 's Gravesande.

¹⁷⁷ In the concept plan for ACH'87, culture was approached from a twofold perspective. On the one hand, the economic importance of culture was stressed. Austen and 's Gravesande, who wrote the plan, mentioned the multiplier effect of arts and culture for Amsterdam's economy. They further built on the insights provided in a report published by the municipality's department of culture in 1983. In this report, entitled *Meer dan een miljard* (More than a billion), it was claimed that the total economic impact of Amsterdam's arts and culture sector approximated one billion guilders. The report had evoked fierce criticism from the Amsterdam's intelligentsia, which rejected the idea of an economic approach to arts and culture. In 1985, when Austen and 's Gravesande wrote the ACH'87 concept plan, this economic vision on arts and culture was not accepted by the majority of the city's main cultural institutions. Nonetheless, it provided the NTI and HF with an opportunity to legitimate the organizational costs of ACH'87. Moreover, they strengthened their argument by pointing at arts and culture as a location factor for attracting tourists, businesses and residents (at the time, the population of Amsterdam was shrinking). In this context, Austen and 's Gravesande stressed that ACH'87 was meant to increase publicity for Amsterdam's cultural sector in general in order to reach bigger domestic and foreign audiences.

American, or rather anti-Hollywood sentiments, such as those articulated by Jacques Lang, were shared by the NTI and HF, and ACH'87 was presented as an opportunity to fuel the debate.

At the same time, the debate on European cultural diversity evoked questions about European cultural unity. In this regard, the division of Europe into two power blocks formed another concern. In the concept plan, ACH'87 was also to contribute to this aspect of the debate. It was proposed that the event should be used as an opportunity to strengthen cultural exchange and cooperation with Eastern European nations. So even though the criteria for organizing an ECOC were still vague, the concept plan of the NTI and HF did relate to the debates that were taking place on a European level within the political networks of the EEG. Content-wise, the NTI and HF appropriated the ECOC in line with its generic event formula, which at the time was not much more than a mission to establish a common European cultural policy.

7.3.2 *Translating Interests into Selection Criteria for the Cultural Year*

Even though the NTI and HF defined a concept plan for ACH'87, they did not formulate a clear concept of culture. Instead, they came up with a politically inspired approach to culture. To implement this approach in the programming of ACH'87, more concrete, specific and practical guidelines were needed. Therefore, the NTI and HF translated their approach into seven criteria for selecting and initiating projects for the ACH'87 program. Yet, the general approach to culture could not be translated into tangible criteria this directly. One extra step was necessary, namely the formulation of guiding principles. Two guiding principles were derived from the general approach to culture: "the event had to inform, enlighten, question and examine what culture means to a country *and* the event had to examine what cultures from surrounding countries contribute to the own culture and vice versa."¹⁷⁸ The NTI and HF wanted the program of ACH'87 to address these two issues (guiding principles) by raising cultural questions and by artistic expressions. This focus was captured (translated) in the slogan *A Future for Ideas*.

At this point, the next step could be taken in the translation process towards the composition of the program for the cultural year. The two guiding principles and the slogan were converted into concrete and practically applicable criteria. The following seven criteria were defined:

- ACH'87 had to be a long-term investment for the city's cultural life by developing lasting initiatives that under normal (financial) circumstances could not be realized by Amsterdam's cultural sector.
- ACH'87 had to supply more international artistic and cultural products than were normally available in Amsterdam.
- International cultural exchanges were only useful if they added new dimensions to the existing supply of cultural products and manifestations.
- ACH'87 was to become an event to strengthen Amsterdam's cultural sector on an international level.
- Existing infrastructures of cultural institutions had to be used as much as possible.

¹⁷⁸ Austen, S. and A. 's Gravesande (1985). *Concept—Amsterdam, Culturele Hoofdstad van Europa 1987*. Italics added by author. The concept plan for ACH'87 was presented to the Minister of Culture in February 1985. It is available from the archive of the NTI under code ACH'87 in the box labeled "algemeen".

- Interdisciplinary artistic and cultural expressions were given priority over traditional work.
- Folklore culture and amateur arts were excluded.¹⁷⁹

In these criteria we can read the 'deep investment' in culture that the NTI and HF intended ACH'87 to become. In their view, this CityEvent was in the first place a way to strengthen Amsterdam's cultural infrastructure and to intensify the international dimension of the city's artistic and cultural life. Part of the NTI and HF's mission was to reaffirm Amsterdam's position as leading artistic, cultural and intellectual centre in Europe. On the one hand, this meant that the high reputation of the local art scene and cultural institutions had to be communicated actively to audiences abroad. On the other hand, leading European artists and intellectuals from both the East and the West had to be invited to enhance this presentation of Amsterdam and to position the city as the ultimate location where artists from East and West could meet. Thus, the NTI and HF intended to use ACH'87 as an investment in the city's cultural networks *and* as an opportunity to raise Amsterdam's profile as an international centre for avant-garde art.

In this regard, the NTI and HF had no interest in promoting Amsterdam as a tourist destination or for other economic reasons. They made hardly any efforts to align other actors with the ECOC project and did not broaden support or increase media exposure to areas that fell outside the direct scope of their mission. Illustrative of this attitude was the NTI and HF's reluctance to cooperate with established promotional agencies like the Amsterdam Tourist Bureau, which insisted on marketing the city's cultural clichés: tulips, wooden shoes, Van Gogh and Rembrandt. Promotion of the city's cultural clichés was considered by the NTI and HF to undermine their aim of presenting an innovative image of Amsterdam as a leading international cultural centre.

Interestingly, we saw a similar discussion when Amsterdam hosted the Olympic Games in 1928. At the time, the promotion of cultural clichés was also thought to undermine the image of Amsterdam as an industrious and modern city. In the latter case, however, the different interests were eventually bridged. This was not the case for ACH'87: no joint promotion was undertaken.¹⁸⁰ In addition, the NTI and HF had not been able to set up an integrated public relations and promotion strategy due to limited funds and time pressure.¹⁸¹ As will become apparent later in this chapter, the lack of funding for a large publicity campaign and the reluctance on the side of the NTI and HF to link ACH'87 to more traditional tourist promotion, affected the manner in which the media perceived and covered this CityEvent. Before we analyze these media coverage patterns, let us first examine how the NTI and HF tried to translate their ambitions, which they expressed in their concept of culture, into a program for the cultural year.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 4-7.

¹⁸⁰ Interviews with Austen (Amsterdam, June 14, 2004 and January 5, 2005), Bloemers (November 21, 2005) and 's Gravesande (Amsterdam, November 9, 2005).

¹⁸¹ Due to limited resources and time pressure, promotion of the event started late and was limited to a minimum. Freek Bloemers, who was responsible at the time for public relations and promotion of ACH'87 for the NTI, argues that there was no overall promotional strategy. In his view, the promotion of ACH'87 comprehended little more than a bundling of existing promotional activities for individual parts of the event's program in combination with the regular publicity activities undertaken by Amsterdam's cultural institutions. Telephone interview with Bloemers, November 21, 2005.

7.3.3 The ACH'87 Program: The Second Translation Step, from Selection Criteria to Actions

In this section, we will reconstruct how the NTI and HF tried to realize their ambitions in the way they composed the ACH'87 program. This analysis would become too lengthy if we were to discuss all the program parts of ACH'87. Therefore, only those parts will be addressed that generated considerable audience and media attention and/or had an exceptional character. In selecting and initiating projects for the program, the NTI and HF followed an intellectual course in line with their ambitions. Some projects had a more popular and accessible character, but in essence the approach of the NTI and HF was rather elitist.

The most illustrative example of this elitist approach was the project Gulliver, which was produced by the NTI, in accordance with the parallel programming the NTI and HF had agreed on. The German writer Günter Grass had originally initiated the idea of establishing an independent “platform for the exchange of ideas between individual European artists and intellectuals on essential issues for the future of European culture”¹⁸² at the Budapest European Forum in 1985. The NTI was able to realize Grass's initiative by using ACH'87 as an opportunity to launch this platform. With the Gulliver¹⁸³ project, the NTI wanted to contribute to the international dimension of ACH'87 by inviting leading European intellectuals. Gulliver enabled the NTI to communicate these European aspirations of ACH'87 to the press and public. However, while the project successfully put the issue of European Cultural identity on the agenda of Europe's intellectual elite, the public barely got the message.

ACH'87 was perceived more as an event that suited the interests of the local Amsterdam and pan-European cultural elites than as a manifestation that attracted the attention of a broad domestic and international public. Its organizers were not able, and perhaps not willing, to communicate the intentions of ACH'87 to a wide audience.¹⁸⁴ This seems to be confirmed by the way the Gulliver project was set up, with only a small part of the meeting accessible to the public. The majority of the conference program with its distinguished guests (Grass and other well-known writers and poets like Per Olov Enquist, Robert Jungk, Hans Magnus Enzenberger, Madeleine Gustafsson, Cevat Çapan and Maurice Cranston) took place behind closed doors.

The HF in its turn tried to give international cachet to ACH'87 by including leading foreign music and dance groups, like the St. Petersburg ballet, in the program of the Holland Festival. Since the HF (Holland Festival) was staged annually, many visitors hardly noticed that its program was larger this time around because of the ECOC. Because the Holland Festival always included foreign guests, from the

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ “The ‘informal working body Gulliver’ was founded in 1987 on the occasion of ‘Amsterdam Cultural Capital of Europe - a future for ideas’, aiming at the creation of a European, non-governmental, informal and independent study group, a platform for the exchange of ideas between individual European artists and intellectuals on essential issues for the future of European culture. It is a concrete development of the proposal made by Günter Grass, member of the official delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, in 1985 at the Budapest European Cultural Forum.” Source: Felix Meritis, European Centre for Art and Science, Amsterdam URL: <http://www.felix-meritis.nl/peoplenetwork/Gulliver.htm>, last visited September 12, 2006.

¹⁸⁴ Zoon, C. “Bescheiden slot van Europees Kunstenaars Forum”. *De Volkskrant*. December 14, 1987; “Besluit van ‘ACH 87’ in majeure. *Het Parool/ Het Algemeen Dagblad* (?). December, 14, 1987. The name of the newspaper in which the article appeared could not be verified due to the low quality of the copy included in the ACH'87 archive. The layout of the article, however, seems to point at either *Het Parool* or *Het Algemeen Dagblad* as the source. NTI archive, access number: ACH'87, box 2 and 3.

public's perspective it did not differ much from previous editions.¹⁸⁵ In this respect, the Gulliver project formed a more visible and tangible translation of the selection criteria defined by the NTI and HF for the ACH'87 program. It involved two of the seven criteria: the project contributed to international cultural exchanges that added new dimensions to existing ones and helped to strengthen the reputation of Amsterdam as a cultural center on an international level.

But the international focus of the ACH'87 program represented only two of the selection criteria within the overall approach of the NTI and HF. The guiding concept, *A Future for Ideas*, also had to be translated into projects that contributed to new artistic and cultural developments and expressions, and/or constituted a long-term investment for Amsterdam's cultural scene. In what follows, two other elements from the ACH'87 program will be discussed in order to reconstruct how the guiding concept and the selection criteria were further translated. These projects are *Century'87* and *Kunstkanaal*. Both were initiated by the NTI, which focused more on the experimental parts of the ACH'87 program, while the HF focused on the bigger projects that attracted larger audiences and were embedded in the Holland Festival.

Apart from their experimental nature, *Century'87* and *Kunstkanaal* are of interest for another reason too. They enable us to analyze how ACH'87 reordered and renamed place, albeit on a modest scale compared to later editions of the ECOC or the 1928 Olympic Games. In these two projects, art and culture were taken outside the institutionalized realm of the museum or the theatre to be distributed over the urban environment and the private sphere of the home. By doing so, new spaces and places were produced and existing ones were invested with different meanings and uses. In addition, these two projects signal new developments in the relation between arts, culture and the city, as these emerged in the 1980s. In this regard, the *Kunstkanaal* project deserves our special attention. It shows how the NTI used television media technology as a way to enhance cultural innovation. By doing so, the organizers of ACH'87 not only pushed for new developments in the cultural sector, but also contributed to developments in the media, albeit on a modest scale. The *Kunstkanaal* project will therefore be discussed after the analysis of *Century'87* in a separate section in which we will also address the overall media coverage generated by ACH'87. By describing how *Century'87* and *Kunstkanaal* used arts, culture and media technologies to reorder and rename place, we will moreover be able to identify transformations in the hosting of the ECOC by comparing ACH'87 in the next two chapters to the Berlin and Helsinki ECOCs.

7.4 CENTURY'87: THE CITY AS A MUSEUM

The *Century'87* exhibition aimed to transform the city into one large museum by reimagining Amsterdam and its landmarks as an exposition space/museum. The city's tourist and historic landmarks were 'given' to artists who used these spaces and monuments to exhibit art in the city and the city in art. Approximately thirty Dutch and foreign artists, such as Marlene Dumas, Rob van Koningsbruggen, Christian Boltanski and many others, were asked to create and exhibit an artwork at a particular location in the city. Examples of such locations were the Royal Palace, Schreierstoren, de Waag, and several museums. An illustrative artwork within the

¹⁸⁵ Interviews with 's Gravesande (November 29, 2005) and Bloemers (November 21, 2005).

overall exhibition was Daan van Golden's network of blue grit stone paths in the Hortus Botanicus, Amsterdam's botanical gardens.¹⁸⁶ This artistic intervention in urban space invited visitors and citizens to experience and imagine the alternative potentialities that the city embodied. By changing the white grit paths to blue, Van Golden created the impression of walking on water through the Hortus, suggesting that Amsterdam's famous canals floated through the gardens and thus symbolizing the city's characteristic relation between land and water. Century'87 was aimed at temporarily questioning, reordering and renaming the functions and meanings of buildings, monuments, places and spaces that normally appeared as static entities.

In this particular case, Van Golden's work could be interpreted as an attempt to make the public aware of the meaning of water as a means of transportation by pointing out that where one would normally walk it could also have been possible to move over water. In this respect, Van Golden referred to Amsterdam's past, emphasizing that until the late nineteenth century most traffic in the city went over water. In addition, Van Golden's work undermined the static character of the Hortus. The blue grit paths not only referred to water and the canals, but they also symbolized movement, the running of water, thereby re-imagining the botanical gardens as a dynamic landscape shaped by rivers. Van Golden thus exposed a history and a potential use of space that under normal circumstances remained unnoticed. Our discussion of Van Golden's work illustrates that the Century'87 exhibition aimed at performing the city by making it the main character in its own play.¹⁸⁷ In this way, instead of the city representing the nation, as was the case with the 1928 Olympics, the city itself was put at the centre of attention. In other words, by performing the city, Amsterdam became the main event and attraction of the ECOC.

Even though Century'87 was a novelty in Amsterdam, the idea of using urban space and place as a display for art had been introduced at previous occasions, such as *Chambre d'amis* in the Belgian city of Ghent.¹⁸⁸ Century'87 can therefore be linked to a wider artistic and cultural development that is most notably characterized by a movement from the established realms of cultural consumption, such as museums and galleries, towards alternative spaces and places (cf. Miles, 1997; McGuigan, 1996). Projects like Century'87 and *Chambres d'amis* were partly the result of artists' usage of urban space as a constituent element of art works. A better-known contemporary is Kristo's famous wrapping of buildings such as the Pont Neuf in Paris or the Reichstag in Berlin. Such artistic projects effected creative rearrangements and re-imaginings of space and place that (temporarily) produced new urban spaces and places by exhibiting these spaces and places as works of art. Art was mobilized as a vehicle to rearrange and rename spaces and places by letting people experience and question them in a different way.

In this respect, Century '87 formed an accurate translation of the NTI and HF's criterion that program parts of the cultural year had to offer international and local cultural products that were normally not available in Amsterdam. In addition, the great variety of artists involved, in terms of work and disciplinary background, was a realization of the NTI and HF's goal to stimulate international and

¹⁸⁶ Depondt, P. "Century'87 verandert Amsterdam in museum." *De Volkskrant*, July 20, 1987; Garrel, B. van. "Century'87 verandert hoofdstad in museum." *NRC Handelsblad*, July 13, 1987. NTI archive, access number: ACH'87, box 2 and 3

¹⁸⁷ Interviews with Austen and 's Gravesande

¹⁸⁸ Depondt, P. "Century'87 verandert Amsterdam in museum." *De Volkskrant*, July 20, 1987; Garrel, B. van. "Century'87 verandert hoofdstad in museum." *NRC Handelsblad*, July 13, 1987. NTI archive, access number: ACH'87, box 2 and 3.

interdisciplinary artistic and cultural expressions that gave priority to innovative approaches over traditional work. Within the overall program of ACH'87, Century'87 was one of the more accessible projects. Yet it simultaneously took part in the rather elitist approach of the NTI and HF by insisting that people had to be informed and implicitly also educated about the unusual potentialities of urban spaces and places.

7.5 CHANNELING DISTRIBUTION AND COVERAGE OF ACH'87 IN THE MEDIA

The same approach of informing and educating the public about the value of (highbrow) art also shows in the Kunstkanaal project. This local art television channel was set up by the NTI to distribute high-quality artistic expressions, cultural performances, exhibitions and concerts among Amsterdam's population. The Kunstkanaal is of great interest because it allows us to examine how the NTI 'annexed' the television medium to create its own media network. In this process, new spaces and places were created and existing ones reordered. In this section, we will therefore also relate the Kunstkanaal to the analysis of the media coverage patterns of ACH'87 in general, but not before we have examined this project more thoroughly.

7.5.1 *Kunstkanaal: The Cultural Capital Television Channel*

In 1987, the Kunstkanaal represented an innovative approach to arts and culture and the television medium. The project was one of the few program parts of ACH'87 that outlasted the festivities; it continued until 2004, when Salto, Amsterdam's local television network corporation, took the channel off the cable network because of financial difficulties. In this respect, Kunstkanaal formed a tangible translation of the NTI and HF's criterion that ACH'87 should be a long-term investment that would develop lasting cultural initiatives that could not be realized under normal circumstances. What made the Kunstkanaal innovative was its format. The NTI used the television medium purely as a programmable stage for distributing cultural products to the population of Amsterdam. With a few exceptions, the Kunstkanaal did not make its own productions. Instead, existing recordings were used that would normally not be broadcast by the established television channels because of their limited public appeal. The editorial board of the Kunstkanaal therefore functioned as a research team that investigated and catalogued high-quality documentaries and recordings with a limited circulation from all over the world.¹⁸⁹ By doing so, the production of television broadcasts was separated from their distribution.

Content-wise, the programming of the art channel followed a highbrow approach to arts and culture by focusing on theater, opera, ballet, exhibitions, lectures, art films and documentaries of the 'highest quality,' providing artists and filmmakers with the opportunity to show work that would normally remain on the shelf.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹ As the Kunstkanaal became better known among artists, documentary makers and filmmakers from all over the world, the editorial pool shifted its approach from research to reviewing and selecting submissions. In the first year of its existence, the editorial pool was, however, still a research team. Source: interview with Steve Austen (Amsterdam, January 5, 2005).

¹⁹⁰ In the field of arts and culture, quality remains a vague and contested predicate. The returning question in this regard is when and on what grounds an artwork or performance can be described as

Ironically, the NTI itself was representative of the Dutch cultural elite, which had traditionally looked down on the television medium because of its popular appeal. However, by adjusting the television medium to its own interests, the NTI created a network to distribute highbrow culture to a large local audience. In this manner, the NTI hoped to generate greater interest among the Amsterdam population for “high quality” culture rather than “flat Hollywood” products.¹⁹¹ Again, we can detect the NTI’s drive to inform and educate people. However, instead of opening up the highbrow cultural realm to popular tastes, the NTI invaded the ultimate space of popular culture, television, with highbrow content.

By doing so, the NTI was able to realize several of the criteria it had defined in concordance with the HF for the ACH’87 program. In line with these criteria, folklore and amateur arts were excluded from the Kunstkanaal. Instead, it offered international, and above all interdisciplinary, artistic and cultural products that were normally not readily available in Amsterdam. In addition, by broadcasting recordings of exhibitions, plays, concerts and dance performances that had taken place in Amsterdam, the NTI hoped to attract more people to the city’s cultural institutions, thus strengthening the cultural sector. Finally, Kunstkanaal fulfilled the criterion that existing infrastructures of cultural institutions had to be used as much as possible, because the channel relied on productions made by others. Even on the few occasions that the Kunstkanaal made its own productions, it usually recorded events organized by the city’s cultural institutions, instead of staging original performances.

Despite, or perhaps because of its simplicity, the Kunstkanaal format had a twofold impact on the television medium and Amsterdam’s cultural sector. In the first place, the use of the television medium as a distribution channel for arts and culture contributed to a wider development: namely, a move from established traditional and often elitist cultural institutions such as museums and concert buildings, to alternative spaces and places of exhibition and performance. However, these spaces and places first had to be created. This was possible because the NTI established an alignment with another actor-network, namely the Amsterdam cable network. This infrastructure was itself the product of innumerable alignments between nonhuman actors, such as wires, television sets, municipality departments and human actors ranging from viewers to cable mechanics. At the time of ACH’87, Amsterdam had one of the largest television cable networks of all European cities. Most other European cities were still characterized by a landscape of roofs with innumerable antennas. Apart from the thousands of consumer television sets connected to the cable network, the municipality of Amsterdam owned the entire infrastructure and the NTI was able to convince them to provide a free cultural channel and to subsidize¹⁹² the Kunstkanaal to enable its operation.¹⁹³

By establishing an alignment with the municipality and its cable network, the NTI was able to create new spaces and places for cultural consumption. The

high quality. In the case of the Kunstkanaal, there were no strict criteria to determine this. From the interviews with Austen, however, it becomes clear that expressions of popular culture received little attention. High quality therefore seems primarily to have been associated with highbrow and experimental works.

¹⁹¹ Interview with Austen (Amsterdam, January 5, 2005).

¹⁹² The city’s department of culture granted a subsidy of € 225,000 (half a million guilders). Information obtained through interviews with Luimstra and Austen, and documents found in the NTI archive, access number: ACH’87, box “algemeen”.

¹⁹³ Naarding, R. “TV-zender in Amsterdam met alleen maar kunst.” *Het Parool*. March 30, 1987; Schreuder, A. “Kabelprogramma vergezelt culturele jaar Amsterdam.” *NRC Handelsblad*. January 12, 1987. NTI archive, access number: ACH’87, box 2 and 3.

Kunstkanaal extended the realm of highbrow culture to local television space. Before that time, highbrow culture hardly entered the cable network, which was laid under Amsterdam's surface to access the television sets of local audiences. In this respect, the Kunstkanaal also reordered the place of the home into a site of consumption for those art forms that had previously been accessible only outside the private sphere. Thus, the Kunstkanaal led to a modest rearrangement or remapping of functions of the home.¹⁹⁴ On the condition, of course, that one was prepared to actually watch the Kunstkanaal. The creation of these new spaces and places also affected cultural consumption patterns. The Kunstkanaal allowed the population of Amsterdam to experience arts and culture from the couch, making the consumption of these experiences potentially much more instantaneous than a visit to a museum, gallery or theatre.

The Kunstkanaal format also had implications for the organization of the television medium. Television was reduced to its basic mediating qualities: transmitting information, sounds and moving images from the studio to people's homes.¹⁹⁵ The NTI went so far as to present the Kunstkanaal as 'non-television'.¹⁹⁶ With this statement, the NTI wanted to distinguish the programming of the Kunstkanaal from the established television broadcast organizations in Hilversum, the Dutch centre for television and radio production. Through the Kunstkanaal a new program format, production regime and juridical¹⁹⁷ system were introduced. The Kunstkanaal's focus on distribution instead of production was a relatively new phenomenon in the organization of Dutch broadcasting. The public television channels had (and still have) to divide their programming among independent television organizations that each represented a particular social pillar.¹⁹⁸ While these broadcast organizations also bought some television material produced by others stations, a large share of their programs was self-produced. They thus combined production with distribution. In this national broadcasting culture, the Kunstkanaal clearly distinguished itself by its strong focus on distribution.

In addition, the format of the Kunstkanaal program also differed from the regular broadcasting schemes. Every Saturday, a new episode was broadcast that

¹⁹⁴ See also David Morley's (2000) *Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity* for an extensive analysis on how television and specific television genres, such as the soap opera, affect social relations and, in particular, the use of space in the home.

¹⁹⁵ See Marshall McLuhan's (1999) *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* for this approach to media.

¹⁹⁶ Hoek, S. van der. "We spelen geen televisietje." *De Volkskrant*. June 19, 1987; Naarding, R. "TV-zender in Amsterdam met alleen maar kunst." *Het Parool*. March 30, 1987; Schreuder, A. "Kabelprogramma vergezelt culturele jaar Amsterdam." *NRC Handelsblad*. January 12, 1987. Interview with Austen (January 5, 2005). NTI archive, access number: ACH'87, box 2 and 3.

¹⁹⁷ The format of the Kunstkanaal had consequences for the organization of television from a juridical point of view in the sense that it opened up new possibilities for local broadcasting. Since the editorial board of the Kunstkanaal mainly focused on scouting for and selecting undisclosed material, it was constantly confronted with juridical questions regarding the media rights that had to be obtained to broadcast this material. The board of the Kunstkanaal made a strong case for adjustments in the tariffs for media rights based on its relatively small audience. Until that time, the rights for television materials were sold at a standard price, regardless of the number of viewers a channel reached. Concretely, this meant that a national broadcast corporation paid the same amount as a local channel like the Kunstkanaal, even though the latter had a considerable smaller audience range and budget. According to Austen, the Kunstkanaal was one of the first television projects in Europe that drew attention to the need to consolidate the sale of media rights in relation to the viewer numbers television channels were expected to reach.

¹⁹⁸ See the chapter (footnote 59) on the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics for a more extensive account of this social organization of Dutch society.

lasted one or two hours. This program was repeated six times that day and on Tuesday. This perhaps quite simple format broke with the standards set by the established broadcasting corporations. Following the logic of the established television stations, a program was never to last for more than one hour. The Kunstkanaal deliberately adhered to a different policy to open up television space for productions that were excluded from regular programming due to this 'one-hour rule'.¹⁹⁹ The repetition of the program, moreover, allowed viewers a greater flexibility: the public could decide when to view a Kunstkanaal program. Despite the limited hours of new material broadcast every week, the Kunstkanaal managed to reach quite a large audience, precisely because viewers had a greater choice about when to watch the program.²⁰⁰ Therefore, the new spaces and places that the Kunstkanaal created cannot be thought separately from the alterations that were made in a temporal sense. The reordering of space and place went hand in hand with a rearrangement of temporal relations between actors. The Kunstkanaal therefore not only represents an alternative television space, but also a complex spatiotemporal constellation. While this appears to be a purely theoretical argument, the fact that MTV showed great interest in the Kunstkanaal points at its concrete implications. The idea that television could be used as a distribution channel for existing film material such as music clips, in combination with a degree of repetition that provides audiences with a greater degree of flexibility, exactly matched the format of MTV.²⁰¹ While it is tempting to speculate about the cultural meaning of this television format, a further discussion of this topic lies beyond the scope of this study.

Drawing on the CityEvent model, the Kunstkanaal provides an illustrative case of how a CityEvent not only aligns media to its cause, but also 'annexes' these media. The triangular relationship that constitutes the production of a CityEvent implies that the key actors 'host city', 'media' and event owner' also influence each other. In this case, the relation of interdependency is illustrated by the innovative character of the Kunstkanaal format in relation to that of the established broadcast regimes. The Kunstkanaal was more than just a program item within ACH'87; it also had an influence on the way the television medium operated locally. Moreover, the partial annexation of the media by the NTI and HF²⁰² by means of the Kunstkanaal made these actors less dependent on press coverage of ACH'87. By using the television medium as a distribution channel, the NTI and HF were no longer solely relying on the established news media to cover the program parts of ACH'98 and to inform the local public.

For clarity's sake, we have to make a distinction here between 'promotion', 'coverage' and 'distribution'. As mentioned earlier, the NTI and HF had a very

¹⁹⁹ See footnote 195.

²⁰⁰ According to an official brochure on the Kunstkanaal, 380,000 households were reached during the cultural year. Source: NTI archive, access number: ACH'87, box "algemeen".

²⁰¹ "Continu pop vanaf eind augustus op kabelnet Amsterdam." *Alkmaarse Courant*, June 18, 1987. In the same year the Kunstkanaal was launched, MTV was added to the Amsterdam cable net. While no documents on this can be found in the ACH'87 archive, apart from the newspaper article mentioned above, it is clear that MTV broadcast a special program about ACH'87. Thus, as a result of the different scopes of both channels - popular culture versus highbrow, avant-garde culture - MTV and the Kunstkanaal do not seem to have been in direct competition. Both channels did, however, share a new approach to television in which less rigid broadcasting regimes were introduced and in which the production and distribution of television materials were increasingly separated from each other.

²⁰² While the NTI was the initiator of the Kunstkanaal, some of the program parts staged by the HF were also broadcast on the channel. For this reason, I consider the Kunstkanaal as a distribution channel of both the NTI and HF.

limited budget for promotion. While they used the establishment of the Kunstkanaal as a moment to generate publicity, they barely used it at all for broadcasting promotional messages intended to generate a positive response to the cultural year. The channel primarily functioned as a distribution network for highbrow cultural content, aiming to inform and perhaps educate audiences. The only partial dependency of the NTI and HF on the established media therefore does not imply that they were able to avoid negative coverage of ACH'87 altogether. This is illustrated by the reaction of the Amsterdam population to ACH'87 and the Kunstkanaal. Although the latter was received well by the population, the general opinion on ACH'87 was rather negative.²⁰³ Thus, the Kunstkanaal provided the NTI and HF with some independence from the established news media, but only insofar as they now did not need these media to distribute ACH'87's cultural products to local audiences.

It is with regard to the new distribution methods in the cultural sector that the Kunstkanaal can be considered a success. The project did indeed fulfill the criteria set by the NTI and HF that the ECOC should be used as a durable investment in Amsterdam's culture and should rely as much as possible on the existing infrastructures of the cultural sector. It also contributed to innovative cultural developments, for instance by allowing film and documentary makers to broadcast their work on television without being subject to the half hour and one hour standard television formats. Through this, the key actor 'media' also changed its role in the amalgamation of networks that produced the ECOC, as the media became incorporated in its generic formula.²⁰⁴ In other words, the media contributed to artistic innovation *within* the event rather than playing the role of an 'outsider' whose alignment is necessary only to generate publicity and capture audience attention.

The changing role of the media, however, does not imply that its other role, that of covering the CityEvent, was of no importance at all. Let us therefore now examine the media coverage that ACH'87 generated in the domestic and foreign press.

7.5.2 Domestic and Foreign Press Coverage

In the first six months, ACH'87 managed to attract barely any positive audience attention because the local press frequently reported in a negative tone about the manifestation. A number of reasons can be given for this. Just like the Minister of Culture who had initiated the hosting of the ECOC by Amsterdam, the NTI and HF were confronted with the novelty of the generic event formula of this CityEvent. The idea of the ECOC was unknown to the public and the press. Due to the absence of a coherent promotional strategy, the NTI and HF were not able to inform the public and the press about the ECOC. In addition, there was the controversy about the municipality granting ACH'87 a subsidy while simultaneously reducing the general budget for culture. Eventually, the lack of information and the initial disinterest in the

²⁰³ "Onderzoek wijst uit: belangstelling voor kunstkanaal is groot." *De Waarheid*. November 5, 1987; Weidemann, S., von. "Eine Stadt hat Katzenjammer". *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. March 19, 1987. NTI archive, access number: ACH'87, box 2 and 3.

²⁰⁴ The success of the Kunstkanaal is also illustrated by the fact that it soon attracted attention from other cities such as Hilversum, The Hague, Rotterdam, and ACH'87's successor Berlin. All these cities wanted to cooperate with the channel to establish local arts broadcasting within their territory. Sources: "Lokale kunstzender kan uitgroeien tot landelijk C-netwerk." *Het Parool*. November 9, 1987; "Onderzoek wijst uit: belangstelling voor kunstkanaal is groot." *De Waarheid*. November 5, 1987; Berg, E. van den. "Cultuurzender Amsterdam wil het land in." *De Volkskrant*. November 6, 1987. NTI archive, access number: ACH'87, box 2 and 3.

ECOC changed into a negative perception. Thus, before the cultural year had even started, the local press had already developed a skeptical, if not negative attitude to the event, which was not effectively countered by the NTI and HF. In this regard, we can think of the lack of briefings, public relations and general information provided to the press, which, due to time pressure and financial insecurity, received less attention from the NTI and HF than the actual programming of ACH'87.

More important, however, was the inability of both institutions to present/translate ACH'87 in terms of the interests of the local media. In comparison to the Olympic Games, the ECOC does not offer a direct economic interest for the press since it does not lead to huge increases in audience attention and advertising revenues. Consequently, whether the media reported positively or negatively about the event would not change their economic position. Yet, this does not mean that no other interests could be mobilized to align the local press with the ECOC. The NTI and HF could have tried to convince the press more effectively that ACH'87 was an event that would increase Amsterdam's cultural reputation on an international level. They could have pointed out that this CityEvent was being staged for the benefit of the city. Indirectly, the local press might then have recognized the benefit of the event and developed an interest in it.²⁰⁵ Instead, the NTI and HF adhered to their own agenda and did not manage to create wide support for their project amongst the local population, cultural institutions and the press. It became their event, not that of Amsterdam. While we should refrain from making absolute judgments, in this case the isolated position of the NTI and HF certainly formed an obstacle in trying to establish positive and productive alignments with the local press. Especially when the Kunstkanaal shows that other media networks could effectively be aligned with the NTI and HF.

It was only in the summer of 1987, when the local and domestic press had become more accustomed to the idea of the ECOC by visiting program parts of the manifestation, that coverage turned more positive. Due to the inability of the NTI and HF to inform the public and press beforehand, the press needed time to develop an understanding of the purpose of ACH'87. The gradual change in press coverage was therefore not achieved through advertising—the NTI and HF lacked the budget to start a media offensive - but was the result of personal contacts that Austen and 's Gravesande maintained with journalists.²⁰⁶ This strategy, however, required quite a large investment time-wise, and the NTI and HF were not able to optimize it until the second half of the cultural year when start-up problems with the ACH'87 program demanded less time. The personal approach to journalists was used to establish relations with both the domestic and foreign press. This explains the intensive German press coverage: the NTI and HF cooperated with West Berlin and West

²⁰⁵ In this regard, it should be recognized that the traditional skeptical attitude of domestic journalists did not allow the NTI and HFD much room for presenting their ideas. Perhaps quite typical for Dutch culture is the tendency to be skeptical towards anything that goes beyond what is considered normal. This is vividly illustrated by the Dutch saying 'if you behave normal, you are already extraordinary enough'. Many of ACH'87's critics in Amsterdam's cultural institutions and the media wondered why the city needed all this fuss, when it was already a leading cultural centre in Europe. ACH'87 was therefore perceived by many as a pretentious effort to raise the profile of the NTI and HF and its directors. As has become clear from our analysis, this critical attitude can be explained by the lack of shared interests, caused by the rather blunt designation of Amsterdam as ECOC by the Ministry of Culture.

²⁰⁶ Interviews with Austen, (Amsterdam, June 14, 2004) and 's Gravesande (Amsterdam, November 29, 2005).

German cultural and media organizations with a view to the ECOC edition of 1988, which was to be held in West Berlin.

While foreign press coverage of ACH'87 was less negative than the domestic one, many foreign newspapers also used the ECOC as an opportunity to review Amsterdam as a tourist designation, sometimes rather negatively. Certain foreign media, mainly the German ones and the BBC, warned their audiences that if they wanted to visit and experience Amsterdam's cultural attractions and ECOC, they had to take into account pickpockets, drugs, dog turds and the city's rather impolite inhabitants, in particular its waiters.²⁰⁷ In general, the quality of the cultural attractions and ACH'87 was therefore not the main issue in most foreign reports and if it was mentioned it was quite often praised. From this, we can conclude that Amsterdam had a strong image when it regards the city's cultural attractions, but suffered from negative associations concerning safety and hospitality, a problem with which it still struggles today. In terms of promotional impact, reaffirming Amsterdam's image as European cultural centre was less urgent than staging a charm offensive to counter the negative aspects mentioned in the foreign press. Therefore, the staging of CityEvents always raises questions regarding their legitimacy. After all, the public money spent on these events could also go to other important areas, such as fighting crime. With this remark, it is not my intention to argue that one is better than the other. Rather, I want to draw attention to the fact that hosting CityEvents always comes at the cost of something else, regardless of the benefits. This is not an argument for abolishing such events, but rather a plea to make decisions about hosting CityEvents carefully, considering both the advantages and disadvantages. In this regard, the designation and hosting of ACH'87 is certainly not a schoolbook example.

7.6 CONCLUSION

The amalgamation of networks that was established to produce ACH'87 was the result of a minimal number of alignments between a limited amount of actors: the municipality, the organizing body, the Ministry of Culture, and the domestic and foreign press. The case of ACH'87 reminds us that alignments never represent a natural order. Instead, we have to focus on how actors are able *and* unable to establish alignments with others by triggering their interest. By including a 'failed event' in our analysis of CityEvents, we have focused on the inability of actors - in particular the Ministry of Culture, the NTI and HF - to make their project speak to the interests of other actors. The failure of ACH'87 was not that it did not take place, but that it took place in a much smaller form than its organizers had planned. They were unable to establish a network that had enough strength and mass in terms of alignments to stage the ECOC as a true CityEvent. As a result, in this case we could hardly speak of the

²⁰⁷ According to Freek Bloemers, who was responsible for the promotion of ACH'87 at the NTI, a BBC camera crew came to Amsterdam especially for ACH'87. Shortly after their arrival, their equipment was stolen. Even though Bloemers arranged for alternative equipment, the report about Amsterdam mostly focused on the negative aspects of the city, such as its drugs scene, pickpockets, red light district and dog turds. Source: telephone interview with Bloemers, November 21, 2005.

Critical articles in German newspapers can be found in the press map of the ACH'87 archive in the NTI library. A few examples are: 'Eine Kneipe, berühmt wie Rembrandts „Nachtwachte.“' *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. April 27, 1987; Weidemann, S. "Das Bankett der Beraubten." *Franfurter Allgemeine*. March 30, 1987; Weidemann, S. "Eine Stadt hat Katzenjammer." *Franfurter Allgemeine*. March 19, 1987, p. 9-10. NTI archive, access number: ACH'87, box 2 and 3.

'host city' as an amalgamation of networks. Instead, the 'host city' consisted almost exclusively of the NTI and HF, who followed their own approach to the ECOC and primarily used it as an opportunity to make a 'deep' investment in Amsterdam's culture.

While the NTI and HF may have succeeded in this task—there are no reliable data available on the long-term impact of the various projects that were initiated under the umbrella of ACH'87—they mainly followed their own agenda and did not make any serious attempts to use the ECOC for selling Amsterdam as a city. Insofar as ACH'87 was used to raise the profile of the city, it primarily reaffirmed Amsterdam's status as a leading cultural centre in Europe. Precisely because the case of ACH'87 presents us with a less successful attempt to align actors with the network, we have been able to achieve a better understanding of the network dynamics that underlie the production of CityEvents. This makes ACH'87 such an interesting case to compare with successful CityEvents such as the ECOC of Helsinki or the three Olympic cases.

We furthermore acknowledged that the concept of the ECOC was not yet well-established in 1987. The relationships between the key actors were rather undefined and since the first ECOCs were the result of an experimental idea launched in Athens in 1983, there was no clearly delineated event owner. Formally, the ECOC was an event initiated by the EEC but legislation, guidelines and financial resources were fairly limited. In reality, it was therefore rather unclear who was responsible. This ambiguity formed the point of departure for our analysis. ACH'87 drew attention to the complex and unstable formation of the three key actors that constitute the triangular core of the network. The factor of time was an important factor in this: in 1987, the ECOC had not existed long enough to form an event tradition or to establish guiding principles on which the organizational network could rely. In addition, there was no compensation for this lack of tradition in the form of a solid institutional framework. Thus, for the NTI and HF there were few opportunities for benchmarking, which would have allowed them to copy best practices from previous ECOC editions.

Not only the unclear relations between the key actors played a role, but our analysis also pointed out that the key actors themselves, at least the host city and the event owner, were characterized by internal contradictions. This made it difficult for these actors to establish relations with the other key actors. As mentioned before, the EEC barely entered the picture as the event owner of the ECOC. Instead, the nation state occupied a double role as both event owner and host. Since the designation of Amsterdam was not the result of a well-formulated and institutionalized bidding process, but of a political compromise, we may conclude that the EEC was still in the process of defining its role as event owner. Precisely because its role was not yet clear, the nation state could seize the opportunity as an actor within the network that constitutes the EEC to designate its own capital city by securing the support of the few other member states involved in founding the ECOC.

Another complex element of this case study was the relation between the host city (NTI and HF) and the media. News media interest had to be created from almost nothing. In contrast to our earlier inquiry into the Olympic Games, the concept of the ECOC was still too vague for many media organizations to determine their news interest in the event. For the local press, ACH'87 only became of interest when a controversy emerged about the financing of the event. ACH'87 therefore constituted a case study that enabled us to look at a CityEvent before it was recognized as such by the news media. In other words, the ECOC's generic event formula still lacked tradition, reputation, prestige and, consequently, newsworthiness. In this respect, ACH'87 can be compared to the first editions of the Olympic Games, which were also

rather obscure events that received relatively little international media attention. Yet, not all alignments with the media were problematic. Through the Kunstkanaal project, the NTI managed to incorporate media into the ACH'87 program itself. As such, the key actor 'media' was partly annexed by the key actor 'host city' (NTI and HF). In this way, the mediation of ACH'87 became less dependent on press coverage, since audiences could be reached directly, albeit on the local level only. However, this annexation had hardly any consequences for the promotion of ACH'87, because the Kunstkanaal was many used as a 'vehicle' to distribute cultural content to local audiences. The actual promotion of ACH'87 was limited and not very effective, as shown by the fact that the majority of the local population perceived the event negatively, even if they responded positively to the Kunstkanaal.

The Kunstkanaal project not only enabled the NTI to create its own distribution network for highbrow cultural content, but it also produced new spaces and places. By connecting ACH'87 to Amsterdam's television cable infrastructure, artistic and cultural products that could normally only be consumed in the established cultural institutions, became available in the private sphere of the home. In addition, the introduction of the Kunstkanaal meant that a televisual space was created for highbrow culture. In addition to the Kunstkanaal, the Century'87 exhibition also produced a temporary reordering of space and place in Amsterdam. Through artistic interventions at different locations in the city, art was taken from the 'sacred' realm of the museum into the open. At the same time, the city itself became the subject of these artworks. As a result, the ordinary uses and therefore meaning of the sites where Century'87 was staged were temporarily changed. Unlike the previously examined Olympic Games, in which the city mainly served as the stage for a sports spectacle, ACH'87 constituted an attempt, albeit on a modest scale and with limited success, to turn the city into the primary object and subject of a CityEvent.

8. E-88: BERLIN EUROPEAN CITY OF CULTURE 1988²⁰⁸

Towards New Cultural Networks

Paris, Venice, Rome, Athens. Berlin is often omitted from the list of great cultural cities of Europe. In the early 20th century, just when it seemed the city on the Spree would succeed the city on the Seine as the cultural center of the Continent, the Nazis stifled expression throughout the country. West Berlin has regained its vitality over the last decade, however, and, as if to accent the change, the city has been designated Cultural City of Europe 1988, a title rewarded annually by the ministers of the European Community to a different city (Griffith, 1988)²⁰⁹

8.1 INTRODUCTION

As this quote from *The New York Times* suggests, the 1988 ECOC provided a vehicle to announce West Berlin's cultural comeback to the world. Yet, as the subtitle of this chapter hints, the city's cultural revival had by no means been secured at the time. Even though West Berlin had more theatres, museums, opera houses and other cultural amenities than any other West German city, the public cultural sector was dominated by traditional and highly institutionalized organizations, such as the Theater des Westens and the Deutsche Oper Berlin. The city's budget for culture was spent largely on these select institutions. At the same time, there were hardly any facilities and subsidies for artists and collectives that were not affiliated to established cultural institutions, despite the fact that these so-called 'freie Gruppe' (alternative and non-institutionalized artist collectives) greatly contributed to the city's artistic and cultural development. West Berlin's authorities had little financial space within their regular budget for arts and culture to support new and innovative initiatives that would sustain the city's cultural vitality. It is in this context that the (West) Berlin European City of Culture—nicknamed *E-88* by its organizers and the city's inhabitants—was staged, prompting the question how exactly this CityEvent was used to raise Berlin's cultural reputation.

In relation to this question, we have to inquire whether raising West Berlin's cultural profile resembled the aim of the NTI and HF in Amsterdam in 1987 or whether other interests played a role as well. In the case of ACH'87, hosting the ECOC was perceived by its organizers as a deep investment in Amsterdam's cultural sector. Does this also apply to E-88 or did this edition of the ECOC also have other ambitions, such as, for example, an increase in tourism? In this regard, we have to draw attention to the role of the media in the staging of E-88. Depending on the

²⁰⁸ Instead of European *Capital* of Culture, the organizers of the event decided to change it into *City*. The reasons for this will be explained later in this chapter.

²⁰⁹ This article has been obtained through the New York Times on-line archive service.

interests involved in staging an ECOC, the media approach differs, as does the type of media that covers it. We therefore have to examine how the organizers of E-88 established alignments with the media. Did the organizers invest in promotion to realize their ambitions or did they try to create their own publicity and distribution networks by partly annexing the media, as the organizers of ACH'87 had done?

Before we can address these issues, we have to reconstruct how West Berlin obtained the honor of hosting the fourth edition of the ECOC.

8.2 CONSOLIDATED INTERESTS

8.2.1 *Bonn's Favorite: Geopolitics, Culture and the ECOC*

At the same meeting where Amsterdam's designation was decided, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the federal minister of foreign affairs, proposed that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) could also host an ECOC. He suggested 1988 as a feasible option. At this moment, no final decision was taken about which German city would host the event. As our previous inquiry into ACH'87 demonstrated, the designations of the first ECOC's by no means resembled a bidding process in which candidate cities actively try to convince an event owner that they are the most suitable host. As will become apparent in the next chapter on the Helsinki ECOC, later on the designation of a host city for ECOC did become subject to a highly institutionalized bidding process.

At the time when West Berlin obtained the honor of hosting the ECOC, the event was still no more than an initiative. Only those EEC member states that actively engaged themselves in the debate about European cultural policy were willing to contribute to the idea. Considering Germany's special role and commitment to the European integration process after World War II, there was a strong feeling within the federal government that the country should also contribute to the cultural dimension of this process. As soon as Germany's candidature for 1988 became official, various German cities, including Munich, started to compete with West Berlin. However, both the federal government and West Berlin's leaders strongly felt that if there was going to be a German ECOC, it had to be West Berlin.

Since the final decision took some time to be made, West Berlin's designation became official only in 1986, leaving little time for preparation. Moreover, because the city was already putting a major effort into organizing its 750th anniversary in 1987, the Berlin authorities were partly taken by surprise when the city obtained another big event.²¹⁰ As in the case of ACH' 87, the unusual designation procedure of the first ECOCs left organizers with little time to plan the organization of the event.²¹¹ To organize the ECOC with hardly two years to go, while the city was already preparing for another huge event, demanded an enormous effort from the city's political, bureaucratic and cultural institutions. But, despite the additional organizational burden the ECOC would constitute, the West Berlin authorities did not refuse the designation. In contrast to Amsterdam, there were clear political reasons for West Berlin to host the European City of Culture. The federal government considered

²¹⁰ Interview with Volker Hassemer, senator of cultural affairs of the Land Berlin, Berlin, April 11, 2005.

²¹¹ Nowadays, most cities start preparing for organizing the ECOC five years in advance (Palmer et al., 2004).

West Berlin a constituent part of the FRG and the ECOC offered the opportunity to communicate this principle on a European level. Moreover, for the Western sector of a divided Berlin, it would have been unwise to reject the federal offer, since during the cold war period West Berlin sought out every opportunity to strengthen its ties with the Federal Republic. The city's economy heavily relied on special federal subsidies to compensate businesses and residents for the higher cost of living caused by the city's awkward geographical position deep within GDR territory. This made West Berlin financially much more dependent on the federal government than other cities. In those days, about half of the city's budget came directly from the federal government through special funding programs. This special relationship also shows in the federal government's support for E-88: it provided approximately half of the total budget for West Berlin ECOC.²¹²

In this regard, ACH'87 and E-88 present two very different cases. Whereas both cities obtained the ECOC without engaging in a bidding process, the German government provided much more financial support than the Dutch government did. In contrast to ACH'87, which was perceived by many as a cuckoo in the nest, the designation of West Berlin ECOC was more or less accepted as a gift, as an extra opportunity for raising the city's profile.²¹³ Both the state and the city shared a political interest in positioning West Berlin as a constituent part of the FRG in order to reinforce the desire to reunite the two Berlins and Germanies.

When we return to the CityEvent model—the idea that every CityEvent is based on productive relations of interdependency between three key actors: the host city, the event owner and the media—the nation state can be seen as part of the event owner, because each EEC member state has a vote in designating and proposing an ECOC. At the same time, in the case of Berlin, the state also subsidized E-88. For this reason, the state can also be included in the network of the host city. Therefore, in the case of E-88, not only did the state and the host city share an interest in the ECOC, but so did the event owner via the nation state. West Berlin, the federal government and the EEC all shared the same interest, namely the idea that the aim of the ECOC to foster European cultural cooperation and exchange would be fulfilled by enabling West Germany *and* West Berlin to reconnect the East to the West culturally. Within the Federal Government and the West Berlin authorities, many hoped that the two Germanies and two Berlins would be reunited at some point in time. Even though the political reality at the time was different, on the West German side there was a strong belief that culturally the two Germanies were already a unity. Although one can argue about whether there were clear signs or not, it is certain that few could have expected 'the Wall' to come down so quickly, just one year after E-88.

²¹² In the "Senatvorlage Nr. 2084/87 für die Sitzung am Dienstag, dem 18.8.1987" (pp. 18-20) from the Senator für Kulturelle Angelegenheiten, the financing of E-88 is planned as follows: the total cost for E-88, including organizational measures, public relations and promotion, is estimated at 53,3 million DM. From the Bundeshaushalt (the federal government) a total of 20 million DM is expected (8 million DM in 1987 and 12 million DM in 1988), with the other 20 million DM coming from the Landeshaushalt of Berlin (the city and land of Berlin). 13,3 million DM of the total amount has to be covered by other sources, leaving the 40 million DM to be paid for by Bundes and Landeshaushalt. It is expected that E-88 will receive 4 million DM support from other European countries, 6,5 million DM from ticket sales and merchandising, 1,5 million DM from licenses and copyrights, and 1,3 million DM as a direct donation from the Ministry of Domestic Affairs for exhibitions of international allure. Available at the Landesarchiv Berlin, access number: B Rep. 148, nr. 2048/87.

²¹³ At least, this was the viewpoint of the Berlin authorities. As will become apparent later on, E-88 was contested in other circles.

As became clear from ACH'87, the aim of unifying Eastern and Western Europe culturally was not exclusively a West German issue. Many artists, intellectuals and politicians in both the East and the West were convinced that it was morally and politically necessary to speak of a European cultural unity. From a Western point of view, not to do so would imply that one was giving up on the countries on the other side of the iron curtain. Both the West Berlin and federal authorities were interested in the ECOC because it provided a platform to demonstrate the desire for European cultural unity. In his speech at the opening ceremony of E-88, Genscher made no secret of his ambitions.

Europa ist eine Kulturelle Einheit—aber Europa ist ideologisch und politisch in zwei Teile geteilt (...) Die europäische Kultur, zu der alle Völker Europas Grosses beigetragen haben, ist nicht auf die Europäische Gemeinschaft oder den Europarat beschränkt. Wir sollte Städte in ganz Europa zur Kulturstadt Europas wählen.²¹⁴

He did not stand alone in this belief. The initiator of the ECOC, Mercouri,²¹⁵ also adhered to it and so did the organizers of ACH'87, who had set up collaborations with Eastern European artists.

The politicized nature of the ECOC at the time is also apparent in the reactions from the Eastern block. Initially, the Russians were suspicious of West Berlin's candidature for ECOC. According to Nele Hertling, director of the E-88 organizing committee, despite Gorbatsjov's Glasnost and Perestrojka the Russians were anxious about the West German government's initiative to intensify cultural collaboration between Eastern and Western Europe. In her view, they perceived the hosting of the ECOC as political propaganda, enhancing the fiction that Berlin was a constituent part of the FRG. Thus, E-88 was caught up in a network in which the political rivalry between East and West was transposed to the cultural realm. While we should refrain from any comparison on moral grounds, both E-88 and the 1936 Nazi Olympics show that Berlin has a tradition of appropriating the hosting of CityEvents for the pursuit of political interests.

8.2.2 *The Plus Factor: Arts and Culture*

Apart from geopolitical interests, economic reasons increasingly played a role in the hosting of the ECOC too. According to the authorities, West Berlin was always in need of projects that would make the city visible to the outside world and raise its profile internationally.²¹⁶ In the years before 1988, West Berlin's population had decreased. Of particular concern was the migration of young talented people and businesses to other parts of West Germany. Together with many other cultural events and initiatives, E-88 was a way to counter the outflow of young talent from Berlin by stimulating an artistic and cultural environment that would appeal to these groups. The authorities thus saw culture as an additional asset to increase the attractiveness of

²¹⁴ Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Hans-Dietrich Genscher aus Anlaß der Eröffnung "Berlin—Kulturstadt Europas 1998" am Samstag, den 23. April 1988, in Schloß Charlottenburg", Berlin. Archive code Landesarchiv Berlin: B. Rep. 148, nr. 79.

²¹⁵ This shows, for instance, in a fragment from the speech given by Mercouri at the E-88 opening ceremony. "Die Kultur Europas lässt sich niet halbieren. Seine kulturelle Identität ist einheitlich. Die Stunde der Annäherung zwisschen Ost und West ist gekommen". Source: Speech by Mercouri, Berlin, April 23, 1988. Coded in the Landesarchiv-Berlin as: B.Rep. nr. 79.

²¹⁶ Interview with Volker Hassemer, Berlin, April 11, 2005.

Berlin for (new) residents, employees, investors and company representatives. In this regard, E-88 provided publicity for Berlin as a city of cultural creativity and innovation. This can be illustrated by a fragment from one of the speeches made by Volker Hassemer, Minister of Culture of the federal state Berlin (SenKult²¹⁷), to create support for E-88.

Unsere Gesellschaft ist zunehmend auf den sicheren Umgang mit dem schnellen Wandel der Lebensverhältnisse, also auf Innovationsbereitschaft und Innovationsfähigkeit angewiesen. Aus diesem Grund sehen wir uns in unserer zukünftigen Entwicklung nicht nur vor materielle Fragen, sondern zunehmend vor kulturelle Fragen gestellt. Denn die Kultur als Feld der geistigen Auseinandersetzung, ist das wichtigste Übungsfeld für Haltungen und Fähigkeiten, die auch auf anderen Gebieten Innovation ermöglichen.²¹⁸

Culture is more than just a luxury; it contributes to wider social and economic developments. In line with what experts on urban development and marketing such as Philip Kotler (1993; 1999) and David Harvey (1989; 1996) have argued, Hassemer²¹⁹ expected culture to play a crucial role in accommodating the developments of a rapidly changing world in which the labor market is transformed and innovation becomes increasingly important to enhancing economic growth.

When confronted with this speech fragment in a later interview, Hassemer explicitly stated that he had not perceived the cultural sector as a field that would directly generate economic growth. The economic importance of the culture and creative industries that now seems so self-evident to us was not widely acknowledged among politicians and policy makers in Europe at the time. Culture was still perceived as no more than an *auxiliary* asset for luring companies, residents and investors. Apart from a short-term impulse to the tourist sector, the hosting of E-88 was thus not expected to have a direct economic effect. E-88 was perceived more as a means to create a distinct profile for arts and culture as a 'soft location factor'²²⁰ that would

²¹⁷ I will use the term Senator of Cultural Affairs to refer not only to the political position of senator of cultural affairs, but also to the overall ministry or department that belongs to this position. In contrast to most other cities in West Germany, West Berlin was considered an independent city or federal state. Thus, the political institutions at the state level coincided with those of the municipality. The Senator of Cultural Affairs is therefore not equivalent to the function of deputy mayor or alderman, but to that of a landesminister (state minister), even though the political territory was not much larger than West Berlin plus the city of Charlottenburg.

²¹⁸ Hassemer, Volker. "Berlin als Kulturstadt Europas 1988: Eine Bilanz" Vortrag vor der URANIA am 4. Nov. 1988, pp. 6-11. Indexed at the Landesarchiv Berlin as B. Rep. 148, nr. 2.

²¹⁹ I prefer to refer to the Senator of Cultural Affairs rather than to Hassemer the person, because his political visions and decisions were supported by staff, who translated them into policies. Following a Latourian perspective, it is not the person of Hassemer who is of primary importance, but the network in which he acted. Thus, the Senator of Cultural Affairs will refer to the functionary Hassemer as the Minister of Culture of the Land Berlin, and to the entire institution with its civil servants, papers, policies, funding and innumerable other actors. In the remainder of the text, I will only refer to Hassemer personally if his individual opinion or position is of importance for the analysis of E-88.

²²⁰ A soft location factor can also be understood as a secondary factor. When a company or investor considers locating itself or its capital in a particular city, the choice is determined in the first place by primary factors, such as tax benefits, the characteristics of the labor force (e.g. high- or low-skilled), the presence of infrastructures, the quality of government (is the local government reliable, is it easy or difficult to obtain permits, etc.) and the quality of public amenities, such as hospitals and schools. When the primary factors are in line with the wishes of the decision makers, secondary factors often play a critical role. In this regard, we can think of the beauty of the natural environment, the physical appearance of the city and also of the cultural products and atmosphere that a city offers. When cities already offer a high quality of primary factors (like West Berlin at the time) or are confronted with factors that they cannot influence, such as geopolitical position, secondary factors become increasingly

strengthen Berlin's image nationally and internationally. The idea that the cultural sector could be an industry that generated more money than it cost was unfamiliar at the time. What was recognized, however, was the promotional impact of culture. In the case of E-88, the idea was to present an attractive image of Berlin as a thriving cultural centre within Europe, buzzing with creative activity and innovative potential. From this perspective, E-88 was an investment in the city's cultural scene, adding to a general quality of life that would have a wider impact. The publicity that the city's cultural sector would generate through E-88 was therefore not confined to promotion for the tourist market only, even though this was used as an important formal argument to justify the costs of E-88 politically.

Most importantly, E-88 provided an opportunity to reform established infrastructures in Berlin's cultural scene in order to foster the city's creative and innovative potential. Even though the quality of artistic and cultural productions was not necessarily poor, Volker and others from within the city's cultural circuit considered the established Berliner cultural scene too inwardly oriented and the repertoire too traditional.²²¹ Innovation, creativity and an international orientation were not expected from the established institutions, so young, international and contemporary artistic and cultural developments should be stimulated. E-88 provided extra resources to achieve this, because it was paid out of incidental monies that did not affect the structural budget for arts and culture. For the organizers of E-88 it only made sense to host the event if it would reshape cultural life in Berlin in a visible and structural way. E-88 was therefore intended to push the local arts scene forward and to reshape established networks so that more facilities and subsidies would be available for *freie Gruppe*, the non-affiliated and institutionalized art groups. An additional goal was to present the Berlin public with contemporary cultural developments and find ways to involve more inhabitants in the city's cultural life to compensate for the traditional and nationally-oriented productions of the established cultural institutions.²²²

8.3 THE E-88 ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAM

8.3.1 *The Werkstatt Team*

The three main interests involved in hosting the European Capital of Culture—reforming the West Berlin cultural scene, selling the city through arts and culture, and culturally reconnecting East and West—largely determined the institutional form of the organizing body that would coordinate the production of E-88. Due to time pressure and the enormous preparations that were going on for Berlin's 750th anniversary, Hassemer opted for an unusual organizational construction. He convinced the senate of the federal state of Berlin that he had to be personally in charge of the organization of E-88. Because Hassemer took direct responsibility for

important to making a city attractive to its target groups. In addition, secondary factors are usually easier to use for publicity purposes than primary ones. After all, a cultural event or impressive natural environment is easier to promote than a tax benefit. For a detailed description of target groups and location factors, see Kotler et al. (1993).

²²¹ Interview with Hassemer (Berlin, April 11, 2005) and Weber (Berlin, April 14, 2005). At the time, Weber was a high-ranking official working for the Senator of Cultural Affairs, who was involved in the organization of E-88.

²²² This notion was articulated by all three interviewees.

the organization of E-88, he did not have to rely on the established cultural institutions and personalities, thus preventing delays caused by discussions, negotiations and possible disagreements.²²³

In 1986, Hassemer approached Nele Hertling about the organization of the event. Initially, E-88's organization was to be placed within the Academy of Arts, but it soon became apparent that this would not work because Hertling was not able to work independently enough within the institutional setting of the Academy. In the summer of 1986, Hertling therefore formed the so-called 'Werkstatt Team' (Workshop Team), which became an independent society funded by the Senator of Cultural Affairs and consisting of 5-6 employees who each took responsibility for the coordination of the projects in one artistic discipline.²²⁴ The organizational network could remain relatively small because Hertling was in direct contact with Hassemer. Thus, the network core that constituted the key actor 'host city' was the result of the establishment of a direct alignment between the Senator of Cultural Affairs and the Werkstatt Team. Clear arrangements were made about the division of tasks and Hassemer did not intervene in the content-related issues of the E-88 program. While the Werkstatt Team worked on the actual organization and composition of the E-88 program, his network (the ministry) concentrated on politically legitimating the event, allocating funds and taking care of international affairs.

Even though the core network of E-88 was not much bigger than that of ACH'87 in terms of the number of actors involved, it was stronger and had more mass in terms of the number of alignments. In contrast to ACH'87, the Senator of Cultural Affairs and the Werkstatt Team shared responsibility and therefore also an interest in staging the ECOC successfully. The alignment between the Senator of Cultural Affairs and the Werkstatt Team was also not limited to purely financial support. Indirectly, many other actors, in the first place from the cultural sector, were aligned with the Werkstatt Team via the network of the Senator of Cultural Affairs. Furthermore, both the Senator of Cultural Affairs and the Werkstatt Team were aligned with the federal state, which strengthened this relationship by providing a large subsidy. This was not the case for ACH'87, where the alignment with the state was not substantial enough to provide the organizers with sufficient means (money) to realize their ambitions.

The strong link between the Werkstatt Team and the Senator of Cultural Affairs made both of them less dependent on the cooperation of the established cultural institutions, who might oppose their plans. This is not to say that the Werkstatt Team and the Senator of Cultural Affairs did not align the established cultural institutions with their project—in fact, many of these institutions asked the Werkstatt Team to include their planned exhibitions and productions in the E-88 program. Rather, the strong link between the Werkstatt and the Senator of Cultural Affairs enabled the Werkstatt Team to concentrate on the alternative art and cultural scene in Berlin, while still keeping the established cultural institutions aligned as well.

²²³ This in contrast to other European Capitals of Culture that set up organization committees and boards governed by representatives from the cultural institutions, government and business community. While such organizational structures might be more democratic—although this is not always the case—constant discussions and negotiations between participants often result in delays. For Berlin, financing the cultural year was not a problem, but time pressure was. By personally taking charge of the organization of E-88, Hassemer was able to bypass the so-called 'big names' of Berlin's cultural scene and appoint a team that would be able to carry out the organizational tasks as effectively as possible.

²²⁴ The members of the Werkstatt Team did not work for the Senator of Cultural Affairs, but were temporarily employed by the Werkstatt Team.

The public relations and promotion were carried out by a separate organization that did the same job for the B-750 event (Berlin's 750th anniversary). The experiences and expertise this organization had gained while managing the public relations and promotion of B-750 were thought to be an advantage for marketing of E-88.²²⁵ As will become apparent later, this strategy proved to be rather unsuccessful. What this somewhat last-minute organizational setup shows above all is that, unlike the IOC, the EEC had not managed to introduce a crystallized organizational formula or tradition for the ECOC concept. Previous ECOCs, like ACH'87, had all been organized differently. In this respect, the ECOC differs crucially from the Olympic Games, which is always organized by an organizing committee established by the National Olympic Committee of the host nation.

In conclusion, we can summarize the organizational setting of E-88 as follows. The core network that formed the key actor 'host city' existed of the Senator of Cultural Affairs, the public relations and promotions agency, and the Werkstatt Team. Many other actors, such as the established cultural institutions and the federal state, were aligned with this network, but they did not form its core. In the core network, the Werkstatt Team formed the organizing body or central actor, given the task of translating the existing interests in the ECOC into the eventual program of E-88.

8.3.2 A Threefold Approach to Berlin's Culture

How did the Werkstatt Team translate the three main interests in E-88—innovation of the cultural sector, selling the city and reconnecting the East and West culturally—into a comprehensive programming and presentation of the city? Before a program could be composed, the Werkstatt Team first needed to define a concept of culture. In line with the political and economic interests discussed earlier, both the Werkstatt Team and the Senator of Cultural Affairs wanted to display an imagery of West Berlin as a city of modernity, open-mindedness, tolerance, experimentalism and innovation. The organizers wanted to grasp 'the spirit of Berlin' as a relatively young city characterized by a rather discontinuous historical development.²²⁶ In his book *Berlin: Ein Stadtschicksal*, the art critic Karl Scheffler famously summarizes the enormous pace at which Berlin transformed from a small city into a metropolis within less than a century by saying that Berlin's faith is "immerfort zu werden und niemals zu sein" (1989: 219). This notion of Berlin as a city of eternal change that embraces and absorbs experimental and innovative developments formed the basis for programming E-88. Initially, the advising experts and representatives from the Senator of Cultural Affairs had discussed whether the image of West Berlin should not be an image of 'tolerance' instead.²²⁷ This concept, however, proved too difficult to visualize.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the title of 'Capital of Culture' was changed into that of 'Cultural City'. To call West Berlin 'Capital' was thought to be a provocation of the GDR authorities. Since the success of E-88 partly depended on the GDR's willingness to allow some of its artists to participate, 'City of Culture' seemed the best way to avoid conflict. There was, however, another reason for changing the name to 'City of Culture'. The term 'Capital' was also felt to evoke negative

²²⁵ Indeed, in official documents frequent references can be found to Berlin 750. The budget to cover the costs of the extra civil servants and materials that the organization of E-88 required was 3,5 million DM, while Berlin 750 was budgeted at 8 million DM. See Landes-Archiv Berlin, folder: B. Rep. 148, nr. 3.

²²⁶ Interview with Ingo Weber (Berlin, April 14, 2005).

²²⁷ Interviews with Hassemer (Berlin, April 11, 2005) and Weber (Berlin, April 14, 2005).

associations of Berlin's past. Since extensive attention had been paid to the Nazi period during the celebration of the city's 750th anniversary in 1987, the organizers preferred to emphasize West Berlin's contemporary cultural competence instead of focusing on its political past as capital of Germany. As we will see, this decision was contested. What distinguishes E-88 from ACH'87 in this regard is that the latter event's organizers were not concerned with the promotional impact of their program, but focused only on its quality. The Werkstatt Team, on the contrary, had to translate the abovementioned three interests into an approach that would result in a program that would be of the highest standard and that would simultaneously be useful for raising West Berlin's profile abroad.

The emphasis on West Berlin's contemporary cultural potential resulted not in one guiding concept, but in three guidelines. In other words, the E-88 program would be based on a threefold approach, each representing a separate section in the overall program. The first guiding theme was defined as "Berlin—Venue of the New". In the official E-88 program booklet, this guideline is defined as follows:

The events of "Cultural City '88 are oriented towards the special nature of Berlin's contribution to European culture—the large part it has played in the origins of modern culture in Europe. Berlin is still a young city and does not have the long tradition of the cultural metropolises such as Athens, Florence, Amsterdam or Paris, the 1989 "Cultural City". Following Berlin's elevation through the founding of the Reich to a focus of politics and culture in Germany, it also became a place for crystallizing new developments in culture. Through the changes it has undergone, and its characteristic openness, Berlin is a world city of the 20th century in a way that hardly any other European city is. This is why Berlin 1988 is a forum for the art trends of the moment in Europe.²²⁸

The organizers aimed to present and enhance an image of Berlin as a centre of artistic and cultural innovation by linking the city's young and turbulent history to characteristics such as openness, innovation and experimentalism. As we saw earlier, this guideline corresponds with the interest in presenting West Berlin as a flourishing, open-minded and attractive cultural city. Thus, E-88 is strategically employed to strengthen Berlin's cultural dynamic as a 'soft' location factor in attracting the attention of a wide range of target groups, ranging from foreign tourists to businesses and investors. However, it is difficult to associate the slogan that summarizes the guideline "Berlin—Venue of the New" with a clear imagery, this in contrast to Paris as the 'capital of love' or Milan as the 'capital of fashion'. "Venue of the New" is more general and in its most basic sense conveys the idea that 'there is something going on' in Berlin.

This image of a lively cultural city was also supported by the second guideline, "Workshop Berlin". This part of the E-88 program was specifically directed at stimulating European artistic cooperation, development and innovation. It formed a translation of the interest on the part of the West Berlin authorities in investing in the city's alternative and non-institutionalized artistic and cultural scene. The Werkstatt Team aimed to provide a powerful incentive to the city's cultural scene by using E-88 to present Berlin as a European centre of artistic and cultural development. In the E-88 program brochure, this aim is described as follows:

²²⁸ Presseinformation "Berlin—Cultural City of Europe 1988: The Programme", published by the Berlin—Kulturstadt Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Berlin, 1988, p. 8. Source: Landesarchiv Berlin, access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 88.

Artists from all over Europe, but also from other countries, have in 1988 not only the possibility of presenting and staging their finished work, but also to work for a while in Berlin and to meet through their work. It is hoped that unusual ways of cooperation will emerge, whenever possible across the disciplinary boundaries. In workshops and symposia, artists will meet with those interested in the arts. New developments stand at the heart of the programme, as well as the process of artistic work, where the interest is not only in a finished product. This is why the second guiding theme of the programme is “Workshop Berlin”²²⁹

Relating this quote to the earlier fragment from Hassemer’s speech, the focus on the innovative potential of arts and culture in the E-88 program comes to the fore. Thinking about arts and culture in terms of a profitable sector was still unusual at the time, but the ‘Workshop Berlin’ theme nevertheless constituted a clear strategy of investing in the city’s cultural scene. This strategy aimed at deepening and strengthening the city’s cultural potential, approaching culture as a resource that would provide the city with a vital base for tackling current and future economic, political, social and cultural changes.

The geopolitical interests involved in the ECOC were translated into the third guideline: “Berlin in the Heart of Europe”. This guideline presented a way to rethink the geopolitical situation of Berlin by envisioning the city as a historic gateway between West and East. This was intended to counteract the common perception of West Berlin as Western Europe’s furthest outpost in the Eastern Block. While this image, which was supported by the presence of the wall, made West Berlin an important tourist attraction, it was also the foundation for West Berlin’s rather complicated economy, which was increasingly suffering from an outward migration by residents, businesses and investors. “Berlin in the Heart of Europe” was an attempt to rename, or rather to re-imagine the city in such a manner that its remote and isolated geographical position in Western Europe was translated into a more positive message. This is clearly illustrated by the E-88 program brochure:

Right up until the mid-Thirties Berlin was the centre of a lively cultural network in a central Europe relating through cultural exchange not only with the other German cities and the cultural centres of the West, but also, for example, with Prague, Warsaw, Riga and Cracow, to name but a few places. On their part, these cities drew strong cultural influences across state boundaries from Berlin. The city’s present-day central position in Europe on the border of East and West does not make an easy reconstruction of the shattered network. Nonetheless, in 1988 the city faces up to the challenge of offering Berlin for the cultural presentations of East and West Europe. More than elsewhere, the “Cultural City” of Berlin must make clear through its Programme that artists are invited from Europe as a whole to a European programme of events.²³⁰

Now that we have analyzed how the three main interests involved in E-88 were translated into three guidelines, we have to reconstruct how these guidelines were eventually translated into tangible selection criteria for composing the E-88 program. This happened as follows: “Berlin Venue of the New” was translated into the more specific selection criterion of opening up spaces and places for artistic and cultural production, while “Workshop Berlin” was specified into the selection criterion of ‘interdisciplinary approaches to art’. This interdisciplinary approach was quite a new

²²⁹ Presseinformation “Berlin—Cultural City of Europe 1988: The Programme”, published by the Berlin—Kulturstadt Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Berlin, 1988, p. 9.

²³⁰ Presseinformation “Berlin—Cultural City of Europe 1988: The Programme”, published by the Berlin—Kulturstadt Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Berlin, 1988, p. 10.

approach in the German cultural sector at the time and could be interpreted as an attempt to create new creative networks. Finally, “Berlin in the Heart of Europe” was translated into the criterion of ‘internationalization’. The idea was to stimulate collaboration and co-production between local artists and foreign ones, and to open up the local cultural scene to international developments.

8.3.3 Programming E-88

Thus far, we have seen that the Werkstatt’s approach to culture was the result of several acts of translation. First, three interests were defined by the federal and West Berlin authorities (reshaping West Berlin’s cultural scene, connecting East and West, and marketing the city). These interests were then translated once more into three guidelines that provided a threefold focus for the programming of E-88. This translation, however, did not yet produce a concrete result. The three guidelines were still too general to function as actual policies or selection criteria. Another translation therefore had to take place which eventually resulted in three workable criteria: opening up spaces for artistic and cultural production, internationalization and, finally, an interdisciplinary approach to arts.

The application of this last criterion materialized, for instance, in a project that was included by the Werkstatt Team in the E-88 program with the aim of reforming artistic and cultural practices. It was part of the Workshop Berlin Theme and titled “Theatre Workshop: Border Crossing”. The project concentrated on interdisciplinary exchanges between visual arts and performance arts and was supported by other acts in the E-88 program, such as Laurie Anderson’s performance, which confronted Berlin audiences with pioneering artistic and cultural work in which new links were established between music, visual arts and dance. Thus, the Werkstatt Team’s aim of reshaping Berlin’s cultural sector led to the creation of new symbolic spaces, spaces that superseded traditional artistic disciplines. These interdisciplinary spaces and places were by no means only virtual. They relied, for example, on performances and actual exchanges between artists. To enhance interdisciplinary artistic and cultural processes, the Werkstatt Team invited foreign artists and groups to not only present and perform their work, but also to live and work in Berlin for several weeks during the cultural year. Here, we can identify the way the criterion of ‘internationalization’ was translated into a concrete program item. In order to cross disciplinary boundaries, national boundaries had to be crossed too. Interdisciplinarity was therefore not only a matter of breaking down traditions, authorities and definitions in art, but also of creating intercultural and international networks. In this regard, the Werkstatt Team was of the opinion that not only the inwardly-oriented Berlin art scene would benefit from collaboration and exchanges with foreign artists: the international component of the E-88 program served an economic interest too. It was thought that, if more foreign artists would live and work in the city, its cultural atmosphere would become more appealing to young talent, helping to turn the tide of outward migration. This objective, moreover, also suited the political agenda of bringing Eastern and Western Europe together culturally.

Apart from the experimental parts of the E-88 program, a number of prestigious projects were included to generate publicity and a wide audience interest. Examples of such projects were exhibitions on the work of Joseph Beuys and Hans Holbein, and the musical performances of Mikis Theodorakis, Philip Glass and Laurie Anderson. By including these famous artists in the program, the Werkstatt Team was able to make E-88 recognizable and marketable to a large public. Nonetheless,

Hertling herself concludes that the overall E-88 program concentrated more on experimental works than on popular tastes. Despite the organizer's intentions to reach as many people as possible, the aim of contributing to an innovative and creative cultural climate was given a higher priority.

In this study, it is impossible to do justice to the richness and variety of the program parts that together made up E-88. Of many program parts, hardly any traces can be found (the traces that do exist vary from brochures and press reports to correspondences between the organizers). Instead of trying to reconstruct the E-88 program, the next section will focus on one specific program part that draws attention to the question of how a CityEvent like the ECOC produces a reordering and renaming of spaces and places.

8.3.4 Reordering and Renaming Berlin

The program part in question consisted of numerous smaller events and projects such as the "Theatre Workshop: Incident Spaces" and "Zeitvergleich'88: Contemporary Painting from the GDR". These two projects were dedicated to opening up unused spaces for artistic and cultural use. In addition, by exhibiting the works of contemporary artists from the GDR, an attempt was made to translate the geopolitical interests of the ECOC by demonstrating the cultural unity of Europe. When *Zeitvergleich'88* was organized, West Berlin had many abandoned and unused buildings and other empty spaces that had emerged after the construction of the wall. By opening up these sites to the production and distribution of arts and culture, the Werkstatt team wanted to make artists and audiences aware of the possibilities these 'uncanny' spaces and buildings offered for developing artistic and cultural initiatives outside the established institutions. In contrast to an event like the Olympic Games, E-88 aimed to rearrange particular urban spaces in a different way by remapping their uses and functions, rather than by physically reconstructing places. This mode of rearranging was more of a networking on a mental level that worked by changing peoples' perception of places. Instead of seeing these places as abandoned and uncanny sites, the Werkstatt Team tried to make people see their creative potential. Enabling artists and performers to exhibit their work in these places required temporary measures and physical rearrangements. This partial reordering of place allowed for a different utilization of places and, as such, produced new meanings. The meaning of places is therefore never a symbolic dimension only, but based on the networking of various tangible actors (such as artists, artworks, buildings and audiences), the performances of these actors and the alignments they establish with each other.

An obvious example of this was the temporary installation of electricity in an old abandoned factory building in order to use it as a gallery for *Zeitvergleich'88*. In this case, introducing electricity and some necessary safety precautions constituted a relatively minor adjustment that made it possible to reorder the place from an abandoned industrial building into an exhibition space for art. As a result, the meaning and function of the place changed, albeit only temporarily.²³¹ Thus, instead of integrating E-88 with urban development plans that aim at fundamentally

²³¹ In this regard, an analogy can be made with the different uses of artifacts. Take, for example, an axe. While it can be used as a tool to cut wood, at the same time its flat side can be used as a hammer. In less fortunate circumstances, the axe can function as a weapon to attack or kill. While the shape of the axe remains the same, its function and relation to other actors alters because it is programmed differently depending on the logic of the network with which it is aligned (Law, 2002).

(re)producing places on a physical level, the Werkstatt Team produced cultural change through minor material rearrangements. The aim of reshaping Berlin's cultural sector was therefore not only a matter of subsidizing the non-institutionalized arts groups or *freie Gruppe*, but also required the establishment of new places into which this alternative network could expand. To foster innovative creative processes, it was necessary to provide places, platforms or shelters where these processes could occur and develop. In the end, therefore, E-88 constituted an attempt to re-program the city by enabling places, buildings and other actors to perform different functions than they normally did.

8.4 MISREPRESENTING BERLIN? PROMOTION AND DOMESTIC PRESS COVERAGE OF E-88

The reordering of uncanny places in West Berlin was one strategy employed by the Werkstatt Team to enforce the idea that West Berlin was regaining its cultural vitality. Through the *Zeitvergleich'88* project, an attempt was made to alter the meaning of spaces and places in the city through renaming. At another level, images were also actively created and distributed with the aim of renaming West Berlin. These processes took place in the media, in particular the printed ones. Whereas *Zeitvergleich'88* tried to change the meanings of places by rearranging the actor-networks that made up a place, another mode of renaming took place in the abstract, textual (yet at the same time physical) spaces of newspapers and promotion brochures. Such spaces are multilayered and heterogeneous; a text in a left-wing or foreign newspaper is 'placed' in a different media space than a text in a local conservative magazine. In this regard, the place of the text is not only linked to the discursive space of the medium, but also to the geographical network in which this medium circulates. In other words, the local newspaper will be distributed mainly to local readers, whereas a text in a foreign paper literally takes news abroad as the medium is distributed in a foreign and/or international space. This multilayered and heterogeneous quality of media spaces becomes apparent in the way E-88 was promoted and in the way different news media reacted to the promotional messages. The heterogeneity of the media space manifested itself in the difference between, on the one hand, local and domestic press coverage and, on the other, foreign, notably American press coverage. To understand this difference, we will first focus on the promotion of E-88.

8.4.1 E-88 Promotion: A Discrepancy between Material and Immaterial Place Images

The promotion of E-88 depended on cooperation between various institutions.²³² The public relations and promotion bureau that was responsible for B-750 (the festivities organized around Berlin's 750th anniversary) coordinated the overall promotion of E-88. Despite, or perhaps because of the involvement of so many organizations, there was a serious public relations and promotion problem, especially with regard to the domestic press.²³³ The Werkstatt Team wanted to raise the cultural profile of West Berlin by drawing attention to the city's alternative art scene, interdisciplinary and international artistic and cultural expressions, and the (re)claiming of uncanny places for artistic purposes. The public relations and promotion bureau was, however, more interested in promoting West Berlin as a tourist destination. These conflicting interests resulted in a promotion strategy that, content-wise, was hardly linked at all to the actual E-88 program the Werkstatt Team aimed to realize.

A remarkable element in the promotion of E-88, for instance, was the explicit reference to Berlin's famous bohemian and avant-garde culture of the 1920s and early 1930s, often captured in the term 'the roaring twenties'. The proliferation of West Berlin as a blossoming cultural centre was marketed as a revival of the city's flourishing period between the two world wars. This link between West Berlin's cultural resurgence and the famous roaring twenties was articulated not only in the official E-88 program: references to this particular historical period were also common in promotion material distributed by other institutions than the Werkstatt Team, such as speeches by politicians. They appear, for instance, in the following quote from Genscher's speech at the opening ceremony of E-88:

Berlin ist wiederum, wenn auch unter ganz anderem Vorzeichen als in den zwanziger Jahren, zum Anziehungspunkt für Kunst und Geist geworden. Diese neue gewonnenen Vitalität und Attraktivität zeichnet Berlin auf besondere Weise als Kulturstadt Europas 1988 aus.²³⁴

Moreover, frequent references were made to renowned artists, writers and actors, such as Bertold Brecht and Marlene Dietrich, who had resided in the city at the time. Through these references, Berlin's present-day cultural scene was linked to its golden years with the purpose of strengthening the credibility of the city's cultural revival.

Within the E-88 program there was, however, a schism between the representation of the theme 'Berlin in the Heart of Europe' and the actual programming of the event. In the actual E-88 program, hardly any attention was paid to the works of avant-garde artists that had lived and worked in the Berlin of the

²³² The Verkehrsamt Berlin (Berlin Tourist Agency) was responsible for domestic and international tourism promotion, while the Presse und Informationsamt (The Press and Information Department of the city of Berlin) took care of the promotion of E-88 within Berlin. Other institutions that were involved include the Auswärtiges Amt/Bundespresseamt (Foreign Affairs and the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government), Goethe Institute, InterNationes (NGO for international cultural exchange), Information Bureau of the European Economic Community in Berlin, and the Directorate General of Information of the EEC in Brussels. Within this network, the public relations and promotion bureau had a coordinating function and was responsible for the general media and promotional strategy.

²³³ Interview with Hertling (Berlin, April 18, 2005).

²³⁴ Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Hans-Dietrich Genscher aus Anlaß der Eröffnung "Berlin—Kulturstadt Europas 1988" am Samstag, den 23. April 1988, in Schloß Charlottenburg, Berlin. Archive code Landesarchiv Berlin: B. Rep. 148, nr. 79.

1920s. The Werkstatt Team instead emphasized contemporary artistic and cultural developments. This points to a discrepancy between the conceptualization and promotion of E-88 on the one hand, and the actual programming of the cultural year on the other, thus drawing attention to the distinction we made between material and immaterial place images in earlier chapters. Through projects such as *Zeitvergleich'88*, the reordering and renaming of places in the actual E-88 program produced material place images. These are the images we construct of a city when we visit, experience, interpret and interact with places in it. Interventions in the physical environment are therefore likely to affect the manner in which we construct place images. The immaterial images belong to the virtual realm of representation and, in the case of E-88, these images were created by and circulated in various media and promotional texts.

Material and immaterial images interact and sometimes compete with each other over the meaning of places. At times, a place image in a press article fits in well with the image one has when visiting or living in a place. At other occasions, place images in the media seem to represent a totally different meaning of a place. The relationship between material and immaterial images is determined by the translations that are made, or not made, between a place and its representation in the media and vice versa. Sometimes bad translations occur, such as, for instance, when the media report negatively about a place because of crime-related events, whereas people living there have a different experience. On other occasions, the relation between material and immaterial images shows little discrepancy. Drawing further on the example above, when people in a place start to perceive that place as unsafe because of crime-filled media reports, a translation is made between immaterial and material place images so that the discrepancy between them decreases. This can also work the other way around: when the security situation in a place improves, the representation of that place in the media might become more positive. This happened, for instance, in New York, where Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's fight against crime gradually transformed the media image of the city from 'vice city' into 'safe city'.

8.4.2 *Domestic Media Polemics about E-88*

The discrepancy between the Werkstatt Team's program for E-88 and the public relation and promotion bureau's presentation of West Berlin and its cultural year, resulted in a domestic media polemic even before the manifestation started. On April 15, 1988, just a few days before the official E-88 opening ceremony, leading German newspapers including the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Berliner Morgenpost* and *Die Welt* reported that thirty organizations and twenty-four people from the cultural and intellectual establishment had protested against the absence of any reference to the Nazi period in the official E-88 program booklet. The critics were unsatisfied with the way the program booklet represented Berlin's history and argued that it was unjust to spend more millions on a cultural manifestation when the city of Berlin had refrained from financing the construction of a Jewish museum. The press continued to report on this issue for months after the first protests. A fragment in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* of June 15, 1988 illustrates this:

Sie [the organizers of E-88] bemängeln vor allem die ihrer Meinung nach ungenügende Berücksichtigung der jüngsten Vergangenheit im offiziellen Veranstaltungskatalog. Berlin sei die Stadt Europas, in der die „größte Barbarei

dieses Jahrhunderts'' ihren Ausgang genommen habe, nämlich die Vernichtung des jüdischen Volkes, die dort „beschlossen, geplant und organisiert'' worden sei.²³⁵

Indeed, the E-88 program booklet and other official press promotional material did ignore the Nazi period. What bothered the critics most in this regard were the many references made to Berlin's roaring twenties to stress Berlin's current cultural revival, while the Nazi era was hardly mentioned at all.

At first sight, it might seem that references to the city's notorious past did not fit with the organizers' aim of boosting Berlin's image abroad. According to Hassemer, Berlin's 750th anniversary, which had been celebrated one year earlier, had been organized as an introspective event in which Berlin's history under Nazism received a lot of attention. In this view, E-88 focused on contemporary cultural developments in Berlin and consequently did not need to pay attention to the Nazi period.²³⁶ On the other hand, Hertling, the director of the Werkstatt Team, argued that the origins of the polemic were located in the relation between the Werkstatt Team and the public relations and promotion bureau. The Werkstatt Team, for one, had never intended to establish a link between the roaring twenties and Berlin's current cultural developments and Hertling stressed that her team was well aware of how Berlin's innovative artistic and cultural development had come to an abrupt standstill when the Nazis seized control. Not only did Jewish artists and intellectuals flee Germany, but the Nazis made it impossible for any critical artist to produce and present their work in the city. Nazism thus destroyed Berlin's bohemian and avant-garde scene (Richie, 1998; Den Boef and Van Faassen, 2002).

As Hertling pointed out, it was precisely due to this black chapter in Berlin's history that the city's cultural life had still not fully recovered in the 1980s, even though Berlin was experiencing an upsurge in cultural creativity and artistic innovation. The city lacked, for instance, a solid international dimension, especially with regard to theatre, dance and performance art.²³⁷ For this reason, the Werkstatt Team thought it unfortunate that the city's current cultural potential was being promoted by the public relations and promotion bureau in relation to the bohemian and avant-garde culture of the 1920s. The whole purpose of the Werkstatt Team was to use E-88 as a platform for reshaping Berlin's cultural sector and opening it up to contemporary, experimental and international developments, not to construct a program that was based on nostalgic imagery.

While there may have been other reasons for the discrepancy that emerged between the E-88 program and its promotion, this case illustrates how critics may perceive immaterial images as false or unjustified when what is represented does not match their construction of reality, in other words, their material images. In the view of its critics, the promotion of E-88 lacked a believable link to its host city by ignoring a critical period in its history. More importantly, this case touches upon the politics of representation that characterizes most CityEvents. Organizers of CityEvents usually aim to present their event and the host city as favorably as possible. Once a host city starts preparing for a prestigious event, a logic emerges that is best described as 'the show must go on'. Criticism, even within the organizational network itself, is often ignored or overruled and sensitive subjects are not dealt with

²³⁵ "Mängel im Kulturstadt Programm". *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 15, 1988. Landesarchiv Berlin, access number: B. Rep 148, nr 20-45.

²³⁶ Interview with Hassemer (Berlin, April 11, 2005) and Weber (Berlin, April 14, 2005).

²³⁷ Of course, visual art exhibitions from abroad were hosted now and then, but according to Hertling and Weber, for the other disciplines international exchange was rather limited.

in a tactful manner, which frequently results in all kinds of scandals. In the case of E-88, the negatively perceived under-representation of the Nazi period was the result of hitches in the cooperation between the Werkstatt Team and the public relations and promotion bureau.

In Hertling's view, the negative domestic press coverage originated in miscommunication and divergent interests. The public relations and promotion bureau was more interested in promoting Berlin as a cultural tourist destination than in informing domestic and foreign audiences about the purpose and concept of E-88. Because, as a result of the aftermath of B-750, the bureau started too late with promotion and public relations and mainly focused on tourist promotion, the Werkstatt Team felt that it was not able to communicate its aims to the public and the press.

The polemic about the Nazi chapter in Berlin's history was only one example of this miscommunication. It was only halfway the cultural year that domestic news coverage changed, after the Werkstatt Team, in cooperation with the Senator of Cultural Affairs, started its own media offensive.²³⁸ Similar reasons seem to have played a role in the gradual change in media coverage of E-88 as in the case of ACH-87: initial unfamiliarity with the formula of the ECOC on the part of the press and time pressure on that of the organizers, with the latter resulting in poor public relations and promotion strategies. Just as the ACH'87 organizers had done, the Werkstatt team started to personally approach journalists, but a firmer approach was followed, which aimed to clear up the misunderstandings that had arisen about the E-88 program. By doing so, the Werkstatt Team actually took over the job of the public relations and promotion bureau. This annexation of tasks demonstrates that even when actors align themselves with the same project, each actor still pursues its own agenda and this might generate conflicts.

²³⁸ Since the public relations and promotion bureau, and most of the other organizations involved, had been preoccupied with generating publicity for B-750 and its aftermath, promotion for E-88 started late. According to Hertling, it was only in the summer of 1988, over two months after the official opening ceremony, that promotional activities really took off. The press was approached in a late stadium and communication between the Werkstatt Team and the public relations and promotion bureau was poor. Unintentionally, the latter agency was working against the Werkstatt Team. The public relations and promotion bureau informed itself too late about the actual E-88 program and the way the event was envisioned. In the summer of the cultural year, a critical point was reached. If domestic press coverage would remain negative, the Werkstatt Team felt that foreign press coverage would also be adversely affected. Therefore, the Werkstatt Team and the Senator of Cultural Affairs thought it time to start a media offensive. In their view, the E-88 program had not been correctly explained to the press and the public, because too many still thought that the event was a continuation of B-750, whereas the aim of the organizers was to present something very different. A press conference was held that enabled the organizers to approach the press critically by refuting false accusations. The organizers went so far as to criticize the work of individual journalists by pointing out that some reviews had been based on prejudices, since some of the journalists had not even attended the events they had criticized in their articles. This aggressive strategy had an impact, because domestic media coverage acquired a more positive tone. Whereas this explanation for the negative domestic press coverage is mostly based on Hertling's personal view, the press cuttings map in the E-88 archive does include more articles with a positive tone from the summer of 1988 onwards. While this provides no conclusive evidence—press cuttings are never complete—Hertling's argument that domestic press coverage changed seems to be externally supported. In addition, we have to consider that ACH-87 saw a similar positive development in reporting by the domestic press.

8.5 STRATEGIC ANNEXATION OF THE PRESS: INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF E-88

Does this mean that the promotion of E-88 was completely unsuccessful? To answer this, we have to return to the distinction we made earlier between local and national media and media spaces on the one hand, and foreign and international media and media spaces on the other. Criticism of the E-88 program brochure and the promotional material as a whole was mostly limited to the domestic press. Apart from a few Dutch newspapers, other foreign papers did not pick up on the issue of Berlin's misrepresentation. Just as with ACH'87, the domestic press was more critical than the foreign press and the same imagery that led to protests in the domestic press did not cause much turmoil abroad. On the contrary, the international promotion of E-88, for example in the U.S.A., was rather successful in terms of the amount of positive press coverage that was generated.²³⁹ The geographical distance, unfamiliarity and the fact that American journalists had less of an emotional attachment to Berlin's history might explain this. Such reasoning is, however, more a justification in hindsight that contributes little to our aim of explaining *how* foreign press coverage was generated. To do this, we have to examine how alignments were established with the American press.²⁴⁰ More specifically, this means that we have to focus on how the official

²³⁹ Apart from promotion specifically targeted at U.S.-based newspapers and magazines, a number of promotional strategies were used to target the foreign media in general. In this regard, we can think of press releases, press meetings, presentations of E-88 at special international occasions such as tourism fairs and conferences, and tours for foreign journalists. These activities were supported by an E-88 information centre, a bulletin, posters, (fantasy) flags and banners, program leaflets and announcements on posters. Most of these promotional activities took place in Berlin and they were not always well-received by foreign journalists. Some foreign journalists complained that most information was only provided in German. See, for instance, 'Bottoms Up!: Art is falling behind in Culture City', *Evening Times (Glasgow)*, October 1, 1988. Another example of the sometimes rather ad hoc promotional activities can be found in an article in the Dutch magazine *De Groene Amsterdammer*. Opheffer, a journalist working for this magazine, evocatively describes how he was suddenly telephoned by the municipality of Berlin and invited to come over for a day. From his description of the trip, it becomes clear that it had no clear purpose. No specific events were visited or mentioned that highlighted one particular theme or that related strictly to E-88. Instead, the municipality organized a general excursion. The journalist in question thought the authorities wanted to stimulate foreign journalists to write something about Berlin, regardless of its connection to E-88. Opheffer. "Eindelijk een prijs!". *De Groene Amsterdammer*, September 9, 1988. As Opheffer's article illustrates, public relations and promotions were often organized on the spot and consequently rather fragmented. This reaffirms that there were hitches in the communication and cooperation between the Werkstatt Team and the bureau.

²⁴⁰ Because the Senator of Cultural Affairs had justified hosting E-88 by emphasizing the event's impact on West Berlin's tourist branch, a big share of the foreign public relations and promotional activities were directed at selling West Berlin as a tourist destination. E-88 was used as a spotlight event to bring the city to the attention of American tourists and travelers. Hence, the aim of reshaping West Berlin's cultural sector was barely presented to foreign media. Moreover, a rather single-minded approach was taken which only targeted the U.S.A. and not other countries, even though annual statistics pointed out that American and Dutch tourists were the largest groups visiting the city. All foreign articles are available at the Landesarchiv Berlin, access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 10-13.

In the E-88 archive the following data were found. The number of American tourists increased by 32,2% in 1987 compared to 1986. This might have been due to B-750. The number of flights to and from Berlin is reported to have increased from 1987 to 1988. For the month of June 1988, data are provided about the number of foreign visitors and their overnight stays. Compared to June 1987, the number of foreign visitors increased by 6,9% to 40,000. The number of overnight stays increased by 7,2% to 114,000. The largest share of foreign visitors came from the U.S.A. (+ 0,2%), U.K. (+4,9%) and the Netherlands (-9,7% compared to June 1987). Source: "Nachrichtenspiegel: Interne Übersicht

promotion activities and materials were translated by the American press into magazine and newspaper articles.

As will become apparent in this section, the translation from promotional content to press coverage was not an incidental process. It was actively directed by the strategic annexation of specific press media. In this regard, we have to pay attention to the role played by the professional New York publicity company Golin/Harris Communications in marketing Berlin as a tourist destination. The agency was hired by the E-88 public relations and promotion bureau to produce stories about E-88. It actively distributed these stories to the press, in particular to travel magazines. The agency also organized press meetings in the U.S.A. and used a publicity model that is characterized by short communication lines between the publicity agency and the specific targeted media, such as travel magazines and local newspapers. This latter strategy allowed the Golin/Harris agency to annex smaller and specialized press media.

What did this strategy consist of exactly? In the *Berlin Publicity Report* by the Golin/Harris Communication Agency it is mentioned that some journalists were commissioned to write about E-88.²⁴¹ Regional or local American papers and travel magazines then adopted the official copy as their own content. In contrast to the organizers of ACH'87, who set up their own media network via the Kunstkanal project, no new networks had to be established for E-88. By hiring the Golin/Harris agency, the organizers were able to 'infiltrate' established media. This allowed them to publish advertisements as journalistic content, giving the information about E-88 and Berlin more credibility than could be achieved with promotional material. In this regard, it is no coincidence that New York and California were targeted, since most Americans traveling to Europe lived in one of these states. In addition, several local Jewish papers seem to have also been addressed. The large American-Jewish population, of which a considerable number have German-Jewish ancestry, formed, and probably still forms, an important target group for the Berlin tourism market.

The ease with which the media accepted publicity stories from Golin/Harris is illustrated by the similarity of many articles that were published on E-88 in different local California newspapers. Frequently, highly similar passages can be found. An example of this is the following regularly quoted one-liner from the director of the (West) Berlin Tourist Office: "No cultural stone will be left unturned (...) Berlin will be bursting with music, art, architecture, fashion, design, drama, comedy, poetry,

Aktuelles aus Presse, Funk, Angenturen und Fernesehen", published by the Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin, 10.12.88., Landesarchiv Berlin., access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 3.

Special promotional activities were nonetheless only undertaken in the U.S.A. In 1988, a West Berlin Tourist Office was established in New York to lure American tourists. In total, a budget of \$ 1 million was reserved for advertising, public relations, promotion and marketing. In addition, a new travel film was commissioned that announced West Berlin's designation as Europe's "Cultural City" for 1988, as well as the 25th anniversary of President Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech" (Kate Rice "West Berlin Eyes Continued Upswing In U.S. Tourism". *Tour & Travel News*, March 28, 1988). The latter topic is an example of how West Berlin was being actively marketed by representing (renaming) the city's division into East and West as a tourist attraction. This strategy worked well and various American travel magazines published a number of articles that presented the wall as a spectacular highlight of Berlin's tourist attractions. See for instance: Thomas Keller. "West Berlin: A Visit to the Cities Divided by The Wall. *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, May 3, 1988; Marcus Tanner. "Within these Walls". *The Independent*, August 6, 1988. Available at he Landesarchiv Berlin, access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 10-13.

²⁴¹ Jay S. Winuk (Golin/Harris Communications, Inc.), *Berlin Publicity Report*. New York, July 20, 1988. Available at he Landesarchiv Berlin, access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 10-13.

literature, film and dance as never before”.²⁴² This quote appears in at least three different magazines. The presence of the same textual elements in these different articles shows that the strategy with respect to local media worked: they willingly published the texts offered. Other evidence is provided by the following text, which was printed in both *The Citizen* (Hickory Hills Edition) and the *California Jewish Press* (both newspapers are California-based) on April 17, 1988.

The selection of Berlin as the 1988 “Cultural City of Europe” follows 1987’s extensive celebration of the 750th anniversary of the city. Artists, musicians, performers, cinematographers, fashion designers, architects, and scientists from throughout Europe will be coming to Berlin to live and work. Throughout the year, there will be art exhibits, concerts, film screenings, theater performances, fashion shows, scientific events, and various other exhibitions for the public to enjoy and virtually all aspects of the world of culture will be discussed. Berlin is the first German city to be chosen as “Cultural City of Europe”, and follows the selection of Athens (1985), Florence (1986) and Amsterdam (1987)

In both papers, exactly the same words are used. Such a strategy would not have worked for the domestic German press, precisely because the distance between the news source and the media was so small. Local American newspapers, however, relied more on press releases, press conferences and ready-made stories by publicity firms.

The above quote is interesting for another reason too. It gives us an insight into the image that was presented of Berlin and E-88. As with this particular citation, many texts distributed by the E-88 public relations and promotion agency and its affiliated organizations were rather descriptive. Often, these texts provided a summary of the most prominent parts of the E-88 program. Yet these texts, including the one quoted above, were simultaneously argumentative in the way they summarize the enormous variety of the E-88 program and relate it to B-750 and the candidature of Berlin as ECOC. This argumentative element points to a development in which promotional copy is increasingly presented as journalistic content. The texts have the characteristics of both a press release and an advertisement, combining a seemingly neutral and descriptive style with a subtle way of praising Berlin as a cultural centre.

Thus, in contrast to the organizers of ACH’87, who created their own publicity network by founding a television channel, the organizers of E-88 permeated the realm of the press and transformed advertisements into journalistic content. When we relate this annexation to the Kunstkanaal project of ACH’87, we can nonetheless identify a tendency on the part of ECOC hosts to construct their own media channels in order to reduce their dependency on press coverage and to maximize exposure. This urges us to examine in the next chapter on the Helsinki ECOC whether we can indeed speak of a trend or whether ACH’87 and E-88 just constitute incidental cases. Moreover, we should also explore the question whether there is a relation between the extent to which the ECOC is used to (re)order places in the host city and the extent to which media are annexed. These questions bring us to the next chapter and final case study, namely the Helsinki ECOC, which was hosted in the millennium year.

²⁴² The quote appears in the following magazine articles: “European culture comes alive during Berlin salute”. *Santa Maria Times*, May 15, 1988; “West Berlin announces ’88 U.S. tourism/marketing plans”. *Darien Monthly*, May 1988; Patricia Larsen Johnson, “Culture City Berlin Plans Arts Barrage”. *Travel Weekly*, May 9, 1988. Since the publication dates of all these articles are quite close to one another, it is highly likely that the journalists based their articles on the same press conference or mailing. Available at the Landesarchiv, access number; B. Rep. 148, nr. 10-13.

8.6 CONCLUSION

The questions raised above also bring us to the conclusion of this chapter. We were able to reconstruct the partial annexation of the press by the organizers of E-88 by approaching this event from the threefold perspective of the City Event model. By analyzing E-88 as the product of the three key actors host city, media and event owner, we were able to focus on how divergent actor interests had to be negotiated to produce E-88, without overlooking the internal complexity of each of the actors. The advantage of the CityEvent model lies in its focus on network dynamics. Precisely because of this focus, the Kunstkanaal project in Amsterdam and the promotion of E-88 in the U.S.A. evoke the question whether we can speak of a trend in the way CityEvents are staged—something that has to be confirmed in the next chapter. This focus on network dynamics remains under-explored in many historical and organizational approaches, which tend to focus on one actor and often ignore the efforts this actor constantly has to undertake to realize its ambitions *and* to maintain itself.

The CityEvent model also made it possible to reconstruct the two different ways in which the generic event formula of this CityEvent was implemented in Amsterdam and Berlin—insofar as we can speak of such a formula in the early history of the ECOC. In comparison to ACH'87, which offered the opportunity to examine a 'failed event', E-88 can be regarded as a relatively successful event, because the actors were more able to consolidate their interests. E-88 was strategically used to contribute to a repositioning of Berlin in a much broader sense than had been achieved in Amsterdam, where the NTI and HF primarily focused on the cultural field. Just like the organizers of ACH'87, the Werkstatt Team approached the ECOC as an opportunity to give an incentive to the cultural sector. But in contrast to ACH'87, Berlin's ECOC was not an investment in culture for the sake of cultural innovation only; the CityEvent was also intended to foster Berlin's image as a cultural metropolis in order to lure tourists, residents, businesses and investors. Thus, in comparison to ACH'87, E-88 was approached in a different manner, namely as a marketing tool to raise Berlin's profile internationally. Apart from economic interests, geopolitical reasons also played an important role. The division of Berlin and Germany by the iron curtain provided an important motive for the West German federal government and the West Berlin authorities to use the ECOC as a means to reconnect the East and the West culturally. Summarized, our analysis of E-88 has shown that there were three main interests in hosting the ECOC, namely innovation of the cultural sector, selling the city and reconnecting East and West.

These three interests also explain the productive alignment of the local and national authorities with E-88. Precisely because the event was approached as an opportunity to reposition Berlin not exclusively in the field of culture but also in a broader economic sense, it was possible to represent the interests of more actors than was the case with ACH'87. Not only cultural institutions had an interest in the event, but also the tourist branch and the local and federal authorities. The key actor 'host city' therefore was a productive actor-network to a much higher degree than in Amsterdam. Yet, the key actor 'host city' was by no means a solid actor-network without internal frictions. The promotion bureau, for instance, acted in a rather autonomous fashion, pursuing its own interests and that of the local authorities and tourism branch over those of the Werkstatt Team. Consequently, a discrepancy emerged between how the Werkstatt Team wanted to program the cultural year and how the event was promoted by the public relations bureau.

We have been able to analyze the differences between ACH'87 and E-88 by following an analytical approach (the CityEvent model) in which we first identified the interests that were at stake and the ways in which actors aligned themselves with the ECOC project. We reconstructed how these interests were translated into three guidelines and examined how these guidelines were eventually specified into selection criteria and translated into concrete program parts. In the cases of ACH'87 and E-88, the network logic was the same. E-88 was, however, more successful because more actor interests could be negotiated and, consequently, there were more actors that aligned themselves with the ECOC project. One remarkable aspect in this regard was the difference we noticed between the position of the Werkstatt Team in relation to the NTI and HF. From the beginning, the hosting of E-88, unlike that of ACH'87, was not an isolated undertaking of a few actors but aligned with a greater project, namely the effort to counter West Berlin's outflow of talented young people and businesses. In contrast to ACH'87, the Werkstatt Team thus aimed to represent interests that lay beyond its initial task of producing E-88. The number of actors that made up the core network of ACH'87 was smaller than was the case for E-88.

In addition, we paid attention to the way the E-88 program partly reordered and renamed places in West Berlin. Whereas ACH'87 used and presented the city as a stage for and object/subject of the ECOC, E-88 formalized this development by temporarily institutionalizing buildings and places as museum sites. Through a rearrangement of actor relations in a place, the use and meaning of a place is (temporarily) altered. The *Zeitvergleich'88* project in the E-88 program was an illustrative example of how a relatively small spatial intervention can change the use and meaning of place. We also noticed that the renaming of place not only happened in the places that were rearranged, but also in other media spaces. The heterogeneity of these spaces became clear in the different (re)presentation of E-88 in the local and national German press on the one hand, and the foreign, in particular American press on the other. In the next chapter, we will address this heterogeneity of media spaces in relation to the complex alignments between the key actors 'media' and 'host city'. In this manner, we will be able to give some answers—though never complete or absolute—to the question of how cities sell themselves by means of CityEvents in our media age.

9. HEL.2000.FI: HELSINKI, ONE OF THE NINE EUROPEAN CITIES OF CULTURE 2000²⁴³

Pocketsized Metropolis

Helsinki is a city on a **human scale**, which **functions well** and offers a **safe environment** in which to live. It provides a concentration of skills and expertise in the northeast sector of the EU and is actively engaged in developing contacts between the EU and Russia. In creating the international image of the city, the emphasis will be on its special qualities and strengths, which include **expertise, creativity, nature and culture** (Linkola and Salovaara, 1999: 8).

9.1 INTRODUCTION

The quote above vividly summarizes how Helsinki's decision makers aim(ed) to position their city internationally. The text is a fragment from the report *Helsinki Today: Policy Priorities for an International City*, which was commissioned by the Helsinki City Office in the late 1990s. From the report speaks a concern about Helsinki's international image. Its publication, just one year before Helsinki European City of Culture 2000 began, is not a coincidence. In the report, a strategy is unfolded with regard to strengthening Helsinki's position among international urban hierarchies. In this regard, the ECOC is explicitly mentioned as a place-selling opportunity "to maintain and develop the intercity contacts within the European City of Culture 2000 network and the themes of the City of Culture year related specifically to Helsinki: 'science, technology, the future'" (1999: 12). The official abbreviation, which was also the URL of Helsinki European City of Culture 2000, *hel.2000.fi*, reveals that the promotion of Helsinki and the cultural year indeed drew on high-tech images, in particular new media and telecommunication technology such as the Internet and mobile phones (Nokia). This focus on science and technology not only hints at a different interpretation or appropriation of the ECOC compared to our previous inquiries into ACH'87 and E-88, but also suggests that the hosting of *hel.2000.fi* was more integrated with broader place-selling strategies. The hosting of *hel.2000.fi* therefore raises questions as to how science and technology were mobilized to raise Helsinki's profile.

The strong focus on place selling, moreover, draws attention to the question of how the key actor 'host city' was established: which actors were involved in

²⁴³ The European Council of Ministers (of Culture) made an exception by nominating nine cities as ECOC for the millennium year: Avignon, Bergen, Bologna, Brussels, Helsinki, Krakow, Prague, Reykjavik and Santiago de Compostela. Therefore, the title European Capital of Culture was temporarily changed to European City of Culture.

Source:

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/other_actions/cap_europ/pdf_word/cap2000_en.pdf, last visited March 30, 2006.

establishing this key actor and which interests played a role in this process? Drawing on the CityEvent model, we have seen in the previous chapters how much effort had to be exerted to establish the key actor 'host city' in such a way that it would be capable of effectively organizing the production of the ECOC. For this, the establishment of the key actor 'host city' did not suffice. To produce the ECOC, alignments also had to be made with the event owner and the media. So far, we have noticed that the EEC as event owner hardly played a role in the ECOC triangular network core because the ECOC formula had not yet been institutionalized and the designation of host cities resulted from political compromises instead of bidding processes. Consequently, in the triangular network, the nation state occupied a double position, acting in the networks that constituted the event owner *and* the host city.

Fifteen years later, Helsinki hosted the ECOC together with eight other cities. Again, the designation was the result of a political compromise. However, in contrast to ACH'87 and E-88, this time the nine host cities for the millennium edition of the ECOC *had* engaged themselves in a bidding process. But the EU Council of Ministers had not been able to select one of them and therefore nominated all nine candidates as ECOC for the special occasion of the millennium year. The bidding for the millennium edition of the ECOC suggests that Helsinki approached this CityEvent in a different way than Amsterdam and Berlin did. This urges us to explore to what extent the role of the EU as event owner had evolved since ACH'87 and E-88. Moreover, this remarkable multiple designation raises the question of how Helsinki tried to raise its profile internationally by means of the ECOC and how all nine host cities related to each other. Did they operate collectively, in isolation or even in competition with each other? Finally, the designation of nine host cities also evokes questions about the relationship between Helsinki, the nation state and the event owner. To what extent was the Finnish state able to occupy the same double position as the Dutch and West German governments had in the cases of ACH'87 and E-88?

In our analysis of ACH'87 and E-88 we were able to identify a development in the approach to arts and culture from 'culture for culture's sake' in Amsterdam to a wider approach in Berlin that also aimed at repositioning the city. This development urges us to look at the way arts and culture were mobilized in programming hel.2000.fi and in selling Helsinki. From our inquiry into E-88, moreover, we learned that the cultural year was used to open up new spaces for cultural production and consumption. This raises the question whether hel.2000.fi also produced temporary and/or more permanent transformations of places in Helsinki.

In addition, we have to address the issue of media coverage and annexation. In 1987 and 1988, the domestic press reported negatively about the ECOC due to the novelty of the event formula. At the same time, the organizers of ACH'87 and E-88 developed strategies to create their own media networks by setting up the Kunstkanaal and by hiring a publicity agency that promoted the cultural year by turning advertisements into journalistic content. Because they could partly 'program' the media themselves, the ACH'87 and E-88 organizers became less dependent on media coverage. We now have to examine whether the hel.2000.fi organizers also developed their own media network or other publicity strategies. However, before we can address this issue, we have to reconstruct which interests played a role in staging the Helsinki ECOC. As became clear in previous chapters, presentations and representations of the host city and the CityEvent are the result of the negotiation and translation of diverse interests. Thus, to reconstruct the imagery through which Helsinki tried to raise its profile, we have to start by asking which actors were interested in hosting this CityEvent and for which reasons.

9.2 GENERATING AND CONSOLIDATING INTERESTS

9.2.1 *Helsinki's Geopolitical and Economic Position before the Nokia Miracle*

While different from the 1952 Olympics, the Helsinki ECOC confronts us again with a geopolitical situation in which Finland and Helsinki sought to (re)establish contacts with the West. In the early 1990s, Finland found itself in an awkward position because its mighty neighbor, the Soviet Union, had collapsed. Since the end of World War II, this country had heavily influenced Finnish domestic and foreign politics and economy.²⁴⁴ Due to Soviet pressure, Finland had refrained from membership of the EU, NATO and other Western political alliances. Thus, in the early 1990s, Finland found itself in a transitional phase. It was not yet an EU member, but its once mighty neighbor was fully absorbed in domestic affairs, neglecting its relations with Finland. This situation offered the Finnish nation opportunities to reorient its political course. As Rita Ekelund, foreign press officer of the hel.2000.fi organization, put it: “for the first time in Finnish history we could make our own decisions independently”.²⁴⁵ According to Ekelund and others,²⁴⁶ this political reorientation soon evolved into a process in which the Finnish political elite started to look toward Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union had opened up political space for Finland to intensify relations with Western Europe, and the EU in particular. Soon, the question arose why Finland should not apply for EU membership.

In this context, the idea of hosting an ECOC emerged. “People in both the ministries and within the city [city council and city board] had heard of the system with the ECOC. In both the ministries and the city of Helsinki the idea began to emerge, could Helsinki perhaps apply?”²⁴⁷ Even though hel.2000.fi was hosted five years after Finland joined the EU, the bidding for the event took place before the country acquired EU membership. The bidding process should therefore be seen in the light of Finnish desires and attempts to align the country with the West. As will become apparent in this chapter, the ECOC was used as a vehicle to present the rapidly developing Finnish nation and its capital to other EU member states.

Yet, more urgent and pragmatic reasons also played a crucial role in bidding for the ECOC. The political turmoil in the Baltic region heavily affected Finland's and Helsinki's economies. The Soviet Union was the country's largest export market and after the collapse of its regime Finnish companies faced severe difficulties. A worldwide economic stagnation further aggravated this economic crisis and Finland slid into a deep economic recession. The recession had an enormous impact on the daily lives of Finnish citizens. Unemployment rates had never been so high, jumping from 3% to 20%, and there was a simultaneously growing tax burden (Key, 1993). For a short time, Finland became the world's most expensive country. Thus, it is easy to understand that Finnish politicians were almost desperately searching for new

²⁴⁴ Interview with Georg Dolivo, director of the foundation that organized hel.2000.fi (Helsinki, March 28, 2001).

²⁴⁵ Interview with Ekelund (Helsinki, March 27, 2001).

²⁴⁶ Interviews with Ekelund (Helsinki, March 27, 2001); Dolivo, (Helsinki, March 28, 2001); and Sirkka Lekman, stirring board member of the foundation and city council member for the conservative party (Helsinki, March 29, 2001).

²⁴⁷ Interview with Ekelund, Helsinki, (March 27, 2001).

initiatives to put an end to the recession. The country's economic problems overlapped with its (geo)political desire to join the EU. After all, EU membership would make it easier for Finland to enter new markets and develop its economy.

In the search for new and innovative growth markets, culture seemed to be one of the fields with great potential. In the case of Helsinki, such an entrepreneurial approach to culture can be defined in three different ways, namely as cultural tourism, as a way to promote Finnish know-how, and in terms of the production and export of cultural commodities such as design and handicrafts (Landry and Kelly, 1994). In the early 1990s, tourism was the fastest growing sector worldwide, measured in terms of the number of jobs generated (Kotler et al., 1993).²⁴⁸ Therefore, the Helsinki authorities had a clear interest in directing their attention to the cultural sector. The growth rates in the tourist sector elsewhere provided Helsinki's decision makers with a strong argument for investing in culture in order to give an impulse to the city's economy, and in particular its tourist sector. In this context, the ECOC became an event of great economic and political interest. Hosting the ECOC was seen as a way to boost tourism and provide an incentive to developing economic activity in the cultural sector. In addition, hosting this CityEvent would express the Finnish desire to become part of the EU. The importance that was attached to the ECOC can perhaps be understood even better when we acknowledge that the Finnish Nokia and 'dot.com' miracle could not have been foreseen at this time. According to Ekelund:

In the beginning, the recession was really bad and everybody knew that the only real expansion fields in the economy were tourism and related leisure time activities, such as culture and sports. These sectors really grew. Nobody could have predicted the successes of the IT sector with Nokia and so on.²⁴⁹

Thus, since culture formed one of the few fields that was expected to contribute to a renewal of Helsinki's economic structure, which would create new jobs and a new image of the city in Europe, the ECOC was expected to be a catalyst for this process.

9.2.2 Image Building and the Culture Economy: Constructing Shared Interests and Problems

So far, we have come to understand *why* staging the ECOC in Helsinki was interesting for many different actors, including the tourist branch and the local and national authorities. Interests alone do not, however, automatically lead to network activity. Actors not only have to share interests, they also have to be brought together. Some actor or network has to make a start by aligning other actors with a project like the ECOC. Furthermore, shared interests should not always be understood in terms of gains. A shared interest can also be an interest in solving a common problem. In the case of Helsinki, this common 'problem-interest' was the city's lack of a strong international image. With traditional economic sectors experiencing great difficulties, new markets and fields of economic activity had to be opened up. Helsinki's remote position in Europe, in combination with its low profile, was experienced as an obstacle to establishing new economic relations and attracting investments and

²⁴⁸ Since 9/11 the tourism branch has experienced some difficult times. The bankruptcy of various travel agencies and national airlines (such as Belgium's Sabena and Switzerland's Swissair), the introduction of cheap passenger flights, and the decline of traditional mass tourism destinations in the Mediterranean indicate that the pace of growth in the tourism sector does not remain constant..

²⁴⁹ Interview with Ekelund (Helsinki, March 27, 2001).

businesses (Cantell, 1999; Landry and Kelly, 1994).²⁵⁰ Hosting the ECOC was presented as a strategy to raise Helsinki's profile abroad.

This interest in the ECOC is vividly illustrated by the stance that Finnair, which would become the main sponsor of hel.2000.fi, adopted with regard to investing in culture. The company expected investments in culture to result in an increase in flight sales. To put it in the words of Rolf Pircklén, Finnair's sales director for the South of Finland, "because we see that people are more interested in culture when you compare it to sports for example".²⁵¹ In addition, Finnair not only identified tourists as its target group, but also businesspeople: "So that on his business trip, he can take his family with him. So that the other part of [*sic*] his family can visit certain cultural events".²⁵² Clearly, Finnair's view on culture is characterized by an entrepreneurial and gendered²⁵³ approach, which was expected to give a positive impulse to Helsinki's business life. Finnair developed an interest in the ECOC because this event could raise the profile of Helsinki's culture abroad and would indirectly contribute to an increase in flights.

Yet, the city's weak international image was by no means an 'objective' problem, just as staging the ECOC was not the 'natural' solution. The city's weak international image was considered a problem because it was actively presented and constructed as such.²⁵⁴ The initiators of hel.2000.fi not only convinced other actors of the political and economic interests in hosting the ECOC, but they also contributed to the construction of Helsinki's 'image problem' in order to create a shared interest in the event as a partial solution. To understand how the initiators of hel.2000.fi managed to present this CityEvent as an important, almost crucial strategy for raising Helsinki's profile internationally, we first have to identify the initiators and reconstruct how they managed to establish the 'fact' that Helsinki had a weak international image.

In this respect, there seems to be consensus amongst the interviewees that collaborated with this study that Antti Viinikka, Helsinki's Deputy Mayor responsible for cultural and personnel affairs, was the first to propose bidding for the 2000 ECOC in the early 1990s. The millennium year was considered appropriate because it was also the year of Helsinki's 450th anniversary. In contrast to ACH'87 and E-88, the idea of hosting the ECOC was thus not initiated by the state. Because hosting the ECOC was a locally-rooted idea, a much larger coalition of local actors had to be formed to establish the key actor 'host city'. After all, as we saw in the case of

²⁵⁰ Interview with Lekman (Helsinki, March 29, 2001).

²⁵¹ Interview with Pircklén (Helsinki, March 30, 2001).

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Finnair's focus on culture is motivated by an entrepreneurial approach. From an economic perspective, this is consistent. From another point of view, however, Finnair's approach to culture is rather problematic. The company's entrepreneurial approach is not only elitist in assuming that sports are not part of culture, but has another exclusive implication that shows in the gender bias of Pircklén's definition of culture as a leisure activity for the wives of businessmen, as if doing business is exclusively a man's thing and culture a less important, hobby-like activity for women.

²⁵⁴ This idea draws heavily on Latour's work, in particular on arguments from his book *Science in Action*. In this book, he argues that scientific facts are never discoveries of natural phenomenon, but always the result of a complex networking of actors *and* various acts of translation that reduce the complex world in which we live to numbers, graphics and models. Consequently, a scientific fact always has to be maintained: if the actors that constitute it drift off, the 'fact' falls apart. This does not mean that there is no such thing as valid knowledge, because as long as the actors maintain a scientific fact, it functions as a truth or reality. What a scientific fact is, therefore, depends on which actors are aligned with the network and which interests play a role in it. This logic also applies to Helsinki's seemingly pervasive image problem.

ACH'87, not even the state with its powerful network of ministries and financial resources could initiate the ECOC without informing the city first. In the case of hel.2000.fi, Viinikka, despite his high political position in the Helsinki City Administration, could not draw on as vast a network of actors as the state. If his idea were to become reality, he and the few people that supported him from the beginning had to align the rest of the Helsinki City Administration and Council, as well as other local actors, such as the city's cultural institutions, with the project before involving the nation state.

How was this achieved? One important strategy was the commissioning of a study by Viinikka and his department to assess Helsinki's cultural potential. This study served a twofold strategic purpose. On the one hand, 'facts' about Helsinki's cultural sector and its economic potential could be established. On the other hand, alignments could be established between various actors asked to cooperate in the study, ranging from the city's cultural institutions to the tourist branch.²⁵⁵ The study was conducted by the British consulting agency Comedia and resulted in a report entitled *Helsinki: A Living Work of Art*.²⁵⁶ Together with reports from other cities and countries, the Comedia report "provided further evidence that the culture sector not only means costs but it can actually have some economic benefits as well" (Cantell, 1999: 249). The report provided Viinikka personally, but also his department and other decision makers and institutions in Helsinki that sympathized with the idea of hosting an ECOC, with 'hard facts' to legitimize the initiative.

One of the most important 'facts' that the Comedia report articulated was Helsinki's weak international image. Comedia concluded that the Finnish capital did not suffer from common urban problems such as increasing crime rates, bankrupt public institutions, pollution, and rundown areas to the same degree as many other cities. Nonetheless, the report's authors argued that despite the high general quality of living that the city offered, it did not have exceptional attractions. Helsinki, therefore, did not bring to mind negative associations, but hardly any associations at all.²⁵⁷ Consequently, the city's cultural qualities remained largely unnoticed by international target groups such as tourists, businesses and investors. In addition, for most foreigners it was difficult to experience Finnish culture, because of the language barrier. Consequently, possibilities for exporting and promoting Finnish culture were also limited. All this formed an obstacle to economic growth in Helsinki's cultural sector.²⁵⁸ Thus, while stressing the city's high level of services, infrastructure and

²⁵⁵ "A starting point for the Helsinki application process can be dated at the decision to commission a study from abroad to assess the city's cultural life. This was a proposal initiated by Deputy Mayor Antti Viinikka" (Cantell, 1999: 222).

²⁵⁶ It was written by *Comedia*, a British consultancy company founded and directed by Charles Landry, a well-known figure in the field of arts and culture consulting. Comedia was given the task of examining the strengths and weaknesses of Helsinki's cultural life. Full reference: Landry, C. and O. Kelly, (1994). *Helsinki- A Living Work of Art: Towards a Cultural Strategy for Helsinki*. Gloucestershire: Comedia.

²⁵⁷ This is vividly illustrated by *Helsinki the Forgotten City*, a magazine article about Helsinki's ECOC. Full reference: Cameron, D. (2000). "Helsinki the Forgotten City". *The Southern Cross Magazine*, June 21.

²⁵⁸ Because Comedia conducted the assessment in 1994, we have to consider the changes that Helsinki has undergone since. Finland and its capital changed rapidly in the last decennium of the twentieth century (Castells and Himanen, 2002). These changes resulted in cultural innovation and in an increase in Finnish cultural products available in English. The Finnish music industry forms the most illustrative example in this regard with the successful launching of artists and bands such as Bomfunk MC's, Dardude, The Rasmus and Him. Compared to many other countries, Finnish culture is more strongly developed and less driven by 'Hollywood' commercialism (Landry and Kelly, 1994; Landry, 1998).

quality of life, the Comedia report pointed out that the image of Helsinki abroad did not correspond with the city's (cultural) potential.

In this light, hosting the ECOC was presented by Viinikka and others as a strategy to bring Helsinki's qualities, and in particular its cultural potential, under the attention of international target groups. This strategy not only provided an answer to the image problem of Helsinki, but was also a proposal that appealed to the Finnish state. At the same time that Helsinki was searching for ways to raise its profile, the Finnish state was struggling with similar questions on the national level.²⁵⁹ If Finland brought any strong associations to mind at the time, it was usually mistaken for a former satellite state of the Soviet Union. Due to Finland's specific geopolitical situation, an image had emerged that perhaps is best described by means of the following anecdote: before Finnish number plates were engraved with FIN, they said SF, meaning Suomi Finland. This abbreviation was sometimes jokingly interpreted as Soviet Finland. In the words of Sirrka Lekman, a local politician and vice-chairman of the governing board of the foundation that organized hel.2000.fi, "We knew that some people in continental Europe thought that Finland was like Poland or one of these countries".²⁶⁰

Thus, notwithstanding the attempts of the organizers of the 1952 Olympics, the Finns were still fighting against misconceptions about their country almost half a century later. In the early 1990s, however, economic interests prevailed over the desire to demonstrate the autonomy of the Finnish state, a desire that had dominated during the 1952 Games. Even though an analogy with the 1952 Olympics is not completely appropriate due to historical differences, the case of hel.2000.fi again confronts us with a Helsinki that wanted to open up and connect itself to the West. Both the private and the public sector shared a common interest in joining the EU in order to develop new growth markets and job-generating initiatives. In this respect, political leaders such as Lekman expected that the confusion of Finland with Eastern European states would have disadvantageous effects for the country's and Helsinki's economy. It was feared that foreign businesses and investors would not recognize the high standard of Finnish industry, trade and public services, and would consequently refrain from doing business there.

This fear was translated by Comedia into a solution that also represented the interests of other actors: staging the ECOC would present an investment in Helsinki's cultural sector and a means of raising the city's profile internationally, which was in

From an outsider's perspective, Finnish culture has a certain authenticity. Nonetheless, the emergence of a large Finnish hip-hop scene shows that cultural influences from other parts of the world, especially America and Western Europe, have affected the country. Although this signals that the notion of authenticity should be interpreted in a rather broad sense, the way in which the Finnish language operates within such cultural processes produces an aura of authenticity, despite the artificiality of the term itself. I use the term 'aura of authenticity' on purpose to point to the perception of an authentic culture from an outsider's perspective. Such a view is usually no more than a superficial impression, as when one explains a city's or nation's culture and history by means of holiday brochure. Nonetheless, the tourist sector forms the uncontested proof that an aura or idea of authenticity about a holiday destination forms an important asset when selling a place. The Comedia report certainly considered this aura of authenticity an advantage in distinguishing Helsinki from its competitors, Copenhagen and Stockholm, which were the leading cultural cities in Scandinavia. In the end, authenticity opens up possibilities for attracting the foreign attention of those target groups that want to experience 'something different' (Baloglu, et al., 1999; Dredge, 1999; Urry, 1999).

²⁵⁹ Finland's national image problem, like Helsinki's weak international image, can be approached as a constructed interest-problem. It would, however, go beyond the scope of this study to engage ourselves in a thorough analysis of this topic.

²⁶⁰ Interview with Lekman (Helsinki, March 29, 2001).

turn expected to benefit the city's economy. This solution appealed to companies like Finnair, which saw Helsinki's stronger cultural profile as a condition for increasing flight sales. In addition, leading cultural institutions also saw their interests represented in the proposal, which argued that the ECOC would promote Finnish culture on an international level. Even before Comedia presented its final report, it had already achieved one of Viinikka's goals, namely to persuade as many actors as possible that Helsinki should host the ECOC.²⁶¹

When we compare this situation with the way in which Amsterdam and Berlin obtained the ECOC, we can conclude that the key actor 'host city' was already largely established *before* Helsinki was officially designated. In other words, the bidding for the ECOC was supported by a large network of local actors before the city's candidature was actively pursued. In the case of ACH'87, there was no local network at all, since the Ministry of Culture proposed Amsterdam as ECOC host without the support of other actors. Only after Amsterdam had been designated was an ad hoc network created to ensure that the ECOC could actually be organized. In comparison to ACH'87, but also to E-88, in the case of Helsinki the key actor 'host city' was characterized by a greater network complexity and the involvement of more actors. Moreover, to align actors with the ECOC project, the hosting of hel.2000.fi became part of a much broader strategy to reposition the city than had been at play for ACH'87 and E-88. These two characteristics of the amalgamation of networks that formed the key actor 'host city' in Helsinki, created better conditions for successfully implementing the ECOC generic event formula than existed for ACH'87 and E-88.

In this respect, success can be interpreted in terms of, first, the complexity and size of amalgamations of networks and, second, their heterogeneity. When we compare the host cities of the previous two ECOCs with Helsinki, the latter clearly distinguishes itself on these two grounds. The amalgamation of networks that constituted the key actor 'host city' in Helsinki was characterized by a greater mass and heterogeneity than those of ACH'87 and E-88. In addition, this heterogeneous network was more firmly based on shared interests, so that the willingness of actors to work together was greater.

9.3 THE FORMATION OF THE HOST CITY NETWORK

9.3.1 *The City of Culture Foundation*

The wide interest in Helsinki hosting the ECOC also shows in the organizational network that was established shortly after the publication of the Comedia report. In

²⁶¹ After the publication of the Comedia report, actors kept themselves aligned with it, thereby affirming its 'factual' status. In this regard, it is crucial to acknowledge that if the actors would not have had an interest in the report, they would have withdrawn their support and it would probably have ended up somewhere at the bottom of a desk drawer in the city hall. This happens quite often with similar reports and studies when they lack the support of actors who are able to translate their content into action. In the case of hel.2000.fi, the Comedia report did have support and therefore acquired the status of '(scientific) fact'. "This knowledge [published in the report] proved important for legitimization purposes, especially for those with reservations about 'investing' in the culture sector" (Cantell, 1999: 249). In other words, by presenting 'objective data', the Comedia report made a reorientation of the city's economic and cultural policies a legitimate choice. As had been the aim from the beginning, the report included various recommendations for new urban development strategies and advocated the implementation of a cultural planning model. According to this approach, culture was to become a leading component in all policy areas governed by the Helsinki authorities.

1994, when Landry and Kelly were still working on the report, the Board of Directors of the City of Helsinki set up a Cultural Capital 2000 working group. This body was given the task of promoting and preparing the bid. In the autumn of 1995, Helsinki was selected as ECOC together with eight other European cities.²⁶² As already mentioned in the introduction, the European Council of Ministers quite exceptionally decided to nominate nine ECOCs for the special occasion of the millennium year. Apart from the initial disappointment that the decision caused in the nine cities, this rather unusual designation also illustrates the consequences of the fact that the ECOC is a generic event formula owned by a political institution, for the decision could be criticized as a political compromise caused by a lack of courage on the side of the council's members to select a single host. On the other hand, the decision also demonstrates that during particular phases, such as the bidding phase, the event owner functions as an obligatory point of passage in the amalgamation of networks that produce a CityEvent. As an obligatory point of passage, the event owner can change the rules. In this case, the EU decided to break with the event tradition of one ECOC per year.²⁶³

This exceptional designation draws attention to the relations of interdependency that exist between the key actors. Even though the generic event formula speaks of one ECOC per year, the event owner has the power to make changes. Host cities, as well as the media, are dependent on the event owner's cooperation. In comparison to the Olympic Games, the ECOC formula allows for much more flexibility and its event owner has an interest in increasing the number of host cities per edition, whereas the IOC has not. For the IOC, it is the number and quality of the sports matches and athletes that largely determine the success of the Olympics. For the EU, the number and quality of the host cities increase the reputation of its generic event formula, because cultural cities are the main ingredients

²⁶² At first, disappointment prevailed over Helsinki's designation together with eight other cities. Some politicians and opinion makers even suggested withdrawing Helsinki's candidature. Eventually, however, the city council and city administration approved the designation. In retrospect, the designation of nine ECOCs might even have enlarged the success of the ECOC, because the millennium year dramatically increased both media exposure and audience attention. Sources: Palmer et al., (2004); interviews with Lekman (Helsinki, March 29, 2001) and Ekelund (Helsinki, March 27, 2001).

²⁶³ The EU decides which country is going to host an ECOC in a particular year. Each state then decides which city within its territory will be the official candidate. Even though the decision is subject to the approval of the European Commission and European Parliament, they usually vote in favor of the proposed city. The bidding process thus mainly takes place between cities in the same country. In this respect, the nation state still occupies a twofold role: it selects a candidate that will be presented to the EU and it usually also grants subsidies to the host city for staging the ECOC. In contrast to the first editions of the event, including ACH'87 and E-88, which resulted from political negotiations between EU member states, a bidding process does now take place on the national level. Sources: Decision 1419/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999, establishing a Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2005 to 2019. http://europa.eu.int/eur-ex/pri/en/oj/dat/1999/l_166/l_16619990701en00010005.pdf, last visited, April 6, 2006. In addition, a report has recently been published proposing a specification of the selection criteria for the ECOC. This report can be downloaded from the European Commission's website of the Directorate General of Culture and Education: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eac/other_actions/cap_europ/pdf_word/report_cap2010.pdf, last visited August 14, 2006. It is entitled *Report on the Selection Meeting for the European Capitals of Culture 2010* and was issued by The Selection Panel for the European Capital of Culture (ECOC) 2010, April 2006. Additional source: "EU Capitals of Culture should focus On EU dimension", EU Parliament Press Service, REF.: 20051005STO01040, http://www.europarl.eu.int/news/public/story_page/037-1041-276-10-40-906-20051005STO01040-2005-03-10-2005/default_en.htm, last visited April 20, 2006.

on which the prestige of the ECOC formula is based. Yet, the EU can only make limited alterations to the ECOC formula. If the Council of Ministers would designate nine cities every year, the ECOC's reputation would likely be subject to inflation. The event would lose the exclusivity that makes cities compete to host it. In addition, the nomination process for the year 2000 shows that the actor 'event owner' is a network in itself. It is not a unity, but rather an amalgamation of actors with different interests. The designation of nine cities makes clear that this network does not always 'behave' in a predictable manner. Compromises have to be made to keep all the actors aligned. The designation of nine ECOCs is a typical result of this network logic.

Directly after Helsinki's designation, several conferences and meetings were organized with experts from various fields, such as the cultural sector, NGOs, companies, media and higher education institutions, in order to create further support for the ECOC project and facilitate the preparation process.²⁶⁴ In 1996, this process materialized in the City of Culture Foundation (in the following, I will abbreviate this as the foundation), which was the official organizing agency of the cultural year. We have already seen that how the organizing body of a CityEvent is set up has consequences for the way the event is staged. An organizing body that is, for instance, based on public-private cooperation often functions differently than a municipality department.

From our previous two ECOC case studies, we have seen that the organizing bodies are different for every ECOC edition. Unlike the Olympic Games, where the NOC always forms an organizing body that works in close cooperation with the IOC and local and national authorities, the ECOC does not have a stable organizational format. In fact, the EU barely plays a role anymore as soon as a city has been designated as host and it does not prescribe to host cities a particular institutional format for organizing the event. In comparison to this, the IOC has many more means at its disposal to put host cities under pressure to implement the Olympic formula according to its wishes.

The foundation that was established for Helsinki's ECOC followed a different model from ACH'87 and E-88. The organization was not carried out by existing cultural institutions or a small task force like the Werkstatt Team, which worked independently in close cooperation with the city administration's department of culture. To understand how the foundation functioned as organizing body or 'central actor' in the triangular network core that produces the ECOC CityEvent, we first have to draw attention to the relationships that were established between Helsinki, the Finnish state and the EU. In the overall production process of *hel.2000.fi*, the EU played a decisive role only in the pre-bidding and bidding phases. As became clear from our analysis of ACH'87 and E-88, the EU only defined a few very general criteria for hosting the ECOC. This left and still leaves host cities with ample room to decide how exactly they want to stage an ECOC. There is little danger in departing from the event formula because the designation of the ECOC is always a decision made by a political institution. Revoking a designation could lead to political tensions between EU member states and is therefore not likely.

The establishment of the organizing body for Helsinki's ECOC also confronts us with a different constellation of alignments than was the case with ACH'87 and E-

²⁶⁴ These facts are derived from the official report by the City of Culture Foundation, which was published late April-early May 2001. At the time of this research, the report was available on the official website *hel.2000.fi*. I printed the report from the website in May 2001. Unfortunately, the official website no longer exists. The archives of the City of Culture Foundation were transferred to the City of Helsinki archives when the foundation was officially dissolved.

88. It was not the nation state that initiated the idea of Helsinki hosting the ECOC, but the local authorities. In addition, Helsinki had to engage itself in a bidding process to obtain the honor of hosting the ECOC. The city actively had to convince the EU, or at least all the actors within the 'EU network' that play a decisive role in the designation of ECOCs, that Helsinki was capable of hosting this prestigious CityEvent. To do so, a local coalition of actors had to be established long before it was decided whether Helsinki would be designated or not. In this process, the city had to align the nation state with its project rather than the other way around, as had been the case with ACH'87 and E-88.

From this reconstruction of the relations that were established between Helsinki, the Finnish state and the EU, it becomes clear that the foundation occupied a central role in the network that produced hel.2000.fi. This also shows in the institutional structure of the foundation. Representatives from the city of Helsinki, surrounding municipalities, the business community, the University of Helsinki and several ministries together formed the steering board of the foundation.²⁶⁵ Precisely because all these different institutions were represented on the foundation's board, the interests of a wide range of actors could be adjusted to each other, creating a broad coalition. In this regard, the relatively large share of private funding for hel.2000.fi, in combination with the heterogeneity of the actors that aligned themselves with the project, shows that there was a strong and wide commitment to the event from both public and private actors (Palmer et al., 2004).²⁶⁶ The steering board had a controlling function; it oversaw the daily activities of the foundation's organizing agency, which was the actual production bureau of hel.2000.fi led by Georg Dolivo, a famous television and theatre personality and director of the Swedish theatre in Helsinki. The city administration had chosen Dolivo because, in addition to his managerial qualities and knowledge, he would be an easily recognizable ambassador of hel.2000.fi within Finland.

The foundation was given full organizational and financial autonomy by the Helsinki City Council, Board, and national institutions. In general, the foundation was able to follow its own course, even though politicians were represented on the steering board and some of its operational personnel consisted of civil servants who had been temporarily detached by the city administration.²⁶⁷ Whereas an independent task force also organized E-88, the organization of that ECOC was externally represented by the head of the organizing body and the minister of culture for Berlin. In the case of hel.2000.fi, Dolivo was the spokesperson of the foundation, which thus operated outside the political institutions. The specific institutional framework of the core organizational network in Helsinki therefore differs from our earlier case studies as a result of the wide support that was generated for the ECOC both inside and outside political institutions. In this respect, it could be argued that the foundation was more entangled with local networks than was the case for the NTI and HF, and the

²⁶⁵ The representatives on the foundation's steering board came from the City of Helsinki, the City of Espoo, the City of Vantaa (this city joined a year later in autumn 1997), the Helsinki Chamber of Commerce, the Ministries of Education, Finance, Trade and Industry, and the University of Helsinki. In total, the steering board counted fifteen seats of which eight were reserved for representatives of the Helsinki City Council, two for the Chamber of Commerce and one each for the cities of Vantaa and Espo, the ministries and the university. Source: the official evaluation report as published on www.hel.fi, last visited, May 16, 2001.

²⁶⁶ In total, 20.15% of the overall operating budget for hel.2000.fi came from private sources (Palmer et al., 2004).

²⁶⁷ Interviews with Dolivo (Helsinki, March 28, 2001), Ekelund (Helsinki, March 27, 2001) and Lekman (Helsinki, March 29, 2001).

Werkstatt Team. Furthermore, its autonomy was enhanced by the fact that it had quite a large budget.²⁶⁸

Apart from the institutional setting of the foundation, support was also generated at another level. Even before the foundation was established, namely in the bidding phase, Helsinki's inhabitants were invited to propose ideas for the program of the cultural year. Moreover, in the organizational phase itself, the foundation adopted a relatively passive role in initiating cultural projects, leaving as much freedom as possible for the citizens of Helsinki to propose ideas. Thus, from the beginning, a reactive policy was followed to allow maximum space for grass-root initiatives. In total, the foundation accepted approximately one-fifth out of the 2,100 concrete project proposals submitted by Helsinki citizens, artist collectives and cultural institutions²⁶⁹ (Sucksdorff et al., 1999/2000). The foundation itself did initiate small projects, but in general it limited itself to defining a concept of culture, compiling the program, selecting projects, dividing funds among projects, advising on projects, finding sponsors, establishing contacts with the other eight ECOCs and communicating the cultural year to audiences, organizations and media.²⁷⁰ By adhering to such a reactive approach, the foundation was able to align large shares of the local population with the ECOC.

Thus, in contrast to ACH'87 and E-88, which both adhered to a top-down approach, the Helsinki population was not reduced to the role of passive audience or consumer, but was given the opportunity to participate in the cultural year. In this manner, parts of the population could appropriate *hel.2000.fi* as their event. As a result of this, it seems likely that the foundation faced considerably fewer difficulties in explaining the idea of the ECOC and its program to the people of Helsinki.²⁷¹ Of course, it should also be taken into consideration that by this time the ECOC formula was already fifteen years old, so that the idea of the event had become much more familiar.

²⁶⁸ In total, the public sector contributed €26.39 million to the event, €9.65 million of which came from the state and €16.74 million from the Cities of Helsinki, Espo and Vantaa (Palmer et al., 2004). The foundation thus not only had a clear mandate for producing the ECOC, but also the means necessary to carry out this task. In addition, public-private cooperation played a more prominent role in the financing of the Helsinki ECOC than in that of ACH'87 and E-88. In total, €6.66 million, 20.15% of the overall operating budget of €33.05 million was generated through private sponsorship (Ibid.). The main sponsors of the cultural year were Finnair, Elisa (telecommunication services), ICL Invia (hardware, software, IT) and Channel Four Finland (television broadcasting). Other sponsors included Helsinki Energy, Marja Kurki (fashion), Nokia, Finland Post, Scandic Hotels, Sodexho (restaurants and catering), Tapiola (insurance), and the Finnish Forest Foundation. Source: The official evaluation report as published on www.hel.2000.fi, last visited May 16, 2001.

²⁶⁹ Other sources, such as the interviewees, speak of 3,000 projects. However, as the authors of the final evaluation report on *hel.2000.fi* argue, a distinction was made between vague ideas and concrete project proposals.

²⁷⁰ Interview with Jouko Astor (Jyväskylä, April 9, 2001). Astor was the production manager of the Children's Year from February 1998 until April 2001.

²⁷¹ While there are no reliable data that suggest a relation between the foundation's reactive approach and the extent to which Helsinki citizens were aware of the cultural year, data from the foundation's marketing and publicity department point out that *hel.2000.fi* was well-known among Helsinki citizens by the time the event was staged. The precise data can be found in the appendix of this book.

9.3.2 *The Programming of the Cultural Year as a Place-Selling Strategy: The Quality of Life Concept of Culture*

Considering the broad coalition of actors that aligned themselves with the hel.2000.fi project, the question arises which concept of culture was chosen to act as a criterion in programming the cultural year in such a way that the interests of as many actors as possible could be negotiated. As became clear from our reconstruction of the pre-bidding and bidding phases, the hosting of hel.2000.fi was embedded in a much broader political and economic reorientation of the Finnish state and its capital Helsinki. As had happened with the 1952 Olympics, Finland and Helsinki wanted to open themselves up and connect to the West. Both the private and the public sector shared the common interests that enforced this process: the urge to join the EU, to present Finnish expertise and technology to the world and to develop new growth markets and job-generating initiatives. The foundation had to find a way to translate these interests into its concept of culture, which was eventually defined as *quality of life*.

In the process leading up to this definition, Dolivo personally played a leading role as director of the foundation. According to Dolivo, 'quality of life' appeared as a suitable concept because it did not confine culture to its highbrow incarnations but also directed attention to the generally high quality of living in Helsinki. Nevertheless, a focus on artistic and cultural expression and experience did remain the most important facet of the Helsinki ECOC for Dolivo. In his view, since a safe, clean, green and well-organized way of life in Helsinki should include more than purely material aspects, art provided an extra spiritual dimension. Thus, on the one hand Dolivo considers culture to be an autonomous entity with its own intrinsic values and characteristics²⁷², while on the other hand, as director of the foundation, he had to adjust his definition of culture to the interests of the actors he needed to keep aligned with the event.

Balancing an autonomous and an instrumental approach to culture within the 'container concept' of quality of life, the foundation defined two main goals: "Helsinki's Year of Culture is to enhance the quality of life for people living in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and to send a message to Europe and the world at large about Finnish culture and know-how" (Dolivo in Sucksdorff et al., 1999/2000: 7). In this manner, the foundation not only served the interests of the city's cultural institutions, tourist branch, research institutions, business community and authorities. By presenting the cultural year as also an investment in the quality of life in Helsinki, the foundation simultaneously tried to align the city's population. In addition, when we take a closer look at the precise definition of these two goals, the word "know-how" illustrates that halfway through the organizational process, the economic interest in hel.2000.fi broadened from the tourism to the high-tech sector. This was a result of the fact that by the mid-1990s, the rapidly developing Finnish knowledge and high-tech industries, including Nokia mobile phones and Internet applications like Linux, had successfully manifested themselves.

In 1996, after the nine candidate cities for the 2000 ECOC had recovered from the shock that they had all been designated hosts by the Council of Ministers, a host city network was established. It was decided that each host city would focus on a specific theme around which it would build its program and that each host city would initiate at least one project that involved the other host cities (Cogliandro, 2001). Helsinki was to focus on the theme of *Knowledge, Technology and Future*. This

²⁷² Interview with Dolivo (Helsinki, March 28, 2001).

opened up possibilities for presenting the Finnish advancements in education, technology, design and engineering internationally (Bergholm et al., 2001). With the 'quality of life' concept and the 'knowledge, technology and future' theme, the programming of the cultural year, in terms of content, was easy to appropriate for place-selling purposes. However, while city marketing strategies could build on this conceptual approach, a further translation was needed to define tangible selection criteria for programming the cultural year.

As became apparent in the case of E-88, a concept of culture alone is too general to act as a selection criterion for programming the cultural year. Therefore, four criteria were defined by the foundation, namely investment in the future, activating inhabitants' participation and interest in culture, innovation in the arts, and intensifying international cultural relations. Respectively, these four criteria corresponded to the program themes of the Children's Year, Everybody's Year, the Year of Art and the International Year. Of the four criteria/themes, the International Year was most evidently used to realize the economic interests of the various actors that aligned themselves with *hel.2000.fi*. Although the title of this theme did not refer explicitly to technology, in the actual program part a lot of attention was given to new media and communication technologies.

A project that forms an illustrative example of how the cultural year was exploited to promote the burgeoning Finnish high-tech industry was *cafe9.net*. Cafes, or rather installations with seats and displays, were set up in all nine ECOCs and "connected to each other with a real-time audio and video connection, offering among other things musical performances, discussions and theme evenings".²⁷³ By means of a website with extensive applications, ranging from e-mail and chat boxes to live cameras,²⁷⁴ audiences were invited to participate in the project and to communicate with other participants in one of the other ECOC host cities. In this manner, *cafe9.net* created real-time events and narratives in and between nine different locales.²⁷⁵ Of all nine ECOC host cities, Helsinki was most active in initiating projects that involved all the host cities (Cogliandro, 2001; Palmer et al., 2004). *Cafe9.net* was just one example of such a project,²⁷⁶ which allowed the foundation to establish contacts with other European cities while simultaneously drawing international attention to Finland and Helsinki's leading role in the development of new media and communication technologies. *Cafe9.net* is therefore an illustrative example of how place-selling strategies were almost seamlessly integrated into the programming of the cultural year.

The programming of the cultural year did not stand on its own in this regard. The promotion of Helsinki as a cultural city and as a high-tech and knowledge centre was embedded in broader regeneration strategies. From the late 1980s onwards, the

²⁷³ The official evaluation report as published on www.hel.2000.fi, last visited May 16, 2001.

²⁷⁴ While these Internet applications might not appear to be very innovative, it should be acknowledged that in the year 2000 Internet applications were less developed and less commonly used than today.

²⁷⁵ Through this initiative, the European Commission's advice on "possible elements of designated cities' programmes: (...) taking the planned activities to a wider public, particularly through the use of multimedia and audio-visual means and a multilingual approach" was implemented. The EU Commission's General-Directorate of Culture, *Document 399D1419*, 1999.

²⁷⁶ The Crystal project is another example of how Helsinki presented itself, while at the same time seeking to intensify relations with the other host cities. The Crystals were sound and light installations made of glass, which were sent as Helsinki's greeting to the other eight host cities. The Crystals were linked to each other through a GSM video connection, enabling the audiences that admired the Crystals to see each other. Apart from displaying technological know-how, projects like Crystal and *cafe9.net* enabled Helsinki to strengthen its ties with continental Europe, in particular the EU.

city administration had produced plans and initiatives to strengthen Helsinki's cultural vitality. In 1993, the Finnish Opera House was opened, followed in 1998 by the completion of the KIASMA, the Museum of Contemporary Art designed by American architect Steven Holl. The construction of this museum, with its fancy architecture, fits in with the ongoing construction boom in cultural flagship projects, which have occurred from the 1990s onwards in many European cities, including Bilbao, Amsterdam, Newcastle-Gateshead and Berlin (cf. Evans, 2001, 2003). In addition, several venues in Helsinki, such as the old Nokia cable factory, were converted into creative centers. The most illustrative example of this is the Tennis Palatsi. This building was especially constructed for the 1940 Olympic Games as an indoor tennis court.²⁷⁷ In the 1990s, it was turned into a large cultural center housing a cinema, an arts museum and some shops. Summing up all these initiatives, we can conclude that during the pre-bidding, bidding and early preparation phases of hel.2000.fi, cultural planning strategies were implemented in various fields and places in the city.

The idea of applying for the ECOC thus emerged at a moment when Helsinki's decision makers and business leaders had already started to develop new initiatives to support the transition to a culture-driven economy.²⁷⁸ Helsinki's cultural turn led and is still leading to a substantial reordering and renaming of places. Whereas the Werkstatt Team in Berlin tried to raise awareness about the creative potential of some of the city's uncanny places and spaces, in Helsinki abandoned factories and underutilized spaces had already been fundamentally transformed into sites where culture, or rather commodities with a cultural aura, were produced, distributed, circulated and consumed long before the cultural year began. Many of the program parts of hel.2000.fi took place in such regenerated buildings and sites, thereby reinforcing the reordering and renaming process that had already been initiated.

The case of Helsinki presents us with the most recent stage in the transition process from an industrial economy to a post-industrial, partly culture-driven urban economy (cf. Van Aalst, 1997; Harvey, 1989). This transition already appeared in a modest, small-scale form during E-88, specifically in its temporary appropriation of abandoned buildings. Helsinki's cultural turn is therefore by no means a unique case. The first developments in Berlin, but also the Glasgow 'Miles Better Campaign', the same city's 1990 ECOC and Barcelona's hosting of the 1992 Olympic Games, constitute illustrative examples of what Graeme Evans (2001) has called 'the urban renaissance'. This development is partly characterized by a redevelopment and rearrangement of abandoned or run-down urban spaces and buildings (cf. Harvey, 1989; Zukin, 1995; Sassen, 2000). The developments undertaken in Helsinki are representative: the KIASMA, for instance, was built on an open space in the city centre. Due to indecisiveness on the part of the local authorities, no buildings were constructed in this space for a long time, even though several development plans, including a master plan by Finland's most famous architect Alvar Alto, had been proposed. Until KIASMA's construction, the space merely functioned as a parking lot.

The turn towards a culture economy not only manifested itself in the construction or reconstruction of cultural flagship projects, but also in policy changes.

²⁷⁷ After the Games, the Tennis Palatsi was converted into a car showroom.

²⁷⁸ I interpret culture here in broad terms, as also referring to science, design, architecture and the creative application and development of technologies and engineering practices. For a further reading on the culture-economy, see Richard Florida (2002, 2005); Landry and Bianchini (1997) and Bianchini and Parkinson (1993).

From the 1980s onwards, but even more so in the 1990s, the Finnish government and the Helsinki authorities relaxed various regulations concerning restaurants and bars. In addition, many investments were made to raise the profile of the city centre (Korpinen, 1999; Lehtovuori, 2000). Parks and streets were renovated and street furniture and lighting modernized. In addition, public and private owners of buildings also undertook major renovation work, resulting in more colorful gables. Dolivo vividly captures the changes that Helsinki underwent, and is still undergoing: “When I said fifteen years ago, the city was different. It was quite dull and very grey. Helsinki has got color now”. Without exaggerating, it could be argued that from the early 1990s onwards, Helsinki underwent a process in which the city was reinvented (Castells and Himanen, 2002; Bell and Hietala, 2002; Verwijn and Lethovuori, ed., 1999; Cantell, 1999).²⁷⁹

When we take this enormous reordering of place into account, it can be concluded that hel.2000.fi functioned much more as a continuation of existing developments than as an isolated event. This CityEvent functioned less as a cultural manifestation for culture’s sake than as a ‘premiere party’, a happening that generated a publicity peak for the presentation of a creative and future-oriented Helsinki to the rest of the world. Hence, hel.2000.fi was not so much an attempt to temporarily reorder and rename places in the city, but manifested itself as a catalyst for the grand-scale reprogramming of Helsinki. In comparison to E-88, this reprogramming had a much more durable character. Hel.2000.fi made visible and enforced earlier and simultaneously initiated processes that transformed places in Helsinki into sites where culture and high-tech industries could be developed.

Since the reordering of place usually affects place images, we should relate the physical transformations that Helsinki underwent to the way the city was presented by means of the cultural year. In this regard, we have to focus on how the hel.2000.fi program and the transforming urban environment were *related and translated* into a promotional imagery. In other words, how were the material images of the city, which were the product of the process of reordering places that was partly fuelled by hel.2000.fi, translated into immaterial images (media texts, signs, images and sounds)?

9.3.3 Marketing and Reordering of the City

The media was an important actor in the foundation’s translation process of material images into attractive (re)presentations of hel.2000.fi and Helsinki. In analyzing the role of the media, the focus will be on the marketing strategies deployed by the foundation rather than on media coverage. This approach allows us to examine whether hel.2000.fi presents us with another case of media annexation like ACH’87 and E-88. First, however, a brief overview of the media coverage on hel.2000.fi will be given to provide an impression of the media setting of this CityEvent.

The year-round nature of the ECOC made it difficult to attract global media attention on a similar scale as the Olympics. Even individual program parts of the cultural year rarely attract international television attention.²⁸⁰ Furthermore, the ECOC does not attract mass audience attention either. Generally, its public can be

²⁷⁹ Even though this process was driven by the need to strengthen Helsinki’s future position in a globalizing world, there was also a price to be paid, especially by those from the lower socio-economic segment. Helsinki’s cultural turn resulted in a dramatic increase in real-estate prices, in particular in the centre. Consequently, inner-city living has become too expensive for many people on low incomes.

²⁸⁰ Interview with Ekelund (Helsinki, March 27, 2001).

described as highly educated and middle class.²⁸¹ This shows in the kind of media that cover the ECOC. In the foreign media, hel.2000.fi was, for instance, mostly covered by the printed press, in particular by leading national newspapers, travel and lifestyle magazines and quality papers like *Times Magazine*. In general, media coverage was more positive than in the cases of ACH'87 and E-88.²⁸² Most foreign articles only mentioned that Helsinki was hosting the ECOC in passing, paying little attention to the event's program as such. Instead, foreign journalists focused more on the city's main tourist attractions, heritage and local habits. In this respect, the coverage of hel.2000.fi resembles that of ACH'87 and E-88, albeit more often in a neutral or positive tone.

Considering the difficulty of attracting media and audience attention for the ECOC, and especially when one takes into account the negative press coverage of ACH'87 and E-88, it is clear that huge investments had to be made in order to align the media and audiences. Marketing strategies²⁸³ were deployed to establish these alignments. When the percentages and absolute amounts spent on marketing in the overall budget of the foundation are compared with those of ACH'87 and E-88, it can be concluded that in both relative and absolute terms larger investments were made.²⁸⁴ In comparison to ACH'87 and E-88, the marketing of Helsinki's cultural year also started much earlier. While the city administration was vying for the title of European City of Culture, Helsinki tried to attract attention by launching a publicity campaign

²⁸¹ For an extensive introduction to defining and addressing target groups within the field of arts and culture, see Hill, E., O. O'Sullivan and C. O'Sullivan, (1998).

²⁸² The foundation gathered feedback concerning the impression foreign journalists had of hel.2000.fi. In total, 650 foreign journalists, of whom 550 had visited the foundation's office between 1998 and 2000, were interviewed. Most of the journalists replied that they had been positively surprised by Helsinki. I base this on my archive research into the foreign press cuttings that were collected by the foundation, and on interviews with Ekelund and Malinen. Another source was the press cuttings analysis that the foundation commissioned. According to this report, of a total 722 foreign press cuttings only 5 were negative. Observer Oy, the company hired to compile the report, analyzed 772 articles from 27 different countries and concluded that the attitude of the international press towards the Year of Culture in Helsinki was "positive" (Bergholm & Sorakunnen & Säkkinen ed., 2001). Yet a closer look at the 772 articles reveals that not all of the articles explicitly mentioned the cultural year. Therefore, I analyzed a sample of 121 articles out of the total amount of collected articles. From the 78 articles written in English, only 26 mentioned Helsinki as European City of Culture. Of the articles written in German, 24 out of 26 were specifically about the ECOC. Of the Belgian and French articles written in French or Dutch, 14 out of 17 mentioned the cultural year. From this, I conclude that the foreign media attention specifically directed to Helsinki as European City of Culture was remarkably lower than appeared from the foundation's report.

²⁸³ City and event marketing are often confused with the promotion of cities and events. Promotion concentrates only on how events and cities *as they are* can be brought to the attention of target groups, whereas marketing also applies to how events and cities should be developed in order to bring them to the attention of target groups more effectively. In other words, marketing applies both to the development of products and their advertisement. Promotion is part of marketing, but cannot be equated with it (Kotler et al., 1993; Kotler, 1999; Hill, O'Sullivan and O'Sullivan, 1998).

²⁸⁴ For ACH'87 there are no exact numbers available on the share of the budget that was spent on publicity, because the NTI and HF each promoted only their own program parts and no final financial report was compiled. Since all interviewees agreed that there was hardly any budget for promotion and marketing, it can safely be concluded that less than 10% of the operating budget was used for this purpose. This in contrast to hel.2000.fi, where 20,37% of the operating budget was spent on promotion and marketing (Palmer et al., 2004). In the case of E-88, the total budget for promotion and marketing was 3,5 million DM (See Landes-Archiv Berlin, folder: B. Rep. 148, nr. 3). Thus, of a total operating budget of 55 million DM almost 16% was spent on publicity. (See also "Informationsfunk", published by the Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 22.11.1988., pp. 30, available at the Landesarchiv Berlin, access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 3). From ACH'87 onwards, we can therefore identify a steady increase in spending on promotion and marketing.

for which the following slogans were used: *Helsinki Gateway between East and West*, *Helsinki Capital of the Baltic* and *Helsinki Pocketsized Metropolis*. These slogans aimed to familiarize European audiences with the up to then relatively unknown Finnish capital. Moreover, the slogans emphasized Helsinki's character as a relatively small capital city, positioned at the crossroads between East and West, and with all facilities of a modern metropolis within walking distance.

Interestingly, the slogan 'Helsinki Pocketsized Metropolis' greatly resembles the *Helsinki Miniature Metropolis* slogan used for the 1952 Games. Many of the Helsinki landmarks that had been used to present Helsinki in 1940 and 1952 reappeared in the foundation's promotion material for the ECOC. Examples include the Tuomiokirkko (Lutheran Cathedral), Uspenski Cathedral (Orthodox Cathedral), and Kauppatori. This shows that in creating a distinct profile of Helsinki, new images circulated alongside existing images. In contrast to the branding of ordinary consumer products like washing powder, the slogan 'new' is rarely applied to cities. Selling a city is always based on a combination of existing and historical images with a focus on the city's most recent developments and attractions (Ashworth, 1994, 1998; Bradley et al., 2002; Kotler, 1999; Ward, 1998).

Yet, the iconographic imagery of the city, as constituted by its landmarks, functioned in a more complex inter-referential network in the case of hel.2000.fi than had been the case with the (never held) 1940 and 1952 Olympics. In 2000, the nature of the ECOC, the deployment of niche marketing advertising strategies, as well as the use of the Internet as a promotion, information and communication medium, resulted in a more complex representation of Helsinki. To unravel the complexity of this promotional imagery and to make a comparison and analyze the differences, we first have to return to how Helsinki was presented in 1940 and 1952.

In 1940 and 1952, a monumental imagery of Helsinki had been the dominant and practically the only image with which the city was promoted by the Olympic Committee, the authorities and the Finnish tourist branch. The city was above all represented as Finland's capital by displaying national landmarks, modernist architecture and urban planning. In retrospect, the translations that were made from Helsinki's physical places or material images into immaterial images can be typified as quite transparent. In the organizing committee's promotion materials, such as brochures and news bulletins, an attempt was made to establish a direct, 'objective' relationship between material images and immaterial images by presenting Helsinki in a 'postcard kind of fashion'. In this regard, the printed press was not only the dominant promotion medium. Through the deployment of print technology, the city could be (re)presented as a coherent collage of photographic stills. In this manner, an immaterial imagery was produced that clearly linked to the buildings and places that visitors could see if they visited Helsinki: it was as if one could step directly from the photographic promotional imagery into the 'real' Helsinki. The official promotion material therefore presented an objectified and rationalized imagery of the city, as if a brochure indeed contained a miniature or pocket-sized version of Helsinki.

9.3.4 Marketing Helsinki: High-Tech and Lifestyles

In the marketing strategies of the foundation, this kind of rationalized promotion imagery was supplemented, if not almost completely replaced by imageries that did not pretend to be 'objective' representations of the 'real city', but instead emphasized Helsinki as a subjective and highly emotional experience. This shows, for example, in the advertising campaign the foundation launched in the European edition of *TIME*

magazine. The slogan used was *Come to Your Senses in Helsinki*, with *Smell*, *See*, *Taste* and *Hear Helsinki* as sub-slogans. These phrases emphasized that visiting Helsinki is an exceptional experience. The city, therefore, was not promoted through a transparent image, but by focusing on intuitive associations by means of which target groups were approached based on their individual experience. The foundation's marketing campaign, then, could be described as a typical example of the 'experience economy' (Pine and Gilmore, 1999) put into practice.

By emphasizing experience, place was 'packaged' as something that could be consumed. The slogan "smell and taste Helsinki", for instance, draws quite literally on metaphors of food and dining. In addition, the general slogan "coming to your senses" evokes associations with leisure resorts and spas, representing the city as a holiday package. The 'Come to Your Senses' campaign illustrates that the advertising of Helsinki and the cultural year put lifestyle at the centre of attention instead of addressing a single homogeneous mass audience. Thus, the promotion of Helsinki was more *personalized* than that of the 1940 and 1952 Olympics.

This experience-centered marketing strategy was reinforced by the extensive use of the official hel.2000.fi website, which was launched by the foundation. In contrast to a printed brochure, the website offered visitors many different ways to engage with, experience and inform themselves about the cultural year. The website provided information, but it also enabled visitors to pay a virtual pre-visit (cf. Urban, 2002) to Helsinki and its cultural year. Pictures and short video clips of exhibitions, performances and other parts of the program were included on the website. The enormous variety of topics and information enabled visitors to assemble their own tour through the website, creating their own virtual experience of the city and hel.2000.fi. The hel.2000.fi website was equipped with the latest applications and well designed. At certain times it was, for instance, possible to engage in live chat sessions with artists and other visitors, establishing a real-time connection on an individual basis between remote visitors and the events as they were taking place in Helsinki. Although most of the user options that the hel.2000.fi website contained are now regarded as standard features, in the year 2000 the website appeared highly innovative.

Through the website the foundation was not only able to reach larger audiences²⁸⁵ and offer them much more information than printed promotion material could ever provide, but it also symbolized Helsinki's status as one of the world's leading high-tech centers. With its fancy design, innovative applications and links to the sites of high-tech companies such as Nokia and Sonera (mobile network provider) as well as the Helsinki Science Park, the website clearly constituted the virtual embodiment of the 'Knowledge, Technology and the Future' theme that was Helsinki's focus within the network of the nine ECOCs. Drawing on McLuhan (1999), we could indeed argue that in this case the medium was the message.

²⁸⁵ In 2000 alone, more than half a million people visited the site. Source: www.hel.fi, last visited May 16, 2001.

9.4 EXPERIENTIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF PLACE AND EVENTS: FRAGMENTATION AND CENTRALIZATION

The combination of a lifestyle-centered advertising strategy and the extensive application of the Internet as a promotional and informational technology not only signals a place-selling strategy that increasingly addresses audience members as individual visitors rather than mass consumers, but it also enables us to identify a blurring of traditional media categories. Just as the organizers of E-88 had done in their American publicity campaign, the foundation's website contained promotional texts that were presented as journalistic content. The qualities of Helsinki and its rapidly developing new media economy were linked to the program of the cultural year and described in a rather factual tone. In this manner, the distinction between facts or information on the one hand, and advertisements on the other, became blurred.²⁸⁶ In the terms of the CityEvent model, this blurring of media categories can be interpreted as a partial annexation of the key actor media by the host city (foundation).

In this regard, we can identify a correlation in the development of the ECOC and the extent to which host cities annex media. By the time hel.2000.fi was staged, the ECOC had evolved from a rather obscure and elitist cultural event into a happening that fused arts and culture with new lifestyle-based consumption patterns and marketing strategies. Our earlier comparison of the promotion and marketing expenditures of ACH'87, E-88 and hel.2000.fi seems to suggest that this evolution of the ECOC's event formula was accompanied by an increase in promotion and marketing. Significantly, it was not only promotion which increased. The change to a more lifestyle-oriented and thus more individualized approach also correlates with an expansion in the number of projects composing the overall program of the cultural year. With approximately 450 projects, hel.2000.fi was considerably bigger than both ACH'87 and E-88. In addition, the *quality of life* concept and its four corresponding selection criteria suggest that hel.2000.fi offered a wider variety of program parts that appealed to people with different lifestyles and cultural preferences. The programming of Helsinki's cultural year was not primarily focused on highbrow culture, while the greater number and diversity of program parts, ranging from hip-hop performances to opera, gave visitors more of a chance to compose their own 'package' out of the overall program than ACH'87 and E-88 had done. In this regard, the program of hel.2000.fi epitomizes "postmodernity",²⁸⁷ combining new modes of lifestyle-based consumption patterns with a simultaneous dethronement of grand modernist narratives. Highbrow cultural canons were replaced by an enormous variety

²⁸⁶ Of course, it should be mentioned that the distinction between categories such as news, promotional content and entertainment has never been completely clear. In her book *Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Paris*, for example, Vanessa Schwartz shows how the crime reports in the late-nineteenth-century Paris newspapers stood at the basis of the feuilleton. However, although the sensational details in the news reports provided content for the crime feuilleton, the two forms remained clearly separated when they appeared in the same newspaper. In the case of the hel.2000.fi website, this 'physical' distinction within one medium was much less sharp.

²⁸⁷ The term postmodernity was introduced by the social geographer David Harvey in his book *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (1989), in which he identifies, analyses and criticizes cultural change in terms of the transition from an industrial economy to a post-industrial economy. In his view, post-modernism is the culture that is produced by a changing capitalist regime, in which the Fordist production regime of mass production and consumption has been replaced by flexible, partly rootless modes of production, niche marketing and lifestyle-based consumption patterns.

of heterogeneous, co-existing and overlapping cultures and modes of cultural expression.

In contrast to the Olympic Games, which are based on the idea of people sharing the excitement of watching sports matches, the combination of an expanding and increasingly differentiated program and a lifestyle-oriented presentation of the cultural year made hel.2000.fi less a CityEvent centered on *shared experiences* than a *fragmented event*. In comparison to the Olympic sports matches, most program parts in the cultural year only attract marginal audiences. Because there are hardly any large audiences, let alone large remote audiences that all share the same moments simultaneously, individual visitor experiences become much more fragmented. In addition, the generic event formula of the ECOC is less clearly defined and unambiguous than the Olympic Games, whose formula is mostly based on sports regulations and ceremonial protocols. Consequently, individual parts of the hel.2000.fi program cannot always easily be described in transparent and predictable terms. This also makes it more difficult to relate different program parts to each other and to discern a sense of coherence in the overall program, notwithstanding the use of selection criteria and program themes.

The role of the hel.2000.fi website in further fragmenting the experience of the cultural year should not be underestimated, because it was explicitly geared towards enabling individual audience members to compose their own program within the overall program. In fact, despite all the advanced features on the website, it was impossible for visitors to get a total overview of hel.2000.fi. Instead of featuring a program leaflet that unfolded like a map to give a complete image of all the events in the program, the events were arranged by months, on which the visitor could click. Moreover, behind the many web pages on the hel.2000.fi website, there were still more pages and links. Every click confronted visitors with yet another dimension or aspect of hel.2000.fi: some clicks led to nothing but the end of a page, but on other occasions one found a link to an affiliated organization. In the latter case, one could be redirected from the official hel.2000.fi website to another website, such as, for example, that of the Helsinki Tourist Agency, the City of Helsinki, various cultural institutions or a sponsor. Thus, one could start by looking at the program for the cultural year and end up on Finnair's website searching for last-minute tickets.

The speed with which visitors could access diverse web pages points to a reemerging tension between fragmentation and centralization. On the one hand, the website enabled people to see and experience much more of hel.2000.fi at a distance than had been possible through other media. The Internet turns audiences into 'interactors' with the ability to explore an event from many more perspectives within the spatiotemporally fixed setting of the home or office than offered by, for example, television (cf. Manovich, 2001). The collective experience thus makes way for differential individual experiences. In this regard, the website indicates a new phase in targeting consumers that partly replaces a focus on niche markets and lifestyles with an even more individualized approach. Although the 'Come to Your Senses' advertising campaign of the foundation no longer addressed a homogeneous mass audience, it still addressed a vast niche market by targeting people with a shared interest in arts and culture. In this sense, the advertising campaign is a typical example of a post-industrial marketing technique that separates consumers into more specific target groups by using criteria like income, gender, age, education level, ethnicity, religious background and sexual preference (cf. Gabriel and Lang, 1995). However, despite this more refined approach to consumers, the target groups could still be regarded as 'container definitions'.

In contrast, the hel.2000.fi website allowed for a more radical exploitation and expression of the notion of lifestyle. Because of its interactive character, the website allowed visitors with an interest in arts and culture to select their individual preferences, as if creating their own personal advertisement. In this way, a website visitor positioned her/himself as a target group by making individual specifications within the general group of culture consumers. Concretely, we might think of how two different people planning to visit Helsinki's cultural year would each navigate the website to create their own preference profile within the overall program. One is mainly interested in classical music, whereas the other prefers contemporary visual art and urban music. The lifestyle-centered 'Come to Your Senses' campaign could never have addressed our two art lovers on such a personalized level because it lacked the direct feedback mechanism of the interactive website. Ultimately, the highly personalized information provision that the website offered further fragmented audience experiences.

When we combine this insight with the kind of program that hel.2000.fi offered, namely an enormous variety of relatively small-scale events, we can conclude that the cultural year was more fragmented in terms of representation and programming than the five case studies we examined earlier. Yet, it would be too hasty a conclusion to posit that visitors and remote audiences could not share any experiences at all. CityEvents always have centralizing dynamics too. For example, visitors to the website mostly entered it via the same portal. The slogans and logos used also increased recognition among large audiences, marking each of the many program parts part of the same brand. In addition, a few large events, such as an opera dedicated to the life of Finland's famous athlete Paavo Nurmi, were held in the Olympic Stadium, allowing large audiences to share the same experience.

9.4.1 The Festive (Re)Programming of Helsinki: Mobilizing Place

The reemerging tension between fragmentation and centralization also has a spatial resonance. Through the Internet, hel.2000.fi took place at many places that did not remain confined to the locality of Helsinki. The abovementioned cafe9.net project illustrates how events could be created that took place in nine different cities in Europe simultaneously. The web has made it possible to trace networks at a much faster pace than ever before (Rogers 2002a, 2002b; Urban 2002). For example, the foundation's website links to the website of a cultural institution, which is in turn connected to the web page of a local artist, which links to an artists' collective. With a few more clicks, one could end up on the site of the European Commission in Brussels, many miles away from Helsinki. However, the increased interaction and accessibility that the Internet offers at the same time generates more lacunas. The more information available on the web and the larger and faster the connections between different localities, the more difficult it becomes to oversee the whole, so that the godlike bird's eye view is replaced by a fragmented, juxtaposed and multilayered vision (cf. De Certeau, 1988; Lefebvre, 1991, 2003a; Lefebvre and Guterman, 2003).

This fragmented vision not only shows in the website, but also in the programming of the cultural year. Hel.2000.fi had a bigger and more varied program than ACH'87 and E-88 and also entailed new ways of reordering and renaming place, what I would tentatively like to call a *festive (re)programming*²⁸⁸ of the host city.

²⁸⁸ I am grateful to Thomas Elsaesser, whose introduction of the idea of programming the city has been a great inspiration for my thinking about the relationships between urban space and events like the ECOC. Elsaesser introduced the idea of 'programming the city' over the course of the numerous

Festive (re)programming in many respects builds on the developments that had been set in motion by the organizers of ACH'87 and E-88. Some of the hel.2000.fi projects, like the Töölönlahti Bay Art Garden, were based on a similar principle to the one the organizers of ACH'87 and E-88 had adhered to, namely the idea of temporarily reshaping urban spaces. In case of the Töölönlahti Bay, which was located between the KIASMA, the Finlandia Hall and the Central Railway Station, an undeveloped site was temporarily transformed into a public art garden, so that residents and visitors were confronted with a different use and possibility of place. To a certain extent, this project can be compared to Century'87, where artists tried to create alternative spatial experiences in Amsterdam.

Yet, hel.2000.fi went further than both ACH'87 and E-88. Hel.2000.fi was an attempt to *program the city at large*, instead of only its city centre and the established cultural institutions. This shows, for instance, in the projects that corresponded with the theme Everybody's Year, which summed up one of the four selection criteria—increasing the participation of Helsinki's inhabitants in the cultural year—used for programming the cultural year. Projects ranged from the 'Sauna of the Month'²⁸⁹ to 'Ele', a community festival for residents in the Pikku Huopalahti district (Sucksdorff et al., 1999/2000). Many such initiatives took place outside the space of the established cultural institutions, but also outside the city center. Whereas the organizers of ACH'87 and E-88 aimed to rearrange the experience and use of place, these efforts were mostly directed at the city center, as with E-88, or at rather eccentric and uncanny places, such as abandoned factories surrounding the inner city. In the case of hel.2000.fi, projects were also located in suburbs, schools and hospitals. In other words, locations were used where ordinary everyday activities took place. Thus, hel.2000.fi aimed to 'cover' or program the city in all its facets, ranging from the highbrow cultural palaces and regenerated former industrial sites to the less spectacular spaces of the suburbs. This approach entailed a new way of reordering the city, namely by dispersing festival activities away from the city center and the cultural institutions, which are usually located in the center, to the outskirts of the host city. This process is what I have indicated with the notion of 'festive' (re)programming.

Helsinki's ECOC thus confronts us with a different spatial model of hosting CityEvents than that of typical temples of modernity such as the World Fair and the

meetings of the Cinema Europe research project of the University of Amsterdam of which this research is a part. The notion of programming the city was used by Elsaesser to interpret the increasing mediatization and commodification of people's experience in urban public spaces and to thereby examine changes in urban and public space. Elsaesser explored this issue earlier in his book *Hollywood op straat: Film en televisie in de hedendaagse mediacultuur* (2000). Elsaesser refers to the programmable city as follows: "(...) Metropolitan authorities try to endow their city with the sense of being a site of permanent, ongoing events. Complementing the architecturally articulated urban space with a temporal dimension, the built city turns into, and is doubled by, the "programmed"—or programmable—city. In this endeavor, major exhibitions and annual festivals are a key ingredient in structuring the seasonal succession of city events across the calendar year" (Elsaesser, 2005: 86). When the Cinema Europe project group explored the notion of programming the city, the term was open to various interpretations. For that reason, there is a small difference between Elsaesser's conception and my own appropriation of the term 'programming' the city. Elsaesser's notion of the programmable city refers to the general trend in which events increasingly invest urban spaces with experience-based acts of consumption and commodification. My notion of festive programming does not propose a different use or interpretation of the term in this respect, but focuses more specifically on the role that CityEvents play in the regeneration of places in the city and of whole cities.

²⁸⁹ This was a project in which every month a sauna in Helsinki, which was normally not open to the public or only to a select group, opened its doors to everyone. An example is the world's largest sauna at the Marine base in Suomalinn, a fortress island for the coast of Helsinki. Normally, this sauna is only used by military personnel.

Olympic Games. Instead of having events take place in a concentration of locations, such as a sports dome or a designated festival terrain, hel.2000.fi was characterized by geographical dispersal and multiple, often juxtaposed temporalities in the various program parts. These program parts evolved around tensions such as slow versus fast, light versus dark, rational versus emotional, place versus space, and center versus periphery (in particular suburbs). At first sight, it therefore seems logical to assume that the (re)presentation of Helsinki and hel.2000.fi became increasingly fragmented as a result of the heterogeneity and spatiotemporal dispersal of program parts. Our earlier analysis of the hel.2000.fi website also points at such a conclusion.

However, from a spatial perspective, fragmentation was limited. Despite the disjointed manner in which the hel.200.fi website presented the cultural year and its host city, the 'dispersed space' of the physical location, Helsinki itself, acquired a virtual equivalent in the way the website seamlessly intertwined the interests of capital, culture, media, residents, political institutions and businesses. The website could bring all these different actors and their interests together precisely because the Internet is a network technology, linking webpage to webpage. The major difference that the website, as an information source and promotion channel, offered in comparison with the print and television media that were used to advertise ACH'87 and E-88, was its capacity to create a virtual unity out of the complex and divergent places and actors that together produced hel.2000.fi.

The virtual unity that the website created was also highly mobile, or rather footloose. The website could be visited at any time at any location worldwide as long as one had Internet access. As argued earlier, visiting the hel.2000.fi site enabled people to explore and visit Helsinki before actually going there. The quantity and diversity of information sources on the website provided visitors with more insight into Helsinki and its CityEvent than any free publicity, promotion films and brochures could ever have offered. The city and its CityEvent thus became much more knowable to remote audiences on a personal level. People's personal associations with Helsinki could be enhanced with new information or contradicted if the particular users allowed themselves to accept different views on the city. After all, not everyone clicked on the same links. Hence, the website made it possible to bring Helsinki and its cultural year to the rest of the world in a manner that had not been possible before.

How should we interpret the Internet as an actor-network in relation to the ANT approach we have followed so far? Is the Internet merely a network metaphor or does it present a different kind of network ontology than the actor-networks we have studied? The Internet itself consists of innumerable actors that have to be aligned with each other to produce new immaterial interactive images, such as websites. These actors can be followed and by doing so we can reconstruct the networks behind the website. These networks are never solely virtual entities, but always consist of a combination of tangible actors, such as cables, interfaces, electricity wires, processors, but also digital codes and bits (Parks, 2004).²⁹⁰ Consequently, the Internet does not undermine the basic assumption of our ANT approach, which is that networks can only exist if actors keep other actors actively aligned by generating their

²⁹⁰ The virtual appearance of the Internet might, however, falsely suggest that it is a virtual media technology. Like every medium, though, the Internet relies on a vast material infrastructure constituted by innumerable computers, servers and cables. In her analysis of the Internet, Liza Parks (2004) argues against the image of the Internet as a clean or so-called clean technology by tracking the route that abandoned computers from the West make to China. Low-paid Chinese workers dismantle the computers in abominable circumstances, exposed daily to the toxic gasses that escape during the recycling process.

interest. Nonetheless, the Internet does confront us with a more complex mode of reordering and renaming place, as became apparent in the case of hel.2000.fi. The festive programming of the city was successfully accomplished because the geographically dispersed program parts all came together in the virtual space of the hel.2000.fi website. This space was linked not only to the 'physical Helsinki', but simultaneously to the many other virtual and physical spaces and places connected to the website.

This complexity brings us to the conclusion that both host cities and CityEvents can no longer be understood in exclusively local terms. As our analysis of the Helsinki Games already indicated, staging CityEvents always leads to a mobilization of host cities. The difference between hel.2000.fi and the other five case studies is the pace and scale at which the Internet mobilized the host city, in combination with the simultaneously more personalized and specified approach to target groups. The staging of hel.2000.fi therefore seems to point at a new mode of selling host cities. What the consequences of this development are is at this point difficult to indicate. More research is needed to comprehend and interpret this development in all its complexities.

9.5 CONCLUSION

By means of the CityEvent model, we have been able to reconstruct *how* hel.2000.fi was produced and used as vehicle to raise Helsinki's international profile. We did this by identifying the actors and their interests and by reconstructing how these actors aligned themselves with the hel.2000.fi project. In this manner, we have been able to reconstruct and analyze the strategy that was chosen to implement the ECOC formula. Our inquiry into hel.2000.fi has pointed out that the ECOC became a tool for urban regeneration with the aim of raising Helsinki's international profile and enhancing its economic development.

From the moment that the idea of hosting the ECOC emerged, geopolitical and economic interests played a major role. At the time, the Helsinki and national authorities were almost desperately searching for initiatives that would generate economic growth and new markets. This urgency was the result of the economic recession of the early 1990s, which was caused by the collapse of Helsinki and Finland's biggest trading partner, the Soviet Union. The cultural sector and, in particular, the tourist branch seemed one of the few areas where economic growth could be generated at a time when traditional industries and export markets were declining. Concurrently, the loosening grip of the Soviet Union on Finland's domestic and foreign affairs opened up space for the Finnish state to orient itself towards the EU and to opt for a membership. Bidding for the ECOC was a means to express the Finnish desire to join the EU.

The two main interests that were at stake—connecting Finland to the EU and developing new economic incentives in the cultural sector—were shared by a great number of heterogeneous actors, varying from the Helsinki municipality and the state to the city's cultural institutions and companies like Finnair. Many actors therefore aligned themselves with the project even before Helsinki officially engaged itself in the bidding process. For the reasons we identified in our reconstruction of the formation of the key actor 'host city', a remarkable difference arose between hel.2000.fi and ACH'87 and E-88. In contrast to the latter two, in the case of Helsinki

the key actor host city was not only comprised of a larger and more heterogeneous amalgamation of actors, but the initiative for bidding for the ECOC came from the city itself, or at least from the local authorities. The state, consequently, acted more as a subsidizer than as an actor occupying the double role of both initiating the bid and aligning actors within the event owner's network.

One reason for this different relationship between the city and the state was the involvement of the EU as event owner. The generic event formula of the ECOC had become more institutionalized since its foundation in 1985. Even though eventually nine host cities were designated for the special occasion of the millennium year, a bidding process did precede this decision. Precisely because Helsinki had to engage itself in a bidding process, the state was not able to unilaterally propose Helsinki as a candidate. Rather, the initiative had to come from the city. Moreover, in contrast to ACH'87 and E-88, alignments had to be established before the city made its bid. This meant that the interests of as many actors as possible had to be negotiated. Different interests had to be translated into shared interests that would bind actors to the network.

To achieve this, the municipality managed to construct a shared interest or rather problem, namely Helsinki's pervasive weak international image. This shared interest was the product of the Comedia agency's assessment of the city's cultural sector. The assessment thus functioned as a strategy to bring together divergent interests. Solving Helsinki's image problem was presented as a step that had to be taken in order to pursue the geopolitical and economic interests that were in play successfully. In this setting, the ECOC was presented as a partial solution to Helsinki's image problem. Hosting the event was conceived of as a publicity instrument that would enable the city to attract international attention. At the same time, it would constitute an investment in the city's cultural sector, something that was again expected to generate economic growth. In this respect, our description of the foundation's institutional structure, as well as our analysis of how culture was defined as *quality of life* for the purpose of programming the cultural year, can be regarded as a continuation of the efforts that were undertaken to align actors with the ECOC project in the initial phase. The foundation's organizational structure and the *quality of life* concept were typical examples of how divergent interests were translated into binding elements that kept the network together.

The programming of the cultural year was furthermore linked to broader urban regeneration schemes, and encapsulated in a major reordering and renaming of place. Hel.2000.fi functioned as a catalyst for reprogramming Helsinki into a cultural city with thriving culture, high-tech and knowledge industries. Indeed, we have been able to identify a partial adjustment in the focus of marketing Helsinki by means of the ECOC. Whereas initially the tourist branch and the cultural sector were the focus for selling the city, from the mid 1990s onward more attention was paid to Helsinki's emerging high-tech and knowledge industries. This shift also became apparent in the promotion and marketing of Helsinki and its cultural year. Emphasis was put on exhibiting Helsinki as a high-tech centre by including projects such as cafe9.net in the ECOC's program and by using a website. Apart from the function of catalyst that hel.2000.fi occupied in generating economic development, this CityEvent also points to a change in the way cities promote themselves. Not only was the advertising campaign of the foundation bigger, it was in a way also less specific than had been the case with E-88. Instead of an overview of cultural attractions and events, Helsinki was presented as an experience. But even this promotional strategy could still be called traditional in comparison with the hel.2000.fi website.

As our extensive analysis above has pointed out, the website not only functioned as a symbol of Helsinki's status as a high-tech capital, but also generated more personalized and consequently more fragmented audience experiences. This individualization or fragmentation produced by the website's promotion of Helsinki correlated with a fragmentation in the staging of the cultural year. Program parts were spread out all over the Helsinki area and no longer confined to the city center and established cultural institutions. Hospitals, schools and even suburbs were turned into festive locations as hel.2000.fi spread across the city with the aim of temporarily re-programming places and spaces. This process has tentatively been indicated as the festive (re)programming of the host city. On the one hand, it was characterized by the geographic dispersal of program parts and, on the other, by the virtual unity created by the hel.2000.fi website. The website functioned as a single virtual place where all the different program parts, interests and information sources came together. It was precisely this virtual unity that allowed for a radical mobilization of the host city, because it could be accessed worldwide. The case of hel.2000.fi has therefore confronted us with a different and perhaps more radical mode of renaming, mobilizing, circulating, distributing or, in other words, presenting and representing the ECOC and its host city. While we should be cautious to make general claims, hel.2000.fi does seem to signal a new trend in hosting CityEvents *and* in marketing or selling the host cities.

Conclusion to Part III

Programming Accomplished

In the last three chapters, we applied the CityEvent model to the ECOC, a CityEvent that has undergone a remarkable development since its establishment. Looking back on our analysis of the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki ECOCs, we can identify a development towards the 'festive programming' of the city, namely a process in which arts and culture are increasingly used to help cities (re)position themselves in a globalizing economy and integrating European market. Festive programming did not become manifest yet in the cases of Amsterdam and Berlin, but emerged as the result or final phase of a much broader development, which will become apparent once we compare the three case studies with each other. In this regard, the title of this third part, namely *Towards a Festive Programming*, emphasizes that we are dealing with a transition in the hosting of CityEvents. In the title, the word 'towards' emphasizes that our first two case studies cannot be considered as exemplary illustrations of festive programming, but more as events that help us to understand the transition towards it. In our inquiry, the Helsinki ECOC represented the case for which we can truly speak of a festive programming of the city.

The conclusion of the third part of this study will therefore not limit itself to a summary of the previous chapters. In this conclusion, developments in each of the ECOC cases will be linked together and interpreted, using the notion of festive programming as a guideline. Introducing a new term or notion is useless if it does not offer us a means to better understand and interpret developments and transformations. The notion of festive programming is therefore not an objective reality, but a term designed to indicate a transition in the relationship between cities, CityEvents and the media. To explain the usefulness of the term, we not only have to compare the ECOC cases to each other, but we have to compare them also to our analyses of the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympic Games undertaken in the second part of this book.

We noted during our inquiry into the Olympic Games that the amalgamations of networks which produced these CityEvents were characterized by a strong link to the physical environment, because hosting the Games required the construction of vast sports complexes. The Games, therefore, not only reordered and renamed a host city in terms of the festivities taking place, but also in terms of their physical, architectural impact on the city. Thus, the Olympics literally inscribed themselves in urban space through the construction of Olympic stadiums and other amenities.

Such a strong material relation is absent in the case of the ECOC. For none of the three ECOCs examined in this study, permanent buildings or sites were specifically constructed. Consequently, the strong visual impact of, for instance, the Olympic stadium in Helsinki on the overall cityscape was absent in the case of the ECOCs, which took place on a more modest scale. Instead of the huge Olympic spectacles that span approximately two weeks, each edition of the ECOC lasts an entire year. The event, therefore, has the character of a manifestation, of a festive programming of the city that is lengthier but perhaps less spectacular than the Games. Yet, the way Glasgow successfully used the 1990 ECOC to raise its profile is acknowledged in academia and in professional fields as a schoolbook example of how a cultural event can be used to reposition a city on an international level (Evans, 2005; Miles, 2005; Garcia 2004a, 2004b; Seo 2002; Bailey et al., 2000; Short et al., 1993).

This suggests that the ECOC has a great potential to rename and thus to reorder places. It also raises questions about the media strategies and technologies that were deployed to use the ECOC successfully as a place-selling tool. From the Glasgow example, we might therefore conclude that the amalgamations of networks that produce the ECOC reorder and rename urban places in a different way than those that produce the Olympics Games.

Festive programming is the notion with which I want to indicate this different reordering and renaming of place. Festive programming is a way of temporarily investing various places in a host city with new activities, performances, uses and experiences in such a way that (some) alignments between (some) actors are (partially) rearranged to produce new place meanings. The term 'programming' needs some explanation in relation to our ANT-inspired approach to CityEvents. At first sight, the word programming suggests a set-up of structures or at least a systematic process. This conflicts with ANT, which categorically denies the existence of structures and systems. By drawing attention to the precariousness of the alignments between actors, ANT stresses that what we, for instance, consider a scientific fact does not present some natural inevitable order (Latour, 1987, 1988 and 1993). Things could potentially also have been different. What appears to be a structure or system is nothing more than a relatively stabilized actor network, which, however, always entails the possibility of dissolving and thus always needs to be maintained. By adding 'festive' to programming, I want to make explicit the ephemeral character of this mode of programming of the city. It is never directed at reaching a phase of stabilization and is too short-lived to become a structure or system.

In contrast to festive programming, the architectural remains of the Olympics leave more visible and durable network traces than the cultural festivities of the ECOC. Nevertheless, the festive programming that characterized the hosting of the ECOC can have longer-lasting impacts on a host city, too, because the events, experiences, uses and meanings with which places are temporarily invested can leave a mental imprint by adding new associations about a place to peoples' minds. Furthermore, festive programming can enforce other processes, such as gentrification, by giving an impulse to emerging and existing network dynamics.

Festive programming is therefore not an isolated phenomenon, but linked to a larger process of reordering and renaming place. This process consists of the transition from an industrial economy predominantly characterized by mass production and consumption, to a post-industrial economy that distinguishes itself from the former phase by its strong emphasis on niche-market-oriented production and lifestyle-based consumption patterns (cf. Harvey, 1989, Castells, 1996). In line with the ANT approach, we have to be cautious in introducing new 'external forces' to our analysis for explaining how developments and transitions occurred. Instead, by describing and tracking the changes in the relations between the key actors and network dynamics, we have been able to identify developments and transitions in the way cities have hosted the ECOC from the late 1980s onwards. In this research, we have therefore approached this larger transition from the inside out.

Festive programming of the city manifested itself most clearly in the relationships that were established between programming Helsinki's cultural year and the broader urban redevelopments and repositioning strategies taking place in that city. In other words, the ECOC set in motion a process in which the host city increasingly became a festive playground rather than merely a location where an event is staged. As our analysis pointed out, programming the city is based on a geographical dispersal of program parts within the host city in combination with more

specific lifestyle-centered marketing techniques. From ACH'87 onwards, we have seen how arts and culture were increasingly taken outside the 'sacred spaces' of the established cultural institutions. The first step in this process was the exhibition of art works in urban places. This was followed in Berlin by the temporary appropriation of abandoned buildings and places as sites where arts and culture could be produced, consumed and distributed. Finally, the previous two developments were enhanced by a centrifugal movement from the cultural institutions and the inner city towards the city's outskirts, thus geographically spreading the ECOC program out across Helsinki at large.

Simultaneous with this development, arts and culture were increasingly being marketed as consumable experiences. In promotion materials and strategies, rather descriptive overviews of the cultural year's program gradually made way for more lifestyle-oriented ways of (re)presenting the host city and the ECOC. By the time of hel.2000.fi, the 'Come to Your Senses Campaign' promoted the cultural year and Helsinki by aiming to trigger people's associations and experiences rather than by highlighting the ECOC program itself. Promotion and marketing also became increasingly focused on the individual consumer. This approach became visible in the programming of the ECOC, which grew more diverse and larger, giving visitors more choice and the chance to compose their own package within the overall program. This individual-focused promotion was further enhanced by the hel.2000.fi website, which, on the one hand, provided a unity by offering a virtual place where the dispersed program activities could come together, and, on the other, enabled visitors to feed their personal interests. The geographical dispersal of the cultural year's program therefore corresponded with the promotion and marketing strategies that were/are increasingly targeting individual consumers. In the chapter on Helsinki's cultural year, this process was typified in terms of the recurring tension between centralization and fragmentation in hosting CityEvents.

In this regard, the CityEvent model offers the advantage of analyzing this turn towards the festive programming of the city from a broader perspective. The changes in hosting and marketing the ECOC cannot be related to changes in host cities alone. If we would not have used the CityEvent model, we might perhaps have come to a similar conclusion, but the explanation would have been different. The transformation in the hosting and promotion of the ECOC would have been attributed to the way host cities organize the ECOC. Perhaps some external causes, such as globalization, would have been included in the analysis to explain the changing position of cities and their urge to exploit the ECOC as a major publicity offensive and a way to develop new economic incentives. While it is unmistakably true that host cities play a leading role in determining how the ECOC is staged, adhering to an approach that is mainly focused on the city leaves developments in the media but also in the institutional setting of the ECOC out of consideration.

It is in this respect that the CityEvent model proves its additional value. The model enables us to look at the relations that have to be established *within* but also *outside* the city hosting the ECOC. We noted, for instance, that the relation between the EU as event owner and the host cities developed in relation to the role of the nation state. In the case of ACH'87 and E-88, the EU played a relatively passive role as event owner, while the nation state was able to play a double role within the institutional format of the ECOC. On the one hand, the states proposed a city within their territory as ECOC candidate and, on the other hand, they also formed an essential part of the event owner. Our comparative inquiry into the ECOCs of 1987, 1989 and 2000 has shown that the state gradually became less dominant in initiating

the bidding for the event. This decreasing influence was accompanied by the increasing institutionalization of the ECOC by the EU, which introduced formalized bidding procedures and regulations. As a result, the EU was able to manifest itself more as an event owner. Whereas the cities of Amsterdam and Berlin were both more or less confronted with their candidacy as a *fait accompli*, Helsinki initiated its own bid.

Furthermore, the CityEvent model's focus on network dynamics allowed us to reconstruct the relations between the media and the host city. When it became clear that mediation of the event became less and less dependent on traditional news media coverage, which presupposes a distance between the newsworthy object and the medium, the CityEvent model enabled us to interpret this development in terms of an increasing annexation of the media by the host city. In other words, the (news) media domain was increasingly invaded by the organizers of CityEvents. In this regard, a remarkable transformation can be identified. Whereas the organizing bodies of ACH'87 and E-88 annexed media with the purpose of creating their own information and publicity networks, the hel.2000.fi foundation used the Internet not only as a means of communication, but also as content for programming the cultural year. The website was both an information source and an icon of the high-tech imago that Helsinki wanted to display during the ECOC. In all three cases, therefore, the key actor 'media' was partly annexed by the event organizers to target specific audiences. With regard to press *coverage*—which took place outside the annexed media and other promotion strategies—another remarkable development can be identified. In the case of ACH'87 and E-88, the domestic press was quite negative about the ECOC, but by the time hel.2000.fi was staged, the general tone of the domestic press was positive.

In addition, we have been able to reconstruct the complex networking processes that underlie the production of CityEvents. Even more than the Olympic case studies, our inquiry into the ECOCs showed that the formation of the local organizing network 'host city' is always a result of the way interests are negotiated and shared interests are constructed. The CityEvent model helped us to approach each ECOC as a unique case, but at the same time allowed for a generalization between the cases. In each case, actors had to be aligned, yet the manner in which this happened differed enormously between the cases. When we compare ACH'87, E-88 and hel.2000.fi, it can be concluded that the ECOC was most successfully hosted when a local coalition had already been established before the bid was initiated. Time and shared interests are critical factors in this regard.

Finally, the observation that the increasing dispersal of the ECOC is linked to a specification of promotion and marketing strategies could not have been made had we not approached the presentation and representation of place in terms of a reordering and renaming. This approach urged us to look for relationships between the built environment and physical places on the one hand, and place images on the other hand, without reducing the latter to a mere reflection of the first. Thus, the CityEvent model has allowed us to reveal complex relations that would have been difficult to identify if we had approached the three ECOCs from a singular historical perspective. However, the full advantages of the CityEvent model only become obvious when it enables us to draw comparisons between the ECOC and the Olympic Games. If the model allows for such a comparison, then we might be able to find a general answer to the central question addressed in this study, namely how cities create a distinct profile of themselves by means of hosting 'large international

periodic rootless events'. This final test of the CityEvent model will be discussed in the last part of this book, which is also its epilogue.

10. BRINGING DEVELOPMENTS TOGETHER

10.1 INTRODUCTION

In this study we have addressed the question of how cities raise their profile by means of hosting so-called hallmark events like the Olympic Games, European Capital of Culture (ECOC) or the World Expo and Super Bowl. In this research, we focused on the Olympic Games and the ECOC. Now that we have examined the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki editions of these two events, we can draw the developments and transformations together and begin to evaluate the CityEvent model, which we used as our analytical frame. Let us therefore briefly reiterate the motivation for developing this model.

We introduced the CityEvent model for two reasons. First, to delineate our research object on the basis of common characteristics shared by events like the Olympics, World Expo, ECOC and others. The term CityEvent was introduced to encompass these kinds of events. Second, the term CityEvent could not be introduced without an analytical frame that allows us to study this kind of event. This produced the accompanying network model. Of course, this twofold motivation does not fully answer why the object of our research needed to be categorized in the first place.

This need originates in the lack of an accurate term that groups together events like the Super Bowl, the Commonwealth Games, the World Expo and the Olympics on the basis of accurate common characteristics. In professional and academic literature, several terms are used interchangeably to refer to such events. The most common of these are mega-events and hallmark events. These two labels are, however, problematic because they refer only to the scale and/or prestige of an event, leaving all other features outside the definition. A more specific term was introduced by Jones (2001), namely that of large rootless periodic international events. While this categorization is certainly more precise in the sense that it draws attention to the footloose character of these events, Jones' term is nonetheless a rather unfortunate label, because the word 'rootless' suggests that these events can be staged anywhere. The term therefore underexposes the spatial and temporal complexities of this kind of event. Happenings like the Olympic Games, the ECOC, but also the World Expo or UEFA's European Championship in soccer, not only leave an imprint on their host cities, but these cities also in turn affect the formula of the event itself. What distinguishes these events from other large, renowned international events such as the Berlin Film Festival, the International Documentary Festival (IDFA) in Amsterdam and the Edinburgh Fringe Festival (one of world's biggest art festivals), is precisely their generic event formula, which is not rooted in one particular city (for each host city, the staging of the event is a unique happening). The term CityEvent, therefore, was introduced to emphasize the intrinsic relationship between a generic event formula and the different cities that implement this formula.

10.2 A SPATIAL APPROACH TO EVENTS: CAPTURING SPATIOTEMPORAL COMPLEXITY

By categorizing events like the Olympic Games, Commonwealth Games, World Expo and ECOC as CityEvents, no answer was given as yet to the question of how these events enable cities to raise their profile internationally. Therefore, an approach had to be developed to analyze the relationship between the generic formulas of these events on the one hand, and the host cities that implement them on the other. Here, a complex problem emerged, since CityEvents, like any other event, are per definition temporary happenings not intended to last. At the same time, we are well aware that the staging of large spectacles like the Olympic Games requires massive preparations and planning and that these events are therefore by no means spontaneous occurrences. They are, rather, the result of a prolonged production process that involves many different actors. CityEvents thus confront us with a complex temporal constellation: although they are highly organized and not spontaneous, their outcome remains unpredictable. A CityEvent is not like a monument or prestigious building, where the final result of the construction process is already apparent beforehand on the artist's or architect's drawing table. Yet, like monuments and landmark buildings, a CityEvent is inevitably staged with the intention of leaving an imprint designed to raise the host city's profile until long after the events.

Considering this, we saw ourselves confronted at the beginning of this inquiry with the question of how to approach the temporal complexity of CityEvents. Instead of starring ourselves blind on questions regarding time, a spatial approach was proposed. CityEvents always take place somewhere, and this place is (often) affected by the event, as if the event nestles in that place. Furthermore, the various actors that produce a CityEvent all operate from specific places, too. By drawing on Actor Network Theory (ANT), and in particular the work of the French philosopher of science Bruno Latour, a network model was developed that approached the staging of CityEvents as a production process driven by a network dynamic in which heterogeneous actors constantly have to negotiate their interests and align other actors with their cause. The interactions and relations between actors were accordingly analyzed in terms of their spatial consequences. In other words, this approach helped us to discern how space and place are affected by the networks that produce CityEvents.

By following an ANT-inspired approach, we were able to approach the complex spatiotemporal relation between the host city and the CityEvent by means of the question of how network relations are established between various actors to produce the event. In response, a triangular network model was proposed, since we found that the involvement of three main actors forms the necessary condition for linking the host city to the generic event formula. These key actors are: the host city, the media and the event owner. As became apparent in our analyses of the six case studies, these key actors were by no means the only actors essential to producing a CityEvent; they merely formed the precondition for the emergence of the larger network that eventually produces the event. We have referred to this 'larger network' as an amalgamation of networks in order to stress the heterogeneity of the actors involved. The event owner, the host city and the media were defined with the specific purpose of developing a consistent, threefold approach to the six case studies that does not exclude other important actors in advance. It could, however, also be applied to other events such as the World Expo or the Commonwealth Games. The key actors

function as domains or perspectives that emphasize how CityEvents are always the result of productive relations of interdependency between them.

The success or failure of a CityEvent depends on the ability and willingness of actors to consolidate their interests. How a CityEvent is staged and how a host city raises its profile in relation to it is therefore a consequence of how actor-interests have been negotiated within the amalgamation of networks that produces a CityEvent. This approach refrains, therefore, from an analysis in which some leading person or institution is seen as the single originator of historical events. Thus, although in the analysis of the 1928 Amsterdam Games Baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken was seen to have played a leading role in initiating the idea of Amsterdam hosting the Games, as soon as he had generated sufficient support for his idea, other actors became more dominant in the network. In the end, Van Tuyll stopped playing any role at all in the production of the event. Hence, the CityEvent model focuses on the necessity for actors to work together.

Now that we have reiterated the CityEvent model and its purpose, we have to evaluate its usefulness and determine its applicability to other areas of inquiry. Once we have done this, we will be able provide an overview of the historical developments and transformations that can be deduced from our examination of the Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki Olympic Games and ECOCs.

10.3 (RE)IMAGINING THE HOST CITY: REORDERING AND RENAMING PLACE

ANT, and in particular the work of Bruno Latour, makes no strict distinction between human and nonhuman actors. This same approach has been adopted for the CityEvent model. For our analysis of the case studies, the benefit of this “heuristic flattening” (Leigh Starr, 1991: 43) of the difference between human and nonhuman actors was that it enabled us to reconstruct relations between the built environment and the way a host city is presented and represented. In the analysis of, for instance, the Berlin Games, we were able to reconstruct how buildings, street decorations and transport systems were mobilized to produce effective propaganda imagery. Although throughout this study we adhered to Latour’s refusal to distinguish between human and non-human actors on pragmatic grounds, the principle that nonhuman actors play critical roles in networks has enabled us to analyze place and place images from a different perspective than is common in media studies and cultural studies. Instead of reading the morphology of place, we focused on the acts of translation that were necessary to transform physical places into place images and, conversely, to make images part of the physical reality of place.

This approach to place urged us to go one step further than Latour’s network analysis. A re-conceptualization of place was needed in order to comprehend the acts of translation taking place between material places and place images as their virtual equivalents. By drawing on the work of the British sociologist Kevin Hetherington, we were able to make explicit what remains underexposed in Latour’s work, namely the *networked ontology* of place. Hetherington adds a new dimension to ANT by presenting place as the result of acts of translation between human and non-human actors, arguing that changes in the interrelations between these actors affect the place-network and thus alter place itself. Place then emerges as a result of the ordering of objects. Consequently, a re-ordering of objects—a change in the network—leads to

changes in the boundaries that constitute a place. Place thus results from a dynamic process of boundary crossing, which makes it inherently mobile. By using the idea of a networked ontology of place as our frame of reference, we were able to understand the efforts that Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki undertook to raise their profile as spatial interventions made with the purpose of mobilizing places as images. These mobile images could then be distributed to many locations and (remote) audiences.

With respect to this mobilization, we identified a correlation: the more host cities reordered and renamed place, the higher the effect derived from their promotional activities. The Berlin Games and the Helsinki ECOC are the most striking examples in this regard. Both cities invested heavily in upgrading their physical appearance and were also not reluctant to exploit new media technologies in order to maximize exposure. In both cases, moreover, CityEvents were used to add momentum to larger processes of reordering and re-imaging the city. The Nazis wanted to turn Berlin into Germania, the mythical capital of the Third Reich, whereas the Finns wanted to transform their capital into an internationally renowned high-tech and cultural center. Of course, there are many differences between these two cases, but the CityEvent model proved its value by pointing to a recurring dynamic in refashioning and (re)presenting place.

It is at this level of network dynamics that the CityEvent model can be applied to other research areas. Within social geography, media, cultural and tourism studies, the issues of representing place and place identity are recurring topics that deserve and have received intensive scholarly attention (Amin and Thrift, 2003; Bruno, 1997a, 1997b; Dávila, 2004; Jeong and Santos, 2004; Aitken and Zonne, 1994). In many of these studies (Massey, 1994; Soja, 1996; Donald, 1995; Rio, 1992) attention is given to the materiality of place only insofar as the presence, transformation or disappearance of objects and subjects like buildings, artworks and people raise questions of representation and place identity. The methodological focus in these studies therefore often falls on reading a place and interpreting its (re)presentations in relation to the material reality of place. These studies are without a doubt crucial for our understanding of place. Scholars such as Rosalind Deutsche (2002) and Malcolm Miles (1997) have, for instance, drawn attention to the power struggles and processes of inclusion and exclusion that subject, shape and create places. Nevertheless, what these studies tend to overlook is the need to provide an answer to the twofold question of how the physical environment produces images and how images in turn produce the physical environment. This is not to say that the aforementioned studies do not acknowledge and examine this relationship at all, but that they do so strictly from an observer's standpoint: they identify, observe, read and interpret the interactions between the materiality of place and acts of (re)presentation, but they do not look *into* it. The CityEvent model provides a 'new' analytical tool in this regard, precisely because it allows us to look *into* the processes of place and place image production by following the actors in the networks that constitute these places and place images.

10.4 MATERIAL VERSUS IMMATERIAL PLACE IMAGES

The point made above closely relates to another aspect of the CityEvent model. By approaching the gap between the object and its representation or, in other words, between the actual and the virtual, in terms of acts of translation, the model has allowed us to re-conceptualize this gap as a continuum rather than a strict separation

between two distinct realms. In this regard, the terms ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ images were introduced to stress that representations of host cities are never exclusively virtual. All place images are the result of a translation process of the material arrangements in and of place into immaterial representations. This also explains the difference that sometimes exists between inhabitants’ and visitors’ experiences of a place on the one hand, and media coverage of that same place on the other. Sometimes material and immaterial images converge, while at other instances discrepancies arise as a result of the translation process. This was the case, for example, with E-88 (Berlin European City of Culture 1988), when the domestic press heavily criticized the representation of Berlin’s history in the event’s official promotion materials. The perceived misrepresentation resulted from the way certain actor interests, and not others, had affected the translation of the city into images. The CityEvent model’s focus on translation processes thus helps us to understand that the way cities are (re)presented is always a product of the way specific actor interests are negotiated. This approach to city images stresses the ambiguity of place representations, which always only express one meaning of a place out of innumerable possible ones.

By adapting Heterington’s conception of place, the CityEvent model also allowed us to draw attention to the material constitution of the media technologies that produce, distribute, circulate and store representations. Our inquiry into the 1952 Helsinki Games, for example, highlighted the enormous investments that had to be made in order to construct the required media infrastructures for making media coverage possible in the first place. Precisely because the CityEvent model does not distinguish between human and non-human actors, we have been able to develop a materialist approach to city images, drawing attention to the networks that produce and constitute them without ignoring the influence of the images themselves on material constellations. However, in contrast to the (Neo)Marxist materialist tradition that approaches the virtual superstructure as a dialectical product of the material conditions of the base, the CityEvent model adds another dimension by drawing attention to the impact of the virtual on the actual. While the condition for this impact is always material in the sense that the virtual has to materialize in the actual, the CityEvent model shifts the focus from the ontological gap between the actual and the virtual to what binds or links these two realms, namely acts of translation. The CityEvent model is materialistic and dialectical insofar as every act of translation is preceded by a previous act involving actors that are per definition actual. After all, for an image to exist it has to be stored and distributed from somewhere material, which can range from a piece of paper to digits stored on a computer hard disk to the neurons, synapses and cells in our brains.

Yet, as has been stressed throughout this study, the outcome of a translation process is never certain in advance. A reordering of place does not necessarily result in an image that corresponds to this place’s new physical reality and vice versa. Mistranslations can occur at any time. In this manner, place images that highlight distorted views of a place can become reality in people’s minds: in other words, the mistranslation is encapsulated in a translation process that eventually leads to a reordering and renaming of place. While theoretically possible, a move the other way around has proved more problematic. From our analysis of the case studies it became clear that huge investments had to be made to create a positive imagery of the host

city. Successful²⁹¹ event-based place selling therefore involves more than devising slogans, logos and promotion campaigns: it requires an extensive and strategic (re)ordering and renaming of place. In other words, city images can only successfully be launched when they correspond to and are somehow implemented in the 'real' environment. This was most vividly demonstrated in the case of the Berlin Games. The Nazis created a false imagery with the purpose of launching a charm offensive. To uphold this imagery, they had to make real changes in the physical environment. During the 1936 Olympics, intimidation of minorities was, for instance, softened, while anti-Semitic signs were removed and aggressive nationalistic propaganda reduced. Although these adjustments in national socialist policy only lasted for a short period, they were real at that moment. The true deception, of course, lay in the fact that the Nazis intended to restore and even aggravate the old situation as soon as foreign media and visitors had left Berlin.

On the one hand, this example demonstrates the strength of the CityEvent model. On the other hand, it points to the limits of its applicability. The CityEvent model enables us to reconstruct the process that links place and place images to each other, but it does not provide us with a solid methodology to give meaning to the acts of translation that constitute places and place images. It can only do the latter insofar as translations can be related to actor interests. According to the model, each image is produced by a process in which actors align other actors to their cause by translating these other actors' interests into the terms of the network. In the case of the Nazi Olympics, this approach helped us to reconstruct the network of actors (including buildings, art works and propaganda material) that produced highly effective propaganda imagery, but it did not enable us to interpret this imagery in terms of its cultural meaning. While some references have been made to the long-term impact of this imagery, we did not find an answer to the question what this imagery meant and continues to mean for Western thought and, in particular, how it has affected Western thought about spectacles. The CityEvent model thus works only insofar as we can follow the traces in a network; once these traces take on the form of memories that we keep and process in our minds, the materialist approach of the model encounters its own limit.

At the same time, it should be mentioned that this blind spot in the CityEvent model is largely compensated for by the abovementioned studies (Amin and Thrift, 2003; Bruno, 1997a, 1997b; Dávila, 2004; Jeong and Santos, 2004; Aitken and Zonne, 1994; Massey, 1994; Soja, 1996; Donald, 1995; Rio, 1992), which provide a reassuring range of literature on the topic. What the CityEvent model offers in this regard is precisely a different perspective that focuses on the translation processes between place and place images instead of on the reading of place imageries alone.

10.5 THE CITYEVENT MODEL: THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Another advantage of the CityEvent model should be mentioned here, namely its ability to help us gain insight into the dynamics of the production process of CityEvents, rather than offering a reconstruction of causal and historical developments alone. By focusing on actor relations and network dynamics, we found a way to compare different case studies in different historical settings, such as the

²⁹¹ Here, the adjective "successful" refers to the extent to which a host city is able to attract media, businesses, capital, tourists and residents.

Amsterdam Olympics in 1928 and ACH'87 (Amsterdam European Capital of Culture 1987). In this respect, the concept of the CityEvent should be seen as a model that can be imposed on the history of the phenomenon of 'event-based place selling'. It enabled us to analyze the six case studies from a threefold perspective by paying particular attention to the positions of the event owner, the host city and the media.

The historical applicability of the CityEvent model thus made it possible for us to examine how the hosting of CityEvents differs with each historical context and type of event. In contrast to many other studies, however, the consistent application of the CityEvent model allowed us to make historical comparisons between past and recent cases. By following how actors and networks changed over time, we were able to trace transformations in the actors, their relations, and the hosting of CityEvents. In other words, the CityEvent model enabled us to avoid the constraints of much historical research, which refrains from generalizations because of the specific historical contexts of case studies. Our model provided us with a tool to reconstruct the changing network dynamics between cases. It is at this level that comparisons can be made and transformations in the hosting of CityEvents identified. Its consistency also enables us to apply the model to current and future events, thereby superseding its use as a strictly historical instrument. At the same time, it should be mentioned that the CityEvent model did not limit itself to generalizations only. For each case study, the specific actors, interests and alignments of the CityEvent in question were also described.

In summary, the CityEvent model allows for a *diachronic* as well as a *synchronic* comparison between the case studies. The synchronic comparison concerns the three Olympic Games and ECOCs, as well as the general comparison between all six case studies. The diachronic comparison focuses on the Olympic Games and the ECOC as they were hosted in the same host city. As such, we were able to determine how Amsterdam, Berlin and Helsinki have each undergone transformations over the course of hosting CityEvents. Precisely because the Olympic Games and the ECOC are such different events, we had to deduce some general dynamics in order to be able to make a valid comparison. By drawing attention to network dynamics, comparisons can be made that allow for wider generalizations applicable to the other CityEvents that each of the cities has hosted or will host in the near future. Transformations in the hosting of CityEvents are consequently not ascribed to single historical events, but emphasis is put on how the interactions between the main actors takes a different shape every time a CityEvent is (re)produced. This insight enabled us not only to identify and analyze single transformations, but also made it possible to relate these different transformations to each other. After all, they are all the product of the same basic network logic, namely the changing alignments between actors.

In the remainder of this conclusion, we will make a *diachronic* comparison for each of the cities and work towards more general conclusions by linking our findings to a broader perspective that will ultimately enable us to also draw a *synchronic* comparison between the six case studies.

10.6 DIACHRONIC COMPARISONS: TRACKING CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL HOST CITIES

10.6.1 *Amsterdam*

Even though Amsterdam has always been internationally orientated because of its extensive trade and financial networks, culturally the city was quite isolated in the early twentieth century. Compared to cities such as Brussels, Paris and Berlin, Amsterdam had the characteristics of a large provincial town more than those of a leading cultural capital (Deben et al., 1993). When ACH'87 was staged, the city's cultural position in Europe and worldwide had transformed dramatically over the previous decades. In the 1980s, Amsterdam ranked among the world's top tourist attractions, only just below Paris, London and New York. Amsterdam was internationally recognized as an avant-garde centre where leading European intellectuals and artists met and worked. At the time, the city was so confident about its superior cultural position within Europe that the idea of hosting the ECOC was received with a certain disdain by the city's political and cultural institutions, large shares of the population, and the local and national press. Many argued that Amsterdam was already a cultural capital, so there was little need for an event like the ECOC. Only recently has this attitude given way to a more pro-active approach in selling Amsterdam, mainly because other cities like Prague, Brussels, Barcelona and Budapest have increasingly become serious competitors. The "I AMsterdam" city marketing campaign and recent plans to put the city back in the top five European cities (Amsterdam Top City Program)²⁹² are the most illustrative examples of the way the city's political and business elite has become more aware of the fact that the city has lost its comfortable position in the international urban hierarchy.

Despite the different historical contexts of the 1928 Olympics and ACH'87, a recurring pattern can be identified with regard to how Amsterdam hosts CityEvents. In both instances, the organization of the event was not supposed to cost too much. A sparing approach was followed, flowing from the assumption that the organizational costs should not outweigh the benefits. In comparison to Berlin and Helsinki, the production budgets for both Amsterdam CityEvents were relatively small. The 1928 Olympics and ACH'87 showed that the city, and also external subsidizers like the state, were not prepared to take huge financial risks. The (re)decoration of prominent places in the city, as well as advertising and public relations, were in both instances quite minimal. This preoccupation with cutting costs resulted in a rather short-term approach to hosting CityEvents and a failure to integrate them with larger urban developments strategies (even though the NTI and HF did attempt this in the case of ACH'87). In this regard, it should be noted that Amsterdam hosted the Olympic Games and the ECOC when these CityEvents were still relatively small. Since in both cases there was hardly an event tradition in place and benchmarking possibilities were also limited, it may have been difficult for Amsterdam to recognize their broader promotional and economic potential.

Another recurring issue was the wish of the city authorities and event organizers to do away with the cliché imagery that existed and still exists of

²⁹² The Top City Program (Amsterdam Topstad) was initiated by aldermen Lodewijk Asscher in 2006 with the purpose of developing and implementing policies to increase Amsterdam's prestige in various areas, such as education, science, hospitality and creative industry. Source: Gemeente Amsterdam (2006). Amsterdam Topstad: Metropool, Amsterdam terug in de top 5 van Europese vestigingslocaties.

Amsterdam. These images of tulips, canal houses, wooden shoes, mills and the great painters from the seventeenth century were considered problematic. There was, and still is, an urgent need to supplement these stereotypical images of Amsterdam in order to highlight the other qualities of the city. In the case of the Olympics, the organizers compromised by combining typical tourist images with images of progress and industrialism. The interests of Amsterdam were aligned with those of the nation by (re)presenting the city as 'little Holland'. Consequently, the images that were used to promote the Dutch nation as a whole blended easily with the promotion of Amsterdam. In the case of ACH'87, a different strategy was adhered to because Amsterdam's cultural scene was at the centre of attention rather than the elements of the city that could easily stand in for the Dutch nation as a whole. In this regard, the generic formula of the ECOC also played a role, because it was explicitly aimed at drawing attention to the specific local features of each host city. As such, it enabled Amsterdam to pursue its own cultural agenda to a much greater extent than the Olympic Games had (in the end, the Games are not about cities, but all about nations competing with each other). In the case of ACH'87, there was not really a 'host city' key actor; rather, two cultural institutions used the event to realize their interests. The NTI and HF refused to promote ACH'87 by means of cliché tourist images, but because they did not have a big budget to compensate for the lack of traditional tourist promotion, the publicity impact of ACH'87 remained small. The struggle waged by CityEvent organizers and many other actors in Amsterdam against the city's cliché tourist imagery dates back to at least the beginning of the twentieth century, if not longer. The question therefore remains if it is useful to keep trying to resist such a powerful and apparently well-rooted imagery by actively denying or dismissing it. Other strategies that do not refute the stereotypical imagery of the city, but instead aim at supplementing it by highlighting other aspects of the city might perhaps be more effective in the long run.

10.6.2 Berlin

Due to its turbulent history, Berlin does not face the same image problem as Amsterdam. Historical events have forced the city to reinvent itself constantly. Instead of focusing on obvious differences, let us first pay attention to possible resemblances. What is remarkable about the 1936 Olympics and E-88 is the political-ideological motivation the authorities had for staging these CityEvents. In both cases, the generic event formulas were appropriated in such a manner that ideological agendas could be pursued. The Olympic Games were used as a charm diplomatic offensive not only to promote the 'New Germany' to the rest of the world, but also to convince the western powers that the Nazi government was a friendly and orderly regime and a respectable ally in the struggle against Bolshevism. The political objectives that played a role in the case of E-88 can, of course, by no means be compared to those of the 1936 Games. Nonetheless, the staging of E-88 was also motivated by an overtly ideological agenda, namely to promote the notion that East and West Berlin and East and West Germany were culturally one and should therefore be reunited at some point in the future. In both cases, the interests of the state coincided with those of the city. Even though the staging of the 1936 Olympics was clearly dominated by the national socialist state, the CityEvent also offered Berlin the opportunity to reaffirm its position as the mythical capital of the Third Reich. In the case of E-88, the city was less overwhelmed by the state, but both actors still shared an interest in raising Berlin's profile internationally in order to remind the world of

the fact that Western Europe's last outpost in the communist East should not be forgotten. Hence, Berlin can be seen as a city with a highly politicized tradition of appropriating CityEvents for ideological purposes, even though it is difficult to predict whether this tradition will continue now that the city is reinventing itself again after the collapse of the wall.

Another resemblance to Amsterdam is that both the Nazis and the Werkstatt Team represented Berlin as a great cultural city, albeit of course in very different manners. In 1936, Berlin was not presented as a city of artists, but as the 'imperial' cultural centre of the New Germany. In contrast, E-88 focused on the alternative contemporary avant-garde scene. This difference in presentation is also illustrative for the way approaches to arts and culture in Berlin changed over the course of the twentieth century. During the Nazi Olympics, arts and culture were mobilized to impress foreign media and visitors, and to display the superiority and advancement of the Third Reich. When E-88 was hosted, arts and culture were no longer used to proclaim the supremacy of the German nation state; instead, they were mobilized to create a more attractive image of the city with the purpose of luring residents, businesses, tourists and capital to Berlin. This different approach to arts and culture also had a spatial resonance. Whereas the Nazis used architecture, art and urban planning to create homogenous places and to remove or cover up subversive elements for the 1936 Olympics, in 1988 a completely different approach was taken. Arts and culture were deliberately used to draw attention to Berlin's uncanny and abandoned places. In other words, a comparison between the 1936 Olympics and E-88 confronts us with the difference between, on the one hand, the strategic deployment of arts and culture to reduce ambiguity and establish a totalitarian space, and, on the other, the mobilization of arts and culture to open up places and display their heterogeneity.

10.6.3 Helsinki

Helsinki went one step further than even Berlin. For the cultural year, arts and culture were not only strategically used to attract foreign visitors, businesses and capital, but they were also approached as a field that would generate economic growth. To facilitate this, the ECOC had to be integrated with broader urban regeneration programs that aimed at strengthening the city's cultural sector and international profile. Indeed, Helsinki has a strong tradition of embedding the hosting of CityEvents in larger urban development programs. Because the Olympic Games and the ECOC were the only two genuine CityEvents hosted by the city in the twentieth century, it is possible to draw more definite conclusions about Helsinki than about Amsterdam or Berlin.

If we were to characterize Helsinki as a host city, we can conclude that the city has used CityEvents as opportunities to fuel broader urban changes by heavily investing in the built environment and in technological infrastructures. Despite the different historical contexts, the huge investments that were made for the 1952 Olympics and the ECOC (hel.2000.fi) were prompted by a similar agenda, namely to (re)connect Helsinki and Finland politically and economically to the West. In 1952 as well as in 2000, the geographical and political distance to Western Europe was perceived as an obstacle to the development of both the Finnish nation and Helsinki. Thus, Helsinki has always approached the hosting of CityEvents from a broad, long-term perspective. For both the Olympics and the ECOC such an integrated approach was only possible because a wide coalition of actors was established long before the CityEvents were staged.

Both with the 1952 Games and the 2000 ECOC, the interests of the Finnish state and Helsinki coincided. Nevertheless, a remarkable difference can be identified. In 1952, and even more so in the case of the cancelled 1940 Games, Helsinki merely acted as a stage for the nation state. The investments that were made to build the Olympic venues and village were above all directed at architectural projects intended to exhibit the sovereignty of the Finnish nation and to display the country's advancements in the fields of science, technology and social legislation. The construction of large infrastructures, such as a new airport and a submarine telegraph cable, should also be seen in this light. While these projects undoubtedly increased Helsinki's international connections, they were above all intended to benefit the nation as a whole. In this regard, Helsinki functioned primarily as Finland's gateway to the West.

In the case of the ECOC, the nation state was less prominent and, consequently, the city was able to put itself at the centre of the event. This not only became clear in the 'Come to Your Senses in Helsinki' advertising campaign, but also in the connection that was established between the cultural year and the investments made to strengthen the city's cultural sector. In addition, Helsinki's fairly rapid transformation into a centre of high-tech development and business contributed to its rising profile as a city. Because it used the ECOC as a platform to exhibit a connection between its emerging high-tech industry and its increasing vitality as a cultural centre, Helsinki no longer merely functioned as Finland's gateway to Europe. The city had transformed itself into the nation's largest economic centre and demanded a place on the international stage in its own right.

Despite this reversed relationship on the level of representation, some remarkable continuities can also be identified. In 1952 and in 2000, Helsinki presented itself to the rest of the world by creating an imagery that closely linked Finnish cultural identity to science and technology. In both cases, future-oriented images of progress in the fields of science, technology, architecture and social legislation dominated historical (re)presentations of Helsinki and the Finnish nation. In 1952, advancements in the fields of healthcare, architecture and urban planning were presented as an integral part of the post-war construction of the Finnish welfare state. In 2000, Helsinki's presentation as a cultural centre was linked to the city's transformation into one of Europe's leading high-tech centres. Both times, the images through which Helsinki presented itself, expressed a strong, modernist belief in the future. In addition, both CityEvents marked Helsinki's and Finland's reorientation toward the West and thus connected to the broader reformulation of Finnish cultural identity set in motion by the historical events of the Cold War and the collapse of the Communist Block. We can therefore conclude that Helsinki has consistently used CityEvents not only as strategies to reposition itself in a changing world, but also as a festive tactic to reorient and reinvent its identity throughout the twentieth century.

10.7 EVOLUTION OF GENERIC EVENT FORMULAS

Not only the host cities have undergone developments and transformations; so have the CityEvents we have studied. With each staging of the Olympic Games and the ECOC, new dimensions were added to their generic event formulas, without, however, completely changing their essence. The evolution of the generic event formulas manifested itself in the first place in the growing scale of the events. Next to

this, the addition of new rituals and ceremonies are only of minor importance. In this section, the evolution of the Olympic Games and ECOC will only be summarized briefly, because extensive conclusions were already drawn at the end of parts 2 and 3.

10.7.1 Olympic Games

The Olympic Games not only grew in size and reputation as a result of growing media exposure, but the media's power in the overall production process also increased in the sense that the media affected the relations between the key actors more and more. As a result of the transition from printed press to live radio and television coverage, ever more information and images of the host city and the CityEvent were needed to keep up the news flows. Consequently, there was a growing demand for the whole urban environment to be made more attractive. Only then would the media have enough content to represent the host city in a favourable manner. The introduction of electronic media also led to higher demands being made of a host city's communication infrastructure. As a result, the hosting of the Olympic Games became progressively more integrated with broader urban development schemes in which a modest redecoration of urban space made way for comprehensive urban expansion programs. This development correlates with a shift in financial focus from the direct revenue generated during the Olympics themselves to more comprehensive approaches that concentrate on generating longer-lasting spin-off effects.

10.7.2 European Capitals of Culture

The ECOC's event owner has evolved from a small coalition of political actors supporting a loose political initiative into an institution that has nestled comfortably in the amalgamation of networks that constitute the EU. The institutionalization of the ECOC was paralleled by the emergence of economy-based approaches to arts and culture. Because of this, the ECOC has increasingly been used as a city marketing tool that supersedes the level of mere tourist promotion. This process towards 'event-based place selling' entailed a change in the programming of the ECOC from highbrow culture to a broader selection in which avant-garde culture, highbrow art, popular culture and new media technology were combined in order to reach larger and more varied audiences. While this development coincided with a growing media interest in the ECOC, media technologies at the same time became more and more fragmented. In this regard, the Helsinki ECOC seems to indicate a trend in the relation between the media (in particular the Internet) and the programming of CityEvents and their host cities, which will increasingly feature processes of spatial and informational fragmentation accompanied by a simultaneous homogenization and centralization.

10.8 DEVELOPMENTS AND TRANSFORMATIONS

In this section, general developments and transformations in the hosting of CityEvents, derived from our analysis of the six case studies, will be outlined. This way, a general history can be written about the phenomenon I have called, throughout this study, "event-based place selling". As stated above, it is at the level of network dynamics that general synchronic comparisons can be made between the case studies. This general comparative level of inquiry urges us to focus on the changing

relationships between the three key actors that principally determine the production process of every CityEvent: the media, the host city and the event owner. Changes in the relations between these actors are indicative of changing network dynamics. In this regard, we noticed that over the course of the twentieth century the key actors media and host city became increasingly integrated due to the annexation of media technologies by the host city. Also, the nation state seemed to decrease in importance as an intermediate actor negotiating relations between the media, the event owner and the host city. In the Olympic case studies, the nation state did seem to dominate the amalgamation of networks that constituted the host city to some extent. However, from our analysis of the ECOCs it became clear that cities increasingly pursued their own local political, economic and cultural agendas and that the role of the nation state became more and more reduced to that of a subsidizer. This shows, for instance, in the presentation and representation of the host city in relation to both events. National symbols, landmarks and histories were increasingly supplemented with the host city's specific local characteristics. Thus, a development can be identified from a situation in which the (re)presentation of the CityEvent and its host city was overshadowed by images of the nation to one characterized by promotion and marketing strategies in which the host city itself plays a central role.

10.8.1 European Culture and Identity

The changing role of the nation state corresponds to developments regarding European culture and identity. Throughout the twentieth century, thinking about Europe was characterized by several ideas that sometimes complemented and sometimes contradicted each other, including Europe as a universal idea or as the birthplace of Western civilization, Europe as consisting of nation states, Europe as divided (during the Cold War), Europe as a cultural unity, and Europe as composed of Regions (Mikkeli and Campling, 1998; Den Boer et al., 1995; Caljé and Den Hollander, 1998). In our Olympic case studies, the idea of Europe as composed of nations was dominant. The nation state played a leading role in these events and expressions of nationalism and patriotism abounded in the (re)presentation of the Games and their host cities. At the same time, nationalism was supplemented with references to a common European and/or universal history and culture (Rydell, 1993; Segrave, 2000). The Nazi Olympics most clearly illustrated how fierce nationalism not only focused on local history and culture, but also drew heavily on the ancient European tradition (Mandell, 1972; Bohlen, 1979). This link to the classics is, of course, inherent to the generic formula of the Olympic Games, but it was nevertheless much less present during the Games in Amsterdam and Helsinki. In the latter case, the division of Europe into East and West played a dominant role in how the Finnish nation presented itself. We encountered a view of Finland as constantly balancing between two power blocks, just like Europe was permanently struggling with its own geopolitical division.

The idea of a divided Europe also played a strong role in the ECOCs of Amsterdam and Berlin, although not so much on the immediate level of military power. Instead, ACH'87 and E-88 emphasized the notion of Europe as a cultural unity. This idea, however, was not the same as the Eurocentric view characterizing the Olympic Games. Rather, it consisted of the politically motivated standpoint that people on both sides of the iron curtain were culturally still one. Consequently, the organizers of ACH'87 and E-88 used their events to (re)establish cultural ties with artists from the East. Another difference from the Helsinki Olympics was the more

prominent role that Amsterdam and Berlin played as host cities. The latter two controlled their cultural agenda, their identity and their (re)presentation much more tightly than Helsinki did. In 1952, Helsinki functioned more or less as a platform for the Finnish state. This contrasts with the role the city played when hosting the ECOC in the millennium year. By then, the idea of European cultural unity had partly been replaced by the notion of a Europe of regions, focusing on local and regional identity and diversity. Even though today the nation state still plays a prominent role in European politics and identity formation, from our analysis of the six CityEvents we can conclude that host cities increasingly seem to push their own cultural agendas. This change in the relation between the nation and the city has consequences for the way cities host events.

10.8.2 From Short-Term to Long-Term Impact

By increasingly expressing their own local qualities, culture and identity, host cities have shifted their attention from short-term goals, such as the direct revenue generated through ticket sales, to mid-term and long-term objectives. This shows most clearly when we compare the Amsterdam Olympics of 1928 with hel.2000.fi. In the first case, the organizing committee and authorities aimed to generate enough revenue during the two weeks of the Games to cover the expenditures made to organize the event. In the case of hel.2000.fi, such a calculation was deemed irrelevant. Instead, indirect and/or long-term objectives were mentioned, such as raising Helsinki's and Finland's profiles abroad and developing Helsinki as a tourist destination. To achieve such long-term goals, the hosting of CityEvents has increasingly become embedded in larger urban (re)development plans designed to reposition the host city. Broader economic goals, such as making the city attractive to visitors, investors and businesses or generating new areas of economic activity, have become leading incentives for hosting CityEvents.

To fulfil long-term objectives, alignments with large coalitions of actors have to be made in a much earlier stage than when the focus was still on short-term effects. In other words, broad local support is necessary and it requires more time and investment to implement the generic event formula in such a way that more durable effects can be produced. The extent to which a particular type of CityEvent is integrated with larger repositioning strategies also depends on the reputation and tradition its generic event formula has built up. The analysis of the Olympic Games and ECOC showed that the host cities which integrated the staging of these CityEvents with broader urban development programs hosted these events only after their generic event formulas had already been implemented several times by other cities. The 1936 and 1952 Games and Helsinki ECOC were, for instance, staged when these events had already matured.

Our analysis of the case studies also pointed out that the development towards a long-term strategic approach to hosting CityEvents has spatial resonances. With regard to both the Olympic Games and the ECOC a shift can be identified from investments that were made to beautify the city specifically for the event itself by decorating its main avenues and constructing impressive and monumental buildings, to a more integral approach in which the construction of new prestigious buildings and the redecoration of public space not only served to impress the event's audiences, but were also expected to stimulate the development of economic activities.

10.8.3 Changing Approaches to Arts and Culture

This shift from ‘monumental’ spatial interventions to urban regeneration strategies also corresponds to a changing approach to arts and culture. In our description of the development of the ECOC, we noted that host cities increasingly began to realize that arts and culture are not only means to impress others, but also strategic assets to attract investments, businesses and tourists to a city. From our analysis of the Olympic Games, and in particular the Nazi Olympics, it became clear that arts and culture were initially seen as means to express the level of advancement, civilization and grandeur of the host city and host nation. Not coincidentally, many cultural expressions, such as the architecture of the Olympic Venues, constituted showcases of nationalism demonstrating the advancements of the whole nation rather than those of the host city alone. It is in this initial stage that, within the triangular CityEvent network, the nation state played a dominant role as intermediate actor between the host city, event owner and media. Arts and culture were seen as necessary expenditures in the production process of CityEvents, designed to impress foreign visitors and media. They added prestige and grandeur to the host city. While this approach to arts and culture has not completely disappeared, arts and culture are increasingly seen as important secondary location factors, crucial for attracting and retaining residents, tourists, businesses and capital. At the time of the Helsinki ECOC, this view had evolved into a strategy in which arts and culture were used to generate economic growth. Besides Helsinki, other cities like Glasgow, Lille, Barcelona, Rotterdam and many others have adopted this strategy when hosting large events (García, 2004a; McDonogh, 1999; Berg et al., 2000; Richard and Wilson, 2004). We can thus summarize the transformation in the way arts and culture have been used in hosting CityEvents as follows: arts and culture no longer only cost money, they also generate it.

10.8.4 Media

The transformation in the approach to arts and culture cannot be understood without referring to the changing role of the news media. News media have gained in importance within the overall production process of CityEvents: the staging of such events, as well as their more durable integration with urban development strategies, has become increasingly dependent on (positive) news media coverage. Despite the differences that exist between various CityEvents in the type of media coverage patterns that they generate, the analysis of the six case studies suggests that there is a positive relation between an increase in media coverage and technologies on the one hand, and a growth in the scale of CityEvents on the other.

To facilitate media operations, host cities have had to increase their investments in media infrastructures. As has been stressed in the second part of this book, the physical-infrastructure dimensions of the media are often overlooked in research on the hosting of large events such as the Olympic Games and the ECOC. While new stadiums, museums and other eye-catching structures vie for our attention, the less visible, but no doubt equally essential investments in information and telecommunication infrastructures remain underexposed.

From the analysis of the Berlin and Helsinki Olympics it became clear that the increasing investments in media infrastructures correlate with a transition in media coverage from the printed press to electronic media that allow for live broadcasting. In comparison to the printed press, electronic but also digital media rely on vast infrastructures that put much higher demands on host cities of CityEvents. Because of

these infrastructures, electronic media are able to overcome spatiotemporal obstacles to a much greater degree than the printed press. Since information, images and exciting stories can reach remote audiences faster than before, photographs and illustrations of events, symbols and landmarks no longer satisfy the growing demand of these audiences (Gorman and McLean, 2003). In the past, the delay that characterized press reports and news reels allowed for more editing of still and moving images, thus enabling photographers, illustrators and cameramen to capture and repeatedly show the most favourable or impressive parts of the host city (Burgess and Gold, 1985; Friedberg, 1993; Schwartz, 1995, 1998).

With the introduction of live media coverage, it seems that the urban environment increasingly has to be (re)decorated in order to provide the (electronic) news media with sufficiently newsworthy stories and images. Live radio reports and television broadcasts do not necessarily limit themselves to the selective editing of the urban environment that is characteristic of the printed press and cinema. While more research should be conducted to arrive at more definite conclusions, our analysis suggests that the increasing investment in media infrastructures to facilitate electronic news media correlates with the increasing investment in urban planning to beautify the host city as a whole.

Not surprisingly, host cities have come to attach greater importance to their image. What is remarkable in this regard is the change in perception of city images by local authorities. City images have changed from a way of promoting a city to a necessary asset for safeguarding its social and economic vitality. In our case studies, this view was first expressed in Berlin when it came to legitimating the hosting of the ECOC in 1988. This confirms findings by scholars such as Bianchini and Parkinson (1993), David Harvey (1989) and Ward (1998), who date the increasing awareness of city images and place selling to the mid 1980s. That the local authorities and event organizers of the ECOCs in Berlin and Helsinki considered an attractive and widely circulated city image a condition for luring and retaining tourists, residents, businesses and capital, also shows in the way their cities were promoted. Compared to the Olympic Games and the Amsterdam ECOC, the presentation of Berlin and Helsinki by means of the 1988 and 2000 ECOCs illustrates a transformation in promotion activities from listing the attractions and qualities of the host city to lifestyle-centred advertising strategies in which the consumer's experience of the city is the focal point. In the case of *hel.2000.fi*, the focus on lifestyles, niche marketing and consumer experience was even stronger than in Berlin. Thus, E-88 offered us an insight into the early stage of the transition towards what I have called the "festive programming" of the city, which came to full fruition in Helsinki.

10.8.5 Towards the Twentieth First Century

From the observations listed above, several conclusions can be drawn, the most important of which is undoubtedly that there is a relation between fragmenting media audiences and the emergence of experience-based consumption patterns on the one hand, and changing interventions in place on the part of the host city on the other. This showed in the programming of *hel.2000.fi* and, to a lesser extent, E-88. Host cities no longer only stage program parts of the ECOC in the city centre or in established cultural institutions. The organizers of E-88, for instance, temporarily opened up abandoned buildings and sites as places where culture could be produced, distributed and consumed. In Helsinki, this approach was further enhanced: not only were formerly abandoned buildings converted into permanent cultural centres, but the

programming of the cultural year also reached into the suburbs of the city. The ECOC was thus geographically spread out. At the same time, this fragmentation was partially compensated for by the event's website, which created a virtual unity by bringing the different and geographically spread program parts together in one place. Thus, current and future host cities will increasingly have to broaden and simultaneously specify the programming and marketing of CityEvents in order to capture the attention of increasingly fragmented audiences. As was demonstrated in the case of the Helsinki ECOC, fragmented audiences seem to correlate with a fragmentation or geographical dispersal of CityEvent program parts over the host city at large.

In this respect, the analysis of the case studies points out that the relationship between physical place and place images is a recurring principle. This was confirmed, for example, by the polemics that arose about the representation of Berlin's past during E-88. Our analysis of hel.2000.fi, moreover, pointed out that the relationship between physical place and city images has become more complex due to the fragmentation of audiences and the diversification of media technologies on the one hand, and the integration of hosting CityEvents with broader urban (re)development programs on the other. Mass marketing has increasingly been replaced by niche marketing and more personalized marketing strategies, which most notably involve Internet technology. Thus, by means of websites, people were able to construct their own image of hel.2000.fi and its host city. The interactive nature of websites allows people to compose their own program from the overall program that a CityEvent offers. In this manner, people themselves are actively able to reaffirm or supplement their associations with a city. Insofar as there ever existed a single cohesive imagery of a host city, this imagery has fallen apart as a result of the introduction of more personalized media coverage and marketing and has increasingly been replaced by fragmented and highly personalized images. To understand this development, we had to involve changing consumption patterns in our analysis.

Because we involved macro-social developments in our analysis without always tracing actors in local networks to verify these developments, we were not able to work exclusively within ANT. This points to a practical and epistemological problem that is inherent to an ANT-inspired approach like the CityEvent model. According to Latour (1993; 1999a), abstract and macro-sociological categories like race, class, globalization and changing consumption patterns, such as the shift from mass consumption to lifestyle-based acts of consumption, are empty labels as long as it remains impossible to study them at the level of local, tangible actor relations. Following Latour, in order to understand consumer practices we have to re-conceptualize them in terms of local networks and follow the actors to comprehend the process that constitutes them. Yet, it does not always suffice to study and comprehend processes like changing consumption patterns at this level only. It is here that the network epistemology of ANT becomes problematic, as is vividly expressed in the following quote.

All functioning of the network must be explained in the mundane terms of the network itself. Taken to its logical limits this means [for example] that (...) if you want to analyze coffee trade, [according to ANT logic] it suffices to analyze the specific market and neglect the larger economic context created by the IMF and the neoliberal policies it advocates. Any reference to larger structural developments is by definition excluded (Teurlings, 2004: 28).

The coffee trade, or in our case the changing consumption patterns of CityEvents, are phenomena that are not completely traceable at the level of tangible, local actor-network relations. Therefore, we have adhered to a pragmatic approach by invoking

macro-sociological research at those points in the analysis where an ANT-based reconstruction of phenomena would exceed the scope of this study.

By involving macro-sociological insights in our analysis, we were able to reconstruct how arts and culture have increasingly become consumable experiences that manifested as such in the promotion and marketing of CityEvents and their host cities. This turn towards experience-based consumption has not only led to an individualization of consumption, but also signals a trend towards a festive programming of host cities. People's experience of place has increasingly become transformed into the activity of consuming place. CityEvents play a central role in this process, because they enable host cities to invest places in the city with new meanings and experiences, thereby generating consumption and thus economic activity.

While it goes too far to draw any absolute conclusions from our analysis of hel.2000.fi and E-88, the tentative generalizations above can be made on the basis of the network dynamics that were identified in the analysis of the six case studies. In this regard, the case of hel.2000.fi can be envisaged as the outcome of a lengthy transformation process.

10.9 FINAL REFLECTIONS

At the level of network dynamics, recurring power relations can be identified. All six case studies showed in one way or another that CityEvents are always political events. Due to their media impact, CityEvents easily lend themselves to being used by national and local authorities to pursue certain political goals. There is, therefore, no such thing as an apolitical CityEvent. This is not surprising, considering the enormous scale and cost of staging CityEvents. In all our case studies, the CityEvent in question required state support, which means it inevitably partakes in a political decision-making process. The exploitation of CityEvents for political purposes is not bound to specific historical periods. Whether the interests at stake were geopolitical, as in the case of the Berlin Olympics, or economic, as in the Helsinki ECOC, the state or local authorities always tried to influence the manner in which CityEvents were staged. It was only in the case of ACH'87 that the state and the Amsterdam municipality experienced difficulties in putting a strong political mark on its organization. But even in this case, politics played a prominent role, since the organizers used ACH'87 as a platform to reaffirm the cultural unity of Eastern and Western Europe. While nowadays many CityEvents, such as the ECOC in Glasgow, the Barcelona Olympics and the World Expo in Hanover, seem to be used as strategies to (re)generate urban economies, other events, like the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, appear as 'hypermodernist' events in which the nation state pushes a geopolitical and economic agenda, announcing its claim to a leading role in the international political arena.

When delineating the theoretical framework in the first part of this book, questions regarding power were raised in relation to ANT methodology. It was mentioned then that by following actors in a network, ANT runs the risk of only tracing the most powerful actors, so that what is ultimately written is an official history. After all, official history is usually constructed by focusing on the most powerful actors, the ones leaving the most visible imprints, while marginalized actors might 'silently' leave the network. In this study, we have tried to avoid writing official histories only. In the case of the Berlin Olympics, for example, I discussed the

position of the Marzahn Roma. Yet, despite adding a different perspective, this example also reaffirms the previous point that ANT tends to follow successful actors at the cost of actors that did not manage to obtain a central position in the various networks constituting the CityEvent. During my archival research into the Berlin Olympics, I did not encounter any documents about or traces of the Marzahn Roma. Quite possibly, these archives did contain some documents about the Marzahn Roma that were not explicitly linked to the archive concerning the 1936 Games. Only through secondary sources (Benz, 1994; Mandell, 1972; Bohlen, 1979) did this marginalized group enter my perspective. While admitting that every researcher makes mistakes and that I could have investigated the archives more extensively, the argument stands that the following of actor traces betrays an inherent tendency to focus on the most powerful actors. The reason for this is that traces of these actors often remain in some form or another, while the traces of those actors not able to establish productive alignments, and therefore not able to oppose or resist the interests of other actors, are often destroyed, remain un-archived or are so slight that they are easily overlooked.

Considering this, reconstructing CityEvents and the historical development of event-based place selling is not a risk-free operation; it is likely to allow dominant perspectives to overshadow marginalized ideas, beliefs or groups. This in turn has consequences for how we remember and memorialize CityEvents. Here, we return to the temporal dimension of CityEvents. In the third chapter, several phases were delineated that characterize the production process of CityEvents. One of these phases, namely that of closure and memorialization, has, however, only been discussed theoretically rather than being studied in practice by means of the case studies. Since the main focus of this research lay on the question of how CityEvents are produced, little attention was given to what happens afterwards.

Following ANT logic, the amalgamation of networks established to produce a CityEvent does not completely disappear after the festivities. Proof of this is provided by the Olympic stadiums that are still standing, a film like Riefenstahl's *Olympiad* and many other objects, places and media texts and images that remain after the events themselves. Our analysis of the material dimension of the mediation of CityEvents not only draws attention to media infrastructures, but also to the places where media remains are archived, categorized and further distributed. Thus, the media impact, and therefore also the audience impact of a CityEvent is not produced only at the time the event is staged, but also in retrospect. The Nazi Olympics are the most vivid example of this, because the perception of these Games completely altered years after it took place. During the event itself, most foreign journalists and visitors had been greatly impressed and two years later, Leni Riefenstahl received a *medaille d'or* for her film of the Olympics. It was only during World War II that the same film and the same event started to bring very different associations to mind (Downing, 1992).

Drawing on Hetherington's (1996) analysis of place, meaning only changes if the order of actor alignments has changed. This suggests that the remaining traces of CityEvents can only change meaning when new alignments with different actors are established. Thus, not only the staging of a CityEvent is a process in which actors actively have to establish alignments with each other, but the same applies to its memorialization. Memories are actively constructed, so if host cities want to prolong the impact of a CityEvent, they have to produce memories by linking what they perceive as the 'right' traces to each other. This implies that networks have to be set up to archive, categorize, distribute and circulate the media remains of the CityEvent

effectively. Since many of these remains are not located in the host city itself—after all, when a CityEvent is covered, media transport information, images and sounds from the city to remote audiences—host cities increasingly have to expand their geographical network range by linking up to other places where traces of the CityEvent are located.

Despite the criticisms that can be made of ANT and the CityEvent model, this approach has enabled us to develop a framework for studying and comprehending the complex spatiotemporal dimensions of cities and the large footloose events they host. By defining and studying CityEvents, we have been able to unravel the network dynamics that allow cities to expand in different (remote) locations at the same time. Through these connections, the world not only comes to the host city but the host city also comes to the rest of the world. For a host city to attract worldwide audiences, it has to transport itself to many locales across the globe and present itself there. From our analysis of the case studies, it became clear that scale is networked and that this networking of scale leads to a mobilization of place. CityEvents thus provide cities with a ‘booster effect’ that enables them to reposition themselves internationally, because the media and audience attention that these events construct and attract leads to an intensified mobilization of place and networking of scale.

This process has accelerated since the introduction of electronic media. Whereas spatiotemporal obstacles still characterized the media coverage of CityEvents in the glory days of the conventional press and cinema, since the introduction of electronic media CityEvents take place in many localities simultaneously. Yet, as our analysis of the case studies, and in particular the Helsinki Olympics, showed, coverage by electronic media is by no means an exclusively virtual process. Compared to the conventional press and cinema, electronic media require vast infrastructures and the mobilization of the host city is therefore the effect of a networking of many different material locations that are required to capture, edit, distribute and circulate the electronic sounds and images across the globe. Examples of such locations are television studios, radio and telephone transmission centres, extraterrestrial satellite orbits, radio and television sets around the globe, servers and, not least, the extensive transport infrastructures, in particular the airport terminals used to fly in journalists from all over the world. All these locations actively connect the host city to other remote places, turning it into a multi-place. In this respect, CityEvents function as catalysts that provide an enormous impulse to a city’s ability to expand the range and mass of the networks with which it aligns itself. The staging of CityEvents thus results in a temporal and spatial expansion of the host city.

But what remains of this vast geographical expansion of host cities when CityEvents come to a close? Only small parts of it continue to exist after the event and, even then, these traces often take a different form. The few alignments that remain compose what is commonly referred to as the long-term impact of hosting large international events, producing effects such as a lasting growth in the number of tourists, investments, and new businesses, as well as the improvement of a city’s reputation and prestige in the context of urban hierarchies. However, the exact way in which long-term impacts and memories are produced by the post-CityEvent network falls outside the scope of this work and remains to be addressed in future research.

PRIMARY SOURCES

In this overview are listed all the archives and sources that have been consulted for this research. Of all sources, only those sources are mentioned which are actually referred to in this book, or which otherwise have been of great importance for this research. The consulted archives, sources and interviews are listed per case study. Reference indications are listed in the original language such as they are used by the archives or in English.

1928 Amsterdam Olympic Games

Consulted Archives:

Gemeente Archief Amsterdam (Amsterdam City Archives, Amsterdam). Visited on January 28 and 30, 2003.

Index: Ons Amsterdam Register, jaargangen (volumes) 1-50: 1949-1998.
Olympische Spelen 1928: jaargang 30, pagina's 191, 202-213, 215-218; jaargang 38, pagina's 225, 327-333.

Register Gemeentebblad (Municipality Index) 1925
Folders: I 825; II 957
Nederlandsch Olympisch Comité. Verlenen bijdrage van fl. 500.000,-

Register Gemeentebblad (Municipality Index) 1926
Folders: I 33; II 36, 42.
Nederlandsch Olympisch Comité. Regelingen met het NOC in verband met de Olympische Spelen.

Folders: I 33, 1944, 216; II 36, 42.
Olympische Spelen: exploitatie Nederlandsch sportpark en opmerkingen bouw nieuw stadion.

Register Gemeentebblad (Municipality Index) 1927
Folders: I 1454; II 1269.
Nederlandsch Olympisch Comité. Wijzigingen van de met het NOC gesloten overeenkomst.

Folders: I 760,763, 2353; II 589, 838, 845.
Olympische Spelen: bouw stadion.

Folders: I 2647; II 2761.
Huisvesting bezoekers.

Folder: II 1785
Verzoek van de Commissie van Culturele en Economische Propaganda voor subsidie.

Register Gemeentebblad (Municipality Index) 1928
Folders: I 135, 613; II 107, 629
Olympische Spelen: Subsidie Commissie Culturele en Economische Propaganda en de Vereniging De Amsterdamsche Pers.

Folders: I 525, II 524
Promotie boekje/reisgids

Folders: I 451, II 523

Stadsverfraaiing

Folders: I 667, 799, 826, 854, 906; II 684, 960, 1030, 1458.

Volksfeesten

Folders: I 958, 999.

Verbod vertooning films over de Olympische Spelen.

Het Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (National Dutch Archives, The Hague) Visited on February 13 and 19, 2003.

Toegangsnummer (access number) 2.19.124

Content: Archief (archives) NOC 1912-1993

Folders (folders): 61, 62, 63, 64, 141, 142, 143, 171, 176, 177, 178, 270, 271, 272 and 328.

Folders 61-64

- Bestuursvergaderingen NOC, 1912-1934.

Folders 141- 143

- Jaarvergaderingen NOC, 1919-1930.

Folder 171

- NOC, derde jaarverslag, 1915-1916.
- NOC, tiende jaarverslag, 1922-1923.
- NOC, elfde jaarverslag, 1923-1924.
- NOC, twaalfde jaarverslag, 1924-1925.
- NOC, veertiende jaarverslag, 1926-1927.

Folder 1977

- NOC, jaarverslagen, 1913-1932

Folder 178

- NOC vijftiende jaarverslag, 1927-1928.
- NOC, jaarverslagen, 1913-1948

Folder 270-272

- Oud-bestuursleden, 1912-1985.

Folder 328

- Photo's, cartoons of winning athletes, the organisers and employees of the organising committee of the 1928 Games.
- Correspondence on the presentation of the Official Report on the 1928 Amsterdam Olympic Games.

Toegangsnummer (access number) 2.05.21

Inventaris (inventory) 1755

Content: Correspondentie Olympische Spelen Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

- Correspondence between Baron van Tyull van Serooskerken, the Mayor of Amsterdam and the Minister of Foreign Affairs about Van Tuyll's request to support his bids for the 1928 Games at the annual IOC meeting on April 23rd, 1923.

Toegangsnummer 2.02.05.02

Content: Notulen Ministerraad en Rijksbegroting
 Folders: 216,217 and 218

Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Den Haag (Royal Dutch Library, The Hague). Not visited, documentation requested and delivered through Het Nationaal Archief.

Requested source: IXe Olympiade: Officieel Gedenboek van de Spelen der IXe Olympiade Amsterdam 1928.

Private archive collection of Paul Arnoldussen, Amsterdam. This archive was set up by Paul Arnoldussen for his work on a book on the Amsterdam Olympics. The archive contains copies from newspapers and official documents from the Gemeente Archief Amsterdam, Het Nationaal Archief, Den Haag and the Archives of the International Olympic Committee in Lausanne. Most copies are marked with reference numbers from the original archives. For reasons of expediency, I have relied a lot on Arnoldussen's archive. The archive is on file with Arnoldussen himself.

Olympische Spelen 1928, krantenknipsel (press cuttings):

All references to original newspaper articles that have been used in chapter 4 can be found in the following folders. The Index Archive Numbers from Arnoldussen's archive correspond with the original reference numbers of the Amsterdam City Archives.

Index Dates:	Index Archive Numbers according to the Amsterdam City Archives:
Folder 22/3/1921 - 28/1/1921	54942 - 78453
Folder 5/3/1927 - 30/5/1928	78454 - 78641
Folder 31/5/1928 - 26/7/1928	78642 - 78785
Folder 26/7/1928 - 3/8/1928	78786 - 78936
Folder 4/8/1928 - 9/12/1928	78937 - 79076

The original archives of the organizing committee of the 1928 Amsterdam Olympic Games unfortunately do no longer exist. According to the employees of the Gemeente Archief Amsterdam the archives have either been destroyed some years after the Games, when the Dutch Olympic Committee cleaned up its offices, or the archive was destroyed as the result of a German bomb attack on The Hague during World War II. At the time, the Dutch Olympic Committee's headquarters and archives were located in The Hague and heavily damaged by the air raids.

1936 Berlin Olympic Games

Consulted Archives:

Bundesarchiv, Standort Berlin Lichterfelde (National German Archives, location Berlin, Lichterfelde). Visited from 4 till 11 November 2003.

Access number: 24339

Content: Organisations-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936. (1937). *XI Olympiade Berlin 1936: Amtlicher Bericht (Band 1 und 2)*. Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag.

Access number: R/43/II/729

Content: Correspondence of various kind:

- Letter from the IOC to the German government.
- Letters from Dr. Lewald to Baillet-LaTour and Dr. Lewald
- Letter to Hitler regarding the patronage of the 1936 Games.
- Signed letter by Hitler accepting the patronage of the 1936 Games.
- Anti-German lobby organisations against the discrimination of Jews.

- Visit of USA diplomat Sherill to Berlin regarding the anti-German lobby.
- Letters of the Ministry of Propaganda.
- Letters from Von Tschammer von Osten to Hitler, requesting a subsidy for an archaeological expedition in Greece.

Access number: R/55/1054

Content: Foreign press reports made by the Nazis to monitor foreign press coverage during the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games.

Access number: R/55/1473

Content: 'Bereinigung des Stadtbildes. Ortssatzung zur Bereinigung des Stadtbildes'.

Access number: R/1501/5613

Content: Correspondence and visit of USA diplomat Sherill, regarding the exclusion of German Jewish athletes from the German Olympic Team.

Access number R/4902/1701

Content: Various foreign press cuttings

Access number: NS/5/VI/19415.

Content: Various German press cuttings

- "Der Marathon Sieger". *Tagesblatt Wocheschau*. 16 August 1936, vol 6, issue 33.

- 'The Mayor Greets Bremen's Olympic Guests'. *Bremer Zeitung*. nr., 229, August, 18, 1936. Special English sections were included in German newspapers during the Olympic Games for foreign visitors.

Access number: NS/31/88

Content: Standortbefehl, 23-07-1936, regarding regulations wearing uniform dress.

Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße. (State Library in Berlin). Visited November 15, 2003

Content: Olympia Pressdienst nr. 1 (21/12/1933) till nr. 33 (10/11/1936).

Accessnumber Os 6601/236-1933/36

All the issues of the Olympia Pressdienst are together available in book format.

Official reference: Olympia Pressdienst: Olympische Spiele Berlin 1936. Berlin:

Organisation-Komitee für die XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936.

Zentrum für Berlin Studien, Berlin (Centre for Berlin Studies, Berlin). Visited November 19, 2003.

Access number: B975 OLY 12

Content: Promotion brochure "Olympische Spiele Berlin 1936: 1-16 August".

Access number: B 975 OLY 51

Content: XI. Olympiade Berlin 1936: Presseführer

Access number: B 975 OLY 39

Content: Olympia Zeitung: offizielles Organe der XI. Olympische Spiele 1936 in Berlin. Herausgegeben von Olympisch Komitee.

1952 Helsinki Olympic Games

Consulted Archives:

Urheiluarhasto, Helsinki (The Sport Archives of Finland, Helsinki)

Access number: no index specifications

Kollka, Sulo, ed., (1955). *The Official Report of the Organising Committee for the Games of the XV Olympiad Helsinki 1952*. Helsinki: the Organising Committee for the XV Olympiad Helsinki 1952.

Access number: Suomen Olympiakomitea: Helsinki 1940 Olymialaiset; Painotuotteita; 1936-1940.

Content: Official Newsbulletins and promotion material of the Organizing Committee of the 1940 Helsinki Olympic Games.

Access number: Suomen Olympiakomitea: Helsingin Olympialaiset: Painotuotteet Matkoikiaisitteet yuis 1952.

Content: This folder contains official promotion material that was provided for foreign visitors and contacts abroad for the promotion of the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games.

Helsingin Kaupunginarkisto (City of Helsinki Archives, Helsinki) Visited May 28, 29 and 30 2003.

Access number: Helsingin Kaupunki XV Olympia 1952, Ohjelmatoimisto Ja: 1

Content: The official guide of the 1952 Olympics.

Helsingin Kaupunki XV Olympia 1952, Sanomalehtiostasto: Ja: 7 and 9

Content: collection of foreign press cuttings

Helsingin Kaupunki, XV Olympia Helsinki 1952, Sanomalehtiostasto JeI: 1

Content: collection of official news bulletins, published by the organizing committee of the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games.

Helsingin Kaupunki XV Olympiad Helsinki 1952; Käännöstoimisto Da: 2-Fa: 2.

Content: Notes and correspondence on entertainment and cultural programs, as well as tourist excursions for foreign visitors.

Access number: Helsingin Kaupunki XV Olympia Helsinki 1952: Käännöstoimisto, Ba: 1-Da:1

Content: correspondence on photo rights between the organizing committee and various news agencies.

Films from the City of Helsinki Archive, no access number specified.

Title: "Helsinki Capital of Sports"

Directed by Erik Blomberg.

Produced by Swedish American Lines.

Format: Colour and Sounds.

Year of production: 1952.

Duration: 13 minutes.

Interviews:

- Cor Moerman, founder of the Museum for Radio Amateurism, interview by telephone, July 25, 2006.

Amsterdam European Capital of Culture 1987

Consulted Archives:

Het Nederlands Theater Instituut, Bibliotheek en Archief, Amsterdam (The Dutch National Theatre Institute, Library and Archive, Amsterdam). Visited October 10, 2005 and March 15, 2005.

All documents regarding Amsterdam European Capital of Culture 1987 are filed in three boxes. The boxes are indexed as: ACH'87

- Box 1 is labelled "algemeen" and contains documents and correspondence of the organizers of ACH'87.
- Box 2 and 3 (the numbers are my own categorization) have no specific labels. The boxes contains press cuttings from the Dutch and foreign press.

Gemeentearchief Amsterdam (Amsterdam City Archives). At the time of working on the case of Amsterdam European Capital of Culture 1987, no official policy documents were archived. The reasons for this is that in the Netherlands official policy documents are only made accessible to the public after 25 years.

Interviews:

- Steve Austen, former director of the Nederlands Theater Instituut (Dutch Theatre Institute) and responsible for the organisation of ACH'87, Amsterdam, June 14, 2004 and January 5, 2005.
- Ad 's Gravesande, former director of Het Holland Festival and responsible for the organisation of ACH'87, Amsterdam, November 29, 2005.
- Minnie Luimstra, former alderman of cultural affairs for the City of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, October 25, 2005.
- Jan Riezenkamp, former general-director of the department of culture of the Ministry of Culture and Education, Amsterdam, December 14, 2005.
- Elco Brinkman, former Minister of Culture and Education, interview by telephone, January 10, 2006.
- Freek Bloemers, former promotion manager of ACH'87 organisation, interview by telephone, November 21, 2005.

Berlin European City of Culture 1987

Consulted Archives:

Landesarchiv Berlin, Berlin (Archives of the Land Berlin, Berlin). Visited April 4-8 and 12-15, 2005.

Access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 2.

Content: Hassemer, Volker. "Berlin als Kulturstadt Europas 1988: Eine Bilanz" Vortrag vor der URANIA am 4. Nov. 1988, pp. 6-11.

Access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 3.

Content:

- Official documents about financing of B-750 and E-88, and the B-750 public relations and promotion bureau.
- "Nachrichtenspiegel: Interne Übersicht Aktuelles aus Presse, Funk, Agenturen und Fernsehen", published by the Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin, 10.12.88

Access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 10-13

Content: Press cuttings from foreign newspapers.

Access number: B. Rep 148, nr 20-45.

Content: Press cuttings from German newspapers.

Access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 79.

Content:

- Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Hans-Dietrich Genscher aus Anlaß der Eröffnung "Berlin—Kulturstadt Europas 1998" am Samstag, den 23. April 1988, in Schloß Charlottenburg", Berlin.
- Speech given by Mercouri at the E-88 opening ceremony, April 23, 1988.

Access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 88

Content: Berlin-Kulturstadt Europas 1988 Presseinformation (official programme information for the press).

Access number: B. Rep. 148, nr. 2048/87.

Content: "Senatvorlage" about the financing of E-88.

Interviews:

- Volker Hassemer, former senator of cultural affairs of the Land Berlin, Berlin, April 11, 2005)
- Nele Hertling, former head of the Werkstatt Team (organisation of E-88), Berlin, April 21, 2005.
- Ingo Weber, former civil servant at the department of cultural affairs of the Land Berlin, Berlin, April 14, 2005.

Helsinki European Capital of Culture 2000

Consulted Archives:

Author has obtained research material during the cultural year from the Cultural Year Foundation. In the spring of 2001, when I had gathered all the data and documents for my analysis of Helsinki European Capital of Culture, the Cultural Foundation was about to dissolve and transfer its archives to the City of Helsinki Archives.

Interviews:

- Georg Dolivo, director of the Cultural Year Foundation, Helsinki, March 28, 2001.
- Minna Malinen, marketing manager Cultural Year Foundation, Helsinki,
- Jouko Astor, manger the Children's Year (programme part of hel.2000.fi), Jyväskylä, April 9, 2001.
- Rita Ekelund, foreign press officer Cultural Year Foundation, Helsinki, March 27, 2001.
- Rolf Pírcklen, Finnair sales director for the South of Finland, Helsinki, March 30, 2001.
- Sirkka Lekman, stirring board member of the Cultural Year Foundation and city council member for the conservative party, Helsinki, March 29, 2001.

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DUTCH SUMMARY

SAMENVATTING

Mijn proefschrift *CityEvents: Event-Based Place Selling in a Media Age* richt zich op de vraag hoe Europese steden zich gedurende de twintigste eeuw hebben geprofileerd door middel van het organiseren van grootschalige evenementen. Binnen deze vraagstelling ligt de nadruk op evenementen die een terugkerend karakter hebben en bovendien niet aan één specifieke stad zijn verbonden. Deze evenementen worden in de vakliteratuur ook wel aangeduid als *large rootless periodic international events* (Jones, 2001). Hierbij valt te denken aan de Olympische Spelen, de Europese Culturele Hoofdsteden (ECOC), de wereldtentoonstellingen en de wereldkampioenschappen voetbal. De Olympische Spelen en de ECOC van Amsterdam, Berlijn en Helsinki vormen de *case studies* van dit onderzoek. Deze evenementen vonden respectievelijk plaats in 1928, 1936, 1952, 1987, 1988 en 2000. Daarmee bestrijkt het onderzoek de eerste helft en de laatste twee decennia van de twintigste eeuw. Deze tijdsindeling maakt het mogelijk om op drie samenhangende niveaus vergelijkingen tussen de case studies te maken. Ten eerste is het mogelijk om algemene ontwikkelingen te identificeren, die alle cases gemeenschappelijk hebben. Ten tweede is het mogelijk om per stad historische ontwikkelingen te analyseren door de Olympische Spelen in de eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw en de ECOC in de laatste decennia van dezelfde eeuw met elkaar te vergelijken. Ten slotte is het mogelijk om de ontwikkeling van de Olympische Spelen en de ECOC over meerdere ‘edities’ te onderzoeken.

Om het onderzoeksobject van deze studie nauwkeurig te beschrijven, is de term *large rootless periodic international event* echter een nogal ongelukkige aanduiding, omdat hiermee de suggestie wordt gewekt dat dergelijke evenementen in iedere willekeurige plaats zouden kunnen worden georganiseerd. Niets is echter minder waar, want steden moeten aan allerlei kwaliteitseisen voldoen om als gastvrouwen van dergelijke evenementen op te kunnen treden. Bovendien drukken gaststeden vaak een zware stempel op hoe een dergelijk evenement wordt neergezet. Om die reden introduceer ik in dit onderzoek de alternatieve term *CityEvent* om daarmee de intrinsieke relatie tussen de gaststad en het evenement te benadrukken. De hoofdletters in deze term geven aan dat het om de combinatie van *grootschalige* evenementen en *grote* gaststeden gaat. Het jaarlijkse bezoek van de koningin aan twee Nederlandse gemeenten op koninginndag zou anders ook onder deze categorie terugkerende ongebonden evenementen kunnen vallen.

CityEvents worden gekenmerkt door een aantal eigenschappen. Ze vinden telkens in een andere stad plaats en ze worden ieder gekenmerkt door een specifieke tijdscyclus. Zo wordt een CityEvent als de wereldtentoonstelling elke vijf jaar georganiseerd, terwijl de ECOC ieder jaar plaatsvindt. Het belangrijkste kenmerk van CityEvents is dat deze zijn gebaseerd op een vast format. In mijn proefschrift refereer ik hiernaar met de term *generic event formula*, oftewel de generische evenementformule. Een dergelijke evenementformule is altijd in het beheer van een “evenementeigenaar”, zoals het Internationaal Olympisch Comité in het geval van de Olympische Spelen en de Europese Unie in het geval van de ECOC. Een

evenementeigenaar ziet erop toe dat een gaststad op de juiste wijze de generische evenementformule toepast.

Op dat punt bestaan overigens veel verschillen. Het Olympisch Comité geeft gaststeden relatief weinig ruimte om naar eigen maatstaven de olympische evenementformule te implementeren. Dit komt onder andere doordat de formule van dit evenement berust op strikte regelgeving die is vastgesteld door verschillende internationale sportfederaties. De ECOC hebben daarentegen een erg algemeen geformuleerde formule. Dit geeft steden veel meer vrijheid om naar eigen inzicht een programma op te zetten. Ondanks deze verschillen ontwikkelen generische evenementformules zich doordat gaststeden telkens nieuwe elementen toevoegen. In 1928 werd in Amsterdam bijvoorbeeld de olympische vlam geïntroduceerd en in 1936 werd in Berlijn de inmiddels traditionele fakkeltocht aan de Olympische Spelen toegevoegd. Steden zijn daarmee geen passieve locaties waar evenementen neerstrijken, maar katalysatoren die veranderingen in generische evenementformules teweegbrengen.

In de analyse van CityEvents is er behalve de evenementeigenaar en de gaststad nog een andere actor of domein dat niet over het hoofd gezien mag worden. Dit zijn de media en in het bijzonder de nieuwsmidia. Zonder media kan geen enkel evenement uitgroeien tot de schaal die CityEvents over het algemeen hebben. CityEvents zijn daarom het gezamenlijke product van de evenementeigenaar, de gaststad en de media. De term CityEvent is daarom meer dan alleen een specifieke evenementencategorie. Het is ook een model om *large rootless periodic international events* te analyseren.

Het *CityEvent-model* staat een netwerkbenadering voor waarmee het productieproces van CityEvents vanuit drie domeinen geanalyseerd kan worden, namelijk vanuit het perspectief van de stad, van de evenementeigenaar en van de media. Met behulp van het CityEvent-model kan onderzocht worden hoe deze actoren relaties met elkaar en met andere actoren aangaan die noodzakelijk zijn om het productieproces van een CityEvent op gang te brengen. Het CityEvent-model is geënt op de *Actor Network Theorie* (ANT) en in bijzonder op het werk van de Franse wetenschapsfilosoof Bruno Latour. Volgens Latour moet het *a priori*-onderscheid dat in veel onderzoek wordt gemaakt tussen menselijke en niet-menselijke actoren in de analyse van actor-netwerken opgeschort worden. Concreet betekent dit dat we in de reconstructie van netwerken niet alleen moeten kijken naar de rol die menselijke actoren spelen, maar bijvoorbeeld ook naar de kabels die deel uitmaken van de media-infrastructuur die *live* verslaglegging van een CityEvent mogelijk maakt. Ieder van deze actoren, hoe verschillend ook, vervult een eigen rol in het netwerk dat een CityEvent produceert. Hierbij staat centraal dat de drie “hoofdactoren” (*key actors*) – evenementeigenaar, gaststad en media – telkens hun belangen op elkaar en op die van andere actoren moeten afstemmen. Alleen wanneer verschillende actoren in staat zijn hun uiteenlopende belangen te overbruggen, kunnen er verbindingen worden aangegaan die tot de vorming van een productienetwerk leiden. Met andere woorden, alle relevante actoren die nodig zijn om een CityEvent te produceren moeten voortdurend actief worden verbonden aan het netwerk. Door vanuit deze insteek de case studies te benaderen, komt de nadruk in de analyse op het productieproces te liggen in plaats van op het uiteindelijke resultaat waarbij veelal de meest dominante actoren zich manifesteren. Deze integrale benadering heeft als voordeel dat niet een dominant perspectief de historische reconstructie overheerst, maar juist de diverse belangen van de verschillende betrokken actoren het uitgangspunt zijn.

Het CityEvent model biedt hiermee eveneens de mogelijkheid om de beperkingen van de (historische) context, die inherent is aan case study-onderzoek, te overstijgen. Verschillende CityEvents die op het eerste gezicht weinig met elkaar gemeen hebben, zoals de Olympische Spelen en de ECOC, kunnen met behulp van het CityEvent-model wel degelijk met elkaar worden vergeleken. Dit is mogelijk omdat het model een vergelijking op het niveau van netwerkdynamieken voorstaat. Het CityEvent-model biedt de mogelijkheid om transformaties te duiden in de manier waarop CityEvents gedurende de twintigste eeuw zijn geproduceerd. Aan de hand van de toepassing van het CityEvent-model op de Olympische Spelen en de ECOC van Amsterdam, Berlijn en Helsinki worden in dit onderzoek meerdere ontwikkelingen en trends geïdentificeerd. Door deze veranderingen in kaart te brengen, kunnen eveneens antwoorden worden gevonden op de vraag hoe (Europese) steden gedurende de twintigste eeuw CityEvents hebben aangegrepen om zichzelf te profileren.

Zo valt op dat, over de gehele twintigste eeuw bezien, een ontwikkeling kan worden geschetst waarin steden die CityEvents organiseren zich steeds meer op het terrein van nieuwsmedia zijn gaan begeven. In mijn proefschrift heb ik dit als *annexatie* van mediatechnologieën beschreven. Concreet betekent dit dat de organisatoren van dergelijke grootschalige evenementen steeds meer hun eigen medianetwerken zijn gaan opzetten om doelgroepen te bereiken. Op deze wijze trachten zij hun afhankelijkheid van al dan niet kritische berichtgeving in de nieuwsmedia te verminderen. Dit komt onder andere tot uiting in de vervaging tussen nieuwsberichtgeving enerzijds en reclame of promotie anderzijds. In promotiemediën worden het evenement en de gaststad steeds vaker op een bijna journalistieke wijze gepresenteerd. Advertenties nemen steeds meer de vorm van nieuwsberichten aan door de indruk te wekken feitelijke opsommingen te zijn, zoals die gewoonlijk door journalisten beschreven worden.

Tevens valt op dat naarmate een bepaald CityEvent langer bestaat het aantal verschillende media en mediatechnologieën waarmee over zo'n evenement wordt bericht toeneemt. Als gevolg van deze ontwikkeling hebben gedurende de twintigste eeuw steeds meer verschillende media moeten strijden om de aandacht van het publiek. Deze ontwikkeling heeft ook consequenties gehad voor hoe steden zich middels CityEvents promoten. De 'massa' is steeds verder uiteengevallen in kleinere doelgroepen. *Mass marketing* heeft in toenemende mate plaatsgemaakt voor *niche marketing*. In het laatste deel van deze samenvatting zal daar uitgebreider op ingegaan worden.

Daarnaast kan worden geconstateerd dat de eisen die gesteld worden aan de stedelijke media-infrastructuren zijn toegenomen. Terwijl voor de Amsterdamse Olympische Spelen in 1928 enkele internationale telefonie- en telegrafieverbindingen volstonden, moesten voor de Spelen in Helsinki in 1952 een complete onderzeese telegrafiekabel en een internationaal radiotransmissienetwerk worden aangelegd om voldoende communicatiecapaciteit te kunnen bieden aan de aanwezige internationale mediaorganisaties. De toegenomen eisen die gesteld worden aan de media-infrastructuren van gaststeden hangen in hoge mate samen met de opkomst van elektronische massamedia, zoals radio en televisie. Het vermogen van deze media om *live* gebeurtenissen te verslaan is afhankelijk van kabel- en andere transmissieverbindingen die tussen de gaststad en locaties elders aanwezig zijn.

Door de introductie van *live* radio- en televisieberichtgeving zijn CityEvents veranderd van bijzondere gebeurtenissen in historische momenten nog voordat ze zijn afgelopen. *Live* berichtgeving creëert momenten van collectieve geschiedschrijving terwijl de daadwerkelijke gebeurtenissen zich op dat moment nog voltrekken. Juist

omdat CityEvents terwijl ze zich voltrekken door *live* berichtgeving steeds meer als belangwekkende historische momenten worden gepresenteerd, richten ze zich in toenemende mate op het genereren van herinneringen. Het zwaartepunt van een CityEvent ligt daarom niet alleen meer in de aanloopfase en de festiviteiten zelf, maar is ook steeds meer gericht op het ontlokken van herinneringen. Op deze wijze trachten gaststeden, evenementeigenaren en de media na afloop van het CityEvent ook op langere termijn effect te sorteren.

De transitie in mediaberichtgeving van gedrukte pers naar *live* mediaverslaggeving correspondeert ook met groeiende investeringen in de stedelijke omgeving om een aantrekkelijker voorkomen van de stad te creëren. Doordat informatie en beelden sneller het publiek bereiken, volstaan foto's en illustraties van enkele mooie gebouwen, monumenten en symbolen van een gaststad niet meer. De ansichtkaart is niet langer meer het enige visitekaartje van de gaststad. De gehele stedelijke omgeving moet in toenemende mate worden 'opgeleukt' om de aanwezige media van gunstig beeldmateriaal te voorzien. Daarom neemt de kans dat een stad succesvol haar imago kan versterken en/of creëren door middel van het organiseren van een CityEvent toe naarmate de stad de organisatie van zo'n evenement integreert met bredere stedelijke ontwikkelingsprogramma's. Dit komt naar voren in het steeds grotere ruimtelijke beslag dat CityEvents gedurende de twintigste eeuw zijn gaan leggen op gaststeden.

De analyse van de ECOC in Amsterdam, Berlijn en Helsinki laat bovendien zien dat het stadscentrum, bestaande culturele instellingen of aparte festivalterreinen allang niet meer de enige plekken zijn waar programmaonderdelen plaatsvinden. Er heeft zich een verschuiving voorgedaan vanuit het stadscentrum, culturele instellingen en toeristische attracties naar de buitenranden van de stad. Tegelijkertijd en ook voorafgaand aan deze ontwikkeling zijn leegstaande (veelal voormalige industriële) gebouwen in toenemende mate al dan niet tijdelijk omgevormd tot plaatsen waar kunst en cultuur geproduceerd, geconsumeerd en gedistribueerd worden. Dit proces wordt ook wel aangeduid met de term *regeneration*. CityEvents en met name culturele evenementen zoals de ECOC hebben een aanjagende werking op deze ontwikkeling doordat leegstaande gebouwen tijdelijk tot festivallocaties worden omgevormd.

Een succesvol stadsimago lijkt daarmee in grote mate af te hangen van de investeringen die gedaan worden in de fysieke omgeving en in (media-)infrastructuren. Media, toeristen, bedrijven en kapitaal moeten niet alleen naar de gaststad toekomen, maar ook omgekeerd moet de stad er voor zorgen dat zij wereldwijd op zoveel mogelijk plekken tegelijkertijd haar aanwezigheid kenbaar maakt. De mate waarin steden hierin slagen hangt in sterke mate af van hun fysieke bereikbaarheid en de verwevenheid van bestaande sociale, institutionele en technologische infrastructuur met netwerken elders. Om een CityEvent succesvol neer te zetten en de gaststad effectief te profileren, dient de betreffende stad steeds meer buiten haar eigen grenzen te opereren. De media- en publieksaandacht die een CityEvent genereert, zou daarom ook opgevat kunnen worden als een tijdelijke expansie van de gaststad naar andere locaties.

Tegelijkertijd is de noodzaak voor steden om zich te onderscheiden van andere steden toegenomen. In dit verband zijn kunst en cultuur steeds belangrijker zijn geworden als onderscheidende elementen voor het profileren van steden. Dit komt onder andere tot uiting in de ontwikkeling van de programmering van de ECOC. Deze is steeds breder geworden met het doel om zoveel mogelijk doelgroepen te bedienen. Hoge cultuur en avantgarde kunst vormden tijdens de eerste edities van de ECOC nog

een groot deel van het programma. Inmiddels is de focus op kunst en cultuur verbreed en meer toegespitst op verschillende met name *urban lifestyles* en fenomenen, zoals skaters, hiphop, house en graffiti. In deze context worden kunst en cultuur steeds meer als consumeerbare ervaringen gepresenteerd. Hiermee zijn CityEvents steeds meer een integraal onderdeel geworden van de *experience economy* (Pine en Gilmore, 1999). Dit vertaalt zich ook door in de promotie en marketing van CityEvents en hun gaststeden. CityEvents en hun gaststeden worden steeds meer als consumeerbare ervaringen gepresenteerd en steeds mindere mate als een optelsom van toeristische attracties en evenementen, hoewel dat laatste altijd een belangrijk onderdeel zal blijven om publiciteit te genereren.

De op ervaring gestoelde promotie en marketing van steden heeft geleid tot een toenemende commodificering en “festivalisering” van stedelijke ruimtes. Individuele ervaringen van stedelijke ruimte komen in de *experience economy* steeds prominenter naar voren ten koste van collectieve ervaringen. De publieke stedelijke ruimte is daarom in toenemende mate onderhevig aan een proces van privatisering dat wordt aangejaagd door consumptie. CityEvents spelen hierbij ook een rol omdat door een brede programmering stedelijke ruimtes tijdelijk “geladen” worden met nieuwe consumeerbare ervaringen.

Deze toenemende commodificering van stedelijke ruimte is gekoppeld aan de eerder beschreven geografische verspreiding van CityEvents over een steeds groter deel van de gaststad. Doordat zowel de media als de organisatoren van CityEvents zich steeds meer richten op de individuele bezoeker, kijker, lezer of luisteraar, is het louter neerzetten van enkele “blockbuster”-programmaonderdelen niet langer voldoende om een lange-termijneffect te sorteren. Omdat het publiek steeds gefragmenteerder is geworden, dient de programmering van CityEvents breder en tegelijkertijd specifiekier te zijn om zoveel mogelijk doelgroepen aan te spreken. Deze logica geldt ook voor de gaststad. Steden streven er in toenemende mate naar om een CityEvent aan te grijpen om zichzelf te (her)programmeren. De schaalgrootte van CityEvents biedt voor de gaststad de mogelijkheid om zichzelf opnieuw uit te vinden en diverse plaatsen die verspreid liggen over de stad met nieuwe betekenissen en activiteiten te “laden”. Een voorwaarde hiervoor is wel dat de productie van het CityEvent al in een vroeg stadium geïntegreerd wordt met andere grootschalige stedelijke ontwikkelingsprogramma's. De ECOC van Helsinki vormt hier het beste voorbeeld van. Terwijl politici en beleidsmakers zich bezonnen op de vraag of zij dit evenement moest aantrekken, werd reeds op brede schaal in de culturele sector geïnvesteerd. Nieuwe musea, podia, een flexibeler horecabeleid en grote investeringen voor het opknappen van de publieke ruimte waren reeds in volle gang gezet toen Helsinki de eer kreeg toebedeeld om de ECOC in het millenniumjaar 2000 te organiseren. Op deze manier kon dit CityEvent worden ingezet als een “première-feest”, waarin een vernieuwd Helsinki aan de buitenwereld gepresenteerd kon worden.

Het Internet speelt een cruciale rol in het verbinden van de toenemende ruimtelijke fragmentatie van CityEvents. Afzonderlijke programmaonderdelen die over heel de stad plaatsvinden komen samen op de website van de evenementorganisatie. Websites bieden bovendien de mogelijkheid om de verschillende belangen van betrokken actoren, zoals sponsors, de gemeente, culturele instellingen samen te brengen op één virtuele lokatie. Juist door de *linking technology* van het Internet kunnen veel meer aspecten via dezelfde ingang, de URL, bij elkaar gebracht worden. Een hoofdsponsor, maar ook een individuele kunstenaar die betrokken is bij een CityEvent kunnen beiden via een link opgenomen worden in de

officiële website van een evenement. De nabijheid en de hoeveelheid aan informatie, die bovendien op (bijna) iedere plek wereldwijd op ieder gewenst tijdstip toegankelijk zijn, kan in geen geval via een reguliere programmabrochure of promotiefolder worden gepresenteerd.

Daarnaast bieden websites ook een geheel nieuw scala aan promotionele strategieën die veel beter aansluiten op de ervaringseconomie. Terwijl websites enerzijds verbindingen leggen tussen verschillende programmaonderdelen, belangen en actoren, bieden websites tegelijkertijd een grotere individuele informatievrijheid. Individuen hebben veel meer mogelijkheden om informatie op basis van hun eigen voorkeur samen te stellen. Daarmee kunnen zij hun eigen associaties met de gaststad en het CityEvent aanvullen. Een website is interactief, een folder niet. Daarmee draagt het Internet bij aan een verregaande “radicalisering” van niche-marketing. Waar niche-marketing met behulp van reguliere media zoals folders, reclamespotjes en posters specifieke doelgroepen bereikt, kunnen consumenten met behulp van het Internet zelf hun eigen advertentie samen stellen.

Geconcludeerd kan daarom worden dat CityEvents in geografisch en publieksmatig opzicht niet alleen gefragmenteerder zijn geworden, maar dat ook beelden van de stad vanuit een marketingperspectief steeds minder eenduidig worden en veel meer persoonsgebonden zijn. Waar voorheen een relatief homogeen “promotieplaatje” volstond om een stad te profileren, zullen steden zich in de nabije toekomst in toenemende mate geconfronteerd zien met gefragmenteerde (zelf)beelden, die allemaal op de stad betrekking hebben, maar niet altijd een gedeelde noemer hebben. De introductie van MP3-spelers, televisie in mobiele telefoons, urban screens, Internet etcetera stelt individuen steeds meer in staat om op afstand, maar ook in de stedelijke ruimtes zelf een beeld van de stad te construeren. Dit maakt het strategisch neerzetten van grootschalige evenementen niet minder overbodig, maar stelt juist steden voor de uitdaging om zich zo specifiek mogelijk op individuele verwachtingen en associaties te richten zonder daarbij als merknaam aan sterkte in te boeten. In een wereld waarin individuele en gedeelde ervaringen steeds meer de rol vervullen waar voorheen breedgedragen waarden en normen aan kracht voor samenhang zorgden, zijn evenementen bij uitstek een medium om doelgroepen actief aan steden te binden.